**Title:** U.S. Counterterrorism Landscape: An Examination of Policy and Strategy Using A Conceptual Approach

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**Abstract:**

This thesis uses Graham Allison's conceptual models to examine foreign policy decisions made in response to terrorist attacks on the American embassies in 1998, the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In particular, several lessons in the areas of strategy, policy, and parochialism apply to the strategic security environment. The analysis concludes that the counterterrorism landscape and U.S. policy must generate a more focused national strategy for counterterrorism that unifies and builds upon lessons learned and the principles set forth in national security strategy. Terrorism continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States, and while various U.S. government agencies share a burden in countering this threat, the natural tensions between agencies have often led to fractured strategies, and incoherent methods to counter terrorism. The analysis highlights the need for cultural and organizational shifts to develop and implement a coherent unity of effort and the required collaboration underscored in the 9/11 Commission Report.

**Subject Terms:**

Counterterrorism, Intelligence, Governmental Decision Models

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U.S. Counterterrorism Landscape: An Examination of Policy and Strategy Using A Conceptual Approach

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes. (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis uses Graham Allison's conceptual models to examine foreign policy decisions made in response to terrorist attacks on the United States embassies in 1998, the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. In particular, several lessons in the areas of strategy, policy, and parochialism apply to the strategic security environment. The analysis concludes that the counterterrorism landscape and U.S. policy must generate a more focused national strategy for counterterrorism that unifies and builds upon lessons learned and the principles set forth in national security strategy. Terrorism continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States, and while various U.S. government agencies share a burden in countering this threat, the natural tensions between agencies have often led to fractured strategies, and incoherent methods to counter terrorism. The analysis highlights the need for cultural and organizational shifts to develop and implement a coherent unity of effort and the required collaboration underscored in the 9/11 Commission Report.
DEDICATION

To my wife and children, whose endless support and sacrifice throughout this academic experience has been immeasurable. Let us hope that I never have to write another thesis.
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CHAPTER 1: Evolution in Counterterrorism

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 planted permanent place-marker in the historical memory of United States; it altered the American experience, challenged U.S. foreign policy, and changed our perceptions of foreign culture, and religion. Much in the way past world events portrayed periods of war that followed cyclical change, (e.g. post-World War I and II, post-Korea, and post-Vietnam), the post-9/11 era points directly to the political instrument of terrorism and how it affected the American landscape at home and abroad. The United States did not need a wake up call to understand the threat posed by violent Islamic extremism, as demonstrated by attacks in Lebanon 1983; Germany 1986; New York, 1993; Saudi Arabia 1996; East Africa 1998; and the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 off the coast of Yemen. While state sponsors of terrorism executed the early attacks carried out against the United States, the latter revealed a relationship with compartmentalized terrorist cells and sophisticated global networks. The attacks signaled the affects of a disjoined foreign policy when faced with a cold, cunning enemy willing to engage in asymmetric warfare around the globe.

The U.S. counterterrorism (CT) strategy is a holistic, interconnected interagency effort that executes CT strategy based on the roles and responsibilities assigned to individual agencies according to U.S. law. The prevailing effort to counter violent extremism is met with incongruent approaches to understanding terrorist organizations, their goals, and methods to achieving them. In practice, the United States CT approaches (isolation, containment, deterrence, destroy) may yield a different agency lead to implement CT strategy depending on the terrorist organization. The current struggle against Islamic extremism challenges American founding principles and ideals that sometimes conflict and contrast with our actions in response
to 9/11. Our counterterrorism effort will place a premium on our ability to assess an enemy's intent, and maintain adherence to U.S. strategy to counter the threats posed by a single, or group of terrorist organization(s).

The natural tension in the United States bureaucracy leads to conflicting aims between presidential administrations and U.S. government agencies. This tension obscures the relevancy of a national security strategy, and how strategy (ends, ways, means, risk) counters terrorism and confronts individual terror organizations based on goals, methods, and threats to U.S. national security. This thesis examines three key events that demonstrate: 1) adherence to national strategy, 2) unintended consequences, and 3) gaps in our counterterrorism strategy. This may call for a revision to our current approach to counterterrorism strategy, and the need to discuss and develop a grand national strategy for counterterrorism that addresses terrorist organizations individually, not as a unified global effort.

This thesis will apply Graham Allison's governmental behavior models to examine decisions made by U.S. government decision-makers. The author will use Allison's three governmental decision making models: the rational actor model, organizational behavior model, and governmental politics model to analyze American foreign policy and counterterrorism strategy. In the first example, this thesis will attempt to understand the unitary actor, President Clinton, and the decision cycle that led to the use of military force in response to the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa. In the second example, the organizational behavior model illustrates how organizational behavior factors into governmental decisions using the Bush administration's decision to use the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 is best explained using the governmental politics model, which shows how
the politics of government led to development and planning the war. In Chapter 6, the thesis provides lessons learned in counterterrorism strategy, marked by a rapidly changing international system and close-knit circles within government. In conclusion, the thesis shows how counterterrorism strategy evolved from the 9/11 Commission Report\(^1\) (released on July 22, 2004), which offered forty-one recommendations that emerged from its investigation\(^2\) of the September 11, 2001 attacks in an effort to make the United States "safer, stronger, and wiser."\(^3\)


\(^2\) Ibid, xvi. Among the lessons learned from the 9/11 Commission's investigation: We leaned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, planes, and practices to deter or defeat it. We learned of fault lines within our government—between foreign and domestic intelligence and between and within agencies. We learned of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers.

\(^3\) Ibid. From the 9/11 Commission Report: We need to design a balanced strategy for the long haul, to attack terrorists and prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting our country against future attacks. We have been forced to think about the way our government is organized. The massive departments and agencies that prevailed in the great struggles of the twentieth century must work together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national power can be combined. Congress needs dramatic change as well to strengthen oversight and focus accountability.
CHAPTER 2: The Allison Models of Governmental Decision-Making

Government decision-making can be influenced by a wide-range of principles and strategies past from individuals, groups, and public opinions. The decisions made by state governments are complex and require a sophisticated set of conceptual models that explain the problem sets, and the rationale that led to the final decision(s). One danger in attempting to explain behavior is that oversimplifying the actions of a national government may lead an analyst to the wrong conclusion. Another problem is reducing a decision to the “decisionmaker,” when there is not one but a mixture of large organizations and political actors involved in the input and decision-making process.¹

This chapter introduces the methods that will apply the conceptual models from *Essence of Decision* to provide an analytical framework to capture the United States’ decision-making process. *Allison* recognizes the importance of the rational actor theory; he suggests that Model I alone is not an all-encompassing model to explain the decision-making process. In this vein, *Essence of Decision* offers Models II & III as a way to further explain governmental behavior beyond the Rational Actor Model.² This thesis applies all three models to decision-making in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy pre & post 9/11. In Allison’s models, the argument developed in this study of organizational behavior is viewed in three propositions:

1. Professional analysts of foreign affairs and policymakers (as well as ordinary citizens) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.

² Ibid., 5.
2. Most analysts explain (and predict) behavior of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, Rational Actor Model (RAM or Model I).

3. Two alternative conceptual models, labeled the Organizational Behavior Model (Model II), and Governmental Politics Model (Model III), provide a base for improved explanations and predictions.\(^3\)

**Rational Actor Model**

The Rational Actor Model (Model I) relies on a number of assumptions about decision-makers in foreign policy that include: (1) decision makers are logical and orderly; (2) they are open to arguments and new evidence as they consider evidence available; and (3) they learn from history and draw propositions from the past. Theoretically, the rational actor paradigm offers the greatest utility in explaining state decisions in the context of international relations by extracting the aims and calculations of a government.\(^4\) Within the formulated paradigms are components that include the basic unit of analysis, organizing concepts, the dominant influence pattern, and under Model I the decision-maker makes choices among a series of alternatives.\(^5\) At the basic unit of analysis, the governmental action is viewed as a choice. To further explain this concept, events that occur in foreign affairs are the result of a nation or government’s choice to conduct an action or multiple actions. One assumption is that governments will choose an action that maximizes their strategic goals and objectives.

The Model I construct will examine the decision to use military force in response to the 1998 American embassy bombings, possible limitations, and the hesitancy to use military force in counterterrorism operations. To illustrate this point, President Clinton’s decision to use the
military in 1998 to launch missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan will be analyzed from four concepts: Goals and Objectives; Alternatives; Consequences, and Choice. Goals and objectives articulate, "...the "payoff" or "utility" or preference function, which represents the desirability or utility of alternative sets of consequences in terms of her or his values and objectives." With each action President Clinton ranked-order his sets of preferences and consequences that may have resulted from a set of courses of action. In the second core concept, alternatives, "the rational agent [President Clinton] must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before her or him in a particular situation... these alternatives represent a decision tree." The alternatives concept includes examining the specific courses of action at lower levels of granularity to reveal the disparity between alternatives. The third core concept consequences conditions rational actors to contemplate the relationship to consider as it relates to each alternative and the outcome. Choice, the fourth core concept, is neither attained with ease or linearity, "rational choice consists simply of selecting an alternative whose consequences rank highest in the decision maker's payoff function." 

Organizational Behavior Model

The Organizational Behavior Model (Model II) also makes a significant number of assumptions. Model II assumes that the state's behavior is a vast number of conglomerate organizations (departments, agencies etc.) each with different interests of their own, not based on the role of an individual. Second, each of these organizations possesses their own 'standard operating procedures', which may explain how decisions are made within that organization.

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7 Ibid., 18.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
Governmental behavior can therefore be understood according to the second conceptual model, less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.\textsuperscript{11}

The decision to use the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary force with integrated Special Forces\textsuperscript{12} is an example of Allison's assertion that governments must be responsive to wide-ranging problems, and to do so, they achieve agility through arranging themselves in large organizational structures that divide tasks and responsibilities. As there are few problems that can be solved by one agency, cross-domain interaction requires multiple organizations to find solutions. The behavior of the government reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. "Government leaders can substantially disturb, but rarely control, the specific behavior of these organizations."\textsuperscript{13}

Organizations inherently are an aggregate of vast numbers of individuals seeking to perform wide-ranging complex tasks, with different tools and capabilities. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) provide a baseline rule-set for coordinated activity, "grounded in the incentive structure of the organization or even in the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes, professional culture, and operating style,"\textsuperscript{14} which equates to deep rooted foundational structures that are less resilient towards adapting or changing SOPs. Because governments are comprised of organizations, each one maintains a preexisting set of SOPs that determine how to deal with standard situations on a routine basis.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{13} Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 143.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 170.
Governmental Politics Model

The Governmental Politics Model (Model III) explains the politics of government and captures events as a game among players, and the end outcome being a resultant of negotiations that go on between players that ultimately yield the critical decisions and actions. Model III converges on certain concepts: the players whose interests and actions impact the issue in question, the factors that shape players' perceptions and stands, the established procedure or "action channel" for aggregating competing preferences, and the performance of the players. The governmental politics model invokes certain patterns of inference that postulates if a government performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among players in a game. To further expound on this assertion, model III "explains" an event when it is discovered who did what to whom that yielded the action in question.

When the initial preparations were made for the Iraq invasion in 2003, governmental politics explains the relevant players, and their relative power and bargaining skills that led to the decision. All of this occurs as a result of the analyst performing an investigation of the players, and their multitude of reasons for playing the game. The elected, appointed civilian leadership, along with high-ranking military leaders demonstrate that government behavior under Model III can be understood not as a rational calculation, nor as organizational outputs, but as results of bargaining games.

Outcomes are formed, deformed, by the interaction of competing preferences. Model III does not see a unitary actor like the Model I, rather it sees many players who do not focus on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various

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15 Ibid., 6.
conceptions on national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make
government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by pulling and hauling that is
politics.\textsuperscript{16}

An analysis of governmental politics illustrates that a leader’s initial preferences are rarely seen
as a guide for explaining or predicting actions. This belief is founded in an understanding that
authoritative power is usually shared among players.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 255.
CHAPTER 3: U.S. Decision-Making as a Rational Actor

"What the Americans ignored was that the Islamic extremists were even more cynical than the most hardened cold warrior."

- Tod Hoffman, *Al-Qaeda Declares War*

The rational actor model (Model I) is used in the first analysis to examine President Clinton’s decision to use military force in response to the August 7, 1998 attacks on the American embassies in East Africa. Using Model I’s conceptual design methodology, the unitary actor makes decisions based on the perceived value-maximizing objectives that coincide with the national security interests of the state. Model I asserts that governmental action results from a series of choices among alternatives. In a crisis or in response to a problem, a unitary actor will likely pursue a natural progression that will do the following: (1) accomplish goals and objectives; (2) provide a set of alternatives; (3) provide an estimate of each consequence; and (4) rank order the range of consequences. After examining Model I’s conceptual decision-making framework, Clinton is a good test case for the model. As a politician and lawyer by profession, he advocated for strong international institutions, and applied a strict standard to the legality of using military force. During his administration, one of his strategic goals sought to expand democracy around the world, and as president he would have to find substantiating evidence to implicate the group responsible for the bombings, while being cognizant of American public opinion and international perceptions. The president relied on the CIA to marshal and present evidence in overseas attack, while the FBI and the Justice Department would pursue traditional law enforcement methods to conduct an investigation and prosecution. If Clinton felt that the

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1 Ibid., 24-25.

evidence was strong enough to implicate those responsible, he would decide whether to use military force, or CIA covert operatives.³

Counterterrorism Tension

One key figure during the Clinton-era foreign policy team, Richard Clarke, worked on the National Security Council (NSC) at the White House, chaired the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), and eventually became the counterterrorism czar. Clarke oversaw the counterterrorism heads for CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Departments of Defense, Justice, and State.⁴ The Pentagon and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operated counterterrorism programs in the past that resisted any White House oversight. Clarke’s appointment as counterterrorism czar position meant that the CIA inherited one more person to answer to at the White House.⁵ A natural tension developed between Clarke, and the CIA. Clarke represented presidential authority and control over CIA privileges; he influenced CIA budgets; wrote legal guidance; all of which created suspicion at Langley that he wanted to assume direct control over CIA operations and direction, “Clarke and his team saw Langley as self-protectively secretive and sometimes defensive about their plans… the White House team suspected the CIA used its classification rules not only to protect its agents but also to deflect outside scrutiny of its covert operations.”⁶

The CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) tracked bin Laden’s movements and communications.

...It seemed obvious to the dozen of [them] that bin Laden meant what he said: He had decided to launch a new jihad against the United States, and he would attack American targets wherever he could reach them...bin Laden unit’s officers had been unable to

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³ Ibid., 406.
⁴ Ibid., 388-89.
⁵ Ibid., 389.
⁶ Ibid., 394.
persuade their bosses to act on the plan to raid Tarnak Farm [bin Laden’s compound in Afghanistan]."\textsuperscript{7}

While risky, could have killed, maimed, or at least sent a message to the budding transnational terrorist that the United States was not going to tolerate his threats, or attacks. The Director of CIA, George Tenet, briefed the Tarnak plan to National Security Advisor (NSA) Sandy Berger. Clarke told Berger that the plan seemed was not ready to execute. Meanwhile, senior CIA officials felt that the raid would be reckless, despite the CIA’s station chief, Gary Schroen urging CIA officials to follow the plan and the “tribals” in the region cooperate. Deputy Chief of Clandestine Service, James Pavitt, voiced his opinion that causalities and financial costs would detract from the mission’s success in the long run.\textsuperscript{8} On July 29, 1998, the CIA CTC issued an alert about a possible attack by Al-Qaeda, yet the plans were not specific to Africa.\textsuperscript{9}

The Attacks

On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda executed two simultaneous attacks on the American embassies in the East African countries of Kenya, and Tanzania. In the aftermath, 224 people were killed (12 American), as the embassy buildings were reduced to rubble.\textsuperscript{10} In the wake of the bombings, President Clinton had to answer the following questions: what terrorist group was responsible for the bombings? And, did they receive assistance from a foreign government? Clinton considered the legal aspects, and the political ramifications if he answered one, or both questions wrong. These questions can be deduced by the rational actor model’s core concepts: goals & objectives; alternatives; consequences; and, choice. President Clinton issued a memorandum to authorize the CIA to develop an operational plan to target al-Qaeda, “since we

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 405.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 393-395.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 404.
\textsuperscript{10} Thomas E. Copeland. \textit{Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism} (Leiden, NLD: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 164.
had been going after his organization for several years, I had known for some time that he was a formidable adversary. After the African slaughter I became intently focused on capturing or killing him [bin Laden] and with destroying al Qaeda.”¹¹ The president confirmed in his memoir that the CIA and FBI substantiated that al Qaeda was responsible for the bombings and some of the perpetrators had been arrested. Richard Clarke took the content of document in its literal sense “The President’s intent was very clear: kill bin Laden. I believe that those in the CIA who claim the authorizations were insufficient or unclear are throwing up that claim as an excuse to cover the fact that they were pathetically unable to accomplish the mission.”¹²

One week after the bombings, Clinton continued to meet with his national security team to decide on a course of action that would increase the likelihood of accomplishing the goals and objectives, while maximizing the value of the action.¹³ Clinton gave clear instructions to his White House staff that if they could substantiate bin Laden’s location supported by clear intelligence, he would issue the strike order. After intense debate, Richard Clarke argued that the United States should target bin Laden’s infrastructure, and move beyond singling-out al-Qaeda’s leadership. Clarke believed this could be accomplished in conjunction with seeking diplomatic approaches, financial disruption, covert action in Afghanistan, and military strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets. Clinton’s national security cabinet opposed Clarke’s approach to targeting bin Laden with military force. James Steinberg (Deputy National Security Advisor), and NSA Sandy Berger both opposed Clarke’s call for strikes against the Al-Qaeda camps and Taliban targets.

The CIA’s collection assets asserted that bin Laden would be at a terrorist training facility near Khost, Afghanistan on August 20. The senior military officer in the region for the Middle

¹² Tod Hoffman, Al-Qaeda Declares War, 69.
¹³ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 25.
East and Afghanistan, General Anthony Zinni, recalled that the intelligence was not solid, and felt that launching cruise missiles into the camp on August 20, 1998 had a long shot of success. Paul Pillar, deputy director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center, along with two senior directors in Richard Clarke’s White House counterterrorism office recollected that the intelligence predicted bin Laden’s presence at the meeting. Some other members of the group recalled that the report presented to them did not elude to bin Laden’s whereabouts.14

The Decision

After wrestling with the decision to strike al-Qaeda targets, on August 20, 1998, Clinton made the decision to strike, “At 3 a.m. I gave Sandy Berger the final order to proceed, and U.S. Navy destroyers in the northern Arabian Sea launched cruise missiles at the targets in Afghanistan, while missiles were fired at the Sudanese chemical plant from ships in the Red Sea… but bin Laden was not in the camp where the CIA thought he would be when the missiles hit it.”15 In his speech to the American people, Clinton stated, “Our target was terror. Our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden.”16 The August 20 decision to attack bin Laden did not succeed in killing him. One consequence, political partisans and media pundits accused the president of launching the missiles as a means to distract the American public from the impeachment charges.17 Another consequence, bin Laden’s position in the Muslim world elevated as he managed to evade the United States’ attempts to kill him.

14 Steven Coll, Ghost Wars, 410.
15 William J. Clinton, My Life, 803.
17 William J. Clinton, My Life, 798.
Clinton’s decision to use military force suggests that the *value-maximizing* means for achieving his objectives\(^{18}\) led him to choose among the alternative courses of action, and to attack targets in Afghanistan, and Sudan. Richard Clarke informed Clinton’s national security officials that Clinton contemplated launching subsequent attacks, while on the other hand the Pentagon pursued the plan for more cruise missile strikes with reluctance. A civilian official at the Pentagon wrote to Defense Secretary William Cohen about the ineffectiveness and political fallout after the first wave of strikes only confirmed the importance of defining a clearly articulated rationale for military action. The release of the “Starr Report”, chronicling the president’s conduct worsened an already fragile political climate. George Tenet briefed a Senate intelligence committee that the CIA’s emerging strategy to deal with bin Laden involved covert action, something Tenet previously warned the president about with increased caution. Tenet felt that using CIA covert action to solve foreign policy issues was not a pathway to success. The reality was that the U.S. was not in a position to take on the challenge of a regional war that involved bin Laden. This would entail choosing sides with the Taliban and confronting the movement’s supporters, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).\(^{19}\)

In the Clinton policy analysis, Model I suggests that the following considerations were factored into his decision-making calculus: (1) The national goals and objectives defined by his administration in the 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS),\(^{20}\) (2) His perception that the decision to use force weighed higher than the alternatives, and (3) The final decision to choose a

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\(^{18}\) Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 25

\(^{19}\) Steven Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 413.

\(^{20}\) From the 1997 National Security Strategy: Terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism approaches are meant to prevent, disrupt and defeat terrorist operations before they occur, and, if terrorist acts do occur, to respond overwhelmingly, with determined efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. Our policy to counter international terrorists rests on the following principles: (1) make no concessions to terrorists; (2) bring all pressure to bear on state sponsors of terrorism; (3) fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists; and (4) help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1997.pdf date accessed, March 19, 2015.
course of action that would maximize the value between the perceived costs relative to gains.\textsuperscript{21} Under Model I core concepts, the unitary actor's interests and values are translated into a \textit{payoff} or \textit{utility}, or \textit{preference of function}, "governmental actions as a choice: happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or a national government... select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives."\textsuperscript{22} Model I suggests that the United States strategy to counterterrorism did work effectively. However, would the Model I response be any different under a different crisis, or president. After September 11, 2001, would Clinton have made the decision to send CIA covert action teams with military support elements into Afghanistan the same way President Bush did? When faced with the 1998 embassy bombings, would president Bush have chosen to use missile strikes against al-Qaeda targets, or opted for an alternative course of action? In either decision-making analysis under Model I's construct, while a terrorist attack against the United States homeland is weighed far greater than an attack against foreign interests, in either situation a rational, unitary actor would have decided to use force in response to an event the resembled the 1998 bombings, or 9/11.

There are serious limitations and drawbacks to the use of military force in counterterrorism operations. High value targets like Osama bin Laden do not make themselves easy targets, susceptible to even the most advanced military hardware. While the unitary actor (President Clinton) understood this, he still felt that there was value to striking the al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and the chemical factory in Sudan. The discovery that the training camps were not critical to the conduct and preparations of terrorist operations rendered the action unsuccessful, despite the risk that Clinton assumed when he decided to execute the missile strikes.

\textsuperscript{21} Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis}. 25.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 18-23.
CHAPTER 4: The 9/11 Response as Organizational Behavior

Organizational behavior seeks to influence governmental decisions through specialization in order to increase the probability of a specific action being chosen by the leadership, organization, or government. Specialized organizations create options that generate information and estimates that are tailored to make their option look like the more suitable solution. The preeminent feature of organizational activity is its programmed character: the extent to which behavior in any particular case is an enactment of pre-established routines that define acceptable performance levels. The concept of *programmed character* relates to objectives that are quantified sets of targeted aspirations measured against constraints. When there is tension between targets and constraints, sequential attention to objectives is applied in order to deal resolve the tension in terms of importance. To ensure compliance of critical tasks, and reliable performance of targets and constraints, standard operating procedures (SOP) are required. SOP allows organizations to employ sets of rules to a large number of people in order to ensure easy learning explicit application. According to Allison, "the deeper the grounding, the more resistant SOPs are to change,"¹ this reflects one of central tenets in the organizational behavior model. The tensions between the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)² reflect Model II tenets that when organizations are confronted with conflicting aims or goals, they will prioritize and make tradeoffs that are most consistent with their special capacities, to the parochialisms inherent in their cultures.³

The tensions that exist between the CIA and DoD are personality and culturally driven, as each entity competes for relevancy, funding, and power. An example of this occurs in the House and Senate select committees on intelligence, which share limited authorities—neither committee possesses exclusive authority over the intelligence services. The Armed Services committees possess jurisdiction over the intelligence agencies within DoD (in the case of the Senate, over the CIA). As a result, the CIA is affected by fluctuations in the intelligence budget, which is directly linked to defense spending. The overall intelligence budget is, however, classified, yet intelligence committees cannot exercise one of democracy’s most powerful benefits: public disclosure. This point highlights tensions between the DoD and CIA at the legislative level where intelligence committees are diametrically opposing to other congressional oversight committees.\(^4\) Congressional oversight in CIA and DoD covert operations waned after 9/11, thus each agency’s actions reinforce their parochial behavior and organizational culture, which distorts a rational decision-making process.

While some kinds of important shifts in the behavior of governments can take place with little change in a particular organization’s parochialism and SOP, the range of existing organizational operational programs limits the degree of these shifts. The Bush Administration’s decision to use the CIA as the primary instrument of choice is attributed to the premise that if a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing (or have had established routines for performing) an action only marginally different from today’s action.\(^5\) The impact of organizational behavior shaped the United States’ decision to invade Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. Coming back to Allison’s conceptual framework, analyzing the Bush administration’s decision-making may yield that:

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\(^5\) Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 174-175.
If the unit of analysis is governmental action as organizational output, then analysis of formal governmental choice centers on the information provided and the options defined by organizations, the existing organizational capabilities that constitute the effective choices open to the leaders, and the outputs of relevant organizations that fix the location of pieces on the chess board and shade the appearance of the issue. Analysis of actual government behavior focuses on executable outputs of individual organizations as well as on organizational capabilities and organizational positioning of the pieces on the chessboard.6

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the U.S. national security strategies and government agencies maintained a status quo. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lost some of its power and relevance, thus became a relic of the Cold War due to budget constraints, and perceived lack of necessity. The prevailing success of the 1991 Gulf War, and “no-fly” zone enforcement in southern Iraq demonstrated that DoD could fulfill its role in the execution of military operations. DoD, also affected budget cuts, had to adhere to restraints on the operational effectiveness of the force well into the 1990’s, despite being directed into ill-suited operations in Somalia, and the Balkans. The long and drawn out nature of humanitarian relief, and stability operations substantiated the military’s tendency to be able to effectively lead these types of missions in the long term.

Organizational Behavior and Turf Wars

“Had we known at the time, it [9/11] would have sounded very much like all the other warnings we received in June, July, August, and early September [2001]... less than twenty-four hours later, the unthinkable happened...But to us, it wasn’t unthinkable at all...We had been thinking about nothing else.”

- George Tenet, At the CENTER of the Storm

Prior to 9/11 the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) employed traditional espionage techniques of the cold war—agent recruitment, imagery analysis, and communication intercepts. One former case officer stated, “The CIA probably doesn’t have a single truly qualified Arabic-

6 Ibid., 166.
speaking officer of Middle Eastern background who can play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would volunteer to spend years of his life...in the mountains of Afghanistan.”\(^7\) The attacks on 9/11 forced the CIA shift from a Cold War mindset to one focused on counterterrorism, as evidenced by the expansion of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC). Model II asserts, “explanation of a government action starts from this baseline, noting incremental deviations. But organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over time; dramatic organizational change occurs in response to major disasters.” In case of the CIA, 9/11 forced a dramatic behavioral shift to occur as a result of peril and stress placed on the organization.\(^8\)

The regional commander assigned to Afghanistan was Army General Tommy Franks, someone who was not familiar with the histories and cultures of the region he commanded. Despite urging from the Clinton administration, and senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials to draft contingency plans for Afghanistan, the requests went unfulfilled. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, DoD officials realized they had to act swiftly to develop an executable plan that would satisfy the requests of the Bush administration. The plan to invade Afghanistan, developed by General Franks, focused on al Qaeda leadership, not on capturing or killing bin Laden.\(^9\) By the end of the September 2001, the United States began the invasion of Afghanistan using CIA covert operatives and DoD support teams.\(^10\) In the final months of 2001, Bush ordered the CIA in charge of hunting bin and al-Qaeda targets. The CTC became the war’s command post,\(^11\) and the U.S. military conducted a campaign of air strikes to support invading

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\(^7\) Ronald Kessler, *CIA at War*, 140.
\(^8\) Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 143.
ground troops at the beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan. CIA and Special Operations Forces (SOF) worked together:

We are fighting for the counterterrorism objectives in the Afghan theater... and although this sets high goals in very uncertain, shifting terrain, we are also fighting for the future of CIA/DOD integrated counterterrorism warfare around the globe. While we will make mistakes as we chart new territory and new methodology, our objectives are clear, and our concept of partnership is sound—stated by the chief of counterterrorist special operations in a memo to CIA personnel in October 2001.12

While the CIA maintained a small paramilitary unit at the time, they were the lead agency responsible for hunting al-Qaeda and could do so with the assistance of Special Operations Forces.13

One advantage that the military possesses as an instrument of national power over other instruments is that the potential effect on terrorist capabilities is immediate and overwhelming. The military’s ability to use combat operations does not depend on anyone else’s cooperation, and it does not depend on the terrorists’ calculations or psychology. One possible benefit of using the military to disrupt terrorist activity means going beyond immediate physical destruction. Military operations disrupt terrorist planning cycles, and limit their ability to prepare and execute their own attacks. This use of force gives credence and priority to the military’s counterterrorism operations.14

The interagency battle between the CIA and the Pentagon over supremacy in the U.S. war on terrorism came to the forefront when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed that the CIA Counterterrorism Center’s chief, J. Cofer Black, released information that appeared in the April 17, 2002 edition of the Washington Post that claimed U.S. forces allowed bin Laden to

13 Ibid., 23.
escape at Tora Bora, Afghanistan—the opening paragraph stated “gravest error in the war against Al-Qaeda.”15 The swift disposal of the Taliban became mixed with the reality that Osama bin Laden had made it into Pakistan because of the limited U.S. military strategy. The small military footprint can be attributed to the Bush administration’s aversion to nation-building, and to some extend Rumsfeld’s aspiration to justify his vision for a new type of warfare that limited the role ground forces as evidenced in the planning for the Iraq invasion in 2003. In general, American’s lack of interest in Afghanistan’s welfare paralleled its enduring view of Afghanistan as a country of limited strategic importance.16

The most important policy document that came as a result of al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States was The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS; White House 2002). The foreword, signed by President George W. Bush, amplifies the dominance of military strength over political and economic influence: “Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom.”17 This is significant as it gives rise to prominent military strength in combination with such concepts as ‘balance of power, and ‘great powers’ (White House 2002), as well as mirrors the ideas of senior level officials within the Bush administration and their interpenetration of international relations. The remarks made in the foreword reveal a widening of the responsibility of future military operations to include ‘tyrants’ as well as terrorists.18

15 Jeremy Scahill. Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield. 57.
The impact of the 2002 NSS is what became known as the Bush Doctrine. Many of its key features in the NSS are clearly mentioned with the part that emphasizes pre-emption (anticipatory action and the dangers posed by imminent threats). In this respect, the document is straightforward: 'To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.'¹⁹ This language lines up with a new vision of international security in which the United States military instrument of power intervened in conflicts around the world,²⁰ yet Iraq would be different. The Iraq invasion had nothing to do with 9/11, despite intelligence shaping, and numerous accusations by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein possessed the capability and intent to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against the United States.

²⁰ Alastair Finlan, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences. 160.
CHAPTER 5: The Governmental Politics Approach

“We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it.”
-George Orwell, 1984

One distinct difference in the governmental politics framework compared to the organizational behavior model is that governmental politics can be understood, “not as organizational outputs but as results of bargaining games… outcomes are formed, and deformed, by the interaction of competing preferences.” An individual’s power to persuade emphasizes importance on the ability to influence other players in a bargaining game, and ultimately influencing the president. The ability to persuade the president boils down to the presidential choice. In this case, power can be measured in terms of the impact a player has on the outcome of choice. By design, the United States Constitutional system outlines and identifies those individuals who are responsible for separate, and distinct roles in an organization, which yields differences in what each individual may see and judges to be important. In Allison’s view, responsible citizens are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right; because players share power, they differ on what must be done.

Governmental Politics

“Once you step into a fight that is not of your choosing, you lose all initiative. The combatants’ interests become your interests; you become their tool. Learn to control yourself, to restrain your natural tendency to take sides and join the fight. Be friendly and charming to each of the combatants, then step back as they collide. With every battle they grow weaker, while you grow stronger with every battle you avoid.”

-Robert Greene, The 48 Laws of Power

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1 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 255.
2 Ibid., 259-260.
3 Ibid., 256.
How would Allison define governmental politics and how can it be applied to the decision to invade Iraq in 2003? It is important to recognize that goals and objectives within the governmental politics construct are the results of bargaining and competing interests within each individual’s pursuit of power under the Constitutional framework. In practice, individuals or “players” represent political tradition and governmental practice where groups converge to stress differences among the needs and interests of individuals in the government, and to divide influence among them. Their preferences and beliefs are aligned according to their organizational intent; analyses often yield conflicting recommendations. By analyzing the organizing concepts of the governmental politics paradigm, one may arrive at the conclusion that the end resultant to invade Iraq was overwhelmingly governmental politics. This chapter includes an analysis of: (1) the predominant players, (2) factors that shape the players’ parochial interests, (3) the relative power of each player, (4) the game that is played (the action-channels, rules, and resulting action of the game). The predominant players in the decision process (game) were: President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet. The rest of this chapter will describe each player’s power to persuade, and ability to influence the decisions.

The first factor in describe the game will be to understand what the issue or problem that needs to be solved and how each player defines the problem. Under this analysis, the problem was defined as global terrorism and how to counter and prevent an attack against the United States on its homeland. In an NBC interview with Vice President Dick Cheney on September 16, 2001, Cheney stated that the fight against al-Qaeda would likely be accomplished using

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4 Ibid., 259.
5 Ibid., 296-301.
intelligence sources, and non-traditional methods of warfare. In other words, Cheney eluded that the new Global War on Terrorism would occur in the "shadows", without traditional armies and fanfare that is synonymous in conventional warfare.⁶

Fundamentally, al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq were completely different in their ideology and goals. President Bush turned to foreign policy and counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke and asked him if he thought Hussein’s regime had been linked to the 9/11 attacks. Clarke emphatically stated there definitely was not a link between the two—they were natural enemies and did not share the same goals, methods, or beliefs. In a briefing with George Tenet, President Bush posed the same question, and Tenet gave the same answer, “no”. At the end of the briefing, president Bush told Tenet to meet with Vice President Cheney, and he would fill him in on links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In a somewhat peculiar but legal arrangement, Cheney took charge of intelligence collection in an effort to build evidence that al-Qaeda and Iraq were somehow linked. By November 2001, President Bush asked Rumsfeld to build a plan to invade Iraq using the military as the primary instrument of power. Cheney told Secretary Rumsfeld to be prepared for this request ahead of time. Bush also asked Rumsfeld not to share the request with anyone in the upper echelons of the government.⁷ As the United States moved towards a military solution to oust Saddam Hussein, only Bush, Cheney, Rice, and Rumsfeld were within the small circle of those who knew the Iraq invasion would eventually take place.

The Iraq Focus

At the onset of the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney frequently disagreed with Secretary of State Powell on the strategy to

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⁷ Ibid., 23.
counter terrorism after 9/11. Powell advocated for retaliatory attacks against the “perpetrators of 9/11 than with a global war against Islamic terrorists and their state supporters.”

Powell wanted a more narrow, law enforcement approach to fight terrorism, not Rumsfeld and Cheney’s ideas of preemptive war using the military and CIA as the instruments of choice. Powell’s duties as Secretary of State would be to forge alliances and build international partnerships, which conflicted with Rumsfeld and Cheney’s agenda to generate the support they needed to wage war. According to Lawrence Wilkerson, Powell’s former chief of staff, “I think Rumsfeld, Cheney thought that the CIA was a bunch of pansies, much the way they thought about the State Department.”

The State Department cautioned the Pentagon, specifically Rumsfeld, and Vice President Cheney against a declaration of global war or terrorism, and to push for a more refined, law-enforcement approach towards the problem. Rumsfeld and Cheney ignored State’s caution and continued to widen the use of Special Operations Forces and CIA clandestine operators in the conduct of secret missions in Afghanistan, and which they would eventually employ in Iraq.

Rumsfeld’s justification for an Iraq invasion was predicated on links between Iraqi and senior level al-Qaeda contacts. In an unclassified CIA report, Rumsfeld cited that al-Qaeda leadership would be granted safe haven in Iraq, and they had been in Baghdad during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The claims that credible reporting suggested that Iraq assisted al-Qaeda in training and acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction were not fully corroborated. A newspaper article in December 2002 stated that members of the Joint Chiefs had opposed the plan to go to war in Iraq. Rumsfeld replied, “It would be most unusual, to say

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8 Jeremy Scahill. Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, 59.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
the least, for sitting members of the Joint Chiefs to publicly oppose the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense, the responsible combatant commander, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the eve of a potential war." According to Rumsfeld, postwar planning exposed a gap in the way the United States government is organized—no template or roadmap existed for the kind of postwar planning that proved to be a necessity in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia. There is not single office within the United States government that could take charge of the military and civilian reconstruction. This left the president to turn to Department of Defense with its expertise in war planning, not in postwar reconstruction as the only practical option, thus empowering the military action-channel.

Vice President Dick Cheney stated, “There was also consistent reporting that Saddam (Hussein) had in place the personnel and the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program and that he was continuing to acquire technologies that had the potential for either nuclear or non-nuclear use.” Cheney echoed Rumsfeld’s remarks from CIA director’s George Tenet’s brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that al Qaeda’s presence in Baghdad had been known. Cheney also stated that president Bush asked him to travel to the Middle East in the spring of 2002 to meet with state leaders to discuss a range of issues including Afghanistan, and the ongoing efforts in the worldwide War on terror—he claimed that he planned to discuss the next phases in the Global War on Terror, which meant discussing the threat Saddam Hussein posed.

Secretary of State Colin Powell introduced the idea to hold an international conference on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which as Cheney said “the president had not agreed to this,” around

12 Ibid., 452.
13 Ibid., 487.
15 Ibid.
the same time as Cheney’s visit to the Middle East. Powell’s remarks generated some discontent on behalf of Cheney as he suggested to National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice to “let Secretary Powell know that he was once more out line with the president’s policy.” The impression that Cheney’s direct approach did not mesh with Powell when it came to differing opinions or ideas. The vice president stated that “[he] began hearing from a number of former and current high-ranking government officials that Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage were not only failing to support the president’s policies, but were openly disdainful of them.” Powell and Cheney were also at odds over whether or not the State Department should engage Iraqis living in exile to form a new government once Hussein was overthrown. Cheney felt that Powell’s assertions at the United Nations only slowed the process down (to invade Iraq). According to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, vice president Cheney and his staff were convinced that Hussein’s regime had a role in the 9/11 attacks, and to prove it, he had personally reviewed intelligence reports that had not been analyzed, or corroborated. Cheney focused on intelligence reports that mentioned any meetings with Iraqi and al-Qaeda affiliates. The CIA thought that many of reports had suspect origins, and that there was no collusion between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda in the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet reflected that the focus on removing Hussein from power in Iraq by senior Bush officials predated the Bush administration. A group named, “The Project for the New American Century,” called for Hussein’s ouster, and

16 Ibid,382.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid,387.
of the eighteen people who signed the public letter, three were Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, and Richard Perle. The Clinton administration introduced the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, which also passed in Congress. The “The Project for the New American Century,” and the Iraq Liberation Act were intended to bring about regime change in Iraq and deliver the Iraqi people from a long-standing dictator that inflicted unspeakable crimes against his people.\textsuperscript{20}

In early 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell thought that an initiative called “smart sanctions” would re-shape public opinion in a positive way towards United States and United Nations sanctions against Iraq. The “smart sanctions” as Powell perceived would target Iraq’s military-related acquisitions. Opponents of Powell’s proposal within the Bush administration thought that “smart sanctions” would only allow Hussein to recapture lost funding and pursue his weapons programs further.\textsuperscript{21} Powell wanted to pursue a new resolution with the UN Security Council, yet Cheney sharply disagreed with Powell and felt that Saddam Hussein had violated seventeen previous UN resolutions, and why would a new one be any different.\textsuperscript{22}

The Energy, and State Department disputed claims by the CIA and Bush administration senior officials (Cheney and Rumsfeld) that Hussein pursued a nuclear weapons program. In the summer of 2001, the CIA captured cylindrical tubes that were to be allegedly used by Iraqi scientists to harness radioactive material in centrifuges, however, in a previously classified Energy Department report, the tubes were stated to be used for “rocket production, not nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{23} The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) also disputed the CIA’s claim that the tubes could be used for weapons grade material production. Several

\textsuperscript{20} George Tenet. \textit{At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA} (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 302-303.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
scientists and nuclear experts told the INR, and Department of Energy that the tubes pushed by the CIA were not centrifuge grade.

Vice President Cheney maintained his position that the tubes were “Exhibit No. 1” that Hussein was going nuclear, and insisted that Iraq harbored terrorists and the United States would never allow “terror states” to threaten us with weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, vice president Cheney controlled the flow of intelligence, and the military action-channel that determined, “who’s got the action” which ultimately determined that the defense department and the vice president held the sway in the decision to invade Iraq. Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld prevailed in convincing president Bush that Iraq and al-Qaeda were linked and possessed a stockpile of WMD, and was in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons. Because Cheney and Rumsfeld were able to control the action channels, they were able to exploit the uncertainty and ambiguity in intelligence reporting that led to transforming the uncorroborated reports into fact. Despite the misgivings of other key interagency partners, and lack of supported evidence, history will be the judge on whether or not the decision to invade Iraq was the right one.

24 Ibid.
26 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 301.
CHAPTER 6: Lessons Learned and Conclusions

This thesis examined the execution of the United States counterterrorism strategy in three distinctly different approaches to accomplishing foreign policy goals, and preventing further acts of terrorism. The evolution of American counterterrorism policy and strategy has incrementally emerged from traditional views that terrorism constitutes a “crime” to the view that “terrorism” is a new unprecedented form of warfare.\(^1\) While great strides have been made to deal with the threat that terrorism poses, establishing a counterterrorism framework that will be able to enhance the synchronization of U.S. government agencies will provide greater legal authorities to plan, execute, and build capacity. The establishment of a more formalized process for interagency coordination across the U.S. government spectrum would ensure that policy objectives, and grand strategy for national security is followed with greater consistency.\(^2\)

The United States’ use of military force to reduce terrorist capabilities continues to retain some of the same damaging consequences of past retaliatory attacks.\(^3\) Despite the amount of goodwill the U.S. bestowed onto the civilian population in Afghanistan, most of it was lost due to the result of collateral damage from U.S. military operations. The tradeoff is not counterterrorism and popularity; it is the conflict between the immediate tactical counterterrorism objectives, and longer-term strategic vision. Anti-American sentiment impairs the United States’ ability to conduct counterterrorism operations, and it adversely impacts the

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willingness of a civilian population to cooperate with U.S. This corollary also degrades the population’s willingness to support its own government, therefore predisposes individuals to remain neutral, or join the efforts of anti-American terrorist groups.4

Lessons Learned: 1998

In the timeframe that led up to the 1998 attacks on the United States embassies in East Africa, the failure to understand the terrorist threat can be attributed to several factors. First, policy makers did not understand the strategic threat of terrorism to the United States and its interests, as there were few vital U.S. interests in East Africa at the time. Mirror imaging took over—if the region was not important or of value to us, it must be of no interest or importance to the terrorists’ as well. Second, the radical Islamist regime in Sudan was engaged in a religious civil war (at the time), while exporting revolutionary ideas and terrorism; Iran was making headway in the region to increase trade and secure its stature; and, Iraqi intelligence officers and weapons developers worked directly with the Sudanese.5 Third, policy makers failed to see how Iran and Sudan (state sponsors of terrorism with expansionist dreams) might be seen as inconsistent or have negative repercussions. Sudan and Iran were developing closer ties at the time, and Iran sought a way to get around U.S. containment policy. U.S. direct support to the rebels in the Sudanese civil war angered the Sudanese national government. Not all U.S. policy initiatives were wrong, but that policy makers failed to anticipate the reaction of Iran and Sudan.6

Second, the continued approaches to terrorism as solely a law enforcement problem only emboldened the enemy. Osama Bin Laden often noted in his public statements that the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon and from Somalia; he believed that the Americans

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4 Ibid., 72.
5 Thomas E. Copeland. Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism, 164-165.
6 Ibid.
lacked the willpower or military strength to retaliate for incidents like Khobar Towers and the first World Trade Center bombings in 1993. And, because the United States did not have enough courtroom quality information against bin Laden to obtain an indictment, it chose not to target Bin Laden directly. The disillusion that military strikes somehow disrupt highly sophisticated terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda is both irresponsible and foolish. After the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, al-Qaeda’s leadership planned and executed the terror attacks on 9/11.

Lessons Learned: Afghanistan 2001

The war in Afghanistan began as a small conflict with an expected troop level to be a maximum of 10,000 U.S. soldiers. While the Pentagon supported the CIA mission, it was difficult for the civilian leadership of Rumsfeld, his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Policy Douglas Feith, and their senior non-staff advisor Richard Perle to handle given their lofty aspirations for the Department of Defense. Throughout the Clinton years and into the Bush administration, this group wanted to transform the military into a lighter, leaner, more high-tech force that would lead to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. However, they did not count on al-Qaeda changing the landscape.

The Pentagon at the time of 9/11 did not have a dedicated counterterrorism cell that resembled the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, yet Secretary Rumsfeld proposed to build one, only one much larger and more robust. Rumsfeld sent a memo to CIA director Tenet and that proposed his plan for a Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism, a new organization that might shift control of the war in Afghanistan to the Pentagon. Days after he drafted the memo to Tenet, Rumsfeld then sent a classified message to President Bush that

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7 Ibid.
emphatically stated that the war on terrorism would be global, and the United States needed to ensure its goals would significantly change the world's political map, otherwise the United States will not achieve its aim. At the time Rumsfeld sent the message, the Pentagon did not have the machinery, process, or people in place to carry out his plans; it would take time to amass the architecture, skill sets, and material to accomplish his goals. By early 2002, Afghanistan could be seen as a conflict at its end, beset by competition and mistrust between the Department of Defense and the CIA. The turmoil between the two deepened when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld shared discontent that the CIA's paramilitary units had made it into Afghanistan first. The initial invasion was planned and executed by the CIA with the U.S. military providing a supporting role. CIA paramilitary operators joined Army Green Berets on the ground, and then they executed an unthinkable mission that shaped a primitive band of Afghan militias into a formidable army. The customary chain of command in wartime would normally pass from the President to the secretary of defense, down to a combatant commander to design and build a plan—this order had been circumvented altogether. Rumsfeld thought it was illogical that an agency with a sliver of the defense budget and manpower could outmaneuver DoD.

Lessons Learned: Iraq 2003

Conceivably the Bush administration made the decision to invade Iraq several months before Powell briefed the case for war to the United Nations (UN) in February 2003. Richard Hans, a former director of policy and planning at the State Department, stated that Condoleezza Rice told him in July 2002 that “decisions were made” to go to war in Iraq. Vice president Cheney defined the Iraq problem into four factors: al-Qaeda and Iraq connection, Weapons of

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9 Mark Mazzetti, *The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and A War At The Ends of the Earth*, 20-21
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 12-19.
Mass Destruction, Iraq harbored terrorists, and Iraq would eventually have the capability to strike the United States. Therefore, Cheney felt that preemption was the only option to prevent such a strike. The vice president used intelligence as his primary tool in order to persuade the president and other senior cabinet officials to hedge their bets on a preemptive action, vice working through the diplomatic channels that Secretary Powell advocated. The critical point comes into play when action-channels structure the policy “game” by presenting the major players, which usually determine their usual points of entrance into the game, and disturbing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game.

Conclusions

Between the August 1998 attacks, and the attacks on 9/11, the international community saw drastic changes to the United States foreign policy as it shifted international perceptions because of the unilateral approaches the United States would be willing to take to promote its own security. No other military in the world could conduct sustained military operations on two fronts the way the United States did. While the 2003 Iraq invasion stemmed from the Global War on Terror premise, we can see in contrast that early opponents of the Iraq war were right in their aversions to the war. The governmental decision-making models help to isolate the decisions from the decision-maker(s), and provide a framework to explain the ‘behind the scenes’ action that we cannot see. Under Model I, president Clinton did not want the United States to enter a war in 1998 that could be perceived against Islam, or place combat troops on the ground that would leave a large footprint, break international law, and the laws of a sovereign state. While Clinton’s decision to use cruise missiles in an attempt to kill Osama bin Laden and weaken al-Qaeda was not successful, the question becomes: would another unitary actor sitting in Clinton’s position have acted the same? The Model I framework leads us towards thinking
that a unitary actor would have likely attempted to disrupt or destroy the terrorist organization, however, the methods would vary. September 11, 2001 changed the calculus altogether in how the United States employs military force, and when to conduct combat operations under a counterterrorism strategy. In a Model I application, a unitary actor (president) would use national instruments of power in any way he or she saw fit to force a value-maximizing resolve to an event like 9/11. The CIA operations in Afghanistan 2001 demonstrate Model II tenets that organizations can and will adapt to an event when it fosters rapid change. The Department of Defense (DoD) did not have a plan that the Bush administration thought would initially succeed in Afghanistan. The administration then turned to the CIA and placed DoD in a support role, which did not sit well with senior level officials within the administration. The contrast between the CIA and DoD also highlights the natural tensions between the two agencies that have deep-rooted animosities in struggles over budgets, and operational control over resources and human assets. Once DoD developed a feasible military strategy, air power and Special Operations Forces were used in conjunction with the CIA to oust the displace the Taliban from Kabul. We know now in hindsight that the Taliban movement is not something that could be eradicated with military power, it would require a deep, long-standing commitment to Afghanistan, and working with Pakistan despite their dual-hatted approach to counterterrorism assistance. The Department of Defense’s intent was to have a light footprint, aligned with the organizational leadership that sought to change how the military fought wars of the future. The military approach in Iraq 2003 is a prime example of how governmental politics persuades and influences those in the seat of power to act accordingly to bargaining games, and competing interests. The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan could be justified because of the Taliban’s links to al-Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden’s residence and training camps located nearby. The goodwill shown towards the
United States from the international community after 9/11 was burned-up as civilian casualties mounted in Afghanistan, and sectarian violence spawned a civil war in Iraq after the invasion. One would think that lessons learned in previous wars would have cautioned decision makers not to make the same mistakes. During the Bush-era, the military instrument of power became the primary means of diplomacy in many ways, which was the result of players who had greater persuasive power over the chief decision-maker (measured in terms of who could provide limited choices to the president). Graham Allison's conceptual models indicate that in nearly two decades, decision making at the highest level of the United States government still struggles with the uncertainty when confronted with terrorism. Since the tragic events on September 11, 2001, countless studies have been conducted that document the successes and failures of the United States' counterterrorism strategy. It is imperative that we continue to scrutinize our efforts and examine new ways to develop and broader U.S. strategy for counterterrorism that incorporates the use of both conventional and unconventional methods to counter emerging threats posed to the United States and its interests abroad.
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VITA

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