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**THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: ADDRESSING CORRUPTION
DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS**

by

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June 2015

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**THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: ADDRESSING
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ABSTRACT

The United States has spent the last 14 years engaging in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that have aimed, in part, to rebuild two dysfunctional states. However, after billions of dollars in development money, thousands of soldiers' lives lost, and over a decade of time, neither of these countries has achieved the desired degree of stability; both states remain fragile and sources of regional and global insecurity.

This thesis investigates the role that corruption has played in undermining efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan by conducting a longitudinal study that begins with the earliest days of state formation, and concludes with U.S.-led stabilization efforts post-September 11th. This thesis finds that, of the four types of corruption studied (crisis, nepotism, market, and patronage), market corruption is stabilizing in the near-term but becomes destabilizing over time; patronage and nepotism can be stabilizing in the short- and medium-terms, but ultimately create the potential for long-term destabilization; and crisis corruption is the most destabilizing form of corruption and rarely produces stability. These findings provide the U.S. government and U.S. military with an evaluative tool for considering different forms of corruption and their effects on stabilization operations in the modern world.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BSA	Bilateral Security Agreement
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FM	field manual
IGO	intergovernmental organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State in Syria and the Levant
JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center
JP	Joint Publication
MCIP	Marine Corps Interim Publication
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSA	non-state actor
PCR	post-conflict reconstruction
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SO	stability operations
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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—Brian Revell

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—Ryan-Ross Nemeth

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has spent the last 14 years engaging in major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that were aimed, in part, in rebuilding two dysfunctional states. The goal behind these massive state-building exercises has been to develop viable states that could provide for their populations, police their own, prevent terrorists from using their territory to train and plan operations, and to reduce instability in their respective regions. However, after billions of dollars in development money, thousands of soldiers' lives lost, and over a decade of time, neither of these countries has achieved this degree of stability; both states remain fragile and are sources of regional and global insecurity.

Corruption has played an important role in undermining stability operations (SO) in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and U.S. government officials have identified corruption as one of the main contributing factors of this instability. In 2009, for example, the commander of the war in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, stated, "Official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force."¹ General McChrystal's statement suggests that intervening powers must address corruption in order to effectively engage in SO.

However, defining stability and corruption, as well as understanding the dynamic between these two factors, is a difficult undertaking. Academic research has focused considerable energy on economic corruption in a variety of settings, leaving other types of corruption under-addressed. Furthermore, despite its negative connotations, corruption is not always destabilizing; some forms of corruption may actually create stability, at least in the short run. Therefore, the connection between efforts to stabilize states and different forms of corruption needs to be better understood in order to manage this critical aspect of state reconstruction and development.

¹ Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure,'" *Washington Post*, September 21, 2009.

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis aims to help address these gaps in the literature by studying the connection between various types of corruption and their effects on stability within the state. Specifically, this thesis asks the following questions: What are the different sources of corruption and how do they affect intervening powers' efforts to stabilize a state? Is all corruption destabilizing, or can some types of corruption be stabilizing? What are the short-, medium-, and long-term effects of different forms of corruption on state stability?

To investigate these questions, this thesis uses economist Michael Johnston's four broad forms of corruption: crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and politics), nepotism (favoring relatives or close friends, usually within government positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market (the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of conveyance). Furthermore, this thesis will draw from Chalmers Johnson's definition of equilibrium to define stability as the balance between a state's populace, government, and social system structure with respect to its environment; conversely, disequilibrium is the imbalance to varying degrees between a state's populace, government, and social system structure. This thesis uses these definitions of corruption and stability to investigate foreign and domestic efforts to build states in Iraq and Afghanistan.

B. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will use a longitudinal, controlled case study comparison to investigate the relationship between corruption and state stability. First, it will consider three broad periods in the modern history of Afghanistan: Dost Mohammad Khan Shah's reign in 1826 to the assassination of Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah in 1933; the ascension of Mohammad Zahir Khan Shah's monarchy in 1933 to the fall of Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah from power in 1992; and the creation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1994 to the current U.S. occupation. These three time periods include instances of British, Russian, Soviet, and U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and provide an opportunity to analyze the effects of various forms of corruption on state stability.

Second, the thesis will investigate the three periods in the history of Iraq as a state: the era of British influence, from 1914 to 1932; the rule of the Ba'ath party from 1968 to 2003; and the U.S. -led occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2011. The case study will consider the effects of British, Ba'athist and U.S. efforts to create state stability and the role that corruption played in stabilizing and destabilizing the state.

Ultimately, this methodology aims to identify the types of corruption introduced by foreign and domestic powers and their immediate and long-term effects on state stability. The overall goal of this approach is to provide the U.S. government, including the U.S. military, with an evaluative tool for thinking about different forms of corruption and their effects on stabilization operations in the modern world.

C. FINDINGS

This thesis finds that the four types of corruption investigated have varying effects throughout SO. During SO, market corruption is stabilizing in the near-term but becomes extremely destabilizing over time. Patronage and nepotism forms of corruption can be stabilizing in the short and medium-terms, but ultimately, create the potential for long-term destabilization, especially if these networks are disrupted. Finally, crisis corruption is the most destabilizing form of corruption, especially after conflict operations or natural disasters; it hardly ever creates stability.

These findings are of particular importance to both the U.S. government and military. Specifically, certain actions aimed at creating stability in the near-term, such as developing patronage networks or infusing a country with large amounts of development aid, may have positive short-term effects, but, in the long run, they introduce chronic instability. Therefore, the U.S. government and military should weigh carefully the options of using these forms of corruption, even if they have a positive effect in the near-term.

D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides a review of literature relevant to corruption during SO. It proposes a working definition for stability, a multi-source definition for corruption, and an analytical framework to categorize corruption. Chapter III reviews Afghanistan from 1826 to 2015 and the impact of corruption on stability during three broad time periods. Chapter IV evaluates Iraq from 1914 to 2011, examining corruption's effect on stability during the British Mandate era, Ba'athist's rule, and after the U.S.-led invasion and occupation. Chapter V provides observations about the short-, medium-, and long-term effects of corruption on state stability.

II. DEFINING STABILITY AND CORRUPTION

In order to understand how the U.S. government can better target and curtail corruption during SO, an understanding of both stability and corruption is required. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the literature on SO—with the goal of offering a working definition of the term and its purpose—as well as an overview of the role of the military during conflict and SO. This chapter also outlines the literature on corruption, noting in particular that a definition of corruption needs to move beyond financial corruption to include other critical forms, such as cronyism and patronage corruption. It also introduces the relationship between corruption and stability, and how both impact the U.S. military’s understanding and actions to counter corruption. The chapter concludes with the construction of a model designed to make anti-corruption efforts more efficient and effective for the U.S. military.

A. STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

The terms stability and instability are not specifically defined in academic, military, or governmental policy literature. In some cases, stability is used to describe an unspecified state of being. The 2006 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, for example, uses the term stable nine times and the word stability 24 times throughout the document, but does not offer a working definition.² The 2010 *National Security Strategy* brings up the term stable three times and the word stability 35 times throughout the document but also does not define its meaning.³ For example: “We will continue to engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard to pursuit of stability in [the] region.”⁴

² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), <http://nssarchive.us>.

³ Barak H. Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), <http://nssarchive.us>.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 42.

Similarly, the *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* mentions the term stable seven times and the word stability 16 times throughout the document.⁵ An example includes: “The United States remains committed to protecting its interests, sustaining U.S. leadership, and preserving global stability, security, and peace.”⁶ In all three examples, the words stability and stable are mentioned without specific definitions, assuming the term is universally understood. Furthermore, the terms stability and stable are not synonymous with peace, prosperity, security, justice, or order because these terms are used independently throughout the documents.

There have been several attempts by academics to define stability or stabilization by focusing on outcomes or necessary variables for stabilization, but these efforts do not offer a theoretical definition of the term. For example, stabilization and reconstruction expert Robert M. Perito, along with other practitioners, suggests five core functions or desired objectives that a state and its population should work toward in order to be stable: a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and social well-being.⁷ Perito suggests that these five core functions are interconnected and reinforcing; each function impacts and influences the other.⁸

Anthropologist and current president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, along with legal expert Claire Lockhart, suggests 10 functions of a stable and capable state: the legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, administrative control, management of public figures, investment in human capital, delineation of citizenship rights and duties, provision of infrastructure services, formation of the market, management of the state’s assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets), international relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing), and the

⁵ Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

⁶ *Ibid.*, XIV.

⁷ Robert Perito, ed., *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

⁸ *Ibid.*, xxxiv.

rule of law.⁹ The authors contend that weak states can measure their own capabilities against these 10 functions of a state to better understand which areas they need to improve to create *de facto* state security. In many ways, these 10 functions of the state are very similar to Perito's five core functions.

Another scholar, Jens Meierhenrich, describes core functions that he believes are necessary and sufficient to create a stable state. Specifically, he believes that a state should create a predictable environment that allows citizens to “buy into” the idea of the state.¹⁰ This is best done through two core functions: bureaucracy and, as he describes it, legality, which is rule of law.¹¹ Once these functioning states are created, they can ultimately build “six interrelated functions: (1) encouraging predictability; (2) creating confidence; (3) lending credibility; (4) providing security; (5) displaying resolve; and (6) controlling resources.”¹²

These different scholars demonstrate that there is no consensus on what a state should actually do in order to be deemed stable. For example, North Korea, China, and Cuba are considered stable, but they all have one-party political systems that are not democratic in nature. Charles Call, a political scientist, critiques this approach of state functionality by claiming that this approach to stabilization is a “Western-centered view of what a state should be or what state function should look like.”¹³ He asserts that this approach is based on two problematic assumptions: “first, that the Western model of governance is exclusively stable; second, that it will be stable for everyone.”¹⁴ These proposed functions or end-states fit neatly onto a checklist; however, they thinly define the terms stable or stability.

⁹ Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building*, Working Paper 253 (London, UK: Overseas Development Institute London, 2005), 6.

¹⁰ Jens Meierhenrich, “When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,” in *Forming States after Failure*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 156.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ As cited in J. Eli Margolis, “Understanding Political Stability and Instability,” *Civil Wars* 12, no. 3 (2010): 329.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Finding a working definition of stability is also difficult within academic literature. Social theorist Jane Jacobs provides a definition of what she calls “dynamic stability,” in which there is “a capacity for self-correction and adaption to emerging problems and opportunities,” within a social or political system.¹⁵ Jacobs further contends that the process of stability must continue to change to cope with continuous problems. This definition is not useful because it infers that a populace or the state can correct a systemic problem of which it is a part. Additionally, this definition does not set limits for self-correction. In theory, therefore, a democracy could “self-correct” to an autocracy.

In fact, more literature appears to define instability rather than stability. Political scientist Louis M. Terrell, for example, focuses on the conditions that lead to the breakdown of stability within a state.¹⁶ Terrell explains, “For example economic depression, severe social cleavages, and rapid social change are disruptive to the general equilibrium of society; and when institutional forms of integration are unable to cope with these stress situations, dislocations appear.”¹⁷ Terrell’s analysis concludes that the state’s political system has the capacity to “receive and resolve the conflicting demands placed upon it,” thus restoring equilibrium, which may be similar to stability.¹⁸ This approach, however, is also problematic in that an understanding of what is wrong or unstable is required in order to discern what is correct or stable. Nevertheless, Terrell’s work now allows us to conceptualize the term stability better by visualizing the state and its society as a general equilibrium that is calculable instead of as a form of state functionality.

Perhaps somewhat similarly, political scientist Chalmers Johnson describes homeostatic equilibrium as a condition in which a social system, its shared legitimate

¹⁵ Jane Jacobs, *The Nature of Economies* (New York: Free Press, 2000) as cited in Richard P. Gildrie, *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2008), 5.

¹⁶ Louis M. Terrell, “Societal Stress, Political Instability, and Levels of Military Effort,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15, no. 3 (September 1971): 331.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

value structure, norms, and division of labor, is in balance or synchronization with respect to its environment.¹⁹ Johnson's homeostatic equilibrium is the closest working definition of what a state looks like when it is described as stable. It is important to note that Johnson argues that small changes can be made to the social system structure, and the structure will still stay in equilibrium over time; however, when these changes exceed the system's capacity of values and norms, the result is a disequilibrated social system.²⁰

Johnson explains that sometimes, as social systems move out of equilibrium, changes occur and a new equilibrium is established.²¹ The in-between periods would constitute instability. It is only when a combination of internal (from within the state) and external factors (from outside the state) are so great that stability cannot be restored, that absolute instability takes place. Essentially, the balance is no longer stabilized at zero and the torque of the conditions prevents the balance from returning to zero until an appropriate counter force can be applied. Too many changes and the state loses its stability and moves toward "the propensity of a government collapse."²² If government sectors are not functioning, or their functions are impeded, a government is more prone to act erratically or in an unpredictable manner.

An example of Johnson's understanding of equilibrium can be found in recent events in the United States. Ferguson, Missouri experienced a series of unstable events in 2014 that made national headlines, but the city was brought under control and equilibrium was restored.²³ This is a good example of how stability fluctuates after chaotic events. The interactions between local and state government officials, law enforcement, and protesters created a new set of issues that changed the social structure of the environment not just for Ferguson, Missouri, but for the United States as a nation. A national debate ensued over race relations, the relationship between the community and

¹⁹ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 56–60.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 55–59.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 62.

²² Alberto Alesina et al., "Political Instability and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Growth* 1, no. 2 (1996): 3.

²³ "What Happened in Ferguson?," *New York Times*, November 14, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

law enforcement, and the rise of military tactics and tools being used by local law enforcement agencies.²⁴ These debates will move the fulcrum of social structure and a new equilibrium will be created.

Johnson's definition of stability leaves considerable leeway for equilibrium to sway with episodes of instability between the populace and its government, but yet still allows for stability over time. One example is the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, also known as the "Rodney King Riots." The riots occurred after police were tried and acquitted of police brutality, which was caught on video, against an African American, Rodney King. Although this was considered a significant riot for the United States (close to 60 people died, over 6,000 arrests, and 3,767 buildings burned) the United States did not fundamentally shift its equilibrium as a stable state.²⁵

By contrast, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s had an enormous impact on the social system within the United States, and that impact is still felt today. The fulcrum of equilibrium was extensively moved over time through small and large bouts of instability and change. In some cases, citizens pressured the government to change, and, in other cases, government policy changes caused citizens to react, changing the equilibrium. Some of the major policy changes included *Brown versus the Board of Education*, which legally ended public school segregation; the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which legally abolished Jim Crowe Laws; and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which legally ended voting discrimination acts against African Americans. These Supreme Court decisions and congressional policies led to further civil rights legislation within the United States that focused on women, the disabled, Native Americans, and other minority groups. Some of these outcomes include the Equal Rights Amendment of 1972, which made pay discrimination and hiring based

²⁴ Alexandre Jaffe, "Obama, Holder, Congressional Black Caucus Address Ferguson," *CNN Politics*, December 1, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/01/politics/obama-ferguson-police-meetings/index.html>.

²⁵ For deaths, see "After The Riots; Of 58 Riot Deaths, 50 Have Been Ruled Homicides," *New York Times*, May 17, 1992, sec. U.S., <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/17/us/after-the-riots-of-58-riot-deaths-50-have-been-ruled-homicides.html>. For property damage, see Robert Reinhold, "Riot in Los Angeles: The Overview; Cleanup Begins in Los Angeles; Troops Enforce Surreal Calm," *New York Times*, May 3, 1992, sec. U.S., <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/03/us/riot-los-angles-overview-cleanup-begins-los-angles-troops-enforce-surreal-calm.html>.

on gender illegal; Roe vs. Wade of 1972, which legalized abortion; the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, which guaranteed the rights of persons under the care of state and local institutions; and the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. Although at times the process appeared tumultuous, stability was restored and a new equilibrium was created.

For the purposes of this thesis, Johnson’s explanation of homeostatic equilibrium is used to more accurately define stability as a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state’s populace, government, and social structure—specifically, the social structure’s shared legitimate values, norms, and division of labor—are in balance or synchronization with respect to its regional environment, or the international system that continually influences and is influenced by forces within the system. A measurement of stability is regarded as a functioning state that is in homeostatic equilibrium, and absolute instability will be regarded as a failed state that is in disequilibrium, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. A Representation of State Equilibrium²⁶

²⁶ Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 56–60.

The U.S. military offers a more specific description of stability and the role that the U.S. military should play in SO, but these descriptions also have important shortcomings. The military description of stability focuses on two key components: the absence of violence and state functionality. Both of these components are symptoms of stability, but they do not offer a comprehensive picture of what state stability is. In 2006, in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued *Department of Defense Directive 3000.5: Stability Operations* that elevated SO to the same level of priority as combat operations. The directive states, “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”²⁷ The DOD’s *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* emphasizes the importance of SO by stating, “In a fiscally constrained environment, the future U.S. Army will need to be capable of conducting prompt and sustained land combat as part of large-scale, multi-phase joint and multilateral operations, including post-conflict stability operations that transform battlefield victories into enduring security and prosperity.”²⁸

The U.S. military’s role in SO is further delineated in *Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations* (JP 3-07), which is the United States Armed Forces’ doctrinal publication for providing authoritative guidance on joint SO in support of U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), and foreign governments.²⁹ JP 3-07 defines SO as “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the [United States] in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” in which “the primary military contribution...is to protect and defend the population.”³⁰

²⁷ Michele Flournoy, *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODI 3000.05)* (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, September 16, 2009), 2.

²⁸ Charles T. Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 2014), 29, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, I-2.

Alongside JP 3-07, the U.S. Army developed *Field Manual 3-07: Stability* (FM 3-07)³¹ and the U.S. Marine Corps developed *Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02: Maritime Stability Operations* (MCIP 3-33.02) with the aim of further delineating the U.S. military's role in SO.³² These doctrinal manuals explain SO as a means to deescalate issues between the government and the populace to an acceptable level, while protecting the populace's interests. FM 3-07 and MCIP 3-33.02 reassert the primary objectives of SO described in JP 3-07 as protecting and defending the population, providing "essential governmental services, infrastructure reconstruction," and establishing an acceptable level of security and governance for the populace.³³ The manuals further assert that SO can follow conflict or natural disasters, and include foreign humanitarian assistance, theatre security cooperation programs, counterinsurgency operations, peace operations, and sustained combat operation augmentation.

Both JP 3-07 and FM 3-07 describe factors (see Table 1) that add to the stability of a state. JP 3-07 provides three elements of a stable state, which are human security, economic and infrastructure development, governance, and the rule of law,³⁴ and FM 3-07's five desired outcomes for a stable state are a safe and secure environment, good governance, rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy.³⁵

³¹ United States Army, *Stability (Field Manual 3-07)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014).

³² Department of the Navy, *Maritime Stability Operations (Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07)*, I-2. Department of the Navy, *Maritime Stability Operations (Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02)*, I-4.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I-3.

³⁵ United States Army, *Stability (Field Manual 3-07)*, I-10.

Table 1. Definitions for Desired Outcomes

Rule of Law (FM 3-07, 1–2)	“All persons, institutions, and entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles.” ³⁶
Safe and Secure Environment (USIP, 6–38)	“An environment in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence.” ³⁷
Good Governance (USIP, 8–98)	“The mechanism through which the basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and competition for power occurs nonviolently.” ³⁸
Social Well-Being (USIP, 10–162)	“Basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.” ³⁹
Sustainable Economy (JP 3-07, III–27)	“A market based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.” ⁴⁰

Furthermore, SO require a coordinated effort by multiple agencies within the U.S. government, and are not entirely the U.S. military’s domain. To further this goal, President Bush established the U.S. Department of State (DOS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 to lead U.S. government efforts at SO.⁴¹ This organization, absorbed into the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Development (USAID), plays a large role in SO in conjunction with USAID’s

³⁶ United States Army, *Stability (Field Manual 3-07)*, 1–2.

³⁷ United States Institute of Peace and United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 6–38.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8–98.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 10–162.

⁴⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07)*, III-27.

⁴¹ John C. Buss, “The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction with the Department of Defense,” Center for Strategic Leadership: U.S. Army War College 09–05, 2005, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA436010>.

development mission. Together with the DOD, these agencies along with other non-government agencies (NGOs) and U.S. government agencies, provide a whole-of-government approach to restoring stability to post-conflict states.

To help further direct U.S. efforts at SO, the DOS created an evolving document beginning in April 2005 built on the Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Task Framework.⁴² The document asserts that a stable state should have elements of security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.⁴³ These five sectors are similar to JP 3-07's three elements of a stable state and FM 3-07's five desired outcomes for a stable state. Although these descriptions of a stable state are similar, for the purposes of this thesis, FM 3-07's five desired outcomes of a stable state will be used because they are differentiated into focus areas of stabilization similar to the different areas influenced by corruption, meeting the needs of this thesis.

B. CORRUPTION

The U.S. military constantly encounters corruption as part of its deployments overseas. For example, in the authors' personal experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi military officers advanced in rank or position by bribing their superiors or exploiting familial ties. Politically, elections experts have called the most recent round of elections in Afghanistan corrupt, with each side engaging in ballot box stuffing.⁴⁴ Economically, millions of dollars have gone missing in both Iraq and Afghanistan, most likely ending up in private bank accounts overseas.⁴⁵ Although not specifically directed during SO, a 2013 NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) report

⁴² Robert Cameron Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004).

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, "Post Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix," Archive, accessed November 23, 2014, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm>.

⁴⁴ Jason Straziuso, "A New Warning of Unrest Amid Afghan Vote Dispute," *ABC News*, September 6, 2014.

⁴⁵ David Pallister, "How the U.S. Sent \$12bn in Cash to Iraq. And Watched it Vanish," *Guardian*, February 7, 2007; Perry Chiaramonte, "War on Waste: Pentagon Auditor Spotlights U.S. Billions Blown in Afghanistan," *Fox News*, July 28, 2014.

stated that, for Afghanistan, counter and anti-corruption efforts should have been identified as an implied task.⁴⁶

Military doctrine directly states that countering corruption should be a planning consideration. Throughout JP 3-07, corruption is identified as a problem that undermines a legitimate government, and support to anti-corruption efforts should be considered, even to the extent of forming an anti-corruption task force.⁴⁷ However, “the strongest military contribution...is the example set by [commanders] at all levels.”⁴⁸

Despite the doctrinal emphasis on countering corruption, there is little consensus on its definition. For example, JP 3-07 states that “there is no absolute test of corruption; practices that are acceptable in some societies are considered corrupt in others.”⁴⁹ Rather than define corruption broadly, JP 3-07 delineates its two forms, grand and petty corruption, and it is recommended that the military only address petty corruption when it “exceeds what is acceptable within local norms, or impinges on the security and well-being of the population.”⁵⁰ This guidance may be due to the fact that DOS maintains primary interaction with the high level state leadership; therefore, its focus is more strategic than tactical or operational. Nevertheless, the concept of diminishing corruption by reducing the opportunity for corrupt acts that usually accompanies conflict and U.S. intervention is not addressed in these key documents.

Furthermore, despite the doctrinal acknowledgement on corruption, military planning regarding counter corruption is usually ad hoc during a campaign, and typically enacted only after the harmful effects of corruption have become sufficiently disruptive to U.S. operations and strategy. This may be partly due to a misconception of what is meant by corruption; therefore, a review of literature on corruption and its various meanings is required.

⁴⁶ Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Counter- and Anti-Corruption*, June 27, 2013, 8.

⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07)*, III-17.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, III-51.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, III-50.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, III-51.

Multiple definitions of corruption exist in academia and policy circles. One definition of corruption is proposed by economists Banerjee, Mullainatham, and Hanna, who define corruption as “the breaking of a rule by a bureaucrat (or an elected official) for private gain.”⁵¹ This definition asserts that any intentional act by a government official for private gain is corruption. This definition demonstrates the “hard line” approach that most Western societies utilize. Little consideration is given to the context of the situation, such as varying cultural norms.

Contrastingly, not all scholars agree that there is one universal description of corruption. Aled Williams, a political scientist, provides a much broader definition that corruption is “where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of responsibilities, are considered to have been abused.”⁵² This definition infers that the acceptance and understanding of corruption varies according to societal norms and values, which will differ by state and region. This observation is important because, during SO, the U.S. military must work to enforce the host nation’s laws, as well as international laws in differentiating what constitutes corruption. Beth Asch, a senior economist at the RAND Corporation, argues that institutions govern individual behavior and are composed of the “rules of society as they structure incentives.”⁵³ The cultural nuances of corruption provide a cornerstone explanation for why countering corruption is so problematic.

Another critical consideration is the role that culture and context play in defining corruption. Corruption is prevalent in all societies, but it is not always recognized, nor is it always the same act. For example, in the United States, it is culturally accepted, and expected, to tip a waiter or waitress in a restaurant. Many other cultures consider tipping to be a form of low-level corruption, a bribe that pays for better service. Also, campaign financing is widely accepted in the United States. Businesses and affluent individuals

⁵¹ Abhijit Banerjee, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Rema Hanna, *Corruption* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012), 6.

⁵² Aled Williams, “Using Corruption Risk Assessment for REDD+: An Introduction for Practitioners,” *U4 Issue*, no. 1 (January, 2014), 1.

⁵³ Beth J. Asch, Nicholas Burger, and Mary M. Fu, *Mitigating Corruption in Government Security Forces: The Role of Institutions, Incentives, and Personnel Management in Mexico* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 6.

finance the campaigns of candidates they expect will represent their interests in the government. In other cultures this could be inferred as a form of corruption. In England, the monarchy passes the crown to heirs within the royal family, which could be considered a form of nepotistic corruption, particularly in modern democracies. All these examples of what could be considered corruption are widely accepted within their respective cultures, but can be viewed as unacceptable in other cultures.

Furthermore, in addition to understanding more broadly what corruption is, it is also important to understand different types of corruption. The prevailing definition delineates corruption as either grand or petty corruption. Grand corruption “refers to practices pervading the highest levels of government, leading to an erosion of confidence in the rule of law.”⁵⁴ Petty corruption “involves the exchange of small amounts of money or the granting of minor favors by those seeking preferential treatment.”⁵⁵ This latter definition can be deceiving for several reasons. There is no concrete distinction between grand and petty corruption, leaving significant room for interpretation, or allowing one to view an act of corruption as both petty and grand simultaneously. Also, the term “petty” may be inherently misleading. The World Bank, for example, states that “the sums involved in grand corruption may make newspaper headlines around the world, but the aggregate costs of petty corruption, in terms of both money and economic distortions, may be as great if not greater.”⁵⁶

Michael Johnston, a professor of political science, states that “many proposed distinctions among types of corruption...refer more to the location of corrupt processes than to their internal dynamics,”⁵⁷ meaning that corruption is labeled by the level within the government at which it manifests (grand and petty), rather than diagnosing the causes.

⁵⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07)*, III-50.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ World Bank, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank,” 10, September 1997, <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corruptn.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Michael Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” *Comparative Politics* 18, no. 4 (July 1986): 461.

Boucher, Durch, Midyette, Rose and Terry assert that “fighting corruption...requires rooting out both petty and grand corruption.”⁵⁸

An alternate model by Michael Johnston divides corruption into four subcategories based on causation: market, patronage, nepotism, and crisis.⁵⁹ Market corruption refers to regularly occurring corruption that provides goods or services to the populace similar to the black market. Market corruption implies a supply-and-demand relationship that may enable other types of corrupt acts, such as bribery. Patronage corruption, similar to a *quid pro quo* relationship, indicates favoring a supporter or group of supporters with benefits like providing favorable provinces with construction projects. Nepotistic corruption describes the favoritism of family members, relatives or close friends by a government official, for example awarding a multimillion dollar reconstruction contract to a brother. Crisis corruption refers to an uncommon situation, to include conflict or natural disasters, where normal governance is decreased allowing for large transactions, like the potential sale of an Ebola vaccination to a country experiencing an outbreak prior to widespread distribution of the product.

By differentiating the type of corruption by cause, the U.S. military may be able to focus anti-corruption efforts yielding better results. Furthermore, market and patronage corruption are predominately stabilizing while nepotistic and crisis corruption are predominately destabilizing.⁶⁰ Johnston goes on to clarify that, in the right context, all forms of corruption can be stabilizing for a finite amount of time. Johnston’s observation suggests that SO should only focus on destabilizing corruption. Additionally, Johnston’s definition has the potential to provide the U.S. military with a method to proactively target corruption, whereas current anti-corruption efforts take a predominately reactive approach.

⁵⁸ Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry, “Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States,” *Stimson Center Report No. 61*, March 2007, 2.

⁵⁹ Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” 466–474; Philippe le Billon, “Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts,” *Journal of International Development* 15, no. 4 (2003), 414–415, further describes each type of corruption presented by Michael Johnston.

⁶⁰ Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” 466–474.

For a definition of corruption, this thesis will use Williams' broader definition "where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of responsibilities, are considered to have been abused." This definition is useful because it does not describe corruption as grand or petty; rather it differentiates a corrupt act as one that contradicts established and accepted norms for self-interest. Williams' definition of corruption is then superimposed on Johnston's model to determine the severity of the corrupt act and potential for instability. In this manner, one first takes into account the law, influenced by local culture, in which the act took place, and then determines if the act was contradictory to the state and societal norms.

1. U.S. Efforts to Fight Corruption in SO

Although multiple U.S. agencies counter and prosecute corruption globally, much of their efforts are broadly focused on bribery and criminal accounting practices of U.S. citizens and public companies trading with foreign actors.⁶¹ Some of the prominent U. S. government agencies that work together on anticorruption effort are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), DOS, Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These interagency partners, along with select NGOs, such as Transparency International and Open Society Institute, help fight and bring attention to corruption abroad. U.S. policy does not address an element of state power in anti-corruption efforts, the military.

Literature and policy suggest that interagency coordination and cooperation is paramount to making headway in anti-corruption efforts. In 2013, for example, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reported that "ISAF will continue to need the assistance of the broader [international community] to achieve substantive counter-corruption reforms."⁶² In cases where the military is deployed to provide stability within a foreign country, military commanders may be the only U.S.

⁶¹ "A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," 2, November 14, 2014, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171485784#.U_pt0WOGNaE.

⁶² Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), *Counter- and Anti-Corruption*, June 27, 2013, 11.

asset in the geographical area that can report and directly affect corrupt practices. However, the very presence of U.S. military units may be directly or indirectly responsible for encouraging corrupt practices of host nation actors because of the U.S. ability to inject funds into a state's economic system and to affect civic power dynamics. These are issues that need to be addressed in a comprehensive DOD policy for countering corruption in SO.

Military anti-corruption efforts have received more emphasis following Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. military utilizes the most stringent definition for corruption, yet, pre-deployment corruption training states that it is a "Western definition, but sustained success will be in the way Afghans view things."⁶³ As mentioned, corruption, according to the military definition is typed by either grand or petty. However, using Johnston's method of categorizing types of corruption into stabilizing and destabilizing is more functional for the U.S. military since their primary concerns are security and stability. Again, corruption can be stabilizing or destabilizing within specific contexts, such as time period or the culture. Categorizing corruption by causation also aids both with prioritization and in creating operational and tactical guidance for the military's anti-corruption efforts.

Despite the U.S. military's recognition of the need to fight corruption during SO, implementing an anti-corruption strategy is difficult. Aside from developing a broad definition of the phenomenon, the primary challenge is to detect acts of corruption or discover the corrupt individual, a problem encountered by all anti-corruption efforts.⁶⁴ The second specific challenge for the military is determining whether mission success requires the cooperation of a corrupt individual. In some instances, a corrupt individual is vital to U.S. military efforts, such as the U.S. partnership with Afghan warlords at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. In these circumstances, determining when and how to fight corruption, as well as preventing it, becomes increasingly difficult.

⁶³ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Governance, Legitimacy and Corruption in Afghanistan*, (predeployment PowerPoint presentation), 7, https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=143.

⁶⁴ Benjamin A. Olken, *Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006), 1.

Third, military commanders and staff must forecast the type of corruption that endangers the military's mission and focus efforts against these specific acts or individuals. These points are suggested in General McChrystal's 2010 anti-corruption guidance for Afghanistan, which identifies three types of corruption (extortion, nepotism, and patronage) across five governmental organizations (the police force, border security, public officials, judges, and contractors).⁶⁵

Despite providing methods to cope with corruption, conflicting prioritizations for counter corruption efforts exist within the directive.⁶⁶ For example, initial guidance targets all corrupt actions, but the plan of action only specifies procedures for reporting corrupt public officials, insinuating that subordinate units should focus on public officials. JALLC posits that successes within the military can translate into non-military areas.⁶⁷ So by focusing on the police force, border security, and contractors, the military may be able to impact corrupt public officials more broadly.

2. Corruption and its Effect on Stability

Corruption represents the potential to reverse gains made during SO. Indicators of instability can be the lack of government capability or presence of an adversarial organization. Violent non-state actors (NSAs) have become an increasing concern to state leaders as the threat of terrorism becomes more prevalent. The appearance of criminal organizations in weakly governed countries usually precedes or coincides with the appearance of NSAs. Criminal organizations primarily participate in corrupt acts, which can support NSA operations, in addition to signaling a lack in state capacity to enforce the rule of law.⁶⁸ Corruption undermines stability in two main ways: corruption presents

⁶⁵ Stanley A. McChrystal and Mark Sedwill, *ISAF Anti-Corruption Guidance* (Kabul, Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force, February 10, 2010).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁷ JALLC and NATO, *Counter- and Anti-Corruption*, 10.

⁶⁸ Jessica C. Teets and Erica Chenoweth, "To Bribe or to Bomb: Do Corruption and Terrorism Go Together?" ed. Robert Rotberg, *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order* (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2009), 168.

an opportunity to subvert rule of law, and also can create a safe-haven for NSAs in which to operate, plan, and coordinate.⁶⁹

First, corrupt officials represent an opportunity to bypass the national and international rule of law. At perhaps its most extreme, corruption empowers NSAs to proliferate nuclear weapons. Nuclear policy researcher Matthew Bunn discusses the increased availability of nuclear technologies, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), from corrupt states through a case study of nuclear material and technology proliferation by Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea from Pakistan.⁷⁰ Political scientists Bryan R. Early, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Quan Li found that fighting corruption appears to be more effective in preventing nuclear proliferation by NSAs than increasing physical security measures around nuclear facilities.⁷¹ This finding may be due to corrupt officials being more likely to provide state secrets regarding WMDs, especially where little to no effective accountability is present.

Second, the presence of a safe-haven has mass appeal for illicit organizations. Political scientists Jessica Teets and Erica Chenoweth posit that terrorist attacks will increase inside highly corrupt states, but will not necessarily target those same states.⁷² NSAs have an increased opportunity to train, supply, and plan terrorist operations unimpeded in corrupt states due to reduced security and the ability to sway state officials. Political scientist Robert Rotberg states that “corruption facilitates, more than it motivates, terrorism.”⁷³ In other words, state authority can be challenged through the use of corruption, in the form of coercive acts or changing the dynamics of a society, with a consequence of decreasing stability.

⁶⁹ Teets and Chenoweth, “To Bribe or to Bomb: Do Corruption and Terrorism Go Together?,” 168.

⁷⁰ Matthew Bunn, “Corruption and Nuclear Proliferation,” *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2009), 126–128.

⁷¹ Bryan R. Early, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Quan Li, “Atoms for Terror? Nuclear Programs and Non-Catastrophic Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 43, no. 4 (October, 2013): 932.

⁷² Teets and Chenoweth, “To Bribe or to Bomb: Do Corruption and Terrorism Go Together?,” 180.

⁷³ Robert Rotberg, *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order* (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2009), 12.

In addition to physical security challenges, corruption is prevalent throughout all phases of SO. Since the U.S. military partners throughout all levels of a host nation's security forces, corruption is confronted at all echelons, and the types of corruption change depending on the governmental office engaged. For example, Mark Checchia, a professor of political science, has studied how the U.S. military has dealt with varying types of corruption within the Afghan National Security Forces, which include the Afghan military, police, and border security. Specific examples of corruption stem from a lack of accountability of military equipment and resources. This includes instances, such as Afghan officers extorting money and resources from their subordinates, buying and selling rank and positions, extorting Afghan civilians, as well as undue political influence within the military.⁷⁴ It is worth noting that the different examples Checchia has identified are not unique to Afghanistan; they vary in the extent and severity with other global partner forces the United States works with as well.

C. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis proposes the following model to define and analyze corruption, developed from Michael Johnston's four-category differentiation of corruption. Specifically, it presents a four-by-four to show the relationship between Johnston's corruption categories (see Figure 2).

⁷⁴ Mark Checchia, "Corruption and the Afghan Security Forces," in *Corruption and Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan*, ed. Civil-Military Fusion Centre (Norfolk, VA: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2012), 39–41.




Figure 2. Categorization of Corruption⁷⁵

The x-axis is the measure of corruption along a continuum between material and people. “Material” is defined as physical goods that can be bought, sold, or traded for personal gain or profit. “People” includes average citizens to “specialized” individuals, such as those within the government. Overlap can occur at the margins, for example using a patronage system to install a black market. Michael Johnston’s corruption categories (market, patronage, nepotism, and crisis) can be paired together along the x-axis. Market corruption and crisis corruption generally deal with materials, and patronage and nepotism generally deal with people.

Stability is measured on the y-axis. Stability, as previously defined as a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state’s populace, government, and social system structure is in balance with respect to its environment, can be left vague or can be specified with measureable metrics using the five categories from FM 3-07, depending on the context of the military mission. As previously stated, market corruption and patronage corruption are generally more stabilizing, and nepotism and crisis corruption are

⁷⁵ Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” 466–474.

generally more destabilizing. In theory, therefore, anti-corruption efforts that move corruption from nepotistic to patronage would succeed in increasing state stability. The same can be said for moving crisis corruption to market corruption. It is worth mentioning again that Johnston states that all corruption can be stabilizing or destabilizing depending on the context, so U.S. military operations would greatly benefit, in theory, from an in depth study of a state's history of corruption in order to understand its potential for stabilization or destabilization.

This model (see Figure 2) also provides a means to categorize and prioritize anti-corruption efforts. Corruption can be categorized into Johnston's four types of corruption, and then anti-corruption efforts can be prioritized to address the most destabilizing forms first. Continuous monitoring should be conducted throughout the process to determine the target and rate of anti-corruption efforts. If conducted too rapidly, anti-corruption efforts can have unintended consequences. For example, China's president, Xi Jinping, is conducting a campaign that is "dis-incentivizing some officials from starting new projects and instilling fear in others of being perceived or charged as corrupt," stagnating several of China's much-needed civil projects.⁷⁶

This model suggests that the military does not have to completely eradicate corruption, only move it from unstable to stable in order to positively affect operations. Moving specific instances of nepotistic corruption to patronage and crisis corruption to market on the model may establish stability within a state long enough for more substantial anti-corruption efforts to take root.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided an overview of SO, defining what is meant by stability and offering avenues in which to focus implementation. Specifically, it provided a broader definition of corruption that acknowledges cultural variability along with further categorization of corruption beyond financial corruption. It also offered an overview of the effects of corruption during SO along with its destabilizing implications. Finally, the

⁷⁶ Gabriel Dominguez, "China's Corruption Crackdown 'Is Slowing the Economy,'" *Deutsche Welle*, July 3, 2014, <http://www.dw.de>.

chapter concluded with a model specific to the military to identify the most destabilizing types of corruption that could streamline military anti-corruption efforts.

The next chapters will analyze case studies of Afghanistan and Iraq, in which state and international actors dealt with or perpetrated corruption, and the effects of corruption on SO.

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III. CASE STUDY: AFGHANISTAN, CORRUPTION, AND STABILITY (1826–2015)

In the past few decades, Afghanistan has been ranked as one of the most corrupt states in the world. In 2014, it was listed 172 out of 174 of the most corrupt states with only Sudan, North Korea, and Somalia placing lower.⁷⁷ Compounding this problem, Afghanistan's economy is wholly dependent on foreign aid; the United States alone has appropriated \$107.5 billion dollars since 2002 toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan.⁷⁸ However, numerous reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) claim that significant amounts of this money has disappeared and never reached the populace, further feeding corruption in Afghanistan.⁷⁹

Despite these recent examples, massive corruption is not a new phenomenon in Afghanistan. This chapter investigates the history of corruption in Afghanistan and how these different forms of corruption led to chronic instability in the country. The chapter builds on Chapter II, which offered a brief overview of corruption. It defines corruption as an instance where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of responsibilities, are violated. Chapter II further noted that corruption is more than financial, and includes military, political, and market forms of corruption that affect stability. Specifically, this thesis uses Johnston's four types of corruption: crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and politics), nepotism (favoring relatives or close friends, usually with government positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market (the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of conveyance) to analyze the case. Finally, the chapter defines stability as a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state's

⁷⁷ "Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International: The Global Coalition against Corruption, 2015, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0/.

⁷⁸ "January 2015 Quarterly Report to Congress," Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 30, 2015, <http://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/>.

⁷⁹ "All Reports," Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, April 15, 2015, <https://www.sigar.mil/AllReports/>.

populace, government, and social system structure are in balance with one another. This chapter investigates the effects of corruption on Afghanistan's homeostatic equilibrium.

To understand why Afghanistan has such a problem with corruption today, it is necessary to sift through almost two centuries of persistent internal conflict and external interventions. The chapter, therefore, is broken into three broad periods in Afghanistan's modern history. The first section offers three mini-cycles, starting with Dost Mohammad Khan Shah's reign in 1826 and ending with the assassination of Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah in 1933. This section includes the Anglo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century. The second section begins with the ascension of Mohammad Zahir Khan Shah's monarchy in 1933 and finishes with the fall of Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah from power in 1992. The last section starts with the creation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992 and ends with the current state of affairs in 2015.

This chapter finds that a cyclical pattern of corruption and destabilization evolved in modern Afghanistan over time. Leaders and intervening forces used patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption to consolidate power over fragmented and unstable territories. Once stability was achieved, attempts to modernize the state generally caused opportunities for market corruption. The central government's policies marginalized the populace, creating instability, which led to external interventions and crisis corruption. The unstable environment, in turn, created opportunities for market and crisis corruption. Over time, the external occupiers capitulated and left, causing a power vacuum and ensuing civil war. After a contentious period of internal governance, the cycle repeated itself.

A. BRITISH INFLUENCE AND THE AFTERMATH (1826–1933)

1. Dost Mohammad Khan Shah—British Exhaustion (1826–1842)

Beginning in the 1800s, the British and Russian empires engaged in what Rudyard Kipling referred to as “the Great Game,” both empires’ efforts to control key territory in Central Asia and deny the other dominance in the region.⁸⁰ By the time British forces invaded Afghanistan in 1838, the two empires had already been engaged in a geopolitical strategic game for control over “the less advanced, more anarchic states of Asia.”⁸¹ Great Britain, seeking to create a buffer zone for India, invaded Afghanistan twice during this period to counter Russian influence, expansionism, and control.⁸²

In 1826, the Pashtun ruler Dost Mohammad Khan Shah inherited his position of authority and consolidated his power from a fortress in Kabul as the *Amir ul-Moninin* (Commander of the Faithful).⁸³ Prior to Dost Mohammad’s reign, the state’s power was fragmented and limited to the immediate area around Kabul; however, the amir established an emerging state with a standing army and a national bureaucracy.⁸⁴ Dost Mohammad chose to consolidate his power around Kabul by relying on nepotism and patronage to control territories outside the capital; his brothers governed the fertile lands of Jalalabad and the affluent city of Qandahar.⁸⁵ Although the amir had influence over Kabul and the city Ghazni, the two main Pashtun tribes, the Ghilzai and Durrani, and the powerful princes and warlords that ruled over the other Afghan cities controlled the rest of the territory.⁸⁶ Thus, Dost Mohammad ruled from Kabul, but the rest of Afghanistan was largely unaffected by the state’s reach.

⁸⁰ Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* (Delhi, India: Global Media, 2007), 140, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10300300>.

⁸¹ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 129.

⁸² Henry S. Bradsher, 1931- *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), 9.

⁸³ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2001), 34.

⁸⁴ Thomas J. Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 110.

⁸⁵ William Kerr Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1962), 72–73.

⁸⁶ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, 133.

This relatively stable period in Afghanistan started to disintegrate when internal and external challenges emerged in the late 1830's. The amir brought in revenue for the state by forcibly collecting taxes from the rural areas, which in turn sparked sporadic rebellions from subjects who were not use to being taxed.⁸⁷ At the same time, Dost Mohammad faced growing external problems from Russia and Persia in the West, and with the Sihks that controlled the city of Peshawar in eastern Afghanistan.⁸⁸

The advance of Russia into Persia and the threat of further incursions into Afghanistan prompted the British to invade southeast Afghanistan in 1839.⁸⁹ By August, the British quickly seized Kabul and ousted Dost Mohammad. The British East India Company installed Shah Shuja of the Durrani family line, the grandson of a former Afghan amir, to further Britain's interests. The British had cultivated their relationship with Shah Shuja well before he came to power by providing him with a luxurious pension 20 years prior to taking the crown.⁹⁰ Moreover, the British subsidized the ulama, Islamic clergy, and bought the support of prominent Durrani and Ghilzai leaders throughout the country with money and arms.⁹¹

Almost immediately after the British gained control, they aimed to reconfigure the state to their needs. The British attempted to restructure Afghanistan's military by creating a professional army that was supported directly by the state through taxation. This approach upset local tribal chiefs throughout eastern Afghanistan, who traditionally supplied the state's army with civilians in exchange for half of the state's revenue.⁹² The local chiefs' loss of state revenue prevented them from financially supporting their tribal patronage networks. During this time market corruption also became a problem. British occupiers infused large sums of money into the local economy, which raised food and

⁸⁷ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 112–114.

⁸⁸ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 369–370.

⁸⁹ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 45.

⁹⁰ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, 136.

⁹¹ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 116.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 118–119.

other commodities' prices, thus causing huge burdens on the local populace.⁹³ The British were also accused of corrupting merchants and fostering prostitution due to the influx of soldiers and money in the cities.⁹⁴ These unstable events created a groundswell of Afghan resentment toward the British occupiers.

Afghan resentment continued to foment in the winter of 1841 as this cycle of corruption and inflation continued. On November 2, a mob attacked and killed Sir Alexander Burnes, the British political advisor to Afghanistan, along with his brother, at their shared residence.⁹⁵ This event caused more uprisings. Instead of the British trying to bribe local warlords to end the unrest, local Afghan chiefs attempted to bribe the British in return for not interfering in their affairs.⁹⁶ The British did not concede, and after the loss of its cantonment and the death of William Macnaughton, the political envoy to Afghanistan, the British retreated from Kabul on January 6, 1842.⁹⁷ As the archeologist and anthropologist, William Dupree notes, the results of the British intervention can be summed up as "...after four years of disaster, both in honor, material, and personnel, the British left Afghanistan as they found it, in tribal chaos and with Dost Mohammad Khan returned to the throne of Kabul."⁹⁸

This initial period of consolidated rule in Afghanistan reveals important clues about efforts to create stability and the role that corruption played in this process. From 1826 until the first Anglo-Afghan war, Dost Muhammad was able to maintain the stability of the Afghan state through the use of patronage and nepotistic relationships, specifically by placing family members in positions of power within the fledging central government. This practice of using family and sponsor ties was consistent with how leaders had established rule for generations. Therefore this approach was culturally acceptable and led to a stable environment.

⁹³ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 47.

⁹⁴ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 120.

⁹⁵ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 48.

⁹⁶ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 122.

⁹⁷ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, 176–187.

⁹⁸ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 399.

The British invasion in 1839 disrupted the stability of the state by deposing Dost Mohammad and replacing him with Britain's chosen leader, Shah Shuja. Shah Shujah did not have the needed support from the old ruling elite. Moreover, Shah Shuja attained his power from the British, which the local leaders viewed as corrupt.⁹⁹ Additionally, the rapid influx of money into the Afghan system from British forces was destabilizing, creating an environment for crisis and market corruption. Because these forms of corruption undermined the financial and political stability of the state, Afghan resentment boiled over and drove the British from Afghanistan, thus preventing them from achieving their goal of controlling this critical buffer zone.

2. Dost Mohammad Khan Shah—Abdur Rahman Khan Shah (1845–1880)

After the British retreated in 1842, Dost Mohammad returned to Afghanistan to consolidate his power and regain territory lost under Shah Shuja.¹⁰⁰ The amir took advantage of the existing domestic military and financial reforms that the British created and gained enough support and money from the local populace to consolidate his domain.¹⁰¹ He also re-established a nepotistic monarchy by appointing family members to every official position throughout the state.¹⁰² In doing so, Dost Mohammad conquered the majority of the territory that constitutes modern-day Afghanistan, unified the country under a single government, and created a stable environment for most Afghans.¹⁰³

Dost Mohammad died in 1863 and was replaced by his son Sher Ali. Although Dost Mohammad's family helped keep Afghanistan stable for many years, internal dissent eventually overtook the new leader.¹⁰⁴ Sher Ali fought members of his own family for almost six years, ultimately causing a civil war. He eventually won the war—

⁹⁹ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 118.

¹⁰⁰ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, 201.

¹⁰¹ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 127.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 135.

¹⁰³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 401–403.

¹⁰⁴ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 135.

albeit only after losing the crown for a short period of time—and stability was restored through the creation of reforms. He created a national army, the first postal system, a Council of Elders, a tax collection system, and published Afghanistan's first newspaper.¹⁰⁵

However, this relatively stable period in Afghan's history also started to disintegrate when external interference increased in the late 1870s. The British still sought control of the region to provide a buffer from Russian influence. To this end, they began to bribe Sher Ali with considerable sums of money and arms.¹⁰⁶ Despite the British gaining the support of Sher Ali, Russian Tsars began to reconquer parts of Central Asia. In response, the British used their influence over Sher Ali to allow British military leaders to enter Afghanistan and defend key areas, although eventually the British decided that a second invasion was necessary.¹⁰⁷

The Second Afghan war started in November 1878 with a 35,000-man British force aiming to take Kabul. Sher Ali turned to Russia for support but died shortly thereafter of natural causes and his son, Yakub Khan, inherited power. Without much of a fight, the British and Yakub Khan agreed on the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, ensuring the amir would surrender full control of Afghanistan's foreign policy to the British along with territory that bordered India.¹⁰⁸

Although the treaty focused on Afghanistan's foreign policy, the presence of British influence in the region was contentious. Almost immediately, the Ghilzai Pashtuns and the Kohistani Tajiks began attacking British posts and declared jihad on the foreign presence.¹⁰⁹ The British quickly put the rebellion down, but at significant cost to British forces both in blood and resources.¹¹⁰ The British then expelled Yakub Khan

¹⁰⁵ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 404.

¹⁰⁶ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 57.

¹⁰⁷ Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 42.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha International, 1992), 385.

¹⁰⁹ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 142.

¹¹⁰ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 70.

from the throne and installed Abdur Rahman, the grandson of Dost Mohammad Khan. Abdur Rahman was also from the same blood line as Yakub Khan but deemed more suitable. This decision most likely stemmed from the lessons the British learned from the first Anglo-Afghan war that, in order to control Afghanistan, they needed an amir that could subdue internal conflicts and centralize political power.¹¹¹

In July 1881, the British agreed to leave Afghanistan with the stipulation that Britain would not interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs; all British envoys would leave the country, and British aid and subsidies to the amir himself would continue to flow into Afghanistan if Abdur Rahman promised to ally with Britain and maintain the British territories near India.¹¹² The agreement held, stability was restored, the British left Afghanistan, and Abdur Rahman began his rule over Afghanistan.

This second episode of British influence demonstrates that corruption and its effects on stability in Afghanistan were less disruptive than the first invasion for several key reasons. First, the return of Dost Mohammad reestablished the stability of the state by using existing patronage and nepotistic networks. The British, in turn, while remaining in India, were able to influence Dost Mohammad, by using patronage and nepotistic networks already in place. In other words, the British worked through the culture and customs, rather than devising a plan that worked against the cultural norms. Dost Mohammad's son, Sher Ali, inherited his father's power after his death. This presented new challenges and opportunities for the British. The British initially decided to bribe Sher Ali in hopes that he would politically support their interests. However, Russian advances forced the British to invade. The British once again succeed in taking control of the country, but Afghan tribesmen soon attacked the infidels in their country. The British decided that it would be better to rule from afar and, therefore, installed Abdur Rahman and stipulated conditions that favored Britain.

Ultimately, their second intervention had a better outcome because they were able to influence the Afghans from abroad using the existing patronal and nepotistic networks,

¹¹¹ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, 44.

¹¹² Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 70.

and they did not stay long enough to create the conditions for crisis or market corruption. Stability was reestablished, Russian influence was diminished, and Britain's positive influence in the region was restored.

3. Abdur Rahman Khan Shah—Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah (1896–1933)

In 1896, Abdur Rahman Khan consolidated his political power over the state soon after the British left Afghanistan. He initiated a policy wherein he systemically suppressed any opposition to his throne by mercilessly executing his enemies and deporting whole tribes, such as the Ghilzai Pushtun, to different regions.¹¹³ He then consolidated his power by playing one tribe against the other and forcing arranged marriages between tribal members to create a nepotistic and patronal environment of loyalty and obedience.¹¹⁴ Although he would later become known as the Iron Amir for crushing his enemies, he would also be known for unifying the state and creating stability throughout Afghanistan. The result was “centralized political and economic power in Kabul [that] made Abdur Rahman the undisputed ruler of Afghanistan.”¹¹⁵

After the death of the Iron Amir, his son, Habibullah Khan, took the throne in 1901 and maintained Afghanistan's internal stability.¹¹⁶ The amir chose to reverse many of the policies his father undertook during his reign. For example, he granted prominent members of the Musahiban tribe, who were ousted by his father, political immunity in addition to selecting them for key positions within his government.¹¹⁷ He used these patronage and nepotistic networks to control the tribes beneath him. Although Habibullah was assassinated in 1919, he instituted many reforms: he improved the country's education and communication systems; he developed the first hydroelectric plant and hospital; and he maintained stability throughout the state.

¹¹³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 418–419.

¹¹⁴ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 74.

¹¹⁵ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 151.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹¹⁷ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 80–81.

Amanullah Khan succeeded Habibullah and continued in his footsteps by modernizing the Afghan state. After bribing officials in Kabul, Amanullah Khan gained control of Afghanistan's arsenal and treasury and wrestled away control of the country from other key politicians in his family.¹¹⁸ Following this internal coup, the remaining political leaders and his brother recognized Amanullah Khan as the amir. Amanullah inherited "a vast pool of public animosity toward the British," as evidenced by Afghan tribes attacking British posts along the border.¹¹⁹ Officially, he wrote to British officials requesting formal independence for Afghanistan. Simultaneously, he reached out tribal leaders in eastern Afghanistan and asked them to declare jihad on the British.¹²⁰

Amanullah's actions started the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. The Afghans won the initial battles, but the British countered with aerial bombardments on the cities of Kabul and Jalalabad.¹²¹ Following a stalemate, both sides signed the treaty of Rawalpindi, which granted Afghanistan independence. However, the treaty hurt Afghanistan more than it did the British because the Afghans lost an important regional ally, subsidies, and aid, which ultimately destabilized the state and set up the amir's fall from the throne.

In 1927, following a trip through Europe and the Middle East, the amir initiated significant modernization changes in Afghanistan: a liberal constitution, new tax laws, and a new legal system. The amir also abolished slavery, initiated education for women, imposed universal military conscription, enforced the reduction of polygamy, prosecuted the harsh treatment of women, and ended child marriages.¹²²

Although the amir attempted to bring Afghanistan into the 20th century, he immediately received criticism from tribal leaders who did not accept cultural changes and did not have the money to pay for elaborate programs. Moreover, "while he was

¹¹⁸ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 86.

¹¹⁹ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, 218–219.

¹²⁰ Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 186–195.

¹²¹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 442.

¹²² Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 182–183.

concerned to root out corrupt practices, these were, paradoxically, increased through his creation of a bureaucracy that was, inevitably, susceptible to corruption and nepotism.”¹²³ Tax collection revenues rarely made their way to the state because the collectors frequently pocketed the money.¹²⁴

In January 1929, Shinwari Pashtuns revolted, initiating a civil war. The amir escaped to India, eventually dying in Italy. General Mohammad Nadir Khan seized power in October 1929 and was declared the King of Afghanistan.¹²⁵ However, his reign would not last long; Mohammad Nadir Khan was assassinated in November 1933 during a turbulent period in Afghanistan’s history.¹²⁶

The third cycle of Afghan leadership and British influence shows a similar pattern of efforts to create stability amidst patterns of corruption. Following the withdrawal of the British in 1896, Abdur Rahman took control of a fragmented, decentralized, and unstable state; he consolidated his power over the tribes and unified the nation. The Iron Amir was able to control Afghanistan through a nepotistic and patronage environment by arranging forced marriages and placing family and friends into key positions throughout his government. The amir created a stable state by relying on those kinship and patron ties, but he established this stability through oppression and war.

After the death of Abdur Rahman, his son, Habibullah Khan, maintained stability for a short period of time by tapping into the existing patronage and nepotistic networks. He reversed some of his father’s policies and opened his government to the Musahiban tribe. In an attempt to modernize the country, he infuriated Afghans who did not want Russia or Britain to intervene in Afghanistan’s affairs. These events caused Habibullah’s downfall, eventually resulting in his assassination in 1919. Members of the Musahiban tribe were rumored to be behind the attack.

¹²³ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 97.

¹²⁴ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 184.

¹²⁵ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 459.

¹²⁶ Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest*, 232–233.

Amanullah Khan replaced Habibullah, changed the state's title from Emirate of Afghanistan to the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1926, and declared independence from Britain. The British stopped all economic assistance to Afghanistan, leaving the state financially in ruins. The king, just like his predecessors attempted to modernize the state by seeking outside economic assistance. He was able to secure some international aid, which led to several reforms, but his patronage network of tribal leaders would not accept the cultural changes. Finally, Amanullah's drive for reforms was too swift and internal dissent quickly brewed, ultimately resulting in a civil war and the end of his rule. General Mohammad Nadir Khan seized power in 1929, but was also assassinated in 1933.

B. MOHAMMAD ZAHIR KHAN SHAH—MOHAMMAD NAJIBULLAH (1933–1992)

Following the death of Mohammad Nadir Khan in 1933, his 19 year old son Mohammad Zahir Khan ascended the throne but did not immediately rule. Due to his age, Mohammad Zahir relied on his three uncles and other family members, who held prominent positions within the government, to help consolidate his power over Afghanistan. The young king reigned and stabilized the state for the next 40 years, often referred to by Afghans as the “Golden Age.”¹²⁷

Mohammad Zahir began his rule in an era devoid of British economic aid, and he continued Amanullah Khan's diplomatic policy of isolating Afghanistan from the Soviets. He understood early on that he needed to procure money quickly in order to maintain the stability of the nation and his hold over the Afghan people. With an expanding government bureaucracy and declining tax revenue, the king chose to extract revenue from the international community just as his predecessors had.¹²⁸ Italy and Japan took initial interest in the country, but Germany quickly gained favor and engaged Afghanistan after Hitler's Third Reich came into power.¹²⁹ Afghan leadership welcomed the Germans into the country after they started fighting two of Afghanistan's former

¹²⁷ Rodric Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89* (London, UK: Profile Books, 2011), 16.

¹²⁸ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 205.

¹²⁹ Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, 223.

occupiers: the Russians and the British. Germany briefly helped modernize the country by building bridges and dams and allowing the company Siemens to produce electricity in the country.¹³⁰ The Afghans' pro-German sentiment was short lived, however, and the Soviets and British demanded Germany's exit from Afghanistan following the end of World War II.

Post-World War II Afghanistan became a battle ground for Cold War dynamics as both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to buy influence to keep the country aligned with their respective specific interests. The Afghans approached the United States for military and financial aid following the end of World War II. The United States provided a \$17 million contract to build gravel roads linking the city of Kabul to Qandahar, an effort for which the Soviets later took credit.¹³¹ They also poured \$60 million into repairing old irrigation dams and building canals for the Helmand Valley irrigation plan, which was meant to bring water to new areas of Afghanistan for farming; however, this project was not completed until 30 years later.¹³² The Afghans requested multiple times for the United States to become Afghanistan's arms supplier to counter the Russian threat, but every request was denied.¹³³ The United States further strained its relationship with Afghanistan by supporting Pakistan and their anti-Pushtunistan state policy.¹³⁴

Due to these missteps, the Soviets gained a foothold and began providing aid to Afghanistan. Leon B. Poullada, a career Foreign Service officer, noted, "A careful analysis of the extensive Soviet economic, military, and cultural programs set in motion during the Daoud regime, 1953–1963, reveals a coherent, integrated and premeditated plan, disguised as something the Afghans themselves wanted and needed but in fact

¹³⁰ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 104.

¹³¹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 513.

¹³² Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, 17–18.

¹³³ J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1986), 21.

¹³⁴ Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, rev. and enl. ed., Hoover International Studies (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 29.

serving first and foremost Soviet political, economic, and strategic interests.”¹³⁵ Daoud wanted to modernize his country and needed external financial aid to strengthen his fragile military. The Soviets quickly stepped in and flooded the market with financial aid and subpar Soviet weaponry. As a result, the Afghans became dependent on the Soviets for military expertise, parts, and weaponry.¹³⁶ This is an example of market corruption because the Soviets disrupted the Afghans free-market economy by offering cheaper products, but of an inferior quality. Daoud was able to equip the military at a reduced cost in the short-term, but in the long-term, it cost him his position within the government as Afghans became disgruntled with Soviet influence.

The monarchy used both U.S. and Soviet aid to continue modernizing the country. The king guaranteed primary education for both sexes and allowed women to attend universities for the first time.¹³⁷ Also during the same time, vast numbers of people were moving to the largest cities because of these broader opportunities. However, the government became overwhelmed with swarms of educated citizens who needed employment. Barfield states that, for the ones that did have government jobs, “the rate of pay was so meager that it encouraged endemic low-level corruption.”¹³⁸ This is another example of the role that external aid played in creating market corruption. Although no examples were given, one can infer from similar cases that government workers obtained supplemental income by accepting bribes or selling government documents through illicit channels.

Furthermore, Soviet aid introduced important changes to military culture that also caused corruption. Specifically, Soviet aid and influence allowed the Afghans to rapidly grow both its military and the bureaucracy that surrounded it. Barfield claims, “these changes proved fatal to old patrimonial ties as mid-ranking individuals in both the

¹³⁵ Leon B. Poullada, “The Road to Crisis 1919–1980: American Failures, Afghan Errors and Soviet Successes,” in *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited*, ed. Rosanne Klass (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 1990), 46.

¹³⁶ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, 28.

¹³⁷ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89*, 16–17.

¹³⁸ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 212.

military and bureaucracy came to see themselves as instrumental in preserving state power, no matter who held the reigns of command.”¹³⁹

The monarchy showed signs of fragility with three major events, starting in 1963. First, Daoud was quietly removed from power in 1963 after the king and the Kabul elite were dissatisfied with the Prime Minister’s handling of relations at the border with Pakistan. Second, Pakistan closed the border over an ongoing dispute between the two nations regarding political issues, which caused a considerable strain on the Afghan economy.¹⁴⁰ Third, the king regained his authorities after Daoud’s departure and signed a new constitution establishing a bicameral parliamentary system and elections. This new system of government allowed dissention to be voiced in parliament, and it created an opening for the Marxist-Leninist leaning PDPA and other extremist groups to expand their membership and role in Afghan politics. The king’s creation of a fledgling democratic system also created opportunities for these political parties to use the parliamentary system against the royal family.

Popular discontent further weakened Afghanistan’s stability. In 1972, student-led political demonstrations began in Kabul and moved throughout the country.¹⁴¹ Simultaneously, a severe two-year long drought caused widespread famine, that was exacerbated by government incompetence and corruption.¹⁴² Barfield notes that, during this time, governors throughout Afghanistan were largely corrupt by the 1970s and were extorting as much money as possible from locals.¹⁴³ Journalist John C. Griffiths also notes that, during this time, corruption was “a normal and inevitable ingredient in the Afghan way of life”; however, “the problem was to draw a dividing line between corruption and the customarily permissible nepotism.”¹⁴⁴ The results were that destabilizing versions of corruption became acceptable because they maintained civil

¹³⁹ Ibid., 211.

¹⁴⁰ Arnold, *Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, 40–42.

¹⁴¹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 664–665.

¹⁴² Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, 127.

¹⁴³ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 223–224.

¹⁴⁴ John Charles Griffiths, *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 172.

servants' livelihood. Griffith adds, "such practices were bound to continue as long as the government remained the only considerable source of patronage and as long as the parliamentary, ministerial and civil service salaries were so low that they made some of form of supplementary income—by private enterprise in some instances, by taking bribes in many others."¹⁴⁵ This represents another example of market corruption that held over from the last time period. Finally, nepotism and bribe-taking were flourishing as much under the new parliamentary system as they were in earlier regimes.¹⁴⁶

Daoud's return to power in a bloodless coup in 1973 exacerbated market corruption. He abolished the monarchy and promoted himself to *de facto* President and Prime Minister of Afghanistan.¹⁴⁷ Daoud promised to fix corruption by punishing those involved; however, bureaucrats eventually started to "demand even larger bribes to compensate for the additional risk they were now taking."¹⁴⁸ As a result, Daoud lost the trust of the bureaucrats, which led to Daoud's presidency abruptly ending in 1978.

In late April 1978, the "Saur Revolution" brought the PDPA to power, which was followed by a coup that put Nur Mohammad Turiki and Hafizullah Amin in control of the country. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 to restore communist rule in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁹ President Amin was killed and the Soviet Union installed Babrak Karmal to govern the country. Although Moscow was able to take control of Afghanistan quickly, just as the PDPA had done years before, they were not able to maintain the stability of the country and in turn increased the instability due to their invasion and subsequent presence as external occupiers.

The Soviet Union spent the next 10 years in bloody conflict with groups that opposed them in what many historians refer to as Russia's Vietnam.¹⁵⁰ The United States

¹⁴⁵ Griffiths, *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent*, 172.

¹⁴⁶ Arnold, *Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, 55.

¹⁴⁷ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89*, 31.

¹⁴⁸ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 214.

¹⁴⁹ Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, 169.

¹⁵⁰ Lester W. Grau, ed., *The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).

and Pakistan became involved and supported the Afghan resistance groups with weapons and money. After a long and costly intervention, the last of the Soviet troops left Afghanistan on February 15, 1989.¹⁵¹ The conflict resulted in 876, 825 Afghan deaths or roughly seven percent of the population.¹⁵² In addition, millions of Afghans were either internally displaced or made refugees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

From the rise of King Mohammad Zahir Khan in 1933 to the Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989 and ensuing civil war, a pattern of stability, external intervention, and instability mirrored the previous era from 1826 to 1933. Following the end of British then German patronage, the king played both Russia and America against each other and managed to secure overwhelming amounts of financial aid, including \$523.9 million dollars from the United States in economic assistance, \$1.250 billion dollars in military aid, and \$1.265 billion dollars in economic aid from the Soviet Union.¹⁵³

This aid and influence produced several forms of corruption that had short-term stabilizing effects, but then ultimately created instability. The Soviets implemented multiple strategies that made Afghanistan's government dependent on them, resulting in patronage and market forms of corruption. Adding to the Afghan dilemma, the money was intended to support the populace, but most of the financial aid never extended past Kabul. The monarchy's attempt at modernization backfired when the very people that the government educated and trained turned against Afghanistan's rulers. Ultimately, Daoud attempted to curb corruption in the country by prosecuting and punishing individuals suspected of market and patronage corruption, but only caused the perpetrators to conceal their actions and demand more money.

The patronage system created by Soviet aid eventually culminated with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to maintain its influence in the country. The result was for Afghanistan 10 years of war; economic, social, environmental, and structural devastation;

¹⁵¹ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89*, 340.

¹⁵² Noor Ahmad Khalidi, "Afghanistan: Demographic Consequences of War: 1978–87," *Central Asian Survey* 10, no. 3 (1991): 101–26.

¹⁵³ Poullada, "The Road to Crisis 1919–1980: American Failures, Afghan Errors and Soviet Successes," 63–64.

an enormous casualty and mortality rate; and gross instability. The Soviets left behind a shattered government that depended on nepotistic and patronage relationships for its stability. Without these stabilizing forces in place, the result was a three year civil war cast among rival Mujahedeen groups, and the rise of the Taliban.

C. ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (1992–2015)

After the Soviets departed Afghanistan in 1989, many political observers anticipated the collapse of the PDPA government within months. Contrary to their expectations, Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah was able to retain power for another three years until his removal from office in April 1992.¹⁵⁴ Following his predecessors, Najibullah “planned to use continuing aid from the Soviet Union to consolidate his power through networks of patronage and by maintaining a powerful military.”¹⁵⁵ His strategy worked until the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, which terminated financial aid to Afghanistan. Barfield remarks that Najibullah’s government was deeply affected by this loss of patronage because “Corruption was so rampant that the government bureaucracy absorbed 85 to 90 percent of the Soviet Aid intended for the population as a whole.”¹⁵⁶ Although Najibullah lost Soviet support, he continued to rely on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States for financial aid. This support finally ended in 1992, but private donations from several Arab countries continued to flow into Afghanistan at an estimated \$400 million dollars a year.¹⁵⁷ Private donations were still not enough to make-up for the loss of external state support. Without substantial external aid, Najibullah was unable to keep the central government operating and his patronage networks, particularly former mujahedin leaders aligned under the “National Islamic Movement,” deposed Najibullah and his regime from Kabul.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Neamatollah Nojumi, *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*, 1st ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 60–61.

¹⁵⁵ Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, 245.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹⁵⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 183.

¹⁵⁸ Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 158–165.

The unity of the National Islamic Movement quickly disintegrated into three major Mujahedeen groups commanded by three warlords: Jamiat-e-Islami (commanded by Ahmed Shah Masood), Hizb-e-Islami (commanded by Gulbadin Hikmetyar), and Jumbish-e-Milli (commanded by Abdul Rashid Dostum).¹⁵⁹ The country was quickly “divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.”¹⁶⁰

In the midst of this fighting, most external state actors were unwilling to provide support, and corruption became rampant.¹⁶¹ With limited opportunities for financial support, the Mujahedeen groups started looking for illicit ways to raise capital by attacking the populace. Crisis and market forms of corruption dominated the landscape. Many of the leaders “sold off everything to Pakistani traders to make money, stripping down telephone wires and poles, cutting trees, selling off factories, machinery, and even road rollers to scrap merchants.”¹⁶² Shopkeepers were extorted, passengers in vehicles were forced to pay bribes, and women were being kidnapped, gang-raped, and killed.¹⁶³ For example, in 1993, Ahmed Rashid, a journalist, was stopped by at least 20 different groups demanding a toll for passage along a 130-mile stretch of highway, demonstrating the rampant forms of crisis and market corruption.¹⁶⁴

Afghanistan was in a state of failure—the currency was worthless, land for licit crop production was severely damaged due to the Soviet war, already poor rural villagers had little to no options, and warlords were fighting for power and resources; opium poppy cultivation and trade became a source of cash. Until the 1990s, the people of Afghanistan generally did not farm poppy crops, and opium usage and acceptance was

¹⁵⁹ Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 7.

¹⁶⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 21.

¹⁶¹ Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997*, 23–25.

¹⁶² Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 21.

¹⁶³ Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*, 23.

¹⁶⁴ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 22.

very low. Anarchy and war changed that.¹⁶⁵ Without a functioning government or economy and few options, the warlords, traders, and Afghan people started creating their own market economy by trading the opium crops.¹⁶⁶ This was a good example of when market and crisis corruption might be stabilizing in the short-term. Opium poppy cultivation would later contribute to the destabilization of Afghanistan in the late 1990s until the present day because of its significant economic value for everyone involved.

Under these conditions, the Taliban began its rise to power. The Taliban started out as a group of Pashtun religious students who predominately traveled through the rural areas of Afghanistan to *madrassas* or religious schools.¹⁶⁷ They believed in a strict interpretation of Islam that they learned while in Pashtun refugee camps in Pakistan or in foreign run madrasas. The Taliban grew as an ideological group after they “felt outrage at the behavior of the Mujahedeen leaders fighting for power in the city and decided to take action to end what they saw as corrupt practices, drawing on Islam as a justification for their intervention.”¹⁶⁸ By 1996, the Taliban had recruited, organized, and developed a formidable fighting force that controlled the majority of the country.

Although the Taliban did not focus on economic recovery, they were able to reverse some of the corruption throughout the country as they moved from town to town toward Kabul. They also meted out justice for Mujahedeen forces that were perpetrating the crimes against the populace, and began to reduce the country’s rampant drug trade.¹⁶⁹ Magnus and Naby note that the Taliban “were particularly vehement in their condemnation of the drug trade, which was not only against Islam but was also a major source of foreign influence and corruption in society through its vast profits.”¹⁷⁰ In 1996,

¹⁶⁵ UNODC, *The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem* (New York: UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003), 87–88, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/search.html?q=the+opium+economy+in+afghanistan+unodc+2003>.

¹⁶⁶ UNODC, *The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem*, 89–91.

¹⁶⁷ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid*, 179.

¹⁶⁸ Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, Politics in Contemporary Asia (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 43.

¹⁶⁹ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 27–30.

¹⁷⁰ Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid*, 182.

the Taliban finally succeed in taking Kabul, forcing Afghanistan's Defense Minister, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and his allies to flee to the north.¹⁷¹

The rise of the Taliban presented opportunities for market and crisis corruption. Specifically, the timing was ripe for transforming "the legal agricultural economy into illegal poppy cultivation on a vast scale."¹⁷² The Taliban quickly realized that they needed to raise capital in order to fund operations. Instead of angering local farmers, the Taliban allowed farmers to plant poppy crops, instead of their licit crops, to produce Opium in return for a zakat or Islamic tax.¹⁷³ The Taliban eventually settled on a 20 percent tax that provided the movement with \$40–\$50 million dollars annually.¹⁷⁴ By 1999, Afghanistan was responsible for producing 75 percent of the world's opium, and 96 percent of it was being cultivated in Taliban held territories.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, by securing the highways, which allowed cross-border smuggling of other commodities, the Taliban made an estimated US \$2.5 billion dollars by the end of 1996.¹⁷⁶ The tide changed temporally in 2000, when the Taliban banned opium, explaining that it was un-Islamic. Opium production fell from "3,000 metric tons in 2000 to 74 metric tons in October 2001."¹⁷⁷

The unfettered rise of the Taliban ended in 2001. On September 11, Al-Qaeda attacked the United States, killing nearly 3,000 U.S. civilians. On October 1, President Bush declared that the U.S. military and its allies had begun striking targets in Afghanistan in order to "disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations and to

¹⁷¹ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (City of Westminster, UK: Penguin Press, 2004), 14–15.

¹⁷² Rasul Bux Rais, *Recovering the Frontier Stage: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 153.

¹⁷³ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 118.

¹⁷⁴ Mark Galeotti, "Drugs Fund War," *The World Today* 57, no. 12 (December 2001): 12–13.

¹⁷⁵ Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November 1999): 22–35.

¹⁷⁶ Jonathan Goodhand, "Frontiers and Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 5, no. 2 (2005): 191–216.

¹⁷⁷ Raphael Perl, *Taliban and the Drug Trade* (CRS Order Code RS21041) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001), 2, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf>.

attack the military capability of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”¹⁷⁸ With the help of the Afghan United Front (Northern Alliance), the United States and its allies were able to unseat the Taliban from power. Hamid Karzai was elected by delegates to run Afghanistan in 2002, following a *loya jirga* or meeting in Kabul. Although the United States and its allies were able to externally intervene, security and stability were more difficult to establish.

Within little over a year of the invasion, disparate insurgent groups and warlords began to attack occupying powers and the fledgling Afghan government. In 2004, the Taliban reemerged and became another source of insecurity.¹⁷⁹ According to Nasreen Ghufuran, an international relations professor, “The Taliban’s return has been fueled by the frustration of ethnic Pashtuns seeking more political power in the government, public resentment of ongoing military operations, and the lack of economic opportunities for the general populace.”¹⁸⁰

Two forms of corruption that flourished under the NATO occupation were nepotism and patronage corruption. The post-Taliban system left very little room for competent people to work their way up the hierarchical chain without patronage support.¹⁸¹ From 2004 to 2010, President Hamid Karzai built a powerful patronage network by placing leaders throughout the government who were loyal to him and his family’s influence beyond the 2014 elections.¹⁸² According to James Risen, a reporter for the *New York Times*, “Dozens of Karzai family members and close allies have taken government jobs, pursued business interests or worked as contractors to the United States government, allowing them to shape policy or financially benefit from it”; they wield

¹⁷⁸ “Bush Announces Strikes Against Taliban,” October 7, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_100801.htm.

¹⁷⁹ John Ware, “The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” *British Broadcast Channel*, accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/the_taliban_resurgence_in_afghanistan.

¹⁸⁰ Nasreen Ghufuran, “Afghanistan in 2007: A Bleeding Wound,” *Asian Survey* 48, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 155, doi:10.1525/as.2008.48.1.154.

¹⁸¹ Yama Torabi, *The Growing Challenge of Corruption in Afghanistan: Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People, Part 3 of 4* (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2012), 5, <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2012/08/01/the-growing-challenge-of-corruption-in-afghanistan/>.

¹⁸² James Sisco, “Karzai’s Governing Strategy,” *Small Wars Journal*, January 31, 2011, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/karzais-governing-strategy>.

considerable influence through government jobs and businesses throughout Afghanistan.¹⁸³

Market corruption has also thrived in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Black-markets have appeared in many of Afghanistan's cities undercutting the government's ability to curb corruption and collect taxes. These underground markets have become so popular in Afghanistan that they are called "Bush-markets" or "Obama-markets" due to their association with stolen or imitation American products being sold.

Another form of market corruption that affected stability within Afghanistan was poppy cultivation and opium production. The Taliban were temporarily successful in reducing the production of opium up until Al-Qaeda attacked the United States. After the United States and its allies externally intervened in Afghanistan, poppy crops and opium production eventually surpassed pre-war levels; by 2006, Afghanistan was producing over 6,000 metric tons of opium despite coalition attempts to destroy the fields.¹⁸⁴ Although the United States spent approximately \$7.6 billion dollars as of June 2014 to counter narcotics in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation is at the highest level it has ever been;¹⁸⁵ in 2014, Afghan farmers cultivated approximately 224,000 hectares of opium, compared to approximately 74,000 hectares in 2002.¹⁸⁶

Foreign militaries have also created familiar forms of corruption in Afghanistan. According to Time Magazine reporter Jason Motlagh, "the presence of foreign armies in the country has for many years spawned supply and demand for [the occupier's] homegrown products."¹⁸⁷ These items include everything from military and police body

¹⁸³ James Risen, "Karzai's Kin Use Ties to Gain Power in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, October 5, 2010, sec. World/Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/asia/06karzai.html>.

¹⁸⁴ Hermann Kreutzmann, "Afghanistan and the Opium World Market: Poppy Production and Trade," *International Society for Iranian Studies* 40, no. 5 (2007): 615.

¹⁸⁵ "Special Report: Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2012 and 2013," Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 14, 2014, 2, <https://www.sigar.mil/allreports/index.aspx?SSR=5>.

¹⁸⁶ "2014 Afghanistan Opium Survey," UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 12, 2014, 61–66, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2014/November/afghan-opium-crop-cultivation-rises-seven-per-cent-in-2014-while-opium-production-could-climb-by-as-much-as-17-per-cent.html>.

¹⁸⁷ Jason Motlagh, "Kabul's 'Bush Market': Army Gear to Go," *Time*, November 3, 2010, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2029137,00.html>.

armor to American treadmills.¹⁸⁸ In 2010, roughly 790 civilian truckloads worth of gear, or 79,000 shipments, went missing, most likely ending up on the black market.¹⁸⁹

Nepotism is another type of corruption that has dominated Afghan politics in the post-Taliban era. In the past, this type of corruption was prevalent in both the central government and the tribal areas of Afghanistan. The rulers typically placed their family members into powerful positions in order to maintain control of the patrons and the populace. Patronage networks were used to extend the monarchy's rule beyond the capital when the monarchy decided to collect taxes. Nepotism and patronage were stabilizing types of corruption in the tribal and clan areas because in many instances, the rural areas outside Kabul typically ruled themselves. Again, just like with patronage corruption, nepotism converted into a destabilizing form of corruption once massive amounts of unregulated aid entered the arena and the coalition needed Afghan partners to help with logistical support. An example comes from Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, who reports that ISAF and NATO are actually reinforcing the corruption around Kandahar that supports the insurgency by relying on Afghan security firms and militias to "transport supplies, construct roads and bridges, and protect vital supply lines and military bases." Moreover, these contracts directly support the Gul Agha Sherzai families and the Ahmed Wali Karzai families who together "control the economic and political favors throughout the province" and receive additional money from the United States for their services.¹⁹⁰

Crisis corruption has also continued since 2001 and Operation Enduring Freedom. Enormous amounts of reconstruction aid have flowed into Afghanistan over the last 14 years from the international community. The United States has appropriated \$107.5 billion dollars of reconstruction aid since 2002, and Congress will contribute another \$16

¹⁸⁸ Monica Villamizar, "Rag-Tag Bazaars of War Goods in Afghanistan," *Huffington Post*, April 8, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/monica-villamizar/afghanistan-black-market_b_3035157.html.

¹⁸⁹ Matt Millham, "Afghan Market Flourishing with Coalition Goods," *Stars and Stripes*, May 25, 2012, <http://www.stripes.com/news/afghan-market-flourishing-with-coalition-goods-1.178460>.

¹⁹⁰ Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011," The Brookings Institution, September 2001, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.

billion dollars of aid through 2015.¹⁹¹ This financial aid does not include other donor nations or U.S. military and federal agencies support in Afghanistan. An example that exemplifies the crisis corruption issue since 2001 comes from an excerpt written by Qiamuddin Amiry, president of the Afghans Scholar Initiative, concerning a small village in Bamiyan province:

In 2002, \$150 million could have transformed the lives of the inhabitants of villages like this one. The money was received by an agency in Geneva, who took 20 percent and subcontracted the job to another agency in Washington DC, who also took 20 percent. Again, it was subcontracted and another 20 percent was taken; and this happened again when the money arrived in Kabul. By this time there was very little money left; but enough for someone to buy wood in Western Iran and have it shipped by a shipping cartel owned by a provincial governor at five times the cost of regular transportation. Eventually some wooden beams reached to the villages. A young man explained: “the beams were too large and heavy for the mud walls that we can build. So all we could do was chop them up and use them for firewood.”¹⁹²

Beginning in 2008, the Congressionally appointed SIGAR began providing independent investigations and objective oversight of aid projects in an attempt to save taxpayers’ money and promote economic efficiency and transparency.

The United States and its allies have finally become exhausted in its occupation of Afghanistan, just like other great foreign states before them. Starting in 2011, the United States and its coalition partners reduced troop levels with an end goal for all troops leaving Afghanistan by 2015; however, the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) permits at least 9,800 U.S. troops to stay beyond December 2014.¹⁹³ Additional aid will continue to flow into Afghanistan, but at much lower levels than previously recorded. After 14 years of occupation and development, the United States and its coalition partners are leaving Afghanistan with a fledgling economy, a persistent insurgency, and

¹⁹¹ “January 2015 Quarterly Report to Congress,” 4.

¹⁹² As cited in Qiamuddin Amiry, “Corruption and Social Trust in Afghanistan,” The Fletcher School-Al Nakhlah-Tufts University, 2010, 9, <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/aln/aln690/index.html>.

¹⁹³ Declan Walsh and Azam Ahmed, “Mending Alliance, U.S. and Afghanistan Sign Long-Term Security Agreement,” *The New York Times*, September 30, 2014, Online edition, sec. Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/asia/afghanistan-and-us-sign-bilateral-security-agreement.html>.

questionable security forces. Within these challenges, Afghanistan's level of corruption is at an all-time high according to the Transparency Index 2015.¹⁹⁴

The United States and its allies fell into the same trap as Britain and the Soviet Union had years ago. All of these actors intervened and quickly conquered Afghanistan. They all achieved short-term stability by concentrating on security and creating a bureaucracy based on their own individual political systems, whether those were imperialist, communist, or democratic. All of these nations placed leaders of their choice into positions of power.

Patronage corruption also flourished during this time. Patronage corruption and nepotism has historically been both stabilizing and destabilizing for the Afghans. For example, according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghans surveyed increasingly view patronage and bribery as acceptable social practices;

68 per cent of citizens interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (as opposed to 42 per cent in 2009)...[and] 67 per cent of citizens considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on the basis of family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 percent in 2009).¹⁹⁵

Afghanistan's tribal-based societies have always relied on patronage and nepotistic networks to function. For the most part, history has shown that these types of corruption had stabilizing effects when Afghanistan was ruled by a powerful leader and a small centralized government that permitted, to a certain degree, the autonomy of the tribes. Only when the ruler attempted to modernize the state or when external actors and their money were introduced into the Afghan way of life did these types of corruption become destabilizing. Afghans are now more tolerant and accepting of patron-client relationships, bribery, and nepotism than ever before. The results have been that very few

¹⁹⁴ "Transparency International—Country Profiles: Afghanistan," Transparency International: The Global Coalition against Corruption, 2015, <http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG>.

¹⁹⁵ "Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2012, 5, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/February/despite-progress-afghanistans-total-corruption-cost-increases-to-3.9-billion-dollars.html?ref=fs1>.

people have any chance of moving up the hierarchal chain within the government based on merit.

Finally, crisis and market forms of corruption have contributed to both the stability and instability of the Afghan state. An excellent example is poppy cultivation and opium production. Before 2000, the Taliban allowed farmers to plant poppies on their lands. Although the Taliban collected a 20 percent tax, the farmers made more money planting poppies than traditional crops.¹⁹⁶ The farmers, therefore, had more money to buy other products and a local stable economy was created. However, after the United States and its allies entered Afghanistan, opium production decreased as the coalition and Kabul government cracked down on the now illicit crops. This caused a destabilizing effect because many of the farmers were left with no alternative other than to plant crops that were substantially less rewarding.

D. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a circular pattern of stability, corruption, and instability has added to the current situation in Afghanistan. The pattern is perpetuated by efforts to consolidate power and is composed of six phases. The cyclical pattern begins with the consolidation of the state. This is a period of time when the central government is typically strong and relatively stable. Patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption are predominant during this period. The next phase begins with an effort by the central government to modernize the state, which at times produces opportunities for market corruption. Inevitably, dissent grows in a portion of the population that feels marginalized. These disaffected groups create *quid pro quo* relationships to form coalitions that eventually challenge the central government. External actors intervene and set the conditions for crisis corruption to occur. Eventually, exhausted external actors capitulate, withdrawal, and are replaced by an internal interim government. This newly formed central government attempts to reconsolidate power by exploiting patronage and nepotistic relationships among the elites and numerous tribes throughout Afghanistan. During this transition, internal conflicts rise between the ruling elite and competing

¹⁹⁶ Mark Galeotti, "Drugs Fund War," *The World Today* 57, no. 12 (December 2001): 12–13.

tribes. After a contentious period of internal governance, the cycle repeats once again with an attempt by the country's elite to consolidate the state (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Afghanistan's Cyclical Pattern of Corruption and Instability

IV. CASE STUDY: STABILITY, CORRUPTION, AND IRAQ (1914–2014)

Corruption in Iraq is not a new occurrence. The use of corruption by occupying powers and ruling elites has historically created a pattern of behavior that has led to several collapses in state stability, including the 1920 Arab revolt, the overthrow of King Faisal II in 1958, a series of coups and countercoups in the 1950s and 1960s, the rise of Ba’athist Iraq, and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Corruption, although not the only factor, has greatly supported the destabilization of Iraq in its 95 years as a state.

Chapter II offered a brief overview of corruption. It defines corruption as an instance where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of responsibilities, are violated. Chapter II further noted that the term corruption refers to more than financial corruption, and includes forms of military, political, and market corruption that affect stability. Specifically, this thesis uses Johnston’s four types of corruption—crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and politics), nepotism (the favoring of relatives or close friends, usually within government positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market (the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of conveyance). Finally, stability is a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state’s populace, government, and social system structure are in balance with one another. Specifically, this chapter aims to investigate the effects of corruption on Iraq’s homeostatic equilibrium.

This chapter considers the role that internal influence (societal and governmental influence within a state) and external influence (outside actors) play in changing stability, and the types of corruption these influences introduce into Iraq’s history. Specifically, this chapter looks at three periods in Iraq’s history: the British Mandate, beginning in 1920; the rule of the Ba’ath party from 1968 to 2003; and U.S. and coalition occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Each section analyzes the level of stability and the effects that specific types of corruption had on stability. Within each timeframe, the chapter answers three questions: Was stability established during a specific timeframe and if so how?

What types of corruption were present? And how did corruption affect stability within Iraq?

This chapter finds that the current destabilizing forms of crisis corruption in Iraq originated from market and patronage corruption introduced under the British Mandate. These forms of corruption grew under the Ba'ath party, in conjunction with oppressive policies, as a way to suppress individuals and groups that grew increasingly antagonistic toward their regime. This dynamic was shattered with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in which unchecked crisis corruption ultimately contributed to an unstable and insecure environment, and the exacerbation of sectarianism.

A. THE BRITISH MANDATE OF IRAQ (1920–1932)

The Ottoman rule of Iraq, which began in 1534, focused on major urban cities, dividing the region into three vilayats—Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—each with five distinct administrative departments. Retired U.S. Army General Julian Cunningham notes that the Ottoman departments were “notable mainly for the graft and corruption connected therewith, with the resultant dissatisfaction on the part of the inhabitants.”¹⁹⁷ In addition to these urban centers, which were Sunni run, the Ottomans managed the hinterlands by leveraging one tribe against the other.¹⁹⁸ The Ottomans gave Shia tribes near the Euphrates River governing autonomy.¹⁹⁹

Britain began occupying Iraq in 1914 as a preemptive strike against the Ottoman Empire, which the British suspected was siding with the Central Powers in World War I. Britain captured Basra on November 21, 1914 in order to protect their communications and interests, as well as the oil fields near the Persian Gulf, and by 1918, it had seized the

¹⁹⁷ Julian W. Cunningham, *A Critical Analysis of the Methods and Means Adopted by the British Forces in Mesopotamia, to Control the Civil Population During the Occupation of That Region* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School, 1933), 12.

¹⁹⁸ Amal Vinogradov, “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 2 (April 1972): 127.

¹⁹⁹ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 2 (April 2007): 371.

Baghdad and Mosul vilayats.²⁰⁰ Prior to their retreat, the Ottoman officials burned government records, leaving an administrative void.

The British initially used the same administrative policy from India, what was called “the India Office,” to stabilize Iraq until its political fate could be determined. Specifically, it imposed the laws developed to govern India without taking into account cultural differences between the two countries.²⁰¹ British Field Marshall Sir Arthur Barrett imposed the civil administrative policy, which consisted of subdividing each vilayat into sub districts and empowering personnel to administer those areas, including levying taxes and imposing judiciary powers.²⁰²

Through the India Office, the British empowered a patronage system that bordered on cronyism. The India Office established central government control in all areas of the vilayats, including the rural areas; tribal sheikhs were appointed as the “instruments of government.”²⁰³ Cunningham argues that “every effort was made to concentrate power in one man.”²⁰⁴ For example, Captain H. R. P. Dickson was able to consolidate the power of 22 Suq tribes under a single sheikh.²⁰⁵ These sheikhs then had to “collect revenue, maintain order, settle minor disputes and provide tribal labor for public works.”²⁰⁶ Furthermore, the appointed sheikhs could establish patrols,²⁰⁷ and, in extreme cases, request the assistance of the British army to suppress rebellions. Judith S. Yaphe, a professor of Middle East history, asserts that “enhanced by self-interest, [the sheikhs] reverted to autocratic authoritarianism and were increasingly alienated from

²⁰⁰ Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 22.

²⁰¹ Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” 355–357.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 356.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ Cunningham, *A Critical Analysis of the Methods and Means Adopted by the British Forces in Mesopotamia, to Control the Civil Population During the Occupation of That Region*, 21.

²⁰⁵ Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” 357.

²⁰⁶ Cunningham, *A Critical Analysis of the Methods and Means Adopted by the British Forces in Mesopotamia, to Control the Civil Population During the Occupation of That Region*, 21.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

their natural power base.”²⁰⁸ In other words, the sheikhs needed subordinates they could trust, primarily relatives, to manage their different tasks; this created a system of nepotism within the administration.

The British also engaged in crisis corruption during this time. Reliance on oil was one of the major factors in the British decision to invade Iraq.²⁰⁹ To this end, the British engaged in near slave labor and seizure of state property in order to extract necessary quantities of resources to fulfill their requirements.²¹⁰ Crisis corruption also spread to the acquisition of resources within Iraq to sustain a British force of 420,000 from 1915 to 1918.²¹¹ British actions “caused conditions of near-famine in 1917–18, and the resulting food shortages and inflationary pressures hurt the urban populations.”²¹²

Adding to the fragile stability was the British misuse of force. The British military aided the India office, and “dispensed ‘severe punishment’ on hostile tribes that resisted the imposition of British control.”²¹³ For example, when the British experienced tribal resistance, they would bomb houses during the night, killing women and children. They also engaged in public hangings, and conducted what became known as a “general slaughter policy.”²¹⁴ This approach compelled local tribes to continuously challenge British rule.

The British policy from 1918 to 1920 was a continuation of war practices after the conclusion of World War I. The British extended wartime demands for tribal manpower for military construction works, taxed crops up to 25 percent, and expanded the British

²⁰⁸ Judith S. Yaphe, “War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?,” *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 396.

²⁰⁹ Ian Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921* (London, UK: Saqi Books, 2014), 400.

²¹⁰ Cunningham, *A Critical Analysis of the Methods and Means Adopted by the British Forces in Mesopotamia, to Control the Civil Population During the Occupation of That Region*, 18.

²¹¹ Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” 351; Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 132.

²¹² Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” 366.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 361.

²¹⁴ Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921*, 388.

policy into tribal matters, increasing the resentment within the populace.²¹⁵ Historian Kristian Coates Ulrichsen notes that formerly ungoverned Shia tribes in western Iraq became more irate over the increasing interference of the British in “local political, economic and social resources in the occupied territories.”²¹⁶

In 1920, the League of Nations awarded the mandate for Iraq to Britain at the San Remo conference.²¹⁷ “The British Mandate” empowered the empire’s oversight of Iraq’s political and economic fate. Shortly after being awarded control of Iraq, the Arab population rebelled in what became known as the Revolution of 1920. Specifically, the 1920 revolt occurred “to defend [tribal] traditional rights and privileges, which the new regime of British colonialism threatened to undermine.”²¹⁸ Furthermore, international pressures, specifically President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” further exacerbated Iraqi relations under British Rule; point 12 in particular alluded to Iraq autonomy advocating “the other nationalities, which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”²¹⁹ Combined Sunni and Shia demonstrations in May and June 1920 were early manifestations of the discontent with British rule.²²⁰ A tribal uprising in Rumaytha sparked a four month uprising of 131,000 Arabs against the British.²²¹ While the Arabs

²¹⁵ Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921*, 370–371.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 352.

²¹⁷ Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” 373.

²¹⁸ Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921*, 399.

²¹⁹ Woodrow Wilson, “President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” College Library, Brigham Young University, February 28, 2008, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points.

²²⁰ Ulrichsen, “The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922,” 374.

²²¹ Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921*, xxiv.

suffered 10,000 dead,²²² the British sustained 1,540 casualties along with the financial cost of 40 million pounds.²²³

The Revolution of 1920 confirmed Britain's prejudices against the Shia. Although Sunni involvement did occur, the 1920 revolt was centralized in the Shia territories in the Euphrates river areas. The Shia dominated revolt echoed Gertrude Bell's opinion that "the Sunni element should take authority in the new Iraqi state, in spite of their numerical inferiority, to forestall a 'mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil.'"²²⁴ This prejudice against the Shia would last throughout British rule, setting a precedent for the "marginalization of the Shia from the centres of power."²²⁵

Patronage corruption became increasingly visible during and after the Revolution of 1920. Specifically, the British instituted a patronage system rewarding the Sunnis for their loyalty, while neglecting and marginalizing the Shia. Shortly after the mandate era began, the British created the Council of State, a puppet institution that gave the appearance of autonomy, which favored the Sunni. This initial governing body helped populate all Iraqi governmental positions with Sunnis thereafter. British historian Ian Rutledge contends "This absence of representative state formation at the birth of the Iraqi nation established a dark precedent for the future conduct of Iraqi politics."²²⁶

The British appointment of King Faisal I on August 23, 1921, was the greatest example of patronage corruption that aimed to establish stability in Iraq. The British chose Faisal as monarch "because of his history of cooperation and the assumption that [the British] could manipulate him," leading to his unanimous election by the Council of

²²² Thomas E. Lawrence, "A Report on Mesopotamia," *Sunday Times*, August 22, 1920, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/A_Report_on_Mesopotamia_by_T.E._Lawrence.

²²³ Ulrichsen, "The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922," 370; Reeva S. Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 4.

²²⁴ Ulrichsen, "The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922," 371.

²²⁵ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 374; Yaphe, "War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?," 391.

²²⁶ Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921*, 402.

State under Sir Percy Cox's direction.²²⁷ The British effectively made parliament answer to the king; the king approved all laws and could issue ordinances without parliamentary approval.²²⁸ The decision to install King Faisal I as head of state in Iraq ironically united the different tribes and ethnic groups in Iraq; he was regarded as a symbol of British influence in Iraqi politics.²²⁹

Nepotism corruption was an important destabilizing byproduct of the British instituted patronage system. In addition to installing King Faisal as head of state, several of the officers who served with him during World War I also returned with King Faisal, deposing older notables installed by the British.²³⁰ Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the British advisor to King Faisal, noticed how British empowerment of the king led to "harmful effects of widespread nepotism and the low moral tone of public life."²³¹ The nepotistic network "became an arena in which corrupt political cliques and personalities...would struggle against each other to seize the material spoils of power."²³²

British influence was solidified by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The treaty stipulated King Faisal had to "heed Britain's advice on all matters affecting British interests, especially on fiscal policy, so long as Iraq was in debt to Britain."²³³ It was also agreed that Britain and Iraq would renegotiate the treaty after 25 years, in 1955—a political event that never actually occurred.²³⁴ This era concluded with the overthrow of King Faisal II in 1958 and the rise of Ba'athist power in the country.

²²⁷ Yaphe, "War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?," 391–392.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 397.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 25; Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology*, 1–2.

²³¹ Matthew Elliott, *Independent Iraq": The Monarchy and British Influence 1941–1958*, vol. 11 (London, UK: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 20.

²³² Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: The British Occupation of Iraq and the Great Arab Revolt, 1914–1921*, 403.

²³³ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 26; Yaphe, "War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?," 397.

²³⁴ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 27.

This initial period of Iraq's formation of a state under British oversight contained several types of corruption identified by Johnston, all of which affected the fledgling country's stability. First, the British's initial use of patronage corruption had an immediate stabilizing effect. The use of tribal sheikhs to stabilize the rural areas and empower the Sunni minority over the Shia established authority and stability over the region. Specifically, the British were able to harness tribal sheikhs' and Sunnis' informal networks of influence to bring dissidents under control. However, these methods of controlling the population became less effective and destabilizing over time.

Iraq became an independent state in 1932. However, the British continued to influence Iraqi affairs until 1956 when they failed to renegotiate the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The removal of British stewardship demonstrated the long-term effects of various forms of corruption they had used to stabilize the country. As will be described, Iraq fell into a decade-long period of political instability that included a series of coup and counter-coups.

Second, the British use of crisis corruption, especially after World War I, was never stabilizing and only served to disenfranchise the Iraqi populace and generate an anti-British movement that constantly challenged British governance and oversight. The exploitation of Iraq's natural resources caused increased subjugation of the local populace, especially as the British used native labor to extract their spoils. By the same token, excessive taxation in the form of farm yields decreased the available food supply for the Iraqi populace and increased the growing rift, fueling discontent within the country.

Finally, the imposition of a foreign monarch, an example of patronage corruption, further led to instability and necessitated continuous British intervention. Since most groups considered King Faisal to be a puppet of the British, his legitimacy mirrored the population's opinion of the British, which was increasingly negative. Also, the introduction of King Faisal initiated the institutionalization of Sunni nepotism within Iraq, as former officers returned with Faisal and occupied authoritative positions in the government and military.

B. THE BA'ATH PARTY (1968–2003)

The years 1958–1968 consisted of four regime changes and numerous failed coups that historian Phebe Marr claims “ruptured the institutions of the state, brought constant and dramatic shifts in policies and orientations, and eroded the country’s still fragile national identity.”²³⁵ The July 17, 1968 Ba’athist coup, led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussain, almost immediately initiated judicial actions against real, potential, or imagined challengers; the first victims came from the recently overthrown Arif regime.²³⁶ Immediately after the coup, Saddam deported two of his co-conspirators, Colonels Ibrahim Abd al-Rahman Da’ud and Abd al-Razzaq Nayif, to Jordan and Morocco, respectively, and replaced them with Ba’ath party members.²³⁷ Other groups, such as liberals, the Iraqi Communist Party, and members of the Shia Da’wa party, were later jailed, executed, or exiled. Marr explains that these trials demonstrated “the ruthlessness of the regime and made clear that no attempt to overthrow Ba’ath rule would be tolerated.”²³⁸ Most notably, Saddam foiled a military coup in 1970, resulting in the execution of 37 military officers.²³⁹

The Ba’athists used patronage and nepotism to secure their power. During the initial purges, Saddam appointed his relatives into vacant positions, drawing from four major Tikriti clans: the Bakr, Talfah, al-Majid, and Ibrahim families.²⁴⁰ The nepotistic network provided Bakr and Saddam with a “stronger guarantee of loyalty” than any other social structure, and because the Tikritis dominated key positions within the regime, their *de facto* rule was secured within the Ba’ath party as well.²⁴¹

²³⁵ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 81, 137.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 141.

²³⁷ Bengio, “How Does Saddam Hold On?,” 95; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 141.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 51.

²⁴⁰ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 139; Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 51; Ofra Bengio, “How Does Saddam Hold On?,” *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 4 (August 2000): 97.

²⁴¹ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 63.

Expansive social programs ensured the Ba'ath regime was able to assuage the populace, taking away the popular support for coup attempts. Iraq's oil infrastructure was nationalized on June 1, 1972, with the approval of Iraqi Law 69, providing the Ba'ath regime needed revenue to support several social programs.²⁴² The regime won the loyalty of the Shi'a by establishing state run collective farms that dislodged powerful landowners, and by providing electricity to approximately 4,000 rural villages along with free refrigerators and televisions.²⁴³ More broadly, a social system was established that "provided widespread health, education, and social benefits that went beyond those of any previous regime."²⁴⁴ Saddam used the social programs "to mitigate tensions and distract attention from the harsh and brutal measures of the regime."²⁴⁵

The Da'wa party in Iraq was particularly targeted due to their goal of "the overthrow of the regime and the imposition of an Islamic state."²⁴⁶ For example, during a demonstration in February 1977, "2,000 demonstrators were rounded up and some 500 interrogated."²⁴⁷ Similarly, after the Soviet supported 1978 coup in Afghanistan, the Ba'ath regime executed approximately 21 Iraqi Communist Party leaders in order to deter coup attempts in Iraq.²⁴⁸ The Ba'ath regime also targeted the Kurds because of their international support, primarily from Iran. The Iraqi government instituted mass relocation of Kurds throughout Iraq and the destruction of some 1,400 Kurd villages along the Iran-Iraq border by 1978.²⁴⁹

The Ba'athist regime underwent a change of power from Bakr to Saddam Hussein in July 1979. Saddam instituted harsher policies by immediately purging rivals within the

²⁴² Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 139–140; Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 54.

²⁴³ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 54, 57.

²⁴⁴ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 140.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 176.

²⁴⁶ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 53.

²⁴⁷ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 173.

²⁴⁸ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 52; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 171.

²⁴⁹ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 158.

Ba'ath party.²⁵⁰ Saddam established a totalitarian stability in Iraq through two primary means: eliminating his direct competition and assuaging the populace. Saddam's policy was to "never share power,"²⁵¹ leading to "a series of trials, executions, and arrests" that were directed against his political rivals in the military and in other political groups.²⁵²

As president, Saddam was able to maintain stability through the manipulation of power bases in Iraq, specifically "the Ba'ath Party, the security establishment, the military, and his own family cliques."²⁵³ Saddam was able to simultaneously empower and subvert each power base at will. For instance, Saddam emplaced a nepotistic network in the military enabling him to "bypass the [Ba'ath] party and the military and keep control over these institutions."²⁵⁴ Saddam also conducted a purge of the Ba'ath party in July 1979 after a coerced confession by Muhie Abdul Hussein Mashadi falsely implicated 66 Ba'ath party members as conspirators in a Syrian developed coup plot.²⁵⁵

Saddam also targeted the Iraq military, particularly the officer corps, in which he placed key family and tribal members. The extensive nepotism within the Iraqi military created an incompetent officer corps. Saddam, in an attempt to control the military, purged experienced officers and appointed members of the Tikriti tribes. Political scientist Risa Brooks notes that "the centralization of command chains, purges, politicized appointment criteria and the tendency to select from privileged minorities all impose limitations on battlefield proficiency."²⁵⁶

Nowhere is the corrupting effects of Saddam's influence on the military seen more than during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988, in which Saddam attempted to claim contested land with Iran and curb its revolutionary influence in the region. A retired senior British officer stated that the Iraqi "command level is unbelievably bad... the Iraqi

²⁵⁰ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 177–179.

²⁵¹ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 50.

²⁵² Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 139.

²⁵³ Bengio, "How Does Saddam Hold On?," 91.

²⁵⁴ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 152.

²⁵⁵ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 59.

²⁵⁶ Risa Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 44.

general staff seems to be a farce. They used to refer to the British Army in World War I as ‘lions led by donkeys.’ Iraqi soldiers are tigers led by a pack of jackasses.”²⁵⁷ Saddam ultimately had to “keep ‘political’ (Ba’athist) officers off the battlefield and let competent officers reorganise the army and especially the air force.”²⁵⁸ After eight years and an estimated half million military and civilian casualties, the war ended in a strategic stalemate and massive war debt for both sides.²⁵⁹

To avoid coup attempts following the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam fostered support within the military by “setting up subsidised markets, giving highly decorated officers automobiles and lowering the criteria for admission into colleges and universities for members of the armed forces.” Brooks further states that Saddam also “doubled salaries, eased the terms of military service and lowered the retirement age for officers.”²⁶⁰

Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 in order to secure greater access to Gulf ports²⁶¹ and to seize the Rumaila oil field that straddles the Iraq-Kuwait border.²⁶² The United States intervened, forcing Iraq to retreat. After the war, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, increasing the abysmal conditions of the population within the country.²⁶³ Rather than inspire a rebellion, the UN sanctions furthered the populace’s dependence on the state, effectively increasing Saddam’s control.²⁶⁴ For example, in July 2001, the Iraqi government failed to grant humanitarian visas to 280 United Nations officials, leaving the distribution of humanitarian assistance to Iraqi officials. The officials resold the supplies on the black market, requiring the population to pay for these

²⁵⁷ William O. Staudenmaier, “A Strategic Analysis,” in *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts*, ed. Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 30.

²⁵⁸ Elizabeth Picard, “Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State,” in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (London, UK: Routledge, 1990), 194.

²⁵⁹ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 208.

²⁶⁰ Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, 26.

²⁶¹ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 218.

²⁶² Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 85.

²⁶³ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 240–241.

²⁶⁴ “Iraq Sanctions (IRAQSANC),” American University, May 31, 2012, <http://www1.american.edu/ted/iraqsanc.htm>.

necessities. Historian Michael Rubin suggests that because the sanctions benefitted the loyalists, the sanctions' effect was to "actually strengthen the regime itself."²⁶⁵

Under the UN "oil-for-food" sanctions, market corruption was used by the Saddam regime for personal economic gain. The Iraqi vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan, called for the inflation of oil contracts by at least 10 percent. The extra money would be paid in cash, and then funneled into the Iraqi accounts in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.²⁶⁶ Oil smuggling generated approximately \$900 million annually for the central government.

Alongside illegal oil sales, Saddam took advantage of medical supplies designed to help the population. For example, the regime accepted UN donated pharmaceuticals and sold them in Lebanon.²⁶⁷ Contracts for other medical supplies were used as a form of bribery and were allotted based on "which country was on the [UN] Security Council."²⁶⁸ Dr. Khidr Abbas, the Iraqi Interim Minister of Health, canceled \$250 million worth of Ba'athist contracts for drugs, medical equipment, and maintenance agreements that were never delivered.²⁶⁹ Most of the revenue gained through market corruption was diverted to the Saddam regime for payoffs to the top elites, ensuring no one would have the ability to overthrow Saddam.

Furthermore, government jobs, only available to regime loyalists, provided a lucrative means of salary augmentation through the sale of official documents.²⁷⁰ Political scientists David Palkki and Shane Smith add that "The regime's preferential ration allotments to government employees and regime supporters incentivized fealty,

²⁶⁵ Michael Rubin, "Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance?," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2001, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>.

²⁶⁶ Susan Sachs et al., "Hussein's Regime Skimmed Billions from Aid Program," *New York Times*, February 29, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/29/international/middleeast/29FOOD.html>.

²⁶⁷ Christina Lamb, "Saddam Sells UN Drugs on Black Market," *Telegraph*, September 24, 2000, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>.

²⁶⁸ Sachs et al., "Hussein's Regime Skimmed Billions from Aid Program."

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Dave Whyte, "Hire an American! Economic Tyranny and Corruption in Iraq," *Social Justice* 34, no. 2 (2007): 158.

thus strengthening the regime.”²⁷¹ It was not until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with the stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power that this system of corruption was disrupted.

The longevity of the Ba’ath regime was a result of a patronage network at the highest levels within the regime, similar to that of the network that functioned during the British Mandate.²⁷² The Ba’ath party centralized control of Iraqi natural resources, key governmental positions, and other social sectors, such as education,²⁷³ and used these resources to develop and pay off a vast patronage network. This form of corruption was especially prevalent during the Iran-Iraq War in which “‘good’ citizens were rewarded with extra rations, while those who caused trouble could be denied food altogether.”²⁷⁴ By 1990, approximately 60 percent of the Iraqi population was dependent on the government, allowing the Ba’ath regime to reward and punish ethnic groups and tribes based on their actions.²⁷⁵

After the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam empowered Sunni tribal sheikhs south of Baghdad to act on his behalf, mirroring British policy 70 years before. Additionally, some Sunni tribes were allowed to form militias armed with light weapons, howitzers, and rocket-propelled grenades.²⁷⁶ The patronage networks in Iraq exchanged resources and power for continued loyalty to the regime.

Saddam also used economic and market forms of corruption to retain control of the populous. International interventions, in the form of sanctions, created an environment where institutionalized market corruption flourished. The resale of medical aid to regime loyalists reduced the available supply of medications and medical equipment to the Iraqi people. More importantly, the illicit sale of Iraqi oil in direct

²⁷¹ David D. Palkki and Shane Smith, “Contrasting Causal Mechanisms: Iraq and Libya,” in *Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation*, ed. Etel Solingen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 279.

²⁷² Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 107.

²⁷³ Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 151.

²⁷⁴ Anderson and Stansfield, *Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, 93.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 106; Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, 34.

contention with the oil-for-food program generated immense wealth for the Saddam regime and was used to further its political and military dominance.

Ultimately, the stability that the Saddam regime experienced was primarily based on the networks he formed through the use of corruption. The patronage network initially established by the Ba'ath party encompassed the majority of the state even though the party was run by the ethnic minority. Legislation ensured that political survival and upward movement within the government were supervised by the Ba'ath party, leading to increased population dependence. The nepotistic network ensured that family members were indebted to Saddam, thereby increasing genuine loyalty. Finally, market corruption allowed the regime to prosper under international sanctions while the population was dependent on the state for their physical survival. At the center, the Ba'ath regime maintained stability through heavy exclusion policies that ultimately bred resentment from the ethnic Shia and Kurdish populations, as the United States would later discover.

C. U.S. COALITION OCCUPATION OF IRAQ (2003–2011)

The United States invaded Iraq under two pretenses: first, the United States aimed to reduce the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his purported nuclear weapons program. Second, the invasion of Iraq was an indirect result of Al-Qaeda's attack on the United States. Some in the United States' leadership believed that Saddam Hussein had ties to Al-Qaeda, assertions that later were proved to be untrue. President George W. Bush underscored this notion on January 28, 2003 stating that "a brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States."²⁷⁷

The initial invasion plan was limited to the overthrow of the Saddam regime. U.S. and coalition forces invaded on March 20, 2003, capturing Baghdad and the country on

²⁷⁷ As cited in Steve A. Yetiv, "The Iraq War of 2003: Why Did the United States Decide to Invade?," in *The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies*, ed. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014), 346.

April 9, 2003. U.S. forces killed Saddam's sons, Uday and Qusay, on July 22, 2003; Saddam was captured on December 14, 2003.²⁷⁸

Although the United States-led invasion achieved its goal of removing Saddam, it created an unstable security environment. Almost immediately after the Saddam regime was toppled, Iraqi citizens began looting government buildings, facilities, and Ba'ath party members' houses.²⁷⁹ Looting soon gave rise to graver acts of violence because "coalition forces appeared unable or unwilling to curtail the violence that swept across [Baghdad]."²⁸⁰ Historian Toby Dodge points out that this power vacuum accelerated the transition of looters into organized criminal organizations.²⁸¹

The United States created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), an organization led by Lewis Paul Bremmer, to stabilize Iraq prior to holding national elections. The CPA's governance of Iraq has been criticized in four different ways. First, the CPA helped form the Sunni insurgency through its policy of "de-Ba'athification" (CPA Order No. 1) and the disbanding of the Iraqi military (CPA Order No. 2).²⁸² By May 2003, an estimated 750,000 Ba'athist were unemployed,²⁸³ of which 720,000 were former security personnel.²⁸⁴ Political scientist James Pfiffner argues that these two orders created the Sunni insurgency by alienating Sunni Iraqis, undermining the normal governing infrastructure, removing the security apparatus, and creating resentment toward the United States.²⁸⁵ Additionally, Salem Chalabi, a Shia exile, was appointed to

²⁷⁸ "Saddam Hussein Arrested in Iraq," *BBC News*, December 14, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3317429.stm.

²⁷⁹ Ali A. Allawi, *Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 94.

²⁸⁰ Dodge, "War and Resistance in Iraq: From Regime Change to Collapsed State," 214; Allawi, *Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, 94.

²⁸¹ Yaphe, "War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?," 214.

²⁸² James P. Pfiffner, "U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army," *Intelligence and National Security* 25, no. 1 (February 2010): 78–79.

²⁸³ Dodge, "War and Resistance in Iraq: From Regime Change to Collapsed State," 215.

²⁸⁴ Pfiffner, "U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army," 80.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

oversee the de-Ba'athification trial in Iraq.²⁸⁶ Salem's appointment was highly criticized as creating an American run judiciary that was not impartial.²⁸⁷

Second, the CPA also created an amicable environment for economic crisis corruption. The United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 1483 on April 12, 2003, and it established the Development Fund for Iraq, approximately nine billion dollars to be spent under CPA authority.²⁸⁸ Sociologist David Whyte asserts that the CPA spent Iraqi funds in a cavalier way with little oversight on the contracts leading to "at least \$8.8 billion...unaccounted for."²⁸⁹ For example, Stuart W. Bowen, a presidentially appointed special inspector general, found "that \$1.2 billion to \$1.6 billion had been stolen and moved to a bunker in rural Lebanon for safe keeping."²⁹⁰

Third, CPA contracting procedures also created a patronage network for U.S. contractors. In May 2003, U.S. Congress passed an emergency supplemental funds appropriation for \$2.5 billion allocated for reconstruction in Iraq, in addition to U.S. Agency for International Development's \$500 million in assistance;²⁹¹ further funds were allocated by other U.S. Government agencies, totaling \$30 billion.²⁹² The CPA requirements for awarding U.S. contracts was stringently regulated, requiring forms be filled out in English, use of the correct terminology, and an intimate knowledge of U.S. Federal Acquisitions regulations.²⁹³ These requirements imposed restrictions only U.S. contractors could pass, leading to a surge in U.S. contractor partnership and hiring.

²⁸⁶ Pfiffner, "U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army," 80.

²⁸⁷ Sabrina Tavernise and John F. Burns, "The Conflict in Iraq: Beleaguered Iraqi; Chalabi Returns to Iraq, Expecting Arrest but Vowing to Fight in Court," *New York Times*, August 12, 2004, www.nytimes.com.

²⁸⁸ Zaid Al-Ali, *The Struggle for Iraq's Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 194–195.

²⁸⁹ Whyte, "Hire an American! Economic Tyranny and Corruption in Iraq," 159.

²⁹⁰ James Risen, "Investigation Into Missing Iraqi Cash Ended in Lebanon Bunker," *New York Times*, October 12, 2014, www.nytimes.com.

²⁹¹ Richard G. Lugar and Henry J. Hyde, *Rebuilding Iraq* (GAO-03-792R) (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003), 4.

²⁹² Whyte, "Hire an American! Economic Tyranny and Corruption in Iraq," 162.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 163.

Whyte goes so far as to argue that the CPA exchanged Saddam's tribal nepotism with capitalist patronage.²⁹⁴

Finally, the CPA constructed a system that was unable to monitor itself or prosecute corruption. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, an Iraqi organization mandated with detecting "corruption, fraud, waste, abuse and inefficiency," was considered very effective, and had direct access to prosecutorial judges in the case corruption was found.²⁹⁵ With the CPA de-Ba'athification order, the Board of Supreme Audit was disbanded. In April 2004, CPA Order No. 77 reinstated the Board, but subordinated it to the CPA instituted Ministry Inspector Generals.²⁹⁶ Effectively, the decision to prosecute corruption was given to the head of each ministry. Zaid al-Ali, a legal advisor for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, states that "A bureaucratic nightmare had been created just when violence and corruption were on the rise and when there was a desperate need for legal clarity to allow existing institutions to function effectively."²⁹⁷

Despite initial setbacks, the CPA handed over authority to an interim government in June of 2004. The transition left Iraq with reduced oversight of the fledgling government. Under these conditions, heads of the ministries were able to achieve significant crisis corruption. In October 2006, the interim Minister of Electricity, Ayham al-Samaraie, was sentenced to two years in prison in connection to the disappearance of \$2 billion allocated for Iraqi electrical infrastructure.²⁹⁸ The interim Minister of Defense, Hazem Sha'alan, reinstated the same networks utilized by Saddam era oil-for-food smugglers and was able to steal between \$1.3 to \$2.3 billion.²⁹⁹ The interim Minister of

²⁹⁴ Whyte, "Hire an American! Economic Tyranny and Corruption in Iraq," 162–164.

²⁹⁵ Al-Ali, *The Struggle for Iraq's Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy*, 198.

²⁹⁶ L. Paul Bremmer, "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 77: Board of Supreme Audit," Coalition Provisional Authority, April 18, 2004, <http://www.iraqcoalition.org/>.

²⁹⁷ Al-Ali, *The Struggle for Iraq's Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy*, 199.

²⁹⁸ Bassem Mroue and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Iraq Loses \$8 Billion Through Corruption," *Associated Press*, April 4, 2007, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/>.

²⁹⁹ Allawi, *Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, 367.

the Interior, Falah Hassan al-Naqib, spent \$4.2 million on VIP trailers and an Olympic-size pool from allocated funds for a police training camp.³⁰⁰ Ministers also created “shell companies” outside Iraq that would bid on reconstruction contracts with no intent to fulfill their requirement.³⁰¹ These same practices were executed in 2008, when the Minister of Defense bought \$75 million worth of the ADE 651, a fake bomb detector, from James McCormick, owner of Advanced Tactical Security & Communications; this fictitious product was used by Iraqi security forces until 2013.³⁰²

The United States formed its first patronage network in August 2004. The newly returned Shiite exile, Muqtada al Sadr, began preaching extreme rhetoric to his loyalists, often called “Sadrist,” prior to the handover of authority to the interim government in an attempt to gain political influence.³⁰³ The Sadrists began to revolt in key towns across southern Iraq,³⁰⁴ most notably in Najaf in August 2004, where Sadr established his headquarters in the Imam Ali Mosque.³⁰⁵ At the end of August, General George W. Casey, Jr., the commanding general of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, negotiated a ceasefire with Sadr in which “Casey spent \$1.2 million buying back some weapons and \$330 million more in what were called ‘reconstruction funds.’”³⁰⁶ The patronage network formed by the United States decreased the risk from Shia threat groups, and would last until the Samarra Mosque was bombed in 2006, sparking massive sectarian violence.

The 2005 elections added to sectarian tensions because the Shia majority gained control of the Iraqi political system. The Sunni minority protested the 2005 parliamentary elections for two reasons. First, the Sunni were still angry about 2004 combat operations in Fallujah, initiated by the death and mutilation of four U.S. contract workers, which had

³⁰⁰ Mroue and Abdul-Zahra, “Iraq Loses \$8 Billion Through Corruption.”

³⁰¹ Al-Ali, *The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy*, 207–208.

³⁰² Kelsey D. Atherton, “How a Millionaire Sold Fake Bomb Detectors to Governments All Over the World,” *Popular Science*, April 24, 2013, <http://www.popsci.com>; Robert Booth, “Fake Bomb Detector Conman Jailed for 10 Years,” *Guardian*, May 2, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com>.

³⁰³ Dodge, “War and Resistance in Iraq: From Regime Change to Collapsed State,” 217.

³⁰⁴ Yaphe, “War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?,” 217.

³⁰⁵ Kirk, “Losing Iraq.”

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

destroyed the city.³⁰⁷ Second, political scientist Adeed Dawisha and political sociologist Larry Diamond asserted, of the Sunni: “Fearful of losing political power, they tried to thwart and delegitimize the elections, publicly boycotting and belittling them as a U.S. imperialist endeavor, while giving a silent nod to the threat and intimidation employed by the Sunni insurgents.”³⁰⁸ The boycott resulted in the Sunnis obtaining only 17 out of 275 seats in the Transitional National Assembly.³⁰⁹ Although the Sunnis boycotted the election, the coalition was able to negotiate their inclusion in drafting the Iraqi constitution, ensuring the constitution passed in August 2005, even if by a small margin.³¹⁰ Finally, Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia exile, won the Prime Minister office during the December 2005 elections with a platform of a more inclusive government.³¹¹

Sunni exclusion from the Iraqi political process spurred an increase in violence from 2005 to 2007. U.S. Army Colonel William Hix, the chief strategist of the Multi-National Task Force-Iraq under General Casey, assessed that insurgents, comprised predominately of Sunni tribes, escalated attacks in 2005 in an effort to “undermine the political process and the legitimacy of the new government.”³¹² The attacks targeted members of the populace, both Sunni and Shia, government officials, and members of the Iraqi and coalition security forces.

Sectarian violence and the insurgency became a front for market corruption. For example, the Jaish-al-Mahdi, Sadr’s Shia militia, sold stolen homes and cars for profit while Sunni insurgents used extortion, kidnapping and oil smuggling to fund their cause; both extorted protection money from reconstruction contractors.³¹³

³⁰⁷ Kirk, “Losing Iraq.”

³⁰⁸ Adeed I. Dawisha and Larry J. Diamond, “Iraq’s Year of Voting Dangerously,” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 93.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 94–95.

³¹¹ Jason M. Breslow, “Who Is Nouri Al-Maliki?,” *Frontline*, July 29, 2014, www.pbs.org.

³¹² Kirk, “Losing Iraq.”

³¹³ Phil Williams, “Illicit Markets, Weak States and Violence: Iraq and Mexico,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 52, no. 3 (September 2009): 331–332.

Missteps by the organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq empowered the United States to form a second patronage network. In 2006, the coalition initiated a new “surge strategy,” increasing U.S. forces in Iraq by 30,000, in an attempt to quell increasing insurgent and sectarian violence. Foreign policy analyst Phil Williams explains that a rift between Sunni tribes and Al-Qaeda emerged over disputes about smuggling and black market activities.³¹⁴ General David Petraeus was able to capitalize on the rift, and eventually paid \$400 million to Sunni tribes that later formed the “Sons of Iraq,” a Sunni paramilitary group that split from Al-Qaeda and succeeded in driving the insurgent group from the central portion of Iraq.³¹⁵

Insurgent and sectarian violence in Iraq began to subside in the fall of 2007, and stability was within reach. The formation of the patronage network enabled the coalition to provide the necessary security required for the formation of a working government. In 2008, President Bush made an agreement with Prime Minister Maliki for U.S. forces to remain in Iraq until 2011. On December 18, 2011, U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in accordance with the agreement.³¹⁶

After the U.S. withdrawal, the corruption established during the war continued, eventually leading to instability. After Maliki’s election in 2006 and again in 2010, the Shia used his position of authority to “ensure Shia majority in all ministries,” to marginalize Sunnis within the government, and to “consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.”³¹⁷ Maliki also made use of the U.S. created de-Ba’athification laws to target political opponents and remove their eligibility for office.³¹⁸ General Petraeus states that

³¹⁴ Williams, “Illicit Markets, Weak States and Violence: Iraq and Mexico,” 332.

³¹⁵ Kirk, “Losing Iraq.”

³¹⁶ Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush and Iraq Prime Minister Maliki Sign the Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement,” The White House President George W. Bush, December 14, 2008, georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov; Joseph Logan, “Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War,” *Reuters*, December 18, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/us-iraq-withdrawal-idUSTRE7BH03320111218>.

³¹⁷ Breslow, “Who Is Nouri Al-Maliki?”

³¹⁸ Zaid Al-Ali, “How Maliki Ruined Iraq,” *Foreign Policy*, June 19, 2014, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>.

this patronage corruption “started the process of undoing the process that we’d worked so hard to do during the surge and even in the years after the surge.”³¹⁹

Security forces were also rife with corruption and continued to deteriorate after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Nepotism was a leading cause of the Iraq security force failure in 2014 against the advance of the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL). Prior to their advance, Maliki had replaced trained commanders with political loyalists, thus rendering the military weak and ineffective.³²⁰ In fact, this process of undermining the officers’ corps began while U.S. and coalition forces were still in the country. As early as 2007, U.S. Army First Sergeant Joseph McFarlane stated that, “Most of [the Iraqi Army’s] promotion system has been based on nepotism or family.”³²¹ The Iraqi Police Service was also based on nepotism and rather than relying on an independent process used sheikhs to verify if a candidate was associated with insurgents.³²² Al-Ali states that “there was very little desire to take risks on behalf of political elites who were viewed as wildly corrupt.”³²³ Similar to the Saddam era, the Iraqi military was commanded by officers with little to no military experience.

Market corruption was also problematic in the Iraqi security forces. Williams states that by 2006, “it was estimated that more than 14,000 of the 370,000 weapons the United States provided to Iraq in the previous few years were unaccounted for,” adding that similar weapons were available in Iraqi markets.³²⁴ Additionally, in 2014, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi accused military commanders of skimming the pay of 50,000 “ghost” soldiers who were on record but did not actually exist.³²⁵ Global Security

³¹⁹ Kirk, “Losing Iraq.”

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Robert Yde, “MiTT Focused on Iraqi Army NCO Corps,” *U.S. Army News Service*, February 20, 2007, <http://www.army.mil>.

³²² Michael A. Musard, *Militia Influence and Corruption in the Iraqi Police Service*, Theater Observation Detachment (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Munit-National Division-North-Iraq, n.d.).

³²³ Al-Ali, “How Maliki Ruined Iraq.”

³²⁴ Williams, “Illicit Markets, Weak States and Violence: Iraq and Mexico,” 329.

³²⁵ Yousuf Basil and Ben Brumfield, “Iraq’s Army Weakened from Within by 50,000 ‘Ghost’ Soldiers,” *CNN*, December 1, 2014.

explains that “They do this by firing soldiers and not taking them off the payroll, splitting salaries, pocketing half and giving the rest to men who do not show up to work, and even listing soldiers who have defected or been killed.”³²⁶ Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former mayor of Mosul, accused Iraqi military officers in his city of being complicit with Islamic State smuggling operations that contributed to ISIL’s control of Mosul prior to their assault in 2014.³²⁷ The Islamic State recruited the willing, intimidated those that interfered, and killed the rest.³²⁸ Several Iraqi soldiers assert they were ordered to abandon their posts prior to the assault, substantiating allegations of corruption within Iraqi security forces. Ultimately, the Iraqi military all but collapsed with the arrival of the ISIL in June of 2014, forcing the Maliki-led government to resign and a new unity government to be created.³²⁹

The U.S.-led occupation of Iraq created the conditions for several forms of corruption. Some of these forms had short-term stabilizing effects, but over the duration, they led to the collapse of the military and government. The CPA de-Ba’athification policy and disbanding the Iraqi military provided the required personnel and motive for an insurgency, demonstrating that policies that exclude key members of society are bound to negatively affect stability. This decision not only negatively affected the near-term stability of Iraq, but it also had lasting repercussions. For example, Liz Sly, a *Washington Post* reporter, writes that Iraqi security officers affected by the de-Ba’athification policy are currently aiding the Islamic State’s assault and occupation of Iraq.³³⁰

Crisis corruption in the form of graft and misuse of reconstruction funds reduced the effectiveness of international efforts to stabilize the country, raised the cost for SO, funded part of the insurgency, and delegitimized the new Iraqi government. The

³²⁶ Global Security, “Iraqi Army,” Global Security, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.

³²⁷ Al-Monitor, “Former Mosul Mayor Says Corruption Led to ISIS Takeover,” *Al-Monitor*, July 2, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com>.

³²⁸ Al-Ali, “How Maliki Ruined Iraq.”

³²⁹ *Ibid.*; Global Security, “Iraqi Army.”

³³⁰ Liz Sly, “The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” *Washington Post*, April 4, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

embezzlement of reconstruction funds resulted in faulty electrical and other infrastructure throughout Iraq. Embezzled funds also created a poorly armed and outdated military, which can also be blamed for the loss of countless lives through the purchase of faulty or fake security equipment.

The U.S. sponsored patronage networks with the Shia in 2004 and Sunni in 2007 momentarily added to the stability of Iraq. Buying momentary peace in 2004, the U.S. military was able to focus security efforts on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and then later separate the “irreconcilable” members of the insurgency that could not be integrated back into society. The United States created patronage networks also capitalized on the close-knit tribal culture for both influence and information. Lastly, the patronage network motivated the Sons of Iraq to secure their territory from insurgents. However, these patronage networks, while stabilizing in the short run, proved to be highly destabilizing over time.

Finally, similar to the Saddam era military prior to the Iran-Iraq war, Shia nepotism within Iraqi security forces decreased their effectiveness to the point that a fraction of Islamic State personnel were able to overrun Iraqi Army divisions. The Maliki administration installed incompetent military commanders who reduced the military’s planning and tactical capability, leaving Iraq vulnerable to invasion. Appointed military commanders used their positions for profit rather than to increase security by appropriating the pay of 50,000 ghost soldiers along with the sale of military weapons and supplies.

D. CONCLUSION

A waterfall effect of corruption added to the current situation in Iraq. The British patronage network of the Sunni, although stabilizing at the time, set precedence for the future rule of Iraq along with creating Shia grievances. The patronage network was then exploited by the Ba’athist regime to create a nepotistic network to ensure their control of the government. The nepotistic network, which constituted approximately 60 percent of the Iraqi populace, may have added to the formation of the insurgency once the Saddam regime was toppled. Additionally, the Ba’athists created the framework for market corruption through the illicit sale of oil under UN sanctions. During the coalition

occupation, the reinvigoration of the Ba'athist market corruption networks by members of the ministries empowered the skimming of a substantial amount of reconstruction funds, thereby delegitimizing the new government. The empowerment of a Shia patronage network within the state and a diminishing Sunni voice created a volatile environment ready for an insurgency undermining both the stability and legitimacy of Iraq.

The next chapter reviews the definitions for “stability” and “corruption.” Also, by comparing the Afghanistan and Iraq case studies, this thesis concludes that Johnston’s different forms of corruption are more prevalent at different times during SO. For example, crisis corruption is extensive and destabilizing at the start of SO, whereas patronage and market forms of corruption can initially aid in stabilization. Furthermore, the different forms of corruption morph throughout SO, necessitating a change in priority for the military’s anti-corruption efforts. The next chapter will conclude with recommendations for the prioritization of anti-corruption efforts throughout SO.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY FINDINGS

This thesis began by creating working definitions of stability and corruption, drawn from academic and practitioners' literature. Specifically, this thesis used Chalmers Johnson's concept of homeostatic equilibrium to define stability: a condition in which the state's populace, government, and social structure are in balance or synchronization with respect to its environment. The intervals between equilibrated periods constitute varying degrees of instability. This thesis used Johnson's understanding of equilibrium and disequilibrium specifically to investigate the effects of corruption on governments and societies within states.

This thesis also drew from a variety of literature to create a working definition of corruption. Specifically, it used Aled Williams' definition of corruption—the instance where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of responsibilities, are considered to have been abused. Within this definition, the thesis made several assertions regarding the study of corruption and its effects on stability: first, corruption is prevalent in all societies, but culture and context make it a relative term; in other words, there is no “one-size-fits-all” regarding corruption and its effects in practice. Second, corruption is more than just financial. As importantly, there are non-material forms of corruption that require investigation for their roles in affecting the stability of a state. Specifically, this thesis identified four types, drawn from political scientist Michael Johnston: crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and politics), nepotism (favoring relatives or close friends, usually within government positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market (the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of conveyance).

Although Johnston hypothesizes that market and patronage forms of corruption are generally more stabilizing, while nepotism and crisis corruption are more destabilizing, cultural tolerance of corruption truly determines the stabilizing or destabilizing nature of each form, as illustrated in the case studies. This observation

makes studying corruption particularly challenging because a society's culture is constantly changing. Therefore, it is important to study the effects of corruption on stability over time, not just in the beginning of a crisis or towards its end.

The case studies for this thesis focused on the most recent U.S. interventions in Afghanistan (2001–2015) and Iraq (2003–2011). In both cases, U.S. and host nation officials noted corruption as a significant impediment to the creation of a stable state. Additionally, both cases involved a large deployment of the U.S. military to conduct SO after major conflict operations ceased.

The Afghanistan case study examined three broad time periods covering almost two centuries. The first period covered Dost Mohammad Khan Shah's reign in 1826 and ended with the assassination of Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah in 1933, which included the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century. The ruling elite created short-term stability by consolidating their power through culturally acceptable patronage and nepotistic networks. The British exploited the Afghan patronage networks by infusing them with aid and other forms of influence, eventually breaking the necessary trust of the tribal leaders within the network, resulting in the long-term destabilization of the state.

Starting in 1933, Mohammad Zahir Khan Shah's monarchy introduced market corruption by attempting to consolidate and modernize Afghanistan's military, an effort which initiated the destabilization of his regime. The state also exacerbated market corruption after attempting to curtail bribes within the civil service. Simultaneously, the Afghans grew increasingly dependent on patronage and nepotistic relationships to create stability after the Soviet withdrawal; an initial three year civil war among rival Mujahedeen groups removed Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah from power in 1992.

The rise of the Taliban in 1992 initiated the third cycle of destabilization and corruption. The Taliban created new patronage networks through its strict interpretation of Islam and through Pashtun lineage. The United States deposed the Taliban in 2001 only to perpetuate similar forms of corruption in the years that followed. The United States instituted patronage networks that provided momentary stability, but stifled

competition and was, therefore, destabilizing over time. Crisis and market forms of corruption flourished out of these patron-client relationships, exacerbated by the continual flow of financial aid into an unstable environment.

The Iraq case study considered three time periods beginning with the British Mandate of Iraq (1920 to 1932), followed by Ba'athist rule (1968 to 2003), and concluded with the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003 to 2011). This investigation found that the British established Sunni patronage networks that momentarily stabilized Iraq from 1920 to 1932. However, Britain also perpetuated crisis corruption to extract natural resources creating extensive instability by disenfranchising the populace. King Faisal I transmuted the patronage network into a nepotistic network to help solidify his reign. By initiating patronage corruption, the British enabled subsequent regimes to exploit the patronage and nepotistic networks. Ultimately, these forms of corruption resulted in increased instability, both within the state and social structure.

The Ba'athist regime, 1968 to 2003, expanded upon the corruption established by the British. The Ba'athists used crisis corruption after their coup in the form of governmental purges to expand the patronage and nepotistic networks within the Iraqi government, generating stability from authoritarian control. During the Iran-Iraq war, the nepotistic network of political appointees within the military resulted in an incompetent officer corps. The use of market corruption, specifically during the UN sanctions in the 1990s, increased regime stability through the accumulation of revenue, which in turn was used to further control the populace.

The U.S. occupation of Iraq created instability through the Coalition Provisional Authority orders of de-Ba'athification and disbanding the Iraqi military, disrupting the Ba'athist nepotistic and patronage networks. Crisis corruption was rampant, especially in contracting; likewise, Iraqi ministries spent large sums of money with little oversight. Patronage networks within the Iraqi military contributed to its collapse with the advance of ISIL in 2014, as did Shia patronage and nepotistic networks within the Iraqi government.

B. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT CORRUPTION AND STABILITY

This thesis gathered several general observations about the nature of corruption and its impact on stability. First, as shown in Chapters III and IV, corruption is generally cyclical in nature. Regimes typically use patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption to consolidate power over fragmented and unstable territories. While stabilizing in the short run, these policies ultimately lead to the collapse of regimes and the beginning of a new cycle. This thesis identified that virtually all of the time periods studied in Afghanistan involved leaders or intervening powers using patronage and nepotistic networks to establish or consolidate authority. However, over time these forms of corruption proved destabilizing to leadership.

Second, once a state's regime or an intervening power uses a form of corruption to establish stability, subsequent regimes generally continue to use and magnify that form of corruption. For example, from 1826 to 1842 and again from 1845 to 1863, Dost Mohammad Khan twice consolidated his control over Afghanistan by establishing a nepotistic monarchy of appointed family members to every official position throughout the state. Similarly, in 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan consolidated his power through nepotistic networks, abolished the monarchy, and promoted himself to *de facto* president and prime minister. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein embezzled a reported \$900 million annually from the oil for food program, money intended for a suffering population. Somewhat similarly, following the overthrow of Saddam's regime, the new Iraqi Minister of Defense, Hazam Sha'alan, embezzled \$1.3 to \$2.3 billion. This ever-increasing pattern of corruption over time suggests that, once started, a culture of corruption allows it to persist, making fighting these forms of corruption more difficult.

A third observation is that short-term pay offs in corruption often have long-term consequences. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, several instances of corruption showed stabilizing effects in the short run, but later became destabilizing. For example, in both cases, market corruption was initially useful for the survival of the populace because of the governments' inability to provide basic necessities and services; nonetheless, market corruption later became destabilizing as it undercut the government's control and ability to collect revenue, particularly taxes.

Similarly, patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption initially built loyalty and trust within a regime by relying on family members and key individuals to keep the country running. However, the long-term effect was that large segments of the population were excluded from these positions and animosity grew between the rulers and the rest of society. This dynamic was particularly evident in the Iraqi military, where nepotism ensured loyalty between the officers' corps and the regime, but to the detriment of the military's effectiveness and its perceived trustworthiness amongst the populous.

Finally, the sole outlier for the tradeoff between short- and long-term effects of corruption on stability was crisis corruption; crisis corruption never appeared to be stabilizing during this research. The British perpetuated crisis corruption by exploiting Iraqi natural resources, which created an environment of near slave labor and famine prior to the Revolution of 1920. More recently, crisis corruption occurred in both Afghanistan and Iraq during reconstruction efforts, increasing the costs and the grievances within the populace.

Furthermore, economists have studied the relationship between foreign aid and stability. Economist Paul Collier expresses that instability persists within a state with low income, slow economic growth, and a dependence on natural resources.³³¹ Economists Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol counter that the infusion of foreign aid undermines stability more than a country's overreliance on natural resources.³³² Both case studies in this thesis demonstrate that foreign aid became a catalyst for corruption and instability, specifically for crisis and market corruption. International aid was destabilizing because not only were political and economic systems too weak to account for the aid, resulting in capital flight, but it delegitimized the government. In Iraq, the infusion of \$9 billion dollars resulted in the loss of \$8.8 billion; in Afghanistan, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction claims that a significant amount of aid disappeared, most likely into bank accounts of government officials.

³³¹ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 19–21.

³³² Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, "The Curse of Aid," *Journal of Economic Growth* 13, no. 3 (2008): 169–194.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis proposes a rank order of the different forms of corruption based on the frequency and negative outcomes to deal with corruption during SO. Because corruption has the potential to change over time, this thesis split SO into three subjective phases to provide the most flexible model without detracting from its usefulness.




Figure 4. Predominant Forms of Corruption Throughout Stability Operations

At the beginning of SO, anti-corruption efforts should focus on the crisis and nepotistic forms of corruption. The military should prioritize efforts against crisis corruption because it is the most rampant form of corruption especially after conflict operations or natural disasters. Nepotism is not necessarily common during this phase, but the ramifications of allowing a nepotistic network to form during the early phases, significantly undermines stability during the subsequent phases. Patronage networks may actually be stabilizing during the initial phase because they form a power base between the government and the populace adding to state legitimacy. If the U.S. military allows patronage, the military must monitor it because patronage can easily transform into a

nepotistic network. Market forms of corruption during the beginning of SO are almost a necessity because they provide the necessities the government cannot provide on its own. In this sense, the populace uses market corruption to ensure their survival.

In the middle of SO, anti-corruption efforts should focus on the nepotistic and patronage forms of corruption. Nepotism becomes increasingly destabilizing during the middle phase of SO because it significantly empowers a small portion of the populace, a family or tribe, creating a fissure between the government and populace. Nepotistic networks may also spread throughout the government, producing incompetent ministers and military officers. Patronage is similar; however, the fissure is not as severe because a wider portion of the populace is empowered. During this phase, it is difficult to differentiate market and crisis corruption. The destabilizing effects of market corruption begin to appear, but are not as substantial as nepotism and patronage. The combination of crisis corruption with market corruption seems to lead to destabilizing market corruption at the end of SO.

Toward the conclusion of SO, anti-corruption efforts should focus on market and patronage corruption. Market corruption becomes the antithesis of state legitimacy and stability. Market corruption becomes an avenue through which adversarial groups can infiltrate a state, in addition to undermining legitimate industry and tax collection. Patronage corruption creates partisan views between the empowered and ruled segments of a state creating instability, especially when there is no method to vent grievances. Nepotism might become more stabilizing during the latter phases of SO because it solidifies state control. Finally, unless internal turmoil continues, crisis corruption becomes almost non-existent.

Separately, the U.S. military should incorporate with DOS anti-corruption efforts because DOS has oversight on all U.S. government anti-corruption efforts. This may streamline U.S. efforts, prevent redundancy, and create unity of effort. For example, prior to military SO, the DOD, with the United States Agency for International Development, should harmonize on incorporating foreign aid while mitigating crisis and market corruption, especially when transitioning from major conflict. Integration should continue during SO as the nature and prevalence of the different forms of corruption change.

Agreed upon mutual goals are important because, as stated in Chapter II, military commanders may be the sole U.S. representatives in a geographic area.

D. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis' aim was to provide examples and recommendations at the tactical and operational levels for dealing with corruption. This thesis observed that examples of corruption were generally at the operational or strategic levels. Additional research should focus on interviewing military personnel for their experiences with corruption, with the projected compilation of "best practices" for the military. Future research might focus on creating a corruption tracking system for the military to reduce the friction during anti-corruption efforts. The tracking system might track individuals and groups involved in the different forms of corruption. The distribution of this information may increase the continuity between units and U.S. government organizations.

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