Dynamic Information Management and Exchange for Command and Control Applications

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The main goal of this project was to develop a new model of access control to facilitate the specification of policies in highly dynamic scenarios. The requirement was to have a mathematically well-defined model so that properties of policies can be proven, and so that verifiably correct systems can be developed. We have achieved this general goal: we have developed an expressive category-based metamodel of access control, which has a rewrite-based semantics allowing us to prove correctness properties of policies. Previously defined access control models are instances of our metamodel and in addition the metamodel encompasses distributed models, as well as federative policies (where a global access control policy governing the federation is defined as a composition of local policies specified by individual members of the federation).
Extension to the project on “Dynamic Information Management and Exchange for Command and Control Applications”

Modelling and Enforcing Category-Based Access Control via Term Rewriting

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Abstract

The main goal of this project was to develop a new model of access control to facilitate the specification of policies in highly dynamic scenarios. The requirement was to have a mathematically well defined model so that properties of policies can be proven, and so that verifiably correct systems can be developed.

We have achieved this general goal: we have developed an expressive category-based metamodel of access control, which has a rewrite-based semantics allowing us to prove correctness properties of policies. Previously defined access control models are instances of our metamodel and in addition the metamodel encompasses distributed models, as well as federative policies (where a global access control policy governing the federation is defined as a composition of local policies specified by individual members of the federation).

Using the rewrite-based operational semantics of the metamodel, we have defined a policy composition framework: operators to combine policies can be defined using rules, and properties of the resulting global policy can be proven in terms of the properties of the individual policies in the combination. We have also given a set of core axioms to specify emergency policies in the category based metamodel.

In addition, an extension of the category based access control metamodel has been proposed to include obligations. The extended metamodel allows security administrators to check whether a policy combining authorisations and obligations is consistent. This is particularly important in the context of emergency management.

We have defined a graphical representation of category-based policies, and shown how answers to usual administrator queries can be automatically computed, and properties of access control policies can be checked.

The results obtained in the project have been presented in international conferences and published in peer-reviewed conference proceedings and in international journals.

We are grateful for the financial support provided by AFOSR and EOARD in relation to Grant FA8655-10-1-3047. We thank Dr James Lawton for his always excellent support and advice.

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1 Introduction

Access control policies specify which actions users are authorised to perform on protected resources. An authorisation may entail an obligation to perform another action on the same or another resource. Standard languages for the specification of access control policies include also a number of primitives to specify obligations associated with authorisations. For example, within XACML, an obligation is a directive from the Policy Decision Point (PDP) to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) specifying an action that must be carried out before or after an access is approved. If the PEP is unable to comply with the directive, the access might not be realised, even if it is authorised. Given the complexities involved in the definition of access control and obligation policies for command and control applications, formal methods to analyse and reason about policies are essential. This is particularly important in the case of systems dealing with access control in the context of emergency situations, where users’ rights and obligations may need to change in order to cope with specific emergencies.

In this project we have addressed these issues by developing a category-based metamodel for access control, which identifies a core set of principles of access control, abstracting away many of the complexities that are found in specific access control models in order to simplify the tasks of policy writing and policy analysis. A key aspect of the metamodel is to focus attention on the notion of a category. A category is a class of entities which share some property. Classic types of groupings used in access control, like a role, a security clearance, a discrete measure of trust, etc., are particular instances of the more general notion of category. In category-based access control (CBAC) policies, permissions are assigned to categories of users, rather than to individual users. Categories can be defined on the basis of e.g., user attributes, geographical constraints, resource attributes. In this way, permissions can change in an autonomous way (e.g., when a user attribute changes), unlike, e.g., role-based access control models, which require the intervention of a security administrator. The category-based metamodel does not make any specific assumptions on the components of the system. It is an abstract model of access control and obligations that can be instantiated in various ways to satisfy specific requirements.

The category-based metamodel for access control has been equipped with a rewriting semantics, which allows us to study implementations (rewriting provides an operational semantics for policies) and to prove properties of the policies. It is expressive: we have shown that all the access control models that are currently in use can be specified as instances of the metamodel. To accommodate obligations, the metamodel has been extended and examples of policies have been developed in the context of emergency management.

In critical domains, such as policies for command and control, it is highly desirable that access control models and policies be mathematically well defined so that properties of policies can be verified. Formal methods to analyse and reason about policies are essential for systems dealing with access control in the context of emergency situations, where users’ rights may need to change in order to cope with specific emergencies. The rewrite-based operational semantics for the category-based metamodel allows us to use standard rewriting tools (such as CiME, Maude, Aprove, TTT, etc.) to verify security policies, e.g., to ensure that each access request has a unique answer (the latter is proved by checking the confluence and termination of the rewrite relation, which the above mentioned tools do).
2 Main Results

The main results obtained in this project are:

1. We defined the distributed category-based access control metamodel, and provided a rewrite-based operational semantics, which can be used to model single access control policies or distributed (federative) policies defined as a combination of local policies. The access control metamodel was presented in [3]. The extension to deal with distributed policies is presented in [4], where a declarative, rewrite-based operational semantics is given. Distributed systems are seen as federations in which each component preserves its autonomy: the metamodel provides mechanisms to define combinations of policies, by defining general policy-combining operators, with a formal operational semantics for access request evaluation in centralised as well as in distributed contexts where information is shared. The metamodel includes mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts between local and global policies.

2. We have incorporated the notion of obligation in the metamodel. To specify dynamic policies involving authorisations and obligations in the metamodel, we adjusted the notion of an event used in previous work, and described a set of core axioms for defining obligations. In addition, we provide a rewrite-based operational semantics for the extended metamodel, which can be used to specify policies and derive implementations. The rewrite-based semantics specifies how authorisations and obligations are evaluated, and includes mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts between authorisations and obligations. These results are published in [1].

3. Based on the metamodel, we have defined a graphical framework for the analysis of policies that aims at easing the specification and verification tasks for security administrators. Using a visual representation of policies, we show how answers to usual administrator queries can be automatically computed, and properties of access control policies (such as, every access request receives a unique answer) can be checked. For example, the fact that the policy ensures a “separation of duty” constraint (where no user should be allowed to perform two conflicting actions on the same resource), can be easily proved using graph-based algorithms and rewriting techniques. We show applications of the framework to the analysis of policies in distributed environments, and in particular policies that include management of rights in emergency situations. These results are published in [2].

In addition, the following results have been implemented by students at King’s College London, as part of their final year projects (supervised by M. Fernández).

1. Distributed category based access control (item 1 above): this has been applied in three individual UG projects, where students implemented access control policies for a bank, a hotel and a hospital.

2. Event handler for emergency policies (item 2 above): this has been implemented in two UG projects, one project developed a category-based access control system for a hospital, the other focused on the infrastructure required for the event processing (dealing with mechanisms to obtain and process data that trigger the application of emergency policies).
3. Policy Manager: a graphical environment for the analysis of policies (item 3 above) was implemented in Ruby as part of an UG project.

3 Publications

For more details on the work described in this report, we refer to the annual reports (submitted in August 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) and to the following publications\(^1\) (attached).


4 Conclusions and future work

The access control metamodel developed in this project is expressive enough to deal with most of the features relevant to authorisations and obligations and provides means to reason about them. We consider that the project has achieved all its aims, however, some important issues need to be further developed: the typing relation for events (e.g., to identify events that trigger emergency policies), the definition of mechanisms to deal with accountability in case of failed obligations, and various types of administrative updates on policies (e.g., delegation of rights). These are topics for future research.

We also wish to provide more mechanisms for analysing dynamic properties of policies and helping administrators to develop and manage policy updates. With this aim in view, we plan to develop a version of the Policy Manager tool within PORGY, an environment we are developing to provide visualisation and simulation features for systems specified via port-graph rewriting.

Acknowledgements

The late Dr Steve Barker worked in this project during 2010 and 2011; his inspirational ideas provided the basis for this project. Steve will always be remembered.

\(^1\)Authors are listed in alphabetically order, as usual for theoretical computer science papers.
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References


