TURNING THE ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE IN A MORE PROACTIVE FORCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF PAST INTERVENTIONS TO ASSESS KEY
DEPLOYMENT HINDRANCES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

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# Turning the ECOWAS Standby Force in a more Proactive Force: An Analysis of Past Interventions to Assess Key Deployment Hindrances

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**Abstract:**

The security situation in western Africa has been preoccupying in the last years with threats ranging from large scale radical Islamist groups to a pandemic Ebola outbreak, which have stressed the regional security mechanisms. The study uses a qualitative methodology, analyzes the regional crisis response in the attempts to solve the Ivory Coast crisis of 2002 and the recent Mali one of 2012, in which ECOWAS provided, through its standby force ESF, a military intervention to restore security and stability. However, in both of those interventions, forces were deployed on reactionary basis to humanitarian crisis, rather than in a proactive strategy that could have prevented the crisis from escalating to a point where an external intervention, that questioned the regional mechanisms, took place.

The study finds that the weaknesses of the existing collective security institutions, the delay in implementing the stand by force, and the poor funding were the reasons of the inability to provide an early response. In order to be proactive in crisis management, ECOWAS needs to empower it security institutions, finalize the operationalization of an effective and capable standby force, and conceive, in coordination with other actors, a reliable funding mechanism.

**Subject Terms:**  
Collective Security, ECOWAS, ESF, APSA

**Security Classification:** Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

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Thesis Title: Turning the ECOWAS Standby Force in a more Proactive Force: An Analysis of Past Interventions to Assess Key Deployment Hindrances

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

TURNING THE ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE IN A MORE PROACTIVE FORCE: AN ANALYSIS OF PAST INTEVENTIONS TO ASSESS KEY DEPLOYMENT HINDRANCES, by CPT Abdoul Aziz FALL, 110 pages

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank God Almighty, whom blessings helped me achieve this work. I thank also my dear parents, family and friends whose support and encouragements made me go forward on this path, and embrace new challenges.

I am also grateful to the United States Army Command and General Staff College for offering me this opportunity. My gratitude especially goes to my committee chair: Douglas E. Lathrop for his commitment, and valuable guidance throughout this research, to Dr. Michael M. Mihalka, for his insightful recommendations and time, and Michael J. Burke for his dedicated time.

My appreciation also goes to my classmates, Staff Group Adviser and different teachers for their selfless support and their kindness. I further need to acknowledge my wonderful sponsors (Arny and Charlene Art, Irene Lathrop, and Linda Hearne) for making my stay in the US comfortable, opening their homes and hearts to me and to my family.

I cannot fully express my gratitude to my wife Nogaye, and my daughter Yacine, for their patience, love, and continuous support throughout the year.

Finally, as my fellow predecessor, I dedicate this work to all my countrymen killed or wounded in action around the world, while contributing to peace. May their memories never be forgotten!

On nous tue, on ne nous déshonore pas.
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<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Since the First World War, the international community has tried to establish mechanisms to promote peace and security using various means, going from nonviolent diplomatic ways to the employment of military forces to enforce peace. The attempts of the League of Nations were doomed to fail since there was not an overall commitment of major powers to the early concept of collective security. However, the Second World War, with its unattended scale of casualties, combined with long-term consequences on social, economic, and political realms, was going to definitely convince the world about the necessity to establish a new system that could prevent major conflicts, and their trail of unbearable ravages.

The existing agreement among the world powers before the Second World War relied on the balance of powers between those actors; the resulting equilibrium was fragile and proved ineffective to prevent large-scale interstate wars. Therefore, there was an urgent need to establish a new system that could rely on the commitment of the more powerful states in order to prevent and cease interstate conflicts. The United Nations (UN) was created for such a purpose: building an overall system that could prevent large-scale war and regulate the relations between the different states.

The concept of collective security, that will be further discussed later, allowed the creation of mechanisms and structures that the international community or intergovernmental organizations have used to prevent and resolve conflicts in the early stages, to avoid escalation. The Security Council of the UN is, today, the cornerstone as
the world’s established collective security mechanism, however with the intrinsic monopoly on the use of military forces belonging to its member states. Thus, the practical exercise of a collective security mechanism is done at the intergovernmental organization (IGO) level, or under regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the African Union (AU), usually after being mandated by the UN to do so. This disposition is established in the UN Charter, in its chapter 8, which provides authority to regional organizations for addressing local disputes before involving the Security Council.

The AU has replaced the former Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was created in 1963 to settle disputes emerging from the borders left by the colonization of Africa, and ensure sovereignty and non-interference to its member states. In its mandate, the AU relies mainly on the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Those existing RECs, inherited from the former OAU, are external to but are the building blocks of the AU, and their primary role was economic integration at the regional level. Now they play an important role in implementing the collective security mechanism adopted by the AU through its formalized Peace and Security Council, established in Durban, South Africa, in 2002. The two first principles of the Peace and Security Protocol were about the peaceful settlement of disputes and the rapid response to crises before they turn into open conflicts.

Among those RECs, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created in 1975, was one of the first to establish an organizational security mechanism, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. The conflict in Liberia beginning in 1990, grounded its creation, as a cease-fire enforcement force, a role
it played later in other regional conflicts. This structure has intervened in three major conflicts since its creation, and has been established on a permanent basis since 1999. The other four RECs have followed the same pattern in creating a security mechanism within their structure, but with a later schedule, initiated mostly by the PSC.

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a series of internal conflicts have plagued Africa, along with severe consequences on both human and economic development. The responses to those conflicts were done often with African forces, under the lead of the United Nations, but not always in a timely manner to avoid reaching large scales of casualties and their long term second and third order social and economic effects. The attempts of the African Union to build a standby force that could respond quickly to those contingencies, and limit therefore the consequences, are still in the developing stages. The overall concept was to build an African Standby Force (ASF) with components aligned with the five main African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), in order to provide timely and adequate response to crises over the continent, under the supervision of the AU’s PSC. The roadmap was to have operational ASF brigades within the RECs by 2010, which could then be deployed to respond to major threats over the continent.

In 2002, while the security situation was worsening in the Ivory Coast, mediation efforts conducted by both ECOWAS and the AU were ineffective, even counterproductive as evidenced by their opposite recommendations. Such a situation prevented the ECOWAS and the AU from providing an early response to the crisis. The French Operation Licorne that took place in 2002 in Ivory Coast, under a bilateral defense agreement, prevented the escalation, and was later supported by ECOWAS troops, before the UN overtook the mission.
The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in December 2010 spread later to the Maghreb region, later affecting Libya, and caused a domino effect in the overall Sahel security environment with the greatest impacts in Mali, where armed groups took control of half of its territory. The AU was not able to bring a timely response to the threat, and again the preservation of Mali as a state was solely due to the intervention of the French forces in early 2013, under Operation Serval, in which African forces participated later.

That same year also witnessed the security situation deteriorating in the Central African Republic (CAR), where an internal war caused thousands of casualties and refugees. This crisis, with ethnic and religious tensions, also found the beginning of a solution with an external intervention, namely Operation Sangari, in 2013.

None of the RECs, the ECOWAS, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) particularly, were able to deploy troops. Both of the follow-on AU/UN missions’ deployment were delayed because the RECs’ member states were not able to deploy troops in accordance with the timeline established.

The following sections will review the history of the AU, the ECOWAS, and their respective security mechanisms in order to have a better understanding of the environment in which a response to a crisis has to be given.

The African Union

The AU is the union of 54 African states, created in 2002, in replacement of the OAU, and is aimed at promoting democracy, human rights and development over the continent. It is composed currently by all African states except Morocco and the Central African Republic (CAR). Morocco left the OAU when the organization recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in 1984 but still has special roles, and participates in
some important AU functions, most of them economic. The CAR has been suspended from the AU since its latest military coup in 2012. The OAU, which was created after the independences of most of the African states in 1963, was mainly worried about supervising the respect of the newly inherited borders, rid the continent of the remaining colonization, and promote a non-interference environment over the continent. Those goals were extended over the years to the promotion of a more united African continent, directed mainly on the economic areas. That evolution has led to more participation of the RECs into the OAU processes after the Abuja treaty in 1991, which emphasized the importance of economic integration and creation of a monetary union that existed already in some regional communities. The OAU was often criticized for not properly addressing the human right issues and conflicts over the continent, mainly because of the non-interference principles that laid its foundations, and used as a barrier during internal conflicts. The OAU was, in reality, a cooperation entity in which the Heads of State Conference, as the supreme institution, was making all the decisions. That centralized decision-making body promoted idleness in many areas where they were disagreements between states.

The AU was adopted as a new structure to assess more effectively the goals that were set up by the founders of the AU: promote unity and solidarity, and act as a collective voice for the African continent. The AU is aimed at promoting democracy, human rights and development over the continent, and it is under that purview that a standing Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.¹ Established under the Constitutive Act of the AU, the PSC is supported in its role by the Commission,
a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and a Special Fund. Therefore, the new structure of the union embodies a collective security mechanism. Its first goal is to allow effective decision-making in preventing and solving crises, and its second one is to provide a common defense policy to fill the associated requirements, whether human or organizational. The new framework empowers the bodies of the AU, which constitutes a significant shift in dealing with internal conflicts over the continent. The non-interference concept that prevailed under the OAU, which has favored idleness in crisis response, is no longer valid. The AU has actively participated in different collective security challenges over the continent, even though the last decade has witnessed more coordinated actions with the UN and assistance from external actors, than stand-alone AU interventions. The PSC sets the framework to coordinate actions by integrating the RECs’ security mechanism, the UN and its agencies’ efforts, in order to prevent or solve security issues in their early phases to avoid their escalation and damaging consequences. The PSC is composed of 15 members, and a two-thirds majority is needed for decisions on matters other than procedural. The PSC is empowered by the Constitutive Act of the AU, and its recommendation are applied upon approval of the African Commission, or the Assembly, which are the authoritative bodies of the AU. The Act also gives room for delegation of authority to the PSC by the Assembly, thus empowering the council as a standing decision-making body.

The figure below describe the different entities participating in a security mechanism decision-making process, in which the PSC is the centerpiece. The regional security mechanisms, along with the Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of Wise, plays the sentry’s role in detecting and mediating conflict situations in their early
stages. The PSC assesses and monitors the situation, initiating mediation and prevention on behalf of the AU. If the situation evolves, then recommended solutions for crisis response are made to the authoritative bodies, such as the Assembly or the Commission. The member states and the UN will enable the crisis response, if approved, by providing human and financial resources to activate and deploy the ASF.

Figure 1. Security mechanism process with stakeholders and the PSC as cornerstone

Source: Created by the author, inspired by the procedure described in the Protocol regarding the Establishment of the PSC.
The African Standby Force

The ASF is a continental and multidisciplinary force that operates under the direction of the AU with military and civilian components that can be deployed in crises, after a resolution has been adopted by the PSC. However, the ASF is a collective security mechanism in which each of the five brigades comes under the command and control of its respective REC and is independent of the AU. It works with the AU but is not yet an organic subset of it. The force is part of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), along with the PSC, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund. The situation that prevailed in the 1990s, with dramatic conflicts over the continent, particularly the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and the violent conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, pushed the African States to establish such a force, creating a framework for a better security cooperation and empowering such a body to operate wherever needed on the continent.

The protocol relating to the PSC, gave room for the RECs to be highly active in implementing continental security cooperation through their regional mechanism. Therefore the ASF concept presented in Maputo (Mozambique) in 2003, which suggested the building of the ASF around regional components, was approved and formalized through the Report of the Chairperson establishing the framework for the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) on January 2004, in regard of the recommendations of the third meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS). Under those recommendations, the ASF was to be built under a framework established by the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) in close collaboration with the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), located in Stockholm. Before that report,
several contacts were made and collaboration missions conducted with those structures to help build the future policy framework for the ASF. The report described six scenarios, ranging from a military advise provision all the way to the deployment of a full peacekeeping force for multidimensional peacekeeping missions. The ASF, according to the PSC Protocol, should be composed of standby multidisciplinary components with civilian and military components, from the five identified RECs at the figure 2, ready for rapid deployment at an appropriate notice. The next figure shows the different brigades constituting the ASF by its AU’s regional communities.

Figure 2. MAP of ASF regions.

The road map of the ASF was a two-phased plan to be completed respectively by 2005 and 2010. In the first phase, the AU had to establish a management capacity at the strategic level that the regional communities were to complement by building up to a brigade size force. In the second phase, the AU had to develop that management capability to be able to deal with complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs would develop further their brigade and be able to deploy a mission HQ for an AU/Regional peacekeeping force under Chapter 6.6 Each of the phases were gradual. On one hand, the AU had to build strategic management capabilities to initially handle the first two scenarios described in the report, and then build upon that to broaden capacities to handle more complex ones. On the other hand, the RECs had to build their stand-by brigade, or upgrade it if they already had one, and later build up a mission HQ capability they could deploy in an AU/REC mission.

The strategic management capability was described as a critical requirement in the ACDS recommendations, as it was needed for the AU, the commission, as well as the RECs, to effectively manage the ASF. In addition, a mission level management capability was to be built and deployed along with the force when it had to be deployed. The report also emphasized the need to establish the Military Staff Committee as a standing advisory element within the PSC, composed of senior military elements of countries represented in the Council. It went further and made recommendations in standardizing procedures through common training, the building of communication networks, and the adoption of regional frameworks that will link up easily with the continental system, having, for example, regional early warning system in their regional mechanisms.7
Despite the regional work group program recommended by the ACDS, and later adopted by the RECs, the progress made was uneven and its timetable has not been met in a number of the RECs.

**ECOWAS**

The Economic Community of West African States is the western REC that is comprised of 15 countries listed on the following figure. It was created in May 1975 after the adoption of the ECOWAS treaty by its member states.

![ECOWAS Member States](http://fr.slideshare.net/ceciliawutaiwan/introduction-of-ecowas)

**Figure 3.** ECOWAS Member States

The organization’s goals were to promote regional economic integration, after a decade of stand-alone attempts, and bilateral agreements that failed to improve economies of recently independent West African states. Its main goal was and remains the promotion of cooperation and integration, with a view to establishing an economic and monetary union as a means of stimulating economic growth and development in West Africa.  

ECOWAS’ first attempt in creating a security mechanism was in 1981 under the protocol relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense (MAD). The MAD promised military aid (material, technical and personal) to any of the signatories aggressed by a third state, and considered any external attack to one member as an attack to the community. The Protocol was not signed by all the member states. Mali, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau declined to sign it, fearing the influence of larger states, while others, like Togo and Senegal, perceived the deterrent role that Nigeria could play against an external aggressor and adopted it with other states that had already experienced border conflicts with their neighbors. Mauritania and Algeria, which share borders with several ECOWAS members, also joined the protocol. This first attempt, and the next that this study will analyze, focused mostly on the military perspective and did not adopt an overall multidisciplinary approach as needed in collective security mechanisms. It was also challenged by the rival influences that prevailed at that time between the former French colonies, which still had close ties with France, and the English speaking ones. Both the ECOWAS and the MAD protocols had prior equivalent within the Francophone community. The Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) was created in 1973, two years prior to the ECOWAS founding treaty of May 1975, and the
Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matière de Defense (ANAD) existed since 1977, four years before the adoption of the MAD protocol.

The second attempt in creating a regional security mechanism was the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990, in response to the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The MAD protocol discussed earlier provided the establishment of an Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC), upon which ECOMOG was built in response to the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and later in Guinea Bissau. ECOMOG was the second multilateral African armed force, after the Inter-African Force (IAF) deployed by the OAU in Chad in 1981. It managed to stop the Liberian civil war with the financial and political support from US State department. However, the lack of financial resources and full political commitment from the member states have hindered and weakened ECOMOG’s actions. Its later interventions and mediations were mainly on an interim basis, or as an auxiliary to a broader UN-led intervention.

The ECOWAS objectives were broadened as time rolled on, as economic integration and sustainable development required a stable and democratic environment. They included more political and institutional cooperation and integration. The first treaty, which focused essentially on economic integration, was revised in 1993 to speed up the integration process and broaden the organization’s responsibilities and powers. Thus, two of the basic principles adopted under the revised treaty were the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and the peacekeeping, stability and security at the regional level. The new treaty gives room to establish specific protocols regarding issues that are relevant to the community, and introduces the principle of supra-nationality in the
application of decisions. By signing the treaty, the acts approved by the Authority of the Heads of States and Government are binding on member states and institutions of the community. Under this purview, the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security was adopted on December 10th 1999 at Lomé (Benin), as the community’s security mechanism, with a standing Mediation and Security Council (MSC) being the PSC equivalent at the regional level. The framework and procedures of the protocol are similar in many ways to the one of the AU, even though it was adopted two years prior to the AU constitutive act establishing the PSC. However, the Mediation and Security Council is permanently empowered by the article 7 of the protocol, to act on behalf of the Authority for the implementation of the security mechanism.13

The protocol establishes the framework for an overall security mechanism that encompasses traditional military domains. It also provides room for a civilian task force, for preventing and managing conflicts, conducting rebuilding processes and the restoration of civil authority. The framework also gives funding guidance through the contribution of member states, of the UN, as well as external contributors and fund raising mechanisms. ECOMOG is the military body that should be staffed to be a standing peace keeping force for the West African community and the regional component of the ASF in the overall African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). ECOWAS has thus been a pioneer in establishing a collective security mechanism over the continent, and its structures, that have to be integrated with the AU’s APSA, have been built upon the same framework. ECOWAS brigade’s establishing process started in 2005, and the force architecture has been built around battalion-sized maneuver units.
There are currently 14 regional schools and 3 centers of excellence within ECOWAS, aimed at ensuring uniformity of training throughout the region while allowing to reduce the related costs through sharing, and many multinational training exercises have since been organized and conducted.

The ECOWAS Brigade

At the adoption of the ASF framework, described in the Maputo Report, ECOWAS had already a standing security mechanism, and an established force structure through ECOMOG. Further steps were oriented into transforming the latter in what would become the ECOWAS Standby Force, called either ECOBRIG or ESF. The protocol relating to the regional security mechanism, adopted in Lomé in December 1999, adopted the same framework as the PSC, making regional organizations fit easier in the continental ones.

ECOBRIG is a multidisciplinary, multinational standby force, with military, police, and civil components. The framework, adopted in 2008, is illustrated on the next figure. It is composed at that level of multinational battalions, under the designated leading nations, and was to have a force strength of 6500 once fully operational. Different training exercises were conducted since to ensure interoperability and the establishment of common operating procedures for the different nations’ battalions. The regional training centers and the centers of excellence are the centerpieces of the harmonization of operating procedures, and often overlap with those conducted at the continental level, such as AMANI Africa exercises.¹⁴

The structure described in figure 4 is the one of the planned rapid reaction forces to be deployed within 30 days of any regional emergency, self-sustainable for 90 days,
and to be reinforce later up to 6500 troops. However, the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the member states have not still been formalized, which gives no clear picture on the provision of standby units and the founding of their first three months’ deployment. In the Ivory Coast crisis of 2003, and later in Mali, the mediation conducted by ECOWAS was supposed to be followed by an intervention force, but no standing forces were actually ready to carry out the mission.

![ESF structure as per 2008](image)

**Figure 4. ESF structure as per 2008**

Statement of the Problem

In the first decade of this century, West Africa has been shattered by many internal crises, Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Mali, just to cite the major and ongoing ones. ECOWAS and the AU were not able to intervene in a timely manner and avoid the escalation as per the goals of both the regional and continental security mechanisms. This idleness contrasts with what happened in the early 1990s, where, under ECOWAS, a military action was initiated and carried out by ECOMOG to stop the violence in Liberia, and later set the conditions for the implementation of the UNMIL mission. Despite a supposed better framework, namely the ASF, that should have allowed the RECs to better handle crises, short falls in crises response capabilities were noticed. None of the later conflicts was prevented nor even a response given to by the ASF through its regional components.

Objective of the Study

The mains elements that hinder the effectiveness of the ECOBRIG might be at the political, structural or operational levels. Therefore, we will review first the concept of collective security and how it relates to the ASF. The ASF itself will then be studied internally, to identify responsibilities and interactions between political stakeholders whose interest might sometimes be divergent. Once a clear picture of the overall structure is depicted, the study will focus on the regional components of the ASF, and their relation to the AU, in order to understand the normal operating procedure and how they should become involved in conflict resolution processes. Such understanding will then be combined with the insight gained from the case studies of the Ivory Coast crisis in 2003, and the current one in Mali, thus trying to identify the problems that might explain the
lack of a timely response. Such insight might then help make ECOBRIG more effective, with the goal of extending those insights to the other RECs as well. The specific objectives of this study are to:

1. Analyze the concept of collective security and its application to internal conflicts.
2. Evaluate the effectiveness of the AU security mechanisms in addressing crisis on the continent, in relation to the one of the RECs.
3. Determine the decision-making process leading to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, and the mandating authorities.
4. Assess the current status of the ASF and its regional components.
5. Determine the key triggers and actors that are responsible for ECOWAS crisis response implementation.
6. Recommend solutions, to make the ECOBRIG more effective within the APSA.

Proposed Research Question

This research raises the primary question: What needs to be done to make the ESF more effective and capable, providing early response forces within the overall African Standby Force? In order to answer that, these secondary questions will be addressed, and will collectively provide a response to the primary one.

1. What are the key principles and responsibilities of the ASF?
2. Who are the actors and mechanisms that initiate an ECOBRIG action?
3. How far is the operationalization of the ASF, particularly the ECOBRIG?
4. What main factors contributed in rendering the ECOBRIG unable to respond quickly in past conflicts?

5. What needs to be improved at the structural or policy level to make the ECOBRIG, and subsequently other ASF brigades, more efficient?

This study will analyze the process that based the creation of the ASF and the attempts to operationalize it in order to determine the key factors that prevent the ASF components, particularly the ECOBRIG, from being more effective. Using a qualitative methodology with case studies will help identify the key elements that are preventing the ECOBRIG from being successful.

Assumptions

The study is based on five assumptions. First, the current security situation in West Africa is deteriorating, and local conflicts will continue to have regional impacts. Secondly, an appropriate response will require an overall commitment of West African states to solve current crises that overlap borders and highly impact economies and populations. Thirdly, most of the states do not have the capabilities to face alone the crises, thus security cooperation is needed to be strengthened, particularly under the purview of the new APSA’s framework. Fourth, regional security mechanisms are preferred today because states should try to solve conflicts within their community before involving continental mechanisms. Fifth, the UN Security Council and international community will continue to support regional and continental security mechanisms.
Definition of Terms

**Assembly:** means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, as defined in the PSC protocol.

**Authority:** designate the Authority of the Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS, its highest decision making body.

**Collective security:** a mechanism through which states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression.¹⁵

**Commission:** designate the African Union Commission.

**Conflict:** Conflict in this study, refers to any case in which violence or threat is used between two or more entities, state or non-states actors, whose objectives are incompatible.

**Constitutive Act:** Act means the constitutive act of the African Union as defined in the first article of the AU Act, signed in Lomé TOGO, on 11 July 2000.

**International community:** refers to any association of states, sharing common point of view on specific matters, such as stability and global security, and broad enough to influence international politics. The term is often used to refer to the UN General Assembly, which consist of almost all the countries in the world.

**Regional Mechanisms:** refer to the African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution within the 5 RECs.

**Union:** refers to the African Union.
**Limitations**

The concept of collective security is not new, however it has been theorized and applied primarily for inter-state conflicts. In this study, collective security is assessed mainly in regard of intrastate conflicts that have occurred on the African continent, particularly in West Africa. As the security mechanism is being built, and some crises are recent or still going on, official documentation regarding the operationalization process is still in draft form, or do not exist, and the research will rely on media sources for the timeline of events used in the two case studies. The other limitation comes from the fact that in cases where a collective security mechanism was effectively used, it was well documented through official publications while failures of the mechanism are inherently characterized by the absence any official after action report.

**Scope and Delimitations**

Many scholars, CGSC graduates among others, have written on the concept of collective security, and its application to solve crises in Africa. This study will not focus on the crises themselves but solely in the mechanisms that have been used to trigger the collective security mechanisms and the effectiveness of the given response to solve the crises, particularly in West Africa. Therefore, the researcher will not assess the roots of those conflicts, but will focus on decision-making processes that exist. Flaws and weaknesses of those processes might overlap with the roots of the conflicts, requiring more time from the researcher to conduct a deeper analysis and find all relevant issues.
Significance of the Study

Security throughout the West African region has become a major concern, particularly with the transnational threats that currently infest the Sahel region, characterized by groups like Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. It has become clear that only coordinated efforts can help defeat them. The indecisiveness and inaction of the African Union in timely addressing the 2012 crisis in Mali is a perfect illustration that raises questions about the reasons why the ECOBRIG is still unable to bring timely responses to regional crises. Identifying flaws and weaknesses in the processes used to trigger collective security mechanisms, as well as enablers for the intervention forces is critical. Understanding the underlying factors and defining clear decision-making processes will be a big step forward for the region. The same reasons that can be identified here might also be valid for the other regional components of the ASF since they were designed around the same concept, particularly in East Africa where some conflicts have lasted for decades.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has laid the foundations on which this study will be conducted. It gives a historical review of the African Union and ECOWAS, their creations and evolution over the last decades have been reviewed. It also gave an overview of the attempts made by the two organizations to adopt and operate security mechanisms under the purview of collective security, leading to the current framework adopted by through the APSA. The next chapter will review the literature on this topic and provide an understanding of the ASF in the overall collective security approach adopted by the AU, and particularly its western component the ECOBRIG. It will be followed by an
explanation of the methodology used for the case studies and then subsequent chapters examining each issue in detail.


2 Ibid.


6 Chapter VI refers to the relevant chapter in the UN Charter, dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes.


9 CEAO and later CEDEAO is the French translation of ECOWAS.

10 ANAD literally in English Non-aggression and Assistance on Defense Accord.

11 IAF was the first step of OAU in settlement of peace and security issues in Chad, it was under cold war tensions and colonial interference.


13 Ibid., Article 9.

14 AMANI Africa, from Swahili Peace in Africa is the name given to the exercises conducted since 2005 to assess and upgrade the level of operationalization of the AU strategic management capability regarding the ASF.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The previous chapter laid down the background institutional information and gave an overview of collective security institutions implemented at the continental and at ECOWAS level. This chapter will review the literature relevant to the primary research question of this study. There has been quite an important amount of writings related to collective security mechanisms over the African continent, with a particular focus on the viability of the solutions adopted to solve the crises that faced the continent. The former African graduates from CGSC, who went through the MMAS program, contributed subsequently to this topic, and under various perspectives.

First, a quick review of the literature on the concept of collective security is essential to understand the context and main ideas that have led to the adoption of a collective approach in dealing with security issues on the continent by the AU. This part will focus on the collective security concept, its core principles and recommended requirements for implementation, as a response to conflicts. Secondly, an overview of the framework of the ASF will be conducted through the review of the different steps made under the AU to make the concept adopted by its member states, with a particular emphasis on the decision-making process triggering an ASF (ESF eventually) deployment. Official documents published by the AU, through its various branches will be the principal sources. Thirdly, it will review the current status of the operationalization process, and a particular focus on the military forces in ECOWAS. The information reviewed will be presented in the three following categories:
1. Concept of collective security and the APSA framework

2. The decision-making cycle and triggers of the ASF

3. The operationalization of the ASF and the security forces status

**Concept of Collective Security and the APSA Framework**

As stated in the introduction, the concept of collective security is not new, and finds its early roots at the era of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The concept of state security is the one upon which the international system has been built. It guarantees, to some extent, the preservation of states. Different concepts have been erected over time to achieve such goals, going from the balance of powers during the interwar period, the concept of deterrence during the Cold War, as well as the collective security, which the international community tried to establish since 1919 through the League of Nations.

The collective security concept is aimed mainly at collectively promoting efforts to establish peace and prevent war, using international or intergovernmental organizations as bodies for the implementation of such mechanisms. Collective security may be defined, according to Stromberg, as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack.¹ The concept was globally adopted for the first time with the League of Nations, whose failures to prevent the Second World War led to the creation of the UN in 1945, as being the institution mandated to promote and enforce, to some extent, security of its members. For the concept to be effective, much power was given to five major states, that always have their voice, and a system established to give the UN “Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” charging other members with a duty to “accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council.” The concept can be effective under certain assumptions and some prerequisites have to be met for its successful implementation.

Morgenthau listed those prerequisites as three: First the force assembled by the collective security mechanism should be greater than the one of the aggressor; secondly, those nations gathering their forces should share the same view of security and world order that the collective system is defending; and thirdly, conflicting national interests should be subordinated to the common good, defined as being the common defense of member states. Organski later theorized about five basic assumptions that underlined the collective security concept. According to him, the first is the need of a common agreement on the aggressor. The second is a shared and equal commitment to contain and constrain the aggression regardless of its origin. The third is about the freedom of action of the nation states to engage in any actions against an aggressor. The forth is the same as Morgenthau’s first prerequisite regarding the gathering of sufficient power to outmatch the aggressor’s. The fifth is about the likelihood of the aggressor to be deterred by the threat posed by the collective might or being defeated otherwise.

These prerequisites and assumptions are the ones that have prevailed in the previous security collective mechanisms such as the UN, the NATO, the AU, and also ECOWAS. The AU security mechanism is built upon the same principles and assumptions as they are stated in the AU’s Constitutive Act as well as in the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security. The overall APSA framework, and the ECOWAS collective security mechanisms, seems to be in line with the concept of collective security as it has been theorized and practiced. The theory was meant first to deal with state conflicts, as
those conditions and assumptions were valid only under the purview of interstate
relations, while the later conflicts on the African continent have been more intrastate than
interstate. However, because of the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the
trail of casualties that followed the intrastate conflicts on the continent in the 1990s, new
concepts, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), emerged. This new concept was not
a substitute to existing ones such as collective security. It just raised concerns, created the
debate at the political level on the states’ responsibilities to protect their civilian
populations, and if they fail doing so, or are the one threatening them, then the
international community has the responsibility to intervene and protect them.\(^5\) That
dynamic brought other variables into the equation such as the sovereignty of the states
where conflict occurred, the difficult agreement on the aggressor, and the increasing
conflict of interest with some neighboring states. Nevertheless, they broaden the scope of
collective security as it was first envisioned. The preservation of the sovereignty of states
becomes a lower priority when it comes to the suffering that civilian populations might
face. These factors may have played in the process of implementing the security
mechanism to a lesser or greater degree. The hope is that the case study analysis will
provide more insights. Scholars largely agree that in the last decade the AU has gone a
long way in implementing its new security architecture with progress being uneven
between the continental system and the regional ones.\(^6\) ECOWAS, having started earlier
its journey on collective security, is a little ahead in the process of implementing its
collective security structures.\(^7\)
The Decision Making Cycle and Triggers of the ASF

The PSC is the decision-making body at the continental level for the implementation of the continental security mechanism. This is reflected on the figure 1 in the previous chapter. In the RECs, similar decision-making bodies exist, such as the Mediation and Security Council for ECOWAS, which is mandated by the Authority of the Head of States to act on its behalf for the implementation of collective security mechanisms. The conference report on Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa, held by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), gives insights on African decision-making systems, shared by many other scholars. The report suggests that the decision-making bodies, PSC and its equivalent at the regional levels, lack the supra-national authority they need to come to timely decisions, and are highly influence by the power structure of their respective organizations. The report takes the EU and UN decision-making bodies as examples, and how the strong institutional culture is in those bodies, and enables them being more effective in their decision-making process. It also notices the dynamics between the AU and the REC, and summarizes it as follows:

One of the key issues for African states remains the tension between weak intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. There are several reasons for this tension: first, states are reluctant to relegate part of their ‘recent’ independence to the supranational institutions. Second, in the past, most African international institutions were initiated as a reaction against something (colonialism or apartheid) not for something, with the exception of a strong but hard-to-implement pan-Africanist narrative.8

Members of the institutions that have been built under the APSA framework for the AU, or the MSC for the ECOWAS, are still operating under the purview of the national interests of the represented states that appointed them. This influence hinders the focus of those bodies towards a supra-national stand, and influence often the decision-
making process. In regard to this research, it is clear that national interest can play an important role in the implementation of a security mechanism, which the case studies in next chapters might reveal, if there is such influence. Another concern raised by the report is the lack of power of those decision-making bodies, both continental and regional. There is not yet an institutional culture, such as the one of the EU commission or the UNSC, which allows them to operate independently from the influence of member states, and embrace fully their role of decision makers on behalf of the AU or ECOWAS. The annual review of the PSC of 2013 highlights the fact that the PSC does not have yet the technical expertise and the staff to carry on its activities by itself, and relies heavily on the support of the Commission, which is influenced by member states and their representations. The PSC does not have permanent staff members and the member states have not really given to it an authoritative power for it to be fully effective. According to the review, there are already incentives and efforts toward improving the PSC, both in staff personnel and expertise. Another area of contention might also be found in the relations between the AU and the RECs. The AU decision-making process relies on MOU with the different RECs, as related on figure 5, and such memoranda have not been completely written to allow a fast decision-making process, particularly in crisis response and in the provision of troops by the member states.

At the ECOWAS level, the decision-making mechanism, as explained in the previous chapter, is closer to the one of the UNSC. The MSC is the decision-making body, and is permanently mandated to act on behalf of the AU on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms. It
even went further by not implementing a veto system that could have paralyzed the
system. However, the practice has showed that it faces the same lack of institutional
culture as the PSC, and member states’ interests impede on the decision-making process.
Hartmann and Striebinger relate the change of posture that Nigeria, a dominant regional
power, who is conceding the decision-making power to smaller states while it has acted
alone in previous conflicts such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It also highlights the fact
that many states signed the protocol while they were still autocratic regimes, trying to
gain more international legitimacy; not believers nor supporters of any intervention of the
ECOWAS to internal issues. However, ECOWAS’ actions on collective security have
overall been well appreciated by the international community, as well as its efforts to
improve decision-making processes. The force structures are still being processed,
particularly under the purview of integrating ECOWAS’ collective security mechanism in
the overall continental APSA framework. Some of the previous sources mentioned that
the lessons learned from the first intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone in
the 1990s helped ECOWAS understand the intricacies of political will, financial and
logistical support needed for collective security actions. Such hard learned lessons,
associated with some political disagreement, might have somehow tempered the speed of
reaction, and the decision-making process for crisis response.

In brief, the decision-making body at the continental level remains the AU
Assembly of the Head of States. The PSC’s decisions have to be approved by the
Assembly before they become enforcing resolutions. At the ECOWAS level, the MSC is
permanently mandated to act on behalf of the Authority for all matters relevant to the
implementation of a regional security mechanism. There is, however, no formalized
agreement between the two institutions, establishing procedures for troop provisions and no clear delineation of who initiates the security mechanism process. ECOWAS needs the approval of the AU and the UN before initiating any intervention, even though there are provisions in its framework to act independently as it did in the past. Meanwhile, because of the dependency on external financial support, such a scenario of independent action is less likely to happen.¹⁴

The diagram in figure 5 describes the decision-making process at the AU level. The PSC is the centerpiece around which actions are coordinated with the different AU organs and RECs’ institutions for the successful implementation of a collective security response to a crisis. This document was developed under the purview of the AU Mandating Process for Peace Support Operations as a ready reference for the AU planning staffs. It was achieved with the assistance of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as part of the EU support to the operationalization of the APSA framework.
Figure 5. AU decision-making process,
The Operationalization of the ASF/ESF

This section will review a picture of the current ASF. It will provide a snapshot of the operationalization process, how far it has gone and what remains to be achieved. The roadmap to the operationalization process, discussed in the previous chapter, will be used as a measuring timeframe. Since the collective force will be built from the member states’ armed forces, it is then necessary to conduct a brief overview of the status of the ESF operationalization process. The strengths and weaknesses of that component might facilitate or hinder the building of the ASF. There is an overall agreement that the AU and ECOWAS have made giant steps in implementing collective security mechanisms, almost from nothing, in less than 20 years. Since 2003, the AU has deployed missions to Burundi (AMIB), Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), the CAR (FOMUC), Comoros (AMISEC) and Somalia (AMISOM) while still in the process of operationalizing its APSA. Those missions were somehow fields to test operational concepts, financial viabilities as well as the commitment of member states and RECs to the new framework.

The roadmap of the ASF operationalization process was to have an ASF fully operational capable (FOC) by 2010. The situation has evolved positively but the AU had to admit that the goals could not be achieved in time. After a self-assessment, 2015 was set as the new deadline for the ASF to be FOC. The roadmap III that covers the 2010-2015 period also put more emphasis on the multidimensional facets of the ASF, in which the military component was overemphasized in the previous roadmaps. Another assessment was conducted later in December 2013 by a panel of experts, on behalf of the AU, and concluded that the “ASF is unlikely to become FOC unless major efforts are made by all stakeholders.” The AU self-assessment of the ASF, conducted in 2010, will
be used as a main source to assess the operationalization of the ASF framework. According to that document, the status of the operationalization process could be summarized by the table 1.15

Table 1. ASF Operationalization Status

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<tr>
<td>7 Centres of Excellence</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Bde Operational</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Civilian Components</td>
<td>In process</td>
<td>In process</td>
<td>In process</td>
<td>In process</td>
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<td>In process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Police component</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows that in 2010, improvements in establishing the framework were done, but no regional brigade was FOC at that time, and that the civilian component implementation was still in process in the RECs and at the AU level. The MOU at the AU level represents here the commitment of the different RECs to the APSA/ASF framework.
but not a real agreement on troop contribution and generation process, which is uneven throughout the different RECs. It also highlights the lack of logistical support as there were not any logistic depots, which can be assumed to still be the case up to now, to support any ASF deployment. The recent development of the last years have allowed more but uneven cooperation among the RECs. The eastern and southern RECs have made significant progress in establishing MOUs for force generation, which were tested during the deployment of AU missions in Somalia, Darfur and in the CAR.

ECOWAS, despite the absence of a formalized MOU between its member states, is characterized by a strong commitment of its members to provide troops, and is probably the only REC that has undertaken a partial self-financing of its collective security forces through a dedicated budget and a levy system to generate funds. At the ECOWAS level, the operationalization of the ESF is well advanced on the military component. This is due in part to the existence of the security bodies prior even to the APSA framework. The self-assessment report mentioned previously highlights that the ECOWAS ESF operational framework was established in 2005, the certification of its Task Force (ESFTF) was conducted in 2009, and the remaining was to be completed the next year. The ESF is structured around two infantry components, one western battalion led by Senegal, and one eastern battalion led by Nigeria. To support that capacity building, there are three centers of excellence established, all of which have signed MOUs with ECOWAS to supports its efforts. At the strategic level, there is the National Defense College in Nigeria, at the operational level the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Center (KAIPKC) in Ghana, and at the tactical level the Peace Keeping School in Mali. In addition to those centers, there are about fourteen national schools with
regional scope, in which cooperation in training is conducted to improve interoperability and share training costs. Countries collaborate with external actors to support training effort through exercises and assistance missions, mainly by France historically, and the US recently. The report also highlights the fact that more emphasis has been given to the early deployable component (ESFTF), which is understandable in view of previous crises, but that situation has delayed and weakened the planning element.17

Overall, the operationalization process is still on going. Even if the initial goals were not met, considerable achievements have been made, particularly with the unforeseen crises that have overturned the regional agendas. The framework and operational concepts are laid out in almost all the RECs, but the financial and logistical support needed for the ASF have not yet been fully addressed. Recent crises have shown that the AU still has to rely on external support. The roadmap III to the operationalization of the ASF raised concerns about dynamics and coordination between the AU and the RECs’ efforts in solving crises. It also addressed the mechanisms that should regulate relations between the AU PSC and the RECs in term of troop provisions and deployment, which have to be clearly defined and formalized. Such areas remain still unclear and uneven throughout the REC.18

The following chapter will explain the methodology that will be used in this research, based on two case studies that will help answer the secondary questions of the first chapter.


10 Ibid., 10-11.


13 Elowson and MacDe, *ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and Security*, 63-64.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

CHAPTER 3
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter presents the research design methodology used to conduct this study. As quantitative measures do not readily fit to understand the issues related to collective security mechanism triggers, this study will use a qualitative methodology, based on two case studies. Thus, qualitative methodology characterizes “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of qualification.”¹ And a case study research method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.²

Methodology and Hypothesis

The qualitative methodology used in this thesis is the most apt for this research. It will help to reach a deeper understanding of the ECOWAS decision-making system when it faced the crises that will be described in the cases studies, and identify keys events and actors that triggered those decisions. The qualitative methodology is a major research methodology in social sciences. It focuses on “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of qualification.”³ The qualitative methodology allows an in depth understanding, through interpretation of the why and how of decision-making, as compared to what, where and when of the quantitative research methodology. Qualitative methods are focused on how and why people, by extent organizations, behave, think and make meaning, rather than focusing on what people do or believe in a large scale. Another benefit of such methodology, is that it
enables the researcher to analyze data from the macro to the micro level without risking analytical integrity by comparing the proverbial apples to oranges.\textsuperscript{4} The qualitative analysis is defined as a systematic interpretation into inquiry and then meaning.\textsuperscript{5} It consist in this research in the interpretation and the consistent exploration of meaningful information from the case studies’ observations.

The results of such methodology can then help establish similarities, and eventually new variables that will help broaden the understanding of the overall crisis response, and give a more conclusive analysis. The qualitative methodology goes beyond analyzing triggers and actors of the decision-making process of the collective security mechanisms. It will seek to identify critical windows of opportunities for decision-making, hindrances to those process, whether those are intrinsic to the decision-making process or results of external influences.

By collecting information from primary and secondary sources, this research will analyze the chain of events that led to ECOWAS’ deployments of troops, and factors that played a role in speeding or hindering the decision-making process in the two case studies. This case study process will analyze the crises’ chain of events, in order to determine how they relate to each other, and their relation to the collective security mechanisms’ decision-making processes, both in ECOWAS and in the AU. It will attempt to analyze the response given by the ECOWAS to the two crises, under the purview of the collective security concepts, the level of advancement in the operationalization of the ASF/EF, and the decision-making process.
Case Study Selection

The first chapter gave an overview of a promising ECOWAS debut in collective security implementation with the Liberia and Sierra Leone crises in the 1990s, where a regional peace enforcing and later peace keeping force was relieved by the UN months after its initial deployment. Those actions constitute the lessons learned for ECOWAS, and that has allowed to assess and improve its collective security mechanism. However, that situation contrasts with the crises in Ivory Coast (2002) and Mali (2012), where ECOWAS did not intervened until an external actor, France, deployed its troops to help stop the bleeding. These are the motives for selecting the Mali and Ivory Coast cases for this study. The different steps undertaken by the AU, and ECOWAS in solving those crises, until the point where a third party acted under the provisions of UN resolutions and bilateral defense accords, will be analyzed under the perspective of collective security mechanisms highlighted in the previous chapter. The researcher will analyze the different actors and interactions that should have normally led to a decision involving the effective use of the ASF, and try to pin point where there were holes in the process, either at the political, economic, or at structural level, in the two cases studied. Were those flaws the result of an incorrect implementation of the existing decision-making process, or were they the results of inefficiencies inherent to the AU/ECOWAS decision-making processes?

Analysis

This study will follow the five steps for conducting this analytical research as described by William Wiersma. First, identification and isolation of the problem in the identified case studies. Second, review the available information to determine the factors
relevant to the concept of collective security, and its decision-making processes. Third, collect and classify data and review the case studies. Fourth, analyze the data and determine how mechanisms relate to the concept of collective security, and ECOWAS decision-making weaknesses. Lastly, the researcher will draw conclusions resulting from the study and make recommendations.6

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

As reviewed in chapter 1, ECOWAS started in its early 1990s to implement a collective security mechanism. It was to be integrated progressively into the continental one, with the adoption of the APSA framework in 2001. In 2002 the protocol establishing the ASF conceptualized the integration of the regional brigades, such as the ESF for the ECOWAS, as being the building blocks of the ASF. During the two last decades, a considerable number of intrastate conflicts occurred in the region, whose effects were regional, even continental. That was the urge to set up those standing collective security mechanisms, to intervene in any member states, and prevent crises from worsening. The framework has proven somewhat effective in eastern Africa where the AU deployed a mission first in Darfur and then in Somalia, which the UN later undertook. However, in the Ivory Coast (2002) and Mali (2012) crises, the AU nor ECOWAS intervened until a third party came in. They deployed later, after the crises had already gone far enough to create noticeable destruction and humanitarian crises. The study will try to determine the role that the collective security mechanisms, with more emphasis on the regional one, played in the management of the two crises. How their actions fit under the purview of collective security concepts, what were the decisions made, or what might have prevented effective decision-making processes to operate?
Step 2: Review of Relevant Information

The previous chapter reviewed relevant literature to the concept of collective security, the decision-making of the existing security bodies at both continental and regional level, and the operationalization process of the ASF. It is clear that the dynamics identified have played a role in how the two crises were handled, and may as well do the same in the future.

The successful implementation of a collective security mechanism is conditioned by prerequisites and assumptions that we have previously addressed. In order to cover associated perspectives, the following three key elements will be analyzed: the collective security principles, the responsiveness of the deployment and the operational status of the forces to be deployed.

Collective Security Principles

This study examined the collective security through key indicators: a strong regional coalition, the commitment to intervene and deal with an agreed identified aggressor, and the influence of power distribution in dealing with it, particularly the presence of a hegemonic regional power. Those sub-variables are defined as followed for this research.

The Strong Coalition, refers to the proportion of countries within the region, which shares and expresses, through formal ways mainly, their concerns about an ongoing crisis. It goes beyond just the affirmed stand, it assesses the relative power that such coalition represent within the regional organization, and its likeliness to initiate decisions or actions at a regional level.
The commitment to intervention expresses the willingness of the member states to commit their resources, troops mainly, to a regional intervention that will foster security and stability within the region. It is often driven by the interest that states have in the solving of an ongoing crisis, and can be determined by the regional impact of an ongoing crisis.

The presence of a hegemon here simply measures the level of commitment that Nigeria, considering that it has the preponderant political and military influence in the region, has to a crisis. A significant level of support, troops and resources dedicated to a crisis, will be used to assess it presence or absence in the coalition.

**Responsiveness of Deployment**

This key element assesses the overall effectiveness of the deployment in regard with the time, objectives and the troops tasked. It characterized the regional decision-making process outcomes by analyzing the regional political responsiveness, the adoption of a clear and feasible mandate, and the support provided by Troop Contributing Countries. The associated sub variables are defined as followed for this research.

The political responsiveness assesses the effectiveness of the decision to commit troops, in regards with the ongoing situations. It determines whether or not the political decision-making process was quick enough to project forces on the theater in a timely manner. It does not represent the overarching political responsiveness, with the Assembly or the Authority declarations, but rather the timely adoption of resolutions by the MSC or PSC for interventions.

The clear and feasible mandate is related to the specified tasks of the force in regard with its capabilities and size. It is to assess if the mandate is clear enough, not to
be subject of misinterpretations, and if the force authorized is strong enough and has the capabilities to accomplish its tasks.

The TCC support represents the level of resources committed by the member states in regard with the requirements of the mandate. It is the function between the effective provided force by the TCCs and the number of troops and associated equipment required by a given mandate.

**Operational Status**

The operationalization status determines the effective capabilities of the regional security force, through key indicators such as logistic support, command and control, and capacities to operate with civilian humanitarian actors, such as NGOs or UN agencies. The correlated sub-variables are defined, as followed, for this research.

Logistic support assesses the logistic concept adopted, the required funds and equipment for the deployed force, and the viability of the concept in time. It assesses whether or not the planned mission support has dedicated and sustained resources, covering a period long enough to minimize the effect of any lack of support.

Command and control assesses the chain of command of the mission, from the strategic to the tactical level. It is the function of the timely designation of key actors, of the decision-making process, and the definition of structures that allows them to operate effectively. Material resources that might be required for such task are evaluated as part of the logistic support, and do not influence this sub-variable.

Interoperability with NGO and Humanitarian organization is key to any peacekeeping operations, as those actors are the one that have the expertise and often the means to provide humanitarian relief. The sub-variable assesses here the planned and
effective capability of the force to integrate those efforts in its overall actions, mainly through the provision of assistance, and coordination of efforts.

The overall findings and their relative dependencies will help understand the decisions adopted, and particularly how they align with the theoretical framework described in the Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security.

Step 3: Collection and Classification of Data

This study used two methods to gather needed and meaningful information that could specifically answer the secondary questions, and holistically the proposed research question of this study. The first method was to review the theoretical literature that laid the foundations of collective security concepts, and the official documents that describe the design of the regional and continental collectives security mechanisms. That review provided a better understanding of the overall security environment, in terms of impediments and the existing structures on the continent. The second method was the review of existing analysis and assessment of past collective security actions, from individuals publications to institutions dedicated to the analysis of security issues over the continent such as the Institute for Security Studies based in Pretoria, South Africa. The findings from that analysis helped in framing the perspective under which to analyze the security bodies’ decision-making processes.

Step 4: Data Analysis

The basis of analysis of the ECOWAS collective security response, and decision-making processes will be based upon two case studies. The first case is the Ivory Coast
crisis of 2002, where ECOWAS troops deployed, but almost six months after the beginning of the crisis, France had to play the buffer force role in that period between the two warring sides. The second case is the Mali crisis in 2012, where a combination of rebel and terrorist groups took control of half of the country, and Mali, as a state, was on the brink of collapsing under their repeated assaults, which were now aiming at the capital city of Bamako. Again, in this case, the French troops intervened, and ECOWAS troops deployed later, with a significant delay. In both cases, ECOWAS did finally implement its collective security mechanism, however the responsiveness was not the one expected, particularly in the Mali case which occurred at a point in time where the operationalization process had theoretically gone further. The study will try to analyze the actions and decisions of ECOWAS in those two crises under the perspectives of key relevant information previously highlighted in step 2. The results of the analysis will be displayed in a matrix that addresses the adequacy of the response to deploy the force with collective security concepts, the responsiveness of the decision-making process, and the operationalization status of the ESF Brigade at the time of the conflict. The researcher assesses those key variables by evaluating their related sub-variable s with a YES or NO, according to their presence or absence (see table 2).
Table 2. Assessment of ECOWAS crisis response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Ivory Coast 2002</th>
<th>Mali 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Security principles</strong></td>
<td>Strong Coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment to intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of a hegemon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsiveness of deployment</strong></td>
<td>Political responsiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear and feasible mandate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCC support</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational status</strong></td>
<td>Logistic support</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability with NGO/Humanitarian Org.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

Step 5: Drawing Conclusions and Recommendations

The main objective of the case studies is to compare the findings on the sub-variables in order to assess the key variables discussed earlier. It will enable to identify similar patterns that might explain why the ECOWAS has not given any early effective response to those crises. It will help assess if the collective security mechanisms are well embraced and implemented, the decision-making process outputs and the level of operationalization of the ESF, what has been achieved so far and what remains to be done for it to become a proactive force.
Chapter Arrangements

This study consists of five chapters which cover respectively a specific part of the research conducted on ECOWAS collective security forces in the overall APSA framework. Chapter 1 gave an overview of the history of both continental and regional organizations. It also reviewed the process of establishing their collective security mechanisms, as well as the institutions responsible of their implementations. It also defined some key concepts and key terms used in the study. Chapter 2 covered the literature review. It focused on the concept of collective security, the decision-making process and bodies of the AU and the ECOWAS in regard with collective security, and the operationalization of security forces under the purview of the ASF. Chapter 3 presented the methodology used to conduct this research. It presented the characteristics of the qualitative methodology, and the associated variables used in the case studies. Chapter 4 gave an overview of the two case studies’ crises chain of events, and analyzed them under the lenses of key variables identified in chapter 3. It conducted a deeper analysis of the ECOWAS statements, decisions and actions through the ESF, to assess the collective security mechanism and its effective implementation. Chapter 5 will present a summary of the analysis and recommend ways of improving the ECOWAS collective security mechanism in order to turn the ESF into a more proactive force, capable of providing early response before a crisis worsens.

Summary

The study uses a qualitative methodology, based on two case studies to analyze different variables related to ECOWAS crisis response adopted therein. Its objective is to assess ECOWAS’ collective security mechanism capability to operate in line with the
collective security principles, its decision-making processes, and the level of implementation of the ESF concept as part of the APSA framework. The results will help in assessing the key factors of late intervention and make recommendations to improve the ESF responsiveness in future crisis.


CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

In 1975, ECOWAS was created by western African states to promote economic integration and support their efforts toward development. During its early years, the enterprise faced many obstacles; some of them consisted of intrastate conflicts that threatened the regional security and stability. Therefore, the organization moved toward the creation of a collective security mechanism that could address those issues, in order to set the security and stability prerequisites for its initial purpose: the economic development of the member states. ECOWAS, through the ECOMOG, deployed troops in many countries since the early nineties, and is in the process of integrating that capability into a continental one. However the late response given in some regional crises, has raised comments and critics.\(^1\) This study analyzes the ECOWAS crisis response under the purview of collective security, using two case studies to determine factors of lateness, with a view to formulate recommendations that will improve the decision-making process.

Chapters 1 and 2 laid the background information related to the continental and regional institutions, their collective security mechanism frameworks, and the theory that underlies the concept. Chapter 3 discussed the qualitative methodology that was adopted by the researcher to conduct this study. This chapter analyses the two cases studies, under the perspective of the collective security mechanism response. The researcher will present the information in the following two sections:
1. Section 1 will present the Ivory Coast case study and conduct an analysis based on the variables of ECOWAS crisis response identified in the previous chapter.

2. Section 2 will present the Mali case study and conduct an analysis based on the variables of ECOWAS crisis response identified in the previous chapter.

Each section will include, at its end, an interpretative analysis of the data, to assess relevant information on the effectiveness of the overall crisis response mechanism.

Along with ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, the EU, and the US played important role in the decision-making process that led to the implementation of both ECOMICI and AFISMA. They played a significant role in the funding and logistic support, their support was needed by ECOWAS, particularly in the sufficient political support to enable a UN resolution authorizing a regional intervention, and to enable mechanisms to support ECOWAS security initiatives.

**Case Study 1 Ivory Coast 2002**

**Crisis Overview**

Unlike many western African countries, Ivory Coast had enjoyed a peaceful an relatively stable climate from its independence to the 1990s. Under the leadership of its first president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Ivory Coast managed to establish a relatively stable political and economic environment, which attracted foreign investments and regional labor forces from neighboring countries. However, at the death of its leader, the economic difficulties, combined with a power struggle, let surface ethnic tensions that crystallized towards foreigners who had already been Ivorian citizens for a generation or more. Captain Pape Birane Dieye, a former graduate of CGSC class 2010-1, gave a detailed overview of the
The economic situation that degraded since the mid-1980s, transforming the grievances created by the decline in job creation and economic growth into a resentment toward the foreigners, perceived as being the ones who stole jobs from the real Ivorians.

After Houphouet-Boigny’s death, his replacement, Henri Konan Bedié took a political advantage of the ongoing social contest, and introduced a law requiring that any candidate to the coming presidential elections must be of Ivorian descent. Such a law was clearly made to target an uprising political figure and former prime minister under Houphouet, Alassane Dramane Ouatara. Ouatara was Muslim, and very popular in the north. The political situation rapidly evolved into ethnic and religious tensions between the north and the south, creating a strong divide between the two parts of the countries. In 1999, Ivorians witnessed their first coup, when General Robert Guei overthrew Bedié and formed a new government with the promise of organizing democratic elections in 2000. The tensions increased when in 2000, Guei used the Supreme Court to disqualify Ouatara first, and finally stopped the election process and claimed himself as the winner as the first polling results showed that Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), was in the lead. Within hours of that decision, supporters of Gbagbo took the streets, with the support of some gendarmes and soldiers, they forced Guei to flee, and their candidate was declared president, since Ouatara was initially excluded from the process. After that episode, supporters of Ouatara went to the streets asking for new elections since their candidate was evicted from the process by Guei. Their fighting with the new regime and its partisans made the first large series of victims in the conflict, deeply widening the political and religious cleavages between the north and the south.

A year later, despite the ongoing social and political tension, for the first time in Ivory Coast’s history the ruling party was defeated during the local elections where Ouatara’s
party won. The struggle for power sharing finally broke out into a coup attempt on September 19, 2002, which targeted the major cities of Abidjan the capital city, Bouaké in the center, and Korhogo in the north. The overall objective was not achieved, and the aftermath was a division of the country in two parts, the south controlled by the government, and the north under the rule of the Forces Nouvelles, the rebel group to whom the claims against the Ivority policy measures had given the support of northern populations.

ECOWAS needed to act promptly to avoid the situation from escalating further, because Ivory Coast is one of the major player in western African economies. The collapse of the Ivorian state and economy would have had tremendous economic and political repercussions on the region. France had prepositioned troops in Ivory Coast, and was called thereupon by the Ivorian government to support their fight against the northern rebels that they consider as foreigners. France did intervene, not in support of any side, but in the role of a buffer force between the warring parties (see figure 6), while evacuating its citizens and calling for an ECOWAS led intervention in Ivory Coast.

On September 29, ECOWAS decided, after many early diplomatic approaches, to deploy the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) with the final objective of taking over the French buffer force role. The mandate was later broadened in February 2003 by a UNSC resolution “to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zone of operations, using the means available to them.” The ECOMICI forces, which deployed from January 2013 on, were gradually turned into blue helmets during the implementation of the UN Mission in Ivory Coast (MINUCI).
The following sections will analyze the decision and actions carried out by the ECOWAS, under the different purview of variables identified in the previous chapter.

**Collective Security Principles**

**Strong Coalition**

Building a strong coalition for the Ivorian crisis was an obvious need, but faced many challenges. Because of the cleavage that existed between the north and the south, grounded by ethnic and religious aspects, the party of Laurent Gbagbo would not accept
Burkina Faso, Mali, or Liberia because of the natural ties that tied the two first to the northern communities, and because of the alleged backing of the western rebellion by the third. Therefore those three countries were disqualified from being part of any force that would have to deploy in Ivory Coast. However, on an economical standpoint, Ivory Coast was playing a key role at the regional level, particularly for the Francophone countries being part of the same monetary union. A stable Ivory Coast would mean a less volatile and more secure economy, as many landlocked countries rely on imports travelling through Ivorian ports. Therefore, during the ECOWAS Head of States Conference of 18th December 2002, there was a consensus to deploy an intervention force in Ivory Coast.

The diplomatic efforts were coordinated through a group of contact composed of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo, and ECOWAS designated President Eyadéma of Togo as the principal coordinator to facilitate negotiation and avoid counterproductive duplicity of in the mediation efforts. Different contacts were established with the different warring parties, and almost all the ECOWAS member states were involved in the diplomatic efforts that were made to reach an agreement by all parties on the deployment of an intervention force. For the Ivorian crisis, strong coalition, the first sub-variable of collective security was present, and is awarded a ‘YES’.

**Commitment to Intervention**

There was at the ECOWAS political level, strong and maintained efforts toward bringing peace and stability to Ivory Coast. The second and third order effects of the crisis would have produced a large and persistent impact on the local fragile economies. Thus, there should have been a strong incentive for ECOWAS member states to commit their forces to the intervention. Beside the three countries cited earlier as disqualified
from participating in the intervention, because of possible conflicting interests, only 5 out of 12 states agreed to provide troops for ECOMICI deployment. Only Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo agreed to send troops. Despite the 2,386 authorized strength, only 1,300 were deployed in May 2003, five months after the beginning of the deployment. The weak force authorized, and the delay in the deployment, were largely attributed to the financial and logistic issues the TCC were facing, and to the lack of external support. ECOWAS tried to leverage that weak commitment on the field by leading strong and maintained diplomatic efforts on the warring parties to come to an agreement. The deployment was not at the expected level, but it reinforced the legitimacy of the overall intervention force, particularly with the rebel groups in the north, which perceived the French forces as partial, on the side of the government. Overall, the commitment to intervene, the second sub-variable of the collective security, was not present, and is awarded a “NO”.

Presence of a Hegemon

As mentioned in chapter two, alongside with the assumptions and prerequisite for an effective collective security mechanism, the presence of a hegemon in the coalition, is a determinant factor for success, as being a rallying incentive for smaller states. It augments the likeliness of effectiveness, and usually provides a strong and recognized leadership for the coalition. In ECOWAS, Nigeria can be considered as being in that hegemonic role. It had previously assumed that role in the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in the nineties. In the Ivory Coast crisis, when the decision was made to deploy an intervention force, Nigeria did not commit to send troops, but ECOWAS managed to appoint Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, of Nigeria, as the Special Representative of its
Executive Secretary, as the coordinator of the overall peace keeping operations. The reasons of the relatively weak support of Nigeria to ECOMICI, a medical and signals team, ranged from diverse considerations. At the time ECOMICI forces were implemented, Nigeria was already committed to sending 1500 troops to Liberia. Internally, conflicts in the northern Nigerian states, between religious and ethnic factions, were a real security concern for the forces, switching the focus to domestic operations. Another concern was on the financial side. In the nineties, Nigeria spent about $10 billion in supporting ECOMOG efforts, for its troops and for the support of other deployed nations, which threatened to pull out because of lack of support. The economic rationale, combined with the internal growing security challenges, played an important role in Nigeria’s decision to not undertake the role it used to play in the regional security mechanism. The presence of a hegemon, the third sub-variable of the collective security principles was not observed, and is awarded a “NO”.

Responsiveness of Deployment

Political Responsiveness

As soon as the northern rebels attempted to overthrow the Gbagbo regime, there was an overall condemnation of the move, and to the resort to violence. Just ten days after the coup attempt, an emergency summit took place in Accra, Ghana, and gathered the heads of states of ECOWAS member states. They established a contact group composed of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo, and the mediation coordination was conducted by the President of Togo. The contact group early on established relations with the different parties, and they obtained an agreement to a cease-fire by both parties on October 17. Because of the political and economic outcomes that an escalation of the conflict would have had on the overall region, there was a consensus by all states to
diligently solve the crisis, the political resolve and responsiveness was high. However, despite that resolve, only five countries ultimately provided troops to the ECOMICI deployment. The troops contributing countries met on November 6 to discuss the force deficiencies of equipment, logistic support, and funding. Despite the fact that a force commander was not yet designated at that time, an advance party was sent to Ivory Coast to undertake the preliminary work on logistic issues. The resolve to be on the ground and to start making efforts towards peace was definitely noticed at the ECOWAS level, but the challenges they were facing in human and financial resources prevented them from being able to deploy effectively and timely. Therefore, the political responsiveness, the first sub-variable of the responsiveness of deployment was not observed, and attributed a “NO”.

Clear and Feasible Mandate

The mandate agreed upon for the ECOMICI was “to monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers, and humanitarian staff. The authorized strength of ECOMICI was 2,386 with the provisional breakdown of contributions to the force as follows: Benin - 300; The Gambia - 135; Ghana - 265; Guinea Bissau - 386; Mali - 250; Niger - 250; Nigeria - 250; Senegal - 250; and Togo - 300.” The mandate was clear enough in the objectives to be fulfilled, it focused on stopping the ongoing conflict that a previous three weeks cease fire observation had prevented from escalating. However, the strength of the authorized force, and their real capabilities proved insufficient for the overall mandate. In March 2003 there were only 500 ECOWAS troops on the ground, and their weak logistic support hindered their
capacity. The crisis occurred at a point where the ECOWAS mechanism was still in the process of integration to the overall APSA. It seemed that transition, combined with the poor staffing and funding of the mission made its mandate difficult to realize. The mandate was clear, but the strength authorized was too small, even smaller than the French forces they were supposed to relieve in place, and which were far better equipped. The clear and feasible mandate, the second sub-variable of the Responsiveness of deployment, was not met, and is given a “NO”.

**TCC Support**

The authorized strength for ECOMICI was 2,386 soldiers according to the mandate of the 26th October. By the end of May 2003, the mission strength plateaued at 1,300 troops before they were integrated to the UN mission that was later created to take over the task. Only five countries listed earlier finally deployed their troops in Ivory Coast, and many of them relied heavily on the logistic support that were provided by the French Licorne Force, or other external actors. The TCC, aside from the troops and equipment they provided, did not commit additional resources. The ECOWAS mechanism of conflict prevention requires member states to support and sustain their troops for the first 90 days of operations, while waiting for the regional community to take over and reimburse the related expenses. During the ECOMICI deployment, ECOWAS itself did not have a clear picture for the funding of the operations. There was pressure to act quickly, but the funding mechanisms and resources could not keep up with the pace of operations. The political commitment to solve the crisis was high, mainly because of the fear of the impacts that a deterioration of the situation would have had on the region, both socially and economically. The TCC support was nevertheless very low.
That situation might be explained by the lack of resources of those TCC rather than a lack of will to support. As we mentioned earlier, a hegemon is required not only for its troops and for its capabilities, but also for the resources it can bring along. A good example of such a situation is the US contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations which had in 2013 reached 28%, even if the US has committed no troops to any UN mission. The TCC support, even weak, is considered present as members of the contributing countries provided the best they could afford.

Operational status

Logistic Support

The Logistic burden of supporting a peace keeping operation has always been the biggest challenge for ECOWAS. Gberie and Ado, cited earlier, mentioned that “there was a great deal of financial uncertainty, and there was no integrated logistics plan. The Force Commander did not have any control over the future of his finances; indeed he sometimes had to operate for up to two months without any funds.” The different troops of ECOMICI did not have any common training or similar equipment that could ease interoperability and integration of logistic support. The French speaking countries were relying heavily on the French concept of RECAMP, a program established to reinforce their peacekeeping capabilities by refitting and modernizing their equipment and providing the correlated logistic support while Ghana was relying on the UK, and Benin on Belgium. This disparity did not allow any kind of integration of the logistics at the mission level. Furthermore, there was not really a mission logistic support plan as ECOWAS was still struggling to fund the mission. The logistic support, first sub-variable of the operational status, was very weak and is awarded a “NO”.

**Command and Control**

The framework established by the regional collective security mechanism clearly defines a chain of command that has to be implemented for mission effectiveness. A special representative to the Executive Secretary has to be designated and coordinate all the peacekeeping operations. A Force Commander has to be also designated, as the military chief of the mission, having under his command all the deployed troops, with the mission of fulfilling the mandate assigned to the force. The mission’s HQ has to be established within the theater, unless not feasible. It works in coordination with the different parties, and report to the ECOWAS HQ in Abuja. For the ECOMICI, all those elements were put in place, but in a chronological manner that did not help in establishing a smooth command and control system. The Special Representative was designated early while the Force Commander was appointed in late December, when an advance party was already sent on the field to work on some logistic issues, without a clear chain of command to report back to, nor even the means to do their mission on the ground. That late designation is also suspected to be the basis for the lack of planning for the mission deployment, as well as the weak military staffing of the Special Representative’s office, to allow him to provide better mission guidance, and coordination of military activities with other domains. The Command and Control, in the end, managed to meet the objectives, and build the capacity required to produce effects on the theater. However under the purview of the operational status of the force, before and during deployment, it wasn’t well coordinated and is given a “NO”.
Interoperability with NGO/Humanitarian Organizations

The experience gained from previous conflicts, and from deployment under the UN, proved that the humanitarian assistance and relief organization could be of great benefit as long as the security environment was kept stable for them to operate. When ECOMICICI troops started deploying, combining their effort with the French forces, they significantly improved the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers that could then provide more relief and assistance to the IDPs. It was part of the Force Commander’s concept of operations, to provide in his second phase, a wider corridor for economic and humanitarian purposes, as required by the mission mandate. The Conflict Prevention Framework envisions first the intervention as a way to stop violence and allow humanitarian efforts to be supported. In this crisis, humanitarian staff access to the IDP camps was difficult since the French were not deployed in the buffer zone and the capital, as ECOMICICI troops deployed further, they escorted NGO personnel and eased their access to IDP camps. The ability to operate with NGO and humanitarian organization, the third sub-variable of the operation status was noticed, and therefore awarded a “YES”.

Interpretative Analysis of Ivory Coast Case Study Results

The following table 3, summarizes the result of the crisis assessment under the purview of the key variables identified. It shows that despite the surprise of the crisis, ECOWAS had a strong political coalition. However, there is a noticeable paradox between the consensus on the need to intervene and the commitment to such intervention, which was only supported by five member states. A strong political coalition was obtained, but the other impediments to an effective collective security mechanism were not met.
Table 3. Ivory Coast integrated result assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of ECOWAS crisis response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Security principles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of a hegemon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsiveness of deployment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear and feasible Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC support</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational status</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability with NGO/Humanitarian Org.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*

The responsiveness to deploy troops was nuanced. The TCC pledged to provide their troops despite their small military capabilities and the insufficient strength authorized by the mandate. The deployment was hindered apparently by the challenges they were facing in gathering both equipment and financial resources to support their troops. The overall operational status played also a role in delaying the mission deployment. Since there was not a resourceful team and chain of command early designated to plan the mission deployment, particularly with the weak logistic support of the different TCC, the deployment suffered a series of setbacks, and less than 500 troops were on the ground by April 2003. However, they managed to work with humanitarian
organizations, and that had a great impact on the people’s daily lives, and positively influenced the mission’s perception by the locals.

Case Study 2 Mali 2012

Crisis Overview

The Mali crisis of 2012 had its roots in the conflicts that started in 1963 with the first Tuareg rebellion shortly after independence, and reached its peak with the alliance between separatist and radical Islamist groups in 2012. The rebels’ movements, which were cracked down harshly by the Mali government in the 1960s, found refuge and shelter in neighboring countries, and conducted throughout the years a series of attacks, which were followed by cease-fire agreements that were never successfully implemented. The core grievances of the Tuareg movements were about a transparent wealth sharing, a greater representation, and participation in the governance. They radicalized over the years and adopted a separatist stand. The degradation of the security environment in Libya played a role in precipitating the Mali crisis, with the massive flux of weapons and fighters from Libya.\textsuperscript{13}

The first major attack occurred around January 16, 2012 near Menaka, a town in the far northeast (see map on figure 7). It was ascribed to Tuareg groups that recently came back from Libya with their weapons and vehicles and that were received President Amadou Toumani Touré a month earlier, in an effort to integrate those fighters into the regular army. The situation deteriorated as the Tuareg rebels, under the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA), were seizing more territories in the north and creating a large number of IDPs that fled the combat zone.\textsuperscript{14} From January to March 2012, the regular forces were not able to keep the ground and conceded almost a
third of the country to the MNLA, which by then, gained the support of Islamist groups, locally and externally rooted, such as Ansar Din, AQIM, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa (French acronym MUJAO). On March 22, 2012, military officers deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré, accusing him of incompetency in the northern crisis settlement. The military junta suspended the constitution and set up a transition commission allegedly in charge of putting the country on track. The perpetrated coup automatically triggered a reaction at both the AU and ECOWAS, which started enforcing sanctions against the junta and demanding a return to constitutional order. The void created by the coup, on the institutional level, was quickly exploited by the rebel groups and their terrorist allies. One week after the coup, they seized in three days Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou, cities which gave them the control over almost a half of the country.

Between April and June 2012, while ECOWAS made efforts to pressure the junta to bring back constitutional order, threatening to carry out military actions against the junta and the Tuaregs, which were the illegal armed group that was consolidating its gain in the north. By the June, northern Mali was declared by that alliance as an independent Islamic state. By the end of June, the fortuitous alliance was broken. The Islamist groups ousted the Tuareg rebels from major northern cities and started imposing Islamic law. Major violations of human rights, and the destruction of historic sites around that time were covered by the media, and alerted the international community about the tragedy that was going on in Mali. This situation reinforced ECOWAS’ stand that was calling for an intervention in Mali to restore constitutional order, botched both by the junta and the northern insurgents whose actions threatened Mali’s sovereignty.
From July to December 2012, an agreement was made between ECOWAS and the junta, and a transition government was put in place. The former president of the national assembly, Diokunda Traoré, was appointed as the President of the transition, as guided by the Mali Constitution. During that time frame, the Tuareg rebels were no longer having any hold on the field, and they lobbied through Ansaar Dine, a Tuareg based Islamist group, to get involved in the negotiation that the UN was urging both ECOWAS and Mali officials to undertake the crisis through the October 12th UNSC resolution 2071. After that resolution urged to implement regional actions, ECOWAS leaders decided during the Abuja summit on the Mali crisis, held on the November 11, 2012, to send troops to help the Mali government fight the Islamists in the north, within 45 days of the adoption of the UN resolution 2071.

The political instability in Mali increased in late December due to the actions of the military which dissolved the government, while efforts were made at the regional and international levels to facilitate a military action in Mali in early January 2013. The EU had planned to send trainers for the Mali army, while the ECOWAS troops would deploy in the south and prepare for an offensive northward. On December 20, 2012, UN resolution 2085 authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) supported by ECOWAS, and the deployment was scheduled for September 2013. However, the Islamist insurgents launched an offensive southward on January 10, 2013, taking the control of Konna, Douenza and Djabali, threatening to reach the capital city Bamako within days (see map on figure 7).
At that point, the President of the transition asked France to assist, and Operation Serval was started on January 11, 2013. That situation precipitated the events, and troops deployed, piecemeal, from that moment on, according to their readiness status. By late January 2013, Nigerian aircraft deployed, along with the French ones, in the theater as well as the first West African troops, from Burkina Faso and Senegal. The troops deployed did not reach the ground strength’s timetable, and their numbers were more symbolic. The combined intervention of French forces and African troops (mainly from Chad) was successful, and by March the Islamist insurgents were defeated or ousted of
all northern cities. UN resolution 2100 of April 25, 2013, turned the AFISMA into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was to reach 12,600 troops. As of March 2015, the MINUSMA mandate has been renewed and there are 9,142 military troops, 1,178 police personnel, and 1,180 civilians (542 local national, 648 internationals, among which 125 UN volunteers) deployed in Mali.20

Collective Security Principles

Strong Coalition

Long before the deterioration of the situation that occurred after the coup of March 22, 2012, ECOWAS was conducting mediation efforts with the Mali government and the Tuareg rebels to find a peaceful settlement of the crisis, even if the resort to a military means was not excluded. Five days after the coup, an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS Head of States was organized in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The outcome was the suspension of Mali from the regional organization and the threat of a military intervention against the junta to restore constitutional order, backed by Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, and Ghana. The deterioration of the security situation impacted the overall regional security. The exploitation of the institutional void by the rebels and Islamist insurgents to push further south, combined with ECOWAS pressure on the junta, made the formation of a transitional institution quicker. By the end of April 2012, along with the embargo, the decision was overall adopted to create a standby force that would deploy to Mali to protect the newly appointed political authorities and prevent the insurgent groups from moving further south.21 Despite the fact that the Mali military regime opposed that decision, there was an overall strong coalition, which pushed using
different elements of influence to support the security mechanism during all phases of the crisis. The strong coalition, first sub-variable of the collective security principle was observed, and is awarded a “YES”.

Commitment to Intervention

By July, the Malian Army had conceded many northern locations to the insurgents, partially because of the ongoing sanctions that prevented the supply in weapons and ammunitions to an already weak military. ECOWAS considered to intervene, and the planning was being conducted. Despite the strong will to intervene, concerns were raised about the legitimacy of such action, as the military junta was still influencing the decisions of the transitional authorities and was against an ECOWAS intervention in Mali. Such a situation delayed a formal authorization from the UN, which was more concerned about the capabilities of ECOWAS to cope with the insurgents, and particularly the additional burden of humanitarian assistance that would go along with the military intervention. Finally, a resolution was adopted on December 20, 2012, allowing ECOWAS to deploy the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) under UN Chapter VII, to the restore Mali’s constitutional order and territorial integrity. This resolution was welcomed by ECOWAS and the different member states largely committed to provide troops for the mission. The plan was to deploy the troops by September 2013, but the events of January precipitated their employment, and by the end of January 2013, 1,400 troops were deployed in a 10 day window. The commitment to intervene, the second sub-variable of the collective security principle was observed since the beginning of the crisis, and is awarded a “YES”.

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Presence of a Hegemon

The regional implications of the Mali crisis for Nigeria were high enough to create a greater involvement of the regional power. Boko Haram, the Islamist group operating in Nigeria, had alleged ties with another Islamist group in Mali. The creation of an Islamic state in Mali would have created a safe haven for their training activities, which the Nigerian authorities already suspected in Mali. Therefore there was a greater incentive for Nigeria to get involved, despite its ongoing domestic issues. Early on September 2012, when the decision was made to send a force, Nigeria agreed to provide at least a battalion size element. And later when AFISMA troops were deploying in January, fighter jets and transportation aircraft were committed to the AFISMA efforts. The fighter jets were operated from the Niamey airport in Niger, while the transport aircraft carried troops from Nigeria. Along with Nigeria, Chad which is an influential country in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), played an important role by committing in early January 2013 1,400 troops, number which was later raised to 2,000. Chad was the only non-ECOWAS state to intervene along the western states, and also sustained the higher losses of the coalition with its troops on the front. The hegemon presence, third sub-variable of the collective security principle, was noticed and awarded a “YES”.

Responsiveness of Deployment

Political Responsiveness

As mentioned earlier, ECOWAS was prompt to condemn the coup, and take actions, primarily sanctions, to restore constitutional order even though it decided early to prepare a military intervention. The overall political actors were willing and acted to
promote the quick resolution of the conflict, using first diplomatic and economic means, and resorting to the threat of the use of force, and finally committed their forces.

However, there were dissenting voices in the way of solving the crisis that played against the unity of effort. The first was internal, coming from Burkina Faso, whose leader was more prone to a dialog than to an intervention, and initiated contact with rebel groups that were not well received by Bamako. The second was external, coming from Algeria which feared the consequences of an intervention in Mali, and tried to delay the decision to launch an intervention. As soon as the French intervened their fears were confirmed with the In Amenas hostage crisis in Algeria, where terrorist groups affiliated to insurgent in Mali, retaliated by taking hostages at the Algerian gas facility, which resulted in 39 hostage being killed.²⁶ The Mali government also played a role, under the influence of their military, which delayed ECOWAS actions. The opposition to the presence of foreign troops in Mali was not a motive to delay the deployment planning, but it weakened the responsiveness that ECOWAS could have given to the crisis by being able to deploy earlier. Once the resolution 2085, authorizing the AFISMA, was adopted on December 2012, ECOWAS planned for a nine month window for the deployment of the troops. The situation worsened in January, and Mali had to call France to intervene because ECOWAS was not ready. However by the 28th of January 2013, 1,900 troops, among which 1,350 from ECOWAS, were already deployed in Mali.²⁷ The political responsiveness, second sub-variable of the responsiveness of deployment was not observed, ECOWAS did not effectively deploy until an external actor took over and prevented the situation from worsening, and therefore is awarded a “NO”.
Clear and Feasible Mandate

UN resolution 2085, mentioned earlier, authorized the deployment of AFISMA to contribute to “the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defense and Security Forces, and to support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations.” The mandate later emphasized the need to provide security and humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, without undermining the legitimacy of the Malian authorities. The Malian authorities wanted their military to play an important role in the liberation of the North, which was understandable. However, as the mandate suggested, their capacities needed to be rebuilt before they could cope with the insurgent threat. ECOWAS troops deployed had undergone different training in the previous years, under the concept of the operationalization of the ESF. However, the funding of the authorized mission was not done under a UN-funded logistic package which would have guaranteed suitable logistic support. It relied on a voluntary support fund by international donors, meaning member states of ECOWAS deploying on a self-sustainment basis first, while a funding process would be further developed. The funding of the mission was a key impediment for success. ECOWAS, on its own, was not capable of accomplishing its mandate without proper funding. The mandate was clear, but hardly achievable by the ECOWAS troops given the funding problem. The AU Assembly agreed to provide US$50 million for the swift deployment of the AFISMA, and a conference of donors, organized on January 29, 2013, gathered enough promises to cover the one year mandate, while troops already deployed started to face difficulties on the ground. The clear and feasible mandate was not really met in this crisis, as the Mali
forces were far from being able to participate in the offensive operations, and the AFISMA founding was not sufficient. The second sub-variable of the responsiveness of deployment is awarded “NO”.

**TCC Support**

The support given the Mali crisis, in term of troops, is by far the highest given to any historical regional intervention. The number of troops deployed in Liberia in the nineties were higher, but ECOMOG was still struggling to reach its authorized strength. In the Mali case, with regional and external support, the authorized strength of 3,300 troops was quickly assessed insufficient in regards of the threat. The decision was taken on January 26th, during a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of defense forces, to raise the strength to 5,700 troops. Then, pledge numbers by contributors within ECOWAS and the AU reached 7,727 troops by the May 03, 2013. Despite its domestic threats, Nigeria maintained its ground and air forces in support of AFISMA. The TCC support, the third sub-variable of the Responsiveness of deployment is awarded a “YES”.

**Operational status**

**Logistic Support**

The report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on AFISMA also highlighted that at the conference of donors held on January 29, 2013, pledges up to US$455 million were recorded, covering the need for the mission’s first six months. With the member states having to take the three first months at their expense, the mission could run for the first nine months if the pledges were honored. However by the end of July, only a third of the US$455 million had been received under the UN-trusted fund created
to support the mission. There were serious concerns about the mission’s future and the lack of financial resources of the TCC, ECOWAS, as well as the AU. The inability of the regional and continental organizations to finance the AFISMA is suspected to be the impetus behind the implementation of MINUSMA to overtake AFISMA, and solve the funding problem.\textsuperscript{30} Despite the modest contributions given by some member states, and their efforts to support their troops, ECOWAS had not the financial resources required for the logistic support for AFISMA. The AU pledged US$50 million for the swift deployment of the force, but in the long run, it did not have the capabilities to support it financially. The logistic support, the first sub-variable of the operation status is awarded a “NO”.

\textbf{Command and Control}

For AFISMA, command and control, as described in the concept of operation transmitted to the UNSC by the AU PSC, recommended, in consultation with ECOWAS, the designation of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) as being the head of mission, exercising the authority of the Commission on all components of the mission. A Force Commander and a police commissioner were to be designated with operational control over respective assigned units. The Deputy Special Representative (DSRCC) was to be in charge of the civilian component.\textsuperscript{31} As per those recommendations, ECOWAS designated Nigerian General Shehu Abdelkadir as the Force Commander, and he deployed on January 12 2013, along with a partial staff, to begin establishing the force headquarters. On January 30th, the former president of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, AU high Representative for Mali and the Sahel at that time, was appointed as SRCC and head of AFISMA mission. The roadmap for the
operationalization of the ASF was very elusive in terms of command and control, communication and information services (C3IS). The force HQ was to be equipped by the contributing member states, and ensure connectivity with the strategic AU HQ, and the troops were to be deployed with their own internal communication equipment. The concept did not address the interoperability issues that would likely appear on the technical side, and that no standing AU staff could manage. The framework was thought through, but the technical part had finally to be resolved using a third party contracting service to provide a communication package for the mission. In early February, US Department of State contractors were carrying communication equipment to Mali. The command and control, the second sub-variable of the operational status is awarded “YES”.

Interoperability with NGO/Humanitarian Organizations

The mandate of AFISMA, beyond support to the Mali Defense and Security Forces (MDSF), clearly directed the force to provide assistance for humanitarian assistance to the north. The initial command and control framework planned for a civilian component, under the management of the DSRCC, aimed mainly at coordinating humanitarian actions. By April 2013, UN resolution 2100 established the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which, overtime, undertook the AFISMA’s mandate. The first AFISMA’s troops deployed in Mali were assigned to securing the newly freed strategic northern cities. By mid-June, support brought by the AFISMA troops to humanitarian assistance was really appreciated. They allowed the humanitarian assistance to reach further north, and ease the suffering of the populations. People who moved south to escape the Islamists started to
travel back by the hundreds to their home locations. The civilian component of the AFISMA helped support the humanitarian assistance by coordinating the mission security support required. Under this perspective, the interoperability with NGO and humanitarian organizations, the third sub-variable of the operational status was observed, and awarded a “YES”.

Interpretative Analysis of the Mali Case Study Results

The following table, summarizes the result of the crisis assessment under the purview of the key variables identified.

Table 4. Mali crisis integrated data assessment

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of ECOWAS crisis response</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interoperability with NGO/Humanitarian Org.</td>
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</table>
Table 4 shows that ECOWAS adhered to the key principles of collective security. There was a strong coalition including a regional hegemon, Nigeria, and all member states were committed to intervene to restore security and stability in Mali. However, the responsiveness of deployment was not high. Despite the willingness to provide troops by the members states, the political responsiveness did not manage to issue a clear and feasible mandate to the force that could have allow it to be deployed early enough to alleviate the populations’ suffering and prevent the crisis from escalating to a point where a third actor, France, had to intervene. The overall operational status was far better than what ECOWAS had experienced in previous crises. Despite the chronic lack of logistic support to the mission, the force had a clearly identified chain of command, the troops were better prepared and the interoperability with the NGO and humanitarian organizations was planned. This allowed the force to effectively support the humanitarian relief operations in the theater.

Summary of the Case Study Analysis

The key findings for the two cases studies are combined in the general summary on table 5, with a ratio of the sub-variables observed for each key variable of analysis. The case studies, as assumed in Chapter 3, would allow to assess how well the ECOWAS crisis response aligned with the key variables selected to analyze the crisis response adopted. This combined table, and the interpretative analysis done for each case study, can help draw pertinent conclusions on the overall ECOWAS crisis response.
Table 5. Summary of the case studies integrated data assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Ivory Coast 2002</th>
<th>Mali 2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Security principles</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commitment to intervention</td>
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<td>Presence of a hegemon</td>
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<td><strong>Responsiveness of deployment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political responsiveness</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear and feasible Mandate</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC support</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability with NGO/Humanitarian Org.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
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Source: Created by author.

The Regional Collective Security Framework has been Improved.

The observation of the collective security principles has improved in ECOWAS. Between 2002 to 2012, the REC built a stronger political coalition when it comes to deal with regional security issues. The commitment to collective security principles allowed more commitment of the member states for troop provision in the Mali crisis than in the Ivory Coast one. The mechanism for the prevention of conflict, which gave the framework for collective security actions, emphasized the need to establish a secure and stable region as a prerequisite to any sustainable development. The regional impacts of the two case studies were a strong incentive for all member states commit their resources to the collective security body. The presence of a hegemon, Nigeria for ECOWAS, is a critical requirement for an effective collective response, because of both the political
influence and the resources it brings. The analysis showed that ECOWAS member states, overall, are more committed to the regional collective security. On the institutional level, ECOWAS suffer from the same weaknesses as the AU. The institutional bodies, MSC and PSC, lack the quantitative and qualitative staff to fully embrace the complexities of managing multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The study revealed that the two institutions still relied too much on other organs of their respective organization, and were overshadowed to some extent by the higher decision-making bodies, less for ECOWAS in which the MSC is permanently mandated than in the AU where the PSC can mandate only with the approval of the Assembly.

An Ad Hoc Coalition Force Cannot Provide a Proactive Response

The political response, ranging from the condemnation of the use of illegitimate violence to economic sanctions, had a positive impact in both crises, and helped find some sort of agreement. However, in none of them it did prevent the deterioration of the security situation, nor diminished the suffering of the populations. A ready-to-deploy standby force, upon a political decision, would have truly affected the security situation, and could have alleviated human suffering. As long as there was not a force ready for deployment, the capability of ECOWAS political bodies to influence the ongoing crises were very limited. Both crises needed an early and proactive response that ECOWAS was not able to deliver because there was not a ready and deployable force, despite the number of troops pledged by the TCC member states. That lack of a standby military force hindered the credibility of any threat of use of force that ECOWAS made. Even worse, it allowed parties to adopt postures that made the deployment more difficult. If a
standby was erected, and its units designated, then its real capacities would have been known. Thus, allowing to adopt a mandate that the force could fully accomplish. More so, the ad hoc coalition troops lacked common training and interoperability, which could have made the deployment process smoother. An ad hoc force, such as the ones deployed in both crises faced many interoperability issues at the mission level. They were deployed more on a reactionary basis, according to the crisis evolving, than on a proactive basis. Their permanent erection could have avoided an external intervention which ultimately questioned the relevancy of the regional and continental security mechanisms.

Mission Funding was a Significant Hindrance in All ECOWAS Intervention

In order to deploy its troops, ECOWAS needed operational and ready troops, an authorization from the UN security council, and most importantly the adequate funding to support the mission. The collective security framework planned for a “first three months self-country” sustainment, in which the TCCs had to bear the cost of their participation. The weak resources made that scenario difficult, and caused delays in troop’s deployment. ECOWAS, nor the AU, provided sufficient funding for the mission’s logistic support while that aspect remains an important element for successful peace keeping operations. Significant funding is needed for the training, equipping, deployment and the logistic support during operations. The ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention and the APSA framework do not really assess that critical issue, and rely both on an important external support for the funding of missions. African crises are on the top of priorities for the regional and continental organizations, while they might not be at the top ones of the international community. Their direct effects might not reach influential
actors of international relations, the UNSC permanent members particularly, to favor a momentum in the funding of the missions on the continent. In both crises, subsequent delays in deployments were encountered because of the lack of resources at the TCC and regional level. The adoption of UN missions to substitute or integrate the regional or continental ones were stymied by the inability of regional mechanisms to fund and ensure an adequate logistic support.


9 Ibid.


24 Shurkin, “France’s War in Mali Lessons for an Expeditionary Army.”


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Since the end of the Cold War, West Africa has witnessed numbers of internal conflicts with regional impacts, creating political, social, and economic unrest. Since 1990, ECOMOG has tried to provide collective security responses to those conflicts, but mostly on a reactionary base, intervening to stop unprecedented humanitarian conditions that always followed those crises. Such approaches were not new, as the collective security mechanisms at regional level were encouraged and preferred by the international community, under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. They allowed an intervention by actors with vested interests in solving the crisis, and that usually have a better cultural understanding of the ongoing crisis, and long lasting relations with the parties in conflict.

This study examined the concept of collective security, with the aim of assessing how the framework adopted by ECOWAS aligned with it, and what could be improved in that framework to allow the organization to be more proactive in the management of crises in the region.

Overall, ECOWAS has gone a long way in establishing its collective security mechanism. The REC, through its mechanism for conflict prevention, put regional security and stability at the top of its priorities. The regional security and stability are considered as required conditions for a successful and sustainable economic and social development. The key conditions for an effective collective security mechanism, among which a strong enough coalition to deter, a shared commitment to the regional security and the presence of a hegemon, were part of the framework that ECOWAS has been
trying to establish through its mechanism for conflict prevention. Despite efforts made in establishing that framework, the responses given by the organization to recent crises were more on a reactionary basis to humanitarian crises caused by conflict, than on a proactive stand in the management of those crises. Thus, inhibiting an early response and creating the need for an external actor to intervene, though questioning the effectiveness and relevance of the regional security mechanism, which it substituted. The study revealed that despite the efforts made, institutional bodies’ weakness is part of the hindrances of the effectiveness of the collective security mechanism decision-making process.

The ability to provide an early response is key for any proactive management of crises, and relies on the existence of ready-for-deployment forces. Again, the overall framework addresses that issue with the ESF. The ESF is the permanent force built by ECOWAS, from the contributions of the different member states, and which consists of uniformed and civilian components that could be deployed, in short notice, to respond to a regional crisis. The operationalization of that force is underway, and has made significant steps. The force structure and headquarters are established, the training and interoperability enhancements are done through regional schools and exercises. However, there is not a formal agreement, such as a MOU, that clearly binds the member states to a commitment regarding the number of troops they have to provide. Such a void clearly undermines the establishment of a timeline for an ESF at full operational capability. The study showed that an ad hoc coalition, built upon a reactionary base, could not provide an early effective response. In such a scenario, ECOWAS has no control on when, and from where, troops will be deployed, as well as very little guarantee that troops will be able to work together effectively once deployed.
The forces that deployed in Ivory Coast in 2002, and later in Mali in 2013, suffered both from lack capabilities and logistic supports. These shortfalls could be expected in the first months as the corollary to the ones of the TCCs having to bear the cost of the first three months of deployment, and their relative weak resources. The study showed the delays in deploying regional forces after a mandate was being issued, was tied to the lack of resources of the TCCs for the deployment, and to ECOWAS and the AU, as both of the organizations’ funding concept was unreliable for sustained operations. The lack of planned and sufficient funding that could allow troop training, smooth and rapid deployment, as well as adequate logistic support, has been a constant hindrance to regional peace keeping operations.

Despite ECOWAS’ significant moves in improving its collective security mechanisms, its standing security institutions needs to be empowered. The delays in the operationalization of the ESF, and the lack of an effective funding mechanism, combined with mutual causality, made the organization unable to cope with the pace of crises, and provide proactive responses that could have prevented security situations from deteriorating.

As the challenges are currently, and the fact that a regional response to a crisis has been a constant variable in the past years, the following recommendations might be useful in the enterprise of turning the ESF into a more proactive response force to West Africa’s conflicts. These recommendations answer, in a holistic manner, the primary research question formulated in chapter 1: What needs to be done to make the ESF more effective and capable, providing early response forces within the overall African Standby Force.
Recommendations

ECOWAS has made major steps in including security objectives in its agenda with the adoption of the Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security. From the lessons learned, a framework has been built for the regional security mechanism, and its implementation is underway. To remain relevant in the collective security realm, ECOWAS should strive to be the first responder to security crises in the region. The following recommendations will be in line with the findings of this study. Three areas need more emphasis in the near future: the institutional security bodies’ empowerment, the development of a standing and effective force, and most importantly the conception of a reliable funding mechanism to support the two previous domains.

The security threats in the region have completely changed in the last decade, characterized earlier by localized and internal threats, consisting of separatist armed groups or warring factions in a civil war. The new type of threat seems to lean toward local religious extremism with ties to globalized radical Islamist movements, using mainly terrorist modus operandi, that can also become large scale operations as witnessed in Mali and in Northern Nigeria. Such threats are no longer the problem of one particular state, and should therefore draw from a regional commitment for any response to be effective. The commitment of the member states to a regional crisis should be increased. Every state should first commit more resources to the overall security, troops and finance, and secondly support stronger regional institutions by empowering ECOWAS security mechanism institutions. Countries should move towards a more formal agreement in troops and resources they commit to the ESF. The establishment of a standing MOU will
accelerate the establishment of the ESF, and the resources will provide better clarity on the regional funding capabilities. A PSC resolution should not just bound members states to support it, there should be overarching formal agreements allowing the PSC, upon a resolution, to directly deploy standby forces in a very short notice.

The previous recommendation supposes the availability of full operationally capable stand by forces. ECOWAS needs to speed up its ESF operationalization, for it to be a reality. It needs a standby force, equipped and trained accordingly to handle the threats mentioned earlier. The force concept should go beyond the formalized framework of multinational battalions. It should produce standing units with common training, experience, and most importantly, real and interoperable capabilities that can cope with the current threats. In order to do so, member states need to plan the training and the equipping of their respective components to the ESF, accordingly with specifications that ECOWAS needs to clearly define. Beyond the numbers, and type of units, ESF units should be defined in terms of force capabilities and its equipping in key performance parameters, thus setting clear goals and standards of interoperability to be reached by the different TCCs. The NATO Response Force (NRF) model could be an inspiring framework, not in its structure, but in the modalities of countries’ contribution and commitment. It is a rotational based readiness system, in which countries commit components of the overall force for a year, after a national preparation followed by training with other partners of the force. Such a rotational concept allows, in time, training and operating concepts to spread within the organization. It is composed of a set of three units, one ready for deployment, one in training, and one in resetting, thus, allowing a response capability to an unforeseen conflict.
Regarding the funding, it is a huge step forward, particularly with ongoing economic issues, that ECOWAS dedicated a part of its budget to its security mechanism. But that portion remains too little when compared to what is needed. AU and ECOWAS need to find a more reliable sources of funding for their collective security operations, rather than an African Peace Fund, which relies on the donors’ good will and interests. The funding of a multidimensional peace keeping operation can quickly create turmoil for the regional and continental organizations. So far they were unable to handle any of them on their own. To ease the burden of the funding, ECOWAS needs to be proactive in its crisis response by using, in synergy, all the components in its framework. The Early Warning Systems have not so far proven to be effective. The idea would be to conduct earlier and more effective mediation by using the regional and continental Early Warning Systems, to monitor developing crises. Experiences from previous conflicts need to be used to identify windows of opportunities for mediation or early coercive intervention, and prevent the security situation from deteriorating. Such moves could seem aggressive in nature, but it would reinforce the regional capability in addressing crises. When a crisis escalates to a point where it creates a humanitarian crisis, the resources needed to handle it generally increase far beyond the regional organization’s capabilities, forcing any regional response to the mercy of international donors, such as UN, the EU, and US. The idea is that it is cheaper to deal with a crisis before its outbreak than to let it deteriorate into a large scale crisis with complex and costly humanitarian issues. As long as a reliable funding concept for multidimensional peace keeping operations is not achieved, ECOWAS won’t be able to provide proactive responses to regional crises. Therefore, the building of the ESF should include a more robust humanitarian capable component,
which will allow an easier transition to peace, and mitigate the inability to provide preventive responses. Furthermore, the UN has been very slow in providing a resolution under Chapter VII allowing ECOWAS forces to deploy in the two crises studied. Such tendency is likely to continue, preventing any ECOWAS’ capability to deploy an early response force. Therefore, mechanisms under the purview of Chapter VI, pacific settlement of disputes, should get a bigger focus of ECOWAS efforts to solve regional crises, as mitigation measures to UN’s slowness.

Recommendations For Future Study

The ongoing crises in Mali and Nigeria are both characterized by outbreaks with radical Islamic threats: AQIM and its affiliates in Mali, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Both of these crises were preceded by long lasting crises, with socio economic grievances about the wealth distribution and power sharing. Further study on the evolution of political and social claims to a radical extremism, can reveal patterns and dynamics that will be significant for any proactive strategy that ECOWAS wants to adopt for the regional stability in security.

Recent oil exploration revealed large reserves, not in the traditional Gulf of Guinea but in the western part flank of it. Those discoveries increases the interest of the West and China in the region. This new dynamic creates opportunities for development, and new cooperation opportunities. The need for a secure and stable environment will raise in the agenda of the powers willing to benefit from regional energy sources, as well as their support for regional security mechanisms that could foster such an environment. Further study on how member states can take advantage of that new cooperation dynamic to support the regional security mechanism is necessary.
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