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BASIC OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

MUSKETEER II

29 AUGUST 1944
BASIC OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
MUSKETEER II

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"MUSKETEER-II"

BASIC OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
PHILIPPINE OPERATIONS

1. DIRECTIVE
   a. This plan is derived from "RENO V, Outline Plan for Operations of the Southwest Pacific Area," GHQ, SWPA, 15 June 1944, as amended. It covers operations of forces of the Southwest Pacific Area to re-occupy the PHILIPPINES.
   b. Objectives
      (1) Primary
          Primary objectives of operations of Southwest Pacific forces to re-occupy the PHILIPPINES are:
          (a) To destroy or contain hostile forces in the PHILIPPINES.
          (b) To provide such air support and base facilities within the PHILIPPINES as may be required for further operations against the Japanese.
          (c) To reduce the hostile war making power by air operations against enemy installations in the Eastern NEI and the Northern BORNEO-SOUTH CHINA SEA areas.
      (2) Ultimate
          The ultimate objective of operations of Southwest Pacific forces within the PHILIPPINES is to re-establish and defend the constituted government of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

2. ASSUMPTIONS
   (See Annex 2,a, Enemy Situation)
   a. Hostile
      That the enemy will make a major national effort to defend the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
      That the enemy will garrison the PHILIPPINES with major ground forces, with principal concentrations in MINDANAO, the Central VISAYAS and Central LUZON.
      That LEYTE GULF will be defended by at least one division.
That the enemy will maintain a strong land-based air force in the PHILIPPINES-FORMOSA area, with PHILIPPINES bases initially in three zones—MINDANAO (DIAYO-DEL MONTE), the VISAYAS (Northern LEYTE-Northern NEGROS), and Central LUZON. That this force will have been rendered ineffective within the PHILIPPINES by 20 February 1945.

That the hostile fleet will remain in being.

That logistic support of hostile forces in the PHILIPPINES area initially will be adequate.

b. Own Forces

That amphibious, ground and air forces from Europe will be redeployed in the Pacific as outlined in JCS 521/6 for the period 31 December 1944 - 30 June 1945, assuming defeat of Germany 1 January 1945.

That U.S. forces will be established in the MARIANAS, PALAU, and MOROTAI-TALAU area at initiation of the operations.

That Southwest Pacific air forces will be operating from TALAUD, MOROTAI and Western NEW GUINEA, Pacific Ocean Areas from PALAU, at initiation of the operations.

That full support of the U.S. Pacific Fleet will be available to include establishment of major landing forces in the Central LUZON area.

That an advanced naval base will be functioning at MANUS, and anchorage facilities will be available in the PALAU-ULITHI area.

That existing Filipino Forces will be effective for intelligence, sabotage and harassing operations.

That shipping adequate for logistic support of the operations will be made available.

3. OPERATIONS

(See Chart, annex 3,a, Concept of Operations)

This plan of campaign has as its major objective the prompt seizure of the Central LUZON area to destroy the principal garrison, command organization and logistic support of hostile defense forces in the PHILIPPINES and to provide bases for further operations against JAPAN. The concept visualizes a progressive advance from south to north along the eastern coasts of the PHILIPPINES with fleet support, to establish bases for a final campaign to occupy the CENTRAL PLAIN of LUZON and the MANILA area.
Except for initial lodgments, and secondary operations employing air envelopment to establish advance airdrome facilities, MINDANAO and the VISAYAS are initially by-passed. Hostile forces in these areas are contained by air and light naval action and by such operations as may be accomplished by Filipino Forces.

After the occupation of Central LUZON and the establishment of necessary air forces, the remainder of the ARCHIPELAGO is consolidated, normal government is reconstituted and bases are established for support of such subsequent operations as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Scheme of Maneuver

The basic scheme of maneuver employed along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis is continued with relatively minor changes. The U.S. fleet with its carrier-based air elements provides great power for support of major landing operations along the Eastern coasts of the ARCHIPELAGO and in Northwestern LUZON. Availability of land-based air forces limited only by airdrome facilities, facilitates extensive employment of air envelopment to promptly and economically seize essential areas. Armored elements may be profitable employed in many areas, particularly Central LUZON. Overland operations at considerable distances from beachheads will require full allowances of motor equipment and provision of ample ready replacements for combat losses. An "Inland Sea Fleet" of light naval combat and amphibious craft will be required. Native labor will be available in quantity. Logistic requirements for support of Filipino Forces and relief of the civil population will assume major proportions.

c. Employment of Forces

(See Charts, Appendix 3, c, Command)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Sixth Army</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Allied Naval Forces</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Third Fleet</strong></td>
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POA Forces - Limited land-based general air support.
Eighth Army - U.S. operations in rear areas.
Australian Military Forces - Consolidation and defense in areas assigned.
USASOS - Logistic support.

d. Phases of Operations

(1) Operations "KING"  (See Annex 3,c,(1)).

(a) Purpose:
To secure initial lodgment in the PHILIPPINES and to establish a base of operations.

(b) Tasks:
1. Effect an initial lodgment in the SARANGANI BAY area of Southern MINDANAO and provide land-based air support for LEYTE operations.
2. Establish an advance air operating base in North-western MINDANAO with airborne, air supplied, ground and air elements and provide fighter escort for air operations in the VISAYAS and LUZON in support of LEYTE operations.
3. Seize control of the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area and establish air, naval and logistic bases for the support of subsequent operations to re-occupy the PHILIPPINES.

(c) Operations Required
1. Preliminary Operation, SARANGANI Bay, 15 November 1944, Operation "KING-ONE."

Supported by the Third Fleet, seize the SARANGANI Bay area by overseas landing operations; establish air elements to complete neutralization of hostile air and surface forces in MINDANAO, to provide land-based direct and general air support for LEYTE...
operations, and to guard Eastern exits of the CELEBES Sea; direct and support operations of Filipino Forces to harass and contain hostile ground forces on MINDANAO.

Assault, seaborne from NEW GUINEA, I Corps,
33d and 43d Inf Divs, 112 RCT, air and service elements, total approximately 80,000.

2. Preliminary Operation, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, 7 December 1944, Operation "KING-THREE."

Establish fighter aviation in Northwestern MINDANAO by airborne, air supplied operations; provide advance fighter protection for SARANGANI BAY area and escort of bombardment operations into the Northern VISAYAS and Central LUZON during LEYTE operations; maintain airdrome facilities for subsequent neutralization operations in the Western VISAYAS and MINDANAO if feasible.

Assault, airborne from Talauld base, TF Headquarters,
1 RCT, 32d Inf Div, 2 Groups Fighters and service elements, total approximately 7,900.

3. Main Effort, LEYTE GULF, 20 December 1944, Operation "KING-TWO."

Supported by the Third Fleet, seize the LEYTE GULF area by major overseas landing operations; secure control of LEYTE ISLAND and SURIGAO STRAIT; establish major air, naval and logistic base facilities; consolidate western and northern SAMAR and initiate direction and support of Filipino Forces.

Assault, seaborne from NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS bases,

X Corps, (1st Cav, 25th Inf Divs); XIV Corps
(37th, 24th Inf Divs), 40th Inf Div, air and
service elements, total approximately 204,000.
11th and 13th airborne Divisions, seaborne
follow-up in January, 1945.

(2) Operations "LOVE" (See Annex 3.c,(2)).

(a) Purpose:
To secure a favorable line of departure and provide
air base, naval and logistic facilities to support
operations in Central LUZON.

(b) Tasks:
1. Establish forces in Northern LUZON for the protec-
tion and support of movement and operations into
the LINGAYEN area.
2. Establish air forces and facilities on MINDORO for
the support of Central LUZON operations and the
mounting of airborne operations into that area.

(c) Operations Required
1. Principal Operation, APARII, 31 January 1945,
Operation "LOVE-TWO."
Seize the APARII area by overseas landing
operations; establish air bases and light naval
facilities; protect convoy operations around
Northern LUZON; provide direct and general support
by air and overland operations for the campaign in
Central LUZON.
Assault, seaborne from AUSTRALIAN bases,
1st Australian Corps (7th and 9th AIF Divs),
air and service elements, total 60,000 to
80,000, as required by situation at that time.

2. Subsidiary Operation, Southwest MINDORO, 15 February
1945, Operation "LOVE-THREE."
Seize the SAN JOSE area by airborne operations with seaborne support; establish air elements for support of operations in Central LUZON and provide a mounting area for airborne operations into LUZON. Assault, from LEYTE base,

- airborne - TF Headquarters, 11th Airborne Div, approximately 12,000.
- Seaborne - 1 RCT, 40th Inf Div, air and service elements, approximately 27,000.

Total committed, approximately 39,000.

(3c) Operations "MIKE" (See Annex 3c.(3)).

(a) Purposes:

To destroy principal hostile garrison; to occupy the MANILA area and the CENTRAL PLAIN of LUZON; and to complete the occupation of LUZON, and to support further operations against JAPAN.

(b) Tasks:

1. Destroy hostile forces in Central LUZON and re-occupy the MANILA-CENTRAL PLAINS area; establish bases as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the support of operations to the northward of the PHILIPPINES.

2. Complete the occupation of LUZON.

(c) Operations Required

1. Main Effort, LINGAYEN-CENTRAL PLAINS area, 20 February 1945, onward, Operation "MIKE-ONE."

   Supported by the Third Fleet, seize a beachhead in the LINGAYEN GULF area by major overseas landing operations; employing forces landed at LINGAYEN and forces landed in operations "MIKE-TWO" and "LOVE-TWO," destroy hostile forces in Central and Northern LUZON.
and occupy the CENTRAL PLAINS-MANILA BAY area; establish bases as directed; destroy remaining hostile garrisons on LUZON, re-establish and defend constituted government and effect relief in the Island.

Assault:

Airborne - 11th Airborne Div from MINDORO, approximately 8,000. (Committed as southward advance requires, planning date 20 March 1945).

Seaborne - Sixth Army, XIV Corps (6th, 24th Inf Divs), from NEW GUINEA and LEYTE bases, X Corps (1st Cav and 25th Inf Divs), from LEYTE base.

Reserves afloat - Americal, 38th Inf Divs and an armored Div, from SOLOMONS, NEW GUINEA and U.S. bases.

Total seaborne, including air and service elements, approximately 280,000.

Total commitment, approximately 288,000.

2. Supporting Operation, DINGALEN, approximately 5-15 March 1945, as required by Main Effort, Operation "MIKE-TWO."

Covered by the Third Fleet, seize a beachhead in DINGALEN Bay by amphibious operations; penetrate the SIHUKA MAIKI mountains by overland operations with airborne support; pass to control of Sixth Army and support operations "MIKE-ONE" in the CENTRAL PLAIN of LUZON.

Assault:
Airborne - 13th Airborne Div from LEYTE base, approximately 8,000.

Seaborne - XI Corps, 41st Inf Div, 112 CT, 2 Tank Battalions, from LEYTE and SARANGANI bases. Total approximately 28,000.

Total committed, approximately 36,000.

(4) Operations "VICTOR"

(a) Purpose:
Consolidate areas by-passed in "KING," "LOVE" and "MIKE" operations.

(b) Tasks:
Destroy hostile garrisons in areas within the PHILIPPINES by-passed by "KING," "LOVE" and "MIKE" operations; re-establish and defend constituted government and effect necessary relief measures within areas concerned.

(c) Operations Required

1. During Operations "KING," "LOVE" and "MIKE," Army Commanders, supported by allied Air and Naval Forces, employing means available without diversion from forces committed to major operations, direct and implement operations of Filipino forces within their areas of responsibility to harass and cause attrition among hostile garrisons.

2. Upon completion of the LUZON campaign, selected forces from SARANGANI, LEYTE and LUZON bases, supported by light naval forces and air forces from existing bases, complete consolidation of areas by-passed in the advance northward. Filipino Forces are directed and
accorded logistic support as required to implement assistance of which they are capable.

It is estimated that a total of 10 divisions and 3 separate regiments will be required to conduct operations "VICTORA" and to complete the consolidation of LUZON by 1 October 1945.

(5) Operations "WILLIAM"

(a) Purpose:

- Augment land-based air support of offensive operations.

(b) Task:

To employ air forces redeployed from Europe as outlined in JCS 521/6 to augment current operations of organic Southwest Pacific land-based air forces in the support of tactical operations and in strategic operations to destroy hostile installations, source of war materials and shipping in areas supporting the hostile war effort.

(c) Operations:

Upon arrival, forces redeployed from Europe are initially located in established bases on the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis and in Northern AUSTRALIA. They are employed in support of current operations in the PHILIPPINES to the extent permitted by available facilities. Remaining elements are employed to augment current operations against hostile installations, source of war materials and shipping in the Eastern NEI and the Northern BORNEO-SOUTH CHINA SEA area.

d. Forces:

Employment of assault divisions, assault shipping and air groups are shown in annex 3,d.
4. LOGISTIC SUPPORT
See Annex 4, Basic Logistic Plan.

5. COMMUNICATIONS
See Annex 5, Basic Communications Plan.

This plan is supported by Staff Studies as follows:

- KING-ONE - Operation in the SARANGANI area.
- KING-TWO - Operation in the LEYTE GULF area.
- KING-THREE - Operation in Northwestern MINDANAO.
- LOVE-TWO - Operations in the APARRI area.
- LOVE-THREE - Operations in Southern MINDORO.
- MIKE-ONE - Occupation of CENTRAL PLAIN-MANILA area and Consolidation of LUZON.
- MIKE-TWO - Operations in the DINGALEN area of LUZON.
- VICTOR-ONE - Consolidation of areas by-passed.
- WILLIAM-ONE - Employment of Air Forces redeployed from Europe.
ANNEXES
"MUSKETEER-II"

NOTE: Annexes are designated by reference to corresponding paragraphs in text.

2.a. ENEMY SITUATION

PART I - SITUATION FORECAST TO ACCOMPANY "MUSKETEER-TWO"

PART II - CURRENT EDITION, "PHILIPPINE MONTHLY COMBINED SITUATION REPORT", G-2, GHQ SWPA

(BOTH UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

3.a. CHART, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3.c. CHART, COMMAND

3.c.(1) OPERATIONS "KING"

PART II - CHART

3.c.(2) OPERATIONS "LOVE"

PART II - CHART

3.c.(3) OPERATIONS "MIKE"

PART II - CHART

3.d. EMPLOYMENT OF ASSAULT FORCES

PART I - ASSAULT DIVISIONS

PART II - ASSAULT SHIPPING

PART III - AIR FORCES

4. BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

5. BASIC COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
**ASSAULT LEFT REQUIREMENT**

**SARANGANI BAY, 15 NOVEMBER 1944**

1. Corps Hq & Corps Troops
2. Inf Divs, Reinforced
3. Air Groups (Ground Echelons)
4. Services
   - 80,000 Personnel
   - 113,000 DWT

**LEYTE GULF, 20 DECEMBER 1944**

1. Army Hq and Army Troops
2. Corps Hq and Corps Troops
3. Inf Divs, Reinforced
4. Cav Div
5. Commando Bn
6. Air Groups (Ground Echelons)
   - 214,000 Personnel
   - 522,000 DWT

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**DIRECT NAVAL SUPPORT OF LANDING OPERATIONS**

- CBR
- OBR
- CR
- LST
- LST (L)
- LST (SL)
- AK

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**CONCURRENT "LOVE" AND "TIPPO" OPERATIONS, 25 JANUARY 1945-1 MAY 1945**

**ASSAULT LEFT REQUIREMENT**

**APAHN, 21 JAN 1945**

1. Corps Hq & Corps Troops
2. Inf Divs, Reinforced
3. Air Groups (Ground Echelons)
   - 27,000 Personnel
   - 47,000 DWT

**KINABALU, 15 FEB 1945**

1. IND, Reinforced
2. Air Groups (Cav)
3. Aircraft Combat Elements
4. Services
   - 2,400 Personnel
   - 15,000 DWT

**LIMAHAN, 20 APR 1945**

1. Army Hq & Army Troops
2. Corps Hq & Corps Troops
3. Inf Divs, Reinforced
4. Cav Div
5. Arm Div
6. Air Groups (Ground Echelons)
   - 280,000 Personnel
   - 445,000 DWT

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**DIRECT NAVAL SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS**

- CBR
- OBR
- CR
- LST
- LST (L)
- LST (SL)
- AX

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**NOTES:**

1. All types include Australian vessels.
2. Allocation of operational vessels required maintenance, battle losses and training.
3. Battle losses and escort elements to be determined.
4. Exact requirements for "LOVE" and "TIPPO" Operations undetermined pending photo reconnaissance of landing areas and determination of hostile defenses.
5. Personnel and are employed from APAHN Operation.
ANNEX 4

BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

I. GENERAL.

1. In general, operations consist of successive overwater and
airborne operations to seize and occupy objective areas, employing air
and naval elements for support and protection.

2. From the north coast of NEW GUINEA, SOUTH PACIFIC AREA, and
forward areas, assault elements will advance against objectives by
air, and overwater by employment of amphibious craft and naval assault
shipping.

3. Materials and supplies necessary to provide logistic support
for occupation forces, construct air operating base, port, and base
facilities will be advanced to the objective area with the assault
forces and with later echelons as required.

4. Service troops essential for the support of combat forces
will be provided for employment in objective areas with assault
forces. Organization of these forces will be as indicated in Section
II, following.

5. The magnitude of operations is such that the most careful
planning for execution of logistic missions is essential. The re-
sources available to the theater are limited in quantity and their
most economical employment must be insured.

II. ORGANIZATION OF SERVICE TROOPS.

1. Service troops, whose mission is to directly support combat
elements, will be attached to combat forces for employment directly
with those forces.

2. The Commanding General, USAAGS, will provide Army Service
Commands to be attached to the Sixth Army to receive, unload, store,
and make available to Army forces supplies and materials arriving in
the objective area, for the support of the operation, and to initiate
and continue approved construction projects, and to establish and
operate base facilities.
3. Service commands as indicated above will be formed and made available for all principal operations to provide logistic support for all Army ground and air forces employed in operations and construction of Army and Air projects.

4. The Commander, Allied Naval Forces, will provide Naval Service Commands to be attached to the Sixth Army for construction and operation of naval facilities in objective areas for support of naval forces in the area.

5. Upon transfer of logistic support responsibility from the Commanding General, Sixth Army, to the Commanding General, USASOS, and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces, the Army and Navy Service Commands revert to the control of USASOS and Allied Naval Forces, respectively.

6. The Commanders of Army and Navy Service Commands will report to the Commanding General Sixth Army, prior to each operation for coordination of planning at times to be designated in Operations Instructions issued for each operation.

III. SUPPLY:

1. Overall levels of supply in Supply Points, Advance Bases, and Intermediate Bases will be maintained at 60 Days of Supply for all classes. Maintenance supplies, other than Class IV construction materials, at bases and supply points from which combat elements are mounted for operations, will be built up to and maintained at 30 Days of Supply for those forces to be mounted therefrom, to insure that sufficient supplies of these classes will be on hand to accompany troops upon embarkation.

2. Assault forces, on embarkation from mounting areas, will be accompanied by supplies as prescribed by the Commanding General, Sixth Army, within limits as follows:

   Class I, II, III, & IV (less construction materials): 30 D/S
   Class V: 5 U/P

3. Drummed Class III products will accompany troops or be moved into objective areas during the early phases of operations.
only in sufficient quantities to meet estimated consumption, plus reasonable operating reserve, until projected dates bulk storage and distribution facilities will become operable. An adequate floating reserve will be held by this headquarters.

4. Sufficient Class IV construction materials, including special equipment required for initiation of construction of airfields, bulk gasoline installations, port and base facilities, will accompany assault echelons in naval assault shipping. Subsequent supply of these materials will be by heavy shipping preloaded by responsible supply agencies in amounts required to meet operational requirements, shipped direct from the UNITED STATES, NEW GUINEA, and AUSTRALIA.

5. Initial resupply consisting generally of that part of those supplies indicated in preceding Paragraph 2 not transported in naval assault craft will be moved forward to objective areas in navy-manned AKA's and AK's augmented by USASOS-crewed AK's if necessary.

6. Subsequent resupply will be moved forward in USASOS heavy shipping.

7. Maintenance supplies, to include food, medical supplies and other items necessary for the relief of the civilian population in the objective areas will be moved forward in heavy shipping.

8. To the greatest extent possible, maintenance resupply and construction materials will be procured and shipped direct from the UNITED STATES and AUSTRALIA to the objective areas. These supplies will be augmented, where necessary, by shipments from USASOS bases in NEW GUINEA. Shipments from NEW GUINEA must be held to a minimum in order to relieve the load on overcrowded ports. Such shipments should be confined to movement of equipment, which because of its type, has had to be received and assembled with other equipment to meet organizational needs, and other items which for any reason can not be supplied from the UNITED STATES and AUSTRALIA. Resupply of ammunition will be from USASOS bases in NEW GUINEA. Additional loadings from the UNITED STATES and AUSTRALIA will augment this supply when necessary.

9. The Commanding General, USASOS, will be responsible for the
procurement, preloading, and sailing of shipping of all resupply and
construction materials at times required to insure the arrival of
such shipping at the regulating station as prescribed in prearranged
schedules to be determined by the Commanding General, Sixth Army.

10. To insure availability of maintenance supplies and con-
struction materials in required quantities and at the times needed,
the Commanding General, USASOS, will initiate timely procurement,
based upon estimated strengths of forces to be employed, and estimates
of construction material required for approved construction projects
in the objective areas. This is a modified adaptation of the prin-
ciple of "Automatic Supply," and the Commanding General, Sixth Army,
is relieved of the responsibility for initiation of requisitions to
cover such supplies and materials. The extent to which this principle
is applied will be determined by agreement between the Commanding
General, Sixth Army, and the Commanding General, USASOS.

IV. EVACUATION.

1. Evacuation of casualties will be restricted to those
seriously injured or requiring prolonged hospitalization.

2. Evacuation from objective areas, initially, will be by
naval assault craft, followed at the earliest practicable date by the
employment of hospital ships. Evacuation by naval assault craft
except APH's will be to bases at the ports of call of such craft.
Evacuation by APH's will be to hospitals in Advance and Intermediate
Bases in accordance with bed credits established therein. In the
event of necessity, casualties may be evacuated by heavy shipping.
The Commanding General, Sixth Army, and the Commander, Allied Naval
Forces, are responsible that transports evacuating casualties from
objective areas have adequate medical equipment, personnel, and
supplies to care for casualties enroute.

3. To reduce evacuation from objective areas to a minimum at
the earliest practicable date, fixed-type hospital units, utilizing
tentage and portable-type buildings, will be moved forward with
supporting elements and established in objective areas as early dates.
4. Salvageable equipment and materiel, and captured material, will not be evacuated to bases in NEW GUINEA, but will be assembled and held in objective areas for later repair and reclamation or, in the case of captured material, for later determination as to its disposition.

5. Prisoners of war will be held in objective areas, pending later determination as to their destination.

V. TRANSPORTATION:

1. Assault naval craft will be used for the transportation of assault and reinforcing elements forward from mounting areas and for movement of other troop organizations having heavy equipment and stores. Base, garrison, and follow-up units and organizations with little heavy equipment and stores, will be moved forward in heavy shipping. Troops, equipment, and cargo to be transported in each type of shipping will be finally determined by availability of naval assault shipping for each operation.

2. Necessary concentration of troops from rearward areas will be by employment of heavy shipping augmented by available naval troop-carrying craft. Concentration of units will be held to a minimum. Elements to be moved into the objective areas in heavy shipping will be concentrated in exceptional cases only, every effort being made to embark such units from their point of existing employment at such times as necessary to insure their arrival in objective areas when required.

3. In order to regulate the flow of shipping, to insure the arrival in objective areas of troops and cargo at required times, and to minimize congestion of shipping in objective port areas during operations, a regulating station for all heavy shipping will be established by the Commanding General, Sixth Army, at SEeadler Harbor in the Admiralty Islands.

4. The movement forward of heavy shipping from the
regulating station for each operation will be under the control of the Commanding General, Sixth Army, until the responsibility for provision of logistic support is transferred to the Commanding General, USASOS, and the Commander, ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

5. During the early phases of the operations, sufficient empty heavy shipping and transports will be held, on a rotational basis, readily available in NEW GUINEA ports, for emergency use to augment naval assault craft for the movement of reserve forces and supplies for reinforcement or exploitation purposes.

6. Hospital ships will be employed to maintain evacuation from Advance Bases and direct from objective areas where necessary.

7. To reduce the shipment and handling of drummed petroleum products, pending the construction of bulk installation facilities in objective areas, petroleum barges complete with facilities for filling trucks and drums ashore will be moved forward to objective areas during the early phases of operations. The arrival and installation of this equipment in objective areas prior to the arrival of operating air forces is essential.

8. The requirement for lighterage facilities, barges, tugs, floating wharves, and amphibious craft in objective areas will be supplied jointly by the Commanding General, USASOS, and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces. A slow convoy moving this class of craft will be formed and dispatched to objective areas to arrive at destination prior to or coincident with the planned arrival of heavy cargo shipping.

VI. CONSTRUCTION:

1. Construction will be limited to the provision of minimum facilities for functional purposes at all instal-
lations. Fixed installations will be held to a minimum.

2. Bases and Supply Points will be established only on a temporary basis. Capacities of Supply Points will be sufficient to support the forces employed in the specific operation. Capacities of bases will be as indicated in Operations Staff Studies.

3. Because of the tempo of operations and the demand for shipping space, all unnecessary refinements and facilities not essential for operational purposes will be eliminated, and their construction will not be initiated. All construction will in type and extent comply with the provisions of letter, this headquarters, subject "Construction Policy," file AG 600,1 (1 Mar 44)E, dated 1 March 1944.

4. The principal objective of all operations being the establishment of air and operating facilities for the support of succeeding operations, the employment of available engineer forces to obtain maximum results is essential. The necessity that operational projects keep pace with each other is apparent. The construction of bulk petroleum installations in sufficient time for them to be operable by the time Air forces in any considerable strength commence operation is essential, and has a direct bearing on the congestion of shipping, in the reduction of shipping and cargo handling by reducing the requirement for drummed products. Cargo dispersal areas are as essential as is the shipping to move forward these cargoes. Amphibious landings, wharf facilities, and roads are an early essential to avoid congestion.

5. The early arrival of construction engineers in objective areas is imperative. They must be moved forward during the early phases of operations in sufficient number to insure the initiation and development of construction projects to comply with the phase objectives as indicated in Appendices to Operations Staff Studies. Amphibious ship-
ping must be utilized for their movement to the maximum extent possible.

6. Construction material necessary to initiate construction should accompany units to insure against delay in availability. Additional materials will be moved forward in heavy shipping loaded in accordance with preloading requirements previously determined. Loadings in complete units for installations such as bulk petroleum storage facilities are desirable, and shipping to meet this requirement will be made available by the Commanding General, USASOS.

7. Construction required for all installations in objective areas of principal operations will be planned in advance, and general assignment of areas to services will be made by this headquarters in advance of all such operations, to insure completion of detailed planning.

8. Task force commanders will initiate construction of approved projects in accordance with plans therefor, making adjustments in assignments of areas made necessary because of terrain or other conditions. Construction engineer troops, Army and Naval, will be employed by task force commanders in accordance with the provisions of letter, this headquarters, file AG 370.5 (8 Jun 44)E, subject "Employment of Engineer Forces," dated 8 June 1944. In order, however, to insure the progressive development of projects essential to both Army and Naval services, task force commanders should, in general, employ construction engineer troops of the respective services on projects pertaining thereto. Responsibility for continuation of construction will be subsequently transferred by this headquarters to the Commander, ALLIED NAVAL Forces, for all naval installations, and to the Commanding General, USASOS, for all Army and Air installations. This trans-
for of responsibility will be coincident with the transfer of logistic support responsibility from the Commanding General, Sixth Army to the Commanding General, USASOS, and the Commander, ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Maximum use will be made of available local labor and installations in objective areas.
1. DIRECTIVE:

a. This communications plan is based upon the basic outline plan for PHILIPPINE OPERATIONS, "MUSKETEER-TWO". It covers the Signal communications required in the operation of the forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA within the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO and so much of the Signal communication system required for the operations immediately prior thereto as to show the complete Signal Communication System required by the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA for both the operations and their logistic support from the NEW GUINEA and NORTH AUSTRALIAN AREA.

2. ASSUMPTIONS - It is assumed,

a. That the Signal Communication facilities now provided for Rear Echelon GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, at Brisbane, will not be decreased in scope or extent during MUSKETEER,

b. That the ALLIED NAVAL, ALLIED AIR, AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES, SIXTH U.S. ARMY, EIGHTH U.S. ARMY and UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY will establish and/or maintain and operate at the Rear and Advance Echelons of GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, wherever located, the Signal Communication facilities and agencies required for the reception and transmission of orders, information and intelligence between their respective headquarters and:

(1) Rear Echelon, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, at BRISBANE.

(2) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, initially at HOLLANDIA and, subsequent thereto, wherever located.

c. That the Advance Echelon of GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA may be located in turn at the following places:

HOLLANDIA
LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT AREA
MANILA
d. That the UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY will install, maintain and operate the Signal Communication facilities required:

(1) By GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, for communication with the War Department and the Commanders of adjacent theaters and between the Advance and Rear Echelons of GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

(2) For the logistic support of each operation with bases of the type indicated in RENO V.

(3) For the control of ships operating under its control.

e. That the ALLIED NAVAL FORCES will:

(1) Install, maintain and operate the Signal Communication facilities required for communication:

(a) With PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,

(b) With SOUTH PACIFIC AREA,

(c) With the THIRD FLEET and U.S. PACIFIC FLEET,

(d) With BRITISH EASTERN FLEET.

(e) With ADVANCED NAVAL BASE at MANUS and anchorage facilities in the PALAU - ULITHI AREA.

(f) With PACIFIC OCEAN AIR FORCES operating from the PALAU AREA.

(g) For control of all shipping (not assigned to USASOS) operating to and from and within the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO.

(h) For Naval purposes in the cooperative action of land and carrier-based aircraft and other elements of the Air and Naval Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA and PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.

f. That the ALLIED AIR FORCES will:

(1) Have installed, maintained and operated:

(a) The Signal Communication facilities required for:
1. Air Operational Intelligence, Air Command and Liaison purposes with elements of the 14TH AIR FORCE, 20TH AIR FORCE, CENTRAL PACIFIC and PACIFIC OCEAN AREA.

2. Air Base purposes.

3. Fighter Sector, Aircraft Warning, and Radar and Radio Navigational purposes.

4. Cooperative action between land-based and carrier-based aircraft and other elements of the Air and Naval Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, THIRD FLEET and PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.

5. The continued support of Ground and Naval Forces in the zones of action in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA to the South of the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO.

(2) Have installed, maintained and operated, an Aircraft Warning System (Radar, Ground Spotters and Coast Watchers) required for each operation.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. Signal Communication to be established essentially in conformity with Zones III and IV of JCS 235/1. See attached charts as follows:

(1) Inclosure No. 1: Chart 1 - GHQ and USASOS Radio-Teletype Installations for Zones III and IV.

(2) Inclosure No. 2: Chart 1A - GHQ and USASOS Radio-Teletype Circuits - PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

(3) Inclosure No. 3: Chart 2 - GHQ and USASOS Manual Radio Circuit Installations for Zones III and IV.

(4) Inclosure No. 4: Chart 2A - GHQ and USASOS Manual Radio Circuits - PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
(5) Inclosure No. 5: Appendix A-2-B - Wire Facilities
Line Route Map - PHILIPINE ISLANDS.

NOTE: The types of bases referred to in the legend on these charts indicates the scope and type of base wire installation to be provided at each of these bases. The details of the composition of each of these bases are available in the "Book Plan" for JCS 235/1.

(6) Inclosure No. 6: Unnumbered Chart entitled:

(7) Detailed instructions for each operation.

(8) ALLIED NAVAL FORCES plan being prepared and will be submitted under separate cover to the Director of Naval Operations.

(9) The Signal Communications for press and news broadcasts will be provided initially by means of a ship equipped locally for the purpose which should be complete and ready for operation on 1 September 1944. Press and news broadcasts will later be handled by commercial and civil agencies to be established within the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS under plan now being submitted to the War Department by this headquarters.

(10) The radio facilities required for Psychological Warfare purposes to be provided by G-1, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

(11) The Signal Communication facilities required for Civil Affairs will be provided as follows:
(a) Wire: The wire and cable system plan (amplified where required) submitted under the provisions of JCS 235/1 (See Inclosure No. 5 - Proposed Wire Facilities - Line Route Map - PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), will meet civilian as well as military needs. This system to be installed, maintained and operated by military personnel and, as rapidly as possible and expedient, taken over by civilian personnel (to be supplied in the main from the United States).

(b) Radio: The military systems to be used initially to the extent available pending the completion of the facilities to be civilian installed and operated under plan now being submitted to the War Department.

(c) The Aircraft Warning Service Plan: To be essentially as provided by JCS 781, plus:

1. Such modifications and amendments as proposed by GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

2. The ground spotter and coast watchers included in plan to be provided by the ALLIED AIR FORCES and ALLIED NAVAL FORCES.

4. DIRECTIVES FOR PREPARATION OF PLANS:

a. The component Forces to prepare and submit communication plans and requests for Signal supplies, equipment and personnel based upon the assumptions and more detailed plans for each operation.

b. The Central Bureau to submit a separate plan for Signal Intelligence purposes.

c. Section 22, to submit a separate plan for Radar and Radio Countermeasures.

d. Plans and directives for the general allocation and coordination of frequencies to be issued by this headquarters.
THAILAND

PROJECTED GHQ & USASOS RADIO TELETYPExCIRCUIT INSTALLATIONS FOR ZONE 3 & 4 PER JCS 235/1

LEGEND

TYPE IA BASE
TYPE 1 BASE
TYPE 2 BASE
TYPE 3 BASE
* KEY POINT
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
GHQ & USASOS PROJECTED RADIO TELETYPE CIRCUITS

- Type IA Base
- Type I Base
- Type 2 Base
- Type 3 Base

Scale 1:800,000

STATUTE MILES

00 50 100 150 200

INCLUSION NO. 2

CHART 1A
PROJECTED GHQ 8 & USASOS MANUAL RADIO INSTALLATIONS FOR ZONE II & III PER JCS 225/1

LEGEND:
- TYPE I BASE
- TYPE II BASE
- KEY POINT
AIR FORCE PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR ITEMS OF RADIO EQUIPMENT