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Mobilization

by
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PREFACE

This bibliography provides those with access to the Combined Arms Research Library a starting point in the search for information relating to the mobilization and integration of reserve forces during national emergencies in the twentieth century.

Reserve components played a significant, and in some cases paramount, role in the national defense during this period. Nonetheless, the process of reserve mobilization that formed the massive military establishments of World Wars I and II are little understood today by those responsible for utilizing reservists in future emergencies requiring the total force.

With few exceptions, the historical examples cited in this bibliography concern the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. Titles relating to the role of the reserves in the scheme of national defense, however, relate to all the services. Most of the items included in this bibliography relate only to premobilization structures and plans, call-ups, and the integration of soldiers into standing forces. Combat actions of reserve units are included only as parts of general works.

An examination of the sources in this bibliography will reveal recurring themes in the attitudes and relationships between civilian authorities, the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. One striking constant that runs throughout these accounts is that the lessons of mobilization have not always been learned. Failures that have surfaced include the inadequate provisioning and training of reserves in noncrisis periods, the violation of unit integrity during mobilization, and the mobilization of reserves without the concomitant mobilization of national will. The latter condition has often embittered citizen soldiers, created political antagonism, and confused the nation.

Attempts to reform the system on the basis of military efficiency have often run headlong into the realities of a pluralistic society and a democratic system for which the reserve establishment is more than simply a military asset. Today, the total force concept that seems finally to have placed the reserve forces in a meaningful context within the defense structure has yet to be fully tested. Many of the bibliographic entries in this text relate to sensitive current issues including single-parent reservists, the deployment of female reservists into hostile environments, and the political and social implications of the total force.
structure for mobilization. These and other issues are extensively covered in the post-Vietnam section.

This bibliography adheres to the following specifications:

1. All entries are located in the Combined Arms Research Library and are accompanied by a library call number or a Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) number.

2. Each entry is annotated with the exception of a few classified items for which only an unclassified title is provided.

3. Only substantial studies are included. Trivial references that would provide superficial information are excluded.

4. Emphasis is on the mobilization of Reserve Components in the twentieth century and planning for the total force.

5. The entries are grouped in chronological sections.
Bibliographies


A useful general bibliography.


A good, up-to-date, all-service bibliography covering both manpower and industrial aspects.

General


This new general history of the Army Reserve contains valuable sections on the mobilization for the Korean War and the Berlin crisis and also the lack of a general mobilization for the Vietnam War. The study contains specific references to units called up in Vietnam and a section on total force implications. The book also has a helpful general bibliography and statistics relating to reserve status in the appendixes.


A 56-page overview of the Reserve Components, this study, prepared for members of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, contains a good, short, but dated, review of the history of reserves, focusing on the development of public laws dealing with reserve officers.


This study provides an overview of each reserve system mentioned in the title and identifies characteristics of each system that might benefit the U.S. Army Reserve posture if adopted and those that should be avoided.

Irving and McGregor compare and contrast the World War II, Korean War, Berlin crisis (1961), and Vietnam War (1968) Reserve Component mobilizations to determine what features should be considered in future mobilizations. The historical study identifies recurring deficiencies relating to national manpower and recruitment policies and inadequate reserve training, equipment, facilities, and organization.


Hill’s work is a solid overview of the history of the National Guard from its colonial origins through the early 1960s. His tone is often defensive in response to what he considers slights and condescension from the Regular Army toward the Army National Guard.


The most comprehensive study of American mobilization, this single volume contains detailed explanations of peacetime and wartime Army structures as well as describing the process of mobilization in all U.S. wars through World War II. The narrative is supported by extensive statistics and diagrams.


This analysis focuses on the failure of the all-volunteer force to maintain the quantity and quality of forces needed and tangentially on the Reserve Component forces’ same incapability. Lacy doubts that the political will exists to call up reserves as needed—particularly without a draft—and cites the Korean War as an example of this infirmity of will.


As the title suggests, this is a general history of the militia and Army National Guard, but it does not provide a detailed
analysis of mobilization problems. It does contain a good bibliography that includes a section listing other bibliographies.


Woods examines the structure and mission of the Army National Guard from 1945 to 1966. As part of his thesis, he argues for the greatly enhanced status of reserve readiness by the incorporation of all reserve units under Army National Guard control and for increased funding for equipment and training.

Pre-World War I


Burdett provides a short historical overview of the period of transition between the Spanish-American War and World War I. The mobilizations of 1911 and 1913 call attention to the organizational, manpower, and equipment problems of the old Army and set the stage for military organization in World War I.


Mobilization, as well as other Regular Army, National Guard, and volunteer Army problems, are described in this paper.


This after-action report deals with the mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard for the Mexican border emergency. It is a short but detailed study that candidly examines the legal and technical problems of mobilizing an essentially civilian force for real military action. The study reveals that many of the problems concerning reluctance to serve that are often associated with the Vietnam era are not in fact new.
World War I Era


Bullard’s interesting and insightful essay addresses pre-World War I America and deals with broad issues rather than technical problems. He makes interesting points concerning propaganda, censorship, and the industrial labor aspects of modern war. This is a thoughtful prewar book that avoids the nationalistic and romantic emotionalism that typifies this genre.


The stated purpose of this article is to “review the World War I experiences of the United States in the procurement of munitions and in industrial mobilization.” The authors present a historical overview of the structure and operation of the War Department bureaucracy and a detailed examination of procurement during the war. The study is good in its examination of each component of the mobilization machinery. However, it contains little on manpower mobilization.


The complete regulations for the Army Reserve forces are found in this document.


This is the first of four numbers devoted to the service of the 36th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Guards) in World War I. The numbers are listed and annotated here in the chronological order in which they were published.


The second of four numbers devoted to the service of the 36th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Guards) in World War I, this article stresses the lack of equipment and camp facilities that was typical of mobilization in both World Wars I and II. The article also discusses the wartime replacement of National Guard officers by regular officers in key command
positions and the removal of a naturalized German officer thought unsuitable for service in France.


The third of four numbers on the 36th Division, this article highlights the division's combat experience in October 1918 at St. Etienne and along the Aisne.


The last of four numbers on the service of the 36th Division in World War I, this article contains some interesting personal information on participants in the war but has little information of real value on demobilization as a process.

World War II and Aftermath


An examination of World War II divisional experiences, this study concludes that personnel turbulence and training unrelated to first-battle experiences were the major causes of failure among unsuccessful divisions.


Crowell chronicles post-World War II demobilization and the unreadiness of the Army to face the initial Korean threat in 1950. It carries the message: “To maintain peace, prepare for war.”


Written in rough prose, this World War II era document explains the process of mobilization to laymen. While covering the field, it provides little detailed or technical information.

A general overview of the mobilization effort in World War II, this book also provides a detailed examination of specific mobilization problems, demonstrating the complexities arising from competing armed forces and economic, political, and individual interests.


Brigadier General Palmer presents Marshall’s case for a reserve system that can be used as a mobilization base in the future. He places the argument in the context of the failure to adopt workable plans (including George Washington’s) in the past.


This committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, was constituted to determine the appropriate mission, size, and configuration of the Reserve Components. It recommends consolidation of the Army Reserve and National Guard and their management through the Department of Defense staff. The report stresses the total force concept.


This short but interesting summary of complaints most often voiced by military inductees indicates that many serious problems could be corrected with a little thought and virtually no cost.

**Korean War**

Giusti’s account stresses the key role played by the Marine Corps Reserve in the early days of the Korean War, particularly in the Inchon landing, and contains many charts and graphs to back up its contentions. Although it deals with some standard mobilization problems such as individual delay requests and demobilization planning, it tends to play down the disorganization and lack of preparedness on the part of planners and reservists.


Kendall has written a detailed and well-thought-out study of mobilization problems that focuses on the Korean War. Kendall indicates that the process of call-up in the war was poorly planned and executed and was saved only by a large pool of World War II veterans who functioned adequately despite the system. The dissertation contains an excellent bibliography on the period.


This rather roughly accomplished report contains some interesting insights into the call-up of the Illinois Army National Guard during the Korean War. The report deals with such issues as racial tension, VD problems, and the use of the division for levies.


Without particular reference to armed forces mobilization requirements, this study group treats the overall issue of U.S. manpower in all areas of society.

The Berlin Crisis and the 1960s


Limited to 143 copies, this now declassified monograph deals with the Army buildup during the 1961 Berlin crisis and
examines the call-up of Army Reserve and Army National Guard units within the context of the whole crisis. The Berlin crisis situation clearly demonstrates the problems of partial mobilization when it is unaccompanied by the mobilization of the national will.


Written after the 1961 Berlin crisis, Eliot's study argues for increased readiness of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, particularly in light of the growing threat in Southeast Asia. Eliot makes the point that the Berlin crisis was resolved successfully because of the U.S. decision to call up ground force reserves, which had a psychological impact on the Russians.


This is the report of the board constituted to study the limited mobilization of Reserve Component units and individuals in 1961. The board was to identify problems and to recommend corrective action. The fundamental conclusion is that the mobilization was generally well done.


Levantrosser provides a detailed study of Congressional oversight and policy issues regarding the Reserve Components from the end of World War II to the middle of the 1960s. He deals most specifically with the legal status of the reserves and little with aspects of mobilization.


Presented in this work is a short overview of the role of Reserve Components during mobilization after the Berlin crisis. Also examined is the nonmobilization of the Vietnam era. The authors point out that throughout our history, it has always been assumed that Reserve Components would form the bulk of our armed forces during conflicts but that the planning and
execution of Reserve Component mobilization has always been poorly done. The authors deplore the failure of the Johnson administration to gain the political, psychological, and military advantages mobilization would have brought. They feel the small mobilization was a disgrace.


This fairly sanitized after-action report of the 49th Armored Division (Texas National Guard) during the Berlin crisis should be compared with draft reports (N-18935.1-B) from subordinate units.


A standard after-action report of a National Guard division (Wisconsin) called to active duty during the Berlin crisis, this report reviews the activities and problems of activating a National Guard division.


This document is useful only as a type exercise plan for an Army National Guard unit in the 1960s.


This 1,100-page report documents the extensive examination of the Reserve Components made in the spring of 1962 in the aftermath of the Berlin crisis call-up. The official positions of all interested government agencies and private-interest groups are documented. All the traditional issues of Reserve Component mobilization are examined in detail. Although not always easy to use, this document contains an enormous amount of information, including the valuable appendixes.

The Vietnam War Era


Currie argues that President Johnson's decision not to call up the reserves in 1965 was a political one made to conceal
escalation. The limited reserve call-up in 1968 exposed a lack of training and equipment in most reserve units that was compensated for in Vietnam by individual maturity and esprit de corps.


Scott examines the importance of the ROTC as a source of junior officers and its transformation in the face of academic hostility.


Detailed in this report is the mobilization of the 29th Infantry Brigade [Separate]—the Hawaii Army National Guard—during the Vietnam War. Since no general mobilization of Reserve Components took place during the war, the history of those units called up is of great importance. Points of interest with broad implications include the impact on morale caused by partial mobilization and the threat to unit integrity that resulted from using units for individual levies.


A declassified study, this report describes the 1968 reserve call-up of 76 units and 20,000 men. Chapter 4 deals with lessons learned, and chapter 5 compares and contrasts 1961 with 1968, pinpointing mistakes made in 1961 that were repeated in 1968.

The Post-Vietnam War Era


This study addresses the issue of personnel costs in the event of a large mobilization. It posits a limited war of 48 months' duration, beginning in 1973, and develops a methodology to examine costs arising from such a hypothetical mobilization.

Binkin argues that the Reserve Components are too large, inefficiently organized, poorly integrated into plans for mobilization, and overcompensated. He provides fairly detailed recommendations for a more streamlined, cost-effective force.


Bowman argues that the present organization and management of the Army is not effective in light of its mobilization policy and mission. He calls for full integration of reserves in total Army plans through continuous and staggered involuntary call-ups of reservists and units.


A concise and precise examination of the integration of the Army Reserve and National Guard forces into the Regular Army since 1974, Brayton's article includes general definitions, describes the process of integration, and provides a valuable short overview.


Canby argues that a large, organized reserve force is indispensable for an effective defense in Europe. The problem of western European defense does not lie in greater expenditures but is rather an organizational and conceptual problem. Canby places the role of reserves in the framework of an organization and tactics that thwart Soviet blitzkrieg plans.


Coffey argues that a NATO versus Warsaw Pact war in Central Europe is likely to last less than sixty days and that Reserve Component assets could neither be mobilized nor delivered in that time. In that context, the total force concept has decreased the Army's ability to fight a short-warning, high-intensity war in Europe or deter it through negotiations during the crisis. Given the current era of the volunteer Army and
steady funding levels, Coffey suggests planning for a short war with fully equipped and manned on-site combat power.


Exercise Proud Spirit, a national command post exercise (CPX), demonstrated our inability to make timely midcrisis decisions, to a great extent because of computer breakdown. A second cause of the exercise's deficiencies was the lack of basic supplies, including food, fuel, and ammunition. The deficiencies reflected the same problems identified in CPX Nifty Nugget.


Foster and McPherson propose that limited mobilization can be an effective means to mobilize popular support, realistically test systems, show national resolve, and prepare for future crises.


Foster and Hoeber argue for the Reagan defense buildup, which they characterize as a mobilization of both will and resources to match the Soviet buildup of the 1970s. The article does not deal with the concept of short-term mobilization in the conventional sense.


This three-volume contract study consists of an executive summary, main report, and appendixes. It is a detailed study of a number of concept tests designed to discover the best possible methods to employ Reserve Components to increase the Army's capability to meet NATO's mobilization deployment goals.


Gould focuses on the development of the total force concept after 1973. This chapter is a general overview of the role the reserves play and their limitations.

Using a random mail survey of enlisted women and field studies of selected reserve units, this study examines the impact of women on the operational readiness of Reserve Components. The study should be used carefully, since both the validity and reliability of the poll may be open to question. The report concludes that 64.4 percent of women reservists do not meet legal requirements for deployment outside of CONUS, and 42 percent have dependent children.


This up-to-date anthology contains chapters dealing with economic and manpower mobilization. Chapter 7 deals specifically with Reserve Component mobilization. The work also contains an excellent annotated bibliography.


In this short article, the author argues for using a larger proportion of defense funds by the Federal Republic of Germany for combat-ready reserves rather than for a smaller, full-strength standing force.


By 1982, after ten years of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), Reserve Components constituted 45 percent of all general-purpose forces, including 33 percent of combat divisions, 50 percent of artillery battalions, and 67 percent of tactical support forces under the total force concept. According to Moxon, the reserves have declined in strength, and projections based on demographics are for the decline to continue. Moxon argues that the reserves will not be able to provide more than augmentation for mobilization and stresses the need for an operational Selective Service System, but no current draft. He doubts if the total force concept can survive in the AVF environment. Moxon stresses that there are no "active force" or "reserve force" problems, only "total force" problems.

Pate argues that the current unit-readiness reporting system inaccurately assesses Reserve Component unit combat capabilities. He proposes a new system that would weigh readiness in terms of postmobilization capability.


This report includes the role played by Reserve Components called to duty during the Cuban refugee crisis of 1979.


General Starry reviews the difficulties raised by full or partial mobilization in a situation where the luxury of available time, as in World War II, does not exist. Facility and equipment shortages identified in MOBEX-80 must be overcome as well as the inadequacy of automatic data processing systems. Starry’s article presents a concise outline of Army mobilization problems.


Stuckey focuses on mobilization and deployment plans and capabilities and concludes that they are inadequate, as they could not be completed as planned or required. He reviews personnel, command and control, and training and movement planning for both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve.


Examined in this study is the utilization of nonfederal facilities in Colorado in the event of mobilization, focusing particularly on movement and housekeeping logistics.
A declassified after-action report, this study details serious mobilization problems as they existed in 1976, including "a serious disconnect between European war plans and CONUS mobilization plans." In this instance, the logistics, personnel, and automatic data processing system were designed for peacetime rather than wartime mobilization.


This is the 1979 version of the basic plan for mobilization of Reserve Components, which is continually updated by FORSCOM. It provides guidance for both unit and installation mobilization.


This is one of a series of annual reports detailing mission, strength, readiness, and changes for the year.


The CARL library has only volume 1 of the Army Mobilization Plan for 1981. It is revised and updated yearly. Volume 1 is the mobilization plan for Headquarters, Department of the Army, and details mobilization procedures and organization. Annex D contains reserve mobilization procedures.


A study-group analysis of Army National Guard problems, this report cites major problem areas, including poor instruction and training and inaccurate readiness reporting. An executive summary accompanies the report.

This is a good reference source for reserve units of the National Guard down to company level and includes location, strength, and parent units.


The annual reports of the National Guard articulate information concerning organization and activities throughout the system.


This report concludes that the Army's alert procedures are inadequate. Spot checks and surveys indicated failure of reserve units to adequately brief members or maintain accurate personnel rosters.


Williamson examines the Army in the post-Vietnam environment of reduced manpower and less money. He concludes that greater utilization of Reserve Components will enhance the cost-effectiveness of readiness.


Part five of this anthology deals with various aspects of mobilization. Articles raise such issues as reservists' use of due process to avoid service, the organization of the mobilization process, and theoretical issues concerning the reserves and war in Europe. The anthology contains a useful appendix showing the structure of the reserve forces.
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