

IMPLICATIONS OF A NON-UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR A
UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA

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by
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ABSTRACT

IMPLICATIONS OF A NON-UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM AND THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA, by Major Moses Shapwaya, 102 pages.

This thesis is an attempt to discuss the implications of a non-unified command system and the need for a unified command system in the Zambia Defence Forces (ZDF). It further discusses the need for enhanced operational effectiveness and integration at both strategic and operational levels in times of crisis. This effort provides an analysis of the historical perspective, and both political and strategic implications of having a non-unified command system. It focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of a non-unified command. The thesis discusses how historical aspects have affected the ZDF structure, modeling it into one system after another and analyzing some factors that forced these changes. This paper draws insights from the experiences of both super powers and other African states during conflicts and contingencies; it also draws from interviews of retired Zambian senior officers who served in both systems. The conclusions and recommendations are further backed by the findings from a survey which concluded that the current generation of men and women in ZDF uniform are eager for a unified system. In the end, the paper argues that a unified command system provides synergy to military efforts and, as such, is an inevitable necessity for any national defence structure in Today's world. All in all, the paper stresses the importance and recommends that Zambia adopt a unified structure.

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ACRONYMS

A HQ	Zambia Army Headquarters
Air HQ	Zambia Air Force Headquarters
AOR	Area of responsibility
C2	Command and control
CAS	Close Air Support
CDF	Chief of Defence Forces
CDI	Chief of Defence Intelligence
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJO	Chief of Joint Operation
COA	Course of action
CONOPS	Concept of operations
COS	Chief of Staff
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DDI	Department of Defence Intelligence
DFMS	Defence Force Medical Services
DOD	Department of Defence
DSCSC	Defence Services Command and Staff College.
DSHS	Defence School of Health Sciences
FNLA	National Front for Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
HQ	Headquarters
JCP	Joint Command Post

JHQ	Joint Headquarters
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MSMH	Maina Soko Military Hospital
PS	Permanent Secretary
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance Movement
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defence
SO I	Staff Officer Grade One
UNITA	National Party for the Total liberation of Mozambique
ZA	Zambia Army
ZAF	Zambia Air Force
ZDF	Zambia Defence Force
ZNDF	Zambia National Defence Force
ZNS	Zambia National Service
ZP	Zambia Police
ZR	Zambian Regiment/Zambia Railway

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Brief History of the ZDF

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of having a non-unified command system and to establish the need for Zambia to adopt a unified system. Zambia is a landlocked former British colony in southern Africa. It is surrounded by eight neighboring countries of which most of them have had civil conflicts. As such, its geographical position shapes its foreign policy.



Figure 1. Map of Africa showing Zambia

Source: World Atlas, "Africa," accessed 11 June 2015, <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/af.htm>.

The modern Zambia Defence Force (ZDF), as we know it today in Zambia, was born from the Northern Rhodesian Regiment which was a creation of the British colonial era and initially designed to facilitate colonization and colonial rule of the Northern Rhodesian colony. The regiment, as a military instrument of power, was a tool for the domestic task of protecting the British colony and was mainly involved in policing colonial subjects.¹ In this regard, it is stated that, “they were effectively used by the British to suppress any agitation from the locals.”² On 28 April 1933, the Northern Rhodesia Police (Military wing) was changed into Northern Rhodesian Regiment which later grew into an army. After participating in World War II, the Northern Rhodesia regiment was reorganized to deal with internal threats within the Northern Rhodesian territory. During the 1950s and 1960s, popular nationalistic feelings and movements were becoming a major threat to the British Empire which reorganized its armed forces into police roles.³ See figure k for the constabulary force which was transformed in the regiment.

¹ Bizeck J. Phiri, “Civil Control of the Zambia Military since Independence and its Implication for Democracy,” in *Ourselves to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, eds. Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), accessed 11 December 2014, <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/OURSELVESPHIRI.PDF>, 3-14.

² Benjamin Mibenge, “Civil-Military Relations in Zambia: A View from the Military,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Zambia: A Review of Zambia’s Contemporary CMR History and Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, eds. Gilbert Chileshe, Margaret Chimanse, Naison Ngoma, Paul Swando, and Tasila Mbewe (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), accessed 11 February 2015, <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CIVILMIBENGE.PDF>, 33.

³ Hanania Lungu and Naison Ngoma, “The Zambia Military—Trails, Tribulations and Hope,” in *Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005),



Figure 2. Northern Rhodesia Police Force

Source: William V. Brelsford, ed., *The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment* (Lusaka: The Government Printers, 1954), 13.

By the time Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), gained independence from the British in 1964, the Defence Force was purely organized for the defence of British territory mainly against insurgent movements. In 1960, the British colonies of Nyasaland (now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were joined together to form that the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. However this federation ended in 1963, but had a significant impact on the structure of the ZDF at independence as its military hardware had to be shared when it broke up. However, at independence in 1964, the Northern Rhodesian Regiment became the Zambia Army while the Northern Rhodesian Air Wing became the Zambia Air Force in accordance with the independence order. The new state of Zambia did not have its own

accessed 11 December 2014, http://www.issafrika.org/pubs/Books/Evol_Revolution%20Oct%202005/Chap12.pdf, 313-330.

indigenous officer's corps, as all officers were from the British Army and Royal Air Force. This situation remained until 1971 when indigenous Zambia officers took over as army and air commanders. At independence, the command system was non-unified thus the service commanders reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief via the Minister of Defence. Even though there have been some efforts to unify the services under a joint system, this non-unified situation still prevails today.

Shortly after independence, Zambia became a determined advocate for change in Southern Africa, supporting liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Southwest Africa (now Namibia), Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa.⁴ Zambian involvement in these liberation struggles brought the Defence Force a challenge; that of operational synchronization in a non-unified command structure adopted from the British. By the mid-1970s there was a greater desire to pursue better coordination between the two services to back these liberation struggles. Therefore, in 1976 President Kaunda announced the formation of a unified Defence Force that was to be known as the Zambia National Defence Force (ZNDF). At that time the ZNDF was comprised only of Army and Air Force elements; later the Zambia National Service (ZNS) was incorporated. The ZNS became critical within the ZNDF as it trained and provided required manpower within a short time for military duty, hence increasing the operational strength in response to regional threats arising out of the liberation wars. The Defence Force went through rapid adjustments in organization and personnel structure to suit its role of defending the borders and sovereignty of a new country, whilst supporting neighboring

⁴ Country Watch, "Zambia: Foreign Relations," accessed 28 December 2014, http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.aspx?type=text&vcountry=189&topic=PONAS.

liberation movements. Zambia mostly played a defensive role and, as such, it equipped itself to prevent bombings and infiltration by colonial powers. In this role, Zambia played a key role in the liberation of Southern Africa.

During this period, Zambia faced another challenge; that of internal rebellion or insurgency known as Mushala Rebellion (1976 to 1982), as it was steered by Adamson Mushala. This Mushala insurgency was a South African sponsored operation, code named “Operation Plathond” and was commanded by Colonel Jannie Breytenbach of South Africa’s Special Forces unit. His objective was to destabilize the government and sway its focus from support to other liberation struggles.⁵

The Zambia National Service

The Zambia National Service was, and still is, a unique force in that it provides the Defence Force with soldiers who also possess other various developmental skills. Its history dates back to 1963 as a youth service (land army) for a political party (United National Independence Party [UNIP]). Its sole purpose was to prepare youths for a protracted struggle for independence. However, with a peaceful transition to independence, the land army was transformed into a youth service again. Nonetheless, when Southern Africa liberation struggles over stretched the Zambia Defence Forces, the government saw a need to reinforce its fighting strength. Thus, on 29 December 1971 the youth service was dissolved and the Zambia National Service was established through an act of parliament. Since then the service has contributed to the defence and security of Zambia’s sovereignty; its commandant is sometimes seconded from the army. ZNS

⁵ Lungu and Ngoma, 322.

officers participate in professional courses alongside their army and Air Force counterparts. The service also participates in Defence Force joint operations and training. However, whether they can coordinate well with the rest of the Defence Force in the event of a major conflict, remains to be answered.

Zambia under the First Unified Command System

Since independence in 1964, Zambia has shifted twice between a non-unified command and a unified command of its Defence Force. As earlier mentioned, it adopted a unified command for the first time on 16 June 1976 and became the ZNDF. The first commander was General Kingsley Chinkuli then the Army commander. Each of the services was headed by a Chiefs of Staff who answered to the ZNDF Commander. A Joint headquarters was established and situated at Arakan Barracks in Lusaka. This headquarters was created to oversee and coordinate operations of the ZNDF. Gen Chinkuli did not stay long as commander ZNDF, as he was retired the following year. His domineering, no-nonsense disposition, lack of flexibility and parade square type of leadership were not well accepted by his subordinates. Many officers celebrated his removal as ZNDF commander in 1977,⁶ since they did not like his leadership style. This is an indication that from the inception of a Zambian unified command there have been issues with the command environment. Gen Chinkuli was replaced in 1979 by Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Peter Zuze, then Air Commander. This was a positive move by

⁶ Francis G. Sibamba, *The Zambia Army and I: My Personal Experience: The Autobiography of a Former Army Commander* (Ndola, Zambia: Mission Press, 2010), 201.

Zambia's political leadership to show that the services had equal opportunity to command the ZNDF.

Although Lieutenant General Zuze was the only officer from the Air Force to command the ZNDF at that time, his appointment showed that professional qualifications mattered most for one to be the ZNDF commander and not his branch of service. Lt Gen Zuze however did not last long in the position, as he was taken into diplomatic service and later replaced by Lt Gen Mibenge (See figure 1). Remarkably, the unified ZNDF at that time scaled down to the provincial regions and encompassed both services. For example the first region commander for the North Western Region was from the Army while his deputy was from the Air Force. This inter-service command structure was a positive aspect, but requires further study of its applicability within the current political system. The ZNDF, through the period of 1970 to 1990, encountered various challenges as the nation faced political, economic and security difficulties, coupled with the liberation struggles in southern Africa. However, the Army and Air Force, during the 1960s, operated and coordinated well.⁷ Even so, this unified command was not well received by the Air Force and National Service who felt it was dominated by the Army.⁸ As such in 1980, the ZNDF unified command system was abolished and the three services reverted back to independent commands. The idea of unifying the Defence Forces at that time brought many different points of view, mainly among senior officers. In this regard, it is indicated that Zambia was not ready for a unified system of command. Sibamba noted that:

⁷ Sibamba, 201.

⁸ Lungu and Ngoma, 52.

The unification of the Armed Forces was an ambitious program which was not well researched before being implemented. Ours also brought with it numerous problems, including those related to command and control, individual services traditions, and modus operandi. Uniforms and rank structures were standardized much to the amusement of the Air Force . . . status to equal that of the Army. Army officers for their part felt their ranks were diluted.⁹



Figure 3. Commanders during the first unified command

Source: ZANASE News Magazine, “Zambia National Service Command History,” July 2014.

ZDF Under the Second Unified Command

From the first unification, some value of the system appeared to have been acknowledged such that ten years later an attempt was made once again to have a unified command. This was in July 1990 when Lt Gen Hanania Lungu, then air commander, was appointed Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff (CGS). By this time, the services came under direct command of the Chief of the General Staff, The Ministry of Defence then became the Headquarters. The Chief of General Staff made various changes in the structure and appointments to suit this new system. He introduced joint staff

⁹ Sibamba, 143.

departments including: Chief of Operations and Training, headed by an Army officer; Joint Secretary, headed by an Air Force officer; Administrative Secretary, headed by an Air Force officer; Commanding Officer, headed by an Army officer; Chief of Defence Intelligence, headed by an Air Force officer; Chief of Inspectorate, headed by an Army officer; and Chief of Logistics, headed by an Army officer.¹⁰

The Army did not fully accept this development because they felt that this change was meant to control an army which had just attempted a coup d'état. The 1990 "Luchembe" military coup d'état was organized by an army lieutenant believed to have had the backing of senior officers. However, the coup d'état was quelled by loyal troops, the army commandos. As a result though, the Army felt untrusted by the government. Lt Gen Sibamba felt that the whole structure was hurriedly created and was rather inefficient, ineffective, and confusing by any military standard. He was also concerned that the Chief of General Staff was junior to most of the Army officers who became his staff.¹¹ It is claimed that the new Chief of General Staff from Air Force did not understand such a system imposed on him by political will. As an example, he tended to skip echelons when issuing orders. He flew to the field during the fight against a Mozambican insurgent group, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) and directly issued orders to the field commander without regards to the Army commander. In modern command concepts we would say there was lack of unity of command or arguably *Mission Command*. However, this action can be considered as differences in command philosophy, but the underlining perception or misconception

¹⁰ Sibamba, 195.

¹¹ Ibid., 199.

affected the drive towards a unified command system. In the same vein, it is indicated that the concept of Chief of General Staff would have been advantageous in the development of the Defence Forces had it been well researched, well timed, and appropriately executed. As it was, officers saw it only as a purge of the military following the Luchembe coup d'état.¹² This second unification did not last long either and can be attributed to political changes as the state went from a one party to a multi-party system. The new political leadership did not see the need to have a unified system of military command at that time.

The Third Attempt for Unification

The desire for a unified command system did not die in 1990. For instance, another latent attempt was made on 24 August 2006 by late President L. P. Mwanawasa when he appointed Lieutenant General Chisuzi as Chairman of Service Chiefs and promoted him to the rank of general. This brought about misinterpretations within the Defence Force which in reality did not materialize as the provisions of the Defence Act had not changed to provide for the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff or Commander of the Defence Force.

The lack of a statutory provision of the unified structure is still one of the negative hindrances to unification. However, General Chisuzi indicated that his promotion and appointment was just meant to chair the Defence Council on behalf of the president.¹³ To date, this issue is still being considered, but it receives contradicting views among the

¹² Sibamba, 196.

¹³ General Isaac A. Chisuzi, "His Experience" (Speech, Defence Service Command and Staff College, Lusaka, 2012).

services. Currently, compared to advanced militaries in the world and the defence forces within the region, Zambia is the only country without a unified command system of its own defence force.

ZNDF Under a Non-Unified Command System (1990 to present)

In 1990, Zambia adopted a multiparty system of government under the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) which decided to revert to independent commands. As stated early, this was mainly due to a lack of legislative backing. The only departments that survived are the Department of Defence Intelligence (DDI) and the military health system. The Army, Air Force and National Service once again returned to independent commands and this has remained so to present. This shifting of the command system in Zambia could have been influenced to some extent by changes in the political system as well.

The non-unified system, to a large extent, has existed within the framework of a multiparty political system. Even so, after the 1990s there has been a significant reduction of external and major threats as such, the political system seems to have focused more on social and economic fights. Despite strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems,¹⁴ and seemed to be the focus for Zambian politicians. Hence, little effort to the restructuring of the Defence Forces has been made since then. In any case the system seems to have worked well given the

¹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “Country Economy Overview-Zambia,” The World Factbook, accessed June 5, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/print_2116.html.

Defence Forces' successful deployment during local operations and United Nations (UN) operations.

The non-unified system takes a form of three service chiefs who operationally report directly to the Commander-in-Chief through the MOD. This system is equally taught and exercised by the Defence Services Command and General Staff College (DSCSC) where everything operates on the concept of service cooperation. Despite having the system work well, there has been a number of challenges such as differences in promotions rates, resources and conditions, joint training and lack of standardized procurement process among the three services. A good example can be seen in the generals in the Air Force versus their Army counterparts. The former seem to be better cared for better than the later. For example, Air Force service men are given claims and allowances promptly as compared to their Army counter parts. This should not be the case for a Defence system serving the same government, any blame can be arguably attributed to the lack of a coordinated Defence Force structure.

Nevertheless, the biggest challenge to this command system is yet to be tested when the nation is faced with a major conflict. This future situation will be the focus of this analysis. Based on this structure, a number of questions arise as to how effective the ZDF can be in case of a major conflict. Crisis has unified the system before; should the state wait for another crisis to unify its military?

Research Question

Primary Research Question

This paper attempts to answer the primary questions of what the implications of a non-unified command system are and what factors point to Zambia's need to change from a non-unified command structure to a unified command structure.

Secondary Research Questions

To answer the primary question, this paper will also address the following:

1. What Factors Point to Zambia's Need to Adopt a Unified System of Command?
2. How have regional threats prompted the Zambian Government to shift its system of command?
3. How have political developments prompted the shift of the system of command in Zambia?
4. How has Zambian civil-military dynamics affected the creation of a unified command?
5. What factors have made most nations unify their Defence Forces?
6. What are the advantages of a unified command over a non-unified command system?
7. How well can coordination be achieved in case of a major conflict?
8. What is the general feeling of Defence Force members with regards to unification?
9. To what extent has a non-unified command affected joint doctrine, training, and acquisition?

10. What are the main impediments to establishing a unified command structure in Zambia?

Ultimately these questions, once answered, may help the ZDF make a decision as to whether or not Zambia needs to unify the command of its Defence Force. The importance of a professional well-trained and unified Defence Force in any nation is vital. This raises further questions as to whether the current structure of the Defence Force can work well in case of a major conflict requiring the full mobilization of the nations' war effort. The peace any nation enjoys should never be taken for granted. In this regard there is a need to rethink and reanalyze the non-unified command system in Zambia to ensure joint planning and unified effort and avoid future implications.

Assumptions

Unified command has taken the center stage in most of the militaries around the world either in the form of a joint chief of staff or chiefs of the defence force. Regardless of the form of the unified command system, the idea is to have centralized planning and decision making at higher levels to achieve unity of purpose. The laws of any nation will always determine the organization and structure of its armed forces. Equally, just like any other system where services mix, there will always be inter-service rivalry among the branches and common ground in the interest of the nation will have to be found. Similarly, it is assumed that challenges, difficulties and conflict in most cases bring about cooperation of services. Change is always a resented phenomenon but is sometimes necessary.

Definitions of Terms

Civil Military Relations. Describes the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority.

Integration. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.”¹⁵

Interdependence. The purposeful reliance by one Service’s forces on another Service’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances.¹⁶

Interoperability. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.¹⁷

Liberation Struggles. The movements for the fight for independence. In this paper, these will refer to all liberation wars within the southern African region.

Mission command. The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.¹⁸

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2009), 9.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Change 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2009), 8.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Unified command. A system of command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more military departments/services that is established and so designated by the President ¹⁹. However, for the purpose of this thesis and in case of Zambia, a unified command system refers to: The centralized command, control and coordination of the Defence Force by a joint headquarters under one overall commander with a joint staff comprised of members from all services. This system does not take the autonomy of administrative and operational responsibilities of each service but aims at coordinating their efforts towards common national strategic objectives.

Zambia Regiment. A ground military unit during the colonial era that the British maintained for the protection of its Northern Rhodesia colony. This unit, later at independence, was transformed in to the Zambia Army.²⁰

Limitations

The research has mainly the limitation of sensitivity of some of the aspects with regards to national threats and access to some classified information.

To start with, much of the strategic information on the decisions that were being made to transform the Defence Force are not accessible. This limits the analysis since there will be limited views on the subject. The other limitation being that most senior

¹⁸ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 21.

¹⁹ Rubicon Planning, "Military Terms and Definitions," accessed June 5, 2015, <http://www.militaryterms.net/u>.

²⁰ William V. Brelsford, ed., *The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment* (Lusaka: The Government Printers, 1954), VII.

officers consider this issue to be politically sensitive. As such, services do not want to discuss it. Hence most of the views the author received are likely to have been censored by individuals and this will somehow not provide a real picture of their feelings. Nevertheless, the analysis is based on available literature and the survey that was conducted (See Appendix B).

Scope and delimitations

This thesis will not attempt to answer why Zambia is using a non-unified system of command nor will it answer the political reasons for this status quo, as data to these aspects is not easily accessible as it is politically sensitive. Discussion of unified command will provide evidence in demonstrating the implication of a nation not having a unified command and the need to change.

Lessons learned by other nations in major conflicts, wars, and coup d'état led with survey data will serve as sufficient argument to use in supporting this thesis. In this regard, the thesis research will be limited to unclassified documents. Further, this thesis will not discuss in depth the aspects of joint doctrine as it can be considered as another research. The thesis will, however, discuss the advantages of a unified system over a non-unified command system. For the purpose of simplicity, all references to the jointness will refer to sub components of the unified system as described in the definition of terms. In all cases argued in this thesis the unified command system will mean having a Joint Chiefs of Staff system or commander of defence force system.

Significance of the study

This thesis is of great importance in a number of aspects. Firstly it will increase the knowledge and literature on the subject of unified and non-unified command systems. It further adds insight into the advantages and disadvantages of both systems. The findings, to some extent, help to seal the gap that exists on this matter within the Zambia Defence Force. Also, this thesis makes recommendations that may help restructure the Zambia Defence Force for a better future capabilities.

Summary and Conclusions

Table 1. Summary of Key events

SER	YEAR	EVENT	COMMAND SYSTEM	COMMENT	POLITICAL SYSTEM
1	1964	Zambia Army and Air Force established.	Non-unified	Took over from colonial regime and maintained	Multi-party system
2	1971	Indigenous Zambia officers took over as army and air commanders. ZNS established	Non-unified	Formerly youth service	Multi-party system
3	1972	Zambia becomes a one party state	Non-unified		One party system
3	1976	Formation of a unified Defence Force known as Zambia National Defence Force (ZNDF)	Unified Command	Peak of Liberation struggles	One party system
4	1976	Mushala Rebellion starts	Unified Command	South African sponsored	One party system
5	1980,	the ZNDF unified command system was abolished	Non-unified		One party system
6	1982	Mushala Rebellion is defeated	Non-unified		One party system

7	1990	Lt Luchembe military coup d'état Lt Gen Lungu, appointed Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff	Non Unified Unified Command	Coup did not succeed	One party system
8	1991	Zambia Adopts Multi-party system and Chief of General Staff appointment abolished	Non -unified	New political (MMD) party comes into power	Multi-party system
9	1997	Captain Solo military coup d'état	Non -unified	Coup did not succeed	Multi-party system
10	2006	Lieutenant General Chisuzi appointed as Chairman of Service Chiefs and promoted him to the rank of general	Non -unified		Multi-party system

Source: Created by author

This chapter provided the historical background of the ZDF and the research questions, and rationale used in this research. The background helps to understand some factors that influenced and forced changes to the structure and helped establish the basis of analysis in the next chapters. The questions are the keys to unlocking the desired end state of this thesis and that is to establish the implications of a non-unified system and the need for the ZDF to adopt a unified command system. This chapter has also provided some assumptions, definition of terms, limitations, scope and significance of this study. To further understand these aspects, chapter 2 will consider what other authors have written and expressed on this or similar subject.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of the Zambia Defence Force having a non-unified command system and to establish the need for Zambia to adopt a unified system. This thesis seeks to increase the knowledge and literature on the subject of unified command and non-unified command systems. Its findings will seal the gap that exists on the pros and cons of a unified command within the Zambia Defence Force, which is currently operating on a non-unified command system within a southern African context. It will seek to make recommendations on restructuring the Zambia Defence Force. Therefore, the purpose of this literature review is to present clear and coherent evidence designed to build the foundation for proving the need for a unified command system in Zambia. Constitutionally in democratic countries, the ultimate authority and responsibility for national defence rests with the President deemed as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. However, this may differ from one government system to another. Nevertheless, the military command-and-control structures must adapt to the environment in which they operate. Following World War II, most defence forces evolved to meet the conditions of the postwar era. Military structures evolved accordingly, placing particular emphasis on establishing a task-oriented approach to unity of command.²¹ Therefore the central emphasis of most schools of thought

²¹ Lt Col Edward F. Martginetti, USAF, “Déjà vu: The Unified Command Plan of the Future Revisited” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011), abstract.

focuses on the ultimate importance of unified commands based on previous experiences in wars and campaigns.

This literature review starts with a discussion of the Small Nations concept and the need for restructuring to meet contemporary threats. It then draws ideas of how other militaries the world over have moved toward unified commands and also discusses the importance of a unified command system drawing insights from previous operations and campaigns. In this aspect, it focuses on the U.S military as a super power and how it was compelled to adopt unified command shortly after World War II. It further draws lessons from the Israeli structure considering its unique threat situation and further on other regional neighbors' structures along unified command lines.

Concept of Small Nations

Some scholars have stated that smaller nations, when structuring their military, tend to copy other great nations. This copying is usually based on their pre-colonial structure, advice from great nations, the source of their military professional education and lastly their level of reliance on foreign resources for their military equipment. For all these reasons, military forces of small nations typically are not suitably structured to meet the defence needs of the nation. One category of small nations is one with a large land space and a large population, but a poor economy. For this category, raising a big army is not the best solution for the security of such a nation. Firstly, most likely a big army will be ill-equipped. Therefore, this will render a big army ineffective against a small, but well equipped adversary. Secondly, the financing of a big army puts a heavy burden on the national budget of a small nation and therefore adversely affects national security,

especially in peacetime periods.²² Zambia falls into this category. It is also true that despite attempts to unify it, the Zambia Defence Force still maintains a non-unified command system which it adopted from the British colonialists at independence in 1964. Since Zambia is a small nation, it needs a small, but well trained and unified Defence Force. Another option would be to have strong allies who can quickly come to its aid.

Possible Security Challenges to Zambia

Both local and International sources have reviewed their perspective of possible threats that can emanate from within the nation and the surrounding region. Internal threats include crime, possible revolutionary movements, prospects of terrorism and *coups d'états*, while external threats include border disputes and the possible spillage of the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Internal threats

One of the current notable threats is the possible uprising in Zambia's western province. The western part of Zambia, and surrounding areas known as Barotseland (after the Barotse, or Lozi people), has experienced spates of violence related to a separatist movement (*Linyungandambo*).²³ The reality of this threat is also seen in views expressed by activities in online media. For example, separatists have indicated that since the time Barotseland resolved to revert to its original status as a sovereign state on 27th March

²² LTC Ahmed Khamis Al Hameli, UAE AF, "Defence Alternative for the Small Nations" (Research Report, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1989), 33.

²³ Military Periscope, "Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions, Africa—Zambia," accessed 22 December 2014, <https://www.militaryperiscope.com/nations/africa/zambia/organzn/index.html>.

2012, the Zambian government has used force and arrested Barotseland nationals on politically engineered cases.²⁴ The *Linyungandambo* movement has many times stated that the movement will continue to fight for the independence of Barotseland.²⁵ This movement poses a threat to the nation as it is possible to turn violent and or even get external support. Also weapons from previous conflict zones in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola, which find their way in and out of Zambia, should never be overlooked as a possible factor which can contribute to possible violence in the country.²⁶

The other internal threat is a military coup d'état. This topic is always reluctantly discussed, but it remains a fact that has threatened Zambia's democracy several times before and in all situations the defence force was at odds to deal with the coup due to lack of coordination. Unconstitutional ways to change the government despite not being successful have not spared Zambia. The Zambia military, unlike its counter parts elsewhere in Africa, has been able to defeat any efforts to change the government through illegal means. The 1990 and 1997 military coup attempts in Zambia represent inadequate attempts to analyse the socio-political and economic challenges that faced the country.²⁷

²⁴ Barotse Post, "Petition to the International Community for Release of all Barotseland Nationals Arrested and Jailed on Barotseland," accessed 22 January 2015, <http://www.barotsepost.com/>.

²⁵ Barotse Post, "A Barotseland Cry for 2015," accessed 22 January 2015, <http://www.barotsepost.com/>.

²⁶ IHS Jane's, "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-Southern Africa: Executive Summary, Zambia," 5 November 2014, accessed 6 January 2015, www.ihs.com, 1.

²⁷ Naison Ngoma, "Coups and Coup Attempts in Africa," accessed June 5, 2015, <http://www.issafrika.org/pubs/asr/13No3/ENgoma.htm>.

Nevertheless, these military coup d'état attempts could have failed due to the commitment of the Zambia defense and security forces to democratic ideals.²⁸ With an economy not yet performing as well as it used to in the 1960s and 1970s when the country's resource base (copper) was at its highest, coup d'état led with myriad social and political demands, the needs of the Zambia military are not always met.²⁹ It would be a mistake to overlook it, hence the need for a coordinated means of dealing with such threats.

The increasing presence of illegal immigrants from the Horn of African is another possible threat that also includes the prospects of terrorism. Although Zambia has never experienced a terrorist attack such threats should never be overlooked.

External threat

Zambia is also affected by the conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR). The GLR of central Africa, one of the world's most war-torn areas, faces ongoing violence incited by a turbulent political history of nearly 50 years. Conflict in the Great Lakes region is prone to transcend and spread rapidly beyond borders. Zambia shares borders with the DRC and fears its insulation from violence will wear thin as conflict erupts in DRC as well as in Burundi.³⁰

²⁸ Lungu and Ngoma, 322.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 325.

³⁰ William Walter, "Blurry Borders: Violent Conflict Threatens Zambia," *Harvard International Review* 25, no. 4 (Winter 2004): abstract, accessed July 5, 2015, <https://www.questia.com/read/1g1-112984248/Blurry-Borders-Violent-Conflict-Threatens-Zambia>.




Figure 4. Map of Rebel groups in DRC

Source: WordPress.com, “A Rebel Quagmire for South African Troops,” accessed June 6, 2015, <https://developmentdaily.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/graphic-drc2.jpg>. accessed Graphics: John McCann Map info.OXFAM.

Further, the 1994 Rwandese genocide still affects Zambia in terms of refugees. Zambia’s borders are now in jeopardy as Hutu expatriates flee the Democratic Republic of Congo. With the distrust running high, Hutus are reluctant to comply with Rwanda’s orders to return. This resistance could become the impetus for Rwanda to mobilize Tutsi forces in Zambia. However, the country cannot succumb to a false sense of security. Zambia’s nascent democracy does not ensure immunity to the regional threats festering in the DRC. Violence in Zambia is distinctly possible, if not imminent. More than 30, 000

defecting soldiers of the Rwandan Hutu regime have since retreated to Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, hence making the region a prone to future conflict.³¹

Other sources argue that no nation is poised to challenge Zambia militarily. However Zambia faces a potential threat to its territorial integrity along its southern border, where it converges with Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The limits of each country at that juncture remain poorly defined. Similarly, there is no specific threat of terrorism against Zambia. There have been several attacks in different areas of nearby Kenya and Tanzania, however, including the coordinated bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam that occurred on 7 August 1998 illuminating the potential danger of similar acts of violence throughout East Africa. Nevertheless, Zambia is party to four of the twelve international conventions and protocols pertaining to terrorism.³² All in all, Zambia has possible threats both internally and externally.

Other Unified Commands

United States of America

Military commanders in history have emphasized the importance of lessons learned by the US which drove it towards unification of its services. There was no doubt in almost all generals that future conflicts involving the U.S would be fought with joint forces,³³ as indeed it has been seen in modern conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 1946

³¹ Walter, abstract.

³² Country Watch, “Zambia National Security,” accessed 22 November 2014, http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.aspx?type=text&vcountry=189&topic=PONAS.

³³ GEN Paul F. Gorman, “Toward a Stronger Defence Establishment,” in *Defence Reform Debate*, ed. Asa A. Clark IV, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and James W. Reed (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 295.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the importance of unity of military effort. The effort to unify the US military had legal backing through the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 which amended the National Security Act of 1947. It is for this reason in 1958 President Eisenhower decided to establish a more unified and streamlined chain of command to employ US combat forces thus, in essence essentially putting an end to separate land, sea, and air combat organizations.³⁴ From the onset, Eisenhower emphasized the need and importance for unified command even at tactical level when he stated:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.³⁵

He further stressed on instituting a workable system to address all US security requirements based on jointness and unity. “When you have kept services apart and you wait until men are fifty before they begin to meet and know much about each other, it is pretty difficult to develop a united team.”³⁶ In the same vein, it is stated that despite the service differences, the US Air Force also agreed that ultimately unity of command was important for the national good. For example, by 1984 U.S air doctrine indicated that unity of command, combined with common doctrine, obtains unity of effort by the

³⁴ CDR Richard G. Catoire, USN, “A CINC for Africa is It Time to Rethink the Unified Command Plan?” (Strategic Research Project, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1999), 14.

³⁵ Gorman, 295.

³⁶ David Jablonsky, “Eisenhower and the Origins of Unified Command,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000): 24-31.

coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be obtained by cooperation, it is best achieved by giving a single commander full authority.³⁷ Among the results of such thoughts was the creation of the Unified Command Plan of the US in 1946.³⁸ It is worth noting that adjustments have been taking place to the UCP such as the recent creation of AFRICOM, but the principle of unified system remains unchanged. Similarly, it is argued that a visible, organized, and positive command and control system is a primary requisite for success. Because the military is federalized, and therefore operates under a centralized authority, it is able to designate an overall single commander for any operation.³⁹

To accomplish theater military objectives in support of national policy requires a coherent approach to war fighting. Such an approach involves a detailed knowledge of warfare that includes military history, service doctrine, tactics, and the capabilities of one's own forces. History suggests that an important aspect to this approach is a unified command structure in which a single commander controls all forces assigned to a theater for operations. A unified command structure will permit combat power to be effectively directed toward an objective

³⁷ Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the US Air Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1984), 2-8.

³⁸ Combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defence and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, XVI; Andrew Feickert, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R542077, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2013), 8.

³⁹ Douglas R. Templeton, "Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory in a Unified Command Environment at Catastrophic Incidents" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2005), abstract.

and redirected in response to contingency requirement, thus ensuring concentration of combat power against the enemy and increased flexibility.⁴⁰

Throughout history, the militaries have realized that unity of effort and unity of command are vitally important when understanding joint military operations. The lessons learned over the history of unified command can provide valuable suggestions for unifying a nation's national security strategy.⁴¹

For the US, the drive for unification of the US armed services is by no means a new phenomenon as other writers trace it back to the Spanish-American War when great dissatisfaction arose because of the failure of the Army and Navy to cooperate fully during the Cuban Campaign.⁴² Others say that the origins of the unification of the US military is rooted in World War II. After that war, US leaders took advantage of the lessons learned in both theaters of operations and started initiating a series of legislative changes. The experience of World War II provided countless lessons attesting to the importance of unity of military effort achieved through a unified command. This fact is also admitted by the Air War College as it was the first time the US used the unified approach to war fighting.⁴³ Thus, when World War II started the US did not possess a unified command structure. In the event of war, the services were expected to cooperate

⁴⁰ Col Thomas A. Cardwell III, "The Quest for Unity of Command," *Air University Review* (May-June 1984), accessed 25 February 2015, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/cardwell.html>.

⁴¹ Martginetti, abstract.

⁴² Colonel Harry E. Colestock, III, USAF, "Developing a Unified Command Plan," *Air University Review* (May-June 1998): 172.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 5.

voluntarily; this was known as a doctrine of mutual cooperation. Zambia is currently following this similar doctrine of mutual cooperation.

To address this pressing need, they established what is known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the appropriate Combatant Commands (COCOMs). The UCP developed and was accepted slowly. Nevertheless, since the inception of the UCP, and associated Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the UPC has provided operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces, and had a significant impact on how they are organized, trained, and resourced.⁴⁴

Britain

Britain has had a non-unified command in the past as well, which is the reason that Zambia adopted the same system on independence. However, Britain has since made adjustments to ensure joint command. During the process of unification, it is always advised that top leaders should not put their own interests ahead of those of the country.⁴⁵

For the case of Britain it is stated that:

After decades of chronic under-funding, they will conclude, it was inevitable that a small country such as Britain could no longer afford the luxury of maintaining independent command structures for its Army, Navy and Air Force. With defence spending slashed from 5 per cent of GDP at the end of the Cold War to just 2 per cent by 2011, the individual Services had already been reduced to such a parlous state that they could barely carry out even the most basic military tasks.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Feickert, 2.

⁴⁵ Con Coughlin, "It's Time for Britain to Merge its Army, Navy and Air Force," *Telegraph*, 2011, accessed 2 February 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/concoughlin/8607083/Its-time-for-Britain-to-merge-itsArmy-Navy-and-Air-Force.html>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Based on this point of view, it is easy to see why, rather than simply looking to reorganize the command structure of the Armed Forces, it was decided to simply merge the three services into a single establishment. This, in a way, began to lessen the inter-service in fighting. Instead of fighting about which service was to fly combat aircrafts, pilots would simply be drawn from Britain's unified command. Similarly, the wrangles over who would control the attack helicopter was solved.⁴⁷ Currently, Britain has four services; British Army, Royal Air Force (RAF), Royal Navy (RN), and the Joint Force Command, all coordinated under the Chief of Defence Staff.

Rwanda

The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) is another unified command which has drawn lessons from conflict. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) was previously a liberation force known as the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA). Law No 19/2002 of 17/05/2002 renamed the RPA as the Rwanda Defence Force. Since 2002, the RDF adopted a Joint Structure with a Chief of Defence Staff at the helm of its Defence Force. He is the Joint Commander. The structure and force design offer flexibility required to respond to a variety of contingencies.⁴⁸ (See figure 5).

⁴⁷ Coughlin.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defence, "Rwanda Defence Force," accessed 6 February 2015, <http://mod.gov.rw/about-the-rdf/rwanda-defence-force/>.



Figure 5. RDF Structure

Source: Ministry of Defence, “Rwanda Defence Force,” accessed 6 February 2015, <http://mod.gov.rw/about-the-rdf/rwanda-defence-force/>.

With this structure, the RDF has performed extremely well in the fight against rebel forces in the DRC. It has also earned a good name in maintaining a coordinated professional approach towards United Nations peace keeping assignments.

India

To ensure a high degree of synergy between the armed forces, the Indian Government has set up the Integrated Defence Staff, headed by the Chief of Integrated Staff as the Chairman. It was created on 1 October 2001 based on the recommendations of the Group of Ministers which was set up in 2000 (post Kargil) to review India's defence management. This system acts as the point organization for integration of policy, doctrine, war fighting and procurement by employing best management practices.⁴⁹ The tri-series command in operation is currently under review towards a unified command

⁴⁹ Wikipedia, “Ministry of Defence, Indian Defence Forces,” accessed 26 February 2015, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Defence_\(India\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Defence_(India)).

system. It is argued that this will put a stop to inter-service rivalries and lack of coordination between the government and the armed forces.⁵⁰

Challenges to Unified Command System in General

Even though unified command is important, it is argued that unifying the military apparatus has its own challenges and that jointness is an extremely difficult and complex subject involving organizations with different interests. Unifying the military faces challenges such as the natural struggle over autonomy. Military unification to any degree must address the distinct and enduring character of each service.⁵¹ Naturally most of the countries that possess unified commands have had to go through various difficulties between its services. For example, during unification of the US military, the Army favored a strong unification plan, the Air Force was in favor of centralization because it would be raised to the status of an independent service, while the Navy resisted centralization, principally because it feared control of the fleet by unified commanders of the other services who might not understand sea power.⁵² Similarly, the unification of the British Armed Forces into a single entity put a stop to such counter-productive squabbling, and provides Britain with the with fighting capabilities. Senior officers

⁵⁰ You Tube, “Special Report 2014 India Military,” assessed 26 February 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhexzi56ita>.

⁵¹ LTC Robert E. Durbin, Sr., “Unifying-The Military Services–A Joint Challenge” (Fellowship Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996), abstract.

⁵² Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), 373-374.

previously put self-interest above the national interest being a military that Britain could no longer afford.⁵³

Solutions to challenges

To most difficulties there is a search for solutions. Scholars have expressed ideas and concepts to address problems faced during the unification of military command structures. It is argued that jointness represents an inefficient compromise between two schools of thought: on one hand, complete unification of the military and on the other, maintaining a service-centric structure.⁵⁴ There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that will be faced for not doing so.⁵⁵ Other challenges and arguments come about due to differences in equipment, doctrine, attitude, and outlook stemming from past experience. Past successes however, have shown that these difficulties can be overcome through determination and workable procedures. Experience also shows that corrective steps have been achieved only after many failures in battle.⁵⁶

Conclusion

This chapter has given an insight of what other authors have expressed on this subject, particularly how are small nation with a weak economy like Zambia can consider

⁵³ Coughlin.

⁵⁴ Robert P. Kozloski, "Building the Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness," *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 42.

⁵⁵ Colestock, 276.

⁵⁶ Irving B. Holley, Jr., "A Retrospect on Close Air Support," in *Excerpt from Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support*, ed. Benjamin F. Cooley (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 52.

adjustments to its defence forces, and the possible security threats that may shape its organization. It has also drawn views from the historical perspective of other unified command, the challenges they faced and the solutions applicable to the challenges. These aspects are factored into the research methodology in order to establish the implications of a non-unified command system and the need for Zambia to adopt a unified command system.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of the Zambia Defence Force having a non-unified command system and the potential need for Zambia to adopt a unified system. The survey methodology and rationale for using a combination of qualitative and survey design for collecting information is described in this chapter. More details on qualitative data are given focusing on lessons learned by other nations with unified commands, while details for survey design are also provided with regard to demographics, population sampling and survey administration. This chapter further discusses the procedure that was followed to ensure protection of privacy due to the use of a questionnaire.

The primary research question was based on considering the need for unified effort in times of conflict: Does Zambia need to unify its Zambia Defence Forces? To answer this question, the research solicited data from written sources and both serving and retired members of the Zambia Defence Forces based on the following secondary themes:

1. Impact the lack of a unified command in the Zambia Defence Force will have in case of a major conflict.
2. Impediments to establishing a unified command structure in Zambia.
3. Political developments that prompted the shift of the system of command in Zambia.

4. Regional threat developments that prompted the shift of the system of command in Zambia.
5. Joint doctrine, training, and acquisition aspects.
6. Zambia civil-military dynamics.
7. Advantages and disadvantages of unified command.
8. Experiences from other campaigns.

Qualitative Methodology

Qualitative research is among the main approaches to research methodology in social sciences. It involves an in-depth understanding of the human factor and relies on reasons for particular behaviors. It focuses on why and how decisions were made as opposed to a quantitative methodology which answers the what, when and where types of question. In this research, qualitative data was obtained from open sources, media, individuals, images among others. As such, the qualitative method was the primary means of data collecting and analysis.

Selection Criteria and Explanation

In developing the analysis, this method focused on a number of factors particularly answering the research questions. To start with it is an in-depth look at the need of constitutionalizing the defence structures based on the current laws in Chapter 106, Defence Act of the Laws of Zambia, and compared to those of other nations. In this regard, it analyzes how the legal frame work affects the military structure looking at the example of the Kenyan Defence Forces. Similarly, using literature from the University of Zambia, it analyzes the civil military relations within the Zambian political structure,

setup from independence to date, and how this has influenced its military structures. Consequently, an analysis of factors which lead to other nations unifying their militaries, focusing on a historical evaluation of how and why these nations adopted unified command systems was conducted using available literature. The commonly identified factors discussed in chapter 2 include the need to end inter-service rivalry, need for coherent approach to war fighting, past failures of services to cooperate, need for common doctrine and the advantages that a unified system brings to a nation's defence forces.

Furthermore, the current Zambia structure is analyzed based on information drawn from an online questionnaire survey. The survey incorporated qualitative open ended comment boxes to give opportunities to provide additional information to help understand the respondents' perspective. This gave the researcher a clearer insight into the Zambia system from the respondents' perspective having served in both unified and non-unified systems. Lastly, advantages and disadvantages are analyzed to determine the strategic and operational implications of having a non-unified system of command.

The Survey

The survey research model used is as described by Rea and Parker (2005) in *Designing and Conducting Survey Research: A Comprehensive Guide*. This model was considered important because, "as a research technique in social sciences and professional disciplines, survey research has derived considerable credibility from its wide spread acceptance and use in academic institutions"⁵⁷ Advantages include; the

⁵⁷ Louis M. Rea and Richard A. Parker, *Designing and Conducting Survey Research: A Comprehensive Guide* (San Diego, CA: Wiley, 2005), 3.

ability to solicit self-reported information and generalization of data for analysis. As such, a self-administered online survey technique using a web-based design was chosen for this research as an addition to available literature. Additionally, the confidentiality insured by this method allowed participants to express their views with little fear. Survey questions and responses are in Annex B.

Demographics and Population Sampling

The survey provided options for all three military services in Zambia; Army, Air Force, and National Service, as well as Defence Force civilian employees, to participate. Nevertheless, only the two major services, Army and Air Force participated. Within the two services, the demographics included: branch of service, years of service, and operational experience. This study was conducted at the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). However, because the survey centered on Zambia, the population selected for this study was a random small selection from Zambia Defence Forces Officers and Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) via online means. Of the forty (40) participants invited, twenty eight (28) took part representing 66 percent and 33 percent response rates respectively. (See figure 6).




Figure 6. Service Representation Chart

Source. Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

Table 1. Summary of Survey No 15-02-014 Participation

CATEGORY	ARMY	AIR FORCE
Total participants	20	08
Above 20 years of service	06	03
9 to 20 Years of service	14	05
Operational Experience	13	04
No Operational Experience	04	01
Joint training experience	10	04
No joint training experience	10	02

Source: Created by author.

Protection of Human Rights

A request to conduct research within oversight of the United States Army's CGSC was submitted and it is attached as an appendix. Confidentiality for the participants was ensured. There was no requirement to determine who completed the survey or to communicate with the respondents. However, the participants were given an e-mail address to request a copy of the final results.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter provided the research questions, design, methodology and rationale used in this research. It utilized a qualitative approach from written materials and a qualitative survey. It discussed how the written materials were used and how the survey was conducted in general.

Chapter 4 provides abridged survey data results. Therefore, chapter 4 analysis will focus on the following aspects: Lessons Learned and factors by other nations; advantages of unified command over non –unified; current coordination and cooperation of the Zambia system in joint operations and training; negative implications of the current system; political/economic implications (law/budget); and the desire for change.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of the Zambia's current command system and to determine if there is a need for Zambia to adopt a unified system. As already stated, Zambia currently manages its defense force through a non-unified command structure in which the Army, Air Force and National Service all report directly to the President who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This system so far has faced a number of challenges which need to be addressed. Despite the Zambia command system appearing unified from a perspective of the services working together very well in peace time, it has also shown major challenges within the context of coordination, logistics, common standards, and command and control.

To present the data through those responding to the survey and supported by literature review, this chapter is organized into 10 parts structured on answering the research questions, starting with the general perspective of the primary question of what Zambia's implications of a non-unified system are and whether it needs to adopt a unified system. The findings further presents data answering the secondary questions as they relate to the Zambia Defence Forces.

Q. What Factors Point to Zambia's Need for a Unified System of Command?

To answer this primary question of whether the Zambia Defence Force needs to change from a non-unified command to a unified one, this chapter brings out the findings of this research and the survey with regard to a desire for change, the need for joint

doctrine and coordination, political/civil military dynamics, the advantages of a unified system, impediments to unification, prevailing threats and the lessons learned by other nations unifying their militaries. These factors are supported through answers to the secondary questions focusing on the theme of having a structure suitable to face the challenge of a future major conflict or crisis.

Q. How have regional threats prompted the Zambian Government to shift its system of command?

In considering how regional threat developments prompted the shift of the system of command in Zambia, it has been noted that at previous points in Zambian history, conflict circumstances, such as the liberation struggles of southern Africa in the mid-1970s which made Zambia a military target⁵⁸ and the 1990 attempted military takeover, forced the Zambia Defence Force to seek a unified command system. Since peace is never permanent and the future can never be accurately predicted, it is important that a nation's security structure is suitable for all challenges. In this regard, a nation must be proactive in preparing its military for current and future missions. Bellamy observed that:

Across Africa, the critical missing ingredients (in terms of security) is not a lack of funding, training, or critical equipment. Of course, many African militaries (and police forces) are chronically under resourced and staffed by underpaid and demoralized personnel. But these shortages are symptoms of a deeper flaw, which is the reluctance of many Africa government to undertake urgently needed reforms of their security forces.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Lungu and Ngoma, 319.

⁵⁹ William M. Bellamy, "African Security: Time for a Change in Doctrine," in *CSIS: Africa in the Wider World, A Report of the CSIS Africa Program*, ed. Richard Downie (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, July 2014), 5.

Indeed Zambia has not been and is still not immune from internal and external threats. Despite enjoying a relatively secure environment, Zambia has faced both internal and external threats, but these threats have had little impact on changes to the military structure. However, it is clear that the liberation wars and military coup d'état threat both forced Zambia to try to unify its forces. Unified command is considered a game changer as it provides a nation's military the ability to more effectively analyze its joint war fighting capabilities. In this regard, some survey respondents commented that 'Zambia needs to adopt the command system like other major countries. Perhaps we have never been faced with a major crisis to see how unified command can produce more effective and efficient results without antagonizing each other? There is too much competition amongst the services which is not healthy for the country and this can be minimized by having a unified command and control system.'⁶⁰

Q. How have political developments prompted the shift of the system of command in Zambia?

Civil military dynamics, as used here, are considered in terms of both the political system and the legislative systems and how they impact on military structural adjustments. Firstly, the question of how political developments impacts the shift of the system of command and control in Zambia was answered by analyzing the civil military relations. Civil military relations can be viewed from a broad perspective. Here, it is considered with regards to the military being subject to civil authorities, how changes in the political systems affect the military and the need to have an improved working system

⁶⁰ Survey No. 15-02-014, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 February-24 March 2015.

within a unified command system. As such, the civil military relationship has a bearing on unified command in many aspects. It has been found that Zambia's two attempts to unify its system happened during the one party participatory democracy era. Since the coming of a multi-party democratic system, there has been little civil authority effort to make any meaningful changes to the military structure as all efforts seem to have been directed towards economic and social growth only. Furthermore, it has been observed that support to the liberation wars, which brought about the first and second unification efforts, were both influenced to some extent by political factors, as such the adoption of a unified command system was also supported by a strong political will.

Q. How has *Zambian civil-military dynamics* affected the creation of a unified command?

Understanding the legitimization of the Defence Force structure also answered the question as to how *Zambia civil-military dynamics* affect the creation of a unified command. Any military structure needs constitutional backing. Law makers will always play a key role as they decide the size of the military and have control of the budget that sustains the military. The Zambia Defence Force was established at independence in 1964 by the order of the Defence Act, Chapter 131 of the laws of Zambia, section 4(1) of which currently is Chapter 106. Section 165 empowers the President to appoint an Army and Air Force commander and as such, it stipulates separate command and control of the services. Even though Zambia has adopted a unified system before, the law was never amended in that respect; this could be one of the reasons for failure of this system. To date, the law regarding unified command has not be amended, even though efforts are being made to change this law. These efforts are being made through an on-going

Constitution Review Process to review the Defence Act (Chapter 106), particularly Section 165, to include, the authority of the President to appoint a Chief of Defence Force (CDF) or a Chairman of the joint staff from either service

Q. What factors have made most nations unify their Defence Forces?

Reviewing the processes other nations went through to adopt unified commands answered the question as to what factors led most nations to unify their defence forces. The brief historical perspective of Britain, U.S, Rwanda and India brought out the factors that these nations considered in the process. For example, British failures during the Crimean War caused the British to look towards the German General Staff system in effect during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. This review led the British to initiate military reform programs and the introduction in 1923 of the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the leadership of what is now termed as Chief of Defence Staff. Similarly, the U.S adopted a Unified Command structure after lessons learned from its coordination challenges in World War II. To underpin the criticality of jointness and coordination, General Dwight D Eisenhower remarked "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements with all services as one single concentrated force."⁶¹ To date, this is the means by which both British and American militaries exercise the higher direction of war. Therefore, war and conflicts have shown the importance of coordination between services through a unified command system. These are arguably the reasons that most of the militaries in the world have adopted unified command systems, and are but a few

⁶¹ Feickert, 2.

examples among many others. Similarly, survey respondents also stressed the need for Zambia to follow suit. There is need for joint command in the Zambian military. We cannot continue working as independent entities, unified command will put all our efforts together and enhance our capabilities and streamline the operating procedures. Gone are the days when army used to fight independent from the Air Force ⁶²

Q. What are the advantages of a unified command over a non-unified command system?

The literature review and survey responses have helped to analyze the advantages as compared to disadvantage, hence answering the question whether a unified system is better than that of a non-unified system of command. In Zambia's particular case, the survey, through open ended comments, brought out a number of disadvantages with a non-unified system. Issues of services discrepancies in procurement and logistical aspects, differences in general standards among the services, challenges of interoperability and poor coordination during joint activities, are among the identified disadvantages of the current Zambia's non-unified command system. Other disadvantages identified include the possibility of the redundancy of service chiefs reporting similar issues to the commander in chief. There is also the issue of a general lack of a sense of belonging to the defence force that was associated with a non-unified command. In the same vein, responses stated that due to lack of a unified system, Zambia's current trend is to form a Joint Task force to deal with a particular situation when the need arises. However, this option has its own implications which are discussed in the next chapter.

⁶² Survey No. 15-02-014.

Any system of command has its advantages and disadvantages, however, in this regard they were weighed against each other. There are many other factors that come into play, in line with strategic objectives, before deciding to adopt a particular system. However, in terms of unity of effort, integration, efficient utilization of resources, streamlining command structure, increasing organizational ability, and standardization among the services, a unified command outweighs a non-unified system. The unity of command that can be achieved will result in a significant enhancement of the force effectiveness during joint operations. In support of this the survey indicate that ‘the Whole is made up of parts and the parts need central coordination center to work effectively and efficiently.’⁶³ This is the idea of a joint headquarters.

Q. How well can coordination be achieved
in case of a major conflict?

The Zambia Defence Force can be commended for protecting and defending the nation’s sovereignty, democracy and constitution. Furthermore, Zambia has on several times been surrounded by civil wars in the neighboring countries of Mozambique and Angola, and currently the ongoing conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Undoubtedly, the Zambia Defence Forces has done extremely well in protecting Zambia’s borders and preventing these conflicts from crossing into its territory. Similarly, Zambian soldiers have always been commended for their performance and professionalism in United Nations and African Union peace operations. However, these situations do not give the Defence Force much opportunity for joint operations among the services. Therefore this situation makes the current command system, and the concept of

⁶³ Survey No. 15-02-014.

cooperation, appear effective, but still leaves us with the question of whether coordination can be achieved in case of a major conflict or a national challenge that may require the effort of a prepared joint force.

This was also answered through a series of examples. For instance, during the 1997 military coup d'état, there were no air assets provided for quick deployment of Special Forces who quelled the attempted overthrow even though these assets were available. In the same vein, there is a general feeling among officers and men that the few joint operations and training conducted have highlighted that coordination seems to be a challenge. This was shown by the 61.54 percent who indicated that joint operations/training are “somewhat coordinated” when answering the question about how well their recent joint activities were coordinated? (See figure 7).




Figure 7. Responses on coordination. Response Rate: 51% (N=26)

Source. Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

It is difficult to judge how effective the defence force would be in times of national challenge due to lack of data points on which to base any decision. Others feel that a decade of peace makes the nation feel that all is well and that exercises are not well coordinated due to the fact that we seem to have different doctrines and are not familiar with the way other services operate. Each service has its own umbilical cord.⁶⁴ However, a nation does not need to wait for war or crisis in order to appreciate the importance of unified command or to be compelled into adopting it.

Q. What is the general feeling of Defence Force members with regards to unification?

The survey brought out the answer as to what the general feeling among members of the ZDF is towards unification. It is important to understand that this desire comes from way back in history. Also it must be noted that this desire is based on the reviewed literature and the survey conducted. Granted the survey has few data points, but the few data points are relatively concentrated. As already discussed in chapter 2 on Zambia attempting to unify its defence force, the merits of a unified command system seem to have long been identified, hence the several previous attempts made to unify the defence force. The survey (No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015) indicates that most members feel there is a need for unified command due to the challenges of mobilization, joint training, inter-service cooperation and interoperability. However, from the responders, 22 percent still feel that the current status quo is working well. For instance, some senior officers within the system commented that while it is in the best interest of mission accomplishment to unify the command structure of the services, the current

⁶⁴ Survey No. 15-02-014.

system in Zambia is working just fine. Unity of command would still be achieved through the experience of previous joint exercises. They felt that the current command structure is best suited for the services in that once called upon for a joint task, cooperation is commendable.”⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the desire for and importance of a unified command was reflected in the fact that some elements are already operating under a unified concept (see figure 8).




Figure 8. ZDF current structure with unified elements

Source: Created by author.

Figure 8 reviews the good progress being made towards services working together through common user facilities such as: the Department of Defence Intelligence (DDI), Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Defence Force Medical Services (DFMS), Maina Soko Military Hospital (MSMH), School of Defence Intelligence (SDI), and Defence School of Health Sciences. All these common user

⁶⁵ Survey No. 15-02-014.

institutions have the challenges of variance in standards and conditions due to being administered by separate mother services and this brings discontent and complaints.

The desire for a unified system was further expressed by the respondents to the survey. For example, out of 22 respondents, 65.22 percent felt that there was need for unification (see figure 9). Even though there was no balanced representation of services, the analysis accounts for the respective size of the services. In this regard, the result was assumed to be a fair representative of a general feeling. It was further observed that Army respondents seem to be more inclined to unification than their Air Force counterparts. (See figures 10 and 11).

Q. Would a unified command system be better than the current system?




Figure 9. Chart on general view on unification.

Source: Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

Furthermore, comments were expressed by both service respondents with regard to a comparison of unified and non-unified systems of command (figure 10 reflects Army desire for unification).




Figure 10. Chart of army response only. (Filter applied: Match criteria: All)

Source: Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

From an Army perspective, a unified command is seemed to be beneficial to the whole Defence Force as tasks can be easily undertaken utilizing all available resources and that it would mitigate a lot of logistical challenges that individual services face. It is also said that a force fights the way it trains and that training cannot be done in the midst of war. Nevertheless, others within the army felt otherwise and believe that effectiveness is still achievable through joint exercises. These personnel also felt that the current level

of cooperation is commendable. On the other hand, Air Force personnel seemed to have a balanced view on the matter as reflected in figure 11.




Figure 11. Chart of ZAF response only. (Filter applied: Match criteria: All)

Source: Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

From the Air Force perspective, the three Services need just to conduct joint operations more often to achieve maximum coordination. However, there are still those from Air Force who still feel that Zambia needs a unified command in order to achieve better command and control. They also felt that a non-unified system only works in peace time and would fail in war time as reflected from the comments. They feel that, in case of a major conflict, for coordination's purposes unified command would be more appropriate. If command and control is vested in one person it would be easier to organize the different arms of the ZDF through the respective commanders.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Survey No. 15-02-014.

Q: To what extent has a non-unified command affected joint doctrine, training, and acquisition?

The survey also answered the question about the need for joint doctrine. This was among the issues members of the ZDF emphasized in the survey (See figure 11). Many stated that joint command and doctrine are the best option for Zambia's Defence Forces as they would enhance synergy amongst the services. Besides, activities at the various schools of instructions, particularly the Staff College, point in the direction of joint doctrine.⁶⁷ Joint doctrine and common operating procedures would help to solve many of the problems with regard to interoperability, cooperation and coordination in future joint operations. Even though there are different views on this subject, the survey indicated positive trends and a desire to have a unified command system in Zambia (See figure 12).




Figure 12. Response Rate to Need for Joint doctrine: 43% (N=22)

Source: Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

⁶⁷ Survey No. 15-02-014. See Appendix B for more comments.

Q. What are the main impediments to establishing a unified command structure in Zambia?

Having been had unified command before, and with a number of common operating institutions, what then could be impediments to complete unification? In answering this question it was important to understand that there are many more factors to consider such as political and economic, that can also be attributed as hindrances. Here the discussion is based on literature and views expressed in the survey.

To start with, it was observed that in a unified system there is always innate struggle over service autonomy. This clearly came out from senior officers who indicated that the issue of who will command is of great concern and is attributed to opposition for a unified command. In this regard, they further suggested that service concerns must be addressed from the onset. Similarly, there seems to be a natural fear by the Air Force and National Service personnel about the Army dominating a unified structure in Zambia. Even today there are some indications of this fear about service parochialism.

Furthermore, lack of pooling of service resources for common utilization and a tendency to identify resources with a particular service were also identified as a possible hindrances. Even human resource assets in the common institutions are still, to a large extent, administered by the individual services and the heads of these institutions do not have a say in the deployment/re-deployment of officers and soldiers under their command. Similarly, harmonization of procedures and staff duties has not yet been fully achieved; this has affected service integration to some extent.⁶⁸ Another aspect is the lack

⁶⁸ Florence Mulenga, “Joint Services Command: Revisiting Unified Command in the Zambia Defence Force” (Commandant’s Paper, Defence Services Command and Staff College, Lusaka, 24 October 2013), 15.

of a common doctrine which has been attributed to negative connotations towards unification.

The question of whether there would be challenges to command and control in war time under a non-unified command system was also answered. The survey indicates that 67 percent of the members feel there would be significant challenges (see figure 13). Further implications of a non-unified system of command are discussed in the next chapter.




Figure 13. Figure showing challenges in war time

Source: Survey No 15-02-014, 1 February-24 March 2015.

As reflected in figure 13, about 63 percent of the respondents felt that if the Nation faces a major security challenge, the current command and control structure could face problems. More comments on this issue in Annex B.

Summary

This chapter discussed factors that the research discovered in respect to a need for a unified command. It has answered some questions with regard to unification, of which a

country with a non-unified system, like Zambia, needs to consider. The challenges a non-unified system calls for more joint training and establishing standard operating procedures to enhance coordination. Otherwise, it would be necessary to unify the defence forces. Furthermore the chapter highlighted factors from a historical perspective of how other nations progressed to unified commands and factors which led to those decisions. Enough lessons from the world wars and other campaigns have highlighted the significance of a unified structure.

The advantages of a unified system among others include: effectively execute national military strategy; maintain a logical and unambiguous chain of command; minimize duplication except to enhance wartime survivability and endurance; balance responsibilities evenly across services; provide clear objectives and a manageable span of control for each service; and be cost-effective, flexible, and adaptable.⁶⁹ In this regard other views favor a non-unified command system.⁷⁰ However the factors discussed in this chapter prove otherwise and needs to be consideration. This chapter analyzed the data as expressed by literature as well as the survey to examine the implications of having a non-unified command system and the need to establish the need for Zambia to adopt a unified system The summary of these are factors are tabulated in table 2.

⁶⁹ Charles Robb, "Examining Alternative UCP Structures," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1996-1997): 85-93.

⁷⁰ Survey No. 15-02-014. See Appendix B for more comments.

Table 2. Summary of Aspects Favoring Unified Command Systems

SER	FACTOR	REMARKS WITH REGARD TO ZAMBIA
1	Existence of threat	Has both internal and external threats
2	Existence of political will	Political focus on economic development
3	Coop/ coordination in Joint activities	Currently not well coordinated
4	Streamlined command system	No centralized decision making
5	Joint HQ	Non existent
6	Will to change	Member desire for unification
7	Judicious utilization of resources	Not well coordinated procedures
8	Espirit de corps	Too much service competitions
9	Constitutional requirement	Currently favors non unified command

Source; Created by Author.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Introduction

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of the Zambia Defence Force having a non-unified command system and to determine if there is a need for Zambia to adopt a unified system. The term unified command applies to multiple contexts and is used by several disciplines, including emergency response. This thesis applies the term as it is commonly used within the military. In this context, it is a system of command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more military departments/services that is established and so designated by the President (law).⁷¹ However, for the purpose of this thesis, and in case of Zambia, a unified command system refers to the centralized command, control and coordination of the Defence Force by a joint headquarters under one overall commander with a joint staff from all services. This system would not take away service autonomy of administrative and operational responsibilities, but would be established to synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate activities of the three services in accordance with national and strategic policy to achieve unity of command and effort towards common national strategic objectives. In the same vein, the term joint refers to those activities, operations, and organizations which involve elements of more than one service.

⁷¹ Rubicon Planning, “Military Terms and Definitions.”

This chapter is organized in three parts beginning with the interpretation of the findings described in chapter 4 followed by recommendations and a summary. It brings out the author's interpretation of the meanings and implications of historical aspects of lessons learned, civil military relations, current trends, regional threats and the general views of members of the Zambian Defence Force to come up with conclusions and recommendations. Other factors include political and economic aspects (constitutional/budgetary), advantages of a unified command, possible threats, and the desire for change. It ends with implications of the current system in case of a major incident.

In chapter 4, it has become clear that any military structure must be embedded within a constitutional framework and that the Zambian parliament is considering amending the Defence Act Cap 106. It has further been found that there are already common user institutions within the ZDF that work jointly. Further, Zambia, just like any other nation, still has both internal and external threats. Chapter 4 also brought out various advantages associated with unified command system as viewed from experience. Generally it has also been found that despite working well, ZDF members feel there is need for a joint headquarters and doctrine. Finally, chapter 4 discussed impediments to unification.

Interpretation of the Findings

Constitutionalizing the Defence structure

The ultimate control of the nation's defence force as a military instrument of power rests with the head of state, in most cases referred to as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), of the Armed Forces through the constitution. In this regard, any defence force

structure and organization must be in accordance with the constitution. For example, the U.S had to amend several acts such as the National Security Act of 1947, DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 and the Goldwater-Nichols, DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.⁷² Military power, organization, command and control must therefore be anchored in law.

As discussed in chapter four, there is no law that supports a unified command system in Zambia. However, it is important that this matter be discussed to look at areas of different interests in order to satisfy all stakeholders. Therefore, any changes or reorganization of the ZDF should require both political and military officials to start with considering the constitutional requirements. An example can be drawn from the Kenyan Defence Act. Kenya was also a British colony just like Zambia, but they realized the need for unified command and made amendments to the Defence Act (See Appendix A). It is interesting to note that in the case of Zambia the National Service, despite being a well-trained military force and part of the defence forces in many aspects, falls under separate legislation, particularly the ZNS Act Chapter 121.⁷³ These are among the aspects which require streamlining within the context of a unified command if Zambia is to move forward with unification of its military power.

Political connotations

It has been described that efforts are being made to unify the Defence Force, but with resistance from the other services and little political will. The current defence force

⁷² Catoire, 2.

⁷³ John Ndhlovu, “Memory Lane: Zambia National Service 50 years Down the Line,” *ZANASE News Magazine* 14 (July 2014): 9.

organization has much to do with the political system going back to the colonial era. These structures, which the British colonial system left, favored a non-unified system since independence was attained with very little bloodshed. Similarly, the current peace that Zambia has enjoyed also tends to favour a non-unified system. As such, there seems to be little need or interest for defence reorganization as the political system seems to be more concerned with economic and social development. Nevertheless, any meaningful economic and social development needs to be well protected and anchored upon an effective defence force. Otherwise, a simple crisis can turn things backwards as the situation has been in most war torn countries. Furthermore, political appeasement of the electorate has also contributed to the current status quo. Politicians have not seen the need for a bloated defence force at the expense of projects that may enhance their party's chances of dominating the political landscape. Thus, defence issues have not been a priority to them. Furthermore, any changes to the defence force structure will entail adjustments to the budget to create the enlarged structure, even though this growth would only be for a joint headquarters. Funding again becomes another critical area in which civil military relations comes into play, since it will be the civil authority directing these changes.

There are also claims that there is fear within civil service system, particularly the political system, of having a four star general in charge of the whole force. This could be out of fear of military rule so as to ensure that the defense force remains submissive to the government of the day. However, this assertion was also generally observed across Africa by a CSIS report which stated that institutional fears of powerful armies have so far made many African governments dodge the need to align their security forces with the

actual threats their nations face. Thus, most African military forces continue to focus exclusively on regime protection and maintenance of public order.⁷⁴ In this regard, even though the threat of a military coup d'état is never ruled out, a well unified force is better suited to deal with such a threat. This fear could be probably attributed to lack of knowledge by politicians concerning military command systems and their implication to national security.

Equally, a unified command staff system provides for a civil military staff section (J9) which currently is absent in Zambia. This section works on improving areas regarding civil military relations and military resource needs. Currently this effort is being handled at the Ministry of Defence, but could work better if there was a dedicated section in this respect. Even so, if one service advocates for more improved civil military relations, it might be misconstrued by the others services thus exacerbating service rivalry.

Threats

The current major task of the Zambian Armed Forces is to preserve the state from any incursions by combatants from conflicts in neighboring countries. Weapons from conflicts in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Angola have flowed in and out of Zambia, where the availability of such weapons is seen as contributing to the prevalence of weapons within the country.⁷⁵ These weapons still pose as threats to some extent and are capable of destabilizing the state. Internal threats such

⁷⁴ Bellamy, 6.

⁷⁵ IHS Jane's, "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-Southern Africa: Executive Summary, Zambia," 1.

as; potential terrorism, secessionist movements such as *Linyungandambo* and *coups d'états* should be considered as well. Similarly, border disputes, water disputes and civil war in the neighboring DRC are Zambia's primary external concerns. With such threats, the nation needs to be prepared to deal with any eventuality and be able to operate as a single entity achieving a common effect through a unified command system. In this way, the state will prevent the challenges that comes with a non-unified system in such times.

Advantages of a Unified Command

Many advantages of a unified command system, over a non-unified system have been discussed. In this regard, a unified command is a straight forward means of a holistic and integrated approach to defence management through a joint headquarters. Such a system synchronizes a collective approach in developing and executing joint campaigns and major operations at the operational level. Zambia has a small defence force, as such its strength must be more developed in a professional, well trained and well-coordinated defence force taking advantage of a unified system. So, a unified command ensures efficient and effective utilization of its available resources. As discussed in the small nation's concept, a nation like Zambia with a small economy must make the best use of its meager resources. The current arrangement in Zambia makes it difficult for one service to access resources which may be available in another service. If a joint headquarters existed, this organization could better manage such national resources in consideration of other national needs.

Further advantages are that a unified command structure mitigates the redundancies of service chiefs reporting on the same matter to the President, from a purely service's point of view. A joint headquarters would present both the specific and

joint needs of each service. Even in terms of information flow, a joint HQ could be well fitted into the civil administration hierarchy presenting cross cutting matters without room for one service being side stepped. The issue of each service chief reporting directly to the Commander-In-Chief can even cause unnecessary mistrust amongst service chiefs. Having a Chief of Defence Force (CDF) as an adviser to the head of state and joint commander or chairman of joint chiefs, minimizes these trust issues. Nevertheless, the commander can still summon service chiefs for specific matters. Having a Chief of Defence Forces also ensures that the services will be held accountable to the Commander-in-Chief for the performance of their services. In short, it streamlines the military chain of command and provides efficiencies for the state thus paving possibilities for force development.

In a unified command system, there is a strong sense of belonging to the nation's defence force under one umbrella (*esprit de corps*), as the services develop a mutual relationship based on the accurate knowledge of each other's strengths and limitations. In a unified system, services bond together through joint training and exercises. In essence, this means that in unified command systems, a defence force's organizational abilities and efficiency are improved as has been seen in most modern conflicts.

The current organizational trend in Zambia of forming a task force when a situation demands may not work well in times of major conflict. This was evident in the 28 October 1997 military coup d'état during which a dissident faction attempted to take over the government. A group of soldiers and officers, under a captain, organized and armed themselves with assorted small arms, and supported by armored cars, announced that they had taken over the country. This little incident shocked the entire country and

challenged the non-unified system. There was no central decision making body and, even when the commanding officer for the commandos decided to fight the coup plotters, there were no aircraft tasked for tactical movement or support of the commandos. The State House was threatened and there were ground and Air Force assets in the immediate vicinity that were not tasked. If there had been a joint headquarters, a well-coordinated military response could have been quickly organized and coordinated to quell this coup d'état that threatened the nation's peace. In other words, in a unified system, mobilization of human resources and equipment becomes less complicated during crises.

Unified systems also ensure standardization with regard to conditions of service. In the non-unified system there will always be issues of disparity in the general administration of each services. While it is appreciated that certain conditions of service applicable to one may not apply to the other, it is important that those common conditions of service applicable to all are applied equitably. In Zambia this is an observed issue; for instance, one service is able to pay its members allowances and claims efficiently while another cannot. This situation can be perceived as if one service is better cared for than the others. Such disparities may generally bring disaffection and disgruntlement in the ranks of the other services. A CDF would be able to address these disparities by engaging legislative and policy makers and explaining the differences to them.

Another important benefit of a unified system is centralized command and control at higher levels using a joint staff system. However, the joint staff must be impartial and not biased to the service one comes from. This is evident in most of the comments addressed in the survey such as "A joint command system is required, but needs a systematic and gradual introduction to eliminate prejudices and prepare service personnel

from different services for that type of system.”⁷⁶ In a unified system, the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) will issue orders on behalf of the CDF to the services to conduct specific operations and how they will support each other. Furthermore, joint doctrine can be developed to streamline areas of focus so that service doctrine can be nested into joint doctrine. At the operational level, a commander should command all elements of the force in theatre and be able to switch resources swiftly to seek decisive results. Modern warfare requires members of all services in the defence force to plan and operate together in a joint environment. Jointness in operations is achieved through joint training in peace time. Joint training enhances inter-service cooperation, interoperability between services and command and control of the joint forces at all levels. Even so, lack of focused joint training may result in not identifying the critical vulnerability of each of the services.

Other advantages of a unified system include a common set of objectives and strategies, joint decisions by establishing a single command structure; integrated planning processes; and maintenance of unity of command. This includes: joint resources; shared planning; logistical procedures and supplies; finance functions; coordinated resource ordering; and adoption of an overall strategy or strategies with one set of objectives.⁷⁷

The desires that has been expressed by members of the ZDF to have a unified system need serious consideration, but it is equally important to consider how best the unified structure can be set up to meet the needs and concerns of all stake holders.

Furthermore, the common defence institutions discussed in chapter 4 also indicate the

⁷⁶ Survey No. 15-02-014. See Appendix B for more comments.

⁷⁷ Department of Homeland Security, ICS-300, *Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents*, September 2005, accessed 15 January 2015, http://www.in.gov/dhs/files/ICS_300_SM.pdf, 3-5.

already existing desire for unification. Even the problems and challenges that are faced in these institutions can be addressed by establishing the unified command system. These institutions reflect the importance and need for unification, as they bring out the challenges of a non-unified system in peace time. These challenges may become even more evident in times of conflict.

Lessons from Other Experiences

Unified command has come as a result of lessons learned and failures in previous campaigns. Even though there were various reasons for unifying defence forces, common factors have been observed. These factors include the need: to have the entire force able to operate in a joint environment, for common doctrine, for a coherent approach to war fighting, recognize past failures of service cooperation, to end inter service fighting/lack of coordination. Taking the U.S example, the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 came in the aftermath of the failed 1980 multi-service mission to rescue American hostages in Iran and the 1983 invasion of Grenada which featured numerous instances of poor inter-service planning and cooperation leading to renewed emphasis on jointness both in Congress and at the Pentagon⁷⁸. Even so, the general advantages that a unified command presents, and the budgetary constraints imposed on militaries, are also other factors that made other nations seek reorganization. As such, the importance of having a unified command system as a national instrument of power can never be over emphasized and Zambia needs to learn from others and not wait to learn the hard way.

⁷⁸ Cynthia A. Watson, “*Combatant Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagement* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2011), 14-15.

Impediments

The norm of unity of command is long recognized as vital during war time, but it may be difficult to implement during peace time as there will always be impediments. Even though there is likely to be the case of struggle over service autonomy in Zambia, it would not be a major problem since the services are already well defined and operate independently. The only requirement could be a joint headquarters. The service chiefs will still be able to operate within their organizational autonomy, while the joint headquarters focuses on synchronizing the capabilities of the entire defence force generated from the strengths of each service. However, from the onset there are views that the problem with a unified system that had been tried before in Zambia was that there was bias in representing all services in favour of the service from which the commander came from? This also applied to the staff at the joint headquarters; if a unified system is to work there is need to address such issues.

Another problematic issue is one service dominating the others. Literature has indicated that there is a general fear by Air Force and National Service officers that the Army, being the largest and senior service, would dominate the unified command system. This was the case also with the US military before unification.

Prior to World War II, the services operated independently and, despite lessons learned from World War I suggesting the Army and Navy needed to better communicate and plan, no real concerted effort was made to coordinate the armed forces, largely attributed to bureaucratic distrust and service rivalry. During this period, Marine Corps fears that the Army would lobby to eliminate the Marines on the grounds they were a “redundant service” as well as Army efforts to maintain control over the country’s air arm typified the climate among the services that made any meaningful reform virtually impossible.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Watson, 11.

However, all these issues can be resolved with formulation of common doctrine and standardization of procedures to guide the running of institutions that employ a unified command. Even so, unification seems to be at a slow pace because there has been little discussion about it. Even when efforts are made, the other services, Air Force and National Service, fear the Army will dominate the unified system. Also, there have been no serious discussions on this matter probably due to the low perception of a threat to the state. Lack of consideration of this matter could be attributed to individual officers' interests which may override national interests. Senior officers seem to have taken advantage of this lack of a guiding policy framework on the matter to advance their personal interests. The fact that Zambia had unified command at the height of the liberation wars indicates that this structure is necessary for the purposes of joint planning and directing the desired war effort if the need arises.

Implications of a Non-Unified Command System

Any organizational structure or command and control system may operate effectively depending on the prevailing situation. Nevertheless, this discussion looks at both strategic and operation level implications that a non-unified command system will have in case of a major conflict as compared to peacetime. For Zambia's case, to some extent, it has been observed that the services may work in harmony and cooperate in some joint activities, but the questions remains if this can still be the case in a major crisis requiring full mobilization of the nation's military resources.

To start with, currently there is no constitutional provision for any changes in times of a major conflict. As such, the current system would be applicable. Even though the Commander-in-chief may make statutory provisions, it remains that a unified system

may not work well as there is no provision for a joint staff structure and even when it is set up, everyone will be doing on-the-job training. This will present a lot of challenges in many areas at the military strategic level. Still, if the nation decides to operate with the current system there will be joint planning. Thus, the military strategic planning may not be well nested with national political objective or policy. Furthermore, decision making will likely suffer as the three service commanders are equal in status and rank as no one may be willing to receive orders from the other. Even in terms of acquisition there could be challenges as currently each of the services are doing a separate process though through MOD. In short, command and control, coordination, planning and acquisition of resources will be difficult at the military strategic level and this may transcend down to operational and tactical levels.

Zambia's military schools have put much emphasis on jointness and cooperation among services in exercises. However, there is no commander from another service with operational control of units or elements from another service. With this current status quo the impact in the event of a major conflict will be appalling due to lack of coordination, cooperation, unity of effort and cohesion of the forces at operational level to achieve strategic objectives and goals in support of national interests. This type of ground and air war based on service cooperation without unified command becomes difficult to coordinate a combined unity of effort. Even so, inter-service competition and shifting blames may still arise. All in all, during conflicts, a non-unified system despite having trained well, is likely to face challenges in integration, interoperability, and interdependence at both strategic and operational levels.

Recommendations for the Zambia Defence Force

In today's world with unpredictable hybrid threats, nations should never be rigid, but accept change as a normal process to adapt. In this regard, the author recommends that the Zambia Defence Force reconsider its entire defence force command structure to be able to support national security interests from any perspective. As earlier noted, this change must be backed by necessary legislative amendments.

Current efforts to modify or change the existing command structure have met storms of controversy from different service viewpoints. The author therefore recommends that the Ministry of Defence constitute an inter-service board to discuss, debate and decide the best way to proceed with a unification process and to formulate joint doctrine. This board should be well balanced in representation and should include retired personnel, who had the opportunity to serve in both unified and non-unified systems, as well as political stake holders.

Among the terms of reference, the board should also discuss in detail the composition of service representation at the joint headquarters, including whether the already existing army regional commands should have operational responsibilities of all military troops in their areas of responsibilities (provinces). If not, the same board can instead debate and discuss the best way the defence force can operate to avoid the existing discrepancies and lack of coordination, and come up with common operating procedures for the current structure.

Similarly, this should be followed by developing joint operations doctrine and training curriculum at junior command staff levels within the services. Exposure to different service perspectives on common topics would be a valuable learning experience

for all students. Similarly, the Military Academies should consider modifying their curricula to increase joint exposure of their officer cadets. This would create a joint environment at the onset of their military careers. In the same vein, if the nation is to continue with the non-unified system, it is recommended that a joint office be set up for planning and conducting joint exercises at all levels.

Recommendations for further study

There are several areas that require further research and analysis in order to understand the full potential, capability and benefits of a unified command. To start with, the political factors and considerations still need an in-depth study. Similarly there are questions that this thesis has not been able to address which requires further study. Firstly, what political factors were considered and influenced the switching from one system of command to another. Secondly, the failures of this type of command in the 1970s and 1990 need to be thoroughly examined as well. In the same vein, there is need determine why Zambia is the only country in the region still holding on to a non-unified system. Answering these questions could add more perspective to this subject and will help decision makers to make right decisions.

Closing Statement

This thesis has analyzed the importance of a unified command system to provide a nation with strategic flexibility to mobilize and effectively control its military resources and capabilities, especially in war time. It has argued that Zambia needs to consider adopting a unified command system because of the benefits a unified command offers. Any nation must remember that since it cannot predict the future in this uncertain and

complex world, and that there is no fixed situation, it is better to be proactive in preparing its military for current and future missions. A unified command is indeed a game changer as it provides a nation's required joint war fighting capabilities. Bellamy sums up by stating that:

Across Africa, the critical missing ingredients (in terms of security) is not a lack of funding, training, or critical equipment. Of course, many African militaries (and police forces) are chronically under resourced and staffed by underpaid and demoralized personnel. But these shortages are symptoms of a deeper flaw, which is the reluctance of many Africa government to undertake urgently needed reforms of their security forces.⁸⁰

It is the wish of the author that Zambia should not fall into this flawed category and that instead, Zambia consider the unified system concept and make necessary reforms to meet modern day challenges.

⁸⁰ Bellamy, 5.

APPENDIX A

The Republic Of Kenya-Laws Of Kenya

Kenya Defence Forces Act

No. 25 of 2012

12. Functions of the Chief of the Defence Forces

The Chief of the Defence Forces shall—

- (a) Be the principal adviser to the President and Cabinet Secretary on any military, operational and administrative matters within the competence of the Chief of the Defence Forces.
- (b) Lawfully administer, control and manage the Defence Forces as a disciplined military force.
- (c) Comply with any lawful direction issued by the Cabinet Secretary under the authority of the President.
- (d) Formulate military policy and strategy in consultation with the Service Commanders.
- (e) Execute commands by issuing lawful orders, directives or instructions to the Service Commanders.
- (f) Subject to the general direction of the Defence Council, be responsible for the control, direction and general superintendence of the Defence Forces;
- (g) Ensure the effective utilization of resources and the education, training and development of all members and employees of the Defence Forces;
- (h) Provide the Cabinet Secretary and the Defence Council with such information, with regard to the Defence Forces, as may be requested by the Cabinet Secretary or the Defence Council.
- (i) be responsible for implementing the deployment of members of the Defence Forces in accordance with an authorization by the National Security Council and Defence Council granted in accordance with Articles 240(8) and 241(3)(c) of the Constitution and this Act.
- (j) Ensure that members of the Defence Forces discharge the functions and exercise their powers in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including international treaties ratified and binding the State;
- (k) be responsible for the development of non-discriminatory institutional culture within the Defence Forces in accordance with the Constitution and the policy on equal opportunity and affirmative action.
- (l) Monitor the implementation of the policy, operations and directions of the Defence Forces; and
- (m) Perform any other lawful function as may be assigned by the President, the Cabinet Secretary, the Defence Council or any other written law.

23. Appointments

(1) The Chief of the Defence Forces, the Vice Chief of the Defence Forces and the three Service Commanders shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Defence Council.

(2) A person shall not be eligible for appointment as the Chief of the Defence Forces, the Vice Chief of the Defence Forces or Service Commander unless that person—

- (a) Is a citizen of Kenya pursuant to Article 78 of the Constitution;
- (b) Is a member of the regular Defence Forces; and
- (c) Meets the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution.

(3) In appointing the Chief of the Defence Forces, the Vice Chief of the Defence Forces and the three Service Commanders, the President shall take into account—

- (a) Seniority;
- (b) Military and formal civil education;
- (c) The possession of a relevant degree from a university or an institution recognized in Kenya or such other equivalent qualifications as may be approved by the Defence Council; and
- (d) Military and security experience.

APPENDIX B

Survey No 15-02-014: Unified Command System–Zambia’s Case

Summary Report Aggregate Tuesday, 24 March 2015

QUESTION. What is your service?

Response Rate: **55% (N=28)** Question Type: **Choose one**

ZAF	8
ARMY	20
ZNS	0
CE	0
Total Responses	28

QUESTION. How long have you been in the military?

Response Rate: **53% (N=27)** Question Type: **Choose one**

1 to 7 years	0
8 to 19 years	18
Over 20 years	9
Total Responses	27

QUESTION. How often have you been involved in joint exercises with other services?

Response Rate: **55% (N=28)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Very Often	4
Occasionally	11
Rarely	12
Never	1
Total Responses	28

QUESTION. How well were those exercises most often coordinated?

Response Rate: **51% (N=26)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Very coordinated	6
Somewhat coordinated	16
Poorly coordinated	4
Not coordinated at all	0
Total Responses	26

Comments and/or recommendations:

Response Rate: 27% (N=14) Question Type: Paragraph

In the late 1970s the Defense Forces was a single service under Zambia National defense Force (ZNDF) however, in the early 1980s it reverted back to single Svc, in my own opinion, the reversion was a mere petty jealous among senior officers who didn't want to be led by another. In a broader sense it's better to be unified under one Commander as this can bring about oneness unlike the way it is. The current commanders (Army and Air Force) emphasis has been on joint training especially at staff college which implies that despite being under different commands no arm can fight on its own what so ever. We require a very huge understanding at strategic level to unify Command if not a political will. Though we look unified under different commanders this can be a very big problem if War happens to break out under the current status. The problem with single Command was that there used to be bias in representing the services in favour of svc where the Commander came from. In this era of professionalism, I there recommend for a unified Command system where all the services can be reporting to one let's say Commander Defense Forces (CDF) in order to avoid duplication of work where each reports to the commander in chief separately.

Unified Command will seemingly be beneficial to the whole Defence Force as task can be easily undertaken utilising all available resources it will logistically mitigate a lot of challenges individual services face. However the Joint staff must be impartial and not be biased to a service one comes from. The failure of the type of Command in the 80s must be thoroughly examined.

Whilst it's in the best interest of mission accomplishment to unify the command structure of the services, the current system is working out fine. Unity of command is still achieved through the joint exercises. The weight of arguments for the unification of command outweigh those against however the current status quo is best suited for the services in that once called upon for a joint task, the cooperation is commendable.

We fight the way we train and it imperative to mention that we cannot train in the midst of war

It is highly recommended that the unified command be established as soon as possible.

Let war break out and go through it and then on the other side of things tell me that a non-unified command system works well. In view it only does in the absence of war!

Joint exercises should be more frequent and most importantly, ALL military personnel must be accorded the involvement opportunity.

It is recommended that joint exercises are held very often. This will improve coordination among the services

We can do with more joint exercises. And these should start at the lowest level possible and encompassing all fields e.g logistics, admirations, field exercises etc

Need for more joint exercises as these will bring about singleness of purpose, however the importance of each should be clearly stated to avoid the status quo of one feeling better than others.

Exercises are not well coordinated due to the fact that we seem to have different doctrines and are not familiar with the way other services operate. Each service has its own umbilical cord.

There is need for joint command in the Zambian military. We cannot continue working as independent entities, unified command will put all our efforts together and enhance our capabilities and streamline the operating procedures. Gone are the days when army used to fight independent from the Air Force.

Joint training/ coordination is very necessary hence the need for Zambia to have Unified Command

Total Responses: 14

QUESTION. Have you deployed as part of a joint force with other services?

Response Rate: **49% (N=25)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Yes	20
No	5
Total Responses	25

QUESTION. Thinking about your most recent deployment, how well was the operation(s) coordinated?

Response Rate: **39% (N=20)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Very coordinated	7
Somewhat coordinated	11
Poorly coordinated	2
Not coordinated at all	0
Total Responses	20

QUESTION. How well do the Army, ZAF, and ZNS cooperate during joint activities?

Response Rate: **47% (N=24)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Very well	6
Somewhat well	12
Poorly	6
Not well at all	0
Total Responses	24

QUESTION. How well do the Army, ZAF, and ZNS coordinate during joint activities?

Response Rate: 45% (N=23) Question Type: Choose one

Very well	6
Somewhat well	13
Poorly	4
Not well at all	0
Total Responses	23

Comments and/or recommendations:	
Response Rate: 20% (N=10) Question Type: Paragraph	
Since the other services when operating with the Army are usually under Command, they offer little resistance to orders and instructions, though the implementation is sometimes, foggy.	
However, the 3 Services need to conduct joint ops more often to achieve maximum coordination among themselves.	
Suffice to mention that we could do better if we had a streamlined sop	
We have challenges on who triggers the operation/exercise/deployment depending on the relationship the service commanders have towards each other. This in turn affects coordination and mobilization; reduces efficiency while the staff tend to spend more time on learning how other services operate instead of spending more time on execution. This gap can be bridged by jointness.	
Coordination has been a huge problem between the Army, ZAF and ZNS. Each Service do their own business and that's not healthy for security of the nation	
Total Responses: 10	

QUESTION. Dynamics of global forces, modernization and sophistication of equipment call for coordinated employment, is centralized control important?

Response Rate: 45% (N=23) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	17
No	6
Total Responses	23

QUESTION. Contemporary revolution in military affairs has seen the adoption of unified command system. In Zambia's case, it is ok to remain non-unified?

Response Rate: 45% (N=23) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	7
No	16
Total Responses	23

QUESTION. In case of a major conflict involving Zambia, would command and control of defence forces be a challenge?

Response Rate: 45% (N=23) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	15
No	8
Total Responses	23

Comments and/or recommendations:	
Response Rate: 27% (N=14) Question Type: Paragraph	
In case of a major conflict, for coordination's purposes unified command would be more appropriate. If command and control is vested in one person it would be easier to organize the different arms of the ZDF through the respective commanders.	
More often than not other services treat their resources like personal to order hence unified command will narrow this bridge.	
Unity of command is not a problem in the system as seen in all joint exercises.	
Control of defence forces would be a challenge because we seem not to be aware of each other's state of readiness. We seemingly appear to have different procedures despite attending the same Staff College. That is compounded by the fact that we attend different academies during initial training.	
Unified Command is aimed at splitting leadership of Defence forces, in the sense that, their ability to coordinate can only be done in the face of the Commander in Chief. They might have Direct Liaison Authority, but it has limitations. Coordination at that level comes with a lot of bureaucracy, which involves other civil intelligence groups who have ignorance on the schematics of military operations.	
Zambia needs a unified Command in order to achieve a streamlined C&C system. This would solve the puzzle of having a challenge in terms of coordination in an event of a conflict.	
Your questions have a bias towards seeing that a conclusion that unified work better. For example your questions are suggestive of adopting a unified command. For example your question start by giving a position on a subject like everywhere countries have unified command should Zambia remain non-unified. To me this is subjective.	
While they are areas were each military force may learn from the other it's important to note that to allegiance of the overall commander of the unified force to certain extent will be to the military force he/she comes from. This in turn may effect consideration in terms of priorities of resources. Despite advice rendered. E.g. the need for more air power at the expense of ground troops or equipment (and vice versa). Take in to consideration that national budget in any country will regard the unified force as one entity.	
Though the services complement each other and guided and bounded by the defense Act there is need to adopt a unified command system for easy C2	
The whole is made up of parts and the parts need central coordination center to work effectively and efficiently. In time of conflict it's easier to operate with perfect - economy under unified command.	

Centralized control can be only for major things for purposes of security, safety and accountability. But again it depends on where the need for all these things may arise. Minor ones no. As an African and developing country, I feel we may have challenges having a non-unified command system. This is so because of probably where we have come from, it's very difficult to adopt this type. Unless from history it was there maybe it would work. In case of major war command and control would be a challenge because I don't think we have the modern equipment and now how, of conquering war, because we as a country are peace oriented and have never experienced major war since our independence. Practice makes perfect.

A smooth command control of the Zambian military needs a unified command

C&C of the Armed forces would be a disaster due to lack of coordination/ cohesion between the forces

Total Responses: 14

QUESTION. Would a unified command system be better than Zambia's current system?

Response Rate: **43% (N=22)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Yes	15
No	5
Unsure	2
Total Responses	22

QUESTION. If Zambia set up a Joint Force HQ, should joint staff have an equal number of individuals from each service?

Response Rate: **43% (N=22)** Question Type: **Choose one**

Yes	4
No	4
It depends	14
Total Responses	22

Comments and/or recommendations:

Response Rate: **25% (N=13)** Question Type: **Paragraph**

The only slight concern with unified command is concerning the choice of commanders. Would they be on rotational basis (among the three services) or would the commander always be from the senior most force? I also believe that the number of staff at the joint HQ may not necessarily be equal looking at the relevance of the staff who could be deployed there according to their corps

Army staff must dominate because of their training and exposure

Unique structures across services would make it impossible to have exactly the same number staff at joint HQ.

The differences in Roles and organization of different services makes it realistic to have same number of representation.
It is impossible to have the same number of individuals from each service due to the nature of responsibilities placed on different Services. It is likely that Army would have more personnel.
For transparency and balance of power.
A unified command system would be better than Zambia's current system because it would be easier to issue directives to individual services, conduct joint planning and execution of joint exercises and operations.
Numbers should not necessarily matter if compared to qualification in the field.
Unified command will be better for Zambia. However the joint staff should not have equal number of individuals. This should be based on the tasks at hand. Services have different needs/tasks and only individuals suitably qualified are required for specific tasks.
I think a unified command system would not be a bad idea to take into consideration, but it would depend on a number of factors I suppose, for it to take off.
The Army being the biggest force in Zambia should have a bigger representation followed by ZAF and least ZNS. And command of the Joint Force HQ must always come from the Army. The Army has commanders, ZAF has technicians, and they can't command the Army. In countries like Namibia, it's enshrined in the constitution that the Chief of Defense must always come from the Army! That's the path we should take.
It would depend on the level of training and academics on the part of the Staff Officers/Commanders.
Total Responses: 13

QUESTION. Does Zambia need a joint doctrine?

Response Rate: 43% (N=22) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	15
No	5
Unsure	2
Total Responses	22

Please provide your recommendations for the Zambia Defence Force command system?

Response Rate: 33% (N=17) Question Type: Paragraph

I would recommend a unified command system for centralized command. This would also enable equitable and scrutiny in the distribution and utilization of resources for the efficient running of the ZDF.

In this time and era a Unified Command system is the way to go.

Being a relatively small but professional force, its best suited for maneuver warfare entailing that the philosophy of mission command would be best practiced. That said, each service must have its freedom of action in dealing with its task. Whilst unity of

effete is cardinal in all operations, it has been proven beyond measure that our defence forces are unable to work in a unified command and are better suited with the current state.

Commanded by a full General or can either be from Army or Air Force. The appointments should be based on merit and not necessarily rotational among services and should not be based on political patronage. Then there shall be staff officers from the three services at joint HQ. The respective svc commanders will report directly to Chief of defence force who in turn will be answerable to the commander in chief

Well recommended

A joint Command system is required but needs a systematic and gradual introduction to eliminate prejudices and prepare service personnel from different services for that type of system.

More joint exercises

Current system works effectively well.to remain as it is

Each Service can have its doctrine

Zambia need a joint doctrine in order to improve interoperability among the services.

The status quo is better.

This requires serious thought and research. However, just off- the-cuff i would recommend that point of entry in military be the start of all considerations of Zambia Defence Force command system.

Personally I feel Zambia needs to adopt the command system like other major countries. Perhaps we have never been faced with a major crisis to see how unified command can produce more effective and efficient results without antagonizing each other? There is too much competition amongst the services which is not healthy for the country and this can be minimized by having a unified CC system.

The Zambia Defence Force Command System should be unified. This will ensure that all the services will have a feeling of belonging to the whole and it's easier to develop goals/objectives based on the national policy. The whole in this regard is the military doctrine which is an approved set of principles and methods, intended to provide our military with a common outlook and a uniform basis of action. Under joint command there will be authority and responsibility of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling all the services for the accomplishment of assigned missions with perfectness.

- I would recommend that all service personnel should be well qualified accordingly, in terms of education; A literate command system and civilized staff, men and women. This is so because life ,in the ideal situation, with literate people is make simpler, work will be done, and looking at the fast rate at which the world is developing in terms of technology, you cannot afford to have an Army full of illiterate and uncivilized people, especially that it involves thousands of personnel in numbers. - It makes command and control easier - This is also important for a prompt ,high level of understanding of issues on the ground as they come, as Military may sometimes involve serious matters, that maybe life threatening and other times non-life threatening depending on the prevailing situation in the country.

Zambia needs a unified command just like all other countries in the SADC region. Our constitution must be changed to allow for this unified command structure. And the constitution must categorically state that Chief of Zambia Defence Force must always come from the Army. ZAF officers are mostly technicians who cannot command army units.

Joint command is the best option for Zambia's defence forces. Doing so would enhance synergy amongst the services. Equally, joint doctrine is a must for ZDF besides, activities at our various schools of instructions point in the direction of a joint doctrine

Total Responses: 17

Other Comments:

Response Rate: 12% (N=6) Question Type: Paragraph

Regular joint exercises

Zambia at one time had the unified command system, therefore let's explore what lead to the split. I would rather you start by researching why the system failed in the first before recommending a unified system for Zambia.

Hope this has been helpful. Later man

The services commanders with the authority vested in them should however exercise command over their subordinate formations. Having one umbilical cord from the overall commander will ensure proper coordination during exercise and operations.

On the overall, our command system works under adverse conditions sometimes, but it has put in its level best to make the system work out smoothly to meet its intended day to day objectives.

Total Responses: 6

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