A Survey on Trust Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Jin-Hee Cho, Member, IEEE, Ananthram Swami, Fellow, IEEE, and Ing-Ray Chen, Member, IEEE

Abstract—Managing trust in a distributed Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is challenging when collaboration or cooperation is critical to achieving mission and system goals such as reliability, availability, scalability, and reconfigurability. In defining and managing trust in a military MANET, we must consider the interactions between the composite cognitive, social, information and communication networks, and take into account the severe resource constraints (e.g., computing power, energy, bandwidth, time), and dynamics (e.g., topology changes, node mobility, node failure, propagation channel conditions). We seek to combine the notions of “social trust” derived from social networks with “quality-of-service (QoS) trust” derived from information and communication networks to obtain a composite trust metric. We discuss the concepts and properties of trust and derive some unique characteristics of trust in MANETs, drawing upon social notions of trust. We provide a survey of trust management schemes developed for MANETs and discuss generally accepted classifications, potential attacks, performance metrics, and trust metrics in MANETs. Finally, we discuss future research areas on trust management in MANETs based on the concept of social and cognitive networks.

Index Terms—Trust management, mobile ad hoc networks, social networks, cognitive networks, trust, trust metrics.

I. INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly networked world, increased connectivity could lead to improved information sharing, facilitate collaboration, and enable distributed decision making, which is the underlying concept in Network Centric Operations. In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), the distributed decision making should take into account trust in the elements: the sources of information, the processors of information, the elements of the communications network across which the information is transmitted, etc. This trust must often be derived under time-critical conditions, and in a distributed way.

A. Design Challenges in MANET Protocols

A mobile ad hoc network [1] consists of wireless mobile nodes forming a temporary network without the help of centralized infrastructure, and where nodes communicate through multi-hops.

Security protocol designers for MANETs face technical challenges due to severe resource constraints in bandwidth, memory size, battery life, computational power, and unique wireless characteristics such as openness to eavesdropping, lack of specific ingress and exit points, high security threats, vulnerability, unreliable communication, and rapid changes in topologies or memberships because of user mobility or node failure [1][2][3]. In addition, compared with designing security protocols for civilian MANETs, designing security protocols for military MANETs requires additional caution, since battlefield communication networks must cope with hostile environments, node heterogeneity, often stringent performance constraints, node subversion, high tempo operations leading to rapid changes in network topology and service requirements, and dynamically formed communities of interest wherein participants may not have predefined trust relationships [4]. To cope with these dynamics, networks must be able to reconfigure seamlessly, via low-complexity distributed network management schemes [3]. Security in a tactical network includes notions of communication security which can be easily quantified as opposed to the perception of security which is hard to quantify.

B. Motivation for Trust Management in MANETs

The concept of ”Trust” originally derives from social sciences and is defined as the degree of subjective belief about the behaviors of a particular entity [5]. Blaze et al. [6] first introduced the term ”Trust Management” and identified it as a separate component of security services in networks and clarified that ”Trust management provides a unified approach for specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships.”

Trust management in MANETs is needed when participating nodes, without any previous interactions, desire to establish a network with an acceptable level of trust relationships among themselves. Examples would be in building initial trust bootstrapping [7], coalition operations without predefined trust, and authentication of certificates generated by another party when links are down or ensuring safety before entering a new zone [8]. In addition, trust management has diverse applicability in many decision making situations including intrusion detection, authentication, access control, key management, isolating misbehaving nodes for effective routing, and other purposes.

Trust management, including trust establishment, trust update, and trust revocation, in MANETs is also much more challenging than in traditional centralized environments. For example, collecting trust information or evidence to evaluate trustworthiness is difficult due to changes in topology induced by node mobility or node failure. Further, resource constraints often confine the trust evaluation process only
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Computational and Information Sciences Directorate, U. S. Army Research Laboratory, 2800 Powder Mill Rd., Adelphi, MD, 20783

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to local information. The dynamic nature and characteristics of MANETs result in uncertainty and incompleteness of the trust evidence, which is continuously changing over time [8] [9]. Despite a couple of surveys of trust management [10] [11] [12], a comprehensive survey of trust management in MANETs does not exist and is the main aim of this paper. A short version of this paper was presented at ICCRTS 2009 [13]. The contributions of this paper are: (1) to give a clear definition of trust in the communication and networking field, drawing upon definitions from different disciplines; (2) to extensively survey the existing trust management schemes developed for MANETs and investigate their general trends; and (3) to discuss future research areas based on the concept of social and cognitive networks.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the concept of trust in diverse disciplines, give a clear distinction between trust and trustworthiness, and discuss the relationship between trust and risk. We also introduce the main properties of trust in MANETs. Section 3 surveys generally accepted classifications of trust management, attacks considered in existing trust management schemes for MANETs, and metrics used to measure the performance of existing MANET trust management schemes. Section 4 surveys trust management schemes that have been developed for specific purposes, including secure routing, authentication, intrusion detection, access control, key management, and trust evidence distribution and evaluation. In Section 5, we discuss design concepts that designers of MANET trust management systems should keep in mind and suggest trust metrics based on the concepts of social trust and quality-of-service (QoS) trust. Section 6 concludes this paper.

II. CONCEPTS AND PROPERTIES OF TRUST

In this section, we review how trust is defined in different disciplines and how these trust concepts can be applied in modeling trust in MANETs. Further, we examine the relationship between trust and risk, and how trust should be defined in order to realistically reflect the unique characteristics of MANETs.

A. Multidisciplinary Concept of Trust

According to Merriam Webster’s Dictionary [14], trust is defined as “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something.” Despite the subjective nature of trust, the concept of trust has been very attractive to network security protocol designers because of its diverse applicability as a decision making mechanism. We examine the literature to study how trust is defined in various disciplines including sociology, economics, philosophy, psychology, organizational management, and autonomic computing in industrial and system engineering. Finally, we also examine how trust can be defined in communications and networking with the help of definitions in other fields.

Trust in sociology: Gambetta’s notion of trust [15] is popularly called sociological trust and is defined as an assessor’s a priori subjective probability that a person (or agent, or group) will perform specific actions that affect the assessor. That is, Gambetta [15] describes the nature of trust as subjectivity, an indicator for future actions, and dynamicity based on continuous interactions between two entities. Luhmann [16] also emphasized the importance of trust in society as a mechanism for building cooperation among people to extend human interactions for future collaboration. Adams et al. [17] rephrased Gambetta’s trust concept in applying the sociological concept of trust in computer science; they represented trust as a continuous variable, quantifying trust in the light of context or acceptance of risk. They further stressed that trusting betrayal is an important aspect in building trust. To be useful, network trust models must capture this subjective aspect of social trust.

Trust in economics: Economists distinguish between the personal, informal trust that comes from being friendly with your neighbors and the impersonal, institutionalized trust that lets you give your credit card number out over the Internet [18]. Both notions of trust are important in military MANETs. In economics, trust is represented as an expectation that applies to situations in which trustors take risky actions under uncertainty or information incompleteness [19]. However, as illustrated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game [20], trust in economics is based on the assumption that humans are rational and strict utility maximizers of their own interest or incentives. In this sense, when we apply a human trust model to a network trust model, the assumption of selfish nodes seems reasonable. But altruistic behaviors can emerge from mechanisms that may be initially purely selfish [21], and thus making an argument for redemption mechanisms. Economic models are used in
conjunction with trust-based encryption primitives in [22] to develop a trust management paradigm for securing information flows across organizations.

**Trust in philosophy:** According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [23], trust is important but dangerous. Since trust allows us to form relationships with others and to rely on others for love, advice, help, etc., trust is regarded as a very important factor in our life that compels others to give us such things with no outside force such as the law. On the other hand, since trust requires taking a risk that the trustee may not behave as the trustor expects, trust is dangerous implying the possible betrayal of trust. In his comments on Lagerspetz’s book titled Trust: The Tacit Demand, Lahno [24] describes the author’s view on trust as a moral relationship in human society. Langerspetz believes that investigations of trust reveal that “human individuals, their beliefs, desires and actions are only intelligible against the background of existing social practices and social ties” [24]. This implies that depending on the nature of personal relationships between a trustor and a trustee (i.e., moral relationship between them), trustful actions or betrayal can occur.

**Trust in psychology:** According to the Wikipedia definition of trust in psychology [25], trust starts from the birth of the child. As the child grows older, trust also grows stronger. However, the root of trust derives from the relationship between mother (or caregiver) of the child since the strength of the family relies on trust, if the child is raised in a family which is very accepting and loving, the child also returns those feelings to others by trusting them. But if trust is lost, it is hard to regain it. In this sense, trust in psychology emphasizes the cognitive process that human beings learn trust from their experiences. Deutsch [26] defines trust as the confidence that one will find what is desired from another rather than what is feared. An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to the behavior which he perceives to have greater negative consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive consequences if it is confirmed. In addition, Hardin [27] and Rotter [28] observed in their experiments that past experience may strikingly affect later capacity for trust. For example, bad experience with people will lower the trust level, leading to fewer trusted relationships with people, and thus fewer opportunities for mutual gain. Further, they recognized that the gains obtained by having high trust relationships exceed the loss by having low trust relationships. For instance, high trustors are less likely to lie or cheat or steal. Also they are less likely to be unhappy, conflicted, or unstable, and sought by more friends. Even though high trustors are deceived more often in novel situations, low trustors are also fooled equally by distrusting trustworthy people, thereby losing the advantages that high trustors may have [28].

**Trust in organizational management:** In this field, the concept of trust is also defined as the extent to which one party is willing to count on someone or something with a feeling of relative security in spite of possible negative consequences, emphasizing the possibility of facing risk [29]. Schoormann et al. [30] defined trust as the willingness to take a risk or willingness to be vulnerable in the relationship in terms of ability, integrity, and benevolence. They also explained that trust is not necessarily mutual and is not reciprocal. Trust concepts in organizational management can give us insights on how to measure trust by investigating methods to measure ability, integrity, and benevolence of each networked node, as well as on assessing risk. They can also give us insights on defining group trust (i.e., between a person and a group or between groups) which is important for dynamic communities of interest.

**Trust in autonomic computing:** As technology becomes more complex, fully understanding automation becomes infeasible, if not impossible, and trust in automation becomes critical, particularly when unexpected situations arise and system responses cannot be predicted. Researchers studying autonomic computing in industrial systems engineering have sought to develop models of trust to understand how trust in automation develops and how it may be misplaced. Lee and See [31] define trust as the attitude that an agent will help accomplish an individual’s goals in a situation with uncertainty and vulnerability. In this sense, an agent can be automation or another person that actively interacts with the environment on behalf of the person. Parasuraman [32] links the level of trust with automation reliability stating that “Trust often determines automation usage. Operators may not use a reliable automated system if they believe it to be untrustworthy.” The notion of automation reliability as a trust metric is one that is applicable in MANETs, where the user’s trust in reliability on technology is an important aspect.

**Trust in communications and networking:** The concept of trust also has been attractive to communication and network protocol designers where trust relationships among participating nodes are critical in building cooperative and collaborative environments to optimize system objectives in terms of scalability, reconfi gurability, and reliability (i.e., survivability), dependability, or security. According to Eschenauer et al. [9], trust is defined as “a set of relations among entities that participate in a protocol. These relations are based on the evidence generated by the previous interactions of entities within a protocol. In general, if the interactions have been faithful to the protocol, then trust will accumulate between these entities.” Capra [34] proposes to use a human trust model based on human interactions in a trust model for fully distributed network environments such as MANETs. Capra defines trust as the degree of a belief about the behavior of other entities (or agents). Li and Singhal [35] define trust as the belief that an entity is capable of performing reliably, dependably, and securely in a particular case; hence, different levels of trust exist in different contexts. For example, Alice may trust her physician to give her advice on her health concerns but may not trust her physician’s advice on fixing her car. Aivaloglou et al. [36] describe trust as the quantified belief of a trustor regarding competence, honesty, security, and dependability of a trustee in a specific context.

Recently, researchers have recognized the importance of social networks in building trust relationships among entities. Golbeck [37][38][39] introduces the concept of social trust by suggesting the use of social networks as a bridge to build trust relationships among entities. Golbeck proposes the application of a trust concept derived from a sociological
viewpoint to computer science, and describes trust as a well-defined descriptor of security and encryption as a metric to reflect security goals. Wong and Sycara [40] introduce security mechanisms to establish trust in multi-agent systems. They are concerned with both authenticating agents as well as ensuring that agents do not misbehave. Trustworthiness emerges from the security features in their system.

From the definitions of trust derived from various fields as reviewed above, we can construct a trust metric having the following characteristics: (1) trust should be established based on potential risks; (2) trust should be context-dependent; (3) trust should be based on each party’s own interest (e.g., selfishness); (4) trust is learned (i.e., a cognitive process); and (5) trust may represent system reliability.

B. Trust, Trustworthiness, and Risk

In the literature, the terms trust and trustworthiness seem to be used interchangeably without clear distinction. Josang et al. [41] clarified the difference between trust and trustworthiness based on definitions provided by Gambetta [15]. Level of trust is defined as the belief probability varying from 0 (complete distrust) to 1 (complete trust) [41]. In this sense, trustworthiness is a measure of the actual probability that the trustees will behave as expected. Solhaug et al. [42] define trustworthiness as the objective probability that the trustee performs a particular action on which the interests of the trustor depend.

Figure 2 [42] explains how trust (i.e., subjective probability of trust level) and trustworthiness (i.e., objective probability of trust level) can differ and how the difference affects the level of risk the trustor needs to take. The diagonal dashed line is assumed to be marks of well-founded trust in which trust is equivalent to trustworthiness.

Depending on the extent to which the trustor is ignorant about the difference between the believed (i.e., trust) and the actual (i.e., trustworthiness) probability, there is a miscalculation of the involved risk. That is, the subjective aspect of trust results in incorrect risk estimation and improper risk management accordingly. Figure 2 shows the cases in which the probability is miscalculated. In the area below the diagonal line, there is misplaced trust to various degrees that the perceived trust is higher than the actual trustworthiness. Even though risk is an intrinsic characteristic of trust even in well-founded trust, misplaced trust increases risk and thus enhances the chance of deceit as well, as shown in the example marked with b in Figure 2. On the other hand, when the perceived trust is lower than the actual trustworthiness as shown in the example marked with a, the trustee is distrusted more than warranted. In this case, the trustor may lose potentially good opportunities to cooperate with partners with high trustworthiness.

From the above discussions, we can conclude that careful risk estimation is closely linked with building accurate trust relations among participating entities in networks. However, Josang et al. [41] argue that objective trust may not be applicable to decision making in real situations. They define two interesting types of trust: 1) a context independent reliability trust which measures the perceived reliability by another party regardless of the situations which the trustor might face by recognizing possible risk; 2) decision trust as “the extent to which a given party is willing to depend on something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative security even though negative consequences are possible.” Decision trust deals with components such as utility and risk attitude. As an example, one may not trust an old rope for climbing down from the 3rd floor of a building during a fire exercise (i.e., reliability trust) while trusting the rope in a real fire (i.e., decision trust).

The relationship between trust and risk has been investigated in [41][42]. Figure 3 shows an example of three different risk values: low, medium, and high. The value of risk is low for all trust values when the stake is close to zero. Similarly, if the stake is too high, risk is regarded as high regardless of the estimated trust value. Risk is generally low when the trust value is high. However, the risk value should be determined based on the value at stake (e.g., risk probability) since as shown in Figure 3, high risk exists even for the case of trust value = 1. Also important are the aspects (or probability) of opportunity and prospect (or the positive consequence of an opportunity) [41][42]. To buy rubber is to do risky business, but it also gives the opportunity of selling refined products with net profit. The purchaser of rubber should estimate her/his acceptable risk level in terms of the calculated prospects. Josang et al. [41] and Solhaug et al. [42] conclude that trust is generally neither proportional nor inversely proportional to risk.

Some researchers have commented that trust and uncertainty are intimately linked - trust is a mechanism to cope with uncertainty. The level of uncertainty in the information used as trust evidence will also considerably influence the accuracy of trust evaluation [43].

C. Trust Properties in MANETs

Due to the unique characteristics of MANET environments and the inherent unreliability of the wireless channel, the concept of trust in MANETs should be carefully defined. The main properties of trust in MANET environments can be summarized as follows (see Figure 4):

First, trust is dynamic, not static. Trust establishment in MANETs should be based on temporally and spatially local
information: due to node mobility or failure, information is typically incomplete and can change rapidly [8][32]. Adams et al. [44] point out that in order to capture the dynamicity of trust, trust should be expressed as a continuous variable, rather than as a binary or even discrete-valued entity. A continuous valued variable can represent uncertainty better than a binary variable.

Second, trust is subjective [45]. In MANET environments, a trustor node may determine a different level of trust against the same trustee node due to different experiences with the node derived from a dynamically changing network topology.

Third, trust is not necessarily transitive [46]. For example, if A trusts B, and B trusts C, it does not guarantee A trusts C. In order to use the transitivity of trust between two entities to a third party, a trustor should maintain two types of trust: trust in a trustee and trust in the trustee’s recommendation of the third party. For example, Alice may trust Bob about movies, but not trust him at all to recommend other people whose opinion about movies is worth considering or not trust other people that Bob recommended as much as she trusts Bob.

Fourth, trust is asymmetric, not necessarily reciprocal [44]. In heterogeneous MANETs, nodes with higher capability (e.g., more energy or computational power) may not trust nodes with lower capability at the same level that nodes with lower capability trust nodes with higher capability. As a typical example in organizational management, a supervisor tends to trust an employee less than the employee trusts the supervisor.

Fifth, trust is context-dependent [33]. For example, A may trust B as a wine expert but not as a car fixer. Similarly in MANETs depending on the given task, different types of trust (e.g., trust in computational power or trust in unselfishness, trust in forwarding versus trust in reporting) are required.

Figure 5 shows how several trust properties are considered in the literature. Dynamicity and weighted transitivity are most often considered. However, we notice that some existing work does not even consider trust properly; some represent trust as a discrete variable, while others assume that trust is symmetric or completely transitive. As such they do not capture characteristics of trust in a MANET. Further, we could not find any prior work that comprehensively considers all five properties of trust shown in Figure 5. Note that Figure 5 is based on 36 papers and each work may consider multiple trust properties.

In order to properly take into account these unique characteristics of trust in MANETs as described above, any trust-based framework for MANETs should consider the following as well:

First, a decision procedure to determine the trust of an entity should be fully distributed based on cooperative evaluation with uncertain and incomplete evidence, since one cannot rely on a trusted third party such as a trusted centralized certificate authority to take care of trust management as in wired networks [8][9][34].

Second, trust should be determined in a highly customizable way (e.g., flexible to membership changes and to deployment scenarios) without causing disruption to the device computation and communication resources while capturing the various and complicated natural components of an individual’s trust into a network model [34][47].

Third, a trust decision framework should not assume that all nodes are cooperative [34]. In resource-restricted environments, selfishness is likely to be prevalent over cooperation, for example, in order to save battery life or computational power. Thomas et al. [48] discuss the tradeoff between selfishness and altruism of participating nodes in MANETs in terms of prolonging system lifetime (e.g., with system lifetime defined...
as the time to a node’s death due to energy exhaustion) versus reducing selfish behaviors to enhance system throughput.

Finally, trust should be established in a self-organized reconfigurable way in order not to be disrupted by the dynamics of MANET environments [8][48]. In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, trust-based frameworks for MANETs should consider the trade-off issues between security and performance including reliability, fault tolerance, scalability, and energy consumption where resources are restricted but security vulnerability is relatively high.

III. CLASSIFICATIONS, POTENTIAL ATTACKS, AND METRICS FOR MANET TRUST MANAGEMENT

This section discusses classifications, attacks, and performance metrics for MANET trust management. Before reviewing the literature, we would like to clarify some terminologies that have been used interchangeably but sometimes confusingly in the context of trust management.

In general, the term trust management is interchangeably used with the term reputation management [35]. However, there is a slight difference between trust and reputation. According to Liu et al. [49], trust is active while reputation is passive. That is, trust is a node’s belief in the trust qualities of a peer, thus being extended from a node to its peer. Reputation is the perception that peers form about a node. Further, Ruhomaa et al. [10] distinguish trust from reputation, noting that trust puts an emphasis on risk and incentives while reputation focuses on a perception that a party creates through past actions about its intentions in the context of the norms effective within a community. Also, recommendation is frequently used as a way to measure trust or reputation. Recommendation is simply an attempt at communicating a party’s reputation from one community context to another [45][10].

A working definition of trust for Internet applications, and a survey of trust management schemes for such applications may be found in [12].

In most of the literature, reputation management is regarded as part of trust management. Further, the terms trust management and trust establishment are also interchangeably used. To clarify these two terms, according to Aivaloglou et al. [36], trust establishment is a process to deal with the representation, evaluation, maintenance, and distribution of trust among nodes.

Trust management deals with problems such as the formulation of evaluation rules and policies, representation of trust evidence, and evaluation and management of trust relationships among nodes. As Figure 6 explains, trust establishment is one of several trust management tasks.

A. Classifications

According to Solhaug et al. [42], trust management is a special case of risk management with a particular emphasis on authentication of entities under uncertainty and decision making on cooperation with unknown entities. However, the application of trust management has been extended from authentication to various aspects of communications and networking, including secure routing for isolating malicious or selfish nodes, intrusion detection, key management, access control, and other decision making mechanisms. Trust management includes trust establishment (i.e., collection of appropriate trust evidence, trust generation, trust distribution, trust discovery, and evaluation of trust evidence), trust update, and trust revocation [50][42]. This section surveys popularly used classifications of trust management (or establishment).

Li et al. [51] and Li et al. [52] classify trust management as reputation-based framework and trust establishment framework. A reputation-based framework uses direct observations and second-hand information distributed among nodes in a network to evaluate a node. A trust establishment framework evaluates neighboring nodes based on direct observations while trust relations between two nodes without prior direct interactions are built through a combination of opinions from intermediate nodes.

Yonfay [53] suggests two different approaches to evaluate trust: policy-based trust management and reputation-based trust management. Policy-based trust management is based on strong and objective security schemes such as logical rules and verifiable properties encoded in signed credentials for access control of users to resources. In addition, the access decision is usually on the basis of mechanisms having a well-defined trust management language that has strong verification and proof support. Such a policy-based trust management approach usually makes a binary decision according to which the requester is trusted or not, and accordingly the access request is allowed or not. Due to the binary nature of trust evaluation, policy-based trust management has less flexibility. Furthermore, the availability of (or access to) trusted certificate authorities (CA) cannot always be guaranteed, particularly for distributed systems such as MANETs. On the other hand, reputation-based trust management utilizes numerical and computational mechanisms to evaluate trust. Typically, in such a system, trust is calculated by collecting, aggregating, and disseminating reputation among the entities.

According to Li and Singhal [35], trust management can be classified as evidence-based trust management and monitoring-based trust management. Evidence-based trust management considers anything that proves trust relationships among nodes: these could include public key, address, identity, or any evidence that any node can generate for itself or other nodes through a challenge and response process. Monitoring-based trust management rates the trust level of each participating node based on direct information (e.g., observing the benign or malicious behaviors of neighboring nodes, such as packet dropping, and packet flooding leading to excessive resource consumption in the network, or denial of service attacks) as well as indirect information (e.g., reputation ratings, such as recommendations forwarded from other nodes).

Aivaloglou et al. [36] classify two types of trust establishment frameworks for MANETs: certificate-based framework versus behavior-based framework. In the former, mechanisms are defined for pre-deployment knowledge of trust relationships within the network, using certificates which are distributed, maintained and managed, either independently or cooperatively by the nodes. Trust decisions can be made based on a valid certificate that proves trustworthiness of the target node by a certificate authority or by other nodes that the issuer
trusts. In behavior-based framework, each node continuously monitors behaviors of its neighboring nodes in order to evaluate trust. The behavior-based framework is a reactive approach, operating under the assumption that the identities of nodes in the network are ensured by preloaded authentication mechanisms. For example, if a node uses network resources in an unauthorized way, it will be regarded as a selfish or malicious node, and will finally be isolated from other nodes.

Aivaloglou et al. [36] also classify trust establishment schemes in terms of the type of architectures used: hierarchical framework versus distributed framework. In the former, a hierarchy exists among the nodes based on their capabilities or levels of trust. In this framework, centralized certificate authorities or trusted third parties are usually provided for on-line or off-line evidence. Such a centralized infrastructure does not exist in a distributed framework; hence, each node has some, possibly equal, responsibility for acquiring, maintaining, and distributing trust evidence.

Even though reputation management is part of trust management, many researchers further classify reputation management schemes. Adams et al. [44] propose three types of reputation systems: positive reputation, negative reputation, and a combination of the two. Positive reputation systems only consider observations or feedback of the positive behaviors of a node. Negative reputation systems only record complaints or observations of the negative behaviors of a node. Peers are assumed to be trusted and so feedback on behaviors is used to negatively reflect a node’s reputation. To complement the drawbacks of these mechanisms, hybrid reputation systems have been proposed [53]. For more information on reputation management, the readers may refer to [11].

B. Potential Attacks

It is important to ensure that a trust management system itself should not be easily subverted, attacked or compromised. In this section, we discuss various common attacks and describe features important from the viewpoint of trust management. A survey of threat models and specific attacks on ad hoc routing protocols are described by Argyroudis et al. [54] and Djenouri et al. [55].

Liu et al. [49] describe the characteristics of attacks in MANETs by both the nature of attacks and the type of attackers. One classification of attacks is passive attack versus active attack. A passive attack occurs when an unauthorized party gains access to an asset but does not modify its content. Passive attacks include eavesdropping and traffic analysis (e.g., traffic flow analysis). Eavesdropping indicates that the attacker monitors transmissions of message content. Traffic analysis refers to analyzing patterns of data transmission. An active attack occurs when an unauthorized party modifies a message, data stream, or file. Active attacks usually take the form of one of the following four types or combinations: masquerading (i.e., impersonation attack), replay (i.e., retransmitting messages), message modification, and denial-of-service (DoS) (leading to excessive resource consumption in the network).

Yet another way to characterize attacks is based on the legitimacy of an entity in a network: insider attack versus outsider attack [56]. If an entity is authorized to access system resources but employs them in a malicious way (e.g., in a way not approved by the authorizer), it is classified as an insider attack. More specifically, inside attackers exploit bugs in privileged system programs or poorly configured privileges, and then they may install backdoors or Trojan horses or other such mechanisms to facilitate subsequent acquisition of privileged access. On the other hand, an outsider attack is initiated by an unauthorized or illegitimate user. They usually acquire access to an authorized account and try to perpetrate insider attacks. Both attackers may spoof network protocols to effectively acquire access to an authorized account.

Many trust management schemes are devised to detect misbehaving nodes, both selfish nodes as well as malicious nodes. Specific attack examples are described as follows (the list is representative, not exhaustive):

- **Routing loop attacks**: A malicious node may modify routing packets in such a way that packets traverse a cycle and do not reach the intended destination [56].
- **Wormhole attacks**: A group of cooperating malicious nodes can pretend to connect two distant points in the network with a low-latency communication link called a wormhole link, causing disruptions in normal traffic load and flow [57][58][59].
- **Blackhole attacks**: A malicious node, the so called black hole node, may always respond positively to route requests even when it does not have proper routing information. The black hole can drop all packets forwarded to it [60].
- **Grayhole attacks**: A malicious node may selectively drop packets [61], as a special case of a black hole attack. For
example, the malicious node may forward routing packets but not data packets. Similarly, a sinkhole attacker attracts nodes to route through it and then selectively routes packets [49].

- **DoS attacks**: A malicious node may block the normal use or management of communications facilities, for example, by causing excessive resource consumption [62].

- **False information or false recommendation**: A malicious node may collude and provide false recommendations/information to isolate good nodes while keeping malicious nodes connected. In the stacking attack, a malicious node keeps complaining about a peer node and creates the peer’s negative reputation [44][63].

- **Incomplete information**: A malicious node may not cooperate in providing proper or complete information. Usually compromised nodes collude to perform this attack. However, node mobility or link failure, prevalent in MANETs, may also result in the same phenomenon [8][34].

- **Packet modification/insertion**: A malicious node may modify packets or insert malicious packets such as packets with incorrect routing information [64].

- **Newcomer attacks**: A malicious node may discard its bad reputation or distrust by registering as a new user. The malicious node simply leaves the system and joins again for trust revocation, flushing out its previous bad history and starting to accumulate new trust [65].

- **Sybil attacks**: A malicious node can use multiple network identities which can affect topology maintenance and fault tolerant schemes such as multi-path routing [61][49][46].

- **Blackmailing**: A malicious node can blackmail another node by disseminating false information that another node is malicious or misbehaving. This can generate significant amount of traffic and ultimately disrupt the functionality of the entire network [49]. This attack can be seen as false accusation plus DoS attacks in the sense that false information is disseminated leading to a significant amount of resource consumption.

- **Replay attacks**: A malicious node may replay earlier transmitted packets. If the packets include data, this should not cause trouble, and the receiving node just discards erroneous packets. However, if the adversary replays route requests, routing table information would become erroneous, and old locations and routing information might make nodes unreachable [56].

- **Selective misbehaving attacks**: A malicious node behaves badly but selectively to other nodes [66].

- **On-off attacks**: A malicious node may alternatively behave well and badly to stay undetected while disrupting services [66].

- **Conflicting behavior attacks**: A malicious node may behave differently to nodes in different groups to make the opinions from the different good groups conflicting, and ultimately lead to non-trusted relationships [52].

Figure 7 shows various attacks considered in a survey of 43 papers. Note that the "general selfish" category means no specific information is given in the work except that it deals with selfish nodes. Also papers in the "general misbehaving" category deal with a broad range of misbehaving nodes, including malicious and selfish nodes, but do not provide detailed information. "Packet related" attacks include packet dropping, packet modification, packet insertion, and selective packet forwarding. "Identity related" attacks include impersonation, masquerading, and Sybil attacks. Except for the "general selfish" and "general misbehaving" categories, we notice that "false information" (e.g., including false recommendation or reputation) and "packet related" attacks are dominantly considered in the literature on trust management schemes for MANETs. Figure 7 illustrates that most of the attacks considered in the literature on trust management are general attacks often targeted at other aspects of MANETs. Hence, the trust evaluation engine should be robust and degrade gracefully if some information or evidence does not provide a certain level of trust based on partial or potentially corrupted information.

C. **Metrics for MANET Trust Management**

Although many trust management schemes have been proposed to evaluate trust values, no work clearly addresses what should be measured to evaluate network trust. Liu et al. [49] defined trust in their model as reliability, timeliness, and integrity of message delivery to the intended next-hop. Also most trust-based protocols for secure routing calculated trust values based on the characteristics of nodes behaving properly at the network layer. Trust measurement can be application dependent and will be different based on the design goals of proposed schemes.

Based on 31 papers, Figure 8 shows various performance metrics that have been used to evaluate trust management schemes for MANETs. Note that a single work may use multiple performance metrics. Figure 8 shows standard system performance metrics typically used to evaluate trust management systems; these metrics include overhead (e.g., control
packet overheads), throughput, goodput, packet dropping rate, and delay. "Route usage" refers to the number of routes selected particularly when the purpose is for secure routing. "Trust level" is a recently used system metric. Example metrics using the trust level include confidence level of the trust value, trustworthiness, opinion values about other nodes, and trust level per session. "Others" indicates metrics that consider system tolerance based on incorrect reputation threshold, availability, convergence time to reach steady state in trustworthiness of all participating nodes, and percentage of malicious nodes.

IV. MANET TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEMES

This section summarizes trust management schemes that have been developed for MANETs.

We describe trust management schemes based on specific design purposes such as secure routing, authentication, intrusion detection, access control (authorization), and key management. Further, we also describe existing general frameworks for trust (or reputation) evidence distribution and evaluation. Figure 9 summarizes 45 trust management schemes proposed for MANETs during 2000-2009 based on their design purposes. Note that under each research category, we will survey existing works in chronological order.

A. Secure Routing

Most reputation-based trust management schemes are devised for collaborative secure routing by detecting misbehaving nodes, both selfish and malicious ones. Marti et al. [67] proposed a reputation-based trust management scheme that consists of a watchdog that monitors node behaviors and a pathrater that collects reputation and takes response actions (e.g., isolating misbehaving nodes as a result of misbehavior detection). This work is an initiative to dynamically incorporate direct observations into trust values for secure routing. It extends DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) but trust evaluation is based only on direct observations.

Buchegger et al. [68] initiated a new design to develop a routing protocol by introducing a "trust manager" in their scheme. They determined trust levels based on self-monitored information while employing reputation collected from both direct and indirect observations and experiences. They did not show any experimental results, but pose several interesting questions such as what is a sustainable relationship between the total number of nodes in the network, the maximum number of malicious nodes the system can tolerate, and the minimum number of friends per node needed to achieve high tolerance, and a prescribed level of trust. Buchegger et al. [69] also developed a reputation-based trust management scheme called CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes-Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) based on both direct and indirect observations to detect misbehaving nodes. The unique feature in this work is an incentive mechanism for altruistic nodes to be paid as a result of cooperation.

Paul and Westhoff [70] proposed a context-aware mechanism for detecting selfish nodes by extending DSR with a context-aware inference scheme to punish the accused and the malicious accuser. However, the use of digital signatures to disseminate information about the accused and the malicious accuser may not be viable in a resource-constrained MANET environment.

Michiardi et al. [71] proposed CORE (COllaborative REputation) that has a monitoring mechanism complemented by a reputation functionality that differentiates between direct reputation, indirect reputation, and functional reputation (task-specific behavior). The proposed protocol is developed to make decisions about cooperation or gradual isolation of a node. A unique characteristic of this mechanism is that it exchanges only positive reputation information. However, this may limit its reliance on positive reports without the facility to submit negative feedback.

He et al. [72] proposed a reputation-based trust management scheme using an incentive mechanism, called SORI (Secure and Objective Reputation-based Incentive). This scheme encourages packet forwarding and discourages selfish behaviors based on quantified objective measures and reputation propagation by a one-way hash chain based authentication. The performance of this scheme in the presence of malicious nodes, as may be expected in a hostile environment, has not been investigated.

Nekkanti and Lee [73] extended AODV (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector) using trust factor and security level at each node. Their approach deals differently with each route request based on the node’s trust factor and security level. In a typical scheme, routing information for every request would be encrypted leading to large overheads; they propose to use different levels of encryption based on the trust factor of a node, thus reducing overhead. This approach adjusts the security level based on the recognized hostility level and hence can conserve resources; however, the approach does not treat evaluation of trust itself. Li et al. [74] also extended AODV and adopted a trust model to guard against malicious behaviors of nodes at the network layer. They represented trust as opinion stemming from subjective logic. The opinion reflects the characteristics of trust in MANETs, particularly dynamism. The key feature is to consider system performance aspects by dealing with each query based on its level of trust. Depending on the level of trust of nodes involved in the query, there is no need for a node to request and
verify certificates all the time, thereby leading to significant reduction of computation and communication overhead. This work advances trust management by considering a generic trust management framework for MANETs.

Pisinou et al. [75] devised a secure AODV-based routing protocol for multi-hop ad hoc networks for discovering a secure end-to-end route free of any compromised nodes. Their trust-based routing protocol calculates trust values based only on direct observations, assuming that trust is transitive. As a continuation of [68], Buchegger et al. [76] also proposed a fully distributed reputation system in order to cope with false information propagation. The proposed design maintains a reputation and trust rating system about individual nodes by designing a modified Bayesian approach. Recognizing the dynamic nature of trust and reputation, the authors introduced reevaluation and reputation fading as well as redemption mechanisms. Nevertheless, no other characteristics of trust are addressed except for dynamicity.

Ghosh et al. [77] enhanced trust management by considering the confidence level of trust. Their use of the confidence level as a weight on the computed trust value and the method for calculating trust in a fully distributed way provide a general framework that can be applied to non-trust-aware routing protocols. In [77], SORI [72] is extended to alleviate the problem of selfish nodes, by considering the number of forwarding packets to evaluate the confidence level.

Wang et al. [78] proposed a mechanism to distinguish selfish peers from cooperative ones based solely on local observations of AODV routing protocol behaviors. They use a finite state machine model of locally observed AODV actions to construct a statistical description of each peer’s behavior. In order to distinguish between selfish and cooperative peers, a series of well-known statistical tests are applied to features obtained from the observed AODV actions. An interesting extension of this work would be to consider various patterns of node mobility which can give additional insights.

Zouridaki et al. [79] proposed a trust establishment mechanism for MANETs called Herms to improve the reliability of packet forwarding over multi-hop routes in the presence of potentially malicious nodes. Essentially, direct observations are used to evaluate opinions about others. Also, confidence level is used as a weight to evaluate trust of other nodes based on a Bayesian approach. They also introduced a windowing scheme to systematically expire old data to maintain accuracy of the opinion metric in the face of dynamics. However, this scheme is vulnerable to attacks that can exploit the windowing scheme to disseminate false information to accuse good nodes and to keep bad nodes in the system (such as badmouthing attacks).

As an extension, Zouridaki et al. [80] employed both first-hand trust information based on direct observations and second-hand trust information forwarded from neighboring nodes about non-neighboring nodes. This trust establishment scheme can cope with more attacks, including propagation of false recommendations or information, identifying bad nodes among neighboring nodes, colluding attacks, replay attacks, and duplicate attacks. It is noteworthy that they used only security related metrics to evaluate their scheme, such as trustworthiness and the percentage of nodes recognized as bad.

Pirzada et al. [81] proposed and examined the efficacy of trust-based reactive routing protocols in the presence of attacks. This work only considers first hand information to evaluate other nodes’ trust values. Thus, trust evaluation is restricted to direct neighboring nodes.

Sun et al. [46] proposed trust modeling and evaluation methods for secure ad hoc routing and malicious node detection. The unique part of their design is to consider trust as a measure of uncertainty that can be calculated using entropy. In their definition, trust is a continuous variable, and does not need to be transitive, thus capturing some of the characteristics of trust in MANETs. However, this work considers packet dropping as the only component of direct observations to evaluate trust.

Abusalah et al. [82] proposed a trust-aware routing protocol (TARP) and developed a trust metric based on six trust components including software configuration, hardware configuration, battery power, credit history, exposure and organizational hierarchy. However, no consideration was given to trust decay over time and space to reflect uncertainty due to dynamics and incomplete information in MANET environments.

Sen et al. [83] proposed a trust-based mechanism to detect malicious packet dropping nodes based on reputation of neighboring nodes, and take into account the decay of trust over time. This work assumes that a pair of public/private keys can be preloaded to prevent identity-related attacks. However, this may not be scalable for a large network.

Soltanali et al. [84] proposed a distributed mechanism to deal with selfish nodes as well as to encourage cooperation in...
MANETs based on the combination of reputation-based and currency-based incentive mechanism mitigating their defects and improving their advantages. Compared to existing works, this work considers more aspects of trust such as dynamicity, weighted transitivity, and subjectivity. However, it used only packet forwarding behaviors to evaluate a node’s trust and standard performance metrics to evaluate the proposed trust scheme.

Balakrishnan et al. [85] developed a trust model to strengthen the security of MANETs and to deal with the issues associated with recommendations. Their model utilizes only trusted routes for communication, and isolates malicious nodes based on the evidence obtained from direct interactions and recommendations. Their protocol is described as robust to the recommender’s bias, honest-elicitation, and free-riding. This work uniquely considered a context-dependency characteristic of trust in extending DSR.

Li et al. [52] stated that using only a reputation-based trust framework gives only an incomplete partial solution for trust management. They proposed an objective trust management framework (OTMF) for MANETs based on both direct and indirect information for reputation management and showed the effectiveness of OTMF. This work used the term "objective" trust to refer to trust evaluated based on second-hand information. However, this work did not consider node collusion in obtaining second-hand information, which may lead to incorrect recommendations.

Mundinger and Boudec [86] were the first to analyze the robustness of a reputation system based on a deviation test. Using a mean-field approach in their stochastic model, they showed that liars have no impact unless the number of liars exceeds a certain threshold (a phase transition). They provided precise formulas for the critical values and guidelines for an optimal choice of parameters. This work is unique in that it evaluates a system’s tolerance to untrusted nodes; however, the reputation evaluation is based only on the "fake" information.

Moe et al. [87] proposed a trust-based routing protocol as an extension of DSR based on an incentive mechanism that enforces cooperation among nodes and reduces the benefits that selfish nodes can enjoy (e.g., saving resources by selectively dropping packets). This work is unique in that they used a hidden Markov model (HMM) to quantitatively measure the trustworthiness of nodes. In this work, selfish nodes are benign and selectively drop packets. Performance characteristics of the protocol when malicious nodes perform active attacks such as packet modifications, identity attacks, etc., need to be investigated further.

In quorum or threshold schemes, a node must successfully interact with at least k of n distributed trusted authority (TA) nodes. Finding k such nodes can be resource intensive. Reidt et al. [88] prioritize the TA nodes and find a route to connect to k desirable TA nodes so as to minimize a performance metric such as overhead, taking into account reliability and energy consumption of individual nodes. Significant savings over a standard system were shown. An interesting aspect, not considered yet, would be to incorporate trustworthiness into the TA selection and routing scheme.

Ayachi et al. [89] formalized implicit trust relations in AODV and demonstrated that a node can utilize these trust relations to isolate malicious nodes for secure routing. Nodes overhear neighbors’ transmissions from which they can build a neighbor routing table and check for deviation from normal behaviors for AODV. This scheme can detect malicious behaviors such as message replication, message forgery and some instances of message modification. However, it is not amenable to incorporation of other trust metric components, such as intimacy and competence but monitored behaviors could feed into a trust evaluation scheme.

Adnane et al. [90] proposed trust-based countermeasures to isolate malicious nodes extending OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing). Their protocol provides secure routing paths by identifying malicious nodes. The focus of the protocol is to prevent usurpation of node identities. Performance analysis under other types of attacks remains to be investigated.

Although many researchers have developed secure routing protocols using trust, most of the approaches have focused on monitoring routing behaviors and the evaluation of trust has been in the context of communication networks. Further steps should be taken to refine issues such as (1) how to quantify trust in a MANET node; (2) how to employ (a continuous-valued) trust in a routing decision; and (3) how to develop a composite trust metric incorporating task performance goals, taking into account the social aspects of a MANET node.

B. Authentication

There have been efforts to establish trust relationships to ensure authentication in MANETs. Weimerskirch et al. [91] developed a trust model based on human behavior, noting that society can be properly considered as an ad hoc network. They used recommendations from a distributed trust model to construct trust relationships and extended it by a request for recommendations. Based on models derived from observations of human society, recommendations are used to calculate trust, with weights based on the distance of relationships. Their definition does not assume symmetry or complete transitivity, thus capturing essential features of trust in MANETs. The assumption of low-value transactions does not require any evidence-based mechanism to ensure trust such as authentications using public/private keys. Consequently, it is not applicable to systems where hostility may be high, or where consequences of misplaced trust can be severe.

Verma et al. [92] presented an overview of a trust negotiation scheme using DSR and ZRP (Zone Routing Protocol). Their scheme consists of two components. The peer-to-peer component deals with secure communications with neighbors in a lightweight manner. The heavyweight remote component performs trust negotiation and establishes secure end-to-end communication. The main goal of this work is to add robustness in the process of trust negotiation, rather than trust evaluation.

Pirzada and McDonald [93] proposed a trust-based communication model that, based on a notion of a belief, provides a dynamic measure of reliability and trustworthiness in MANETs. The merit of this work is to incorporate utility as general trust and time as situational trust into the overall trust metric to evaluate an agent in the network. However, the situational trust considered is limited to monitoring dynamics of packet forwarding behaviors.
Davis [47] proposed a reliable and structured hierarchical model for trust management in MANETs that is robust to malicious accusation exploits. The scheme deals with explicit revocation of certificates in a distributed way, eliminating the case in which revoked certificates can be accepted as valid. This work assumes that the initial certificates and public keys of all nodes are distributed by a centralized trust authority to each node before the network is deployed which may not be scalable in a large scale MANET. The paper does not discuss the issue of false positives which can lead to continual eviction of nodes, and eventually loss of network connectivity. To counteract this, dynamic reissue of certificates may be needed which may incur extra overhead.

Ngai and Lyu [94] proposed a secure public key authentication service based on their trust model to prevent propagation of false public keys in the presence of malicious nodes. Trust is evaluated based on direct monitoring as well as recommendation. However, this work does not consider group membership changes, the distance from the evaluator, and their effect on the performance of their trust management scheme.

In summary, there has been quite a bit of work on using trust for authentication. However, as in the case of trust-based secure routing, the models and protocols used are based solely on monitoring packet forwarding behaviors.

C. Intrusion Detection

Trust can be used as a basis for developing an intrusion detection system (IDS). Also, IDS itself can help nodes measure trust of other nodes when they cooperate with each other to detect malicious nodes. Albers et al. [95] proposed a general architecture for an intrusion detection system (IDS) called a Local IDS (LIDS) such that intrusion detection can be performed locally among trustworthy participating nodes. Here, trust is used to detect intrusions in the system. In Ahmed et al. [96], IDS provides audit and monitoring capabilities that offer local security to a node and helps perceive the specific trust levels of other nodes. Hence, evaluating trust and identifying intrusions may not be totally separated processes.

D. Access Control

Trust also can be applied in determining whether or not to grant access to certain resources or rights. Gray et al. [97] integrated trust-based admission control with standard role-based access control. By doing this, an access control decision is effectively made without being affected by incomplete information collected in MANETs. A simple distributed blackjack card game application is described, in which the trust-based admission control system is used to assign roles to users based on their trust-based admission rights. It is not clear how the approach can be extended to a general framework applicable to MANETs.

Luo et al. [98] presented a ubiquitous and robust access control solution (URSA) for MANETs based on a localized group trust model so that only well behaving nodes will have access rights to network resources. Their localized group trust model for MANETs is based on threshold cryptography: a node is globally trusted only if it is individually trusted by any k trusted nodes where k is a system-wide trust threshold. This work assumes that the node density is large enough so that any node can find k trusted nodes, perhaps by moving to another location. Interesting extensions of the work include consideration of mobility models other than random waypoint, and trust evaluation under high node mobility situations.

Adams and Davis [17] presented a decentralized access control system implementing sociological trust constructs in a quantitative system to evaluate the relationships between entities. A distributed, node-centric approach to reputation management considers a node’s behavior feedback and gives a reputation index that nodes can use to determine the trustworthiness of their peers before establishing trust relationships. This work further assessed risk using a Bayesian approach to evaluate trust. Interestingly, this work used reputation as a weight to evaluate direct observations, which is a different approach from most existing works. Extensions of the scheme to handle network dynamics would be useful.

Yunfang [53] proposed an integrated mechanism of policy proof and reputation evolution into trust management for decision-making on access control with the goal of providing firm/objective security as well as social/subjective security. However, this work is based on the assumption that trust is completely transitive, and it is not clear how a more realistic transitivity model can be incorporated into the trust management system.

E. Key Management

Virendra et al. [99] proposed a trust-based security architecture for key management in MANETs. This architecture aims to establish keys between nodes based on their trust relationships, and to build secure distributed control using trust as a metric. In their self-organizing trust-based architecture, nodes are organized into trust-based clusters called Physical-Logical Trust Domains (PLTDs), a group of trusted nodes sharing a group key. Nodes can belong to multiple PLTDs. The unique part of this work is that it considers the trust level of each node in a physical as well as a logical sense, e.g., it considers both one-hop nodes as well as previously trusted nodes that are not currently one-hop neighboring nodes. The significant merit of this work is in formalizing a trust metric reflecting trust decay over time and updating trust as dynamics of the network change. However, establishing pair-wise keys based on pair-wise trust may not be feasible in terms of scalability and in the presence of high network dynamics in a large MANET.

Hadjichristofi et al. [63] presented a key management framework that provides redundancy and robustness in the establishment of Security Association (SA) between pairs of nodes. Their proposed key management system (KMS) adopts a modified hierarchical Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model where nodes can dynamically take management roles. The scheme is designed to provide high service availability based on trust-based SA among nodes. However, trust relationships are derived solely from certificate chains. Adams et al. [44] also extended their prior work [63] with a node-centric reputation management approach that considers feedback about a node’s behavior in generating a reputation index to determine the trustworthiness of its peers before establishing...
IPSec security associations. They considered the decay of trust over time using a three-window weighted average. They also derived reputation values from past experiences and current observations and introduced a rehabilitation mechanism to give a second chance to bad nodes. However, no details were given on the type of information that should be directly observed to derive reputation.

Li et al. [100] demonstrated an on-demand, fully localized, and hop-by-hop public key management protocol for MANETs. In this protocol each node generates its own public/private key pairs, issues its certificate to neighboring nodes, keeps received certificates in its certificate repository, and provides authentication service by adapting to the dynamic network topology, without reliance on any centralized server. However, only certificate chains are used to derive trust.

Chang and Kou [101] proposed a Markov chain trust model to obtain the trust values (TVs) for 1-hop neighbors. They designed a trust-based hierarchical key management scheme by selecting a certificate authority server (CA) and a backup CA with the highest TVs. This work gives a rigorous analysis of TVs and considers a variety of attacks. However, it computes TVs only based on direct observations and does not consider trust decay due to using recommendations from remote nodes.

A survey of key management techniques for network-layer security may be found in the work by Hegland et al. [102].

In contrast to secure routing that produces an operational MANET, authentication, intrusion detection, access control, and key management are general trust contexts that also exist outside the area of MANETs. In these applications, it is useful to abstract out the properties of MANETs and consider only the influence of MANETs on any information/evidence gathering, aggregation, and other computation, and design a trust management scheme that considers influences such as the cost/likelihood of obtaining a piece of information in computing trust.

F. Trust Evidence Distribution and Evaluation

Several trust management schemes have been proposed in order to provide a general framework for trust evidence distribution or evaluation in MANETs.

Yan et al. [64] proposed a trust evaluation based security solution for data protection, secure routing, and other network activities. This trust evaluation model called Personal Trusted Bubble (PTB) considers many factors including experience statistics, data value (the higher the value of the data, the higher is the trust needed from other PTBs to transfer it), intrusion black list, reference (reputation/recommendation), personal preference, and PTB policy (related to the entire network’s security requirements and policy). Interestingly, personal preference and PTB reflect the subjective characteristic of trust in deriving trust values. Yan et al. [64] do not validate whether their proposed trust management is correct or useful compared to the actual trust levels, say, based on trustworthiness in Josang and Solhaug’s terminology. In general, validation of trust models is difficult, given the inherent subjectivity in the trust metric, but it is also critical. Jiang and Baras [103] proposed a trust distribution scheme called ABED (Ant-Based trust Evidence Distribution) based on the swarm intelligence paradigm, which is highly distributed and adaptive to mobility. The swarm intelligence paradigm is widely used in dynamic optimization problems (e.g., the traveling salesman problem, routing in communication networks). The key principle in swarm interaction is called stigmergy, indirect communication through the environment. In ABED, “pheromones” are deposited at nodes by mobile agents called “ants” and provide the mechanism for information exchange and interactions. These “ants” can identify the optimal path toward their food, resembling trust evidence in this case. The pheromone regulation process is known to be suitable for dynamically changing environments such as MANETs. However, no specific attackers are considered to prove the robustness of the proposed scheme in the presence of attacks.

In the continuing work, Baras and Jiang [104] addressed distributed trust computation and establishment using random graph theory. This work uses the theory of dynamic cooperative games and identifies how a phase transition from a distrusted state to a trusted state can occur in a dynamic MANET. This work is unique in that it describes how phase transitions occur in MANETs and how these are related to node mobility and network topology in the process of initial trust establishment. Trust relationships are ternary (yes, no, don’t care) and the emphasis is on understanding steady-state behaviors. Incorporating continuous valued trust variables, dynamics, and transient behaviors in this framework would be useful.

Theodorakopoulos and Baras [50] proposed a trust evidence evaluation scheme for MANETs. The evaluation process is modeled as a path problem in a directed graph where vertices represent entities and edges represent trust relations. The authors employed the theory of Semirings to show how two nodes can establish trust relationships without prior direct interactions. Their case study uses the PGP web of trust to express an example trust model based on Semirings and shows that their scheme is robust in the presence of attackers. However, their work assumes that trust is transitive. Further, trust and confidence values are represented as binary rather than continuous values. Even though no centralized trusted third party exists, their work makes use of a source node as a trusted infrastructure, which introduces vulnerability in MANETs.

Recently, Boukerche and Ren [105] proposed a distributed reputation management mechanism called GRE (Generalized Reputation Evaluation), using a comprehensive computational reputation model. GRE seeks to prevent malicious nodes from entering a trusted community. However, no specific attack model was addressed.

Moloney and Weber [106] presented a trust-based security system that generates appropriate trust levels based on the consideration of the main characteristics of MANETs as well as context-awareness. The scheme leverages two existing projects at Trinity College, Dublin, called SECURE and Aithe. SECURE is used for trust management using a trust engine and a risk engine while Aithe collects and manages context information forwarded from sensors. It is worthwhile to extend this work to consider attacks that can propagate incorrect information to generate trust levels.

Very recently, Cho et al. [107] proposed a trust management scheme for group communication systems in MANETs. This
work proposed a composite trust metric reflecting various aspects of a MANET node such as sociability (i.e., social trust) and task performance capability (i.e., QoS trust), and investigated the effect of the trust chain length used by a node to establish acceptable trust levels through subjective trust evaluation. They also discussed the concept of objective trust evaluation based on global knowledge as the basis of validating subjective trust evaluation. More work remains to be done to ascertain feasibility.

The Appendix summarizes trust management schemes surveyed in this section. In the Appendix, the methodology explains how trust evidence is collected and performance metrics refer to the metrics used to evaluate various trust management schemes.

V. FUTURE RESEARCH DISCUSSION

It is clear that sooner or later intelligence will be embedded in each node with cognitive functionality, adopting recent ideas about cognitive networks in wireless networks [108]. Mahmoud [108] defines a cognitive network as having a cognitive process that is capable of perceiving current network conditions and then planning, deciding, and acting on those conditions. Cognitive networks are able to reconfigure the network infrastructure based on past experiences by adapting to continuously changing network behaviors to improve scalability (e.g., reducing complexity), survivability (e.g., increasing reliability), and QoS (e.g., facilitating cooperation among nodes) as proactive mechanisms [48][108]. We suggest using this concept of cognitive networks so that nodes can adapt to changing network behaviors, such as attacker behaviors, degree of hostility, node disconnection due to physical environment such as terrain, energy depletion, or voluntary disconnection for energy saving. Cognition is more than adaptation; it incorporates learning and reasoning.

Another potentially fruitful research direction is to use social relationships in evaluating trust among collaborators in a group setting by employing the concept of social networks. Golbeck et al. [37][38][39] define a social network as a social structure of individuals who may be related directly or indirectly to each other in order to pursue common interests. Yu et al. [109] and Maheswaran et al. [110] use social networks to evaluate the trust value of a node. Examples of social networks are strong social relationships including colleagues or relatives, membership in the same platoon, and loose social relationships including school alumni or friends with common interests or membership in coalition activities. Social trust may include friendship, honesty, privacy, and social reputation or recommendation derived from direct or indirect interactions for "sociable" purposes. In MANETs, metrics used to measure these social trust properties can be frequency of communications, malicious or benign behaviors (e.g., false accusation or recommendation, impersonation), private information revealed, and quality of reputation. The notion of social trust is being incorporated into communication networks. Trust propagation models, some based on notions of social networking, have been proposed in multi-agent systems [114][115][116].

An important and interesting research direction is to construct a composite trust metric based on social trust and other trust components representing quality-of-service (QoS) to successfully perform tasks to meet both performance and trust requirements. We have seen some work in the literature moving in this direction. Cho et al. considered honesty and intimacy (for social trust), and unselfishness and energy (for QoS trust) for trust evaluation [107]. Kohlas et al. [111] used honesty, competency, reliability, and maliciousness and their corresponding negations as trust components to define trust relationships. Yin et al. [112] computed composite reputation values of peers based on evidences from various domains such as customers’ reputation scores or ranks in commercial sites or the certified roles in certain organizations with different weights indicating the importance and robustness of the reputation computation processes. Boursas and Hommel [113] considered QoS aspects such as the visual quality in multimedia and commitment in interactions to calculate node trust levels in large distributed systems. More work remains to be done to understand the best combination of social trust versus QoS trust components used to construct the composite trust metric, as well as the best weights associated with social trust and QoS trust, especially when given application context information for critical mission executions in MANETs.

Not much work has been done in trust management for mobile vehicular systems. A trust architecture for vehicular networks is proposed in [117] that incorporates a policy control model, a proactive trust model, and a social network based system, and takes into account dynamics. When the environment is volatile, associating trust with data becomes even more challenging; a solution is provided in [117] and a case study is discussed in the context of vehicular networks.

The overall qualities of trust in decision making depends on complex interactions between the information, social/cognitive, and communications networks. Trust metrics might be separately defined in each of the networks, but the key issue is to elucidate the mapping of qualitative and quantitative metrics across the networks, to define an end-to-end notion of composite trust, to determine the attributes (presumably many others than trust) in the different networks that affect this composite metric, and identify those that can be controlled and those that cannot [118], especially for trust management in a coalition environment [119].

We suggest that the following design concepts be considered for building MANET trust management systems:

- A trust metric must reflect the unique properties of trust in MANETs, including possibly imperfect transitivity, asymmetry, subjectivity, non-binary nature, decay over time and space, dynamicity, and context-dependency.
- A trust metric must incorporate adequate trust components (e.g., social trust and QoS trust) capable of reflecting mission difficulty (e.g., high risk upon task failure), changing network environments (e.g., lack of bandwidth, increasingly hostile environment as attackers’ strength increases, high communication load), and conditions of participating nodes (e.g., low energy, compromised status).
- A trust management design must support cognitive functionality for each node to achieve adaptability to changing network conditions and MANET environments including
node density, node mobility patterns, scheduling algorithms, and traffic patterns.

- A trust management system should be situation specific or situation aware [120][121][122]. Situational awareness includes mission contexts and requirements in terms of security, performance and reliability. Depending on the required levels of security, performance and/or reliability, a different level of trust can be adopted reflecting mission contexts and situations.

- A trust metric must adequately reflect tradeoffs in altruism versus selfishness, trust versus reliability, availability, survivability, or security so as to contribute to improved system performance. In addition, since gathering information from spatially remote areas will consume more resources (e.g., time or energy) but improve decision making, one should investigate the tradeoff between resource consumption and decision making accuracy and timeliness. One may utilize aggregation technique to reduce resource consumption in obtaining information from distant nodes.

- A trust management design must allow optimal settings to be identified under various network and environmental conditions so as to maximize the overall trust of the system for successful mission executions. Equally important is an understanding of sensitivity to deviations from the optimal settings.

- There has been no comparison of trust management schemes versus conventional security schemes in terms of metrics of interest in MANETs. One example could be the comparison of trust management schemes to cryptographic schemes in detecting misbehaving nodes.

- Local trust is easy to understand and compute, since it only involves tracking behaviors of neighboring nodes. Local trust is easy to defend from malicious attacks. Global trust is harder to compute and update; Eigentrust [123] is an example of a global trust metric. But a non-local definition of trust is subject to subversion and manipulation by colluding nodes. Zhang et al. [124] provide a robust version of the Eigentrust algorithm. A critical question is: is trust inherently local? How can a global trust metric be computed and distributed reliably?

- Recently, social trust derived from social networks has received considerable attention for establishing trust in various applications. MANET designers may also want to take into account social trust.

- The survey has focused on a trust value associated with individual nodes. But often we may be interested in associating trust with data or with a group of nodes or entities. Many of the concepts discussed here will extend naturally.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Trust is a multidimensional, complex, and context-dependent concept. Although trust-based decision making is in our everyday life, trust establishment and management in MANETs face challenges due to the severe resource constraints, the open nature of the wireless medium, the complex dependence between the communications, social and application networks, and, hence, the complex dependency of any trust metric on features, parameters, and interactions within and amongst these networks.

In this paper, we surveyed and analyzed existing trust management schemes in MANETs to provide MANET trust network protocol designers with multiple perspectives on the concept of trust, an understanding of trust properties that should be observed in developing trust metrics for evaluating trust, and insights on how a trust metric can be customized to meet the requirements and goals of the targeted system. A composite trust metric that captures aspects of communications and social networks, and corresponding trust measurement, trust distribution, and trust management schemes are interesting research directions. For dynamic networks, such as military MANETs, these schemes should have desirable attributes such as ability to adapt to environmental dynamics, scalability, reliability, and reconfigurability.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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APPENDIX

A SURVEY ON EXISTING TRUST MANAGEMENT SCHEMES IN MANETs

See Tables I-VI.

REFERENCES


### TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors, Ref. no</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Attacks considered</th>
<th>Performance metrics</th>
<th>Trust property</th>
<th>Trust management model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buchegger &amp; Boudec [68]</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation, Reputation</td>
<td>Various malicious packet forwarding, DoS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity, Dynamicity</td>
<td>An extension of DSR using a hybrid scheme of selective altruism and utilitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul &amp; Westhoff [70]</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation, Reputation</td>
<td>Masquerading, Packet modification</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Contextaware Inference Mechanism An extension of DSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michalski &amp; Motva [71]</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation, Reputation</td>
<td>Selfish nodes, False information propagation, DoS attack</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dynamicity, Subjectivity</td>
<td>Extension of [67] Functional trust concept introduced to combine subjective direct observation plus indirect information</td>
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<tr>
<td>He et al. [72]</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation, Reputation</td>
<td>Packet dropping, Selfish nodes, Impersonation, False information propagation</td>
<td>Throughput, Overhead</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>Secure and Objective Reputation-based Incentive (SORI) based on DSR Incentive mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nekkanti &amp; Lee [73]</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>General outside attackers</td>
<td>Average endtoend delay, Packet delivery ratio</td>
<td>Trust value ranges from 0 to 10 as an integer</td>
<td>Trust-based adaptive AODV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li et al. [74]</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation, Recommendation</td>
<td>General malicious nodes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Dynamicity, Asymmetry, Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>An extension of AODV using subjective logic</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
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**Note:**
- "Utility" metric refers to the ratio of the number of transmissions originated at the node itself to the number forwarded as an intermediate node on behalf of other nodes [69]. This metric can be represented as A/(A+B) where A is the number of packets transmitted by a node for itself and B is the number of packets transmitted for others.
- "Weighted transitivity" means that trust is transitive only with a weight reflecting decay of trust depending on confidence level, credibility, reliability, timeliness, reputation, distance, etc.

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[30] F. D. Schoorman, R. C. Mayer, and J. H. Davis, “An Integrative...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors, Year, Ref. no.</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pisinou et al. (2004) [75]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Black hole, Route injection, Selfish nodes</td>
<td>Route overhead, Algorithm running time</td>
<td>Transitivity, Dynamicity</td>
<td>An extension of AODV called Trust-embedded AODV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchegger &amp; Boudec (2004) [76]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>False information propagation</td>
<td>Mean detection time for misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>Bayesian Model, Trust revocation introducing redemption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghosh (2005) [77]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Reputaion</td>
<td>Black hole, Gray hole, False accusation, DoS</td>
<td>Overhead Routes selected Route errors</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>Trust-embedded (TAODV) Incentive mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang et al. (2005) [78]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>False accusation, False information</td>
<td>Detection rate, False alarm</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Specification-based approach as an extension of AODV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zouiadik et al. (2006) [79]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Packet dropping, Packet misrouting, Packet injection Added in [2006]</td>
<td>Confidence level over trust value, Trustworthiness, Opinion values about other nodes</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity, Dynamicity</td>
<td>Hems, Bayesian Model, Trust revocation introducing Window scheme to flush out stale trust information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirzada et al. (2006) [81]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Packet modification, Black hole, Gray hole</td>
<td>Packet loss, Packet forwarded, Throughput, Overhead, Latency, Path optimality, Detection probability</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>Trust-based reactive routing protocols (DSR, AODV, TOR) Effortreturnbased trust model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun et al. (2006) [46]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation on packet dropping rate Recommendation</td>
<td>False recommendation, Newcomer attack, Sybil attack</td>
<td>Trust level, Packet dropping ratio</td>
<td>Trust is a continuous value, Subjectivity, Asymmetry, Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>Information theory-based modeling: Entropy-based trust model and Probability-based trust model</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Abusalah et al. (2006) [81]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Packet dropping</td>
<td>Routing overhead</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>TARP (trust-aware routing protocol)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sen et al. (2006) [83]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td>Packet dropping rate</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>Group trust value is used based on reputations for neighboring nodes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soltnahi et al. (2007) [84]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Reputation only based on direct and indirect observation</td>
<td>Throughput</td>
<td>Detection percentage</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>An extension of DSR with the components of monitor, reputation manager, opinion manager, routing and forwarding manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balakrishman et al. (2007) [85]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Packet dropping DoS (flooding)</td>
<td>Packet delivery ratio</td>
<td>Context-dependent</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity, Trust is a continuous value using DSR Fellowship model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li et al. (2008) [52]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>Selective misbehaving</td>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td>Ratio of trustworthiness over reputation for both good and bad nodes</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>Objective Trust Management Framework (OTMF), Modified Bayesian model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundinger &amp; Boudec (2008) [86]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td>The incorrect reputation threshold point</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>A general framework to evaluate robustness of reputation systems by analyzing them using deviation test</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moe et al. (2008) [87]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Selective packet dropping by selfish nodes</td>
<td>Trustworthiness of a node</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>Trust-based Secure Routing (TSR), An extension of DSR Incentive mechanism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reidt et al. (2009) [88]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>N/A (assume that information can be derived through observation or other mechanisms)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Communication cost</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>A group of TA nodes are selected based on their reliability, energy level, and connectedness with the network</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors, Year, Ref. no</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adnane et al. (2009) [90]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct &amp; indirect information</td>
<td>General malicious nodes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Extension of OLSR No specific trust metric shown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayachi et al. (2009) [89]</td>
<td>Secure routing</td>
<td>Direct information</td>
<td>Message replication/ forgery/modification</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Extension of AODV No specific trust metric shown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weimerskirch et al. (2001) [91]</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>Recommendation References</td>
<td>Packet modification BREACH of confidentiality DoS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>Distributed Trust Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verma et al. (2001) [92]</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>General inside and outside attackers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Transitivity</td>
<td>An extension of DSR and ZRP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pirzada &amp; McDonald (2004) [93]</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Packet modification Packet fabrication Impersonation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity Dynamicity</td>
<td>An extension of DSR An extension of Marsh’s trust model [125]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Davis (2004) [47]</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>Evidence-based (i.e., certificates)</td>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Certificate issuance, storage, validation, and revocation are considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngai &amp; Lyu (2004) [94]</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>False certificate</td>
<td>Successful, failure, and unreachable rate for detecting false certificates</td>
<td>Trust is a continuous value</td>
<td>Asymmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albers et al. (2002) [95]</td>
<td>Intrusion Detection</td>
<td>Direct observation for anomaly detection or misuse detection Policy-based</td>
<td>General misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Symmetry</td>
<td>Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmed et al. (2006) [96]</td>
<td>Intrusion Detection</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Black hole Packet dropping Malicious flooding Routing loop Overhead</td>
<td>False alarm rate</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Leverage IDS to evaluate trust level of other nodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gray et al. (2002) [97]</td>
<td>Access control</td>
<td>Policy-based (local and global policies)</td>
<td>Loss of authorization</td>
<td>Trust level per session</td>
<td>Context-dependency Weighted transitivity Trust is a continuous value</td>
<td>Trust-based admission control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Authors, Year, Ref no</th>
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<th>Performance metrics</th>
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<th>Trust management model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adams &amp; Davis (2005) [17]</td>
<td>Access control</td>
<td>Direct observation Reputation</td>
<td>General misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Conditional transitivity¹</td>
<td>Bayesian Model for risk assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunfang (2007) [53]</td>
<td>Access control</td>
<td>Direct observation Reputation Policy based</td>
<td>General misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity</td>
<td>Integrated (policy-based plus reputation-based) adaptive trust management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virendra et al. (2005) [99]</td>
<td>Key Management</td>
<td>Direct/indirect observation</td>
<td>False key generation Compromise of other nodes’ keys</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Weighted transitivity Subjectivity</td>
<td>Physical-Logical Trust Domains (PLTDs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjichristofi et al. (2005) [63]</td>
<td>Key Management</td>
<td>Direct observation Reputation</td>
<td>Stacking attack General malicious nodes</td>
<td>% of available nodes with capability of service provision Average shortest path % of isolated nodes Success ratio to obtain system service</td>
<td>Trust ranges from 1 to 100</td>
<td>Dynamically changing continuous value A modified hierarchical trust PKI model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams et al. (2005) [17]</td>
<td>Key Management Nonreputation</td>
<td>Direct observation Reputation</td>
<td>Selfish nodes Blackmailing Stacking attack</td>
<td>Trust value</td>
<td>Context dependent Trust is a continuous number</td>
<td>Interpersonal trust model Redemption Simple weighted model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li et al. (2006) [100]</td>
<td>Key Management</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Fake certificate Tampering</td>
<td>Average overhead of the repository in each node</td>
<td>Transitivity</td>
<td>Localized Public-Key Management (LPM) Combining certificate chain and communication path based on PGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang &amp; Kuo (2009) [101]</td>
<td>Key Management</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>On-Off attack Conflicting behavior attack Newcomer attack Fake ID attack Cheating attack Collusion attack</td>
<td>Trust value Packet delivery ratio</td>
<td>Trust value is a discrete value</td>
<td>Markov chain trust model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yan et al. (2003) [64]</td>
<td>Trust evaluation</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>Reputation Recommendation</td>
<td>Black hole DoS</td>
<td>Planned metric: security level</td>
<td>Subjectivity Weighted transitivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹ Trust transitivity is a measure of how trust in one node affects the trust in another node. In a direct observation-based system, the transitivity can be calculated as a discrete value, whereas in a reputation-based system, it can be a continuous value.

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TABLE V

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TABLE VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors, Ref. no</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baras &amp; Jiang (2004) [104]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust computation</td>
<td>Local direct observation (certificates) Recommendation (i.e., voting)</td>
<td>General misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>Probability of having at least one secure path between trusted pairs percentage of trusted nodes in the network Time taken to converge to a steady state in trustworthiness of all nodes</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>Distributed trust computation model using graph theory and random theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodorakopoulos &amp; Baras (2006) [50]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust evaluation</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td>Confidence level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boukerche &amp; Ren (2008) [105]</td>
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<td>Reputation evaluation</td>
<td>Direct observation</td>
<td>General misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>Query overhead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cho et al. (2009) [107]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Battlefield trust establishment under no prior interactions</td>
<td>Direct/indirect observation</td>
<td>General misbehaving nodes</td>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>Dynamicity</td>
<td>Quantitative modeling technique used called hierarchical Stochastic petri nets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


