IS THE ARMY DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Is the Army Developing Strategic Leaders?

Given today’s strategic environment and the demand put on the officer corps at every level, is the Army currently developing strategic leaders? The US Army doctrine and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) provide a definition and list of competencies that outlines what a strategic leader should possess. With that definition and list of competencies, the researcher will examine three military leaders, showing linkage to doctrine, which will illustrate examples of this doctrinal definition. Once this is established the research will illustrate the evolution over the last 70 years of the Officer Personnel Management System, through laws passed by Congress that set policy for the Army to arrive at its current system. The research showed that the current Officer Personnel Management System prepares officers to be strategic leaders.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Given today’s strategic environment and the demand put on the officer corps at every level, is the Army currently developing strategic leaders? The US Army doctrine and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) provide a definition and list of competencies that outlines what a strategic leader should possess. With that definition and list of competencies, the researcher will examine three military leaders, showing linkage to doctrine, which will illustrate examples of this doctrinal definition. Once this is established the research will illustrate the evolution over the last 70 years of the Officer Personnel Management System, through laws passed by Congress that set policy for the Army to arrive at its current system. The research showed that the current Officer Personnel Management System prepares officers to be strategic leaders.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Today the United States (US) Army is involved in over 150 countries conducting operations from direct action, to security team training, to nation building.¹ An Army Officer today is expected to be able to lead in the most complex world the Army has ever faced in our history.² This challenge requires a strategic leader to develop a vision that prepares the Army for the ambiguity of the next threat our nation might face. General Raymond T. Odierno stated in his “Way Points” article on strategic guidance “we will expand our strategic leadership education and opportunities to ensure we develop leaders.”³ If the lessons of the twentieth century provide any insight to what the twenty-first century may hold, having an Army that is agile and adaptive, led by strategic leaders will be a necessity to respond to those threats. With that being said, this research will examine and discover if the US Army is currently creating strategic leaders.

Based on Odierno’s statement, from his strategic points described in his vision, is the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) saying the Army has neglected the development of


² Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).

the officer corps or that it needs to refocus, based on its lack of producing strategic leaders? By answering the research question “Is the Army currently developing strategic leaders?” the CSA’s point will be addressed. The US Army doctrine the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and business theories provide a definition and list of competencies that outlines what a strategic leader should possess. With that definition and list of competencies, the researcher will examine three military leaders, showing linkage to doctrine, which will illustrate examples of this doctrinal definition. Once this is established the research will illustrate the evolution over the last seventy years of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), through laws passed by Congress that set policy for the Army to arrive at its current system.

Today the US Army has over 35,000 officers on Active Duty that are managed by the OPMS or Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3 which is derived from laws passed by Congress. This document illustrates what key jobs an officer should hold over a 20 year career. It is important to understand that the twenty year timeline described in the OPMS or DA Pam 600-3 is an “up or out system.”

The Up or Out System, by law, states an officer must be boarded by Human Resources Command to determine selection for promotion to the next grade or rank. If an officer is determined not to merit promotion, based on criteria set forth by the Department of the Army board, they become non-select for promotion. Once they are non-select, the officer is separated from the Army. The officer is boarded at each rank throughout his-her career. The officer’s first Army promotion board is at the fourth year, followed by another board at the sixth year of service, the next board is at the eleventh year and the Lieutenant Colonel Promotion board is at the seventeenth year. This current
system is known as the officer fixed career timeline, which informs an officer when his/her promotion boards will convene. At the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, around 20 years of service, they are boarded and the determination is made whether to continue service or retire. This selection rate from Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel is low in the Up or Out System and the selection rate is based on the promotion percentage derived from laws passed by Congress.

The CSA strategic leader whose vision sets priorities based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense, to develop the Army for an unknown future threat. The Army will have to be capable of deploying worldwide to defeat complex enemies when the nation calls. Conflicts in the future, like those in the past, will ultimately be resolved on land. The vision set by the strategic leader is important because it shapes and develops how the Army will fight the next conflict. How the strategic leader is selected and groomed has an influence on the future success or failure of the Army, which is directly linked to our nation’s survival.

The Issue

The current issue is how the Army develops strategic leaders based on the officer fixed career timeline from the OPMS. Does the fixed timeline used by the Army develop strategic leaders? The Army Leaders Development Strategy 2013 outlines leader development which states “the Army is currently out of balance given the emphasis we have had to place on warfighting.” An officer is developed in three areas; training,

4 Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1.

education, and experience. If an officer adheres to the officer fixed career timeline outlined in DA Pam 600-3 throughout his or her 20 year career, they may not be exposed to the strategic level of thinking and operations until the twentieth year. This is important because if the leader is only exposed to tactical problems they might not be able to address strategic issues. The current officer fixed career timeline constrains an officer’s ability to hold jobs that develop them strategically because of the time available in their career timeline. Additionally, an officer in today’s Army, based on current operational requirements and tempo of deployment around the world, would limit an officer’s exposure to jobs outside of the tactical realm.

The Problem

The problem with the current officer career timeline is it constrains an officer by limiting time to broaden oneself. Broadening is a strategic goal of the current CSA. A broadening assignment for an officer is an assignment outside the traditional tactical assignments which must be completed before their promotion board. The current 20 year officer timeline pushes for tactical assignments and if time allows, an officer can have a broadening assignment. Because of the fixed timeline an officer must complete certain assignments before their promotion board to be considered for the next rank. Without completing the required 24 month key development time (tactical assignment prescribed in DA Pam 600-3 his or her branch, an officer would not be considered for the next rank. For example, a Major leaving the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) generally

has five years before his or her Lieutenant Colonel board. The time constraint before this board can limit the opportunity for an officer to broaden themselves outside the normal tactical assignments. Majors must have successful evaluations in their key development (KD) jobs and others to be competitive to be promoted to the next rank.

The Purpose

The purpose of this research is to examine if the Army is currently laying the groundwork to produce strategic leaders inherent in this guidance. This research will examine several factors as related to this mandate, including first and foremost: how Army doctrine defines a “strategic leader” and will provide the US Army doctrine and respected institutional definition of what specific characteristics a strategic leader should possess. Second, this research will examine: the study commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army, conducted by the Army Strategic Studies Institute, which defines what competencies a strategic leader should possess.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

Is the Army currently creating strategic leaders?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What is a strategic leader?

2. What jobs prepare or educate one to be a strategic leader?

3. What billets or jobs did Generals George C. Marshall, William C. Westmoreland, and Erik K. Shinseki hold to prepare them to be strategic leaders?
4. Why did the Army choose a 20 year timeline?

5. Is General Odierno saying the Army has stopped producing strategic leaders?

This research is being done to discover if the US Army currently educates and develops strategic leaders with the current 20 year officer fixed career timeline. It will also identify any gaps in education and time available in that timeline to develop strategic leaders.

Assumptions

The current OPMS will remain the same for the foreseeable future. Additionally the United States of America will continue to be engaged worldwide protecting our interests and the resources that affect our economy. The Army mission continues to grow in support of our nation’s interests. That mission will only decrease development opportunities for officers while increasing deployments and limiting broadening and professional military education opportunities. Additionally the Army’s current officer fixed career timeline is designed to build strategic leaders7. The current system lays out tactical jobs, and broadening opportunities, which should allow the officer enough time to complete before the promotion board to perform assignments outside that recommendation. The broadening assignments expose officers to new experiences and educates them on other than tactical experiences. The current officer fixed twenty year timeline provides an assembly line of officers by year group or cohort that will produce a pool from which to select future strategic leaders.

Key Terms

Below is a compiled list of terms used throughout the research paper.

**Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC):** is the course initial entry officers attend prior to being assigned to their first duty station.  

**Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA):** is the senior officer on the staff serving the commander.  

**Civil Military Relationship:** the powers that society gives to the military to protect its way of life.  

**Department of the Army (DA):** is the department that the Army is managed under.  

**Pin on Dates:** is a term used for an officer’s projected promotion to their next rank.  

**Up or Out:** the policy in which an officer is boarded at Human Resources Command to determine promotion and retention status.  

**Year Group Cohort Management:** a group of officers commissioned in a year, and managed by that year group throughout his or her career.

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8 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.
Limitations

One of the many limitations in conducting this research is the time constraints to fully explore all of the subject matter relative to the topic. The amount of information on this topic is more than can be reviewed in a year. Another constraint is the time that is available to focus on this research with a full course load to manage at CGSC. Another limitation to the researcher is the access to the available documentation and information from the different periods that discuss Generals Marshall, Westmoreland, and Shinseki. The researcher’s inexperience in conducting original research on the topic and possible bias of the researcher, based on his assignment with the Human Resource Command, towards the topic that could sway the perspective on the subject.

Scope

The scope of the research will use doctrine and an SSI study, with historic examples, to explore if the Army is producing strategic leaders. The research will examine the feasibility of the current officer management system to understand how it promotes, educates, and the development of officers. Furthermore, it will examine the implications of the policy of specific laws passed by Congress, that drive the Army’s officer fixed career timeline. Determine whether there are links between specific factors of doctrine, historic figures, and the current officer fixed career timeline.

Delimitations

The research will not describe or assess certain topics such as below the zone promotions. The below zone promotions will not be discussed because it accelerates an officer’s timeline. Accelerating the officer’s timeline makes it more compressed. The
research will not assess the effects of the political terrain on an officer’s selection to be a strategic leader.

General Odierno states in the “Way Points” article that “we will expand our strategic leadership education and opportunities to ensure we develop leaders.”\textsuperscript{15} This research will examine what a strategic leader is, using Army doctrine and SSI findings, based on their study commissioned by the CSA. The results of this examination will inform the reader, of the importance of a strategic leader to the organization. The literature will provide the base line of competencies a strategic leader must possess. With that established, the researcher will examine three Generals from three different time period to assess their strategic leadership, based on Army doctrine. The research will show the linkage back to doctrine, which will illustrate how the Army is producing strategic leaders. This example will show the relationship to the doctrine through historical military figures to re-enforce that the Army has and does produce strategic leaders. Once that is established the research will look at how well the current officer fixed timeline develops leaders and prepares them to be strategic leaders. Additionally, the researcher will look at the suitability of the current officer timeline to groom future strategic leaders. This examination will explore if it constrains or limits an officer from meeting the definition given by doctrine. The research will identify gaps in the education and development in the current 20 year officer timeline, based on the definition given in doctrine. Additionally the Army is an extension of politics and strategy. The Army’s mission is to fight and win our nations wars, which is why the strategic leader is crucial to the American way of life.

\textsuperscript{15} Odierno, “Way Points.”
Significance of Research

The significance of this research would be its use to adjust the current officer fixed career timeline, identifying gaps in training or education for the development of the Army’s Officer Corps, and management of officer assignments within their career. The results discovered could benefit the military by identifying gaps in how strategic leaders are developed. It could also help in understanding how to educate officers to prepare them to be a strategic leader. Another benefit from the research could be to encourage change in the current officer fixed career timeline and to limit constraints on the officer in their career. Creating more time in the officer’s career to do assignments outside of the tactical merry-go-round. Answering the research questions could illustrate a different way in which to develop future leaders for the Army and force our culture to focus more on leader development.

Summary and Conclusions

In conclusion the research will address the primary and secondary research questions. The researcher will introduce Army doctrine to define what a strategic leader is and the competencies one must have. Additionally, the research will look at historic military Generals in the US Army, to illustrate they were strategic leaders based on doctrine. The research will illustrate how the Army produces strategic leaders with its current officer fixed career timeline. The research will examine and discover if the current officer management system supports the CSA guidance that they educate, train, and cultivate an environment that develops future strategic leaders to fill these roles. Additionally the literature will look at current officer management doctrine; DA Pam
600-3 to see if the current officer fixed career timeline is allowing officers and future leaders the necessary time to be developed into strategic leaders.

The researchers’ literature review will introduce doctrine followed by additional primary sources to establish the definition of a strategic leader. Following the establishment of what a strategic leader is, the literature will show three historical examples and link them back to the definition set by doctrine. This linkage between the doctrine and the examples will re-enforce what has been put forth. Next the literature will explain the laws that the Army used to derive the DA Pam 600-3 officer fixed career timeline. This framing of the literature will answer the primary and secondary research questions.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

General Odierno’s “Way Points” article outlined the way ahead for the US Army. In the article Odierno stated that “the Army will expand our strategic leadership education and opportunities to ensure we develop leaders with the breadth and depth of experience necessary to meet tomorrow’s demands.”\(^\text{16}\) Based on this guidance, the Army should ensure they are educating and cultivating future strategic leaders to face complex problems in the years to come.

The purpose of this research is to examine if the Army is currently laying the groundwork to produce strategic leaders inherent in this guidance. This research will examine several factors as related to this mandate, including first and foremost: how Army doctrine defines a “strategic leader” and will provide the US Army doctrine and respected institutional definition of what specific characteristics a strategic leader should possess. Second, this research will examine: the study commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army, conducted by the Army Strategic Studies Institute, which defines what competencies a strategic leader should possess.

In order to provide purposeful and specific meaning to the application of the characteristics defined by Army doctrine, the literature will introduce historic military leaders to demonstrate the linkages to Army doctrine and the mandate of General Odierno through several selected examples. Finally, the literature will discuss the legislation that drove the Army to develop the current Officer Professional Management

\(^{16}\) Odierno, “Way Points.”
System fixed career timeline as an explanation of how the Army currently manages the officer corps.

What is a Strategic Leader?

In depth research of the definition of a strategic leader and their associated attributes or traits delivered a significant amount of information about strategic leaders. The common theme within the literature indicates the development of a strategic leader is not accomplished overnight. In fact, the knowledge required of strategic leaders is actually acquired over a lifetime of education and life experiences.

Strategic Leader Business World

There are similarities among different theories of strategic leader development. The following information was derived from four different articles from across the business world about the competencies required for strategic leaders. The ability of any organization to identify talent and develop it for an uncertain future is difficult but paramount for its success. The Army has the same problem in developing strategic leaders. Reviewing these different articles will allow a comparison of Army ideas about strategic leaders and business ideas.

Harvard Business School

Harvard Business School’s using historic data compiled over many years, identified six attributes a strategic leader must have; anticipate, challenge, interpret, decide, align, and learn. Each of these attributes is possessed by a strategic leader.

1. Anticipation. According to the Harvard Business Journal, a leader must have the ability to detect change in an uncertain future. He or she must be able to see
the change on the peripheral of the organization and make decisions that offset the change. The importance is to keep the company relevant and stable.17

2. **Challenge.** A strategic leader must challenge the status quo. He or she must ask hard questions and encourage divergent thinking within the organization. The leader must incorporate outside opinions to stay relevant and to keep from feeling secure with the status quo.18

3. **Interpreted.** A leader must solicit new ideas from the challenges he faces and be able to understand the data. In the current complex environment there is so much information to process something can easily be missed. The leader needs the ability to analyze and understand the information in making informed decisions for the organization’s future.19

4. **Decisiveness.** The strategic leader must be able to make tough decisions. These decisions must involve a deliberate processing of information and result in timely decisions. An important point in the article is the emphasis of having an informed group to assist in making decisions around the leader. The strategic leader must be provided with options in making informed and timely decisions.20


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
5. **Alignment.** The leader must have acceptance from his colleagues to forge ahead. They must relay their strategy early and often to have acceptance from the company. They must share their ideas and request feedback on the direction of the company moving forward.\textsuperscript{21}

6. **Learn.** The strategic leader must encourage an organization to be learned, to be informed. The company must not punish its leaders for failings. They use After Action Reports to capture good and bad ideas, thus making the organization stronger and more adaptable.\textsuperscript{22}

__Brian Tracy International__

Brian Tracy International has consulted for more than 1,000 companies and addressed more than 5,000,000 people in 5,000 talks and seminars throughout the US, Canada, and 55 other countries worldwide. As a keynote speaker and seminar leader, he addresses more than 250,000 people each year.\textsuperscript{23} Brian Tracy compiled a list of attributes a leader must possess to be successful. The list of attributes was narrowed to seven.

1. **Courage:** The quality of courage means that you are willing to take risks in the achievement of your goals with no assurance of success. Because there is no certainty in life or business, every commitment you make and every action you

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

take entails a risk of some kind. Among the seven leadership qualities, courage is the most identifiable outward trait.  

2. **Integrity**: In every strategic planning session conducted for large and small corporations, the first value that all the gathered executives agree upon for their company is integrity. They all agree on the importance of complete honesty in everything they do, both internally and externally.

The core of integrity is truthfulness. Integrity requires that you always tell the truth, to all people, in every situation. Truthfulness is the foundation quality of the trust that is necessary for the success of any business.

3. **Humility**: Great leaders are those who are strong and decisive but also humble. Humility does not mean that you are weak or unsure of yourself. It means that you have the self-confidence and self-awareness to recognize the value of others without feeling threatened. It means that you are willing to admit you could be wrong, that you recognize you may not have all the answers. And it means that you give credit where credit is due.

4. **Strategic Planning**: Great leaders are outstanding at strategic planning. They have the ability to look ahead, to anticipate with some accuracy where the industry and the markets are going.

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25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.
5. **Focus**: Leaders always focus on the needs of the company and the situation. Leaders focus on results, on what must be achieved by themselves, by others, and by the company. Great leaders focus on strengths, in themselves and in others. They focus on the strengths of the organization, on the things that the company does best in satisfying demanding customers in a competitive marketplace.²⁸

6. **Cooperation**: Your ability to get everyone working and pulling together is essential to your success. Leadership is the ability to get people to work for you because they want to.²⁹

**A Snapshot of the Strategic Leader**

According to the *Business Dictionary*, the strategic leader is found in charge of large organizations and influences thousands of employees. He or she allocates resources and develops the vision for the organization they lead. The *Business Dictionary* lists common traits that the strategic leader often possesses:

1. **Ability** to operate in an uncertain environment where complex problems and external events may impact the success of the venture.

2. **Make decisions** by processing information quickly and assessing alternatives (often based on incomplete data), the consequences of which impact a wider range of people and resources than a standard organizational leader.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.
A strategic leader often will not see the fruit of their labor come to light during their tenure, planning instead for initiatives that will take place years later and possibly even after the leader has left the job. These traits are not dissimilar to the attributes and competencies identified for strategic leaders by the Army.

Management study is an educational portal launched in 2008 with the vision of providing students and corporate workforces worldwide access to rich, easy to understand, frequently updated instruction on many management related topics. The Management Study guide designs classes to train people on strategic leadership for business around the world. The list below consists of what they developed to describe the attributes a strategic leader should possess:

1. **Loyalty**-Powerful and effective leaders demonstrate their loyalty to their vision by their words and actions.

2. **Keeping them updated**-Efficient and effective leaders keep themselves updated about what is happening within their organization. They have various formal and informal sources of information in the organization.

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33 Ibid.
3. **Judicious use of power**—Strategic leaders make very wise use of their power. They must play the power game skillfully and try to develop consent for their ideas, rather than forcing their ideas upon others. They must push their ideas gradually.\(^{34}\)

4. **Have wider perspective—outlook**—Strategic leaders do not just have skills in their narrow specialty but they have a little knowledge about a lot of things.\(^{35}\)

5. **Motivation**—Strategic leaders must have a zeal for work that goes beyond money and power and also they should have an inclination to achieve goals with energy and determination.\(^{36}\)

6. **Compassion**—Strategic leaders must understand the views and feelings of their subordinates and make decisions after considering them.\(^{37}\)

7. **Self-control**—Strategic leaders must have the potential to control distracting (disturbing) moods and desires, i.e., they must think before acting.\(^{38}\)

8. **Social skills**—Strategic leaders must be friendly and social.\(^{39}\)

9. **Self-awareness**—Strategic leaders must have the potential to understand their own moods and emotions, as well as their impact on others.\(^{40}\)

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
10. **Readiness to delegate and authorize**-Effective leaders are proficient at delegation. They are well aware of the fact that delegation will avoid overloading of responsibilities on the leaders. They also recognize the fact that authorizing the subordinates to make decisions will motivate them a lot.\(^{41}\)

11. **Articulacy**-Strong leaders are articulate enough to communicate the vision (vision of where the organization should head) to the organizational members in terms that boost those members.\(^{42}\)

12. **Constancy—Reliability**-Strategic leaders constantly convey their vision until it becomes a component of organizational culture.\(^{43}\)

### Four Timeless Qualities of Strategic Leaders

Finally, Lisa Nirell is an award-winning expert blogger for *Fast Company*, *Forbes*, and *The Huffington Post*.\(^{44}\) Lisa Nirell wrote an article which discusses qualities and attributes of and defines a strategic marketing leader. In general, a top marketing leader is someone who influences the hearts and minds of others to improve their conditions. Because information is moving at record speed and crossing organizational hierarchies, different approaches to leadership are emerging.

1. **Articulate**. It has forced many of us to become more succinct and clear with our language.

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\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

2. **Accepting.** Accept what you can change and what you cannot.

3. **Aggregation.** A strategic marketing leader spots trends in disparate places, and sees patterns to better understand the big picture.

4. **Adaptable.** The ability to adjust and to change in chaotic environments.\(^{45}\)

The previous section discussed strategic leadership from a business perspective. The author will now review current Army doctrine about strategic leadership and the development of that doctrine over time. The doctrine defines a strategic leader and illustrates various building blocks, experiences, and education which helps develop the strategic leader. The common theme within the literature is the strategic leader is the culmination of a lifetime of education and experiences not accomplished overnight.

**Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22**

United States Army doctrine, specifically Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, defines strategic leaders as a “representation of a finely balanced combination of high-level thinkers, accomplished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts.”\(^{46}\) ADRP 6-22 continues, asserting “Strategic leaders simultaneously sustain what is necessary in the current environment, envision the future, and convey that vision to a wide audience.”\(^{47}\) Additionally, the doctrine indicates strategic leaders often personally spearhead change; change which is not limited to the strategic level.


\(^{46}\) Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, 11-2.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.
Additionally, the ADRP discusses and defines a strategic leader’s sphere of influence, which is the ability to affect development without formal authority. In order to accomplish all a strategic leader is required to do and to enable their activity within their sphere of influence; strategic leaders must have a thorough understanding of both the Army and all of the agencies with which it works.

Army doctrine says the most important aspect of an Army strategic leader is that he or she should be highly qualified as a warfighter. This includes possessing in-depth knowledge of geopolitical militaries and the interaction of the United States’ military with other countries. The resources utilized in support of the national security strategy are those diplomatic, informational, economic, and military resources (tools) applied to achieve strategic “objectives.” The most important, most responsive, and most flexible (adaptive) military resource is the Joint Force, composed of the forces of the US Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 provides a description of the attributes necessary for success as a strategic leader. This description details and defines the specific attributes a strategic leader must possess, see figure below. Additionally, this description reiterates that these attributes are only achieved through experience and education. This means the Army cannot hire strategic leaders off the street or from other corporations because of the unique background Army strategic leaders possess.

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48 Ibid.

Figure 1 is an ADRP graphic depiction of the attributes necessary for becoming a strategic leader.

Figure 1. Army Leadership Attributes


Additionally, ADRP 6-22 indicates a strategic leader must be a complex thinker that is able to address an uncertain future. That uncertain future could be anything. Recently, CSA Oderino identified what he believes is the uncertain future facing the Army in which strategic leaders must operate. In reference to strategic leaders, CSA
Odierno said “fiscal constraints, an armed forces coming out of more than a decade at war and the increased pressure of globalization will be their challenges.”

Figure 2 is an ADRP graphic depiction of the building blocks necessary for becoming a strategic leader.

![Figure 2. Army Leadership Levels](image)


According to this model, the foundation of an Army strategic leader is grounded in values and attributes. The Army’s values include: loyalty, duty, honor, respect, selfless service, integrity, and personal courage. The attributes the Army seeks are: character, presence, intellect, leadership, development, and achievement. These attributes are

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described in ADRP 6-22 as part of the leadership requirements model. Theoretically, the Army leadership requirements model, will guide the leader throughout their career. These values and attributes establish the basic criteria needed for an Army strategic leader.

After values and attributes, the model depicts the remaining building blocks for the strategic leader. The next building block is direct leadership. Direct leadership generally directly relates to the size of the organization. Company grade officers reside in this realm. However, direct leadership is also a skill strategic leaders need to possess because they have direct contact and involvement with staff members and others on a day-to-day basis. A better way to consider this might be as personal leadership, where there is direct contact between the leader and the led. The direct level leadership, which is the face to face leadership, involves small organizations that impact few people. The direct level leadership is the least complex level, and affects the fewest amounts of people. For example, a Company Grade Officer has direct influence on their soldiers, based on their proximity to the soldiers. The officer’s presence during training, leading soldiers is direct leadership. The experience gained here builds confidence and competence in the officer.51

The center block is the organizational leader. Organizational leadership is generally associated with the operational level of war and with skills and experiences from battalion to Corps level. Field grade officers inhabit this realm. Organizational leadership is characterized by leading through others, where the leader does not have direct access to the lowest level of the organization. At this level in these types of organizations the officer operates at the tactical to operational level of the war. It is more

51 Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, 2-4.
complex than direct leadership because of the scope and size of the organizations affected. The organizational leader affects people through indirect influence and through policy. The organizational leader organizes resources and impacts events from two to ten years into the future. As an indirect leader they are involved with more complex issues and larger resources. At this level, the complexity increases significantly, challenging the leader as they progresses within the Army.

The last block of the model defines the strategic leader and incorporates global, regional, national, and social perspectives. The strategic leader sets the vision and agenda for the largest formations. Rather than controlling daily operations, the strategic leader is more concerned with the interactions of the US with other nations and how the Army can support the needs of the country. Additionally, the strategic leader leverages organizational leaders to accomplish the overall mission. The model depicts that each block is necessary for specific periods of time. Strategic leaders are a result of leaders moving through the levels of the model and building on successes in the previous area. The strategic level of leadership requires a lifetime of experience, using values and attributes as guiding principles. A strategic leader manages a large, complex organization that significantly impacts the Army. The strategic leader provides a long-term vision for the organization, which prepares the Army for future missions. The strategic leader will not be able to see the programs and initiatives they have developed through to conclusion because they are planning 10 to 20 years into the future. The strategic leader sets a vision for the organization which attempts to establish conditions and prepares the Army for success in the next conflict. The strategic leader also develops programs for weapon systems and leadership training to prepare the Army for an uncertain future, in a complex
world, against an unknown threat. The vision and ability of the strategic leader to
determine the course for the Army, has significant effects on its ability to respond to
 crisis, when the Commander-and-Chief calls.

In summary, the ADRP 6-22 is significant because it defines through doctrine
how the US Army develops its tactical leaders into strategic leaders. The future focus of
the doctrine is indicated by this quote, “We must develop leaders with the breadth and
depth of experience necessary to meet tomorrow’s demands.”52 The model depicted in
ADRP 6-22 is effective in guiding officers through their careers. From the beginning,
they are grounded in values and learn how to respond from various experiences and
education.53 Ultimately, this document is the Army’s definition of leader development
from tactical to strategic.

Strategic Leadership Competencies

The SSI, at the request of CSA, identified a list of competencies required of a
strategic leader. The SSI is composed of civilian research professors, uniformed military
officers, and a professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience.
SSI is divided into three divisions: The Strategic Research and Analysis Department, The
Regional Strategy Department, and The Academic Engagement Program. The Strategic
Research and Analysis Department focuses on global, trans-regional, and functional
issues, particularly those dealing with Army transformation. The Regional Strategy
Department focuses on regional strategic issues, and The Academic Engagement

52 Department of the Army, 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy, 18.
53 Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, 2-4.
Program creates and sustains partnerships with the global strategic community. In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around the world, including the foremost thinkers in the field of security and military strategy. In most years, about half of the SSI’s publications are written by these external partners.54

Army doctrine defines a strategic leader and explains that the shaping and development of a strategic leader takes years to achieve. Additionally, the strategic leader must not presume the world is stable, knowledgeable, and predictable. With that in mind, future strategic leaders must be able to drop pre-loaded perspectives, methods, or assumptions in a world of uncertainty.55 The Army War College primer is a report conducted at the request of the CSA, to identify or educate strategic leaders following September 11, 2001. The Army War College responded with a model based on the Be, Know, Do trilogy. As presented below in table 1 bolded, the list of attributes one must as a strategic leader:

1. Be: this category has seven sub-points a strategic leader should have.

2. Know: this category has three sub-categories, which are Conceptual, Interpersonal, and Technical. Under each one of these sub-categories is another list of attributes.


3. Do: this category has seven points that a strategic leader should possess.

The table provides a framework to illustrate the trilogy identified by SSI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BE (Disposition—values, attributes):</th>
<th>KNOW (Disposition—skills):</th>
<th>DO (Action—influencing, operating, and improving):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The Values Champion—the standard</td>
<td>• Communication—too much</td>
<td>• Provide for the Future—visioning (long-term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Master of the Strategic Art—ends, ways,</td>
<td>• Focus—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>means</td>
<td>• Action—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Committed to the Future—broad</td>
<td>• Planning—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Creative and resourceful thinking</td>
<td>• Organizational Development—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Systems Understanding—political</td>
<td>• Communication—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anticipation—too much</td>
<td>• Focus—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Initiation of Policy and Directive</td>
<td>• Action—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shape the Culture—Values-based</td>
<td>• Change—too much</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization, leverage diversity</td>
<td>• Action—too much</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Identified by Wong, the following strategic leadership competencies list defines six attributes a strategic leader should possess. Along with “Be, Know, Do,” these attributes capture what the strategic leader would acquire over a lifetime of education, service, and experience. Examining the definitions of these attributes illustrates the depth and breadth a leader must possess.

1. Identity: The article discusses a strategic leader’s ability to be self-aware of his weaknesses. An officer must have this understanding to be able to adjust his or her
thinking to understand themselves and their environment. It goes beyond strengths and weakness and discusses understanding of one’s worth to the organization. The officer understands success is determined by subordinates.  

2. **Mental agility:** In the current operating environment, mental agility is important because of the extremely complex and uncertain environment in which the officer works. One must have the ability to thrive in the unknown. Mental agility builds on the ability to scan and adapt learning based on the environment, mental agility involves aspects of cognitive complexity, improvisation, and lightness discussed in the strategic leadership literature. By definition, mental ability is crucial to a strategic leader. Technology today provides masses of information a leader must process to understand the unknown. Mental agility is best improved with a program of instruction that encourages students to develop multiple points of view, consider alternative explanations, and argue the merits of competing solutions to complex problems. Mental agility allows the officer to synthesize, as well as analyze, to challenge existing frames of reference, and to engage in collaborative tasks.  

3. **Cross-cultural savvy:** Strategic leaders must be able to work outside the Army and engage and understand the culture beyond the Army. Cross-culture savvy refers, however, to more than just the ability to work with non-US militaries. The meta-competency, cross-cultural savvy, includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political

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56 Ibid., 6.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 7.
boundaries. For example, a way to broaden an officer is through experiences outside of the Army. Working with non-Army organizations helps develop cross-culture savvy. Deployment in a joint environment broadens a strategic leader.

4. **Interpersonal maturity:** The officer must have the maturity to be able to coach-teach-mentor the next generation of leaders. The officer needs the vision to see over the horizon and must be able to serve as a role model for others to follow. This type of leadership is not taught in the classroom but fostered over years of self-assessment and leadership study.

5. **World-class warrior:** The officer has to understand the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and be a master of each. The officer’s foundation is grounded in technical and tactical development throughout their career. The officer continuously develops personally and professionally.

6. **Professional astuteness:** The officer must understand he or she is a leader and must maintain that appearance. He or she must live the Army values and display a high level of professionalism. The leader must understand that it is okay to fail and learn from the failure, but this failure must not be fatal to the officer’s career.

One point the SSI advocates is to start early in an officer’s career exposing him or her to strategic thought, even recommending that officers selected, speak a second

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59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 6.
61 Ibid., 7.
62 Ibid., 6.
63 Ibid.
language. The study recommends that strategic leaders should be mentored early in their career and the Army culture should encourage lifelong learning. The study discusses that a leader's development should start in the officer's pre-commissioning source. Again, in the research, SSI alludes to the fact that it takes a lifetime of preparation to develop an officer. The list compiled by SSI gives some understanding of the vast amount of knowledge and experience required to be a strategic leader. The research SSI alludes to the fact that it takes a lifetime of preparation to develop an officer.

Figure 3 is an SSI graphic depiction of the competencies necessary for becoming a strategic leader.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSI Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental agility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cultural savvy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal maturity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World-class warrior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional astuteness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. SSI Competencies

*Source: Created by author.*

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\(^{64}\) Ibid.
The literature up to this point has utilized Army doctrine and SSI to determine the skills and attributes a strategic leader should possess. Through these limited resources it is apparent that achieving the title and position of strategic leader takes a significant amount of time, education, and experience through a variety of jobs.

Next, this paper will examine the careers of three military leaders, to develop an understanding of what job or jobs developed them into strategic leaders. The first military leader examined is General George Marshall, one of America’s most recognized Generals of the twentieth century. Following Marshall the research will examine General Westmoreland’s Army career and jobs he held during the second third of the twentieth century. Lastly, the researcher will examine General Shinseki and his Army career in the later part of the twentieth and early twenty-first century.

Introduction to Case Studies

The historic case studies will focus on three different military leaders from three different time periods in US Army military history. Each time period provided its own context for the emerging challenges of the US Army; whether it be total war, limited war, or budget cuts and transformations. Each of the officers identified for this research have characteristics in common;

1. All had served 35 years of service or more to the Army,
2. All served their country in combat, all served on high level staffs at division and above,
3. All were Chief of Staffs of the Army,
4. All three officers were, by virtue of their accomplishments, very successful in their careers as Army officers, and
5. All three served under different OPMS requirements: from the old “tenure based” system, to the more modern Up or Out System of today.

The case studies are not an extensive history of each officer, but an examination of the first 25 years of their careers, to examine what made them who they were as strategic leaders. The literature will examine each officer’s assignments, education, and promotion timeline. Additionally, the research will define what level of war the officer was operating at in each assignment. The levels of war are tactical, operational, and strategic. Each level increases the size of the organization and the impacts they have on National Strategy. The levels of war are important because it illustrates the officer’s exposure to operational and strategic work and at what time in his career. As discussed previously, the SSI competencies, discusses that an officer’s exposure early and often in an officer’s career helps with their development into a strategic leader.

General George Marshall

General George Marshall served the Army for over four decades, serving in three different wars, holding many high level positions in his career. He would be an Aide-de-Camp three different times in his career. He would also serve on division and corps level staffs in peacetime and during war. Marshall was an instructor on three different occasions in his career. Additionally, he attended CGSC and the Army War College. During his career, prior to being selected to be the CSA, he served in Washington DC, which gave him a great understanding of the civil-military relationship. All these positions, as well as education played important roles in developing him into a strategic leader.
Contemporary Army officers are commissioned Second Lieutenants from a commissioning source and was it was no different in Marshall’s era. He was commissioned from the Virginia Military Institute in 1903.65 His first assignment was to the Philippines where the US Army had just finished putting down a rebellion. While posted in the Philippines, he was in charge of a local area, where he was a platoon leader and partnered with local governments which exposed him to local culture. He would have to adapt and learn skills outside of soldiering, like partnership and understanding to be successful at his first assignment. His joint operations with the local government can be seen as an operational level of war.

Next, General Marshall was transferred to Manila where he was introduced to the administration part of the Army. While in Manila he served with the inspector general and was crucial in the demobilization of militia. Marshall would say later in his life, “I became quite an expert on papers, it helped me great deal in later years.”66 His first 18 months in the Army Marshall had already exposed him to operating in the operational level of war.

By the time General Marshall was promoted to Major in 1920 he had served in a variety of jobs. Marshall served as an Aide-de-Camp for three different generals. His first Aide-de-Camp assignment was with General Hunter Liggett in the Philippines, next was with General J. Franklin Bell, Headquarters Army West and lastly General John Pershing when he was CSA. Each of these jobs provided Marshall with an understanding and

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66 Ibid., 66.
exposure to the operational and strategic levels of war. Observing each of these senior leaders operate on a daily basis making decisions that impacted the Army. For example; observing Pershing brief Congress to acquire funds to man and equip the Army, gave Marshall his first exposure to the civil military relationship in Washington. This relationship with Congress is very important because Congress appropriates funding for the US Army yearly budget.\textsuperscript{67}

During this time Marshall served as an assistant operations officer and a primary operations officer. As an operations officer in World War I with the 1st Infantry Division he planned US Army first offensive operations against the Germans. Additionally, he served on the American Expeditionary Force Headquarters as an operations officer. In both of these assignments he dealt with large formations and had to coordinate with foreign militaries. These assignments fell within the operational and strategic levels of war. Again Marshall was exposed to the highest levels of operations for planning, training, and execution. These types of assignments continued to groom Marshall for future assignments.\textsuperscript{68}

Other highlights of Marshall’s career were related to his service with the National Guard. Marshall was a trainer with the National Guard where he spent his summers working with different states and their units to help them improve their planning and training to enhance their level of readiness. Marshall’s contributions improved the National Guard’s integration with the Active Army units. These types of assignments were on the tactical level of war for training but in the strategic level because of the

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
cooperation required of the National Guard and Active Army during a time of war. The National Guard and Reserve make up the strategic reserve and must be able to work together to ensure success. These two organizations depended on one another to have an understanding of how a unit maneuvered and fought as one. The understanding shared between the Active, Guard and reserve allows them to work together towards mutual or shared endstate.

To understand his military and civilian education and development in the Army Marshall’s first 25 years of service. The first military education Marshall received was at Virginia Military Institute. His pre-commissioning source taught him the basics required to be an Army Officer. Marshall’s next educational step in his career, which has not changed too much from today’s Army, is the Command and General Staff College. Marshall attended CGSC, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which instructs on Army tactics and staff level work for brigade through corps. This instruction prepared them to fight organizations from 3,000 to 50,000 uniformed soldiers towards the commanders desired end state. CGSC trains an officer to conduct staff planning and to know and use standardized doctrine to operate organizations in the Army. The school, at this point in history, had a 24 month curriculum.

The next military education Marshall received was at the United States Army War College in Washington DC, another Army school that is still in existence today but is located at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Most of the education he received was from first hand on the job training with senior leaders on a daily basis. This type of education in the Army profession is a cornerstone in imparting knowledge on to future generations.
Marshall’s promotion timeline for the first part of his career was the norm for that period in the Army. He was commissioned Second Lieutenant in 1903. He received his next promotion in 1907 to First Lieutenant. Marshall’s promotion to Captain was in 1916, he had now been in the Army for 10 years. Following Captain he was promoted to Major in 1920. Next he would be selected to Lieutenant Colonel in 1923. Marshall’s promotion to Colonel was at his 31st year in the Army. This part of the research highlights the amount of years he spent in the Army and the rate he was promoted. Keeping in mind during this time period the Army did not operate on the current OPMS of the officer fixed career timeline.

Marshall’s Army career lasted over four decades but his impact on the Army lasted for generations. Marshall’s mental agility, which allowed him to adapt to an Army forced to change three times in his career, from nation building, to trench warfare, to war of maneuver. All vastly different but he was able to adapt and lead the Army successfully. All of Marshall’s jobs and experiences were part of his development into a strategic leader. To summarize Marshall’s career timeline of 44 years, he spent a significant amount of time as a staff officer on division and corps staffs, an Aide-de-Camp three different times, multiple assignments in Washington DC as an instructor at two Army schools, and a trainer of Active Duty and National Guard soldiers.

General William Childs Westmoreland

General William Childs Westmoreland is another recognizable name in US Army history. Westmoreland served 36 years in the US Army serving in a variety of positions from the battery or company level through CSA. Served in three different wars at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels. His war time experience included World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Westmoreland’s assignments in the Army included the position of Chief of Staff for several different divisions, corps and Army Headquarters. Westmoreland commanded from battery or company through corps size elements in combat and later commanded all combat units in Vietnam, as the Military Assistants Command. Westmoreland had an extensive amount of combat experience in three very different wars.69

Examining Westmoreland’s career, he commanded at every level from company to division. During World War II he started out commanding an artillery battery and would later command an artillery battalion. During combat in World War II officers advanced quickly, sometimes based on need for officers to lead formations during the war. These artillery commands are at the tactical level of war but are commands in combat which can been the most challenging based on conditions. Additionally, during World War II he would be promoted to temporary Colonel serving as Chief of Staff for 9th Infantry Division because of his performance.70 As the Chief of Staff of this division he was again exposed to the tactical and operational levels of war because of the size of the organization he affected. During World War II Westmoreland’s movement from the rank of Captain to Colonel gave him a great deal of experience in managing large formations.71

69 William Gardner Bell, Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010: Portraits and Biographical Sketches of the United States Army’s Senior Officer (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011).

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.
After World War II Westmoreland commanded a battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division prior to the Korean War. During the Korean War he commanded the 187th Regimental Combat Team (brigade size element). While commanding this organization fighting an enemy unlike the one he had faced in Europe with the Germans. The Koreans conducted mass waves and infiltration tactics. After the Korean war he later he would command the 101st Airborne Division. Westmoreland was one of those officers and moved from permeant to temporary rank based on assignment. For example, as the Commander of the 101st Airborne Division he held the temporary rank of Major General. This increase in rank and responsibility to lead an organization of this size developed him as a leader. These commands and assignments exposed him to the operational and strategic levels of war. The temporary rank allowed Westmoreland to move up and down the promotion ladder, exposing him to increased responsibility which expanded his understanding and knowledge and could be seen as helping in his development.

Some other developmental assignments during Westmoreland’s career; he served multiple times as Chief of Staff for many different divisions. Additionally, he served on the G-1, or Army manpower division, which moved him into the strategic level of war. At this level he help managed the Army manpower based on CSA guidance which is nested with National Strategy. He was able to better understand at the strategic level how the civil military relationship worked. Westmoreland like Marshall served as an instructor at the Command and General Staff College. Serving as an instructor forced him to master the knowledge before he was able to teach Army Doctrine. He would also serve on the Army staff and corps staff in his career which again gave him a better understanding of how strategy is developed. Westmoreland’s commands in combat and his staff
assignments up to his 25 year of service gave him a vast amount of experience at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.\textsuperscript{72}

Westmoreland’s military and civilian education included the United States
Military Academy, Command and General Staff College, the Army War College and
Harvard Business School. Westmoreland was commissioned as an Artillery Officer in
1936 from the United States Military Academy. After attending CGSC he became an
instructor, he would also instruct at the Army War College. Westmoreland’s education
widen his purview and understanding, which helped him in leading the Army later,
especially in the transition to an all-volunteer force.

Looking at Westmoreland’s promotions in his first 20 years of service. He was
commissioned at Second Lieutenant from West Point Military Academy in 1936 as an
Artillery Officer. His promotion to First Lieutenant was in 1939; his next promotion to
Captain would take another eight years. During World War II he rose to the temporary
rank of Colonel. Following the war he returned to the permanent rank of Captain and
returned to his traditional timeline. Westmoreland was promoted to Major in 1948. His
next promotion was to Lieutenant Colonel in 1953, which was his seventeenth year of
service. Westmoreland’s promotion to Colonel was in 1961 at his 25th year of service.
He had a vast amount of experience based on his assignments and combat experiences.
Also, Westmoreland had earned experience in three different wars at each level of war
from tactical to strategic.

Westmoreland’s experience, training, and education throughout his 36 year career
developed him into a strategic leader for the US Army. His command of military forces

\textsuperscript{72} Bell, \textit{Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010}. 
in Vietnam, as the Military Advisors Command Vietnam (MACV), is what he is best known for but his lasting contribution was to rebuilding the Army through doctrine and technology, which is his Army legacy. Westmoreland served as the CSA during the transitions, refinement, and rebuilding.\(^{73}\)

General Eric K. Shinseki

General Eric K. Shinseki served the US Army for over 38 years and at every level from tactical to strategic level command. He led the transformation campaign to address both the emerging strategic challenges of the early twenty-first century and the need for cultural and technological change in the Army strategic studies. He would serve as the CSA prior to the Global War on Terrorism and start the Army transformation to a modular force. Shinseki began his career as a field artillery lieutenant in Vietnam in 1965, as a forward observer. Shinseki commanded organizations from 100 up to 20,000 men, as a Division Commander. Shinseki’s tactical commands included; a troop command (same as a company) in Vietnam, Battalion Command in Europe, and a Brigade Command in Europe. These commands fell in the tactical level of war allowing him to master this level. Next his operational assignments included Division Command at Fort Hood, Texas. Shinseki held command of an organization at each level from troop through division and would later command as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Land Forces Commander. Both these commands came with increased responsibility and ranged from operational to strategic level of war. Also he worked with coalition partners increasing his understanding of allied nations.

Shinseki, serving two tours early in his career in Vietnam exposed him to another culture and the training of a host nation forces. The cultural understanding and patience needed to work with other militaries is demanding. Upon returning from Vietnam he held a position on the Pacific Commands staff, which exposed him to strategic level leadership early in his career.74

Shinseki’s other assignments that help to develop him were serving twice at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army, an assignment working at the strategic level of war. This assignment gave him a greater understanding of the Army strategic role in the elements of National Power. He also served as the division’s Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations) and served on the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, VII Corps. All these assignments were at the operational and strategic levels of war. This is important to highlight because these assignments move an officer away from the tactical level of war and start the development of an officer into a strategic leader.75

Shinseki’s education during his career consisted of traditional military schools with two years at a civilian university. Shinseki was a graduate of the United States Army Military Academy at West Point. Shinseki also attended the Armor Captain’s Career Course, at Fort Knox, Kentucky. At this military school Shinseki was taught Armor maneuver tactics and staff planning at the battalion and brigade level. Next in Shinseki’s career he attended CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Sometime later Shinseki was selected to attend the National Defense College. The National Defense College is an

74 Bell, Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010.

75 Ibid.
alternative to the Army War College but still retains the same mission. Shinseki attended Duke University where he received a Master’s in English and with this degree, served at West Point as an English instructor.\textsuperscript{76}

Shinseki was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1965; he achieved the rank of Captain within his first two years in the Army. After his promotion to Captain he would not be promoted again for eight years to Major. Following this promotion in 1980 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. His next promotion would come in 1987 to Colonel. At this time in his career he had around 22 years of service. Shinseki, for the first 20 years of his career, moved between the tactical and strategic levels of war.\textsuperscript{77}

Shinseki’s career spanned over three decades and he participated and led in two wars. Shinseki’s experience, training, and education throughout his 38 year career developed him into a strategic leader for the US Army. His vision for the Army allowed the force to start the transition to today’s modular expedition that is able to deploy worldwide. The forces ability to tailor the size and force package to address the country’s needs. He led at every level of the ADRP 6-22 leadership development model. Shinseki served as the CSA during the transitions, refinement, and rebuilding for an Army that would spend the next 14 plus years in continuous combat.\textsuperscript{78}

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Richard Halloran, \textit{My name is Shinseki and I am a Soldier} (Hawaii Army Museum Society, 2004).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushright}
The research examined the Congressional laws followed by the OPMS or DA Pam 600-3. Congress passes legislation which will ultimately impact an officer’s professional development. This particular legislation, referenced within DA Pam 600-3, effects Army policy and causes changes and updates to existing policies. Legislation drives the policy that the Army writes to manage the officer corp. From World War II to the present, multiple laws were passed or amended moving the Army to the current officer fixed career timeline. The Army moved to a centralized board system that manages the officer corps promotions. DA Pam 600-3 described by branch what jobs an officer had to have to be promoted to the next rank. These jobs are known as key development (or KD) assignments, which are necessary for promotion. The current officer fixed career timeline, depicted in the OPMS system by way of process and requirements, provides an officer a general expectation for the officer’s career path.

Congressional Law

Before World War II the Army and Navy had different promotion systems. Pre-World War II promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in the Army was controlled and determined by the division commander. Promotions were based on a seniority system only. The throughput of an officer being selected for promotion was very low, because it was based on retirement or separation of officers. In this system, an officer would have to wait for a job to open before they could be promoted. After the war this system did not support the needs of the Army. The Army needed a way to manage its officer corps, moving old officers out and promoting young and vigorous officers, instead of the
stagnant system of old. Congress helped the Army by mandating changes supported by
the Chief Of Staff that eventually shaped the current officer timeline and promotion
system.79

After World War II two laws passed by congress had a significant impact on
military officer management. The first law was the 1954 Officer Grade Limitation Act.
The second law was the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980. The
Limitation Act of 1954 placed limits on the amount of officers by grade, by military
branch that could be on the roles of at the end of each fiscal year. The Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act of 1980 standardized the promotion timelines across all
military branches. This law is the basis for the current OPMS or DA Pam 600-3 which
outlines the officer fixed career timeline. Both of these laws were responses to create a
standard career path for all branches.

The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954

The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 (May 5, 1954, Chapter 180, 68 United
States Statutes at Large 65) was passed by the United States Congress and signed into
law by the President.80 The illustration below reflects how the Officer Grade Limitation
Act established officer time in service by ranks. This law would be the first attempt at
moving towards an officer fixed career timeline, as well as transitioning to the Up or Out
centralized board system. The promotions of officers were still done by the division
commanders.

79 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3.

80 American Legal Encyclopedia, “The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954,”
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980

The next law would be passed by Congress in 1980, was named the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. The Act standardized the promotion timelines across all military services. It instituted an Up or Out centralized promotion system. Promotions were determined by centralized promotion boards, based on year group or cohort. Prior to centralized boards, an officer was selected for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel by his division commander. With the centralized boards, an officer is selected by a board evaluated by common criteria. This allowed the services to evaluate officers, or board them to determine whether or not to promote. The purpose of the board is to identify potential leaders for the Army of tomorrow. The fixed timeline identifies the jobs an officer must have before they can be promoted. An officer understands that to be promoted, the officer has to perform certain key developmental jobs as outlined by the military branch. The DA Pam 600-3 outline defines what jobs an officer has to complete to be promoted at each grade.

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, enacted in 1980, and codified in Title 10 and 37 of the US Code, replaced an existing patchwork of rules and regulations governing the management of military officers, as well as updated numerical constraints on the number of field grade officers (0-4 through 0-6) that each service might have at the end of each fiscal year.81 While breaking new ground (permanent grade tables, single promotion system, augmentation of reserve officers into regular status), the Defense

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Officer Personnel Management Act was basically evolutionary, extending the existing paradigm (grade controls, promotion opportunity and timing objectives, Up or Out, and uniformity across the services) that was established after World War II. Table 2 depicts the up-or-out system and the years at which an officer is boarded for their next rank.

Table 2. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act Up or Out Promotion System for Due Course Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Pay Grade</th>
<th>Promotion Opportunity (percentage promoted from surviving cohort)</th>
<th>Promotion Timing (primary zone years of service)</th>
<th>Career Expectation</th>
<th>Career Pattern (cumulative probability to grade from original cohort less attrition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>100% if fully qualified</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2X nonselect &amp; separation</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>3.5/4</td>
<td>2X nonselect &amp; separation or may be allowed to stay on active duty until retirement at 20 YOS</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10±1</td>
<td>2X nonselect &amp; separation or may be allowed to stay until 24 YOS; normal retirement at 20 YOS</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>16±1</td>
<td>30% of 2X nonselectees can be retired before normal (28 YOS) retirement</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>22±1</td>
<td>Normal retirement at 30 YOS, but 30% early retirement possible after 4 years in grade</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Both O-5 and O-6 could experience a more than 30 percent early retirement if considered more than once prior to reaching mandatory retirement.


The two laws would ultimately shape today’s current OPMS outlined in DA Pam 600-3. From these laws the Army transitioned to a 20 year fixed career timeline. The
effect of the current officer fixed career timeline gave an officer a general guide to their career which managed expectations. Next, the literature will introduce the manual that currently manages the US Army Officer Corps.

**Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3**

As General Dempsey stated in the article “Leader Development,” in *Army Magazine*, February 2011 “The most important adaptations will be in how we develop the next generation of leaders who must be prepared to learn and change faster than their future adversaries.”

The DA Pam outlines positions or jobs an officer must hold and the length of time required for each, to be promoted to the next rank in the OPMS or DA Pam 600-3. DA Pam 600-3 delineates a timeline for an officer’s career, but the timeline is not an exact path for the officer. The literature will examine what the officer at each grade, from commissioning through the field grade ranks, is expected to do in a 20 year fixed timeline. A description of a career timeline for a Combat Arms officer is provided in table 3.

Each branch or specialty within the Army has certain KD jobs for the officer throughout their career. Additionally there are common core skills all officers are required, by law, to receive as part of their training. These skills are required, and all officers are expected to be able to perform each successfully, regardless of branch. The

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primary military education provides the basic education and understanding at their pre-commissioning source.83

Key development jobs are outlined in DA Pam 600-3 for each grade plate throughout their career. These jobs, or combination of jobs, must be completed by the officer prior to being promoted. These jobs are crucial in the foundation of an officer’s career. Each grade has different requirements to accomplish before the board convenes. Company grade officers must perform the duties of a platoon leader, company or battery XO, and staff billets at battalion or brigade. For a Field Grade Officer, the battalion or brigade S-3 operations officer and or XO, must be completed successfully. As the officers progress through their career, key jobs and military education are required. At each phase of an officer’s career the board will convene and select officers for promotion. To compete for the next rank (e.g. Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel) one would have to have completed battalion command successfully. At each grade there are certain jobs required which are identified as KD jobs.

As an officer starts their career either from an academy or a university they receive entry level officer’s training built on a common core established from Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The officer attends BOLC, where they are trained to be technically competent and confident platoon leaders regardless of branch. Some of the pillars for the course are physical fitness, mental strength, resilience, and an understanding of what it takes to lead soldiers in combat. The officer must be proficient in their technical field (e.g., an artilleryman must understand gunnery or an infantryman must understand tactics that are employed in combat). The officer will be emerged in the

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83 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, 8.
warrior ethos and the Army values. BOLC is divided into three phases; each phase builds on the other and assists the development of the junior leader. At the end of these phases, they are competent in small unit tactics and their technical specialty field. The basic branch or specialty field must be mastered prior to graduating the course. 84 See table 3 below, which illustrates the officer fixed career 20 year timeline.

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84 Ibid., 9.
Table 3. Combat Arms Officer Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLC</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>ILE</td>
<td>AMS/AMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Fires Observer</td>
<td>Air Assault / Airborne / Ranger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY DEVELOPMENTAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND BROADENING ASSIGNMENTS**

- Platoon Leader
- Battery NO
- Company FSO
- Battery FDO
- BN Ammo Officer
- BN Staff Officer
- Other local, combatants will serve in at least two of the assignments above

- Battery/Company CDR
- Battalion FSO
- Battalion FDO
- Battalion Staff
- Small Group Instructor
- CTC O/C/T
- Ground Liaison Officer
- Armored / SOF FSO
- Advanced Civil School
- USAREC
- ROTC/USMA
- ACRC
- Scholarship / Fellowship
  * Denotes KD

- Brigade FSO
- Brigade NO
- Brigade S3
- Battalion NO
- Battalion S3
- BCD Asst. Ops Officer
- Joint or Army Staff
- Ranger or SOF FSO
- MCTP O/C/T
- CTC O/C/T
- Div / Corps Asst. FSO
- BLK / Div / Corps Staff
- ROTC/USMA
- Scholarship / Fellowship
  * Denotes KD

- Battalion CDR
- Joint / Army Staff
- ASCC Staff
- COCOM Staff
- CTC Senior O/C/T
- Corps / EAC Fires
- ROTC PMS
- Service School Staff
- SOF FSO
- Nominative Assignments
  * Denotes KD

- Brigade CDR
- BCD CDR
- Div / Corps / EAC
- Chief of Fires
- MCTP O/C/T
- Installation / Div CS
- MACOM / DA / Joint Staff
- TRADOC Capabilities Manager
- ROTC/USMA
  * Denotes KD


From BOLC the officer moves to a unit, here an important consideration prior to the Captain’s Career Course, is the senior leaders and who will mentor new Lieutenants. In the Army profession of arms the senior leader imparts their knowledge and wisdom on the young officers. The reinforcement of standards and the warrior ethos is an important
building block for the officer. The officer’s first assignment helps determine their course in the Army. In the leader’s domain of operational experience which allows them to practice and learn valuable lessons about their technical specialty or craft. The relationships built with the senior leaders will help guide the young officers throughout their career. At approximately the officer’s 48 month tenure, they are sent to the Captain’s Career Course.85

The officer is promoted to Captain at the four year mark. The officer’s previous four years’ experience will have included different jobs at the battalion and company/battery level or as a direct-level leader, per ADRP 6-22. The officer will have completed key jobs like platoon leader, a battery or company executive officer, and completed a battalion staff job. These assignments help them prepare for battery or company command, which is the most important job a Combat Arms Company Grade Officer will perform.86

Between the four to seven year mark, the officers attend the Captain’s Career Course, where they prepare to be a company, battery, or troop commander. The officer is also prepared for battalion and brigade staff officer jobs. The officer is refreshed on the foundation of his or her branch. For example, artillery officers are retaught gunnery and basic fire support skills. This recommits the officer to their technical specialty or craft and prepares him or her for the most important job they will have as a company grade officer, which is company or battery command. The officer then returns to the force and takes command. Their performance as a commander, a key developmental job, has a

85 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, 17.
86 Ibid.
significant impact on whether they are selected for promotion. The promotion board also determines their selection to Command and General Staff College.\textsuperscript{87}

Between the tenth and seventeenth year of service as a Major, the officer experiences their primary military education and completes KD jobs.\textsuperscript{88} As a Major, the officer attends the Command and General Staff College, the Army’s formal education system. It is a resident course designed to teach doctrine, ethics, joint, strategic thinking, and critical thinking as it relates to the officers warrior ethos. When the officer graduates, he or she is grounded in the war fighter’s doctrine. The officer returns to the force to perform either a KD job or a broadening job. The officer must complete 24 months of key development time prior to his or her Lieutenant Colonel board, which is necessary to be selected to the next rank. This is the last military schooling opportunity the officer will have for the next 10 years of his or her career.

The next education opportunity for the officer is based on his or her performance as a battalion commander. Battalion command is a board selected job which takes only the best. Additionally, based on the number of battalion commands available makes it very selective. This board has a huge impact on selection for the next rank of Colonel. The officer’s performance during their command time will determine if he or she will be selected for the War College and promotion to Colonel and Brigade Command.\textsuperscript{89} All three of these are prerequisites, to be promoted to Brigadier General.

\textsuperscript{87} Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, 9.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 10.
Between the seventeenth and twenty-second year, the senior service college provides senior level professional military education, to prepare senior leaders for strategic leadership responsibilities.\textsuperscript{90} It educates and develops students on employment in the US Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy. The student will research operational and strategic issues to help prepare them for strategic jobs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates that an officer has joint time to be considered for General Officer rank.\textsuperscript{91} The joint education and experience helps synchronize all branches of the military to work together in operations worldwide.

Officers selected for promotion to Colonel continue their senior field grade phase. This phase concludes with the officer’s separation or retirement from Active Duty, or promotion to Brigadier General. Attaining the grade of Colonel is realized by a select few and truly constitutes the elite of the officer corps. As Colonels, their maximum contribution to the Army is made as commanders and senior staff officers.\textsuperscript{92}

The OPMS objective is to develop adaptive twenty-first century leaders capable of conducting full spectrum operations. There are only a few key principles who are competent in his or her core, and broad enough to operate across the spectrum, able to operate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational levels.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 12.
CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION

Based on General Odierno’s comments on February 9, 2013 there is an implied problem in the Army today. That problem is the Army is not producing strategic leaders who have the characteristics or skills to deal with an uncertain future. The purpose of this research is to examine if the Army is currently laying the groundwork to produce strategic leaders inherent in this guidance. This research will examine several factors as related to this mandate, including first and foremost: how Army doctrine defines a “strategic leader” and will provide the US Army doctrine and respected institutional definition of what specific characteristics a strategic leader should possess. Second, this research will examine: the study commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army, conducted by the Army Strategic Studies Institute, which defines what competencies a strategic leader should possess. In doing so, this research will:

1. Review historical case studies of individuals who appear to exemplify the characteristics of strategic leaders in the Army,

2. Show how the SSI competencies can be applied to the case studies, and

3. Demonstrate how and if the career trajectories of the case studies can be applied to the officer career timeline, as defined within DA Pam 600-3.

Chapter 3 will review the primary and secondary research questions and present the methodology that the researcher will follow while conducting the analysis within chapter 4.
Research Methodology

The researcher reviewed different research methodologies for this study. Quantitative research involves testing hypotheses and theories using numbers and is not suitable for the purpose of this study. The researcher selected a qualitative method to conduct this study. The research method used in this study is a qualitative method using a review of multiple-case studies. The definition of a qualitative multiple-case study states: “that case study research “consists of a detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period of time, of phenomena, within their context,” with the aim being “to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the theoretical issues being studied.”94 The researcher chose this method because of the examination of the three case studies, during three different time periods, and comparing those cases against current Army doctrine.

The primary question to be answered within this research is as follows: Is the Army currently creating strategic leaders? In order to adequately address the primary question, the researcher has identified secondary questions which will enable better analysis of the primary question. The first secondary question: Are the competencies outlined within United States Army doctrine and the SSI sufficient in the development of contemporary strategic leaders, as addressed by General Odierno? The next secondary question is: How can the career trajectories of the case studies be applied to the officer career timeline, as defined within DA Pam 600-3? The final secondary research question is: Should the Army apply the examples of these case studies to the officer career

timeline, as defined within DA Pam 600-3. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the researcher’s methodology while answering these questions.

To frame the problem the researcher used Army doctrine and a list of competencies resulting from a study conducted by SSI. These primary sources provided a tangible definition of strategic leadership and were acquired through personal knowledge and research at the Combined Arms Research Library. These sources illustrated what Army doctrine states concerning the competencies required of strategic leaders and assists in answering the primary research question. To answer the secondary questions the researcher examined three different, successful military leaders, focusing on their education, assignments, and service time. The researcher examined current US Army policies concerning officer development to gain understanding of the process and to support answering the secondary research questions.

**Data Processing and Analysis**

The researcher used primary and secondary sources from the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library. Those resources consisted of a number of books, journal articles and publications identified in the bibliography of this study. The researcher collected information from both primary and secondary sources as indicated in chapter 2. The primary sources encompass all government documents and first-hand accounts concerning the three strategic leaders in the case studies. Secondary sources include all magazine articles and official studies conducted by both private companies and government entities. These sources set the foundation for the research and aided in answering the research questions.
Defining and Analyzing Strategic Leadership

The first task of the researcher was to determine a good definition for the term strategic leadership. To find an acceptable definition the researcher reviewed Army doctrine, writings from SSI, and business theory. Ultimately the researcher determined the Army’s definition of strategic leadership is the best definition and provides a suitable definition to measure against using each officer’s career. In chapter 4 the three historical case studies from three different time periods will be examined against the definition. Additionally, in chapter 4, the researcher used DA Pam 600-3 to compare the current leader development timeline against the case studies to illustrate how the Army develops its leaders today and if those officers from the case studies would achieve strategic leadership levels in today’s Army.

Ethics Consideration

The ethics consideration used during this study identified and recognized all academic work. All primary sources are cited along with the supporting documentation for this review. All sources are from documents and no human interviews were used to support the research.

Validity

Another way to consider the validity of this study is to examine the cases and the information used to review the cases. The strategic leaders in the case studies are US Army officers. The doctrine, or theory, the author is attempting to generalize to the expected population is US Army Doctrine. The doctrine is, in no small part, based on the experiences of preceding strategic leaders including General Marshall, General
Westmoreland and General Shinseki. Therefore the author believes the research is valid because he is using US Army examples to review and apply US Army doctrine. Had the author used leaders from outside the US Army then there may have been inconsistencies that made the study invalid.\(^95\)

**Summary and Conclusion**

The purpose of this research is to discover whether the US Army is currently developing strategic leaders. The research examined what competencies a strategic leader must possess according to Army doctrine and a study by SSI. Chapter 3 provided the research methodology for answering the primary and secondary research questions. Chapter 4 contains the criteria outlined in chapter 2 by primary sources and will illustrate how the Army develops strategic leaders through analysis of the examples compared to the doctrinal and SSI descriptions of strategic leaders.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to examine if the Army is currently laying the groundwork to produce strategic leaders inherent in this guidance. This research will examine several factors as related to this mandate, including first and foremost: how Army doctrine defines a “strategic leader” and will provide the US Army doctrine and respected institutional definition of what specific characteristics a strategic leader should possess. Second, this research will examine: the study commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army, conducted by the Army Strategic Studies Institute, which defines what competencies a strategic leader should possess. In doing so, this research will:

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Chapter 4 is organized by answering the research questions using the attributes from Army doctrine, SSI and business theory. Next, the research will validate that the three officers in the case studies were strategic leaders, by analyzing the case studies against Army doctrine, SSI and business attributes. This analysis shows the current OPMS develops and provided the Army with a pool of available strategic leaders.
Primary Research Question

Is the Army currently developing strategic leaders?

Based on the literature review in chapter 2, the current system does develop strategic leaders. The current OPMS is structured to support the three levels of leadership depicted in ADRP 6-22. As detailed in the OPMS or DA Pam 600-3; an officer timeline currently is managed to continue developing and challenging the officer, while educating and grooming him or her for the next level. The current timeline moves officers through jobs that address each of the levels of leadership depicted in the model; direct, organizational, and strategic. Also, the current OPMS places officers in billets to address each level of war; tactical, operational, and strategic. The current officer timeline is regimented but at times does allow the officer opportunities to serve at the highest levels, early in their careers. This is nested with General Oderino’s statement on Army Leader Development Strategy, refocusing the Army, and introducing strategic thinking early in an officer’s career which encourages him or her to serve outside their normal career path. One of General Oderino’s five principles for the Army of 2025 is to have adaptive, agile leaders in place and serving at all three levels.

The current officer fixed career timeline uses a cohort system to promote and manage a pool of officers from which senior leaders can select the next group of strategic leaders. As the research has illustrated; building a strategic leader does not happen overnight. With current doctrine and the OPMS, the system is continuously developing leaders for assignments at the highest level. Again, the current system provides a predictable career path for an officer during his 20 years of service. It can be likened to an automotive assembly line producing a pool of officers to draw from, which is a
developed ready available officer corps for strategic leadership. Army doctrine provides a
definition of what is needed and OPMS provides a guide that prepares strategic leaders
for the Army.

The three case studies, from three different time periods, demonstrate the Army’s
ability to produce strategic leaders. Each officer from the case studies fell under different
management systems which is important to note. It is important because an officer’s
promotion through the ranks may vary but the job they hold or perform can still be at the
highest level. The fiscal time an officer spent in the Army then, is significantly more than
it is now. This is because of the current Up or Out System which limits the time an
officer can spend in any one grade or rank. During the time periods of the case studies the
Army still educated and moved officers through assignments, preparing them to be future
leaders. The difference in then and now is the level of regimentation of an officer’s career
to achieve the same result.

Secondary Research Question
What is a strategic leader?

Based on the ADRP 6-22 definition outlined in chapter 2 Generals Marshall,
Westmoreland, and Shinseki would meet the criteria for a strategic leader. Analyzing the
three case studies against the ADRP 6-22 model illustrates they are strategic leaders by
definition. Additionally, examining the three case studies against the competencies set
forth by SSI demonstrates they are strategic leaders.

The ADRP 6-22 model outlined in chapter 2 lays out three levels; direct,
organizational, and strategic level. Analyzing the three case studies using the doctrine
model shows they each spent time at each level in their respective careers. Though some
spent more time than others at each level, they all three achieved the same results of being strategic leaders for the Army.

As illustrated in chapter 2, Marshall spent time at each level of the model. Marshall would spend most of his career at the organizational or operational and strategic levels but had jobs that provided experiences at each level. Early in his career Marshall worked at the organizational and strategic level of the model. For example he would be an Aide-de-Camp three different times in his career. Working for a general gives a junior officer access to the highest levels of decision making. His time spent with these senior leaders provided exposure to the organizational and strategic levels. He also served on division and corps-level staffs in peace time and during war. He was a planner at both of these levels of command which gave him more exposure to the upper levels of decision making at the organizational and strategic levels. Marshall’s career spanned four decades, his assignments in the first half of his career prepared him to be a strategic leader. All of Marshall’s positions, as well as his education, played important roles in developing him into a strategic leader.96

The next case study examined Westmoreland’s career. Again using the model outlined in ADRP 6-22 to analyze his career, he fits the definition of a strategic leader. Westmoreland had a more balanced exposure at each level in the first half of his career than Marshall, based on his jobs and assignments. For example, during World War II Westmoreland moved from the direct level to the organizational level very quickly, due to the need for officers during the war. After the war he would move back to his permanent rank of captain but had already had exposure to the second level of the model.

96 Laver and Matthews, 66.
Westmoreland’s movement from the rank of Captain to Colonel gave him a great deal of experience in managing large formations. After World War II Westmoreland commanded a Battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division prior to the Korean War. During the Korean War he commanded the 187th Regimental Combat Team (brigade size element) and later he would command the 101st Airborne Division. Each one of these assignments is at an organizational level, according to the model. The temporary rank allowed Westmoreland to move up and down the promotion ladder, which could be seen as helping in his development. Obviously the management system of the time period and the wartime needs allowed Westmoreland to move up and down the levels of command. These moves exposed him early to each level of the model, which nested him with personnel doctrine of the day and continued to prepare him for strategic leadership.

The last case study examined General Shinseki’s career in the Army. Part of his career fell under the current OPMS. Shinseki started his career while the Army was involved in a war. His first assignment was at the direct level of the model during a conflict. As outlined in chapter 2, Shinseki commanded at each organizational level, from troop through division and would later command as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Land Forces Commander. His jobs at each level of command nested with the model and provided experience at each level of command per ADRP 6-22. Similar to Marshall and Westmoreland the jobs he held throughout his career prepared him to be a strategic leader.97

97 Bell, Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010.
Next the research will use the definition from SSI and compare the definition against the case studies to determine if each officer in the case studies met the criteria set forth by the definition.

As previously discussed in chapter 2, the strategic leadership competencies listing that follows is a narrowed down list of the six attributes a strategic leader should possess. These attributes, along with “Be, Know, Do” capture what the strategic leader would acquire over a lifetime of education, service, and experience. Examining the definition of the attributes illustrates the depth and breadth a leader must have.

1. **Identity**: The article discusses a strategic leader’s ability to be self-aware of his weaknesses. An officer must have this understanding, to adjust their thinking to understand themselves and their environment. It goes beyond strengths and weakness and discusses understanding of one’s worth to the organization. The officer understands success is determined by subordinates.  

2. **Mental agility**: In the current operating environment, mental agility is important because of the extremely complex and uncertain environment in which the officer works. One must have the ability to thrive in the unknown. Mental agility builds on the ability to scan and adapt learning based on the environment, mental agility involves aspects of cognitive complexity, improvisation, and lightness discussed in the strategic leadership literature. By definition, mental agility is crucial to a strategic leader. Technology today provides masses of information a leader must process to understand the unknown. Mental agility is best improved with a program of instruction that encourages students to develop

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98 Wong et al., *Strategic Leadership Competencies*.

99 Ibid.
multiple points of view, consider alternative explanations, and argue the merits of competing solutions to complex problems. Mental agility allows the officer to synthesize, as well as analyze, to challenge existing frames of reference, and to engage in collaborative tasks.\textsuperscript{100}

3. **Cross-cultural savvy:** Strategic leaders must be able to work outside the Army and engage and understand the culture beyond the Army. Cross-culture savvy refers, however, to more than just the ability to work with non-US militaries. The meta-competency cross-cultural savvy, includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries.\textsuperscript{101} For example, a way to broaden an officer is through experiences outside of the Army. Working with non-Army organizations helps develop cross-culture savvy. Deployment in a joint environment broadens a strategic leader.\textsuperscript{102}

4. **Interpersonal maturity:** The officer must have the maturity to be able to coach-teach-mentor the next generation of leaders. The officer needs the vision to see over the horizon and must be able to serve as a role model. This type of leadership is not taught in the classroom but fostered over years of self-assessment and leadership study.\textsuperscript{103}

5. **World-class warrior:** The officer has to understand all three levels of war and be a master of each. The officer’s foundation is grounded in technical and tactical

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
development throughout their career. The officer continuously develops personally and professionally.\textsuperscript{104}

6. **Professional astuteness:** The officer must understand they are a leader and must maintain that appearance. They must live the Army values and display a high level of professionalism. The leader must understand that it’s okay to fail but this failure must not be fatal to the officer’s career.\textsuperscript{105}

Next the researcher will link SSI competencies to the Army attributes and business theory. Showing the linkage then to the case studies illustrates they were strategic leaders.

**Identity**

The competency identity lines up with the Army leadership model values under character. An individual has their identity; who they are when they enter the Army. Upon indoctrination into the Army they take on the values of the organization. The business theory linkage can be made through constancy or reliability. All three officers were examined based on their long careers, many jobs, self-assessing, and subordinate mentoring. The three case studies illustrate they were value based individuals and took on the Army values, which is displayed through their character. Each one of the three case studies illustrates how each officer had to continually self-assess as they moved to more

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
challenging positions of responsibility but grounded in their values. All three of these leaders link with the competency identity.106

Mental Agility

This competency lines up with intellect in the Army’s leadership model. Additionally, in business theory it links with adaptability, which allows the strategic leader to see change in the environment. Each one of the officers in the three case studies faced a complex world during their service. All three men served in multiple wars as commanders and planners. As a commander or planner understanding the environment and having the ability to adjust to the changing world. Marshall, for example, served in a low intensity conflict in the Philippines. World War I was operationally, a high intensity conflict with new technology. The two conflicts required two different kinds of approaches. Their ability to see change in the environment and adapt to that change is depicted in all three case studies.

Cross-cultural Savvy

This competency links to Army doctrine leadership model under develops to prepare self. The strategic leader must be prepared to gain an understanding of the different cultures they will be working with. Linking the Army’s competencies to business theory “to have wider perspective or outlook,” the strategic leader for that organization must have an understanding. After examining the three case studies, all three officers worked beyond the Army. For example Marshall, Westmoreland, and Shinseki, each experienced working with host-nation governments. All three served in Washington,

106 Ibid.
DC where they observed and participated in the civil-military relationship. Marshall’s service in the Philippines, working with the local government is another example, as is Westmoreland’s action in Korea, where he worked with and fought with the South Korean Army. While General Shinseki was in Vietnam he worked with the South Vietnam Army and while in Europe he cooperated with the European Allies. The case studies illustrate multiple instances of cross-cultural work in the careers of each officer, requiring integration and activity with other nations and organizations outside the US Army.

Interpersonal Maturity

The competency interpersonal maturity of the strategic leader links to the Army leadership model under develops others. The linkage to the business theory readiness to delegate and authorize, which is a way of developing others. As we apply to the case studies they were developed during their careers and the professions. This development linked them to the profession and helped define them. Each officer in the case studies had a vision for the Army, to prepare it or improve it, during their career. Marshall has many examples where he effected organizations. He first influenced change at the Infantry School and later when he expanded the Army for World War II. Marshall’s changes at the Infantry School had a huge effect on a generation of officers that would lead formations in World War II. Westmoreland’s experiences in his career shaped his vision for the future of the Army and the transition to an all-volunteer force. Shinseki led the transformation campaign to address both the emerging strategic challenges of the early twenty-first century and the need for cultural and technological change in the Army.
strategic studies. Again, each one of these officers vision for the future of the Army was shaped through his experiences during their Army careers.

**World-class Warrior**

As defined previously this competency is linked to the Army leadership model in more than one way, under warrior’s ethos, and under prepares self and achieves results. A similarity with the business theory attributes is self-awareness or to have a wider perspective and outlook. A strategic leader is master of their domain. The examination of the three case studies demonstrates that each strategic leader had exposure to and mastered each level of war. Each individual spent time training in peace, as well as executing in war, when they were serving at each level of war.

**Professional Astuteness**

This competency links to Army leadership model through stewards of the profession. In the business articles one may not be able to specifically link to one trait but you can make the connection; the strategic leader sets the example for all others to follow. The length and success of these three officer’s careers is testament to their professionalism. Each officer the researcher examined spent over 35 years of service in the Army. In their many years of service their professionalism set the standard for the officer corps to follow. Today this professionalism is founded in the Army Doctrine Publications but it is mirrored off of officer’s careers, such as theirs. As the researcher examined each officer’s career, his time in service and assignments speaks to this.
The Officer Personnel Management System

Next the researcher examined all three officers against today's DA Pam 600-3. The officer fixed career timeline provides a guide to the officer’s career and gives predictability. The current timeline, as depicted in chapter 2 (table 3), lists the positions which an officer should occupy before being promoted to the next rank throughout his career. Additionally, the career timeline in DA Pam 600-3 is nested with the ADRP 6-22 model (figure 2), Army leadership levels.

All three officers under consideration in this paper were successful and fit the current model for success found in ADRP 6-22. The OPMS looks completely different as it changed throughout the Army’s history. When Marshall served he was educated by the Army and held a variety of positions, today his career would take a different path. We can speculate that he would still have been successful even though his career would have been managed differently. Today’s system manages the officer corps so each cohort, as they move through their career, has predictability and delivers a pool of trained officers at the right point in time, for the right positions.

In summary, chapter 4 answered the researcher’s questions against the current doctrine and SSI. The research demonstrates the current system is capable of producing strategic leaders. The case studies are useful because the comparison illustrates the changes in the officer management process over time. Even though each officer in the case studies was successful, in the system of the day, today’s OPMS helps provide predictability and a structured approach to developing officers. The result is still a system that produces a pool of leaders for strategic leadership at the right time in their respective
careers. Chapter 5 will make recommendations and discuss additional ideas for further study.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to examine if the Army is currently laying the groundwork to produce strategic leaders inherent in this guidance. This research will examine several factors as related to this mandate, including first and foremost: how Army doctrine defines a “strategic leader” and will provide the US Army doctrine and respected institutional definition of what specific characteristics a strategic leader should possess. Second, this research will examine: the study commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army, conducted by the Army Strategic Studies Institute, which defines what competencies a strategic leader should possess. In doing so, this research illustrated:

1. Review historical case studies of individuals who appear to exemplify the characteristics of strategic leaders in the Army,

2. Show the SSI competencies can be applied to the case studies, and

3. Demonstrate how and if the career trajectories of the case studies can be applied to the officer career timeline, as defined within DA Pam 600-3.

Chapter 5 illustrates the summary of findings in chapter 4 and then interprets these findings. Additionally, chapter 5 examines what the results mean and any unexpected findings. The chapter will then discuss unanswered questions and anything that could have been done differently. Closing out the chapter will be the summary and conclusions.
Findings

The research discovered the current system can be rigid, is time driven, and might not allow an officer to spend multiple years in the same position. However, the current OPMS, because of mandated laws, does develop leaders and builds a pool of trained personnel from which senior leaders can select future strategic leaders. The current timeline does develop strategic leaders for the Army through a fix path of jobs and assignment that develop the foundation for the attributes that are cultivated over 20 years of service. This foundation and development of the strategic leader(s) this can be groomed even more upon selection for increased responsibility. It ensures an officer has experience at each level of leadership outlined in ADRP 6-22; direct, organizational, and the strategic. The current timeline also allows an officer to move up and down the levels of command, which provides a wealth of experience. For example, General Marshall spent over five years as an *Aide-De-Camp* which developed him beyond his years, if Marshall had fell under current system his movement and grooming would have been more robust. Today an officer could be an *Aide-De-Camp* but for a shorter period of time. This provides the opportunity for the officer to do other jobs as well, which will continue to develop the officer and keep him or her on the timeline for strategic leadership.

The three case studies, from three different time periods, highlighted a need for potential change to the OPMS. DA Pam 600-3 provides a career map for each branch to educate and develop officers throughout their 20 years of service and prepare them to be a strategic leader. The fixed timeline (see table below) which is mandated by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act changed policy which ensures officers do not spend their entire career in one job or location. This is different than the career Marshall had.
Most of his career was spent working only at division or higher levels which helped to develop him into the great strategic leader he was but, today’s current timeline forces the officer to have a mix of jobs, which broadens their experience and is good for the Army.

Table 4. DA Pam 600-3 Career Timeline

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<th>YEARS</th>
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<td>LTC</td>
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<td>AMSF/SAMS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Assault / Airborne / Ranger</td>
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**Typical Assignments**

- Platoon Leader
- Battery XO
- Company FSO
- Battery FDO
- Bn Ammo Officer
- Bn Staff Officer
- New, Ideally, an officer will serve in at least two of the assignments above

- Battery/Company CDR
- Battalion FSO
- Battalion FDO
- Battalion Staff
- Small Group Instructor
- CTC O/C/T
- Ground Liaison Officer
- Ranger / SFG FSO
- Advanced Civil School
- USAEC
- ROTC/USMA
- AC/RK
- Scholarship / Fellowship
- Denotes KD

- Brigade FSO
- Brigade XO
- Brigade CDR
- ASCC Staff
- CTC Senior O/C/T
- Corps / EAC Fire
- ROTC PME
- Service School Staff
- SFG FSO
- Nominative Assignments
- Denotes KD

**Self Development**

- Online/Distance Learning, Professional Reading or Self-Study
- Baccalaureate Degree
- Graduate Degree

To frame the problem the researcher used Army doctrine and a list of competencies resulting from a study conducted by SSI and business model listing their attributes. These primary sources provided a definition and were acquired through personal knowledge and research at the Combined Arms Research Library. These sources illustrated what the Army doctrine states concerning the competencies required of strategic leaders and assist in answering the primary research question. To answer the secondary questions the researcher examined three different, successful military leaders, focusing on their education, assignments, and service time. The researcher examined current US Army policies concerning officer development to gain understanding of the process and to support answering the secondary research questions.

Based on the literature review in chapter 2 and the analysis of other models of strategic leadership the author believes the current Army system does develop strategic leaders by delivering a continuous pool of trained personnel to draw from for further grooming. The current OPMS is structured to support the three levels of leadership depicted in ADRP 6-22 leadership model figure 2. As detailed in the OPMS or DA Pam 600-3 an officer timeline currently is managed to continue developing and challenging the officer, while educating and grooming him or her for the next level. The current timeline moves officers through jobs that address each of the levels of leadership depicted in the model; direct, organizational and strategic. Also, the current OPMS places officers in billets to address each level of war; tactical, operational, and strategic. The current officer timeline is regimented but at times does allow officers opportunities to serve at the highest levels early in their careers, which exposes the officer sooner to strategic leaders which develops the next generation by imparting knowledge. This is
nested with General Oderino’s statement on leader development, refocusing the Army, and introducing strategic thinking early in an officer’s career which allows officers to serve outside their normal career path. One of General Oderino’s five principles for the Army of 2025 is to have adaptive, agile leaders in place and serving at all three levels.

The Army was designed for a traditional war with peer to near-peer threats. The Global War on Terror forced the Army to fight a war it was not trained to fight but through the work of strategic leaders, it adapted to the fight. The last 15 years of war has focused the Army and officer corps on fighting a counterinsurgency, with several deployments to combat zones. The two wars provided the Army with a large amount of combat experience. The vast combat experience that the Army has been in fighting a counterinsurgency allowing the Army, as a whole, to master these skills. Now that the Army moves away from back to back deployments it can start to rebalance education and training and continue the development of adaptive agile leaders, and future strategic leaders the Army needs to lead in the future. The multiple deployments affected some officers by limiting their attendance at professional military education, so as the war slows down the Army will start to move back to a balanced force.

**Unexpected Findings**

After examining the three case studies against the current OPMS and the Army doctrine and the business theory, the author believes the current system is valid and promotes a vibrant officer and does not allow for a stagnant officer corps. The current system promotes young and vigorous officers but at the same time, using promotion boards, which no other promotes officers but determines the ones that will be separated from service. The current system works in preparing officers to be strategic leaders.
through the ADRP 6-22 model and OPMS which forces officers to have multiple experiences, both educational and field assignments. Additionally, the last 15 years of war strained the military and caused some officers not to receive a professional military education. Education is important for the officer as they move through their career, this broadens the officer, developing thinkers who apply the intellectually standards.

The problem addressed within this research centered on the question: does the fixed timeline used by the Army develop strategic leaders? Through case study analysis, this research demonstrates that indeed it is possible to develop a strategic thinker, (i.e. strategic leader) within this timeframe. However, this research did not address, quantitatively speaking, if the Army was truly accomplishing this goal at large. Future research would need to define variables or characteristics of a strategic leader in the Army specifically, and apply them to a representative sample of Army officers across their career timeline, to most accurately respond to this question.

Additional research might also assess what alternative approaches could be taken, to further broaden and enhance the Army’s success with developing strategic thinkers and leaders; while taking into account areas that might impact success, such as contemporary societal influences generally and Army culture specifically. Topics for further research may include strategic leadership attributes that are introduced at the commissioning source. Additionally what classes of instruction can be added to the officers PME at each level to help with development. Also, examine the OER and if it identifies the qualities the Army needs for a strategic leader. Another topic for further research is society producing capable people to serve.
Summary

Army doctrine states that the most important aspect of an Army strategic leader is
that he or she should be highly qualified as a warfighter. However, how does one become
a strategic leader-if the enemy of war is one that is unknown-and ever expanding in
technique, skill, and scope of territory? Terrorists no longer need to be state sponsored,
nor are they confined to the typical “battlefield of war.” As stated in the Army Operating
Concept “The enemy is unknown, the location is unknown, and the coalitions involved
are unknown. The problem we are focusing on is how to ‘Win in a Complex World.’”\(^\text{107}\)
An Army Officer today is expected to be able to lead in the most complex world the
Army has ever faced in US history.

General Raymond T. Odierno stated in his “Way Points” article on strategic
guidance that “we will expand our strategic leadership education and opportunities to
ensure we develop leaders.” Although the fixed officer timeline provides the means to
achieve strategic-level thinking, it is by no means the end. The Army’s officer timeline is
a mechanism for achieving quality, highly-skilled officers; trained in the nuances of
modern warfare, on a nontraditional battlefield.

The “ambiguity of war” in modern society necessitates that we continue to engage
our Army at any possible opportunity in “strategic leadership education and
opportunities.” The current OPMS manages officers, which provides the means, in a way
that will develop them into an available, trained pool of leaders for future high level jobs,
leading the Army of the future.

\(^{107}\) Department of the Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1.
The Army is moving towards the Army University to educate the officer corps. The summary of this research, on how the Army develops its leaders is; the current system provides the education and training through DA Pam 600-3 to produce the leaders of the future, but the Army can also do more through mentorship and rethinking the image of a “modern battlefield,” verses the battlefield of the twentieth century. T. E. Lawrence said “Mankind has had ten-thousand years of experience at fighting and if we must fight, we have no excuse for not fighting well.”\textsuperscript{108}

BIBLIOGRAPHY


