Prospects for Closer Israeli-Nato Cooperation

by

David J. Ingel

September 2015

Thesis Advisor: David Yost
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PROSPECTS FOR CLOSER ISRAELI-NATO COOPERATION

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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This thesis examines the prospects for closer Israeli-NATO cooperation by analyzing the historical context and possible benefits and constraints of developing the relationship. Starting from the inception of NATO and the establishment of Israel, the analysis considers the experiences of the small Middle Eastern nation and the large collective defense organization. Israel’s limited experiences in multilateral settings, its doctrine of self-reliance, Turkey’s critical role, and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict have constrained NATO and Israel from cultivating the full potential of the relationship. Of all the impediments, the Israel-Palestinian conflict stands out as the most significant, an undercurrent to them all. Despite Israel’s growing isolation in the Middle East, Israel and NATO have gained significant ground in deepening their bilateral relationship. Facing similar threats from common radical adversaries, both Israel and NATO stand to gain significant benefits in further developing the partnership. In order to gain more support from the members of NATO, as well as for other reasons, Israel must take progressive steps toward a peaceful resolution with the Palestinians.
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<td>Civil Emergency Planning</td>
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<td>EADRCC</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>Individual Cooperation Program</td>
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<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

What are the prospects for closer Israeli-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation? This thesis will investigate factors that support closer cooperation between Israel and NATO, such as shared political values and security interests, and factors that complicate and constrain collaboration, such as disagreements on the Palestinian question and the divergent economic and political interests of specific NATO Allies in the Middle East. The thesis will examine Israeli-NATO relations since 1949, the evolution of Israeli views on NATO, and the development of policies toward Israel of influential NATO Allies.

From a historical perspective, the following topics will be examined: NATO’s interests in the Middle East, NATO’s position on Israeli security, contemporary Israeli perceptions of NATO, the evolution of the Israeli-NATO relationship since 1949, and the potential benefits and costs of a closer Israeli-NATO partnership. NATO’s current policy on enlargement and partnership will be considered as well as the political and security factors that may support closer cooperation. Given the historical development of NATO, Israel, and their cooperation, the thesis will assess the extent to which a closer NATO-Israeli partnership is probable, the circumstances that might promote it, and its potential implications.

A. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH

Instability within the Middle East has been persistent since World War I. The conflicts of the Middle East are not held within the confines of the ill-fated post-Ottoman borders. The establishment of Israel in 1948 introduced a new and enduring factor in the region’s politics. Powers external to the Middle East, including the United States and Russia, took sides in the Israeli-Arab struggle, heightening Middle Eastern volatility with proxy wars. The spread of Islamic extremism throughout the Middle East further complicated attempts to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. Although several struggles rage within the Middle East, the Israeli-Arab conflict is a consistent variable in the region’s instability.
The United States befriended Israel from the founding of the new state in 1948. Washington maintains a strong bond with Israel, the only stable democracy in the Middle East. Since 1948, the United States has shown unquestionable resolve to support the State of Israel. While the Israeli-Arab conflict has persisted and evolved, the collapse of the Soviet Union obliged NATO to adapt its policies to contemporary problems. The NATO Allies created the Alliance in 1949 in order to deter Soviet expansionism. In NATO’s latest Strategic Concept (2010), the Alliance has reaffirmed its determination to be prepared for collective defense, to deal with all stages of crises, and to promote cooperative security. Specifically, the Strategic Concept notes dynamic political shifts and extremism as factors aggravating the instability of the world. A founding member of NATO, the United States is politically entrenched in the Middle East. Israel’s proximity to Europe, its democratic political system, and its special relationship with the United States have helped to draw attention to the possibility of a greater Israeli-NATO partnership.

The implications of a deeper Israeli-NATO partnership are as convoluted as its prospects. Some NATO members have taken opposite sides on the regional conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. NATO’s enlargement since the end of the Cold War has led to its engrossment into issues of the newly added states. Since 1991, NATO has also undertaken an immense array of partnership activities. In a broader partnership with Israel, NATO would undoubtedly thicken its involvement, and perhaps become as entangled in the Israeli-Arab conflict as the United States. If a deeper partnership with Israel evolved into possible membership, NATO would have to amend Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty to allow a non-European state to enter the alliance. According to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “by unanimous agreement,” the Allies may invite “any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty.”¹ The political consequences of NATO’s entrenchment in Middle Eastern affairs could be even more complex if NATO chose to support Israel in the Israeli-Arab conflict. As the United States is continually faulted by Muslim nations for its unquestionable resolve to support the State of Israel, NATO would also be criticized if it chose to align with Israel in

opposition to the state’s antagonists. Therefore, NATO-Israeli relations continue to evolve, a deeper partnership can only be built on a foundation of a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement.

B. METHOD

Utilizing a comparative analysis, NATO and Israeli interests, benefits, and constraints in pursuing closer cooperation will be compared and contrasted to determine the feasibility of greater collaboration. The critical argument, Israel’s need to resolve the Palestinian conflict, will be illustrated through the perceptions of the Israeli government and NATO. Factors and variables of shared interests and collaboration constraints will be evaluated. The Israeli-NATO relationship will be surveyed through articles, studies, and government documentation. The hypothesis will be investigated through an analysis of the historical development of NATO-Israeli relations.

C. HYPOTHESES

This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue to isolate Israel and constrain its ability to establish a closer NATO-Israeli partnership. As an alliance that shares the same fundamental core values as Israel, NATO will hesitate to cultivate a closer partnership with Israel, unless Israel resolves the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is very little literature on the potential for a greater Israeli-NATO partnership. Although there are no book-length studies, there are a two “policy papers outlining the rationale for full NATO membership of Israel—one written by two Americans, Ron Asmus and Bruce Jackson, and the other written by Uzi Arad, Oded Eran, and Tommy Steiner.” Additionally, there is a formal “Israeli proposal to upgrade relations in January 2005,” and a report by Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar.

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titled *NATO – An Alliance for Freedom.* The bulk of the literature consists of articles by scholars, mainly political scientists and historians, debating the idea of Israeli membership in NATO and the prospects and implications of deeper Israeli-NATO partnership.

In 2005, Ronald Asmus, then the executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transatlantic Democracies, wrote that the “Euro-Atlantic community itself has undergone a profound process of transformation since the end of the Cold War, shifting its strategic focus east and south toward the wider Middle East,” and initiating dialogue on Israeli-NATO and Israeli-EU relations. Asmus and Jackson contended that Israel, the United States, and NATO would gain a great deal from a closer Israeli-NATO partnership.

Jose Maria Aznar, Prime Minister of Spain in 1996–2004, contended in the Alliance of Freedom report that “we must support Israel in its fight against terror. We must recognize that although the Israelis are fighting for themselves, they are also fighting for us all.” As NATO and the United States have been involved in Middle Eastern politics, Israel “should aspire to have the closest possible relations with the actors and institutions setting those policies.” Additionally, Aznar wrote, NATO can become a “critical element in helping to provide the security Israel will need to take steps to make peace with a Palestinian state in the Middle East.”

Asmus and Jackson asserted that a closer NATO-Israeli partnership would “end Israel’s political and diplomatic isolation and strengthen Israel’s position vis-à-vis other

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3 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
parts of the world, including its adversaries in the Middle East.”

The United States would benefit by narrowing “the transatlantic rift over how to deal with Israel.” European actors would “move from the sidelines to center stage in the peace process and Middle East politics more generally.” Although “many Europeans could be concerned that they are being drawn into potential conflicts and assuming new risks in the region,” solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be a significant variable in stabilizing the Middle East. Asmus and Jackson argued that Israel must “decide whether it wants to pursue a Euro-Atlantic upgrade.” Israel could begin, Asmus and Jackson suggested, by negotiating with the Palestinians and “turning to those NATO nations that it considers to be friends and that are likely to be most interested in developing this relationship.”

Three Israeli experts—Uzi Arad (Chairman of Israel’s Institute of Defense Studies), Oded Eran (a former Israeli Ambassador to NATO), and Tommy Steiner (a senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya)—compiled a proposal contending that the ever-growing presence of terrorism, shared interests and ideologies, and proximity to Europe have made Israel a country of potential strategic interest to NATO. The threats that the NATO Allies face, “mainly radical Islam, global terrorism, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), are same threats Israel faces.” Zaki Shalom of the Jaffe Center of Strategic Studies asserted “the major threat” against “which NATO is supposed to defend, comes from radical Islam, whose primary sources of power lie mainly in the Middle East.”

Israel principles parallel those of Western and European democratic political regimes in

9 Asmus and Jackson, “Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?” 50.
10 Ibid., 53.
11 Ibid., 55.
12 Ibid., 56.
14 Ibid.
a region hostile to liberties and freedoms. Democracy and the rule of law are also consistent with NATO policy. Tommy Steiner asserted that NATO-Israeli relations will be determined by NATO’s “implementation of its new partnership policy; its role as an alliance and capacity to deepen Western strategic cooperation and defense integration; and its strategic-military role in an increasingly volatile Middle East.” Steiner further contended that Israel must take steps to accept multilateral cooperation and engage in negotiations that will end the Palestinian conflict.

According to Martin van Creveld, NATO and Israel have begun to frame their relationship through the Individual Cooperation Program (ICP). Israel has shown a steady will to participate in various NATO exercises. In 2001, Israel was the first state within the Mediterranean Dialogue framework to sign a security agreement with NATO. The security agreement provides “a framework for the protection of classified information.” In December 2004, Israel took part in the “first Mediterranean Dialogue-NATO meeting at the level of foreign ministers.” Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer came to Israel in 2005 in his official capacity, just as the first joint Israel-NATO naval exercise was taking place. That same year, Israel joined the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and “Israeli troops participated in NATO exercises in both the Mediterranean and Ukraine.” Having conducted only 35 events in the first decade since its inception, the Mediterranean Dialogue lacked “a clear vision” of “goals, objectives, and cooperation programs.” The Herzilya proposal explains that the dialogue eventually matured.

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16 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 1.
17 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.”
18 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 1.
22 Ibid.
23 Van Creveld, “NATO, Israel and Peace.”
24 Ibid.
25 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.”
because of two main reasons: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rise in
tensions caused by the Second Intifada in 2000–2005.26

Israel’s determination to deepen its partnership with NATO comes just as “the
vast majority of NATO allies want to transform the alliance … to meet new strategic
challenges and threats.”27 The Herzliya proposal argues that NATO should tailor its new
partnerships by giving special recognition to those that “serve NATO’s goals and
missions,” placing Israel at the forefront of candidates.28 However, “the assessment based
… on two years of informal meetings … in Israel, Europe, and North America, co-
organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Atlantic Forum of
Israel,” found the following issues:29 Israel’s multilateral inexperience, the mixed
prospects for Israeli-European cooperation, the need for a step by step process, and the
Turkish-Israeli dilemma.30

Multilateral Inexperience – Although many “governments find multilateral
cooperation with other like-minded governments a most effective and efficient form of
governance,” Israel has very limited experience in the realm, and functions mostly
bilaterally.31 Israel prefers bilateral cooperation due to the additional constraints usually
associated with multilateral agreements. Moreover, Israel has historically not been able to
pursue its interests in a multilateral forum. In most international forums, “the
overwhelming … majority that Arab and Muslim countries muster … has led Israel to
generally perceive these organizations as hostile.”32 For example, Israel was only
accepted into a United Nations (UN) regional group, the Western European and Others
Group, in 2002, and it is still excluded from “all other UN regional group systems.”33

26 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.”
27 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 2.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 2–4.
32 Ibid., 3.
33 Ibid.
Lastly, multilateral cooperation is usually regionally based. Israel does not currently have the regional relationships necessary to pursue such cooperation.

**Mixed Prospects for Israeli-European Cooperation** – Despite the tensions arising from the Israeli-Arab conflict, increased cooperation with European states will ultimately benefit Israel and the European states involved. Arad, Eran, and Steiner hold that the evolution of collaboration between the United States and Europe has become the “nucleus of world politics.”\(^{34}\) The entrenchment of the United States and European countries in the Middle East only broadens the need for Israeli policy makers to become a part of the trans-Atlantic cooperation. The volatility of rising threats in the Middle East will increase European and American interest in the region. The fact that NATO faces threats that are similar to those confronting Israel will eventually lead to closer ties. Israel’s prolonged experience with countering Islamic extremist threats has enabled Israel to teach anti-terrorism techniques to the United States.\(^{35}\) Additionally, with an Israeli-European forum, misconceptions can be alleviated, promoting a broader sense of unity. However, some observers argue that a broadened partnership with Europe would constrain the Israeli agenda and could prove to be useless.\(^{36}\) Israel has been able to defend itself from multilateral and broad threats.\(^{37}\) Israeli contends daily with threats to its existence from militant groups and Arab states. A multilateral partnership with NATO may impede Israel’s ability to take military action on its own.

**The Need for a Step by Step Process** – A closer NATO–Israeli partnership can only be achieved with a step by step process. First, Israel must “preserve and enhance its bilateral strategic alliance with the United States.”\(^{38}\) In the second step, Israeli politicians must come to the understanding that “NATO membership does not necessarily connote a loss of independent strategic freedom of action.”\(^{39}\) Since the establishment of the State of

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34 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 4–6.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 4.
38 Ibid., 6–7.
39 Ibid., 7–9.
Israel, politicians have emerged from the ranks of the Israeli Defense Force. Israeli policies have been designed to counter the constant threat to Israel’s existence.\textsuperscript{40} Arad, Eran, and Steiner assert that NATO should be utilized as a forum for resolving all Israeli-European diplomatic disputes before a greater NATO-Israeli partnership can be established.\textsuperscript{41} With the creation of a NATO-Israeli forum, they argue, diplomatic ties between the parties will strengthen. Lastly, Israel must settle the conflict with the Palestinians because NATO will not align with a state already at war.\textsuperscript{42}

**Turkish – Israeli Dilemma** – Tommy Steiner has argued that Turkey should take a role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the oldest NATO members, Turkey has taken every opportunity to exclude Israel from NATO and international forums, operations, and exercises since 2008.\textsuperscript{43} He contends that the support of Turkey is important to the progress of multilateral peace negotiations involving Israel. If Turkey took steps to create a forum for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Steiner has asserted, it would not only raise its own credibility in the world, but also provide a footing for Israel to join NATO.\textsuperscript{44}

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a large role in Israel’s international isolation. Helga Haftendorn, professor emeritus at the Free University of Berlin, has added, “if Israel joined NATO, would the Palestinians not demand similar security guarantees before accepting Israel’s right to exist?”\textsuperscript{45} Through bilateral agreements and self-reliance, Israel has been able to defend its borders. However, internal strife and the Palestinian conflict will continue to lead many countries to ostracize Israel. According to Zaki Shalom of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, NATO will “hesitate to establish full relations with Israel as long the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues and a political

\textsuperscript{40} Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 6.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 6–13.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.”

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

agreement is not in sight.” The multinational Middle Eastern problems will ultimately require multilateral solutions that include Israel. Shalom contends that the “diplomatic, strategic-defense, military technological, and economic advantages” of a greater partnership with NATO should be used to entice Israel into a Palestinian peace agreement. Israel must make strides to resolve the Palestinian conflict or continue to face growing international isolationism.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis will frame the argument by initially providing historical background on NATO and Israel, including their origins and key developments. Current strategic interests and conflicts will also be scrutinized in Chapter II. The evolution of the Israeli-NATO relationship and an analysis of NATO-Israeli alliance constraints and benefits will be presented in Chapter II. The final chapter, Chapter IV, will sum up the prospects for closer Israeli-NATO cooperation, if not Israeli membership in the alliance, and the steps that will hinder or assist in promoting it.

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46 Shalom, “Israel and NATO.”
47 Ibid.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO AND ISRAEL

This chapter provides a historical foundation to the prospect of closer Israeli-NATO cooperation. The origins, history, political interests, and security concerns of the North Atlantic Organization are briefly discussed, followed by an examination of NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. The section on the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue provides context to the overview of Israeli-NATO cooperation and leads to a brief discussion of Israel since its inception. Israel’s security concerns, political system, and contemporary issues are depicted. Given the dynamics of Israeli-American and Israeli-Turkish relations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stands out as the main obstacle to a closer Israeli-NATO partnership.

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949. Although references to a possible post-war alliance can be traced back to speeches during World War II, the catalyst that ultimately drew Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States to begin negotiations was the rise of tensions between the Soviet Union and Western countries. Upon the conclusion of World War II, “the Soviet Union’s leader, Joseph Stalin, made clear his intention to establish Communist regimes wherever the Soviet Armed Forces could reach.”48 Stalin’s communist ambitions were manifested in newly acquired Eastern European Soviet territories, over twice the size of West Germany.49 Prior to the inception of the alliance, the United States was already establishing anti-communist policies. The Truman Doctrine was based on George F. Kennan’s famous theory that the USSR could only be managed through containment. Combined with the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine was an official American strategy to prevent the spread of Communism. In a Soviet retort, in September 1947, Stalin founded the Communist Information Bureau, in order to promote and organize communist movements. The failure of diplomacy within the Council of Foreign

49 Ibid.
Ministers, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Blockade of Berlin set the stage for Canada, ten Western European states, and the United States to form an alliance able to deter further Soviet encroachment. Signed on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded by twelve countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Allies agreed that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Although the foundation of the alliance was a shared commitment to deter “Soviet expansionism,” the objectives of the Allies also included “forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.”

The organization, structure, and effectiveness of NATO began to mature shortly after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although at the onset the Alliance did not have a military structure, the “Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949” and the “North Korean invasion of South Korea” in 1950 illustrated “the need for a standing military structure.” NATO’s deterrence policy was described as consistent with the United States “doctrine of Massive Retaliation.” The doctrine encompassed threatening a nuclear response to a Soviet attack. With the political-military postures of NATO and the Soviet Union firmly in place during the era of the Cold War, Western Europe progressively cultivated stability and economic prosperity. NATO was expanded with “Greece and Turkey in 1952 … and West Germany in 1955.” In response to NATO expansion, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact in 1955, re-affirming Cold War

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 4.
55 Ibid.
56 NATO, “Short History of NATO.”
57 Ibid.
contentions. With Moscow’s concurrence the German Democratic Republic erected the Berlin Wall in 1961.\textsuperscript{58}

From 1950 to the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991, the history of NATO and the Soviet Union involved periods of tension as well as phases described as “détente, [and] acceptance of the status quo.”\textsuperscript{59} Although crises and proxy wars tirelessly reaffirmed the Cold War phenomena, Western diplomats began to pursue an easing of tensions through policy changes. In 1967, NATO adopted the policy of Flexible Response.\textsuperscript{60} NATO’s role as a defensive organization, described in a report entitled “The Future Tasks of the Alliance,”\textsuperscript{61} and delivered “in December 1967 by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), recommended that NATO should have a political track promoting dialogue”\textsuperscript{62} and positive political change of the “status quo, not preserving it.”\textsuperscript{63} In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union, other members of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Allies, and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region (except for Albania) agreed on the “fundamental freedom of their citizens, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,”\textsuperscript{64} “confidence-building measures,” and “respecting the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of states.”\textsuperscript{65} The Helsinki Final Act did not conclude the Cold War, but it did set a precedent for significant negotiations and diplomacy.

After an escalation in tensions and a showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in 1987. The signing of this Treaty is “regarded as the initial indication that the Cold War

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{58} NATO, “Short History of NATO.”
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
was coming to an end.” Throughout the Cold War, the USSR and its allies attempted to match the military industrialization of the United States and its allies. Soviet military spending soon took a toll on the economy, which was only one-third that of the United States. Communism began collapsing in Europe in the 1980s and the Warsaw Pact crumbled. Internal strife and economic dysfunctions within the USSR led to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms. The collapse of East Germany and the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the triumph of democratic activists within most of the states of the Warsaw Pact underscored the final phases of the Cold War with the disintegration of communist regimes.

The alliance that was established mainly to deter Soviet aggression began focusing on new missions. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created in 1991 and transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. The NACC promoted political stability and democratic practices in post-communist states. Out of NATO’s new mission of cooperative security emerged Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

NATO’s involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, and other parts of the former Yugoslavia changed the alliance from a reactive entity to a proactive intervener. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept took note of the emergence of “complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability.” The threat of extremism and terrorism was evident in the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Terrorism arising from the instability of failed states was now not only a domestic issue, but an international security concern. NATO’s commitment to the security of its member nations and international partners took the alliance to Afghanistan. In support of an all-encompassing mission of stabilization, the Alliance and the Russian Federation created the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 to “work as equal partners on security issues of common interest.”

66 NATO, “Short History of NATO.”
67 Ibid.
69 NATO, “Short History of NATO.”
Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2004, offered “bilateral security cooperation to countries of the broader Middle East region.”

There are a total of 28 member countries in NATO today. In the latest Strategic Concept, published in Lisbon in 2010, the Alliance asserted that “crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” NATO has dramatically changed throughout its history, meeting the needs and threats of the various eras. The dynamic political shifts and diverse crises of modern times, compounded with extremism, constitute a constant challenge that NATO is addressing in a multi-faceted approach. NATO defines itself as “an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world.”

1. NATO 2010 Strategic Concept

NATO persistently seeks to gauge and assess the security concerns of the transatlantic region and abroad, evaluating the changing environment, and adapting to address its needs. NATO’s Strategic Concept is the official NATO policy delineating the Alliance’s “enduring purpose … to safeguard the freedom and security of its members.” The strategic concept incorporates an assessment of the evolving “security environment” that “contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations.” The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept stressed the

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70 NATO, “Short History of NATO.”


75 Ibid., paragraph 38.

76 Ibid., paragraph 4.
significance and importance of working with partners across the globe. Much of NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept takes into account the events of 9/11, the rise of extremism, and the Balkan conflicts. The NATO Strategic Concept includes guidelines for the allocation of diverse resources to address various issues such as arms control, the Alliance’s nuclear posture, cooperative security, and NATO enlargement.

Entitled “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” the 2010 Strategic Concept is grounded on three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Collective defense, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, affirms assistance from the Alliance in response to an attack on a member state. Through collective defense, “based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities,” NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance’s greatest responsibility and overall strategy of deterrence. The Strategic Concept contends that “NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security.” In addition, the latest Strategic Concept further clarifies the necessity of mutual assistance in dealing with “emerging security challenges” where the threat involves “the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.”

The 2010 Strategic Concept also discusses the requisites for crisis management. With a “robust set of political and military capabilities,” NATO will address “the full spectrum of crises – before, during, and after conflicts.” The security of the Alliance will be protected through a proactive approach, and an extensive set of tools, to mitigate crises “before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that

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78 Ibid., paragraph 16–25.
79 Ibid., paragraph 4.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., paragraph 17.
82 Ibid., paragraph 2.
83 Ibid., paragraph 4, 19.
84 Ibid., paragraph 2.
contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.”85 Lastly, within the core task of cooperative security, the latest Strategic Concept asserts that the “Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders.”86 NATO will support regional stability through dialogue and training. The Allies hold that “the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe.”87 The Strategic Concept further states that “the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.”88 NATO enlargement is pursued as part of the core task of cooperative security in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The Allies continue to rely on the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, which says that new Allies must respect “common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”89

The 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is NATO’s latest adaptation, based on experience and evaluation, to the changing security environment of the Alliance. Although nuclear and conventional forces are reemphasized as the core of the NATO’s deterrence posture in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review innovated in various ways, notably by emphasizing the importance of missile defenses as capabilities complementing conventional and nuclear forces. Moreover, the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review underscored the advantages of fostering international stability through proactive means in crisis management.90 The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, as well as the terrorist attacks on numerous European cities throughout the first decade of

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86 Ibid., paragraph 3.
87 Ibid., paragraph 28.
88 Ibid., paragraph 3.
89 Ibid., paragraph 38.
the twenty-first century, suggested that the instability and volatility in certain regions can affect the security of states within the Alliance. NATO, an Alliance of twenty-eight nations, has the resources and broad spectrum of tools necessary to promote stability. Through programs such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative NATO has proactively asserted itself in cooperative security by creating forums for dialogue in an unraveling and volatile Middle East, and providing a bilateral means to achieve greater legitimacy for the participating partners. Some partners evidently regard such cooperative frameworks “as an attractive means of countering pressures to undertake democratic reform.”91 NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept illustrates the Alliance’s determination to work with the developing world and become a factor in its stability.92

2. Mediterranean Dialogue

The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), created in 1994, aims to “contribute to regional security, achieve better mutual understanding, and dispel any misconceptions about NATO among dialogue countries.”93 Partners in the program include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The format of the Mediterranean Dialogue is primarily in the structure of NATO+1. However, “the dialogue … allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).”94 Multilateral assemblies are held twice a year and involve civilian and military representatives.95 According to NATO, Mediterranean Dialogue development is based on the following principles: non-discrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness, two-way engagement, non-imposition, complementarity and mutual reinforcement, and diversity.96 The Mediterranean Dialogue was designed to be flexible in order to promote dialogue

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94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
and permit growth.\textsuperscript{97} The importance of the Mediterranean Dialogue was underscored at the Istanbul Summit of 2004, when “NATO’s Heads of State and Government elevated the MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and expanded framework.”\textsuperscript{98} Prior to 2004, the Mediterranean Dialogue was seen as lacking in substance. Since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, the Dialogue “has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011.”\textsuperscript{99}

The Mediterranean Dialogue is structured through the annual Work Program. The annual Work Program, “which aims at enhancing” the “partnership through cooperation in security-related issues,” consists of civilian and military elements.\textsuperscript{100} The civilian component “includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of modernization of the armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, small arms and light weapons, public diplomacy, scientific and environmental cooperation, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”\textsuperscript{101} 85 percent of the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Program (MDWP) is military oriented.\textsuperscript{102} The military component “includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe—and in some cases participate—in NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) military exercises, attend courses and other academic activities at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defense College in Rome (Italy), and visit NATO military bodies.”\textsuperscript{103} Visiting NATO forces and armed forces training are also included in the military component.

In April 2011, during the NATO Berlin meeting, “NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all

\begin{footnotes}
\item[97] \textit{NATO, “Mediterranean Dialogue.”}
\item[98] Ibid.
\item[99] Ibid.
\item[100] Ibid.
\item[101] Ibid.
\item[102] Ibid.
\item[103] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
The single Partnership Menu became effective on January 1, 2012, “thus dramatically expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.” The broadened accessibility includes the e-Prime database; the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) to “improve partners’ capacity to contribute effectively to NATO-led Crisis Response Operations;” the Trust Fund mechanism; the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC); the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T); the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) action plan; and the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, which “aims at complementing existing cooperation activities developed in the MD framework.”

In conjunction with the Mediterranean Dialogue the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) deepens bilateral political dialogue. The IPCP tailors “cooperation with NATO according to key national security needs, framing NATO cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries in a more strategic way.” According to the NATO website, “Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia have all agreed tailored Individual Cooperation Programme with NATO.” The IPCP “is the main instrument of focused cooperation between NATO and MD countries.”

B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ISRAEL

Fostered by European Zionist leaders, the partitioning plan for what was known as Palestine, governed for twenty years under a British mandate, was formalized by the United Nations in November 1947. UN endorsement of the partition plan was immediately followed by Jewish and Arab clashes in the region that marked the

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104 NATO, “Mediterranean Dialogue.”
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
beginning of the current Israeli-Arab conflict.\textsuperscript{111} After several months of instability, the Jewish population organized and announced the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948.\textsuperscript{112} Immediately recognized by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, Israel was faced with war on the second day of its inception.\textsuperscript{113} The armed forces of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan all attempted to invade the newly established state with dire results.\textsuperscript{114} The first Israeli-Arab war ended with Israel increasing its initial territory by nearly fifty percent.\textsuperscript{115} The consequential territorial disputes involving contemporary Israel are the result of over half a century of conflict between Israelis and Arabs.\textsuperscript{116} The first Israeli-Arab war was followed by the Suez War of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the conflicts in Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, and various Palestinian uprisings.\textsuperscript{117}

The Six Day War in 1967 is due noteworthy consideration as it “radically transformed the nature of regional politics and the relationship between local states and the superpowers.”\textsuperscript{118} The war created a persistent Palestinian refugee issue, enlarged the area of Israel to the disputed borders of contemporary times, and created a “polarization of the Arab-Israel conflict along East-West lines.”\textsuperscript{119} Arab states formed the impression that the “United States had colluded with Israel to destroy the ‘revolutionary Arab regimes which had refused to be a part of the Western sphere of influence.’”\textsuperscript{120} The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States encroached on the Middle Eastern region, driving the Israelis and Arabs into a proxy war.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Lesch and Haas, \textit{Middle East and the United States}, 177.
\item \textsuperscript{117} History-of-Israel.org, “History of Israel.”
\item \textsuperscript{118} Lesch and Haas, \textit{Middle East and the United States}, 177.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 178.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{121} History-of-Israel.org, “History of Israel.”
\end{itemize}
against Israel in response to fabricated Soviet information of an Israeli advance. The Soviets “alleged that concentrations of Israeli troops” were massing near the Egyptian border, driving Egypt to prepare for war.\textsuperscript{122} The Six Day War began with the State of Israel preemptively attacking Egyptian airfields. Even though Israel was converged on from all sides, “the Egyptians pointed to the fact that although the United States had secured from Egypt a commitment not to fire first, it failed to extract a similar pledge from Israel.”\textsuperscript{123} Gamal Nasser, President of Egypt from 1956 to 1965, also “asserted that the United States government helped Israel in several ways ... providing it with intelligence and weapons.”\textsuperscript{124} The Six Day War ended with Israel “conquering the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Desert, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank including the Old City of Jerusalem.”\textsuperscript{125} Owing to an Arab perception that the United States assisted Israel in the Six Day War, the peace process and the United States’ role within it ensued with an Arab “polarized context of suspicion and distrust” of the United States and Israel.\textsuperscript{126}

The Israeli-Arab conflict entered a new phase with the Camp David Accords of 1979, negotiated with the support of the United States.\textsuperscript{127} Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat, recognized the State of Israel and promised peace, diplomatic relations, and safe passage of Israeli ships in trade for the Sinai.\textsuperscript{128} In addition, the Camp David Peace Agreement set in motion a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, paving the path for Palestinian self-rule.\textsuperscript{129} Continued violence and stalemate in negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians were not overcome until 1993, with the Oslo Peace Accords.\textsuperscript{130} The arrangement and organization for Palestinian self-rule was agreed upon by Israel and Yasser Arafat, then the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

\textsuperscript{122} History-of-Israel.org, “History of Israel.”
\textsuperscript{124} History-of-Israel.org, “History of Israel.”
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Lesch and Haas, Middle East and the United States, 180.
\textsuperscript{127} History-of-Israel.org, “History of Israel.”
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
The Oslo Accords led to Oslo II in 1995. This accord created the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement, and fostered the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.\textsuperscript{131} In 2000, the United States unsuccessfully attempted to complete the peace agreement at Camp David. Arafat and the Israelis were unable to settle the last contentions concerning the disputed territories.

Israeli security concerns can be characterized by the remnants of conflict, peace treaties, and most importantly, the unresolved Palestinian issue. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have continually shifted and adapted tactics to adhere to Israeli public sentiments and fears. Although the IDF have been able to defend Israel’s existence, they have also contributed to Israel’s political isolation. Crude videos of life in Gaza and the West Bank have drawn world attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1. Israeli Security Concerns

The effects of the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Israeli-occupied territories of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip characterize some of the key Israeli security concerns. The Israeli coast alongside the Mediterranean is not contested, except for the states and organizations that question Israel’s right to exist. Furthermore, over half of the borders that Israel shares with its Arab neighbors are disputed. In the north, Hezbollah, a formidable Palestinian militant group supported by Syria and Iran, operates at the outskirts of the southern Lebanese border and at Israel’s northern boundary. According to a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Brigadier General (retired) Shimon Shapira of the Israel Defense Forces, “Iran’s policy on the use of force by Hezbollah, based on providing clear targets for Hezbollah’s long-range and short-range missiles, is meant to deter Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.”\textsuperscript{132} On October 7, 2014, “Hezbollah claimed responsibility for

\textsuperscript{131} History-of-Israel.org, “History of Israel.”

an attack against Israeli forces in the Shabaa Farms Region of the Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese border” that killed two IDF soldiers.\textsuperscript{133}

On Israel’s eastern side, the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the Golan Heights are situated. The border between Israel and the West Bank is still in contention since the Six Day War of 1967. To convolute the Israel-Palestinian contention, various Israeli settlements dot the West Bank. The Israeli security wall, still in its construction and erected to defeat and deter Palestinian suicide bombers, is being built with no regard to pre-1967 borders. The controversial West Bank, semi-governed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), continues to be a fertile ground for terrorists against the State of Israel.

The Gaza Strip, which lies between Egypt, Israel’s west-southern border and the Mediterranean, holds the largest concentration of Palestinians and is the birthplace of the militant group Hamas and its political faction, the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel sporadically invades the Gaza Strip in response to the terrorist actions of Hamas, which are not limited to kidnapping Israelis, firing rockets, and infiltrating Israeli communities that reside close to the Gaze Strip. Israel has proactively secured peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, but with other Arab nations contention continues. Statements by Iranian leaders, regularly threatening to end the existence of Israel, are often met with other Muslim nations’ applause. The enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the foundation of Arab antagonism toward the State of Israel. Terrorism, Israel’s deepest security concern, will continue to burden the Jewish State until a resolution is found for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2. Israeli Government

The government of Israel is based on a parliamentary democracy system. It includes executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The Knesset, consisting of 120 members, is Israel’s legislative branch and parliament. Various political parties, such as the center-right Likud party, center-left Labor party, and various religious parties, create a coalition to form a government and elect a prime minister. The Likud party, led by

\textsuperscript{133} Shapira, “Significance of the First Hizbollah Attack.”
current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been controversial in contemporary international politics.134

Prime Minister Netanyahu, representing the Israeli government, has addressed terrorist actions with additional settlement building.135 The construction of housing for Jewish settlers continues to infuriate Palestinians, stall peace negotiations, and attract international condemnation.136 According to the Guardian, Israel’s settlement in the West Bank of 990 acres in September 2014 “comes after an apparently concerted effort by some of its officials and politicians to use the kidnap and murder of three religious students earlier this summer to justify the expropriation.”137 Many governments condemned the latest settlement building. Tzipi Livni, Israel’s chief negotiator in “the stalled peace process,” stated that “it was a decision that weakens Israel and damages its security.”138 Disapproval by the United States and the United Kingdom is met with the Israeli Prime Minister’s retorts referring to Palestinian terrorist actions. The Israeli government has been keen on expansion in the occupied territories, impeding peace negotiations and increasing Israel’s international isolation.139

3. Israeli-United States Relations

Since the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, the relationship between Israel and the United States has been controversial. Although Israel has been characterized (along with Turkey) as one of “America’s two most powerful and closest allies in the Middle East,”140 and usually with the connotation of America’s unwavering support to the State of Israel, the relationship between President Obama and Prime

135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
Minister Netanyahu has been described as “frosty” at best.141 In a speech in Cairo, President Obama stated that the United States “does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements” on territory seized during the 1967 Six Day War.142 To further complicate the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, in August 2014 it was reported as follows: “July 2014: Senior Obama administration officials learn that Israel has secretly been obtaining ammunition from the Pentagon, further eroding the U.S. influence on the intensifying clash in Gaza between the Israelis and Hamas.”143 The relationship further soured between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu when the Prime Minister told the White House, “not to ever second guess me again” regarding how to conduct relations with Hamas.144 Through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Israel has maintained influence in the American political arena; however, the troubled relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu seems to reside in deep disagreements on settlement building and the Palestinian Conflict.

4. Israeli-Turkey Relations

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has eroded Israeli-Turkish relations. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “in the midst of his presidential campaign, equated Israeli policy towards Gaza to a systematic genocide and accused Israel of surpassing Hitler in barbarism.”145 Although relations between Turkey and Israel have been troubled since the political rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Flotilla incident on May 31, 2010 ended Israeli-Turkish political ties, but not economic relations. Prime Minister Netanyahu has publically and officially apologized for the incident and has offered “$21 million dollars in Israeli compensation.”146 In a public address after the

142 Obama quoted in ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
Israeli apology, Erdogan stated “there is no chance ‘to have any positive engagement with Israel,’ dismissing any prospect of normalization.”\(^{147}\) Despite the newly elected Turkish President’s comments, Turkey has attempted to play a pivotal role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, offering to be the middle man in negotiations and providing a forum for dialogue. Additionally, in 2013, trade between Israel and Turkey “crossed the $5 billion mark, and data from the first six months of 2014 indicates a continued rise.”\(^{148}\) Turkey has also agreed to sell Kurdish oil to Israel, demonstrating continued economic interest between the two nations.\(^ {149}\) Turkey’s business and political agendas with Israel seem to be at odds. Although economic ties appear to be growing, political relations are at the lowest common denominator. Turkey consistently blocks Israel from participating in NATO exercises and activities and publically denounces Israel at every opportunity. Turkey’s political elites seem to capture and utilize Turkish anti-Israeli sentiment to popularize themselves.

C. CONCLUSION

NATO’s latest Strategic Concept embraces many of the same principles that the State of Israel advocates. Just as NATO has adapted its strategic position to the changing world environment, Israel has also transitioned to meet the new challenges of this era. Terrorism, extremism, and regional volatility in the Middle East have encroached on the European sphere almost as much as they have on Israel. Exacerbated by the Six Day War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that began with the founding of the State of Israel continues to burden the Jewish state with growing isolation and condemnation from Muslim nations and European states. Although progress has been made in the Israeli-NATO relationship, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and related disputes (notably in Israeli-Turkish relations) have stalled any possibility of a substantial alliance. Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, has attempted to block all possibilities of a closer Israeli-NATO partnership due to the ongoing Palestinian conflict. Steps forward in developing

\(^{147}\) Arbell, “Despite Gaza Conflict.”

\(^{148}\) Ibid.

\(^{149}\) Ibid.
the Israeli-NATO relationship have come only during times when the road map to peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis seemed clear and agreed. The possibility of a closer Israeli-NATO partnership therefore hinges on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
III. CONSTRAINTS AND BENEFITS OF A CLOSER PARTNERSHIP

The magnitude of the Israeli-NATO partnership has expanded, but not to the greatest potential possible. This chapter examines the development of Israeli-NATO relations, and explores some of the constraints that have impeded the relationship from flourishing fully. Israel’s multilateral impediment, a derivative of decades of inability to promote Israeli interests within the United Nations, continues to constrain Israel’s willingness to conduct affairs in a multilateral setting. With a sense of isolation, Israel has attributed its survival to self-reliance. Avoiding the possible constraints of multilateralism, Israeli political and military leaders fear the restraints of deepening security agreements and international partnerships. Of all the impediments to a closer Israeli-NATO partnership, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the greatest—one that functions as an undercurrent to them all. Israeli-Turkish relations parallel the ups and downs of Palestinian-Israeli hostilities in the region. As one of the oldest members of NATO, Turkey systematically blocks attempts by other NATO members to deepen the Alliance’s relations with Israel due to its stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

After analyzing the various constraints, this chapter explores the potential benefits of a closer relationship for Israel and NATO. Although Israel’s small territorial size and marginal population equate to little more than that of a major American or European city,150 Israel and NATO stand to gain significant benefits from greater cooperation. The assortment of constraints impeding closer Israeli-NATO relations can be abated with a renewed, sustainable, and substantive road map for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, opening the door to significant benefits for both Israel and NATO.

A. EVOLUTION

Interest in the Mediterranean region and its growing instability stirred the fears of southern European states in the years following the end of the Cold War. European states that lined the Mediterranean “were concerned that the socio-economic under-
development on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean could potentially ‘spillover’ to the north in the form of mass immigration.” 151 Under the momentum of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations “in the 1990s, the Mediterranean witnessed an outburst of multilateral initiatives,” driven mostly by France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 152 Of the many Mediterranean forums created, virtually by every large European organization, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership became the most recognized. 153 Although NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue provoked skepticism in the first few years after its inception in 1994, it has become a cornerstone and foundation to NATO-Israeli relations. 154

As the Israeli-Palestinian relationship worsened after the failure of the peace process at the turn of the century, and the eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, progress within the Mediterranean Dialogue was slowed to the lowest diplomatic common denominator. 155 The attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 renewed NATO’s focus on the Middle East. Three years later, at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders “decided to enhance our [that is, NATO’s] Mediterranean Dialogue and to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region through the ‘Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.’” 156 For Israel, the Istanbul Summit cleared the way for “the development of bilateral tracks within the framework of the multilateral process of the Mediterranean Dialogue.” 157 NATO’s interest in the Middle East, derived in part from the growing threats of fundamentalism and terrorism, the potential for explosive conflicts, the region’s energy resources, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stimulated closer Israeli-NATO relations.

151 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
157 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”
Addressing an Israeli audience on his first official visit to Israel in 2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated, “the interplay of Middle Eastern and transatlantic security is becoming ever more evident,” and “it is not difficult to see why building closer relations between us has become a strategic imperative.”\(^{158}\) In a press release, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom of Israel stated that the NATO Secretary General’s visit was an “historic event—because it is the first time that the head of the North Atlantic Treaty [Organization] has visited our country. This visit reflects the mutual goal shared by Israel and NATO, to deepen our ongoing ties and to realize the great potential for cooperation which exists between us.”\(^{159}\)

The Israeli-NATO relationship continued to grow with the conclusion of the Individual Cooperation Program agreement in October 2006.\(^ {160}\) Israel was the first country within the Mediterranean Dialogue and “the first country outside Europe” to sign such an agreement.\(^ {161}\) The Individual Cooperation Program agreement was a huge success for Israeli-NATO relations; it allowed cooperation beyond the scope of the Mediterranean Dialogue, which was “restricted to the joint agenda of the other Mediterranean Dialogue countries.” Further developed in 2008, the Israeli-NATO ICP agreement included “response to terrorism, intelligence sharing, armament cooperation and management, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, military doctrine and exercises, civilian emergency plans, and disaster preparedness.”\(^ {162}\)

Despite the success in closer cooperation, the Israeli-NATO ICP agreement has several shortfalls. NATO has been reluctant to let Israel move “too far” ahead of the other Mediterranean Dialogue partners.\(^ {163}\) NATO has also “refrained from concluding a Status


\(^{160}\) Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”

\(^{161}\) Ibid.

\(^{162}\) Ibid.

\(^{163}\) Ibid.
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, “creating “substantial impediments in promoting the bilateral relationship and developing military-to-military cooperation.” Notwithstanding the lack of a SOFA agreement, steps were taken—including an exchange of letters—to establish an Israeli Liaison Officer at the NATO Allied Force Command Naples in 2006, to participate in Operation Active Endeavor. However, Israel was not able to participate in the operation due to an incident and subsequent blockage by Turkey. In May 2010, Israeli Special Forces killed eight Turkish citizens attempting to cross an Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip. Owing to this crisis, often referred to as the Gaza flotilla incident, the Turkish government continues to block Israel’s involvement in the operation, even following an apology by the Israeli Prime Minister in March 2013.

Characterized as a progressively broader agreement by Tommy Steiner, the Israeli-NATO ICP agreement did not demonstrate all the merits Israel had hoped for. Tzipi Livni, then Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in a 2007 NATO-Israel Symposium, “Israel seeks a formal partnership relationship with NATO.” Jose Maria Aznar, a former Spanish Prime Minister, proposed NATO membership for Australia, Israel, and Japan, in order to confront contemporary strategic threats, in his report NATO: An Alliance of Freedom. Capitalizing on the dialogue about a closer Israeli-NATO relationship, Ron Asmus and Bruce Jackson wrote a policy paper exploring the possibility of Israel becoming a NATO member. A second policy paper, written by Uzi Arad and Tommy Steiner, explored Israeli membership from an

164 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”
165 Ibid.
166 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 106.
167 Ibid.
168 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”
170 Aznar, “NATO – An Alliance for Freedom.”
171 Asmus and Jackson, “Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO.”
The interest sparked in a closer Israeli-NATO relationship was quickly muffled when “US officials expressed reluctance” and when in Israeli domestic politics the notion emerged that closer NATO-Israeli cooperation would in fact hinder Israel more than it would help it. A defense pact in a multilateral setting might “potentially impede Israel’s self-assumed strategic freedom of action.”

Promoters of an official Israeli-NATO affiliation reluctantly realized that “Israeli NATO membership was simply not on the cards.” The founding document of the Alliance, the Washington Treaty, would have to be amended in order for a non-European state to become a NATO member. Moving away from campaigning for membership, advocates “focused on upgrading the relationship to a status equivalent to the Partnership for Peace.” Pursuing a new avenue, “Ron Asmus, Uzi Arad, and Oded Eran outlined two scenarios that would engender such an upgrade – an Iranian nuclear threat or the conclusion of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.” NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and the Alliance’s new Partnership Policy, announced in April 2011, streamlined the NATO-Israeli relationship. NATO reformed its Partnership Policy and created the Partnership Cooperation Menu and Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program “to maintain and deepen the ability of partner forces to work alongside Allied forces.” Since the inception of these programs, Israeli-NATO relations have seen improved military security cooperation. However, the programs do not include the establishment of a SOFA, hampering cooperation to its fullest extent short of Alliance membership. Although NATO-Israeli relations have greatly improved, several other factors have hindered the cultivation of a closer partnership. The next section of this chapter explores

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172 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community.”
173 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.”
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
additional constraints that have prevented the Israeli-NATO relationship from attaining full maturity.

B. CONSTRAINTS

1. Israel’s Multilateral Hardships

Israel’s limited experience in multilateralism is in part due to its tenure with the United Nations. Beginning in the early 1970s, Israel had great difficulty promoting its interests after the “Arab-Soviet-Third World bloc” joined “together to form what amounted to a pro-PLO lobby at the United Nations.”\(^\text{179}\) As a result of the bloc and an overwhelming Islamic state prevalence within the United Nations, an unprecedented number of condemnations and resolutions have implicated Israel. For example, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, approved on November 10, 1975, identified Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination.”\(^\text{180}\) Such criticisms of Israel within the United Nations have continued to the present. In 2006, Kofi Annan, then the UN Secretary General, acknowledged that he was “worried by its disproportionate focus on violations by Israel.”\(^\text{181}\) Persistently condemned, and with its interests marginalized in a multilateral context, Israel has avoided multilateralism in a world where globalization prevails.\(^\text{182}\)

Though Israel should geographically be considered in the Asian Group of the United Nations Regional Groups scheme, Israel’s membership has been—and remains—consistently blocked by neighboring regional States. The barring of Israel in the United Nations Regional Group structure excluded Israel from sitting on any United Nations forums, such as the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, because


\(^\text{180}\) Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 3379. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, Thirteenth session, Agenda Item 68, November 10, 1975. The resolution was later revoked on December 16, 1991.


\(^\text{182}\) Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community.”
these bodies require participating states to be part of a regional group. In May 2000, after four decades of being the only UN member state that was not part of a regional group, the Western European and Others Group permitted Israel to become a temporary member, subject to renewal. In 2004, Israel obtained “a permanent renewal to its membership.”

In a press release in December 2013 United States Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “It goes without saying that at a time when the scourge of global anti-Semitism is on the rise, it is more important than ever for Israel to have a strong voice that can be heard everywhere.”

Israel’s negative experiences with multilateral forums have created a “tradition of managing its foreign relations on a bilateral basis,” and this, in turn, has constrained Israel’s experiences with multilateralism. Some Israeli political and military leaders view the Israeli bilateral methodology as a constructive part of Israeli security and an approach that preserves a freedom of action that otherwise might be limited by the confines of multilateral agreements. In their view, a closer partnership with a multilateral organization such as NATO might shackle Israel’s freedom of action in taking the steps that it deems necessary to defend itself. Many of the past Israeli-Palestinian conflicts were immediately followed by international condemnation of Israeli actions. Viewed by Israeli lawmakers and military leaders as necessary, Israeli policies to restrain Palestinian incursions and attacks would be even further scrutinized in the multilateral arena.

2. **Israel’s Self-Reliance**

Since its inception, Israel has been involved in numerous conflicts that have threatened its existence. Surrounded in a hostile environment, citizen soldiers defend a state in which the widest point is no more than 85 miles across. Under constant threat

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185 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community.”

for its survival, the military culture within the state is deeply imbedded within Israeli society. With a population of a little over eight million, military technology and professionalism are consistently sought after and embraced in Israel. Considered to have one of the top military institutions in the world, Israel has been able to secure its borders, and at times increase its size, by the sheer drive and determination of its military.187 Defending the borders of Israel, the Israel Defense Force has an impeccable track record, from the War of Independence in 1948 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014.

The military challenges that Israel has faced in its short life account for the social and military culture of self-preservation.188 One defeat in a significant conflict could lead to the elimination of the state. With the continuing security challenges and a historical foundation of fighting for the right to exist, Israel has embraced a doctrine of self-reliance.189 Under the backing of its non-declared nuclear program,190 Israeli conventional forces are consistently praised by Israeli politicians as the only defenders Israel should depend on. Israel’s historical ability to defend itself, its doctrine of self-reliance, and its leadership’s continued promotion of the self-preservation policy put in question Israel’s need for a multilateral security agreement.

3. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

No greater obstacle stands in the way of a closer Israeli-NATO partnership than that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ongoing land and border struggle interferes with NATO-Israeli partnership development in several ways. For example, the political clout of Palestinian sympathizers in European nations is widespread and substantial.191 Many European politicians openly condemn Israel for its treatment of Palestinians, the

187 Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Geopolitics of Israel.”
189 Ibid.
continuing settlement building agenda, and the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. In the past decade, condemnation of Israel has turned into economic and political sanctions, deepening Israeli isolation from Europe.\textsuperscript{192} Deteriorating Israeli foreign political relationships are not limited to European states, but also include Turkey and the United States.

Since the Six Day War in 1967, the borders encompassing Israel, mainly in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights, have been in dispute and are designated as the regions in which mainly Palestinians live. The Gaza Strip and West Bank, with a combined Palestinian population of over three million, are usually depicted as areas of meager existence and the birth place of Palestinian resistance groups.\textsuperscript{193} The Palestinian insurgents, such as Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, have successfully mounted an international public relations campaign against Israel since their inception in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{194} Despite Israel’s demonstrated skill in overwhelming the enemy and defending its borders, Israel has been unable to effectively defend many of its tactics on the battle front to foreign audiences.\textsuperscript{195} Demolishing the homes of the families of suicide bombers, attacking public centers where rockets are launched from, and enforcing a partial blockade to limit resources within the Gaza Strip and West Bank have been at the forefront of pro-Palestinian media campaigns, including social media outlets. Following every Israeli action to counter Palestinian insurgency, international condemnation of Israel is brought about by the skilled public relations campaigns of the Palestinian resistance groups.\textsuperscript{196}

The criticism of Israel has spread from public opinion and political discontent to diplomatic isolation.\textsuperscript{197} Although there has been a progressing trend in NATO-Israeli relations within the last decade, as noted in the previous sections, the protracted Israeli-

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Economist}, “Campaign That Is Gathering Weight.”

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Economist}, “Campaign That Is Gathering Weight.”
Palestinian conflict has bounded the full potential of the relationship. Some NATO member states, such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, have openly condemned Israel and have warned against the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories.\textsuperscript{198} In addition to its public criticism of Israel, Turkey has systematically blocked almost all attempts to deepen the NATO-Israel relationship. At the root, Turkey would like to see the Palestinian refugee issue and the border disputes settled before Israel is allowed a closer NATO partnership.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict will only be resolved (a) if Israel has an administration willing to negotiate the land, security, and economic disputes, and (b) if the Palestinian factions can align to form a unity government that can guarantee a stop to all attacks on Israel. NATO will continue to limit its bilateral ties with Israel, either owing to the objections of Turkey, or owing to general apprehension about deepening a relationship with a state in a constant condition of conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict will continue to impede any substantial bilateral potential for a closer Israeli-NATO partnership.

4. Turkey’s Role

The Turkish-Israeli relationship can be described as a “fluctuating alliance.”\textsuperscript{199} The unsettled rapport can be paralleled to periods within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel, and did so on March 28, 1949, diplomatic strain ensued as a result of the 1956 Suez crisis.\textsuperscript{200} In 1958, under the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Israel Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, “the two leaders secretly laid down the framework for a ‘strategic alliance’ based on the ‘peripheral doctrine,’ which proposed exchanges of intelligence information and cooperation in military technology between the two countries.”\textsuperscript{201} The renewed


\textsuperscript{199} Ufuk Ulutas, “Turkey-Israel: A Fluctuating Alliance,” \textit{SETA Policy Brief}, no. 42 (January 2010), http://setadc.org/pdfs/SETA_Policy_Brief_No_42_Turkey_Israel_Fluctuating_Ufuk_Ulutas.pdf.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
diplomatic and military relationship was short lived, as the outbreak of Six Day War in 1967 degraded relations. Turkey publicly condemned “Israel for its territorial gains in the War.” Relations further deteriorated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when “Turkey refused to grant the right of passage through its airspace and use of its landing facilities to American cargo planes that carried urgent supplies to Israel.” The Turkish-Israeli relationship came to a noteworthy low in 1980, when Israel applied its laws to eastern parts of Jerusalem occupied since the Six Day War. Ankara reduced “diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of junior chargé d’affaires.”

The Turkish-Israeli relationship undeniably mirrored phases of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Israeli-Palestinian relations and the likelihood of a road map for peace developed in the 1990s, the Turkish-Israeli relationship began to improve as well. In 1991, diplomatic relations were elevated to the ambassadorial level, and in 1996, the two states signed an extensive military agreement concerning assorted military forces and weapons development. Turkey and Israel became strategic partners in the 1990s, as “both states considered that they were surrounded by the same hostile ‘rogue’ states.”

As the road map for peace between Israel and the Palestinians frayed in the late 1990s and the Second Intifada erupted in 2000, the Turkish-Israeli relationship declined once more. In 2002 Turkish political leaders, such as Bulent Ecevit, then the Prime Minister, described Israeli actions in the occupied territories as “genocide.” Speaking in Istanbul before the beginning of Ramadan in 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then the Prime Minister, stated “we have been witnessing the systematic genocide every Ramadan

202 Ulutaş, “Turkey-Israel: A Fluctuating Alliance,” 3.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 4–5.
206 Ibid., 4.
207 Ibid., 5.
since 1948.”  Turkish political condemnations of Israeli strategies for self-defense continue to undermine relations between the two states. In 2010, the Flotilla incident further degraded relations, and it illustrates the contemporary situation.

Since the turn of the century, Israeli-Turkish relations have damaged and constrained Israeli-NATO relations. With the growing potency of public condemnations of Israel in the Turkish media, Turkey has also categorically blocked Israel from participating in numerous NATO exercises and events. As one of the oldest NATO members, Turkey continues to be the loudest voice against any improvement in the Israeli-NATO relationship.

C. POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF A CLOSER ISRAELI-NATO RELATIONSHIP

1. Benefits for Israel

Although security considerations highlight the advantages of a closer Israeli-NATO relationship, security encompasses only a fraction of the actual potential benefits Israel may experience. Israel might especially enjoy heightened international diplomatic relations, a substantially superior strategic defense, significant military technological advances, and ample economic growth and opportunity. In a world where globalization, international networking, and advanced modern states are terms used in tandem, improvements in the Israeli-NATO relationship could bring Israel numerous multilateral benefits that would outweigh many of the feared constraints.

Israel’s diplomatic relations in the international realm have sustained significant shortcomings with the prolongation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As noted in preceding sections, Israel’s international isolation parallels the sea-saw of actions and reactions that occur between the Israeli Defense Force and the various Palestinian insurgency groups. According to Zaki Shalom, a senior research fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies and the Ben-Gurion Research Institute at Ben-Gurion University, a closer NATO-Israeli partnership would “considerably enhance

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Israel’s political status.”

In particular, “it will be made clear to the Palestinian Authority and Arab countries, including Egypt, that the international community does not necessarily hinge cooperation with Israel on broad political agreement.”

Although many NATO members do not approve, and more often than not, publicly condemn the actions of Israel to quell Palestinian uprisings, “this should not prevent them from establishing broad cooperation with Israel in the military, political, and economic fields.”

A closer NATO-Israeli partnership may correspondingly “enhance Israel’s bargaining ability in its contacts with the American administration and also with the countries of the European Union.” As Israel will no longer rest its security solely on self-reliance and the United States, its mitigated dependency will enhance its diplomatic negotiating prospects.

\paragraph{a. Strategic Defense}

Israel’s self-reliance policy and shadow nuclear program have probably deterred aggression against the state on some occasions. However, closer NATO cooperation could provide Israel with an enhanced deterrence capability. Belligerent states contemplating an attack on Israel “will have to take into account at least the possibility that Israel will not stand totally alone in the event of war with them, even if actual assistance is not obligated by the protocol.” Israel’s strategic defense would exponentially increase with the deterrent threat communicated by a close Israeli-NATO partnership. Aside from the visible capability that a firmer Israeli-NATO relationship would show, NATO could provide tangible military capabilities as well. Israel has never fought a protracted war against an organized military. Although the powerful Israeli military has won many wars with multiple adversaries, it has never needed to sustain a

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{209} Shalom, “Israel and NATO.”
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
war with a developed military organization for more than slightly over a year. Limited in resources due to its size, Israel would require assistance in order to fight a protracted war. NATO could hypothetically provide the sustenance and military backing whose absence would place Israel in a position of facing an existential threat. Through the Alliance’s visible and tangible potential, a stronger Israeli-NATO partnership could markedly enhance Israel’s strategic defense.

b. Military Technology

Advanced military systems such as Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome are the products of joint Israeli-American military industrial cooperation. Although Israel is considered to be at the cutting edge of military technology, “cooperation with NATO countries is likely to expose Israel to [additional] advanced technologies and military operations methods that will help it cope better with future threats.”

The types of weapons and the military capabilities of Palestinian insurgency groups have significantly improved in the heated decades of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the weapons of such anti-Israeli groups progressively develop, while accounting for the close proximity of the struggle, Israel needs to maintain its edge in defensive weapons in order to protect its population. A closer Israeli-NATO relationship could open Israel to potential new “sources of information and methods of operation that up to now have not been accessible,” and provide fertile ground for technological military growth with new European and North American partners.

215 The longest Israeli war was its battle for independence, which lasted fourteen months (May 14, 1948–July 20, 1949).


217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.
c. Economic

A deeper Israeli-NATO partnership may afford “Israel a special status regarding arms deals – both in exports and imports.” While Israel may explore and procure new European military technologies that it currently does not have the ability to attain, European states would also be exposed to “Israel’s special military-technological capabilities, including methods of combating terror.” As a result, closer ties “may well be the expansion of export markets for Israeli weapon and combat systems.” In addition to the sale of military equipment, closer cooperation with NATO may induce greater European market access for Israel.

2. Benefits for NATO

According to Tommy Steiner, Israel is NATO’s natural partner, sharing common values and facing common threats. José María Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain, asserted that “Israel is at the centre of the global struggle between the West and the darkest forces of Islamism.” Regarded as a beacon of democracy in a region of instability, Israel has been facing terrorism since its inception and long before NATO realized the level of extremism emerging within the Middle East. Aznar further assessed that Israel’s struggle with terrorism is not only a battle for its existence, but a fight “for all of us.” Aznar equates Israel’s battle for existence with “the right of the West to repel aggression and to resist a mounting campaign by Islamists against us.”

Although Israel is a fairly small state with a population less than that of a large city within the United States or Europe, it geographical position and protracted conflict with extremism make it an ally that pursues some of the same objectives as NATO. By developing a closer partnership with Israel, NATO’s strategic challenges, “namely radical

219 Times of Israel, “Israel Said to Seek Additional $300 Million.”
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community.”
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
Islam, global terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)” can be met with a partner that faces the same challenges and shares a commitment to democracy.\textsuperscript{226} Israel may not be able to provide a formidable contingent outside its territory to take part in a NATO operation; it can, however, support NATO anti-terrorism polices and strategies in a region burdened with extremism.

D. CONCLUSION

With a relationship derived in part from the fertile initiative and underlining intent of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, Israel and NATO have already covered significant ground in pursuit of a closer partnership. However, the extent of the partnership is constrained by Israel’s domestic politics, Israel’s inexperience and distance from multilateral forums, and most importantly, the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Exacerbating every other constraint, the conflict imposes the most significant impediment to establishing the fullest partnership feasible between Israel and NATO. A deeper partnership between Israel and NATO would produce numerous mutual significant benefits. As the capabilities and means of Palestinian insurgency groups continue to rise, Israel will have to make meaningful strides toward reaching a peace agreement, or face growing isolation and the escalating inescapable threats of a perpetually unstable region.

\textsuperscript{226} Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community.”
IV. CONCLUSION

The depth of future partnership between Israel and NATO primarily depends on Israel’s willingness to reach a compromise with the Palestinians. The extent of Israel’s decades-old conflict with the Palestinians has not only contributed to violence and upheaval within the disputed borders of Israel and the occupied territories, but has also impacted Israeli foreign relations with growing isolation. The origin of the conflict can be attributed to several significant events, starting with the Zionist-inspired European Jewish exodus to the British-mandated Palestinian territories after the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the great upheavals of World War II and the Holocaust. Under the endorsement of the United Nations partitioning plan in 1947, Israel gained legitimacy and was soon thereafter recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Proclaiming its establishment in 1948, Israel faced on the second day of its existence a combined attack by the armed forces of an Arab coalition. Israel managed not only to halt the Arab assault, but also to gain control over large tracts of land populated by a significant number of Palestinians. The decades-old conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors has persisted with continued tensions and recurrent combat. The Six Day War in 1967—and the enduring results of the conflict—shed specific light on the turmoil between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel gained control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights through military means. Israel’s U.N.-mandated borders are therefore adjacent to the occupied Palestinian territories. With many Palestinians in refugee camps, Israel has had to deal with Palestinian insurgency.

In the decades to follow, the Palestinian dilemma within the Israeli occupied territories gained international notoriety through a well-organized and professional

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228 The United States recognized the provisional government of Israel de facto May 14, 1948, and de jure January 31, 1949. The Soviet Union provided recognition de jure on May 17, 1948.

229 Thomas, How Israel Was Won. 79–85.

230 The exact legal status of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights remains controversial and contested.
Palestinian public relations campaign. Many Israeli-Palestinian interactions are publicized to present an impression of disproportionate and overwhelming Israeli counteractions. The degree of violence and the disparity of the means available to the Israelis and the Palestinians gradually developed the sympathy of many nations for the Palestinians. Support for the Palestinian cause has gained international traction and has been exponentially mounting since the early 1990s.

Admonished and ostracized at multilateral forums, Israel has developed a practice of handling its foreign relations in bilateral venues, thereby minimizing its experience with multilateralism. This limited experience with multilateralism has not always been Israel’s choice. For example, although Israel has been a U.N. member since 1949, it was the only state to be outside the United Nations regional scheme for five decades, ending with its acceptance outside its geographical area in the Western European and Other Group in 2000. Israel’s limited experience within multilateral arenas has constrained the development of Israel’s relationship with NATO. Believing that a multilateral agreement might impair Israel’s military freedom of action in self-defense, some Israeli military and political leaders have embraced the Israeli doctrine of self-reliance. In view of the Israeli Defense Force’s undisputed achievements in war, and the long-standing United States-Israeli security agreement, many Israeli leaders question the advantages of establishing a closer Israeli-NATO partnership.

Despite some Israeli leaders’ disposition to limit Israel’s multilateral interactions, Israel could benefit greatly from a closer NATO relationship. The growing fundamentalism and extremism in the Middle Eastern region have affected both Israel and NATO members. Israel’s self-reliance doctrine is optimized for countering conventional attacks on the state, not terrorist actions by non-state actors. Facing some of the same threats as NATO member states, Israel, a beacon of democracy in the Middle Eastern region, would find it advantageous to align itself with the Alliance, and to deepen its NATO partnership in order to gain the benefits of information-sharing and proactive anti-terrorism efforts. A closer NATO-Israeli partnership in a bilateral setting distinct from the Mediterranean Dialogue would enhance Israel’s security posture, but would not limit its military freedom of action nor erode its doctrine of self-reliance.
Although Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty limits NATO membership to European states, it does not limit the depth of potential partnerships. In order for Israel to become a closer partner with a multilateral collective defense organization such as NATO, Israel and all of the other parties to the agreement would have to derive a benefit from the pact. NATO’s European member states collectively have limited power projection capability and require U.S. military organization and infrastructure to effectively employ the armed forces of NATO in expeditionary operations. However, Israel and the NATO nations share a common interest in the regional stability that a closer NATO-Israeli partnership might facilitate. Israel’s self-reliance policy is a doctrine that encompasses military action; it does not exclude the proactive promotion of political stability in the region. A closer Israeli-NATO partnership could include a bilateral commitment to prevent conflict, encourage peace agreements, and ensure regional stability by working as partners in a region torn by decades of instability.

Closer Israeli-NATO partnership should be developed within the confines of bilateral agreements. Although some NATO member states do not share Israel’s positions concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there are many other security issues, such as combating the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations and countering the proliferation of WMD, on which closer bilateral ties would benefit both NATO member states and Israel without the complexities, limitations, and possible restrictions that a multilateral arrangement such as the Mediterranean Dialogue might entail. The bilateral accords that NATO has concluded with Australia and Japan might be the most promising approach.

Facing an assortment of threats from common adversaries, Israel and NATO stand to gain substantial benefits from a closer relationship. Israel might enjoy increased economic opportunities and the backing in some circumstances of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO would gain a democratic partner in a region burdened with extremists and volatility. A stronger partnership between NATO and Israel would not only provide numerous benefits for the small Middle Eastern nation and the Atlantic Alliance, but might also foster the momentum necessary for Israel to successfully pursue common ground with the Palestinians.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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