MILITARIZED MANEUVER TERRORISM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security Studies

by

CRAIG BROYLES, MAJOR, US ARMY
BA, Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**Militarized Maneuver Terrorism (MMT)** is an evolving tactic posing a direct threat to the perception of security in the United States. Militarized Maneuver Terrorists (MMTs) are multiple (more than two) highly trained individuals, well-armed and capable of executing planned and coordinated attacks. Using case studies from Beslan, Russia, Mumbai, India, and Nairobi, Kenya, MMTs were found to be substantively different than active shooters and current response protocols likely ineffective.

Examining a means, opportunity and intent framework, the thesis concludes deterrence is preferred over response to avoid physical, economic and psychological harm from such an attack. MMT deterrence may be achieved through five lines of effort using both covert and overt approaches. Disrupting foreign terrorist safe havens, enhancing Border Security, training law enforcement in infantry tactics, and widespread and legal citizenry possession of concealed firearms, combined with information operations could make the United States a less attractive target for MMT.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**
Terrorism, Active Shooter, Border Security, Law Enforcement Training, Deterrence, Beslan, Mumbai, Nairobi

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**
a. REPORT (U)  
b. ABSTRACT (U)  
c. THIS PAGE (U)  

**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**
107
Name of Candidate:  Major Craig Alan Broyles

Thesis Title:  Militarized Maneuver Terrorism

Approved by:

____________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Richard E. Berkebile, Ph.D.

____________________________________, Member
LTC (UK) Mark Robinson MBA, M.A.

____________________________________, Member
Eric F. McMillin, M.A.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2015 by:

____________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

MILITARIZED MANEUVER TERRORISM, by Major Craig Broyles, 107 pages.

Militarized Maneuver Terrorism (MMT) is an evolving tactic posing a direct threat to the perception of security in the United States. Militarized Maneuver Terrorists MMTs are multiple (more than two) highly trained individuals, well-armed and capable of executing planned and coordinated attacks. Using case studies from Beslan, Russia, Mumbai, India, and Nairobi, Kenya, MMTs were found to be substantively different than active shooters and current response protocols likely ineffective.

Examining a means, opportunity and intent framework, the thesis concludes deterrence is preferred over response to avoid physical, economic and psychological harm from such an attack. MMT deterrence may be achieved through five lines of effort using both covert and overt approaches. Disrupting foreign terrorist safe havens, enhancing Border Security, training law enforcement in infantry tactics, and widespread and legal citizenry possession of concealed firearms, combined with information operations could make the United States a less attractive target for MMT.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my wife Valerie Broyles for supporting me with her time and sympathetic ear. Her kindness and patience facilitated this project.

I would also like to thank my committee Dr. Richard Berkebile, LTC Mark Robinson and Mr. Eric McMillin whose expertise, academic skills, and mentorship made this a tremendous learning experience. I am deeply grateful for their assistance, insight, and demanding expectations.

I want to thank Border Patrol Agent Adam Baird from Blaine Sector for his dedication as an active shooter response instructor. His vision, innovation and commitment to protecting the American public provided the inspiration for this thesis.

Additionally, I would like to thank Command and General Staff College Lead Instructor Pete Gibson. He selflessly gave of his time above what was expected to listen and give me advice throughout this process.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents David and Valerie Broyles for their love, guidance, and support throughout my life.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Question</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Frames</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of MMT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism Methods–The Challenge Posed by MMT</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition, Strengths, and Weaknesses of Case Studies</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Selection Criteria</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Method</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH ANALYSIS</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background to Beslan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Beslan MMT Attack</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Means of the MMT Attackers at Beslan</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity of the Beslan MMT Attackers</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent of the MMT Attackers at Beslan</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background to Mumbai MMT Attack</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMT</td>
<td>Militarized Maneuver Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMTs</td>
<td>Militarized Maneuver Terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>Special Weapons and Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. Dispersed Attack ............................................................................................................ 11

Figure 2. Approach to Deter MMT ............................................................................................ 80
TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.</td>
<td>Means</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.</td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.</td>
<td>Intent</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On Tuesday December 16, 2014, a squad size team of nine Taliban gunmen dressed in paramilitary uniforms assaulted a school in Peshawar Pakistan. During an attack lasting eight hours, they used military automatic weapons and grenades to kill 145 people, of which 132 were school children (Walsh 2014, 1-2). On January 7, 2015, two terrorists dressed in ski masks and carrying Kalashnikov assault rifles attacked the Charlie Hebdo weekly satirical newspaper in Paris, France killing 12 people (Walt 2015, 1-2). The terrorists planned the attacks in detail to instill fear and maximize the propaganda of the deed. The attacks point to an evolving threat expedited by heavily armed individuals or groups trained in shoot and maneuver tactics. This evolving terrorist tactic poses a direct threat to the perception of security in the United States.

The threat emanates from the full spectrum of terrorist groups from those that are ideologically, nationally, and religiously motivated forms, to those that are state sponsored groups. Perpetrators may have training in military infantry tactics and in some instances, direct operational experience in conflicts including those in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Transnational Organized Crime groups like Los Zetas are well resourced and have operational experience battling Mexican authorities since 2007. These criminal organizations tangentially pose a similar threat. They possess the capability and opportunity but have yet to demonstrate the intent to conduct such attacks on United States soil.

The growing terrorist threat posed by trained individuals or groups mirrors the increasing trend of active shooters in the United States. The Department of Homeland
Security defines an active shooter as, “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area” (Department of Homeland Security 2008). While such attacks tend to lack a political context and fall outside standard definitions for terrorism, the impact in terms of loss of life provides a guide to potency of the threat. Active shooter events occur with increasing frequency and ferocity. According to a Federal Bureau of Investigation study, 160 active shooter attacks occurred from 2000 through 2013. The number of active shooter attacks rose from 6.4 incidents annually in the first seven years to 16.4 incidents annually in the last seven years (Blair and Schweit 2013, 6). Law enforcement has developed responses to a gunman or gunmen whose only goal is to kill as many people as possible as quickly as possible.

Since the Columbine shootings in 1999, law enforcement and emergency personnel have responded to active shooter incidents. Numerous local, county and state jurisdictions have adopted mechanisms to prevent and respond to active shooter attacks. Their focus has been for the first officers on scene to rapidly find and terminate the threat as quickly as possible (Tallen 2008, 5). They sacrifice security for speed of action by responding officers because every second that goes by generally means more victims. Authorities view this solution to active shooter response as adequate. Yet, on November 26, 2008, a new and more deadly variant of an active shooter attack occurred in Mumbai, India. These gunmen were highly trained and equipped terrorists. Their methods resembled infantry tactics rather than the violence of homicidal active shooters like the perpetrators at Columbine High School. The Mumbai assailants executed a planned and coordinated attack that sought to overwhelm the security forces. This enabled them to
seize and maintain the initiative for a sufficient period to maximize both casualties and psychological impact of the broadcast images.

The United States public and their government authorities may be generally unprepared to counter this evolving threat, a threat that seeks to use an aggressive first response by single police officers or at best, small groups, to its advantage (Tallen 2008, 3-4). Through detailed planning, concentration of force, coordination and fire superiority the terrorists seek to break the cohesion of the responding security forces. Core infantry tactics that include trained terrorist teams or squads competently shooting, moving and communicating fall outside the capability of most current law enforcement organizations to counter. The potential exists to cripple an entire region of the United States and deliver a propaganda coup for the terrorists achieving asymmetric results that far outweigh any expenditure on their behalf. In addition to Peshawar and Paris, attacks in Beslan, Russia, Mumbai, India and the Westgate Mall, Kenya provide precedents. An appropriately targeted and coordinated multi-active shooter attack could have a strategic impact damaging the United States politically, economically, socially and psychologically.

These types of terrorist attacks often use multiple capabilities to maximize lethality. They employ means including improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, mines, grenades, incendiary devices, automatic weapons, and rocket propelled grenades. Yet, their primary means are small arms. To supplement lethal effects, they employ information operations to wage propaganda war. Their attacks transition from rapid violent assaults to lengthy sieges maximizing the theater of the event. They target those whose harm will most likely inflict national and international anguish and instill fear.
This paper will refer to this evolving method of attacks as militarized maneuver terrorism (MMT).

Militarized maneuver terrorists (MMTs) are multiple (more than two) highly trained individuals, well-armed and capable of executing planned and coordinated attacks. These attacks maximize lethal effects by using infantry tactics in confined and populated areas in order to instill fear and lack of confidence in the states’ ability to provide security. The combination of lethal and psychological damage works to achieve terrorist political goals. The tactics may include dispersed attacks, sieges, and ambushes as a means to overwhelm a security force response and generate the theater necessary to propagate the terrorist narrative. MMTs will deliberately target urban environments to maximize their asymmetric impact and gain a position of advantage over responding authorities.

This differs significantly from the active shooter phenomenon. While active shooters use firearm(s), there is often no pattern or method to their selection of victims (Department of Homeland Security 2008). The shootings at Fort Hood, Virginia Tech and Sandy Hook elementary school appear to meet these criteria. The Columbine shooting is slightly different because there were two shooters instead of one. Yet, they share the characteristic of being a-political, revenge motivated and not employing in infantry tactics.

**Thesis Question**

This paper researches methods to deter a MMT attack. The central question is how best to deter MMT with societally acceptable expenditure of resources. To answer this question, this paper conducts a comparative analysis of three events that epitomize
effective MMT. In addition, it briefly reviews emerging techniques employed by groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that could, if executed in a coordinated manner, maximize the propaganda value of such attacks. The first is the terrorist attack in Beslan, Russia in 2004. The second is the attack in Mumbai, India in 2008. The third event is the Westgate shopping mall massacre in Nairobi, Kenya in 2013.

The subordinate research questions in this thesis are how conducive is the environment in the United States for MMT attacks? What is the role of the United States military both active and reserve in deterring domestic MMT?

The characteristics analyzed are the threats capabilities, intentions, and tactics. The comparative study will examine what factors in the environment enabled the terrorists to achieve their goals. Finding the commonalities of the attacks will provide data to determine what methods will most cost effectively deter MMT in the United States. The results will point to recommendations of what doctrine, organization, material and personnel approaches will deter MMT.

This research is significant because it is likely the United States will suffer MMT attacks in the future. Terrorists will plan operations with increased scale, ferocity, and duration to overcome the public’s desensitization and maximize the information effects as a means to changing behavior to further their political or ideological ends. With increasingly sophisticated communication capabilities, these operations will likely become more decentralized. Global jihadists and trans-national criminal organizations have the potential to be peer competitors with security forces for attacks of limited duration. The aim of the MMTs will be to target their actions to accentuate any weaknesses in security force provision. The research will build on previous efforts to
identify capability gaps with law enforcement to combat MMT. It will highlight the key differences between active shooters and MMTs. It will articulate what government changes are necessary to deter MMT. Finally, it will provide Homeland Security, National Guard, and other law enforcement agencies with a perspective on how to prepare, protect, and prevent MMT.

Assumptions

This paper assumes that local, county and state officials will initially lead the effort to counter MMT attacks. Dependent upon the nature and duration of the attack, federal authorities and—or the Army National Guard may be required to provide support. *Posse comitatus* may effect such responses.

Limitations

The research uses unclassified material only and is therefore unable to assess the adequacy of classified counter terrorism techniques as they relate to MMT. Unclassified research has a benefit of ensuring the widest dissemination to all those concerned with the security and safety of the United States. The capability gaps identified by this research may reside within assets of the federal, state, local governments.

For practical purposes, this research is limited to only the three terrorist attacks previously described with supplemental detail using ISIL as an example to demonstrate the evolving nature of the threat. There are many other examples but Beslan, Mumbai, and Nairobi provide sufficiently contemporary events that have been the subject of comprehensive study. These examples also take into account different geographic,
cultural and security environments and therefore better highlight the commonalities of the MMT threat.

The next chapter discusses existing research on MMT. It describes the myriad of definitions, frames, characteristics, and countering methods of MMT. The third chapter explains the methodology used to for this research. The fourth chapter discusses in detail the three terrorist attacks in Beslan, Mumbai and Nairobi. This chapter will then explain the means, opportunity and intent of the perpetrators followed by an analysis of the commonalities in the attacks. This paper will use the commonalities to identify methods to deter MMT. This thesis will conclude by summarizing the results, discussing recommendations, and providing possibilities for further research.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Following the terrorist attack in Mumbai, India in 2008, there has been an increased interest by researchers and government officials trying to determine how the nature of terrorism continues to change, how to describe the threat, how to respond prepare and protect. This chapter divides the literature review into three sections. The first section reviews the various definitions used to explain MMT. The components that comprise MMT are swarm attacks, irregular forces, paramilitary terrorism, Mumbai-style attacks and urban terrorism. The next section describes the characteristics of MMT. These characteristics include the capabilities, tactics, intentions, and potential actions of responding security forces. This section discusses the tactical details of MMT. The third section of the literature review explains the existing research of counterterrorism methods for combating MMT. It discusses the results of research into gaps identified with various echelons of government authorities to counter to this type of terrorism.

Existing Frames

Researchers have identified the trend of terrorists operating using small unit infantry tactics. Several definitions describe the phenomenon. The United States Army’s Provost Marshal published a case study regarding the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013. The case study identifies an “evolving terrorist tactic often referred to as a swarm attack” (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 1-2). Swarm attacks are active shooters who coordinate their assaults using mobile small teams. They attack multiple targets, using various avenues of approach meant to confuse and
circumvent security efforts (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 2). Irregular force is a term the United States Army identifies as encapsulating guerrilla fighters, insurgents and terrorists. Irregular forces are armed individuals not affiliated with the state’s regular armed forces, police or other security forces yet they operate with military like (paramilitary) capabilities. The Army acknowledges those who oppose the United States may employ conventional and non-conventional methods simultaneously. The term “hybrid threat” captures that idea. It describes opponents combining regular and irregular forces to attack the United States in a way to offset superior, U.S. firepower and technology (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, v).

Paramilitary terrorism is another term used to describe fighters who behave, operate and attack similar to infantry or special operation soldiers. Bill Tallen describes paramilitary terrorism as terrorists operating in platoon or squad sized elements using military small arms, improvised explosive devices, and heavy weapons. They use snipers to target first responders and use defensive positions meant to repel assaulting law enforcement officers (Tallen 2008, 1). A Mumbai-style attack is the term coined after the terrorist assault in Mumbai, India in 2008. The characteristics of the attack were so unique it created a new descriptor for a type of terrorism. Mumbai style attacks consist of multiple, simultaneous, coordinated small arms attacks creating the effect of several active shooter attacks occurring at the same time. The operators are prepared to die fighting and train to prolong the attack as much as possible (Justice 2013, v, 2).

Urban terrorism according to H.V. Savitch is the term used to explain the trend of the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks. It states the unconventional nature of terrorism remains constant but as populations are increasing in cities, terrorists take advantage of
target rich environments. Savitch writes how terrorism is evolving to be more urban centric. That it is a form of warfare often “carried out under conditions of asymmetric military capacity . . . utilizing collective violence such as kidnapping, hijacking, shooting, arson, and planted human bombs” (Savitch 2005, 362). Using military methodology, urban terrorism takes advantage of high-density confined areas to maximize their lethality, disrupt responding authorities, and uses the ability to camouflage within the population in order to escape and evade the security forces (Savitch 2005, 352, 365). All the definitions describe how terrorism is evolving following years of global warfare. It resembles militarized units who maneuver to gain positions of advantage over their victims using infantry or small unit tactics.

**Characteristics of MMT**

The opposing force or OPFOR is the threat the United States Army trains to defeat. Irregular forces are a component of the opposing force. Insurgents, terrorists, guerillas, and active supporters are included in the concept of irregular forces. Irregular forces are highly skilled in infantry tasks and conduct deliberate attacks to “achieve a major psychological impact” on its enemy (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 1-1). They are willing to sacrifice themselves to conduct coordinated small unit assaults to achieve “sensational media coverage to a global audience” (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 1-1). Irregular forces tactics are similar to those of MMT.

Insurgents and guerrillas who make up irregular forces use small unit offensive tactics to conduct attacks. These functional offensive tactics are ambushes, assaults, and raids (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 7-1, 7-3). These offensive tasks encompass the overall offensive principles of the dispersed attack. Dispersed attacks are
the offensive method irregular forces use to fight a superior adversary. It combines information warfare with attacks that are continuous, multi-directional by units operating independent of one another. The characteristics of dispersed attacks are targeting key locations, with independent small units who rapidly move in from dispersed locations to mass at the last possible moment. Dispersed attacks rely heavily on information warfare to deceive and confuse the opponent. The key tasks of dispersed attacks are destroying reconnaissance elements, creating uncertainty, denying situational awareness and taking advantage of complex (urban) terrain, (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2011, 3-13, 3-14). See figure 1.

Figure 1. Dispersed Attack

Source: Created by author.
Understanding the principles of dispersed attacks clarifies how irregular forces conduct ambushes, assaults, and raids. Irregular forces move dispersed then mass at the last possible moment before overwhelming their enemy. They task organize into security, assault and support elements. They support the assaults with asymmetric reconnaissance, fire support, man portable air defense and logistics. Using the principles of dispersed attack, irregular forces target weak points. For example, they intentionally target first responders who arrive following the initial attack (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 7-3-7-9). Dispersed attack offensive actions used by irregular forces are the fundamentals to MMT.

The ISIL uses the tactics of dispersed attacks (Burns et al. 2014, 2). In November of 2014, TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity, Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group published a threat report detailing the tactics of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. The report identifies ISIL, as “a capable insurgent paramilitary force . . . has no known association or affiliation with any existing regular military force” (Burns et al. 2014, 23). They successfully demonstrated the ability to conduct dispersed attacks by seizing Mosul in June 2014. In August of 2014, they conducted an area defense of the Mosul Dam by employing obstacles, ambushes, small-scale counterattacks, armored vehicles, heavy weaponry, camouflage, kill zones and multiple other assets (Burns et al. 2014, 4).

The report articulates several insurgent ISIL innovating techniques. They use command and control systems that communicate through a myriad of social media venues. ISIL employs suicide water-borne improvised explosive devices to attack bridges. The terrorists also pack explosives into captured armored vehicles, which serve
as potent vehicle born explosive devices. ISIL have developed highly effective anti-armor capability using shape charges. They employ capable sniper teams armed with precision rifles and night vision devices. ISIL by “coupling heavy firepower, suicide bombers and snipers creates a formidable complex attack” (Burns et al 2014, 5-12). The combined use of these tactics constitutes how terrorism is evolving. Their battlefield successes thus far are from the use of MMT.

Where ISIL is truly innovative is in its employment of social media. Combining the standard infantry tactics displayed in the three case studies with a full-court media press and technological shrewdness displayed by ISIL presents a potent threat to the perception of security. For ISIL, the propaganda of the deed is more important than the deed itself. They combine brutality and human drama to wage a sort of information war using various media outlets. They have a designated propaganda arm to make high quality videos and magazines. Twitter and Facebook are mechanisms they use to recruit, spread fear, target, and disseminate their narrative on the global stage (Burns et al. 2014, 13-15). Social media and video productions are techniques ISIL uses to prolong the theater of terror to global audiences.

The ISIL uses hostage taking to grab and maintain global attention. It is a tactic and a component of MMT. It allows practitioners to wage psychological warfare on a superior power. Major Fritz Pfeiffer researched hostage taking as a tactic in insurgencies. He explained how this tactic allows terrorists to seize the power of human drama to propagandize their agendas to large audiences. Historically, the tactic of hostage taking has brought symbolic victories when military victories were not possible (Pfeiffer 2005, 38). For example, the Black September terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics
where Palestinian militants took hostage Israeli athletes. In November 1979, Iranian terrorists seized 52 American hostages and held them over 444 days. According to Pfeiffer, they “chained the superpower” of the United States (Pfeiffer 2005, 10).

Chechen insurgents intensified hostage taking as their weapon of choice to fight Russia’s military might. Chechen militants seized upwards of several hundred hostages in several attacks. For example, in June 1995, 100 Chechen fighters took 1500 people hostage in a hospital in Budennovsk, Russia demanding Russia’s presence in Chechnya end (Pfeiffer 2005, 14). The attack brought strategic success which prompted further attacks to include the October 2002 Moscow theater attack and the September 2004 Beslan school attack. Each of these produced massive theaters of terror as the human drama played out during the multi-day sieges. Pfeiffer writes how a well-timed mass-hostage siege within the borders of the United States would probably mimic Chechen methods. Such an attack would produce a large publicity event and likely serve as symbolic victory for global jihadists (Pfeiffer 2005, 39).

Now with the internet and social media part of the fabric of society, hostage taking has gained new life as a terrorist tactic (Pfeiffer 2005, 3). It is a key technique to “exploit the nature of democratic government because it forces leaders and representatives to publicly assign value to the life of one of their constituents” (Pfeiffer 2005, 35). Yet there are disadvantages to hostage taking. Faultfinding, sympathy, public opinion, and liability can galvanize the opposition against the terrorist organization. Hostage situations can “suffocate without the drama and immediacy” (Pfeiffer 2005, 13). Consequently, hostage taking has utility but only as part of a broader terrorist operation,
employing a mix of tactics and techniques that seek to maximize the theater of the operation.

Conducting terrorist attacks in urban environments is a tactic that is becoming more prevalent as urbanization increases. H.V. Savitch explains how urban terror revolves around the concepts of territory, space and logistics. Territory refers to the high-density and complex interdependency that exists in large cities. Terrorists seek to disrupt those systems to achieve their political goals. Spaces are specific target sets selected by attackers to maximize disruption and fear. Target sets include population centers, transportation hubs, and schools, so are financial, religious and political headquarters. Logistics refer to the unique characteristic urban environments offer terrorists. Unlike rural areas, cities enable terrorists to purchase and move supplies (equipment) rapidly and covertly taking advantage of the crowds. Large cities provide an ideal place to recruit, hide, refit, organize, and launch attacks with low risk to discovery during movements to and from the attack site (Savitch 2005, 362). They also tend to house numerous media outlets with an ability to feed an increasingly voracious 24-hour media cycle.

The urban environment provides terrorists with the opportunity to maximize fear, and messaging opportunities. The urban environment enables attackers to penetrate selected targets by blending in with the masses. Cities are also victim rich environments. Terrorists can expect to produce high casualties by mass shootings, bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and arson within the urban environment (Savitch 2005, 365). So effective is urban terrorism that Savitch’s research discovered that “urban terror attacks follow a pattern of repetitively hitting the same spaces, located at strategic cores of the central city” (Savitch 2005, 368). By repeatedly attacking key targets within cities,
terrorists can force the government to imprison the population within walls of barriers, surveillance technology and security personnel. These types of measures strain the economic, social, and political fabric of the city. Savitch’s research into urban terrorism provides insight why terrorists repeatedly strike large metropolitans like London, Paris and Jerusalem.

A tactic of focus of MMT is mass shooting of non-combatants. Law enforcement refers to these attacks as active shooters. While active shooters use firearm(s) unlike MMTs and there is “no pattern or method to their selection of victims” (Department of Homeland Security 2008). What differentiates active shooter attacks from other forms of violence is the primacy of firearms to kill as many people as possible. The Federal Bureau of Investigation published a study analyzing active shooters events from 2000-2013. It found there were 160 active shooter incidents in the United States from 2000-20013. Of those incidents, time was a crucial factor. In 64 events where time could be ascertained 44 (69 percent) ended in five minutes or less, the remaining in two minutes or less. Also of the 160 incidents 107 (66.9 percent) ended before police could arrive (Blair and Schweit 2013, 8-9).

The study found that 90 (56 percent) of the 160 incidents ended on the shooter’s initiative either by suicide or by fleeing the scene. In at least 65 (40 percent) of the 160 active shooter events ended by citizen engagement or the shooter committing suicide before law enforcement arrived (Blair and Schweit 2013, 11). It also found that “in all but 2 of the 160 incidents, the shooters chose to act alone” (Blair and Schweit 2013, 17). The Federal Bureau of Investigation study concludes by recommending training for law enforcement and citizens who must decide rapidly whether to intervene and how.
Citizens have important roles because of the increasing threat of active shooters and the swiftness in which the incidents unfold (Blair and Schweit 2013, 21). Law enforcement officials are thus training in the event of an active shooter, to move quickly to the scene and stop the threat as fast as possible. Mass shootings are attractive to terrorists because of the drama it creates and the availability of firearms.

This section discussed the characteristics of MMT. MMT relates to the United States Army’s concept of irregular forces. Irregular forces are paramilitary guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists. Irregular forces use the offensive action principles of dispersed attack to overcome the technological and dominant firepower capabilities of a superior force. ISIL’s successfully uses the principles of dispersed attack to overcome their military disadvantage over regular forces but with an added cross-domain capability that seeks to enhance their narrative. They are innovative in their tactics and use of propaganda by hostage taking, brutality and information campaigns. Urban terrorism and mass shootings are some ways MMT seeks to create a theater of terror to maximize the propaganda value and further their political (and—or ideological) ends. The next section will discuss research into counterterrorism methods for MMT. They are broken down into response, prevention and protection.

**Counterterrorism Methods–The Challenge Posed by MMT**

The government’s response to the MMT threat is complex and challenging. To mitigate the risk, the government must overcome several obstacles and capability gaps. Bill Tallen researched how the government would respond to a MMT attack and what they need to mitigate such an event. In the journal article, “Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat” Tallen begins by posing a hypothetical scenario based loosely on the
Chechen militant seizure of the Beslan School #1 in 2004. He poses what if a platoon-sized element of commando like terrorists took an entire elementary school hostage. Then set up in infantry-like defensive positions sufficiently prepared to repel any police assault. Officers “trained to respond to a Columbine-like active shooter incidents, stage a hasty assault which is bloodily repulsed” (Tallen 2008, 1). He describes the attackers armed with explosives, heavy weapons, and rocket propelled grenades. They are prepared to kill themselves and the hostages if America does not withdraw from Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Middle East (Tallen 2008, 1).

He then discusses how the United States government’s attention is on countering suicide terrorism focusing and on weapons of mass destruction. However, he believes such an attack as described previously would have enormous consequences. He presents how the government produced Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) in 2003 establishing the National Incident Management System. This directive integrated “Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all hazards plan” (Tallen 2008, 3). Later, in 2004, the federal government issued the National Response Plan and the National Response Framework. However, both documents focus on primarily address a 9/11 type of attack and the employment weapons of mass destruction. They “pay scant attention to resolving an ongoing crisis of a non-WMD nature, in the event prevention fails” (Tallen 2008, 3).

He then outlines the probable federal government response should a Beslan like siege occur domestically in the United States. Should such an attack happen, once the terrorist incident overwhelms the capabilities of local and state governments, it would trigger a request for assistance from the federal government. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation would take the lead but the role of the Department of Homeland Security would add confusion because the line between homeland defense and homeland security is not well defined (Tallen 2008, 4). The governor or the federal agency on scene may submit a Request for Assistance to the Secretary of Defense then to U.S. Northern Command to use active duty forces for support. The state governor may also mobilize the National Guard to deploy to the situation.

Local and state Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams generally lack the capability to defeat an organized paramilitary terrorist siege. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hostage Rescue Team would be the most capable but without warning, it could be many hours before they are mission ready at the incident site (Tallen 2008, 6). The Department of Defense’s Special Operation Forces possess robust counterterrorist capabilities but most deploy outside of the Continental United States and they would have difficulty responding in a timely manner. Furthermore, the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385) restricts most active duty forces from serving in domestic law enforcement capacities (Tallen 2008, 7).

Joel Justice researched the challenges and capability gaps from a more micro level. He researched if local and county law enforcement agencies are ready for a Mumbai-style attack. He believes the responsibility to deal with such an attacks would fall on local authorities because of the slow response time of federal or military forces. The problem is law enforcement in the United States is “fragmented across local, state, tribal and federal jurisdictions and no uniformity exists in level, uniformity, or quality of training across different jurisdictions” (Justice 2013, 6). He found the readiness level varied depending on the cities motivation, understanding of the threat and resources.
Based on the characteristics of MMT, it is probable, responding authorities will be unable to minimize the loss of life in a well-planned and executed attack. Consequently, prevention is preferred rather than reaction. Simon O’Rourke argues the Mumbai attack caused a major paradigm shift. Pre-Mumbai, law enforcement became accustomed to terrorists taking hostages, they use the media to articulate their demands to a global audience, and then negotiations occurred, followed by a well-coordinated response (O’Rourke 2010, 45). The Mumbai attack exposed the weakness of the current policing paradigms. He writes how Mumbai demonstrated how terrorists employing tactics used on the battlefield have devastating effects when used on urban targets not outside a war zone. These terrorists aimed to deliberately target patrolling police officers who were “not as well equipped and trained for this role, as the soldiers these tactics were designed to defeat” (O’Rourke 2010, 46).

Despite the stated vulnerabilities and the accessibility of firearms, a MMT attack in the United States has yet to occur. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation testified before the House Homeland Security Committee, subcommittee on Counter terrorism and Intelligence on the threat of a Mumbai-style attack happening in the United States.

Jenkins testified that a Mumbai-style attack occurring in the United State is conceivable but unlikely. He stated there are only two ways to carry out such an attack. The first way would be to recruit, train, indoctrinate and prepare a team on foreign soil and then infiltrate them slowly into the United States. This is the 9/11 model. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the environment was more permissive to terrorists entering the United States. In addition, terrorist organizations were more robust than today (Jenkins 2013, 4). Brian Jenkins testified because of the United States’ efforts fighting the Global
War on Terrorism, assembling a MMT team and attacking the United States from abroad undetected is unlikely.

The second method would be homegrown terrorists conducting a Mumbai-style attack. Jenkins stated such threats lack historical precedence. Despite Al Qaeda’s efforts to radicalize and recruit terrorists inside the United States, their success has been “meager” (Jenkins 2013, 6). He states that authorities have arrested 204 people from September 11, until the end of 2012 involved in plots to carrying out terrorist attacks inside the United States. Of those 204 people, only six planned to conduct mass shootings. Furthermore, United States authorities discovered 68 terrorist plots and most only involved a single person. Few had any sort of infantry type training and “none came close to the sophistication, determination, or personal skills demonstrated in the Mumbai attack” (Jenkins 2013, 6). He testified a homegrown threat of the magnitude of Mumbai unlikely.

The main challenge cited was the difficulty in assembling and training such a team in secrecy. The challenge is not obtaining sufficient firepower but a proper assaulting force. The advantage Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (the terrorist organization responsible for the Mumbai attack) has over homegrown radicals is they had a much larger pool of recruits. The potential assault team must not only plan, prepare, and train without alerting law enforcement, but they must also steel themselves for a suicide attack. Jenkins believes this is difficult for a small organization He testified the Mumbai attack occurred because a large organization sponsored it (Jenkins 2013, 7).

He further testified the attackers in Mumbai were so successful because India’s police had poor training and equipment. United States law enforcement are much better
prepared, trained, and equipped. They have experience in dealing with domestic active shooter scenarios. Jenkins further stated that should a Mumbai-style attack occur, our police force would intervene quickly and end the assault. He gave a hypothetical example that should a terrorist armed assault occur in New York’s Penn Station, the response would be immediate through a litany of armed police to include TSA Viper teams and National Guard (Jenkins 2013, 8).

He concluded his testimony by stating he believed the biggest challenge to United States law enforcement would be an armed assault combined with hostages at multiple locations. Jenkins’s testimony provides possible reasons a MMT attack has not occurred in the United States. However, the contemporary environment continues to evolve. At the time of his testimony, the ISIL’s major offensive into northern Iraq had not happened (Burns et al. 2014, 2-4). The threat of trained personnel returning from the Levant or closed groups radicalized remotely poses a potentially new paradigm. In addition, since his testimony, terrorists conducted a MMT attack on the Peshawar Pakistan School that killed 132 schoolchildren (Walsh 2014, 1-2). MMT continues to evolve and remains a major threat to the security of the United States.

A method to counter MMT is to protect against it. This involves hardening sites and taking panoptic security measures. H.V. Savitch describes massive security efforts governments of large cities are taking to protect against urban terrorism. For example, after several terrorist attacks, city officials have attempted to “design out” terrorism by constructing a “ring of steel” around the city (Savitch 2005, 370). Inclusive in this ring of steel are police patrols, massive security camera systems, and barriers to constrict pedestrian movement. At completion, the ring of steel will have mechanical, physical,
and visual constraints that touch every aspect of human behavior (Savitch 2005, 370.)

This effort is minimal compared with the security measures Jerusalem is taking to protect against urban terrorism.

Savitch writes that urban terrorism is different from conventional warfare in that cities will rebuild and recover. Urban terrorism with its continuous destabilizing effect creates modern besieged medieval like cities (Savitch 2005, 390). Therefore, to protect itself from this siege of terror, the city is turning into a fortress. Savitch writes, how buses in Jerusalem are now equipped with metal detectors and can detect explosives from a meter away. Security personnel guard entrances to most all public buildings. There are metal detectors and those entering experience pat downs before continuing inside. Barriers surrounding neighborhoods and city streets contain “security fences designed to guide crowds and constrain free movements” (Savitch 2005, 382). The government has soldiers at entrances, cameras everywhere, and they search vehicles before entering parking facilities (Savitch 2005, 382-383).

Savitch explains the goal of the Israeli government is to build an overall security barrier around Jerusalem entailing 430 miles of concrete walls, observation posts, fences, ditches and patrol paths (Savitch 2005, 384). He says the protective measures are the result of the almost constant barrage of terrorism endured by the citizens. Jerusalem is not alone in this effort to protect itself by turning the city into a fortress, London, Washington D.C. and Paris are following suit. He states the defensive measures have reduced terror in Jerusalem. From 2002 to 2004, attacks have fallen by 80 percent and casualties have dropped by 83 percent (Savitch 2005, 384). Yet these measures come at financial and civil liberties cost. The added equipment, security personnel, barriers, and round the
clock vigilance are expensive. It is also greatly restricts human interaction and freedom. The measures are driven by the immediacy of the threat. For Jerusalem, such measures may be justified, for New York there would be less justification. He concludes that Jerusalem has found these measures necessary but by shrinking the urban spaces and restricting normal life, it accomplishes what the terrorists set out to achieve (Savitch 2005, 390).

**Summary**

This section discussed the counter terrorism methods for MMT. Researchers have examined the challenges and gaps that exist in responding to a MMT attack. They argued how responding to such attacks require greater training, personnel and equipment. Preventing MMT will require change and innovation within the intelligence communities. Providing comprehensive protection against MMT would be extremely costly, sacrificing civil liberties and creating an environment that enhances the terrorist narrative. While based upon an analysis of risk may be suitable and feasible any counterterrorism effort must balance affordable protection with preparation and prevention or deterrence. What are the methods that would deter a MMT attack? That is the research question. The next chapter will discuss the research methodology.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses a comparative case study. The cases studied are the MMT attacks in Belsan Russia in 2004, Mumbai India in 2008 and Nairobi Kenya, in 2013. There are three sections in this chapter. The first section defines a comparative case study. It discusses the strengths and weakness of the methodology. The second section explains the selection criteria. It discusses why this paper chooses these particular attacks to study. The third section outlines the research method. It explains the process used to find the commonalities and or differences of the case studies and how it will use the results to answer the research question.

Definition, Strengths, and Weaknesses of Case Studies

This paper will use qualitative research to answer the research question. Qualitative research begins with an assumption and the study of a problem. It then collects data and analyzes it that is inductive and forms patterns or themes. Finally, the results provide a description and an interpretation of the problem (Creswell 2007, 36-37). A method of qualitative research is case study. A case study approach explores a case or multiple cases “over time, though detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information, and reports a case description and case-based themes” (Creswell 2007, 73). Conducting a comparative case study, is selecting an issue and the researcher selects several cases to illustrate the issue. The design uses the “logic of replication, in which the inquirer replicates the procedure for each case” (Creswell 2007, 74). The researcher gathers the data and compares it to the different cases to identify
commonalities and differences. The researcher uses the results to understand the issue or problem (Creswell 2007, 73).

The strengths of a comparative case study allows the researcher to study the issue from different perspectives (Creswell 2007, 74). Another strength is by analyzing multiple cases; the researcher can pull from very different circumstances, events, and people to mitigate bias. In addition, examining only one case, the researcher has no other reference point in which to compare data. The strength of this method is the comparison of data. Comparative case studies can generate theories (Creswell 2007, 195).

Weaknesses of comparative case studies are the inherent dilution of the analysis. Having to study multiple cases, the researcher cannot delve into the details. The research could miss details that make the case unique. This may cause the inaccurate generalizations (Creswell 2007, 76).

**Case Selection Criteria**

This paper selected to study the MMT attacks in Beslan, Russia in 2004, Mumbai, India in 2008, and Nairobi, Kenya in 2013 because the terrorist’s best exemplified MMT. The preparation, execution and support methods used in the attacks had military-like characteristics. The weapons and fire and maneuver tactics employed by the terrorists were similarly executed by trained infantrymen. Another reason is all the attacks occurred in very different regions on the world and involved different terrorist organizations. The attacks happened from Chechnya, to India, to Africa, involving the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Al Shaabab (Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism 2005, 125). These examples gave the research breadth and depth. In addition, nine years separate the
Beslan event from the Nairobi event. Finding commonalities between these attacks could indicate a trend developing with global terrorism and could lead to theories on how to deter them.

Research Method

The research method is to identify the means (capability), opportunity, and intent of the MMT attackers in each case study. I define means as a capability, method, or resource used to attain a goal. Opportunity is a good position, prospect or chance for success. The intent is the purpose and desired end state of the attackers (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2012, 1-5). I will further analyze the intent by subdividing it into tactical, operational and strategic. Means (capability) opportunity and intent are the criteria to analyze and compare the case studies.

I will first describe each attack separately in chronological order. The Beslan attack is first, followed by Mumbai, and then Nairobi. With each case study, I will present the background information to provide context. Then, I will give detailed description of the event. With that information, I will determine the means (capability), opportunity, and intent of the MMT attackers. I will replicate this method for the other two case studies. After, I have determined the means (capability), opportunity and intent of the MMT attackers in each case study; I will compare them with each other to identify commonalities. Armed with this data, and a brief look at emerging trends that could enhance the impact of such an attack, I will analyze what methods could deter a MMT event.

The purpose is to examine the commonalities to identify what methods would deter the MMT attackers. From a government prospective, the deterring method must be
legitimate, credible, and relevant. Are the deterrent actions legitimate? Are they legal, ethical, and moral in the eyes of civil society they purport to protect? Next, is the deterrent method credible? Does the state possess that capability? Are they willing to use that capability? Can they demonstrate expertise in that capability? Finally, is the deterrent method relevant from a political, financial and threat perspective?

I will use the identified commonalities to determine what method would potentially deter MMT. For example, what would deter the common capabilities of the MMT attackers? What would deter the common opportunities in the environment of the MMT attackers? What would deter the intent of the MMT attackers? In order for the potential solution to be feasible, suitable and acceptable, it must be legitimate, credible and relevant (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2012, 4-8). The potential solutions found will answer the research question of what methods will deter a MMT attack. Furthermore, it could generate a theory of what methods or conditions would create a hostile environment for MMT attackers. By this analysis, it could assist in determining if the environment in the United States is conducive for a MMT attack. In addition, it could help policy makers to decide what role does the United States military have in deterring MMT domestically.

Summary

This chapter discussed what a comparative case study is and why I am using the method to answer the research question. I chose the cases studies because they were geographically different, involved different terrorist organizations, and separated by almost a decade. In addition, each attack best represents the characteristics of MMT. This gives the research the greatest opportunity for comprehensive study. I discussed how I
would analyze the case studies and the criteria used to determine commonalties. Finally, I presented how I would identify and test the methods to deter MMT attacks for effectiveness. The next chapter is the analysis of the research.
CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH ANALYSIS

This chapter will begin by discussing the MMT attack in Beslan Russia in 2004. Subsequently, I will identify the means (capabilities), opportunities and intents of the terrorists. This will be the same process for the Mumbai and Nairobi case studies. Next, to identify the commonalities of the three attacks, I will list the key factors in a chart. Analysis of the commonalities will answer the subordinate research question of how conducive is the environment in the United States for a MMT attack. Last, I will discuss potential approaches for deterrence. These deterrence methods should be legitimate, credible and relevant.

Background to Beslan

Chechnya is located inside southern Russia in the northern Caucasus Mountains. Chechnya society is a traditional tribal society that embraces a warrior ethic. “Chechens have a festering and deep-seated hatred of Russia” because of 200 years of Russia’s efforts to subjugate them (Shultz and Dew 2006, 106). The consequence of the perpetual Russian-Chechen conflict is a creation of a culture in Chechnya where violence is ingrained (Lengel 2014, 38). Over the centuries, a Chechen warrior ethic and knowledge of warfare developed into a contemporary self-image that one Chechen fighter is worth 10 of his enemies. He expects to fight to the death rather than dishonor his family, clan, and his nation (Shultz and Dew 2006, 107). Chechen society teaches its boys from an early age “fighting is part of life, courage is a supreme virtue, honor is precious, cruelty
toward enemies is no sin, and cowardice brings shame on family and clan” (Shultz and Dew 2006, 111).

Male Chechens follow the traditional ethic of *adat*, which is a code of honor that demands the family avenge the killing or injury of a family member. They must settle the score with those responsible no matter how long it takes. The family will demand justice to maintain their honor, whether immediately or in 20 years (Shultz and Dew 2006, 112-113). This ethic underscores the constant felt need for revenge against the invading Russians.

Adding to this ethic is their belief in Islam. By the late 18th century, the majority of Chechens had become Muslims (Lengel 2014, 38). Sufism is the predominant strain of Islam in Chechnya and confers its followers a belief they are superior to the enemy. The concept of holy war unified the region to resist outside influences and invaders. It motivated and inspired the men to fight vastly numerically (and technologically) superior Russian forces (Shultz and Dew 2006, 137). The Russian-Chechen conflict dates back to the days of Peter the Great. In the almost constant struggle to resist submission to the Russians, the Chechens learned that their military success against the Russians relied on unconventional combined arms approaches, small unit tactics, hostage taking and terrorism.

The modern manifestation of the Chechen Russian conflict began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Chechnya declared its independence from Moscow and held its own presidential elections. Boris Yeltsin’s government rejected the results and relations between the two soured. In December 1994, Russia sent a large military force to Chechnya to reassert its control. This started the First Russian-Chechen
War (Lengel 2014, 41). In retaliation for the invasion, on June 14, 1995, 250 Chechen militants led by their commander Shamil Basayev attacked a hospital in southern Russia. They carried rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, explosives and large quantities of ammunition. They took approximately 2,500 hostages. After three days of negotiations, Chechen terrorists repulsed a rescue attempt by Russia Special Forces. Boris Yeltsin’s government negotiated a resolution with the hostage takers. The agreement allowed for the safe passage of the terrorists back to Chechnya in return for the release of the hostages (Giduck 2005, 67-70). Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin further agreed with the Chechen terrorists to suspend all Russian offensive operations in Chechnya. By humiliating the Russian government, the Chechens achieved their goal (Lengel 2014, 42). The Chechens learned terrorism could get results.

Following the second Russian invasion into Chechnya, the terrorism resumed. In March 2001, they seized a Russian passenger jet in Medina, Saudi Arabia. Later that month, Chechen gunmen held a hundred hostages for 12 hours in an Istanbul hotel (Shultz and Dew 2005 135). On October 13, 2002 at the theater northern Moscow, Chechen terrorists wearing camouflage and carrying AK-47 assault rifles attacked and seized more 800 hostages including the actors, dancers, production crew, and many children. Female terrorists concealed in the audience, joined the attackers by putting on traditional Muslim clothing and wearing suicide vests. They emplaced explosives throughout the theater and around the hostages sitting on the floors. They sent a message to responding authorities saying the world needs to notice the Russians are killing innocent women and children in Chechnya. They told the Russians that they were ready to die for Allah (Giduck 2005, 77-79). The siege ended when Russian Special Forces assaulted the
theater after using gas in an attempt to incapacitate the terrorists. They killed most of the Chechen attackers not before more than 100 hostages died (Shultz and Dew 2005, 135). The attention this attack garnered led to the planning for similar type of operations. An elementary school in Belsan Russia was next.

The Beslan MMT Attack

The city of Beslan is thirty miles north of the Chechen border. The residents are mostly orthodox Christian and speak a language unrelated to Chechen or Ingush (Banovac et al. 2007, 95). The proximity to the border and myriad of dirt roads allows for lucrative cross border smuggling operations. These covert avenues of approach allowed the attackers to cross the Chechen border into Russian on the morning of September 1, 2004 by bribing border guards at three checkpoints between Ingushetia (Chechyna) and North Ossetia (Giduck 2005, 112,115). A terrorist organization known as Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs was responsible for planning executing the operation (Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism 2005, 125). The assault comprised of two teams. The first team infiltrated into Beslan the night before and may have staged heavy weapons and supplies in the basement of the school. They were responsible for clearing the school from the inside out once the second team launched the assault. The second team was responsible for gathering hostages and forcing them inside (Banovac et al. 2007, 10).

Wednesday September 1, 2004 was the first day of school. Children with their parents arrived at the school taking part in a commencement celebration. The attack occurred at approximately 9:00 a.m. Team two, armed with automatic weapons, grenades, sniper rifles, night vision devices, gas masks, explosives and silenced weapons
quickly surrounded as many people as possible and forced them into the school (Giduck 2005, 115). In total, the attackers consisted of 12 Chechen, eight Ingush, two Ossetians, two Arabs, two Russians, and three other men. There were also two Chechen women in the group (Boykewich 2005, 158-159). The terrorists took around 1200 people mostly women and schoolchildren hostage.

The first few hours of the assault the people were in shock. Some believed it was a military training exercise (Giduck 2005, 116-117). The terrorists drove the people into the gymnasium and promptly removed all cellular and video recording equipment from the captives in order prevent any of the hostages revealing information about the situation to responders (Banovac et al. 2007, 11). The attackers forced men and boys at gunpoint to stack furniture to create barricades in order to hinder responding authorities from entering the school. The terrorists shot them after they completed the work (Fox 2009, 10). Other terrorist operatives lined the inside of the gymnasium with mines and explosives intended for blowing up the school (Bransten 2004). The terrorists laid an intricate array of explosives from the floor to the basketball hoops. Smaller bombs hung above the hostages while they laid the larger ones on the floor (Banovac et al. 2007, 12). The attackers also brought improvised explosive devices in plastic bottles filled with nails, bolts and screws used as remote detonated booby traps (Giduck 2005, 121-122).

At 9:45 a.m., the Ministry for Emergencies in North Ossetia reported up to Moscow that terrorists had seized the school. By 10:30 a.m., local police tried to establish a perimeter around the school and waited for reinforcements (Giduck 2005, 125). The terrorist leader dubbed, the “Colonel” demanded that Chechen political prisoners be released and that Russian forces leave Chechnya (Boykewich 2005, 159). Throughout the
negotiations, the attackers inside continually improved their defensive positions in preparation for the inevitable Russian assault to come. The terrorists denied the hostages any water and food. The gymnasium packed with people, became an oven in the hot September sun. This forced many of the hostages to strip off their clothes. At around 11:30 that morning Ossetia’s President arrived on scene. He brought with him a large contingent of Russian police and special military forces (Bransten 2004). The situation remained mostly unchanged for rest of the first day.

By day two, 20,000 people had gathered near the school creating a “circus-like atmosphere” filled with reporters, command posts, government officials, soldiers and grieving relatives (Giduck 2005, 135). During the day, the terrorists passed a list of demands to Russian authorities. Again, they insisted Russians leave Chechnya. They also wrote, “The Chechen people are leading a nation-liberating struggle for its freedom and independence, for its self-protection rather than for destruction or humiliation of Russia. We offer you peace, but the choice is yours” (Banovac et al. 2007, 15). The situation remained in a stalemate for the remainder of day two. That night, three Russian tanks arrived outside the school (Bransten 2004).

On September 3, 2004, the third day of the siege at approximately 12:50 p.m., the terrorists agreed to allow emergency service personnel to remove some bodies lying in heaps both inside and outside the school (Giduck 2005, 144). Two cars from the emergency ministry pulled up in front of the school. Following that, two explosions erupted inside the school (Bransten 2004). It is still unsure if the terrorists or Russians initiated the assault, but following the explosions, panic ensued amongst the hostages. Negotiations were over.
The attackers began firing from windows at escaping hostages, and approaching government troops. They also began shooting everyone inside. Frantically, hostages fled anyway possible. Russian soldiers fired back and began trying to retake the school. Ten minutes after the first explosions the ceiling in the gymnasium collapsed (Giduck 2005, 147-148). Russian Special Forces fired gas inside the school and used tanks to blow through barricades. Four Russian military aircraft arrived to support the assault. The gun battle continued well into the night of September 3 (Bransten 2004). All of the terrorists were killed but one. Three hundred and sixty two hostages and Russian troops died and 700 were injured, many were children (Fox 2009, 17).

The Means of the MMT Attackers at Beslan

The pseudo military doctrine of the Chechen MMT attackers derived from lessons learned from decades of war with the numerically superior Russian armies. Unable to battle Russian forces head on, they adapted unconventional methods such as terrorism (Shultz and Dew 2006, 141). The Chechen guerrillas orchestrated a theater of terror by planning and conducting a large spectacular operation seizing hundreds of hostages and thus seizing media attention. In the ensuing siege with Russian security forces, they constructed fortress like defensive positions integrating direct fires and explosives to repel or punish rescuers. They conducted reconnaissance on the target physically, via internet and by informants (Fox 2009, 6-7). Their defensive tactics resembled those of an infantry unit. The core method the Beslan attackers used to terrorize and kill was firearms and explosives.

They had organized into a platoon-sized element consisting of 32 known assailants. They operated using a chain of command with a defined leader with the
militaristic title of “the Colonel” (Bransten 2004). The Beslan attackers had planned, rehearsed, and pre-staged men, weapons and equipment prior to the attack (Fox 2009, 5-6). The Chechen attackers possessed such overwhelming firepower, that initial responding forces were helpless. A few local police officers tried to intervene but their attempts proved futile. The terrorists possessed weaponry and equipment with almost equal capability to Russian military forces. The terrorists fired thousands of rounds during the three-day siege revealing they had arrived prepared not to run out of ammunition. They used explosives to block ingress and egress routes and to create the “shooting fish in the barrel” effect. They had either stolen or bought the weapons and vehicles used in the attack from Russia security forces (Banovac et al. 2007, 6). To overcome the capabilities of the Beslan attackers required Russian authorities to gather and use substantial combat power to include heavy machine guns, grenades and tanks.

It is very difficult and costly for a military to launch an attack against prepared defensive positions. Modern weaponry, artillery and airpower have mitigated this cost by their ability to destroy enemy fortified positions with precision. Yet, by taking hostages, the Beslan attackers negated this advantage. Russian military forces had the dangerous task of assaulting a fortress with defenders using interlocking sectors of fire, obstacles, and explosive booby traps. Not only did they have to attack, they had to save innocent schoolchildren taken as hostages. Military offensive doctrine dictates attacking forces outnumber defenders by a 3:1 advantage. Facing 30 defenders, the Russians would need at least 90 heavily armed and well-trained soldiers. Such forces are scarce to find on short notice. Adding to the pressure on Russian military forces, were hundreds of families,
government officials and television reporters scrutinizing every move they made. This combination would be a “wicked problem” for any state’s security forces.

**Opportunity of the Beslan MMT Attackers**

Those who intend to harm others may have the capability to do so, but they must have the opportunity or be correctly positioned for success. Part of why the Beslan attackers were able to achieve what they did is because of the environment in which they operated. The border between North Ossetia and Chechnya resembles the border of two warring states more than an internal boundary between provinces. Masses of military forces and police with assault rifles staff the border crossing points. Soldiers scrutinize passports, visas and the reasons for travel (Giduck 2005, 54). This line of demarcation provided the opportunity for the Chechen attackers to plan, recon, target, resource, train and rehearse their complex operation in a safe haven. They selected a target only 30 miles north of the border easing the logistical challenges. They took advantage of existing black market smuggling networks to infiltrate past the border. They chose the school because it offered advantageous defensive positions (Fox 2009, 7). It also was an elementary school full of those unarmed, unable to resist, and most likely to punish Russian society.

The key to Beslan attacker’s ability to conduct their operation was having a safe base from which to plan and deploy. They were able to conduct their planning in a relatively permissive environment in the southern mountains of Chechnya still free from Russian control where their actions in planning would be unlikely to raise undue attention (Shultz and Dew 2006, 141). They were then able to leverage the support of existing groups like organized crime. Afghanistan is a prime example of terrorist (insurgent)
groups using well-established organized crime groups to transit men and material from safe-havens to the point of attack (Falkenburg 2013, 13).

**Intent of the MMT Attackers at Beslan**

Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew view the Beslan attack as the result of increasing escalation of brutality between Russia and Chechnya. The Russian army fought with little concern for international laws of armed conflict and the Chechens fought back without restraint. This escalation created a situation where no one was off limits. Women and children had become legitimate targets (Shultz and Dew 2006, 143). Therefore, the intent of the MMT Beslan attack at the tactical level was revenge for Russian military violence against their citizens. The operational purpose of the attack according to Nur-Pashi Kulayev (the only known surviving terrorist) was to re-ignite the Russian-Chechen war. They would achieve this by the targeting of Ossetian children. They believed the Christian Ossetians would take revenge on the Muslim Ingush and Chechen neighbors (Banovac et al. 2007, 17). This would launch the region into a widespread Muslim-Christian conflict. Strategically, the purpose was coercing the Russian government into allowing Chechen independence. Foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda traveling to Chechnya viewed the attack as a continuation of the jihad against Russian infidels. Two of the Beslan attackers were Arabs (Shultz and Dew 2006, 144). The Beslan attack had a clear political purpose.

John Giduck writes how the single common factor in all terrorist attacks is media attention. The Beslan attack trumped other Chechen terrorist operations by the large number of hostages and that mostly children. These factors were certain to make international headlines unlike their previous efforts. Attacking and terrorizing an
elementary school would ensure the world would see and never forget (Giduck 2005, 199). Terror works when society perceives the violence perpetrated is way beyond moral convention. This differs from country to country depending on that society’s culture. The Beslan terrorists like ISIL, exemplifies this approach opting for increasingly macabre ways of killing people. The terrorists responsible for Beslan intended to carry out an attack beyond any scope of civilized society. However, killing people in regards to terrorism is only useful if there is an audience to witness it. Therefore, the purpose of the attack was an attrition strategy to persuade the Russians that Chechen rebels are strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs so they would yield to their demand for Chechen independence (Kydd and Walter 2006, 59). Furthermore, it was to humiliate the Russian security forces in front of the world. Next will be the case study of the MMT attack in Mumbai, India in 2008.

**Background to Mumbai MMT Attack**

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) is a terrorist organization that originated in Pakistan. The organization emerged from Markaz D’wa wal-Irshad (Centre for Preaching and Guidance). Markaz D’wa wal-Irshad followed puritanical Islamic teaching from the Wahhabis sect and adhered to an interpretation of the Salafist ideology that motivated them to create an armed wing on February 22, 1990 (Mahadevan 2013, 1). Marc Sageman explains the global Salafi jihad ideology advocates for the restoration of authentic Islam. The goal is the reestablishment of “past Muslim glory in an Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries” (Sageman 2004, 1). Followers of the ideology want to wage violent jihad in order to wipe out local political structures or heretical to Islam heresy (near enemy) and to defeat
Western powers (far enemy) that prevent establishing the “true Islamic state” (Sageman 2004, 1).

One of the founders of Markaz D’ wa wal-Irshad believed in a borderless Islamic Caliphate where all Muslim territories are united. LeT believes India is part of a “Crusader-Zionist-Hindu” alliance and is an enemy to Islam (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1). From the beginning, LeT had close ideological ties and alliance with Al Qaeda. Both groups set out to build an international reputation by providing aspiring jihadists quality instruction in military tactics learned from the Soviet-Afghan war (Mahadevan 2013, 2). Unlike Al Qaeda, LeT focused on leading Muslims to retake India creating a Muslim caliphate over the entire subcontinent, which they believe, was part of the Muslim world (Riedel 2009, 116).

Pakistan’s army and the Inter-Services Intelligence played a key role in the creation and development of LeT (Riedel 2009, 115). The army provided protection and assistance in order for LeT to wage a proxy war against Indian forces in the Kashmir province. LeT’s leadership saw Kashmir as the foothold to wage further war in the “re-conquest” of India. During the course of this proxy war, the LeT began conducting suicide raids. Their gunmen would attack Indian security posts, kill as many soldiers and police officers as possible with little regard for their own lives (Mahadevan 2013, 2).

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States designated LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization because of their close ties with Al Qaeda. In 2002, the Pakistan government outlawed LeT. Regardless, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence continued to support LeT’s terrorist attacks against India in the Kashmir region (Kronstadt 2008, 3-4). Al Qaeda fugitives fleeing from the United States military
in the Afghanistan invasion found safe havens among LeT in Pakistan. This further strengthened their ranks (Mahadevan 2013, 3).

Prem Mahadevan stated there are three factors led to LeT’s escalation of global jihadist operations. First, the campaign in Kashmir India was not going well. LeT developed a surplus of jihadists. Its training camps were producing more combat graduates than were employed. LeT leadership worried unless they developed more targets, demoralization would set in from inactivity. The second factor was in July 2007, the Pakistani army begun attacking terrorist bases inside the country. Pakistani Taliban felt betrayed and fought back. The Inter-Services Intelligence turned to the LeT for intelligence to fight Pakistani Taliban. They labeled LeT as a loyal jihadist force. LeT assisted in defusing the infighting occurring inside Pakistan. Their narrative was jihad should be against non-believers and not fellow Muslims. This led to LeT’s expansion to conduct attacks outside Pakistan.

The third factor was by 2007, a generational change had occurred in LeT. The new middle managers now wanted to join Al Qaeda’s global jihad. Sajid Majeed, a leader in LeT and planner of the Mumbai attack, was a former army officer and Inter-Services Intelligence operative. He believed mass-casualty attacks on non-Muslims were essential to the global caliphate vision. He hatched a plot of a suicidal amphibious assault to strike simultaneously Western and, Israeli tourists, and Indian citizens in Mumbai (Mahadevan 2013, 4).

The Mumbai MMT Attack

Mumbai is a densely populated metropolis with a vast social stratification of wealth and poverty. It is the “commercial and entertainment epicenter of India, and home
to the world's third largest stock exchange” (O’Rourke 2010, 46). Mumbai is the symbol of a new and modern India (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1). The terrorists sailed from Karachi on a cargo vessel. Then they hijacked a fishing boat, murdered the crew, beheaded the captain and continued to Mumbai. On the evening of November 26, 2008, the 10 members of the terrorist organization LeT landed via two motorboats on the coastline of Mumbai. They were armed with AK-56 assault rifles with seven magazines a piece, 9mm pistols, 8 to 10 hand grenades, and Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) packed with ball bearings for shrapnel to function as fragments to increase casualties (Rabasa et al. 2009, 3-4). They used global positioning system handsets, satellite phones, Voice over Internet Protocol phone service and high-resolution photos of their target buildings (Kronstadt 2008, 2). They split into four teams, one group of four and three groups of two. They then moved to predetermined target locations to begin their attacks.

Their plan was to use shoot and move tactics and coordinating their efforts. Each team would attack different locations simultaneously using as many destructive methods as possible. They combined mass shootings with carjacking, drive-by shootings, IED emplacement, hostage taking, building takeovers, arson, and barricading themselves (Rabasa et al. 2009, 5). At 9:20 p.m., the attackers began their assault. One two-man team went to the Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Mumbai’s main train station and began firing into the crowd. They continued this rampage for 90 minutes indiscriminately killing all they encountered without meeting any police resistance. This team then traveled to the Cama and Albless Hospital where they continued to kill all they found. Next, this same two-man team ambushed and hijacked a police car and shot their way into the Trident-Oberoi Hotel before Indian police stopped the assault (Rabasa et al. 2009, 5).
The next two-man team moved to the Nariman House that is a Jewish group community group. They threw hand grenades at the gas station near the building and opened fire in the lobby. They took hostages and prepared to fight off law enforcement. The third two-man team traveled to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel where the same scenario played out. Except this team contacted the local media and demanded all Mujahedeen released in exchange for hostages. They also exaggerated their numbers to the media to increase the confusion of the situation. They continued the standoff for 17 hours before authorities killed them (Rabasa et al. 2009, 6).

The four-man team traveled to the luxurious Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. In route, they took the opportunity to attack those inside the Leopold Café killing ten people. Once they arrived at the Hotel, they entered through the back of the building and began killing all they encountered. This continued for 60 hours as they moved throughout the hotel setting fires to the building, shooting anyone found and battling Indian police trying to end the massacre (Rabasa et al. 2009, 6).

India’s security forces scrabbled to gain situational awareness. Using the dispersed attack, the terrorists confused responding authorities as to their size, composition and location. Home Minister Shivraj Patil deployed the Indian National Security Guard commandos within 90 minutes after the attacks began. However, confusion and lack of preparedness delayed their employment until some ten hours after the first initial shootings began. By this time, the terrorists had killed most of the hostages they had taken. It took two full days until Indian National Security Guard commandos cleared the Taj Mahal and ended the siege (Kronstadt 2008, 2). The Indian authorities declared the attack finally over on November 29, 2008 at 8:50 a.m. (Rabasa et al. 2009,
The Means of the MMT Attackers at Mumbai

The MMT attackers used the dispersed attack methodology for their operation. Former members of Pakistan army’s Special Services Group provided this training and guidance. This fire and movement proved vital to the effectiveness of the Mumbai attack (Mahadevan 2013, 2). Their tactics and coordination mimicked infantry squad tactics. According to the U.S. Senate congressional testimonies conducted in January 2009, Charles E. Allen, the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis for Department of Homeland Security, called the group a “well armed, well trained, terrorist cell.” The attackers were able to fight off responding officers using “basically, the weapons of an infantryman” (United States Congress 2009, 5). The New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly testified that the Mumbai attack was a shift in tactics from suicide bombs to a “commando-style military assault where small teams of highly-trained, heavily armed operatives launched simultaneous sustained attacks” (United States Congress 2009, 9). Small arms attack was the core method the Mumbai attackers used to terrorize and kill.

The attackers overmatched the Indian security forces during the firefights. The terrorists had better type weapons than most Indian police or security guards type weapons. Additionally, they intentionally attacked unguarded targets filled with people unlikely to fight back (Rabasa et al. 2009, 7). Their shoot and move tactics throughout the large city presented a complex, confusing, and chaotic problem for responding authorities. Those Indian police officers who did try to confront the MMTs were in
unfamiliar circumstances. Accustomed to crime fighting, the officers had to transition within minutes to urban combat. The police officer’s adversaries continually maneuvered to positions of advantage. Indian authorities had to scramble find forces with superior weaponry to gain fire superiority over the terrorists. The Mumbai attackers employed techniques and tactics found on modern day battlefields against police officers who were not trained or prepared for this type of threat (O’Rourke 2010 46).

Mid-ranking Inter-Services Intelligence officials provided the agents who arranged for the contacts, intelligence, weapons and funding (Mahadevan 2013, 2). The planners used every technological device available to acquire familiarity with structure layouts, routes throughout the city, unguarded public places, police locations and their likely response methods (Rabasa et al. 2009, 3, 7). The attackers coordinated and communicated their efforts between teams to maximize their effectiveness and with handlers in Pakistan via cell and satellite phones. The Pakistan handlers provided encouragement and tactical advice based on watching live media feeds on the television and internet. The terrorists knew what Indian police knew and how the police were trying to stop them (Rabasa et al. 2009, 7). The terrorists demonstrated they were able to use the very elements modern tools and systems from communications devices to the freedom of information to coordinate their actions and maximize their success. This further indicates how the terrorist threat is evolving in accordance with tactics soldiers have learned on the battlefield.

**Opportunity of the MMT Attackers at Mumbai**

The Mumbai attackers spent over a year planning and preparing for the operation (Rabasa et al. 2009, 3). Pakistan offered a safe haven for this preparation to occur. The
target was the neighboring state of India. This enabled LeT to plan, stage, train, recon, and execute the attack by crossing over the shared border reducing the risk of interdiction. The safe haven country provided security to the terrorists to as they readied for the assault. LeT decided to conduct an amphibious assault to circumvent India/Pakistan border security. According to the RAND Corporation, their movement across the sea was the only possible point of failure for the entire attack (Rabasa et al. 2009, 6). Beslan shared this similarity, namely a safe haven. In addition, the LeT were able to leverage pre-established connections in India and use the social surroundings of Mumbai to provide cover for their actions.

Not only did they have a safe haven to stage the attack but the ability to blend in at the target location. They meticulously conducted reconnaissance activities to identify soft targets. They carefully selected target locations that afforded the greatest opportunity to kill the most people. The Taj Mahal Palace and Trident-Oberoi Hotels “provided ideal venues for killing fields and final bastions . . . they were filled with people-foreigners and local elite . . . guaranteed international media coverage” (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1). Media televises suicide blast only for a short while. The Mumbai MMTs used shoot and maneuver tactics transitioning to a hostage taking stronghold. This ensured prolonged live international media coverage and heightened the theater of terror.

Like Beslan, a team of the Mumbai attackers chose to seize hostages and establish defensive positions. The terrorists used the Taj Majal as a defensive fortress, giving them a position of advantage over the assaulting Indian security forces. The situation presented many of the same complexities as found in Beslan. To save the hostages trapped in the Taj Mahal while defeating a heavily armed fire team would require military forces
capable of such tasks. To deploy such forces takes time. However, as minutes pass, civilian casualties mount and the terrorists are able to improve their positions of advantage increasing the cost and risk of the response.

**Intent of the MMT Attackers at Mumbai**

The RAND Corporation reported that according to the testimony of the only surviving terrorist; the purpose of the operation was to kill as many people as possible. The question rises why use firearms instead of bombings which had proven successful in the past. The decision to use primarily firearms instead of bombs may have been because Indian security forces’ prevention efforts were mostly bomb-centric. Perhaps by using firearms instead of bombings, the operatives could portray themselves as warriors instead of “mere button-pushing suicide bombers” (Rabasa et al. 2009, 6-7). Yet, by striking the heart of the Indian tourism market and creating a siege in the Taj Mahal, it was certain to create a theater of terror. A drama played out for two and half days.

At the tactical level, the purpose of the Mumbai attack may indeed have been to kill as many “unbelievers” as possible. The attack sent the message to the Indian people that “your government cannot protect you. No place is safe” (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1). Operationally, the LeT intended the attack as another operation in the global Salafi jihadist’s war against the “Crusader-Zionist-Hindu alliance” (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1). Counterterrorist expert Exum believes the most dangerous organization in the world is the terrorist that can incite a Pakistan Indian War (Padukone 2011, 71). In addition, it was their objective to escalate the Pakistan India conflict whereby refocusing Pakistan’s military away from anti-jihadist operations and more toward India (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1).
Strategically, LeT intended to prove it is just as capable as Al Qaeda to the global jihadist world and joining the “A team of international terrorism” (Riedel 2009, 119). LeT’s initial focus was Kashmir. Kashmir remains central to LeT’s agenda. Their strategy in the Mumbai attack was to refocus the world on the Kashmir issue. Furthermore, the viciousness of the attackers in their indiscriminate mass shootings and taking hostages in a besieged Taj Mahal, enticed the world to watch the drama unfold via ceaseless media coverage. Strategically, LeT intended to humiliate the Indian security forces in front of the world (Rabasa et al. 2009, 2). The next case study is the MMT attack in Nairobi, India in 2013.

Background to the MMT Attack at Nairobi Kenya

Harakat Al Shabaab Al Hujahidin (Mujahidin Youth Movement) was responsible for the MMT attack at the Westgate Mall on September 21, 2013. Al Shabaab formally announced their formal affiliation with Al Qaeda in February 2012 (Blanchard 2013, 2). They originated from the violent clan based Somalia human landscape of the 1990s. Somalia, afflicted by corruption, starvation, severe economic inequality, and lack of governance was a ready-made recruiting ground for Al Qaeda (Shultz and Dew 2006, 99). The absence of government in Somalia during this time empowered local Islamic courts to settle clan based disputes. This gave rise to an affiliated militia known as Al Shabaab. Leaders of Al Shabaab envisioned uniting Somalia as an Islamic caliphate state (Blanchard 2013, 2). As Somalia continued to destabilize, Islamists gained power. The United Nations tried to set up provisional governments to counter the chaos. These transitional governments were unable to control the porous borders, secure the capital in Mogadishu and fight Al Shabaab (Blanchard 2013, 2).
Al Shabaab began to impose their version of Islam violently in southern Somalia. They cut off limbs and executed people using fear to spread their influence (Ibrahim 2010, 285). Fearing the violence in Somalia might spread beyond their borders, the United Nations mandated the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As the transitional Somali Government was unable to provide for its security, it relied on AMISOM forces for help. Countries contributing troops to the AMISOM were mostly neighboring states affected by Somalia’s growing threat. The troops came from Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (Blanchard 2013, 2). In 2011, AMISOM forces launched offensives into Somalia to defeat Al Shabaab. They were able to drive them from Mogadishu and other large cities and into rural areas. However, Al Shabaab fought back launching guerillas style attacks against AMISOM. They targeted government, civilian, AMISOM and foreigners using assassinations, IEDs, mortars, grenades, mass shootings, and suicide attacks (Blanchard 2013, 2).

Al Shabaab used the AMISOM offensives as a call to arms to jihadists worldwide to fight against the invading non-believers. Jihadists came to Somalia from Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Pakistan, Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States (Blanchard 2013, 4). With support from foreign fighters, Somali diaspora, and Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab began terrorizing AMISOM countries to coerce them into leaving Somalia. Al Shabaab propagandized that AMISOM is working for the United States. Thus, justifying attacking targets in Ethiopia and Kenya as furthering the campaign against the Crusading Zionist alliance (Ibrahim 2010, 284).

When Kenyan military forces invaded Somalia in October of 2011 to fight Al Shabaab, it escalated the conflict. Kenya is 80 percent Christian and Al Shabaab declared
this action as an attack on the Muslim faith (Mwangi 2012, 26). Al Shabaab charged, “Kenyan military has massacred innocent civilians in southern Somalia during its operations and it threatened to increase attacks if Kenya does not withdraw its troops” (Blanchard 2013, 6). The MMT attack at the Westgate mall in Nairobi was Al Shabaab’s opportunity to strike at Kenya where it would hurt most.

The MMT Attack at the Westgate Mall Nairobi Kenya

The Westgate Mall in Nairobi Kenya is a popular place for locals and tourists to gather for shopping and socializing. It symbolizes prosperity, modernity, and “Kenya’s newfound decadence” (Gettleman 2013, 2). On September 21, at approximately 12:30 p.m. four terrorists arrived at the Westgate Mall armed with AK-47s, G-3 assault rifles, and grenades (Gettleman and Kulish 2014, 2). They threw three hand grenades into the mall’s entrance and split into two groups. One team entered the mall through the main entranceway shooting everyone encountered. The second team made their way to the rooftop-parking garage and entered the rear of the mall. They opened fire on adults and children attending a cooking competition before going inside (Provost Marshal General 2014, 8). At the time of the attack, there was an estimated 800 to 1000 shoppers in the mall. The terrorist’s intent was to execute a “complex, two pronged assault” trapping victims inside and preventing escape (Gettleman and Kulish 2014, 4). Both teams continued to move through the mall shooting victims indiscriminately. The initial report made to Kenyan authorities was that a robbery was taking place at the mall and there were between 10 and 15 perpetrators.

After one hour, the attackers met together inside the Nakumatt Super Market. They began methodically executing those people found hiding. Witnesses report the
attackers asking the hostages if they were Muslim. To provide proof, they demanded the hostages quote parts of the Koran. If unsuccessful, the attackers shot them. Meanwhile local police tried to set up a perimeter around the mall. It was two hours and fifteen minutes after the initial attack before the Kenyan Police Service’s General Service Unit arrived at the mall and another 15 minutes before they made entry (Provost Marshal General 2014, 8).

The police quickly found themselves poorly equipped to deal with this threat. One hour after making entry the Kenyan police transferred authority of the scene to the military. This mid situation change of authority resulted in the fratricide of one Kenyan Police Service’s General Service Unit police officer by military personnel. The following day, at around 10:00 a.m., Kenyan forces attempted to enter the ground floor of the mall but had to withdraw under sniper fire. Next, they attempted a top-down assault from a helicopter insertion on the roof of the mall. There followed several explosions inside the mall that hindered the rescue attempt. Additionally, the attackers began lighting parts of the mall on fire hampering rescue attempts. Finally, at 7:00 p.m. on Monday September 23, Kenyan Defense Forces fired rocket-propelled grenades inside the supermarket where the terrorists had barricaded themselves (Provost Marshal General 2014, 8-12). The incident nearly destroyed the Westgate Mall. The attack killed 72 people including the terrorists and six Kenyan soldiers (police officers) (Anzalone 2013, 2). Many people are still missing.

The Means of the MMT Attackers at Nairobi

The attackers used fire and maneuver tactics. They operated in two, two man teams with one team attacking the front entrance and the other attacking from the top
down. This method trapped many people inside and caused confusion of responding authorities on the size, composition and location of the perpetrators. It was described by eyewitnesses that they “dashed into the mall from different floors at the same time, opening fire . . . these guys were good shooters . . . you could tell they were trained” (Gettleman and Kulish 2014, 2-3). The terrorists showed evidence of military style training by using a combination of methods to achieve maximum results. They threw grenades into the building before entering. They coordinated their movements to block escape routes and then methodically traveled through the mall killing victims before finally linking up in the supermarket (Provost Marshal General 2014, 4). Their actions created a “fish in the barrel” effect. Once inside the supermarket they began making defensive preparations similar to the MMTs in Beslan and Mumbai.

They had military weaponry to include fully automatic assault rifles, hand grenades and other explosives. They fired their weapons on semi-automatic instead of fully automatic fire being indicative of an amateur. They successfully repelled numerous security forces attempts to rescue shoppers by superior firepower, gaining positional advantage, and demonstrating emotional composure. Their firepower and initial violence of action over matched the lightly armed security personnel in the mall. Like Beslan and Mumbai, they used firearms as their core means to kill and terrorize.

The mass shootings of tourists and shoppers in the Westgate Mall resembled Mumbai in that duration of the event ensured prolonged media coverage. If Al Shababb just desired destruction of the facility with numerous casualties’, they could have detonated a large vehicle borne improvised explosive device nearby. Instead, they chose to execute an attack similar to Beslan and Mumbai. Yet, bombs do not require the
emotional detachment needed to continue shooting innocent people at close range over
the space of hours. Choosing this method of attack may indicate Al Shabaab recognized
the effectiveness of MMT to attract and prolong massive media attention. Not only did
news outlets show images during the attack, security camera footage from inside the mall
is still available from the internet. Global audiences can still watch the attackers perform
in the theater of terror. From Beslan, to Mumbai, then Nairobi, the use of multimedia by
MMT continues to evolve.

**Opportunity of the MMT Attackers at Nairobi**

The conditions in Somalia provided a safe haven for Al Shabaab to plan, prepare,
train and equip for the attack at the Westgate Mall. What proved to be advantageous for
Al Shabaab was that Kenya and Somalia are neighbors. Isaac Mwangi writes, “Kenya
shares a long porous border with Somalia. This, along with the corrupt officials at the
border crossings, ensures easy entry for any would-be terrorists” (Mwangi 2012, 26). He
further indicates there are Somalia majority suburbs in Nairobi. These Somali suburbs
provided support and sanctuary to potential attackers. These sympathetic Somali
residents contributed to the intelligence and logistical requirements for Al Shabaab. They
ensured the attackers knew the layout of the mall, disposition, composition of security
personnel, and the best time to launch the assault.

Al Shabaab wanted to replicate a Mumbai type attack. The Westgate Mall
provided such an opportunity with masses of tourists, hotels, restaurants and families
(Provost Marshal General 2014, 5). It was unlikely the attackers would meet significant
armed resistance. Furthermore, Al Shabaab later claimed it targeted the Westgate Mall
because Kenyan elites, diplomats, American and Israeli tourists frequented it. The Westgate Mall is also Israeli owned (Blanchard 2013, 7).

Intent of the MMT Attackers at Nairobi

The Mumbai terrorist attack may have influenced Al Shabaab to mimic such an operation. The tactics employed and the target selections are similar. Tactically, Al Shabaab wanted revenge for Kenya’s offensive military operations into Southern Somalia. It was to punish Kenya for participating in AMISOM. It also sent a message to other African states not to support AMISOM as well (Blanchard 2013, 1). Operationally, the attack was a part of Al Shabaab’s campaign to wear down Kenya’s security forces, economic resources and public support. To counter future attacks and quell public fear, the Kenyan government would have to spend significant amounts of money to increase security. This could cause Kenya to withdraw from Somalia (Mwangi 2012, 26). Their aim was to highlight a local—regional issue, namely, Kenya’s involvement in Somalia.

Strategically, the attack demonstrated that Al Shabaab is a threat and it is just as dominant as Al Qaeda and LeT thus attracting recruits and funding (Blanchard 2013, 8). Christopher Anzalone writes that “from Al Shabaab’s perspective, the attack on Westgate Mall was a media triumph . . . the attack followed a year in which Al Shabaab lost control of significant amounts of territory in Somalia” (Anzalone 2013, 1). The event brought Al Shabaab back into international headlines (Anzalone 2013, 6). By creating a theater of terror, Al Shabaab intended to humiliate the Kenyan security forces before an international audience. See tables 1, 2, and 3 for analysis of commonalities.
## Case Study Commonalities

Table 1. Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means/Capability</th>
<th>Beslan</th>
<th>Mumbai</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization Command and Control</td>
<td>Platoon Size (30+) - Two teams, assault and support - Hierarchical, leader with the attack</td>
<td>Squad size (10 man) - Attackers controlled remotely via cell phone by leader in Pakistan - Teams coordinated efforts via phones/radios</td>
<td>Fire team (4 man) - Attackers controlled remotely via cell phone, twitter by team in vehicle near mall</td>
<td>At least fire team or more - Attackers were coordinating efforts with a higher echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Experienced in asymmetric warfare from Russian Chechen conflict</td>
<td>Commando style training</td>
<td>“Highly trained” - Experience in asymmetric warfare</td>
<td>Extensive training and experience in asymmetric warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel</td>
<td>Automatic assault rifles, sniper rifles, mines, NVGs, explosives, IEDs, stolen vehicles, gas masks, trip wires, RPGs - Weaponry capabilities greater than initial responding authorities</td>
<td>Automatic assault rifles, IEDs, hand grenades, - Weaponry capabilities greater than initial responding authorities</td>
<td>Automatic assault rifles, hand grenades, IEDs - Weaponry capabilities greater than initial responding authorities</td>
<td>Military grade weaponry superior to initial responding authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda Operations</td>
<td>Targeting school with many children ensured massive media coverage</td>
<td>Targeted Taj Mahal with international clientele and wealthy Indians ensured massive media coverage</td>
<td>Targeted Westgate Mall with wealthy Kenyans and western diplomats ensured massive media coverage</td>
<td>Targeted a location that ensure massive media coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Dispersed attack - Deliberate Strong point defense</td>
<td>Dispersed Attack - Fire and maneuver transitioning to strong point defense</td>
<td>Dispersed attack transitioning to strong point defense</td>
<td>Dispersed attack - Strong point defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
Table 2. Opportunity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Beslan</th>
<th>Mumbai</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Rehearsals</td>
<td>-Plan selected school for its defensive advantages -Nord-Ost Theater in 2002 provided lessons learned</td>
<td>-Plan selected Taj Mahal for its defensive advantages and target rich opportunities -Kashmir Fedayeen raids provided lessons learned</td>
<td>-Plan selected Westgate mall for its defensive advantages and target rich opportunities</td>
<td>-Selected location for defensive and target rich opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon</td>
<td>-Detailed surveillance, and knew layout of school</td>
<td>-Detailed surveillance, and knew layout of Taj Mahal</td>
<td>-Detailed surveillance, and knew layout of Westgate Mall</td>
<td>-Detailed and surveillance effort to put attackers at position of advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-Operation launched from adjacent safe haven country with sympathetic civilian population</td>
<td>-Operation launched from adjacent safe haven country with sympathetic civilian population</td>
<td>-Operation launched from adjacent safe haven country with sympathetic civilian population</td>
<td>-Operation planned and resourced from a safe haven country -Safe haven was adjacent country with sympathetic population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>-Violence of action during initial assault -Execute early those likely to resist -Targets selected as unlikely to resist</td>
<td>-Violence of action during initial assault -Shoot and maneuver between targets disrupted security force’s response</td>
<td>-Violence of action during initial assault, -Attacked to trap people inside -Targets people likely unarmed</td>
<td>-Excessive violence during initial assault -Targets selected as unlikely to resist -Adapted attack methods to best control situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost/Benefit</td>
<td>-Cost/All terrorists killed or captured, Russian retaliation in Chechnya - Benefit International recognition of Chechen conflict, -Disruption of Russian political harmony</td>
<td>-Cost/ All terrorists killed or captured, Pakistan government escalates campaign against LeT -Benefit International recognition of Kashmir conflict -Disruption of India’s economy, security</td>
<td>Cost/All terrorists killed or captured, Kenyan government escalates campaign against Al Shabaab -Benefit/ Africa countries deterred from participating in AMISOM</td>
<td>-Cost/ Terrorists killed or captured, -Benefit International attention to the terrorists’ grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-Terrorists extended operation for 3 days to prolong media attention</td>
<td>Terrorists extended operation for 60 hours to prolong media attention</td>
<td>-Terrorists extended Operation for 2 days to prolong media attention</td>
<td>-Operation deliberately prolonged to maximize media attention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.
A key difference in the case studies is the Beslan attacker’s main effort was to seize hostages and fortify the school into a strong point defense. The Beslan MMTs initially only shot those resisting or those likely to so. Later, they killed the fleeing hostages once the Russians security forces began their efforts to re-take the school. From such a strong point, they attempted to bargain with Russian authorities. Hours after they seized the school, they contacted Russian security forces and demanded they release Chechen prisoners (Giduck 2005, 128). In contrast, the MMTs involved in Mumbai and

**Table 3. Intent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intent</th>
<th>Beslan</th>
<th>Mumbai</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
<th>Commonalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>-Revenge of Russian atrocities -Mass murder -Appeal to supportive Chechen constituency</td>
<td>-Revenge for Kashmir -Mass Murder -Appeal to supportive Pakistani constituency</td>
<td>-Revenge -Mass murder -Appeal to supportive Somali constituency</td>
<td>-Revenge -Mass Murder -Appeal to supportive constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>-Coerce Russia from Chechnya -Bait Russia into excessive retribution</td>
<td>-Escalate Pakistan/Indian conflict -Bait India into excessive retribution -Re-focus international attention to Kashmir conflict -Damage India’s economy and tourist industry</td>
<td>-Coerce Kenya to leave Somalia -Bait Kenya into excessive retribution -Expand and promote Al Shabaab’s regional influence -Damage Kenya’s economy and tourist industry</td>
<td>-Bait victim state into excessive retribution -Coerce a political change in victim state policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>-Further global jihad narrative Humiliate Russia’s security forces to the world</td>
<td>-Further global jihad narrative -Humiliate India security forces to the world</td>
<td>-Further global jihad narrative Humiliate Kenyan security forces to the world</td>
<td>-Further global jihadist narrative -Humiliate victim state security forces to the world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
Nairobi did not seize hostages nor establish a strong point defense until much later in their operations. They initially maneuvered through the city or the mall shooting victims as they moved from location to location. Finally, they transitioned to hostage taking and establishing a strong point defense after their shooting efforts had culminated. Unlike Beslan, the terrorists in the latter attacks contacted authorities chiefly for deception purposes. This may show the evolution of MMT. Practitioners might have realized that contemporary counterterrorism tactics disfavor negotiations. Therefore, contacting authorities for demands are fruitless. The terrorist’s focus shifted to mass murder and prolonging the crisis thus maximizing media attention.

The identified commonalities increase understanding on the question of how conducive is the environment of the United States for MMT. MMTs developed from states engulfed in multi-year warfare. This allowed for military methods amongst warring factions to mature. Along with combat experience, comes emotional detachment, and proficiency in killing. What is likely from the long periods of conflict studied is those who remained alive were the most skilled in combat. The first responding security forces were facing these sorts of militants. MMTs thrived in states providing safe havens. States offering terrorist organizations safe havens is one of the most important forms of assistance by allowing the MMTs to dictate the pace of the operations and retain the initiative (Byman 2005, 65). The safe haven states enabled freedom of movement for the attackers to prepare, resource, and execute their operations.

Shared accessible border with the safe haven state facilitated the MMT’s operations. The terrorists benefited from black market networks to circumvent border security to move men, weapons, and equipment. This ability of the MMTs to maneuver
undetected between the border of the victim and safe haven state proved vital in all three case studies. The safe haven countries along with the porous borders enabled the terrorists to acquire weaponry and large quantities of ammunition necessary gain fire superiority over police forces. This weaponry allowed the MMTs to dominate citizens and initial responding security forces.

In this facet, the United States may be less conducive for MMT than those in the case studies. The United States does not share a border with a safe haven state similar to Chechnya, Pakistan, or Somalia. The United States geographically is far away from the regions of the world harboring jihadist militant ideology prevalent in the case studies. This ideology heavily influenced the MMTs. Citizens in Chechnya, Pakistan, and Somalia are more sympathetic to populations promoting those views than citizens in Canada or Mexico. Terrorist organizations attempting to mimic Beslan, Mumbai, and Nairobi cross border attack methodology may find a less welcoming host population. Yet, there will always be a constituency providing safe-havens for either single-issue lone wolf or larger communities within a particular area. The challenge for counterterrorist forces is to monitor likely risk areas and prioritize those that pose the greatest risk.

However, the case studies may reveal how MMT continues to evolve. For example, the Beslan attack involved the cross border movement of over 30 terrorists along with large logistical requirements. Mumbai involved 10. They were at least four terrorists who crossed over from Somalia into Kenya to attack the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. This may indicate how terrorist organizers realized fewer operators could achieve the same desired effects and mitigate their risk of detection and apprehension by counterterrorism and border security personnel.
Should MMTs find a suitable safe haven in Mexico; Transnational Criminal Organizations offer the same advantages as in the case studies. Mexican Cartels specialize in illicit smuggling and the black market networks are already in place like Beslan, Mumbai and Nairobi. They have access to night vision goggles, encrypted communication, helicopters, anti-tank 66mm rockets, mines, belt fed machine guns, hand grenades and rocket-propelled-grenades (Quinones 2009, 78). Operating in smaller numbers may allow MMTs to infiltrate past the tighter security that exists between Mexico and the United States. If MMTs find a suitable safe haven in Canada, the access to copious amounts of military weaponry and ammunition may be limited. However, they would find easier access into the United States due to the vastness of the northern border and limited border security. This would facilitate larger infiltrations and operations. Yet, once inside the United States the MMTs may find a less conducive environment to conduct attacks than in the examples.

The MMTs in the case studies were confident their targeted victims would generally lack the capability to fight back with any effectiveness. Most, if not all victims would be unarmed. The MMT’s violence of action, proficiency with firearms, emotional composure, use of shoot and maneuver tactics routed those charged with securing the school, hotels, and mall. Responding police officers lacked the numbers, firepower and coordination required to launch an offensive to end the MMT attack. In every case, authorities needed time to build forces sufficient to counter MMT. The battle for time initially favored the terrorists who desired to draw out the operation to maximize media attention.
Militarized Maneuver Terrorists may not perceive their intended victims lack the ability to fight back inside the United States. Compared to the case studies, United States citizens potentially carry concealed firearms. Like Beslan, Mumbai, and Nairobi, terrorists can gain intelligence on their potential targets such as building layouts, number of security forces available, their response time, and best times to strike. The critical element they cannot account for is the number of potential victims who maybe armed. This not only includes citizens, but also off duty police officers. The possibility of concealed carry citizens increase risk to the success of MMTs’ attacks. The idea of concealed carry adds a formidable obstacle for potential terrorists to overcome (Grossman 2011). This could indicate that states or jurisdictions with tighter gun control laws may be more susceptible to a MMT attack. The combination of not sharing a border with a terrorist safe haven state that supports militant jihadists and liberal firearms policies creates a less conducive environment for MMTs in the United States than those in the case studies. However, this is not absolute.

Terrorism will continue to evolve; this is why deterring MMT is preferred rather than reaction and response. Reacting and responding to attacks allow the terrorists to dictate the encounter with security forces in their favor. MMTs continually adapt to state’s security measures and take advantage of discovered vulnerabilities. Additionally, terrorists can inflict substantial casualties in a very short time, a challenge any response force may not overcome. It is likely a MMT attack will incur extensive physical and psychological damage regardless of the competency of the response force. Therefore, deterring MMT provides a better option.
Having discussed how the environment in the United States relates to those in the case studies, it leads to potential approaches to deter MMTs. These approaches are context dependent and are not the panacea. For example, the case studies involved Islamist terrorist groups. The deterrence approaches discussed may not apply to other non-Islamic terrorist organizations. As the case studies indicated, threats evolve and adapt to counterterrorism tactics. Therefore, deterrence approaches should employ both overt and covert methods. Additionally, the deterrence approaches need to be credible, legitimate and relevant.

**Methods to Deter MMT Attacks**

The terrorist organizations analyzed in the case studies made appeals to Islamic culture, mores, values and beliefs. This is not indicative of all terrorist organizations worldwide. This leads to strategic objectives MMTs wanted to achieve in from the case studies. They intended to humiliate the victim security forces. MMTs are equipped, trained, and they the set conditions to dominate and outperform their victims and government responders while a global audience watches. The terrorist organizations select targets to mitigate the risk of failure and reinforce their credibility. The Beslan School, Mumbai hotels, and Nairobi shopping malls were soft targets.

To deter MMT, terrorists must believe they will likely fail in their attempt. According to Dave Grossman in his lectures called “The Bullet Proof Mind”, what terrorists fear most of all is failure, not death (Grossman 2011). Their failure will bring humiliation upon themselves, their comrades, their organization, and their extremist ideology. The global information age, heightens the reward and the risk. With so much at
stake, they carefully prepare to ensure they humiliate their enemy and not themselves. This fear of humiliation is an important idea in the discussion of deterrence.

Al Qaeda is urging Muslims to harm the societies that have humiliated them (Tobias 2006, 38). They give examples of Abu Ghraib where Muslim men were humiliated by Western crusaders some of them women. Tobias continues by stating that there is growing number of second and third generation diaspora Muslims who are radicalizing. This radicalization begins with their real or perceived sense of Muslim humiliation at the hand of society (Tobais 2006, 37). Albert Borowitz theorizes that terrorist organizations commit atrocities for political gains; yet the terrorists themselves commit these acts in response to an unjust world. They seek self-glorification in response to their perceived indignities. Terrorism is highly effective in gaining media attention and being a shahid (martyr) secures instant fame. “Once a suicide bomber has completed his mission he at once becomes a phantom celebrity” (Borowitz 2005, xiv-xv). Fear of humiliation may be a powerful approach to deter MMT. The next sections describe approaches to deter MMT. As this section introduces recommendations to achieve this deterrence, the details for these potential solutions are in chapter 5.

**Overt Approaches to Deterrence**

In the case studies, the terrorists planned their attacks from an adjacent bordering state. In each case, the attackers were most vulnerable when crossing the border. That was the single point of failure. It would be potentially humiliating to terrorists and their organization if after months of preparation, border security forces caught the terrorists crossing the border. Deterrence only works if the terrorist organization believes they will likely fail if they attempt. The first approach is to strengthen border security. Active
military forces, National Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) should integrate and synchronize tactical intelligence regarding illicit cross border activity. In addition, CBP officer—agents need to train on countering MMTs because they are the agency who will encounter them during their infiltration into the United States. Concurrently, officials need to publicize the efforts ensuring global audiences recognize the United States has border security superiority. Border security superiority is an idea where deeds must match words. Once potential attackers believe United States authorities will certainly capture them attempting to cross into the United States, it will have a deterrent effect.

The next method to deter MMT is the state must possess a capability to respond to such an attack rapidly and decisively. This is the most difficult method because of the factors of time, space, and friction. Yet, if the terrorist organizations believed their attack would fail shortly after it began, it would have a deterring effect. This would require an organization or unit trained, equipped and prepared specifically to dominate these sorts of threats. Importantly, the organization would have to prove itself capable of causing MMT attackers to fail. Having the capability to respond effectively to MMTs within minutes after they initiate their attack, would require robust effort and commitment from the state.

Bill Tallen identified three gaps to counter paramilitary terrorism. The first gap is the lack of training of this type of threat at all levels of government. The second gap is the slow or limited availability of capable counter terrorism units to the attack site. The third is the cumbersome and confusing command and control system where multi jurisdictions and competing interests collide. He recommends addressing these gaps may require force restructuring and doctrinal changes. In the short term, the government
should emphasize training exercises to counter a paramilitary terrorist attack. He advocates for the expansion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hostage Rescue Team by 200 to 300 more agents. He believes this option presents the best solution to solving the three identified gaps (Tallen 2008, 9). Joel Justice recommends local law enforcement departments train to counter Mumbai-style attacks. The training should teach officers dynamic tactics to use during an incident involving multiple shooters at multiple locations and it should be standardized across multiple jurisdictions (Justice 2013, 4).

Their recommendations lacks in addressing the fundamental capability gap that exists between law enforcement and MMTs. Law enforcement officers are equipped, trained and tasked to enforce laws and apprehend criminals while using the minimum amount of force necessary. In contrast, military infantry units are equipped, trained and tasked to destroy enemy infantry. Infantry Soldiers are best suited to counter MMTs.

Every state in the United States should task their National Guard to establish counter MMT units. The governor of the state may lawfully employ his National Guard in a law enforcement capacity. Establishing such units gives the governor the capability to respond decisively to a MMT attack if local officials are overwhelmed. This solution allows infantry to fight MMT.

The third method to deter MMT is what John Giduck calls “Citizen Soldiers” (Giduck 2005, 329). The true first responders during a MMT attack are the citizens at the scene. Dave Grossman believes a reason Beslan and Mumbai style attacks have not occurred in the United States is because of the concealed carry capability of American citizens. He states that would-be terrorists can plan against most factors except who and
how many of their potential victims will be armed with concealed firearms (Grossman 2011). Special Operations soldiers finally killing the terrorists after prolonged sieges contribute to the terrorists’ sense of honor and importance. However, an ordinary citizen stopping the terrorists immediately after they initiate the attack humiliates the attackers, the organization, and the extremist ideology. In order for the citizen soldier concept to deter MMT, the capability must exist, a certain critical mass of civilians must prove to be proficient, and they must be willing to take such action. Authorities can accomplished this by enabling and encouraging active duty military personnel, reservists, National Guard soldiers and military retirees to carry concealed weapons. This in addition to off-duty law enforcement officers increases the saturation in society of individuals willing and able to counter MMT during the first critical minutes of the attack. These methods take an overt approach to deterring MMT. However, indirect or covert approaches provide other options.

**Covert Approaches to Deterrence**

The MMTs in the case studies intended to bait the victim state into excessive retaliation. Yuval Harari writes that without possessing the combat power to wage open warfare, the terrorist organizations hope to beat their enemies using the enemy’s own power much like the French in Algeria, and the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. The terrorists want the states to lose their tempers and be unreasonable with their use of massive firepower. The current political environment must change if the terrorists hope to achieve their goals. Therefore, they desire regime changes, power vacuums and destabilization. Enraging their enemies to wreak vengeance is their best hope for success (Harari 2015, 1).
The situation in Iraq is a good example. The power vacuum left when American forces withdrew from Iraq allowed ISIS to expand. They now control areas larger than the United Kingdom (Wood 2015, 1). They have captivated global audiences using comprehensive multimedia to broadcast their brutality and atrocities. They humiliate their captured victims and taunt states to fight back. Yet, they could not defeat almost any nation in conventional combat. So why do they want to pick a fight? Graeme Wood writes in his article, “What ISIS Really Wants” is another American invasion. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for global jihadists. It would confirm the United States is Muslim killing crusaders (Wood 2015, 27). This might finally unite the entire Muslim ummah in a campaign against the West and Israel.

An emotional overreaction is what these terrorist groups hope to achieve. Social media is a conduit to transfer emotions instantly and globally. Yuval Harari writes that terrorist leaders are not military strategists. They are more like movie producers. Their violence does not harm the nation’s capability to wage war. Their violence incites emotional outrage. They produce and orchestrate theaters of terror that audiences will not forget. “Terrorists undertake an impossible mission: to change the political balance of power when they have almost no military abilities” (Harari 2015, 3). By conducting political violence, they delegitimize states who will declare they will not tolerate political violence. So every successful terrorist attack despite the state’s best efforts to stop it, incites fear of anarchy and that social order is about to collapse (Harari 2015, 4).

To deter MMT attacks may require measures that are more indirect or covert. Harari recommends that states do not retaliate overtly following a terrorist attack. If terrorist leaders are movie producers, they need drama and spectacles to succeed. If states
continually refuse to fight back, then terrorists have no hope to change the balance of power. This is not to say victim states do nothing. They can take strong covert actions. Harari believes the most efficient answer is good intelligence and secretly attacking their funding networks (Harari 2015, 3-4). States could covertly disrupt terrorist’s safe havens, which are so important to the organization.

Another way states could covertly take strong action against MMTs is to shatter their logistical network. Daniel Byman writes that organizational collapse is a common reason terrorist movements are defeated. States can facilitate this collapse by disrupting their logistic networks. States often try to target those who plant the bombs or seize hostages. However, attackers need people to procure false documents, run safe houses, conduct training on explosives, acquire and smuggle weaponry, and move illicit funds. It is harder to replace logisticians than operators (Byman 2005, 69-70). These methods allow states to combat MMTs without retaliating with massive military operations. This approach is also far less costly. This approach may deter MMT attacks if they believe they cannot provoke a fight. It would be humiliating to the organization if after a well-executed attack, the state downplayed the event as irrelevant and life continued as normal. Yet, far removed from cameras and microphones the victim state sought their justice (Harari 2015, 3).

The challenge with a covert approach is one of perception. Citizens demand a response following terrorist attacks. Political leaders eager to appease their constituency may not have the patience for a covert response. To calm societal fears, states have to respond with their own theater, feeding the perception of security. They feel “compelled to stage an equally spectacular counter drama . . . so instead of acting quietly and

69
efficiently, state unleash a mighty storm, which fulfills the terrorists’ most cherished dreams” (Harari 2015, 4). This is why the government should implement deterrent actions before MMTs strike.

It would be most effective if states combine both overt and covert approaches to deter MMT. Establishing border security superiority and counter MMT forces before such an attack will not appear as a reaction to terrorist leaders. States can simultaneously conduct covert actions to disrupt MMTs wherever they may be. Both approaches require active and reserve military participation. The covert approach would require active military support. Domestic MMT deterrence may require National Guard support. However, these approaches may be a deterrent, but there is a danger. This is the paradox of deterrence. If the deterrence approaches are effective, there will be no attacks. If there are no attacks, then there is a tendency to believe the threat has diminished. Thus, in the absence of the threat, the government may divert resources to more pressing matters. This weakens the deterrence methods and invites attackers. Should an attack occur, it could be misunderstood the deterrence approaches failed.

Summary

This chapter discussed the Beslan, Mumbai, and Nairobi MMT attacks. It analyzed their means, opportunity and intent. I used the commonalities identified to answer the subordinate research question on the conduciveness of the environment in the United States for a MMT attack. I assessed the United States is less conducive to MMT because of geographic location, lack of safe havens to Islamic terrorist organizations in neighboring countries, and concealed carry capability of United States citizens. I then discussed approaches to deter MMTs involving both overt and covert methods. The next
chapter will summarize the research and then offer recommendations on how to deter MMT. Finally, it will discuss future research possibilities on this topic.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis began by discussing how MMT is an evolving terrorist tactic, which poses a direct threat to perception of security in the United States. Terrorists have demonstrated the capability and intent to bring skills, tactics and weapons from battlefields to far removed cities where they shoot down innocent victims to coerce political change by inciting fear. The challenge facing those seeking to combat MMT is to mitigate risk, reducing the potential opportunities for such attacks, while maintaining the finite balance between protection and civil liberties. Currently, the United States officials predisposed by active shooter events may misinterpret a MMT attack as another Columbine High School or Sandy Hook. Responding authorities lacking understanding of the characteristics of MMT may take inappropriate actions with costly consequences. Authorities need to understand when and how to transition from countering active shooters to countering MMT. It is critical officials do not conflate these distinct threats.

This thesis aims to bring clarity by articulating the differences between active shooter attacks and MMT. Active shooters are mass murderers using firearms for self-glory or revenge in response to perceived social grievances. These events tend to lack the political context. In contrast, MMTs use multiple capabilities to maximize lethality. Their core technique is to employ firearms and infantry tactics to maximize lethality and influence a target audience in order to effect actor behavior in support of a political end. They will employ a myriad of other weaponry to create a terrorist spectacle. MMTs are well-armed, highly trained individuals conducting planned and coordinating attacks. They use infantry tactics such as dispersed attacks, strong point defenses,
ambushes, fire and maneuver to gain positions of advantage over security forces. The culmination is a theater of terror that seeks to propagate their narrative for political or ideological gain. This clarity will aid Homeland Security, National Guard and other law enforcement agencies tasked with countering domestic terrorism.

Responding to both active shooter and MMT attacks is acutely time sensitive. Even the most robust reaction force cannot prevent such threats and eliminate suffering. Deterrence is the preferred option. This paper sought to identify methods to accomplish deterrence. It also provided possible explanations why MMT attacks have yet to occur in the United States. To answer these questions, I first presented existing research into the nature of MMT.

I discussed multiple frames that exist surrounding this evolving terrorist tactic. U.S. Army officials describe it as swarm attacks or irregular forces. Others classify it as paramilitary, Mumbai-style attack or urban terrorism. MMT combines these frames into one term adding clarity. Dispersed attack is a characteristic of MMT. It is an offensive method combining information warfare with continuous, multi-directional and independent attacks. MMT takes advantage of urban environments that afford the best opportunities due to multiple targets in confined spaces. ISIL exemplifies an organization that uses dispersed attack methodology. They are innovative by fusing terror with infantry tactics, infantry weaponry, hostage taking, brutality, criminality and carefully designed media campaigns. Their methods are effective in seizing global media attention.

Characteristic of MMTs is their preference of using firearms to wage terror. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s study into active shooters highlight the criticality of response time when shooters armed with automatic weapons and sufficient ammunition
move about attempting to kill victims as fast as possible. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s research found the first few minutes are vital if responders expect to minimize casualties. In a very short period, untrained lone shooters are able to cause tremendous physical, emotional, and psychological damage. An MMT attack increases the potential for damage exponentially.

Countering MMT requires a change in mindset and tactics. Countering such an attack at the tactical level requires forces that possess superior training, weaponry, and numbers to defeat terrorism on this scale. Law enforcement officials generally train and work to counter criminality. However, their capabilities may be inadequate when facing MMT. For example, in the Beslan case study it required tanks to breach walls for security forces. In Nairobi, government forces resorted to using rocket propelled grenades to end the siege. These sorts of capabilities typically do not reside with law enforcement and employing such tools would currently require military capabilities and time.

Conducting an MMT attack is not a simple affair. It generally requires a large supporting organization from a state and or terrorist group. Large organizational support provides recruiting, training, equipping, funding, planning, and indoctrinating necessary to orchestrate an assault. Without a safe haven surrounded by a sympathetic population, security forces retain a competitive advantage. There is an increased potential for United States officials to discover domestically developing MMT. Foreign borne MMT or returning fighters pose a greater threat.

I conducted a comparative case study examining the MMT attacks in Beslan, Russia, Mumbai, India, and Nairobi, Kenya. Common to all three case studies were involvement of at least a fire team (four personnel) or greater number of terrorists. They
all coordinated their efforts with an external agent. They possessed extensive training and had experience in asymmetric warfare. In addition, they used military grade weaponry that was superior to initial responding forces. The MMTs in the case studies used the dispersed attack approach combining offensive actions with information warfare. Their information campaign was magnified by committing egregious acts at locations deliberately selected to provoke massive media coverage. These locations afforded defensive and target rich opportunities. In all three events, the perpetrators conducted extensive surveillance gaining vast knowledge of building layouts of their intended target locations.

They planned these operations from safe haven countries adjacent to the victim states. They also benefitted from sympathetic host populations, from which they were able to conduct detailed reconnaissance. In all three attacks, the genesis of the MMTs was in a neighboring state. They took advantage of transnational smuggling networks and or poor border security to pass undetected from their point of origin across the international border and to their objectives. Their success during their assaults was because of their violence of action, superior weaponry and selection of victims unable and unlikely to resist. They intentionally prolonged their terror by seizing hostages and barricading themselves in strong points to maximize media attention.

A common intention of each MMTs was to commit an act of such abhorrence and beyond moral convention that the victim society would be provoked to respond. Such fear-inducing dramas compel states to retaliate and in the case of Nairobi, this has merely perpetuated the conflict. Their hopes reside in the state’s use of excessive force to influence target audiences in supporting the terrorist organization’s goals. This
provocation strategy is akin to lighting the fuse. The strategy is to bait the victim
government into a military response harming civilians in the terrorist’s home state.
Convinced the victim is evil, the recipient population supports the terrorist radical goals
(Kydd and Walter 2006, 69-70).

Influenced by jihadist ideology, the perpetrators in the case studies strategically
sought to further global jihadist goals. In each case, the attackers hoped the retaliation
would help unite Muslims against the “Crusader-Zionist-Hindu” alliance (Rabasa et al.
2009, 1). True to their dramatic form, they scripted the operations to humiliate their
adversaries’ security forces to audiences worldwide. The scenes broadcasted by
multimedia outlets depict a few elite jihadist warriors fighting villainous infidels. They
repel assault after assault by the adversary’s best until in glorious martyrdom they were
overwhelmed. Their cinema portrays the superiority of God’s holy soldiers in a man-to-
man contest against the weaker unbelievers. By humiliating the protectors of their
enemies, the terrorists can attract honor, funding, recruits, resources and power to their
cause.

The commonalities identified in the case studies provided insight into the latent
threat of MMT to the United States. Attacks similar to those experienced by Russia, India
and Kenya have yet to occur in the United States. There are multifarious reasons for this,
with geography providing a distinct advantage with stable borders. In addition, following
9/11 well-financed counterterrorism efforts have, to date, been effective in preventing
large-scale attacks. These factors combined with perceptions of United States’ citizens
armed with concealed weapons have made the environment less conducive to MMT. Yet,
terrorism continues to evolve giving preference to deterrence approaches rather than
constant reactions to change. The tactics terrorists employ will consistently adapt to the environment and security forces countermeasures. Few would imagine on September 10, 2001, Islamic jihadists would seize passenger airlines in flight and conduct kamikaze-like strikes into civilian and military buildings inside the continental United States.

In order to deter MMT, the attackers must believe they will likely fail in the attempt. Failure for MMTs is their operations are defeated in such a manner that elevates the superiority of their target society and further degrades their own. This failure may humiliate the individual, their comrades, their organization, and their ideology. MMTs perception of futility is not enough. If terrorist leaders are more like movie producers than military strategists, then deterring MMT may be analogous to deterring a movie from being made. A producer will probably refuse to make a movie he believes audiences will not want to watch, or they will not turn a profit, and his reputation tarnished in the process. Therefore, overt and covert deterrence approaches must target terrorist’s vulnerabilities. The desire to maintain or establish the reputation of the terrorists may present a vulnerability to exploit. The vulnerability extends to targeting the perceptions of their audiences.

The deterrence methods identified have two approaches. The first approach includes overt methods. These overt methods are bolstering global perceptions that the United States has achieved border security. It is producing our own theaters of security (Harari 2015, 4). This is only effective if terrorists believe the capability is credible. This relates to the concept of border security superiority. The second overt method is a having a reactionary force capable of rapid deployment to achieve decisive results at the tactical level. This targets the perceptions of MMTs that their assault will quickly fail before they
can set the conditions to begin their theater of terror. The third overt method is further fostering the perceptions of citizens having concealed firearms. This perception is deterrent because it adds uncertainty and increases risk to MMTs. Combining these methods together may create a hostile environment for MMTs. Yet one weakness of the overt approach is visibility and susceptibility to threat adaptation.

The second deterrence approach involves more covert methods. This approach involves the idea that movie producers will not make movies they believe audiences will not see. Terrorist leaders may not state theaters of terror on countries that will not fight back. This idea is hard to grasp without understanding that terrorist organizations generally lack the capability to be an existential threat. Their only hope is instigating chaos through causing emotional outrage and inducing fear, fomenting political violence. Yet, if the victim state refuses to retaliate, then the terrorists fail in their hopes (Harari 2015, 4). This approach does not advocate pacification; it involves the state clandestinely attacking terrorist funding, safe havens, logistician and leaders.

The methods to deter MMT are about the battle for perceptions, attitudes and beliefs. Both overt and covert approaches are to influence MMTs so their actions will bring greater humiliation upon themselves, their families, their organization and ideology. It is not fiscally possible for United States Government to protect every possible location MMTs may target. MMTs pose a direct threat to the perception of security in the United States. To counter this threat, counter terrorism strategies need to pose a direct threat to MMTs perception of prestige, honor, respect and glory.
Recommendations

Deterring MMT requires an approach of breadth and depth. Breadth requires a societal and whole of government approach. Depth relates to the fundamental principles of defense. Extending counter-terrorism effects globally to influence and deter in consecutive layers back toward the homeland. I recommend five lines of efforts with the end state being MMT deterred. The lines of effort are disruption of MMT foreign safe havens, integration of tactical intelligence between NORTHCOM, National Guard, and CBP, training CBP officers—agents to counter MMT, establishing National Guard state counter MMT units, and increasing citizen conceal carry capability. Each line of effort consists of the agency or organization tasked and the action they conduct.

There are two components to each action. There is the physical action such as the disruption of MMT safe havens, and there is the information operation connected, such as influencing foreign states not to support MMT. Authorities must execute both of these components simultaneously to be most effective. For example, if CBP trains their agents—officers to counter MMT but the terrorists do not know about this training it will not achieve deterrence. CBP should conduct an information campaign ensuring their counter MMT efforts are widely disseminated. A capability is only a deterrent if the adversary is aware of the capability. Therefore, each line of effort has an action and an essential inform—influence operation jointly executed. See figure 2 for the deterring MMT approach.
The first line of effort is for active military forces to disrupt MMT safe havens. They do this by targeting and disrupting terrorist organizational leadership, logisticians, and funding sources. These should be covert actions concealing the source of the effort thus avoiding the appearance the state is seeking excessive retribution. Simultaneously, they can influence their hosts in not supporting MMT. The goal is creating a less
conducive environment for MMT to thrive. The United States Army is already moving toward that goal. The U.S. Army Concept for Winning in a Complex World 2020-2040 states, “To protect the homeland, the Army deters and defeats attacks and mitigates the effects of attacks and natural disasters. To foster security, the Army engages regionally and prepares to respond globally to compel enemies and adversaries” (TRADOC 2014, 7). To this end, the U.S. Army is moving toward aligning certain army brigades with regions in the world to build relationships and develop cultural understanding necessary to inform/influence foreign audiences. Combining covert kinetic and non-kinetic disruption activities on MMT safe havens abroad is the first deterrence line of defense.

The second line of effort is U.S. Northern Command, Army National Guard and CBP to integrate intelligence sharing and collection at the tactical level regarding terrorist threats suspected of entering the United States. Currently, U.S. Northern Command uses the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (or similar groups) as a collaborative tool to share intelligence (information) between Department of Defense and other federal agencies to combat terrorism (Scharzenburg 2011, 24). This is a post September 11, 2001 solution to facilitate information sharing between federal agencies and Department of Defense. However, such information sharing occurs at the strategic and operational level. There is a tendency for intelligence to move toward higher echelons and rarely disseminated down to tactical levels. Additionally, authorities often discover indicators of terrorist activities at the tactical level vitally important to different lateral and higher echelons. Without collaboration at the tactical level, these opportunities could be lost with catastrophic results.
Simon O’Rourke believed to combat contemporary terrorism a new approach is necessary. The modern environment “contains a combination of non-state actors, cultures and political objectives fed by an extremist ideology that is spread via new communications technologies” (O’Rourke 2010, 49). He believes the best way to gather actionable intelligence to prevent terrorism in the homeland is through local police officers and agencies. Their integration into the communities enables them to notice variances, report suspicious activities and investigate hunches. This information is unavailable to operational and strategic intelligence professionals unless open communication conduits exist. O’Rourke states communication up, down, and across agencies, jurisdictions, and international intelligence partners, needs improvement. It is imperative officials remove barriers restricting information sharing (O’Rourke 2010, 50).

The U.S. Northern Command, Army National Guard, and CBP intelligence officials should integrate at the tactical level to collect and share border nexus intelligence. This integration would allow noticed threat indicators one entity deemed irrelevant to be not lost in bureaucratic compartmentalization. MMTs preparing for an attack would likely stage in an adjacent country and may infiltrate into the United States over time. This tactical integration ensures intelligence collected by CBP at point of apprehension passes to point of origin to be actioned by active military forces. Should MMTs evade foreign authorities and launch an operation toward the United States, such integration would maximize the opportunities for detection and apprehension before they cross into the United States. Tactical intelligence integration is another layer in the defense in depth approach.
However, to serve as a deterrent for MMTs, authorities need to carry out this method in conjunction with coherent and timely information campaign. Officials should inform domestic audiences and audiences abroad repeatedly of their increased cooperation between foreign, U.S. Military and U.S. law enforcement counterterrorism forces. Such an information campaign properly disseminated could increase MMT’s perception that authorities will likely discover them. This information campaign is essential in this line of effort.

The next line of effort is training CBP agents—officers patrolling the border to counter MMT. As they are the law enforcement officials likely to first encounter these militants crossing into the United States to attack, they need to train in fire and maneuver tactics similar to infantry units. Currently, CBP agents—officers train in standardized policing methodology of a “cop walking the beat.” Though serving in the law enforcement capacity, they protect the border from incursions, a task other nations assign to their military forces. They face a full spectrum of intrusions anywhere from contraband and criminals to narco terrorists, MMTs and even foreign military forces. This makes them unique from other law enforcement agencies.

The CBP agents—officers need to prevail against terrorists trained and experienced on the battlefields. Therefore, in addition to law enforcement training they need to become proficient in infantry tactics necessary to counter MMT. Bill Tallen and Joel Justice both recommend law enforcement departments train to counter MMT attacks. The training should teach officers dynamic tactics to use during an incident involving multiple shooters at multiple locations and it should be standardized across multiple jurisdictions (Tallen 2008, 8; Justice 2013, 4). This counter MMT training should be
widely publicized utilizing a comprehensive media campaign to ensure the widest dissemination. This along with the previous line of effort may increase the perception that the United States has border security superiority necessary to deter terrorists.

The fourth line of effort is for the Army National Guard to establish counter MMT units in their respective states. If funding is an issue, authorities should prioritize this establishment for states sharing foreign borders or train existing units on tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the threat. These counter MMT National Guard units should be company-sized (120 man). This size is to counter forces similar to the Beslan case study involving over thirty assailants. A company-sized unit would provide the required 3:1 ratio desired in order to attack. The state counter MMT units should serve in a full time status allowing governors the capability to rapidly support law enforcement if required. Active military and the National Guard should train and equip these units to be able to defeat decisively a MMT attack.

These Army National Guard counter MMT units do not replace the elite federal, state and local law enforcement SWAT teams. These professionals are undoubtedly well qualified and highly trained to battle well-armed criminals. Yet, as Tallen writes, local law enforcement agencies “lack the ability to defeat numerous, well-prepared adversaries like those that attacked Beslan in 2004” (Tallen 2008, 5). He further states that even though some departments have highly competent, well-equipped and full time SWAT teams, their training focuses on scenarios they frequently encounter such as high-risk warrant service, active shooters, and barricaded suspects (Tallen 2008, 5). Tracy R. Frazzano argues that though large metropolitan police departments are better prepared and resourced to counter terrorist attacks like Mumbai, smaller municipalities will require
extensive support (Frazzano 2010, 2). Rural jurisdictions spread throughout the vast
distances in United States pose a significant challenge for MMT response. For example,
Denver and Seattle police department SWAT teams maybe highly capable but they can
do little to assist a MMT attack in Alamosa, Colorado and Bellingham, Washington.

State Governors should have the capability to employ a decisive military force
rapidly against a MMT attack. This would prevent precious minutes being lost waiting
for a definitive federal response while terrorists are killing more victims, taking more
hostages and improving defenses. Tallen’s recommendation of expanding the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s Hostage Rescue Team by 200 to 300 more agents to respond to
MMT, is an example of this definitive federal response (Tallen 2008, 9). A disadvantage
to this centralized federal crisis response force is their segregation from local law
enforcement. Such a robust expansion of these forces would still not allow for sufficient
cross training coverage with the massive amounts of departments spread through all fifty
states. These mutual training opportunities are critical to develop the interoperability, to
mount a successful counter MMT assault. Additionally, the problem of distances and
time remain. The federal response team would have difficulty assuming the responsibility
for rapid MMT response over the entire United States from Maine to Alaska. Lastly,
MMT by its definition is a militarized threat, best countered by military forces.

Upon a state governor’s authorization, National Guard units may legally perform
domestic law enforcement duties. This makes them unique to active military forces. In an
address to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Lieutenant General
McMasters said the next frontier in the future threat environment is terrorist networks
bleeding over into organized crime. Terrorists have connections to narcotic and human
traffickers and money launders to enable operations. He recommends better integration with military and law enforcement actions. That interdepartmental teams consisting of both military and law enforcement capabilities holistically combat complex threat networks like MMT (McMaster 2014). In essence, a hybrid solution against a hybrid threat.

These National Guard counter MMT units pioneer General McMaster’s concept. They have the advantage of integrating and training with the same local, tribal and state law enforcement officers. This cross-pollination of law enforcement and military tactics, techniques and procedures will propel the state’s ability to respond appropriately to a MMT attack. Unlike police SWAT teams, these units’ primary mission will be to counter MMT. This narrowly scoped task will develop them into a highly capable option for state governors. Additionally, these units stationed within all 50 states, minimize the time and distance challenges of MMT response. This is more constitutionally palatable than large federal forces doing these missions.

To achieve deterrence against terrorism, states should establish these units simultaneously with maximum publicity ensuring the message reaches would-be terrorists. A robust information campaign should inform the public why these units exist, their scope and the security they provide. Having these units may ease public fears over the increasing “militarization of police”. Authorities should widely broadcast these counter MMT units capabilities. This information campaign may bring a stream of new recruits and strengthen retention of Army National Guard Soldiers. Instituting these National Guard counter MMT units along with its coinciding information campaign is another layer in the defense in depth in deterrence.
The fifth line of effort in this defense in depth approach is expanding the concealed carry capability in the United States. This final line of effort is the least costly. Government authorities should allow, enable, and encourage active military, reserve, National Guard and their retired personnel to carry concealed firearms. Doing so would further saturate society with individuals who have completed basic combat training. These individuals, much like law enforcement have demonstrated basic firearms proficiency as part of the initial entrance training. If desired, officials could establish and conduct quarterly qualification training events allowing individuals to demonstrate continued firearm proficiency. Currently, only law enforcement officers are encouraged to carry off duty.

Armed citizens in the community are truly the only factor that will overcome the challenges of time and distance of MMT response. Posting armed security guards or police officers is not feasible as the list of potential targets is limitless. Even if the funds were available for every school in America to have armed security, terrorists could simply target day cares, youth sport facilities, malls, movie theaters, and more. Grossman argues that American society has put forth enormous effort preparing and preventing harm to the public by fire. Schools frequently practice fire drills; every private and public building has fire extinguishers, fire alarms, smoke detectors, sprinkler systems, and building materials to resist fire. Children frequently visit fire departments and even know “stop, drop, and roll.” He advocates authorities should apply the same amount of effort in preparing against violence. Should MMTs attack an American elementary school or daycare facility in a similar fashion to Beslan, Russia, it would have devastating economic and psychological effects. He advocates that citizens carrying concealed
firearms deter terrorism because of the uncertainty it creates in the minds of the perpetrators. Armed citizens are the only outlier terrorists cannot account for during their planning process (Grossman 2011).

The government cannot lawfully (nor should it) force any citizen to carry firearms. Just carrying a firearm is not enough. An individual must also be capable and willing to use it. Arguing the right and competency of private citizens to carry concealed firearms is far beyond the scope of this paper. These arguments are highly politicized and emotional. A more reasonable approach would be to allow off-duty law enforcement officers; all Active Duty Military; Reservists; National Guardsmen, and military retirees to carry concealed firearms. This may greatly enhance security throughout the entirety of the United States.

As with the other lines of efforts, this approach will only deter MMTs if they are aware of the increased capability. Authorities should simultaneously conduct an information operation informing the public of these added security measures. MMTs perceiving they may face armed citizens, armed off duty police officers and armed off duty soldiers—marines anywhere in American communities is a powerful message.

To deter MMT, I recommended five lines of effort each containing two components. Each line of effort has an action and a corresponding inform/influence operation that must occur simultaneously, failing to do one or the other means failure to the whole. The five lines of effort are disruption of MMT foreign safe havens, integration of tactical intelligence between the U.S. Northern Command, National Guard, and CBP, training CBP officers—agents to counter MMT, establishing National Guard counter MMT units, and increasing citizen conceal carry capability.
Recommendations for Further Research

I recommend for further research analyzing other terrorist attacks containing characteristics of MMT to add or detract from the identified commonalities. The research only examined three events. Since the beginning of this thesis, there have occurred other likely MMT assaults. The attacks on the school in Peshawar Pakistan, the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris France, and the continued Al Shaabab assaults in Kenya are more recent examples. Additionally, ISIL’s activities provide further examples to study the evolution of MMT. I analyzed the case studies by the means, opportunity or intent. Another framework to consider is mission, enemy, troops and support, time available, and terrain. The value of this framework is at any time these factors favor the one side or the other. Whatever group the factors of mission, enemy, troops and support, time available, and terrain favor at any moment is usually winning the conflict. Studying MMT cases as when the factors of mission, enemy, troops and support, time available, and terrain transitioned from the terrorists to the security forces may assist developing tactics for responders.

This paper further recommends studying homegrown terrorism and its relationship to MMT. This research examined threats outside of the United States requiring their incursion to conduct an attack. I suggest studying the radicalization of individuals instructed and manipulated by groups engaging in or advocating MMTs to conduct domestic terrorism. Radicalized youth may receive instruction on infantry tactics and use of firearms by foreign terrorists using social media and the internet. This online instruction may substitute for would-be terrorists receiving training in foreign conflict zones or terrorist safe havens.
Another recommendation for further study is the terror a sniper team could create within the United States. Snipers have long proven invaluable on battlefields to demoralize, paralyze and terrorize adversaries. MMTs may employ sniper teams to attack America’s perception of security. In 2002, John Muhammad and John Lee Malvo acted as a sniper team killing 13 people and wounding 10 in Washington D.C. over the course of three weeks (Grose 2003, 14). Their actions created extreme fear throughout the area at a cost to the predators of a few bullets and a modified vehicle. As a part of MMT, I recommend researching the methods required to counter a terrorist sniper teams operating domestically.

The final recommendation is further study on the psychology of terrorists and role humiliation play in deterrence. Potential research may explore the preference of suicide bombing verses MMT. Do aspiring jihadists and their manipulators prefer suicide bombing to reduce the chance of humiliation? It appears MMTs have many opportunities to fail. Suicide bombers need only worry about discovery enroute to the target, and device malfunction. Lone actors usually serve as suicide bombers reducing the likelihood of detection by authorities unlike MMT fire teams, squads and platoons. The factor of humiliation and its deterrent effect may prove useful for counterterrorism in the future.

The mass shooting incident of kindergarten children at Sandy Hook elementary school horrified the nation as to the amount of suffering and paranoia a single amateur could impose. Consider the consequences instead of a gunman, there had been thirty commandos, all armed with military weaponry. That was Beslan, Russia. Consider, as Sandy Hook was occurring, simultaneously other similar type attacks broke out at various locations. This would be Mumbai, India. The continued escalation of global conflicts
creates more battle-hardened terrorists. Weary of fighting in their homeland, they may attempt to take the war to ours. To avoid an American city from being included in future case studies, deterring MMT needs to be a priority.


McMaster, LTG Herbert Raymond. 2014. “Stage Setter.” Lecture, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, August 14.


