RISK AND RESOLUTION:
THE INFLUENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL PERSONALITY PREDISPOSITIONS ON MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT DECISIONS

by

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A dissertation presented to the faculty of Air University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Greg Brown has served as an Air Force intelligence officer for twenty-one years. He and his wife are parents of identical twin boys. Colonel Brown is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma where he earned a BS degree in Russian Studies. He holds an MS in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, an MS in Strategic Leadership from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Master of Airpower Art and Science as a graduate of the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

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Students do not complete a work of this scope and magnitude alone. It requires patience, encouragement, and mentorship.

First, thanks go to Colonel Mike “MC” McClung, for being my sounding board and partner-in-gripe over many lunches during IDE at AFIT. Many times we bemoaned the illogic of the prospect of three or more Masters degrees between personal professional development and formal developmental education. “Why not use IDE and SDE to build toward a PhD?” we puled. Lo and behold, shortly after arriving a SAASS, a kindred spirit…but one with the ability to do something about it…was working toward the same objective.

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ABSTRACT

America repeatedly finds itself mired in military interventions long after public buy-in to the national interest has waned. Why is the timely disengagement of military forces so difficult to achieve? International relations theories tend to cluster around variations on realist or idealist philosophies, both of which diminish the role of the individual leader in favor of the state or international institutions. Behavioral science theorists who consider psychological factors such as the personalities of a country's leaders to be instrumental in endgame decision-making have in recent years experienced a resurgence. However, the dominant behavioral explanation of foreign policy decision-making, prospect theory, while it focuses on how individuals tend to make decisions under risk, still minimizes the influence of the individual president as the ultimate decider. This dissertation argues that decisions to disengage military forces are presidential decisions, just like the decisions to commit forces to foreign interventions. If we accept this, then it is important to understand if, and if so why, some Presidents inherently are more or less acceptant of the risks disengagement presents. This dissertation operationalizes a competing personality-based model of decision-making under risk. Referred to here as the trait-based model, it is assessed using disengagement opportunities in three varied levels of military intervention across four presidencies: humanitarian relief cum nation-building under George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton in Somalia; compellent air campaigns cum peace-making/keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo under Clinton; and major combat operations cum irregular warfare in Iraq under George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Data for the model predominantly comes from existing presidential personality profiles based on the dominant model of personality theory, the Five Factor Model, augmented by Myers-Briggs Type Inventory data from public sources. This study aims to explain the roughly thirty percent of cases which defy prospect theory’s predictions and to better explain those cases where prospect theory might heretofore have sufficed. The results of the three empirical case study chapters predominantly support the model, suggesting specific personality traits do in fact point to presidents’ predispositions toward risk, which in turn help explain their disengagement decisions. This dissertation may be only the second to apply the Five Factor Model to presidential foreign policy decision-making, and is the first to do so in the context of disengagement decisions. I hope that it will foster further work in both areas.
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Chapter One

The Problem and Its Setting

*Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.*

-- Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

“If that’s the case, why not end it today?” President George H. W. Bush asked his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. “We’re starting to pick up some undesirable public and political baggage with all those scenes of carnage. You say we’ve accomplished the mission. Why not end it?”¹

It was the afternoon of 27 February 1991 in the Oval Office. The President was meeting with his National Security Council Principals Committee. General Powell had just summarized the situation in Iraq based on an earlier conversation with the commander-in-chief of coalition forces, General Norman Schwarzkopf. Powell told the President he expected to come to him the next day with a recommendation to end the fighting. In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Schwarzkopf had just completed the so-called Mother of All Briefings, detailing the plan for and progress of the ground war. Answering questions afterward, Schwarzkopf said, “We’ve accomplished our mission.”²

The undesirable baggage President Bush referred to was the combination of two aspects of the situation in Iraq. First, there was increasing concern over impressions the press was creating with images from the “highway of death” from Kuwait City to Basra. Secondly, earlier on the morning of 27 February French President François Mitterrand had called President Bush saying it would soon be time for diplomacy.³ Bush later wrote, “If we continued the fighting another day, until the ring was completely closed, would we be accused of a slaughter of Iraqis who were simply trying to escape, not fight? In addition, the coalition was agreed on driving the

Iraqis from Kuwait, not on carrying the conflict into Iraq or on destroying Iraqi forces.”

President Bush’s National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, present in the Principals meeting when President Bush asked whether it was time to stop, recalls, “There was no dissent.”

General Powell relayed a quip from General Schwarzkopf, “Do you realize if we go until tomorrow night that will be five days? The five-day war. Does that have a good ring to it?”

Unspoken was the understanding that it would beat Israel’s 1967 war by a day. Chief of Staff John Sununu observed that calling the cease-fire at midnight would result in the ground campaign lasting exactly one-hundred hours. As simple as that, President Bush decided to order the cease-fire that ended the ground phase of Desert Storm.

Many fine books chronicle the lead-up to and execution of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and thanks to the huge impact of television media putting the war in America’s living rooms, the basic narrative of the Gulf War remains familiar to many Americans. That narrative includes a seemingly clear case of the timely disengagement of US military forces after the achievement of their military objectives. Contrary to the similarly well-known protracted quagmires of Korea and Vietnam, in Iraq in 1990-91 the US military built up, fought a war, achieved its well-defined, militarily-achievable objectives, then withdrew, clearing the way for the resumption of diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power. While this seems like a logical progression, such timely disengagement is a historical anomaly.

While the motives of domestic and international pressure to end the fighting are credible and consistent with the prevailing traditional realist and liberal schools of explaining foreign policy decisions, literature on Desert Storm focuses to a significant degree on the influence of the individuals making the decisions. Such accounts highlight the importance of the legacy of Vietnam on decision-making in the Gulf. Powell and Schwarzkopf had grown up in the quagmire of Vietnam and both spent their careers aiming to ensure the lessons of Vietnam were not repeated. The tangible evidence of this sentiment is the so-called Powell Doctrine, the

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6 Gordon and Trainor, *The Generals’ War*, 405. Authors opine that among the advantages Schwarzkopf sought in ending the war quickly were his desire to hold down casualties, but also to win credit for himself and the Army.


expansion of the Weinberger Doctrine to include the requirement for crafting a plausible exit strategy before involving US military forces. The Powell Doctrine defined President George H. W. Bush’s approach to military interventions, implicitly if not explicitly.

That the legacy of Vietnam weighed on President Bush is clear from his personal diary. On 26 February 1991, he expressed his “conviction that we’re right and the others are wrong. We’re doing something decent, and we’re doing something good; and Vietnam will soon be behind us....It’s surprising how much I dwell on the end of the Vietnam syndrome.” So while he clearly acknowledged international pressure to end the fighting, Bush also recognized, “we may get to a place where we have to choose between solidarity at the UN and ending this thing definitively. I am for the latter because our credibility is as stake. We don’t want to have another draw, another Vietnam, a sloppy ending...We’re not going to permit a sloppy ending where this guy emerges saving face.”

Clearly, leaving Saddam Hussein in power was also a source of unease for President Bush. Along with Vietnam, Bush was influenced by his own World War II experience, repeatedly expressing his concern that there would not be a definitive end in Iraq comparable to Japan’s surrender on the battleship Missouri: “After my speech last night, Baghdad radio started broadcasting that we’ve been forced to capitulate. I see on the television that public opinion in Jordan and in the streets of Baghdad is that they have won. It is such a canard, so little, but it’s what concerns me. It hasn’t been a clean end -- there is no battleship Missouri surrender. This is what’s missing to make this akin to WWII, to separate Kuwait from Korea and Vietnam...”

Others reinforced the WWII and Korea analogies, including the British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, in a meeting immediately after Bush decided on the 100-hour ceasefire. Concerned over repatriating prisoners of war, Hurd insisted the allies had to consider the “Cossack factor,” essentially the same thinking that led to a two-year delay in peace negotiations

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in Korea.\textsuperscript{12} Securing the release of allied prisoners was a priority for President Bush, but thankfully repatriation was not an issue in negotiations. At the same meeting, Hurd also suggested a UN mission to police the Kuwait-Iraq border. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft made it clear Washington was not interested in a long-term ground presence, telling Hurd President Bush was adamant that ground troops had to be returned.\textsuperscript{13}

Indeed, once victory on the battlefield was achieved, “Schwarzkopf was eager to conclude an agreement that would allow him to expeditiously withdraw his troops.”\textsuperscript{14} Schwarzkopf was acting in accordance with the Powell Doctrine, but was further supported by the fact that the President had not really wanted a ground war in the first place. Bush believed “we can do it from the air,” and had advocated for a devastating air strike before Christmas 1990.\textsuperscript{15} Surely, though he had conceded to his military commanders the need for a ground campaign, President Bush also felt the other aforementioned pressures. By his own account:

“we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant withdrawing US forces to an absolute minimum....Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done.”\textsuperscript{16}

This statement shows President Bush was cognizant of the risks of staying after the job was done. These pressures encouraged positive framing of the disengagement option. President Bush acknowledged pressure in domestic public opinion in the 27 February Principals meeting, saying “We do not want to lose anything now with charges of brutalization...The issue is how to find a clean end. This is not going to be like the battleship Missouri.”\textsuperscript{17} Embedded in this statement combining domestic pressure and historical analogy is another explanatory variable that is easily missed. President Bush expressed a perceived risk of losing what had been gained

\textsuperscript{12} Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Generals’ War}, 414. The British had forcibly repatriated Russian POWs after WWII, including Cossacks who had fought alongside or collaborated with the Germans, sending many to their deaths. Fearing the same result for Chinese and North Korean prisoners, the UN delegation in Korea insisted on voluntary repatriation, stalemating negotiations for over two years. Some argue the ultimate armistice deal could have reached much earlier if not for the repatriation issue, avoiding approximately half the casualties of the war.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 413-4.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 443.
\textsuperscript{16} Bush and Scowcroft, \textit{A World Transformed}, 490.
\textsuperscript{17} Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Generals’ War}, 416.
in the forty-two day air campaign and four-day ground campaign if he could not find a practical, timely way to disengage.

The problem with cognitive explanations like the Vietnam syndrome or similar analogies is that they, like their realist and idealist counterparts, depend on the situation to explain the behavior of people, ignoring the effect of the individual decision-maker’s personality on their decisions. This dissertation asks why the timely disengagement of military forces is so difficult to achieve and posits that Presidents, as the ultimate decision-makers in the engagement and disengagement of US forces, are influenced by personality traits that determine how they perceive and react to the risks inherent in disengagement decisions.

Why Disengagement Matters

Having tried diplomacy and economic sanctions, and then carrying out a punishing air campaign he hoped would compel Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions, President Bush announced the start of the ground phase of Operation DESERT STORM on 23 February 1991 at 8 PM Washington time (4 AM, 24 February in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). Bush felt strongly that engaging forces in this way was a decision only the President could make, and disengagement was already on his mind, writing in his diary that night: “I’m glad the decision has finally been made and implemented. I’ve got a deep concern about the families, the loss of lives, and am wondering how it will all end. For example, suppose they quit right now -- what will we do?”18 All too often, successes on the ground lead to expanded goals, often beyond what is militarily achievable. Known as victory disease, in the Korean War changing objectives and pressing across the 38th parallel instead of disengaging and suing for peace arguably extended the fighting another two-and-a-half years, accounting for most of the casualties on both sides. This is why disengagement matters and why it needs to be addressed as a positive decision and not assumed away as something that simply happens.

Just over a day into the ground campaign in Desert Storm, President Bush similarly admitted to such temptations, remarking as the Iraqi forces began their withdrawal from Kuwait that it was a new game and the US was no longer bound by earlier demands.19 Among the increased demands not called for by the UN resolutions was the removal of Saddam Hussein, a personal goal of Bush’s from as early as September 1990, along with the hope of achieving it

19 Ibid., 481-2.
without a ground war. President Bush’s diary entry for 28 February 1991, after calling for the cease-fire, shows the tug-of-war going on in his mind. On the one hand, the President appreciated the historic nature of what the country had just achieved, writing “there’s been nothing like this in history...one thing historic is, we stopped. We crushed their 43 divisions, but we stopped -- we didn’t just want to kill, and history will look on that kindly.” In the same entry, though, he opined of Saddam, “He’s got to go...Obviously when the troops straggle home with no armor, beaten up, 50,000...and maybe more dead, the people of Iraq will know.” Such rationalization made it easier to swallow, but history shows regimes like Saddam’s rarely fall even in the face of such seemingly obvious facts.

Nonetheless, President Bush resisted the temptations of mission creep and stayed “true to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam’s threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of a “battleship Missouri” surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.” There are always unresolved problems and new problems will arise that if military forces are there, become problems with which they have to deal. Still, Bush was then, and remains to this day, criticized for not finishing the job. As Brent Scowcroft noted:

“While we would have preferred to reduce further the threat Saddam posed to the region -- and help undermine his hold on power -- by destroying additional Guard divisions, in truth he didn’t need those forces which escaped destruction in order to maintain internal control...One more day would not have altered the strategic situation, but it would have made a substantial difference in human terms. We would have been castigated for slaughtering fleeing soldiers after our own mission was successfully completed.”

Critics will find fault with any decision, as they did when Saddam almost immediately after the cease-fire crushed rebellions by Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiites in the south. Looked at another way, though, because the US disengaged after the 28 February cease-fire, the follow-on humanitarian intervention of Operation Provide Comfort in the north and the eventual no-fly

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21 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 487.
22 Ibid., 487.
24 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 488.
25 Ibid., 488.
zone enforcement mission in the south were new decisions, however the media or others framed them as the US’s fault or responsibility.

**Cold War Lessons of Disengagement**

No doubt, war is a complicated affair. Common sense tells us military engagement should be more difficult than disengagement but that does not seem to be the case. As Clausewitz’s epigraph at the start of the chapter implies, in war even the easiest things are difficult. Using his logic, by the time some level of military success makes disengagement an option, the difficulties have accumulated to such a degree that choosing disengagement becomes exceedingly difficult.

And for all the debate over whether President Bush disengaged too soon in 1991, in most other cases exactly the opposite is true. The very idea of military quagmires revolves around counter-factual debate over missed opportunities to disengage military forces. Korea might have ended with a return to the pre-invasion status quo in October 1950 had President Truman held fast to his minimum aspiration and not been persuaded by the vainglorious and audacious General Douglas MacArthur to ignore the clear risk of Chinese intervention. Vietnam is an even greater example that was demonstrably important to Bush and Powell’s thinking in Iraq in 1991, remained so for most of seven years of the second Iraq War, and continues to this day after nearly 12 years in Afghanistan.

Sooner or later US forces always disengage. So what makes disengagement so difficult? Whose decision is it to make? Why do we not address disengagement decisions in the way we agonize and argue over engagement decisions? With so much literature from Thucydides forward on how and why states go to war, why is there so little said about disengagement?

In *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, David Halberstam hints at answers to some of these questions with respect to the Korean War. Halberstam’s story within the history, however, is one of General MacArthur’s arrogance. Relevant to its time, it points out the differences of opinion between President Truman and General MacArthur regarding who sets the objectives and who should be in charge of decision-making in theater once war was decided. In the absence of modern, instantaneous communications, MacArthur could control decision-making by controlling intelligence, which he and his chief of intelligence did rigidly. George Kennan found MacArthur’s intelligence staff “pompous, far too ideological, and dangerously
MacArthur’s personality predisposed him to audacity and premature information closure, such that his successful Inchon invasion resulted in his rejection of sound advice from anyone beyond his most trusted advisors, including dismissing inputs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Truman himself. The problems of Korea only go so far in explaining more modern difficulties with disengagement decision-making. Partly because of MacArthur’s example, but largely due to the emergence of nuclear weapons and the evolution of President Truman’s reengineering of the national security apparatus in the National Security Act of 1947, the President has progressively gained more and more control and autonomy over foreign policy decision-making.

If we go back before North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, there is a lesson regarding disengagement. It is reasonable to suggest the US disengaged forces prematurely in 1949, without confirmation of the Soviet status in the North. In 1949, the US disengaged forces as agreed by all parties, but without any credible assurance of maintaining the status quo. Without said assurance, the US in fact forced disengagement while North Korea still posed a credible threat, as evidenced by near-continuous border incursions through 1948-50. Lastly, disengagement decisions clearly were not based on present and future intentions, as there was scant evidence suggesting policies of peaceful coexistence from the North. From this we see that disengaging too soon increases the likelihood of subsequent engagements. If there is an advantage to early disengagement, however, it lies in leaving options open. At least the nation gets to decide anew each encounter, vice being committed already. After the invasion and UN counterattack, by ignoring other opportunities for disengagement, the US and UN deepened the commitment to stay and made further loss of lives inevitable. Both of these lessons were evident in Iraq in 1991.

The Vietnam experience was unquestionably central to both the civilian and military thinking in the lead up to Desert Storm. It was the full operational test of the post-Vietnam US military transformation and the Reagan buildup. Vietnam offered little positive to inform disengagement decision-making. Perhaps its most self-evident lesson is that the degree and type

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of forces used determines the relative ease or difficulty of disengagement. Ground forces are the most difficult to disengage, while air and naval forces are considerably easier. This lesson had been learned earlier through the naval blockade of Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis. Also evident is that the more objectives [disengagement in this case] depend on others, the less likely is their accomplishment. Depending on ARVN troops and the Diem or subsequent governments to achieve US objectives in a meaningful way was frustrating. Otherwise, the Vietnam cut-and-run style disengagement mostly sullied the term disengagement. The basic lesson of disengagement from Vietnam is thus the US can disengage at any time by declaring victory based on already-achieved objectives. This was done in the second Lebanon Multi-National Force (MNF) of 14 September 1982 to 27 February 1984.29 The US deployed military forces to Lebanon twice in 1982, and while the missions were different, both represent less an exit strategy and more a strategy of exit.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was wary of nebulous State Department and National Security Council (NSC) interests in leveraging the MNF for other US diplomatic actions, and thus obtained a 30-day limit on the Marines’ 21 August 1982 deployment. This kept the mission clear -- oversee the disengagement of Israeli and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from southern Lebanon -- with specific ends achievable mainly by military means. The MNF monitored and facilitated the Palestinian withdrawal and left on 10 September 1982 when it was complete.30 After Lebanon’s president was assassinated on 14 September and Israel entered West Beirut, a second MNF was sent in to “establish a presence.”31 Sent over Weinberger’s objections, its goals were less specific and not readily achievable by military force alone. The Marines’ mission was not clear and their presence was seen by Jordan and the PLO as taking sides, so they were increasingly targeted. Even after a suicide truck bomb killed 241 Marines on 23 October 1983, US leaders continued raising the stakes without doing anything to better align the military means with the strategic ends.32 After a massive Shia attack on Beirut in January of 1984, the US was left with the military options of withdrawing or initiating an equally

30 Martin and Walcott, Best Laid Plans, 93-4.
32 Hammel, The Root, 38, 217-221; Hallenbeck, Military Force, 81-84.
massive ground offensive. Not until the Marines had quickly departed by 27 February 1984 did President Reagan adopt a suitable end state, declaring the Marines could disengage as they had accomplished their mission of averting an Israeli-Syrian war. This was a proximate cause of the Weinberger Doctrine, though many of the MNF lessons dovetailed with those from Vietnam.

Disengagement in the New World Order

In international relations, theories on war tend to cluster around variations on realist or idealist philosophies. The two camps focus on conflict and cooperation respectively. Realists believe states are the actors and the international system seeks a balance of power. Rooted as far back as Thucydides, foreign policy and war boil down to fear, honor, and interest. Realism prioritizes national interest and security over ideology, moral concerns, and social reconstructions. Realists do not reject morality, but oppose moralistic abstractions that do not weigh alternatives based on their likely political consequences. Modern adherents are mostly neo-realists, also known as structural realists, typified by Robert Art, Robert Jervis, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Walt. They focus on structural and political explanations with the international system and states as the core vice human nature. No common authority exists above the state, so the international system is anarchic, seeking to balance states against one another for security. Put another way, foreign policy decisions are the dependent variable, with the distribution of power the independent variable, and domestic perceptions of the system as intervening variables. In this theoretical framework, statesmen are not as important as their offices to the interests of the state. Such a view might explain the fundamental continuity of US grand strategy (National Security Strategy) after World War II despite twelve Presidents with diverse personalities and political beliefs.

Counter to realists are the liberals/idealists. The idealist perspective emphasizes international norms, international cooperation, and interdependence among states. They apply

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33 Hallenbeck, Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 123-127.
34 Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power.”
35 The term liberal is loaded in the current American political vernacular, so in most cases the terms idealist and/or liberal idealist are used to describe the school of thought that the state’s foreign policy should mirror its domestic policy philosophy.
moralistic concepts such as justice and fairness to the international system. Hope is indeed a strategy for idealists, who focus on how the world should be vice how it is. In modern US international relations, Wilsonian Idealism is predominant. Wilsonian idealists advocate globalization, free trade, and liberal economic and political systems. The spread of democracy is key and morals are universally valid. When these things are achieved, there is a peace dividend. This view is evident in the conception of the New World Order, eschewing state interests in favor of global governance through international institutions. Modern idealist thought is referred to as neoliberalism or pluralism, and is represented by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.37

Both schools diminish the role of the individual leader in favor of the state or international institutions. Both also overlook military disengagement as a critical process or assume it away. Traditional international relations theorists, and often presidents themselves, argue that there are no other choices, but disengagement decisions are judgment calls, and different leaders may make different choices.38 The importance of individual presidents in foreign policy decision-making has been largely ignored since Kenneth Waltz’s dismissal of individual-level analyses in *Man, the State, and War.*39

In studying the factors which constrain and shape the actions of decision-makers and strategists in ending wars, there is a third major school of thought, behavioral science and psychology. Theorists in this camp consider psychological factors, such as the personalities of a country's leaders, and the society's lessons of recent wars, as most instrumental in shaping those leaders' actions in the endgame. Such explanations likewise fell out of vogue for decades. Only in recent years have both experienced resurgence. On the international relations side, the move is largely attributed to an article by Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, *Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In.*40 For international relations scholars, the crucial issue is whether variation in military disengagement decisions stems from the international environment, from domestic politics, or from differences among the presidents themselves. This

37 Ibid. The concept traces from President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the League of Nations, and the Bretton Woods system, and evolved into the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to list a few.
dissertation argues that decisions to disengage military forces are presidential decisions, just like the decisions to engage forces in foreign interventions. As the sign on President Truman’s desk stated, “The Buck Stops Here.”

Traditional studies frame foreign policy decisions as structural, political, and cultural phenomena within the international and domestic domains. While valid and explanatory, without a human element they seem more symptomatic, or contextual and proximate, than causal. Ultimately, the common thread is decision-makers are people; they are human beings weighing benefits and risks of known alternatives based on the information available to them. This study examines the tendency for US presidents to keep military forces engaged in interventions after military objectives are met, are deemed unachievable, after indications that disengagement would otherwise be deemed desirable. Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to answer the question; How does the President’s perception of and predispositions toward risk affect disengagement decisions?

In the liberal idealist view, the Gulf War became the first act of President Bush’s image of the New World Order. As NATO and the Warsaw Pact had represented the bi-polar collective security paradigm of the Cold War, in 1990 the President sought to align good against evil in the New World Order proclaimed in his National Security Strategy.41 True to the Wilsonian roots of the term, collective security and superpower cooperation were at the heart of Bush’s vision. To achieve the desired transformation, the Bush Administration accepted end-state limitations required by its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other coalition partners. Ultimately the moderating tendencies of these agreements eased US strategic military disengagement. In turn, this enabled such non-military policy tools as political and economic sanctions to yield further benefits to US interests.

In the realist view, Desert Storm can be seen as a larger version of the first Lebanon MNF, and demonstrating lessons-learned from the second, US military forces were used for very specific purposes. The realistic limits imposed by the coalition, coupled with the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, successfully resisted the tendencies toward overreach and expansion of missions.

From a behavioral perspective, perhaps the most important constraint imposed on President Bush, was that which precluded regime change as an objective of the campaign. Bush was left to hope for an internal coup, effectively deferring a personal aspiration to others. Dictators like Saddam Hussein, leading repressive and exclusionary regimes, often survive all but the most disastrous of defeats. Because of this, they are prone to settle when it is clear they will lose. Whether or not US leaders believed Saddam could survive defeat, use of force for regime change was undesirable for coalition cohesion. The resultant aspiration level, the desired military end state, was thus clear…”first, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored…”

President Bush’s personality traits make him aware of and responsive to risks in decision-making. Reasonably cautious and deliberative, George H. W. Bush is not impulsive, but judges his environment. “Not a conceptual thinker,” Bush prefers concrete facts to reading-into situations. After Saddam invaded Kuwait, it reportedly took some discussion with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft for Bush to see more was at stake than just Saudi Arabia. Once he had judged the situation, however, Bush’s personality inclined him to take clear, decisive action. He framed disengagement positively and using analogies from World War II and Vietnam, kept his aspirations in check through modest, achievable military objectives and largely self-imposed constraints. Preferring closure and finality in decisions reinforced Bush’s decisions to disengage ground forces immediately upon achievement of stated objectives, resisting the temptation to expand the mission. The President’s leadership style favors having close advisors bring him options from which he himself will choose. He is deliberative, but not indecisive. Bush took the responsibilities of the presidency very seriously and did not require consensus to act; in fact, the only consensus decision in Desert Storm happened to be his most controversial, ending the ground war after 100 hours. His favorable disposition toward disengagement was clearly supported by his Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Colin Powell, who consistently preferred a

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42 Goemans, War and Punishment, 40.
45 Ibid., 105.
46 Ibid., 107.
47 Ibid., 169.
minimalist definition of objectives. His preference for resolution and discomfort with open-ended decisions and commitments was clearly evident in comments to the White House press corps on 1 March 1991: “I just need a little more time to sort out in my mind how I can say to the American people it’s over finally -- the last ‘T’ crossed, the last ‘I’ is dotted.”

The result was the seemingly straightforward decision by President Bush to disengage military forces once these criteria were met. Still, as Bush himself opined on the decision to engage ground forces, the decision to disengage had to be made by the President. On the surface, the situation had many parallels to Korea; similar objectives, and the ability (indeed the temptation) to press forward once the original objectives were met. So perhaps the decision was not so straightforward. Nowhere in the National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy documents was there a clear indication that military disengagement would occur at some specific time or in some specific way after achievement of an end state. Though there was no set timeline as there had been with the first Lebanon MNF, the outcome of Desert Storm was similar. Clear, finite, achievable military objectives, coupled with restraint of mission creep led to a mission clearly accomplished and an orderly disengagement to allow other instruments of power back to the fore. Desert Storm seems the perfect case for proper disengagement.

Critics, however, continue to this day to second guess President George H. W. Bush’s decision to disengage when he did, based on the facts that Saddam’s regime did not fall and his elite Republican Guard units were not destroyed. Bush’s critics almost immediately began using these facts, along with veiled statements of support to anti-Saddam groups and over-restrictive cease-fire conditions, to weaken the public perception of victory.

It is said that nothing fails like success. When, again like Lebanon, US forces were called in to engage in subsequent operations, the objectives expanded beyond those the military could reasonably attain. While Saddam’s overthrow might have been attainable by military means, the alternative of his full acceptance of U.N. Security Council resolutions was not. Without criteria for mission achievement, disengagement cannot come as an orderly step in a process. As a result, Operation DESERT STORM spawned Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which itself became Operation NORTHERN WATCH, and along with Operation SOUTHERN

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WATCH continued across both of President Clinton’s terms and became Operation IRAQI FREEDOM under President George W. Bush twelve years later, and did not finally end until US combat operations ended under Operation NEW DAWN and the last US military forces left Iraq in December 2011.

Lebanon and Desert Storm suggest failure to remain disengaged can have varied consequences. In Lebanon, overly ambitious objectives for the second MNF led to mission creep and eventual disaster. In Iraq, failure to engage the proper personnel and the correct instruments of national power led to an incomplete ceasefire arrangement, which in turn resulted in the nearly immediate engagement of US forces in new missions. While Brent Scowcroft effectively resisted the notion of keeping US troops in Iraq for border enforcement, General Powell suggested the allies use the threat of air strikes to ensure the Iraqis complied with the cease-fire and Bush agreed. 51 An example of what would become a trend, keeping US airpower engaged tends to lowers the threshold of engagement below the level of presidential attention, but makes the commitments linger. Being there makes the nation and its leaders care, meaning actions in Iraq that might not have otherwise drawn US or UN reactions, became important to US/UN interests simply because forces were already in place. The Iraq no-fly-zone enforcement missions lacked attainable end-states. The resulting open-ended missions led not to lost lives, but to lengthy deployments, continuing mission creep, and a costly drain on US Air Force personnel and equipment. To be clear, air exclusion zones (AEZ), or no-fly-zone (NFZ) enforcement, represent opportunities for airpower to offer strategic advantage, but the missions can be abused in the absence of attainable objectives. Failure to disengage from the frustrating, open-ended missions in a reasonable time arguably led to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and contributed to the recapitalization quandary the Air Force faces today.

America needs to learn to disengage military forces from long-term deployments. The lessons of disengagement exist in theory and in history, but are often hard to grasp. Structural, situational, state-based explanations do not adequately explain and help leaders learn the lessons of disengagement. There is no doubt that structural, political, and cultural barriers to disengagement exist at the international and domestic levels, but logically the way the President responds to these barriers is what matters. If an individual President’s personality significantly

51 Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 416.
influences these decisions, it is useful to know the personality profile of Presidents and presidential candidates.

**Preview of the Argument**

Chapter Two defines risk and strategic military disengagement, and then identifies the gaps in the existing literature this study can fill. Chapter Three then details the trait-based model of decision under risk used throughout the remainder of the dissertation. With presidents as the units of analysis, the chapter explores the theoretical foundations of the framework and establishes personality profiles for Presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. Thereafter, Chapters Four, Five, and Six apply the model to disengagement decision during operations in Somalia, the Balkans, and Iraq, respectively. The final chapter consolidates conclusions from the case studies and ends with an application of the model to disengagement decisions pending for US operations in Afghanistan. While the intent is to provide presidents and other decision-makers with useful insights, this dissertation avoids specific topical prescriptions.

To explore how the President's perception of and predisposition toward risk affect disengagement decisions, this dissertation operationalizes a model developed by Drs Paul Kowert and Margaret Hermann in “Who Takes Risks?: Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making.” It melds the theoretical traditions of prospect theory (a situational model of decision under risk) and the five factor theory of personality predispositions into a personality-by-situation trait-based model of decision under risk. It is in the family of risk behavior studies that operate within the “black box” of state decision-making by focusing on individual decision makers, vice treating states as unified rational actors.

Uncovering personal predispositions is central to the framework tested here. A handful of specific personality traits influence a President’s personal propensities regarding risk-taking, and can indicate how the President perceives risk, how the President sets aspiration levels, and how the President frames decision options, to include disengagement. The framework correlates

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52 Each chapter begins with a historical summary of the geopolitical situation. This dissertation does not aim to question or revise the history, but only to pull context relevant to the president’s decision-making. For this reason, a relatively small number of sources were used for historical background. As an example, for the second Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom), Bob Woodward has produced several exquisitely-researched volumes focused on the presidents. Gordon and Trainor have produced two similarly thorough accounts. Between these expert journalistic accounts, the basic historical facts require little more validation. Where possible, quotes and references these authors use are traced independently to insure proper context.
psychology’s gold standard Five Factor Model of personality traits and the human resources industry’s popular Myers-Briggs personality types to risk perception and also to personal predispositions toward risk acceptance and aversion.53

This study profiles the four most recent US presidents based on risk-related personality traits and facets, then applies those profiles to the trait-based model of decision under risk. The model is then tested against varied interventions across the range of military operations, from a humanitarian-cum-nation-building in Somalia to humanitarian-cum-punitive strikes-cum-peacekeeping in the Balkans, to major combat ops-cum-nation-building in Iraq. Hypotheses, gleaned from propositions in the Kowert and Hermann study, are evaluated using a set of standard questions, combined with counter factual analysis to evaluate opportunities to disengage military forces that leaders missed.

Hypotheses first test Presidential risk perception, establishing those who do and those who do not vary their decision-making based on risks and framing. For those Presidents who do consider risk and framing, additional personality traits are used to explain the effects of framing on decision-making, testing hypotheses that some traits lead some Presidents to be especially risk-averse for losses while other traits lead other Presidents to be especially risk-acceptant for gains. These are important because they stand contrary to the predominant theory of risk behavior, prospect theory, which asserts that individuals “overvalue losses relative to comparable gains” and are thus risk-acceptant in avoiding losses and risk-averse in pursuit of gains (reference dependence).54 Prospect theory consistently fails to explain roughly thirty percent of cases, a gap Kowert and Hermann aimed to fill. Some Presidents appear to behave according to prospect theory, and certain traits suggest this fourth type.

The trait-based model further aims to better explain some cases which currently seem explainable by prospect theory. Additional hypotheses address the basic premise of prospect theory that individuals tend to think in terms of gains and losses from status quo reference points. While it is recognized that real world decision-making is often based on aspiration levels that can or must be achieved by the decision, prospect theory offers no means for determining the


decision-maker’s reference point. Whether a decision-maker uses the status quo or an aspiration level for reference can skew how decision options are framed. The additional hypotheses test the effects of personality predispositions on framing and on how aspiration levels are set. Risk-averse Presidents are thought to set unusually low, achievable aspiration levels, while risk-acceptant Presidents are thought to set unusually high, over-ambitious ones. Finally, a hypothesis tests the proposition that regardless of type, if disengagement is not included within the aspiration, it will not be considered as an option.

This dissertation follows William Boettcher’s approach to assessing aspiration level as a situational factor that represents “the minimum level goals that the president hopes to achieve or surpass...(and) may include an immediate goal, imperatives that constrain the means available for achieving the immediate goal, and other interests that reinforce the president’s commitment to achieving or surpassing his immediate goal.” This focuses on the process of decision-making, and thus is useful for the process-tracing methodology as it presents real-world-testable hypotheses. This study attempts to glean the president’s decision frame, or aspiration level, from records of internal White House meetings, personal diaries where available, and indirectly through documented accounts of cabinet or other inner-circle advisors, and finally from biographers’ accounts.

The premise of this dissertation is that the US gets mired in protracted interventions because presidential risk behaviors inhibit disengagement decisions. Their personality predispositions tend to lead them to view disengagement negatively, as unable to achieve even their minimum aspirations.

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Chapter Two

Disengagement and Risk

*You can disengage from a friend or ally by unilateral action. Disengagement from an enemy requires bilateral action.*

--- Hans Speier

*Disengagement*

*It has been said that the United States was deceived into entering and expanding the Vietnam War by its own overoptimistic propaganda. The record suggests, however, that the policy-makers stayed in Vietnam not so much because of overly optimistic hopes of winning ... as because of overly pessimistic assessments of the consequences of losing.*

--- Jonathan Schell

*The Real War*

Much is written on how and why wars begin and how they are fought. The shelves groan under the weight of histories of the strategies, tactics, weapons, and methods of warfare. Much less is written on how and why wars end. Yet, as Fred Ikle points out in *Every War Must End*, “it is the way in which a war is brought to an end that has the most decisive long-term impact.”1

Very often, though, in planning for war political and military leaders alike go into war untroubled that they have no plan for bringing the war to a close.

**Disengagement**

The first requirement for discussing disengagement is to define what disengagement is, and what it is not. The term, as used in this dissertation, is virtually non-existent in the strategic literature. In Joint Doctrine, disengagement is defined: “In arms control, a general term for proposals that would result in the geographic separation of opposing nonindigenous forces without directly affecting indigenous military forces.”2 While the concept is applicable, as removal of US (nonindigenous) forces is the intent, the arms control caveat confuses the term. The term appears in other doctrine publications, but usually synonymous with a more tactical connotation of withdrawal of forces from battle; “to break off a military action with an enemy.”3

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The problem with this definition is its common association with retreat and defeat. This dissertation posits that disengagement as “release from an engagement, pledge, or obligation,” is an overlooked or under-appreciated phase of conflict, tied up somewhere in the ambiguity of victory and war termination.4 At its simplest, disengagement is the withdrawal or separation of US military forces upon achievement of military objectives for the purpose of easing the transition to other non-violent elements of national power and to preserve military forces for other military objectives elsewhere. The importance of disengagement in terms of US national security strategy is apparent in the US history of getting bogged down in unforeseen long-term engagements.

The Joint definition of disengagement reflects the historical strategic literature, where disengagement appears predominantly in Cold War proposals for redeployment of US forces, primarily from Europe. Contemporary usage is focused on counterinsurgency operations such as Israeli disengagement from Palestinian territories and US disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the historic nuclear and contemporary counterinsurgency contexts allude to the concept of disengagement discussed in this thesis but are not complete. Theoretical literature on the concept of strategic military disengagement seems lacking.

**Literature on Disengagement**

This dissertation fills a gap in existing literature. That literature does offer a valuable baseline from which to start discussing disengagement. Foremost among the sources surveyed is a 1958 RAND study, which defined the following important tenets of disengagement:

1. Disengagement from an enemy requires bilateral action
2. Disengagement can be forced if the enemy lacks a credible threat
3. Disengagement decisions can be based on present and future intentions5

Written in the nuclear context, the base tenets are equally applicable to conventional and irregular conflicts. The unstated assumption is the understanding that one can always disengage, provided one does not mind the cost. Given that, the first tenet of disengagement is RAND analyst Hans Speier’s quote that opened this chapter. Speier illustrates his point in post-World War II Europe, where the US could have redeployed its forces to the United States without the consent of the U.K., France, or other allies. The allies tried to block such action with joint

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security arrangements. Disengaging from the Soviet Union, on the other hand, required assurances from the Soviet Union that they would not capitalize on the resulting shift in the balance of power in Europe. Following this tenet of disengagement, the US could have disengaged unilaterally from the Korean peninsula in 1953, but required assurances from the North or its sponsors. The same applied in Vietnam and also applies today in Afghanistan. The US can leave Afghanistan with no actions required of Afghanistan’s national government, but not without assurances from the Taliban and other anti-government forces.

If the first tenet essentially asserts the old saw that in war, the enemy gets a vote, the second tenet points out a caveat. The enemy’s vote only counts if it carries weight. Disengagement can be forced if the enemy lacks the strength to pose a credible threat to national interests. This was true of the Soviets in Europe, the North Koreans, and the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army for nearly a decade. The Vietnam case illustrates that the threat in absolute terms is not what matters, but its weight against perceived US national interests. By 1972, US interests had shifted to the point that the same threat from North Vietnam that warranted US engagement in 1965 was no longer sufficiently important to US interests to warrant remaining engaged.

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan are representative of these first two tenets. The Taliban lost the strength to maintain government control in December 2001 and effectively surrendered all territories. Al-Qaeda lost its safe haven. Yet the US could not disengage from the Global War on Terror. The Taliban are dissatisfied out of power and the terrorists continue to pose a threat. Thwarting Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan does not preclude meeting them again in Iraq, Europe, or elsewhere.

Speier’s third tenet states that disengagement decisions can be based on estimates of present and future intentions. Of particular interest in limited conflicts where military force is less able to produce decisive victory, this tenet means military disengagement may be appropriate if military power is not the primary element of national power targeted by the enemy. George Kennan’s criticism from the 1950s of the “over-militarization of thinking in the West” resonates today and points to this condition for disengagement. At its simplest, the third tenet hints that with the military instrument of power removed from the calculus, diplomatic and economic means may be reasonable if the enemy is viewed as liable to abandon aggressive

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6 Speier, Disengagement, 2. Cites George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West (New York, 1957), 18.
intentions in exchange for an acceptable concession. Lastly, negotiations can be called for if fear of escalation is the driving concern.

Common to the 1958 Cold War nuclear environment and today’s Israel/Palestine or US/Afghanistan situations is one ultimate question: Are the results of disengagement likely to be worse than the current policy and if so; are they irreversible? Can we afford disengagement, “if there is any chance it’s wrong or may become wrong based on disengagement?” Leaders must answer this question in terms of national security strategy. A strategy emphasizing military disengagement, whenever reasonable, leaves more credible military threats on the table for follow-on crises. While easy to say, disengagement does not just happen. It must be planned as diligently as major combat operations. In the terms of the Powell Doctrine, “Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives.”

The implication is that lives are saved by winning quickly and exiting in accordance with the strategy, vice going in with open-ended objectives.

Speier notes the importance of disengagement decisions remaining in the realm of sound national policy and not public or international opinion. “It is the fate of great powers to be criticized by lesser powers and it is salutary in democracy to voice political misgivings,” says Speier, “but foreign policy can not be conducted as though it were a national or international popularity contest.” Weinberger and Powell conflict with Speier in their call for reasonable assurance of public support before engaging US forces. It is the nature of democracies that the people’s voices will eventually win out. Public opinion in the US favors disengagement. The very essence of quagmire in the US connotes the erosion of public support in the face of prolonged interventions with seemingly unimportant or unattainable objectives.

One final note remains on what disengagement is not before the discussion continues with what it is. A key misconception of disengagement seems to be the assumption that it is complete. While it is possible to disengage completely in all areas of national power, this study posits military disengagement as a means of allowing more room for other elements of national power to operate while at the same time freeing the military instrument for future needs. While Speier defined some tenets of disengagement nearly fifty years ago, contemporary literature

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7 Ibid., 2.
9 Speier, *Disengagement*, 9.
deals with it only obliquely, tied up somewhere in the discussions of victory and war termination.

A more contemporary use of the term disengagement as intended here is offered in Selig Harrison’s *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement*. In it, Harrison builds the case for the disengagement of U.S. military forces from the Korean peninsula using a combination of the other instruments of national power to leave the South Korean government in a position of responsibility for its future coexistence with the North. His basic argument is that its context of Cold War alignments no longer exists. Harrison then proceeds to identify and counter several arguments against such a reassessment coming from both realist and idealist camps. Realists chafe at both Koreas’ failure to show proper deference to the world’s only superpower, while idealists resist losing an active presence in a vital center of globalization where cooperation should be the natural order of things.

Along the way, Harrison points out many barriers to disengagement decisions. First, the US needs to maintain a presence to prevent the resumption of the war, for the North has never given up its goal of reunification. Second, and related, tensions on the peninsula could spill off the peninsula, so a US presence is required to maintain regional stability. With or without a war, a power vacuum would emerge if the US disengaged before a stable reunification of North and South was complete. This justification expands to the point that the combined US presence in Japan and Korea are now necessary to contain an emergent China. Even an orphaned North Korea, whose realistic ability to invade and unify the peninsula probably withered beyond hope by 1994, now is seen as a threat precisely because they might be desperate enough to use their weapons vice collapsing without having used them. In the most recent context, the North’s development of indigenous missile and nuclear weapons technology, rather than providing a reason disengage from the peninsula’s threat proximity, creates another reason to stay put.

Harrison points out that there has been interest in disengaging from the Korean peninsula before. There was significant movement in 1971, fueled by exhaustion in Vietnam and Nixon’s detente overtures to Russia and China. The State Department’s Deputy Chief of Mission in Seoul asked a poignant question that should be central to evaluating disengagement

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11 Ibid., xiv.
12 Ibid., xvi.
13 Ibid., xvi-xxii.
opportunities: “Who besides ourselves would be ready to put their own men and resources into Korea today?”14 Then noting the dependency presence develops, he stated, “we seem to be stuck to South Korea like Brer Rabbit was to the Tar Baby.”15 This analogy is not unique to Korea. Even though President Nixon successfully withdrew 20,000 troops from the 60,000 total as part of his Guam Doctrine promoting self-sufficiency among US allies, President Carter quickly failed in 1977 in his effort to withdraw all the remaining ground combat forces.16 While withdrawal from a 60-year presence is hardly the ideal aimed for here, the concept of disengagement as removing the military element to make room for more normal means while freeing forces for other potential actions is on point.

Military leaders recognize the need for disengagement, and the concept is addressed in the 2004 National Military Strategy. That the strategy has not thoroughly considered details of disengagement, however, is apparent. The discussion of disengagement consists of one shallow paragraph:

Disengagement While the force-planning construct assumes that the United States will disengage from some contingencies when faced with a second overlapping campaign, there may be some lesser contingencies that the United States is unwilling or unable to terminate quickly. There may be forces conducting long-term stability operations to reestablish favorable post-conflict security conditions from which the United States cannot disengage. Under such circumstance some important capabilities may not be readily available at the outset of a subsequent conflict. Combatant commanders must consider this possibility when preparing to undertake operations, as many of the same capabilities critical to campaigns are required to conduct lesser contingency operations.17

National military strategy is the highest, most general statement of military doctrine. When the NMS is not published, and even in spite of what is published, the NMS can be discerned in force structure, organization, and weapons systems choices.18 Thus the passive tone of the preceding paragraph may offer an alternative explanation to why strategic military

16 Ibid., 175.
disengagement is not in doctrine; disengagement decisions are distasteful and under the control of others.

The Terms of Disengagement

It seems intuitive that the US would disengage military forces for only three general reasons...victory, defeat, or something in between. Ideally, US forces would disengage after victory, when the adversary has surrendered unconditionally, and all clearly-defined, militarily-achievable objectives are met. Reality is rarely so tidy. More often, victory is indefinite and objectives are ill-defined and imprecise in measurement. Disengagement then happens when minimum acceptable aspirations or objectives are met or dropped because public and political will eventually wanes under competing priorities and interests and the likely rewards are no longer deemed worth the risks. Reducing aspirations and objectives to make disengagement more favorable is in effect declaring victory based on objectives already achieved. At the extreme, the US can disengage anytime it chooses if it is willing to suffer the consequences. Such cut-and-run disengagements are ugly, but provide a way out of deteriorating situations. Generally such situations result from poor engagement decisions or unforeseen changes in the operational environment which render objectives unachievable. Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum from victory is defeat. Defeat is the clearest case if defeat is taken as a near absolute; however, in US foreign interventions the stakes are seldom existential, so clear defeat is far less likely than a reframing of aspirations. The point being, as a theoretical matter disengagement is always an option. When the risks of losing face and credibility are trumped by the actual loss of lives, it is possible to declare victory based on already-accomplished objectives. Perhaps counterintuitively, victory, whether tactical or strategic, can present the most difficult case for disengagement. So-called victory disease makes it very tough to resist adding new, higher aspirations and accompanying missions in the wake of success.

Put another way, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, when military victory occurs, disengaging the military follows as continuing the national policy by less violent means. Victory is the desired end in battle. A better state of peace is the desired end in war. Continuing advantage is the desired end of strategy. The timely disengagement of military forces preserves maximum potential for the military instrument of policy; therefore, disengagement is the best national military strategy in support of expansive national security strategy.
To summarize, strategic military disengagement as used here is not covered directly in the existing literature. **Disengagement is the withdrawal or separation of US military forces upon achievement of military objectives for the purpose of easing the transition to other non-violent elements of national power and to preserve military forces for other military objectives elsewhere.** It is not, and should not be confused with, war termination, end state, or exit strategy.\(^{19}\) Most importantly, it is not isolationist, but rather a resumption or continuance of policy by other means. Many factors favor disengagement, but there are also many barriers. Neither side of this coin is sufficiently explained by the various realist or liberal schools of international relations thought. Disengagement of military forces, like their engagement, is a Presidential decision. Disengagement of military forces upon the achievement of military objectives is not retreat, nor can the bar of said objectives be fairly set at unconditional surrender in most cases. Finally, disengagement is always an option if the President is willing to accept its consequences. However, what exactly are those consequences and how does a President weigh the risks and rewards of disengaging military forces against alternative options?

**Risk**

“Because national leaders cannot know in advance every consequence of their decisions, risk animates all political choices.”\(^{20}\) No one would argue that foreign policy decisions do not include risk. Disengagement is a specific foreign policy decision that is rife with risk. The barriers to disengagement discussed above are evidence of this fact. Yet it still seems counterintuitive that the risks of disengagement could be outweighed by a continued military presence. Moreover, while most people might have an instinctive understanding of what is implied by risk, the term is by no means clear.

Conceptually, risk is studied in a variety of disciplines, to include business, economics, health, political science, psychology, and sociology, among others. While good that risk is widely recognized, the down side is the potential for confusion among varied definitions. In

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\(^{19}\) War (or conflict) termination is the process leading to the resolution of a conflict and the basis for mutual acceptance of interests and objectives to ensure lasting settlement conditions. In military doctrine, the end state is defined as, “the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives.” See U.S. Department of Defense. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 December 2012). 100. Exit strategy is not a doctrinal term, but is often used consistent with the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine; See Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power.” See also Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” 58.

terms of decision making, the definition is derived from the experimental perspectives of economics and psychology and the more empirical perspectives of business and political science. In the first case, “risk describes choice problems where the various outcomes associated with potential actions are probabilistic.”\(^{21}\) In economics in particular, risk is neutral, denoting probabilities of both gains and losses; but risk implies the probabilities are known, as distinguished from uncertainty, where the probabilities are unknown. In most other fields, however, risk tends to focus on negatives and in political use the term almost exclusively references undesirable outcomes.\(^{22}\) In common use and as understood among decision makers, the analysis of non-quantifiable, ill-defined, and at times wicked problems like those in foreign policy is often uncertain and ambiguous. Risk means danger, but that danger does not come with a probability or percentage. All defined decision options have risk, plus the ambiguity of the situation means not only are the probabilities uncertain for each option, but there is no guarantee every option has been defined. At least some potential outcomes are unknown and could plausibly have adverse consequences. **Risk**, then, is *the likelihood that validly predictable direct and indirect consequences with potentially adverse values will materialize, arising from particular events, self-behavior, environmental constraints, or the reaction of an opponent or third party.*\(^{23}\) Adverse does not necessarily mean only losses, but rather adverse relative to what the decision maker desires, known as the *aspiration level*.

“Risk is in the eye of the beholder.”\(^{24}\) That is to say, it is subjective, based on individual experience and cognitive processes, and thus varies by individuals and groups. **Risk perception**, then, is “the level of risk attributed to a situation or behavior by the decision makers.”\(^{25}\)** Risk-taking** refers to choosing a high variance strategy based on the given set of alternatives. As risk is omnipresent, subjective, and relative, the riskier of two options has higher variance, which is to say more numerous and divergent potential outcomes. The potential for both gains and losses is greater than the alternative option.\(^{26}\) If personality traits indeed indicate a president’s

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\(^{24}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 18.

predisposition toward risk-taking, it is significant because this risk propensity is key to a president’s resolve, or determination to make and stick to decisions. This dissertation posits that at least part of why the US military tends to get bogged down in long-term interventions is due to the decision-making behavior of Presidents’ regarding the risks of disengaging military forces after the accomplishment of stated military objectives.

So what are the risks of disengagement? At their simplest, they are, at least initially, what had to be overcome in the decision to intervene in the first place. They can change as ground truth changes the overall objectives of the intervention, but they start as the cost of doing nothing. The problem is that once forces are engaged in the intervention, disengagement becomes an active proposition vice the passive, status quo position it was before the intervention decision. Additionally, once the decision is made to intervene, reversing that commitment impugns the President’s and America’s credibility. In the absence of an unequivocal victory, disengagement risks at least the perception of defeat and retreat. Reflecting back on Speier’s tenets of disengagement, disengaging while the enemy can still resist or pose a credible threat, even rhetorically, risks a reversal of fortunes. Ultimately, at any stage of an intervention, the risk in disengaging forces is in losing what has been gained. If risk is in the eye of the beholder, it is also what you make it. If the risks of doing nothing were overstated with hyperbolic rhetoric to gain public, Congressional, or international concurrence with the decision to intervene, reversing that decision is that much riskier.

That disengagement is always an option is evident if one accepts that the President’s decision to intervene had to overcome arguments for remaining disengaged. Whatever decision calculus was used proved intervention favorable to continued disengagement. Something has to change this calculus for disengagement to regain preference. Whether for good or bad, “states rarely finish wars for the same reasons they start them.” Moreover, once the nation is involved directly and intimately in a situation, its apparent weight on the national interest only grows.

27 James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model Of Crisis Bargaining, American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4, 1989, 941-972: 942. Author proposes that a greater willingness to take risks is one of three sources of greater resolve. The other two are greater military capabilities and an objectively less favorable status quo.

Literature on Presidential Risk Behavior

Unlike disengagement, there is a rich literature addressing decision making under risk, to include Presidential decision making in foreign policy and more specifically the effect of personality traits on Presidential risk behavior in foreign policy decision making. What this dissertation can add is specific testing of existing frameworks against the unstudied decision of strategic military disengagement.

Subjective Expected Utility Theory

L. J. Savage’s model of subjective expected-utility has been the standard for the study of human decision making in the social sciences since 1954. Its historical basis dates back to 1738 in Daniel Bernoulli’s Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk (Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis) and the introduction of what would become the economic theories of risk aversion and expected utility. Subjective expected-utility is the basis of the rational actor model favored by most realist and idealist schools of thought, which essentially put decision making in a black box. Unfortunately, inside that black box, decision-makers often fail to maximize expected utility. Like purely structural, domestic, and cultural explanations, SEU fails to explain satisfactorily the behaviors of many experimental subjects and real world decision makers. These failures would not surprise Savage, who admitted he was presenting “a highly idealized theory of the behavior of a ‘rational’ person with respect to decisions,” and further that said person would have to make decisions in situations outside the ordinary criteria of logic (i.e. beyond rationality).

Prospect Theory

The empirical weakness of expected utility led to a number of so-called weighted utility theories. In political science and international relations, Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory currently dominates. While not as simple as expected utility theory, prospect theory’s

31 Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, 7. Savage notes that to be strictly rational, the person could not be uncertain about decidable mathematical propositions.
appeal lies in its relative simplicity and relevance, it intuitively plausible hypotheses, and experimental support. It may be particularly attractive to international relations theories due to its focus on risk-taking in the face of losses or threats.\textsuperscript{33} “The theory attempts to explain the decision-making processes people actually use and to show how these systematically produce outcomes that violate a number of the key assumptions of rational choice theory.”\textsuperscript{34} A key departure from expected utility is the proposition of reference dependence, that people frame outcomes as gains and losses, not as end state positions. These gains or losses are relative to a reference point, which may be the status quo or an aspiration level. Furthermore, people’s preferences vary according to the frame in which they perceive they are operating. According to this framing effect, people are risk averse when they perceive they are operating in the domain of gains and risk acceptant when operating in the domain of losses. This can lead to risk preference reversals for situations of identical expected utility based solely on how the decision is framed. Put another way, people are more likely to take risks to avoid losses than to achieve gains. Additionally, people quickly renormalize their reference point to assimilate gains, thus the loss of recent gains is seen as an absolute loss.\textsuperscript{35} Loss aversion is key. Losses loom larger than gains and people value what they already have more than comparable things they do not have, a cognitive bias known as the endowment effect.\textsuperscript{36} Further evidence of loss aversion is another cognitive bias referred to as the certainty effect, leading people to overweight outcomes perceived as certain compared to those seen as merely probable.\textsuperscript{37} In the positive frame, people choose a certain gain over a risky choice offering a chance for a larger gain; in the negative frame, people prefer the risk of a greater loss (hoping for no loss at all) over a certain loss.\textsuperscript{38}

Prospect theory was formulated to explain economic behavior, but was extended to international relations. Robert Jervis is among the prominent international relations scholars behind this extension. Far from abandoning his realist roots, Jervis rather acknowledges that, “when the situation is not so compelling as to produce uniform behavior in all people one must

\textsuperscript{33} Boettcher, \textit{Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy}, 22-3.
\textsuperscript{34} Barbara Farnham, ed. \textit{Avoiding Losses/ Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 2.
\textsuperscript{35} Boettcher, \textit{Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy}, 22-3.
\textsuperscript{37} Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 265.
look to the differences among individuals for at least part of the explanation.” In “Political Implications of Prospect Theory,” Jervis cites prospect theory’s usefulness in explaining apparently suboptimal behavior such as states sticking with failing policies or throwing good money after bad in foreign policy goals that seem increasingly unattainable. Prospect theory can explain beliefs such as domino effects from small losses as people overweigh losses more than equivalent gains. Loss aversion is apparent in H. E. Goeman’s findings of how differing regime types behave when faced with losses. Jervis finds the historical record consistent with prospect theory’s implication that states should more often be pushed into war by the fear that not to engage will deteriorate their position rather than pulled in by the belief they can improve an already acceptable situation. Again, wars are started more often to stop losses than to improve the status quo.

In the same volume, and more expansively in her own book, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy, Rose McDermott applies prospect theory to four case studies to explain “irregularities in state behavior: why do nations take crazy risks, like the Iranian rescue mission; throw good money after bad, as in Vietnam; forgo easy gains, by terminating the Gulf War before reaching Baghdad; and so on?” As an example, McDermott explains President Jimmy Carter’s April 1980 decision to rescue the American hostages in Iran. Carter, operating in the domain of losses, ordered a highly risky rescue attempt in the hopes of regaining the status quo. Carter accepted risks he normally would have rejected because of the power of risk aversion.

McDermott’s study approaches the intent of this dissertation, using prospect theory to explain intervention decisions. This approach has promise for the examination of disengagement decisions. Other research, however, notes pitfalls with this approach. First, a major weakness of prospect theory is its reliance on reference-dependence and framing without defining a theory or

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criteria for how either is determined.44 Furthermore, transition from the laboratory to the real 
world is suspect, as gambling and insurance scenarios typically involve knowable numerical 
probabilities and quantitative outcomes as opposed to the subjective and uncertain domain of 
foreign policy decision-making. Also of note, McDermott does not view risk propensity as a 
stable personality trait that influences a person’s decisions over across situations and time, but 
rather as a function of the situation, or as part of the framing effect.45 This endows actions rather 
than individuals with risk attributes.46 McDermott, like many others, avoids the reference point 
issue by assuming it to be the status quo, which lends to the belief that the domain is situation 
vice individual driven.

Presidential Personality

William Boettcher’s research has also attempted to expand prospect theory into foreign 
policy, initially by experimenting with subjective weights for probabilities that cannot be known 
with certainty outside the lab (i.e. in the real world where foreign policy decisions occur), but 
with little support. He has progressively criticized prospect theory’s internal validity over the 
lack of standards for reference points and framing. Boettcher critiques McDermott and other 
authors who rely on the status quo to define the decision-maker’s frame.47 Disputing the 
situation-dependence of framing, Boettcher and others trended toward using personality-based 
explanations to improve the internal validity of prospect theory. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky 
note the term decision frame refers “to the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, 
and contingencies associated with a particular choice,” not only objectively, but also subject to 
the “norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker.”48

As mentioned previously, the relative dearth of literature on the influence of leaders’ 
personalities rests largely on the dominance in international relations of structural and domestic 
politics explanations for foreign policy decisions. As neoclassical realists began to acknowledge 
that leaders’ personalities indeed affect decisions, the overwhelming tendency was and remains 
toward explanations from cognitive psychology such as groupthink, misperceptions, and

prospect theory “a reference-dependent theory without a theory of the reference point.”
45 McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, 2.
46 Maryann E. Gallagher, Who Ups the Ante? Personality Traits and Risky Foreign Policy (Atlanta, GA: PhD 
Dissertation, Emory University, 2010), 46.
heuristics. At least in part these trends were responses to alternative trends in political science which tended to offer support to the traditionalist critiques that “individuals are too individualistic” for scientific study. Blowback from psychobiographies, which tended to be insightful and interesting, but idiosyncratic vice systematic and anecdotal vice empirical, set back explanations based on personality psychology as unscientific.

Fred I. Greenstein’s *Personality and Politics* proved the seminal study that brought more scientific rigor to personality analyses in politics. Greenstein proposed that there are four conditions under which a leader’s personality may be especially important: (1) when the actor occupies a strategic location, for instance the head of government; (2) when the situation within which decision making takes place is ambiguous or unstable, such as in conflict and crises; (3) when there are no clear precedents, routines, or standard role requirements; (4) when spontaneous or especially effortful behavior is required. The ties to intervention and disengagement decisions are clear as we are concerned with: (1) the President of the United States, perhaps the most powerful person in the world; (2) disengagement from a conflict/crisis; (3) interventions in the post-Cold War era were unprecedented in many senses; (4) whether planned or not, opportunities to disengage can arise quickly and be fleeting, precluding extended deliberation.

Greenstein’s follow-on work acknowledged the power of personality in politics as he focused on particular personality traits that make up presidents’ leadership styles from FDR forward. Greenstein does not attempt to categorize Presidents according to any typology, considering each on his own terms. Unfortunately, Greenstein does not subscribe to any peer-acknowledged set of personality traits. The leadership qualities Greenstein traces are:

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proficiency as a public communicator, organizational capacity, political skill, vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence.\(^53\)

For nearly four decades, Margaret Hermann has led the charge among scholars studying the effects of political leaders’ personalities. As world leaders are notoriously difficult to assess directly, Hermann pioneered and popularized the technique known as personality assessment at a distance (PAD).\(^54\) Much of her work has focused on codifying and standardizing the PAD technique and building an extensive personality database of US and world leaders. In assessing leadership style, Hermann focuses on “how leaders react to constraints, process information, and are motivated to deal with their political environment.”\(^55\) Her Leadership Trait Analysis framework measures seven personality traits to assess the three criteria:

1. Belief one can influence/control what happens
2. Need for power/influence
3. Conceptual complexity
4. Self-confidence
5. Task vs. group emphasis
6. Distrust/suspiciousness of others
7. Intensity of in-group bias \(^56\)

The first two combine to suggest the leader’s response to constraints. The next two suggest how open the leader is to information. Finally, the last three describe the leader’s motivation.\(^57\) Automation through the use of computer programs with extensive dictionaries have virtually eliminated earlier concerns over inter-rater reliability and over the years Hermann and other have shown the cross-cultural validity of the PAD technique and Leadership Trait Analysis framework. Unfortunately these seven traits speak to leadership traits and not specifically risk-taking preferences or propensity.


\(^{56}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 11. Hermann extensively details her own and peer research in all these areas.
The PAD technique is not limited to leadership traits. David Winter prominently uses the technique to determine how leaders’ psychological motives explain their historical actions. Winter uses content analysis to measure three kinds of motive imagery — need for achievement, need for affiliation, and need for power. Winter found strong correlations between the level of power motivation in a president’s first inaugural address and historians’ ratings of the president’s greatness. Further, high presidential power motivation predicts entry into war. Affiliation motivation, the need to feel liked and included, is significant in concluding arms limitation agreements, but also with political scandals. Achievement motivation is significant in predicting success in business, but not presidential greatness. By itself, it predicts idealism in presidents, so typically, achievement-motivated presidents become frustrated and do not enjoy the job. The need for achievement is more relevant in its proportion to the needs for power. A classic example is President Bill Clinton’s first two years in office; he scored high in achievement motivation relative to power and the early months of his administration are remembered “for political problems and failure.” President Clinton’s successes came mostly after his party’s losing Congress forced his power motivation to the fore.

The Clinton example demonstrates the distinction between personality traits and motives. Traits are considered stable, while motives can and do change with the environment. Personality consists of four elements: cognition and traits are trans-situational, whereas motives and social context elements are situation-dependent. Winter notes that others use the PAD technique in other ways for other purposes. Most, like himself and Hermann, do content analyses of leaders’ speeches and interviews. Others like Jerrold Post study patterns in and build profiles from known biographical facts. Aubrey Immelman uses the technique to apply more clinical descriptions using clinical diagnostic categories. Most significant to this dissertation, Rubenzer

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59 Ibid., 563-4.
60 Ibid., 570-2.
61 Ibid., 559.
and Faschingbauer had presidential biographers and presidency experts rate US presidents using standard personality rating scales.  

William Boettcher’s recent work endorses prospect theory’s explanatory superiority to expected utility theory, but through integration with other recent research seeks an alternative explanation to prospect theory alone. In *Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy*, Boettcher developed a framework for studying foreign policy decision-making he termed the Risk Explanation Framework (REF), which was the starting point for the framework used in this dissertation. Focused on foreign policy decisions generally, if valid the REF should provide a useful framework for studying the specific foreign policy decision of disengagement.

In the post-World War II era as the United States took a dominant role in international affairs, and more specifically beginning with the restructuring of the national security apparatus under the National Security Act of 1947, US national security decisions have become increasingly executive-dominated. This implies that presidents’ personalities play an increasingly significant role in foreign policy decision-making, to include setting aspiration levels and framing alternatives. Accordingly, the REF focuses on the individual as decision-maker, vice groups, bureaucratic organizations, or states. Boettcher’s core argument is that “personal predispositions interact with the characteristics of a situation (including the number and framing of alternatives, the degree of uncertainty, and time pressure) to produce choices that could not be predicted by theories of rational state interest or domestic politics.”

Similar to prospect theory, Boettcher’s REF is divided into two stages: framing (editing in prospect theory) and option selection (evaluation). Presidents are first typed as either security-motivated or potential-motivated according to Boettcher’s own Presidential Risk Predisposition Index. It aims to quantify Lopes’ security and potential-motivated personalities (worst case/best case tendencies) using data from Margaret Hermann’s PAD technique. Specifically, Boettcher’s index sums PAD-measured traits of belief in ability to control events, need for power, and task emphasis as positively associated with risk-taking (potential-motivation, thus...
positive values), and need for affiliation and conceptual complexity as positively associated with risk-aversion (security-motivation, thus negative values).\textsuperscript{67} In sum, a high score posits a predisposition for risk-acceptance, potential-motivation, and a top-down information processing style focused on best-case outcomes; a low score posits a predisposition for risk-aversion, security-motivation, and a bottom-up information processing style starting from worst-case outcomes.

In the framing stage, the President (with varying levels of input from advisors) constructs an aspiration level, identifies options, and first gets a sense of situational constraints such as the level of uncertainty, time pressures, and the accuracy of available information. The option selection stage involves analysis and evaluation of identified options against the president’s aspiration level. Personal predispositions affect what and how information is assimilated and how options are weighted. The ultimate decision is the interaction of the president’s risk propensity and situational constraints. In the absence of time pressure, all presidents are expected to delay decisions. When time pressure is acute, security-minded presidents are expected to select a risk-averse option, while potential-minded presidents are expected to choose a riskier option. Perceived uncertainty and information accuracy concerns affect decisions only under acute time pressure; when a decision must be made with limited information, security-minded presidents are expected to engage in incrementalism, doing only what is deemed necessary at the moment; potential-minded presidents are more inclined to engage in bolstering, artificially closing debate or otherwise reinforcing preferred options as the only real option.\textsuperscript{68}

Research traditions in psychology, business, and political science all suggest how a decision-maker frames a problem significantly affects the ultimate decision choice.\textsuperscript{69} In line with these traditions, Boettcher focuses on reference points (aspiration levels) which represent the president’s minimum set of goals he hopes to achieve or surpass. So in the REF, “the aspiration level may include an immediate goal, imperatives that constrain the means available for achieving the immediate goal, and other interests that reinforce the president’s commitment to achieving or surpassing his immediate goal.”\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{67} Boettcher, \textit{Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy}, 43.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 37-38.
\textsuperscript{70} Boettcher, \textit{Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy}, 39. Emphasis in original.
Boettcher’s study strongly supported his REF hypotheses regarding the explanatory strength of prospect theory, specifically reference dependence and framing effects, when compared to the expected utility research tradition. Additionally, Boettcher showed his integrative REF, with its inclusion of personal predisposition effects, to have explanatory value in cases contrary to the expectations of prospect theory. Still, some REF hypotheses demonstrated significant weaknesses.\(^71\)

Instances of weak support (5 of 53 decision periods examined) and evidence contrary to REF hypotheses (8 of 53 decisions) clustered around hypotheses dealing with risk predispositions and their effect on the President’s information processing. Most of these (3 weak, 7 contrary) hypotheses dealt with risk-acceptant, potential-motivated hypotheses applied to President Truman’s decisions regarding Iran and Greece, cases where Truman was not deeply interested/engaged, and thus his predispositions were potentially less influential.\(^72\)

Boettcher’s proposed revisions to the REF include better case selection, more consideration of group decision dynamics, and a greater emphasis on the effect of uncertainty on the decision-maker. First, clear interest on the part of the president should logically increase any influence of the president’s personality predispositions. While Boettcher aimed for a universal explanation of foreign policy risk behavior, not all foreign policy decisions warrant the individual attention of the president, nor do every president’s interests and experiences extend to every element of foreign policy. Structural, political, cultural, and geographic factors all vary the degree or magnitude of national interest as well. As President Carter said, “I’ve learned that only the most complex and difficult task comes before me in the Oval Office. No easy answers are found there, because no easy questions come there.”\(^73\) Perhaps the propositions of prospect theory stand up better for the easier questions that do not demand or earn the president’s attention. That said, disengagement decisions are so important by definition they demand the president’s attention. Failing to decide is a decision and as President Truman reminds us, “the buck stops here” for presidential decisions.

\(^71\) Ibid., 172-173.
\(^72\) Ibid., 174-175. Boettcher notes Hermann’s (1984, p. 53) point that personality will be more impactful in ambiguous crises requiring high-level involvement in defining/deciding.
Second, small-group process decision variables might well be addressed within the personality factors relevant to risk behavior. Among the traits Boettcher included in his presidential risk predisposition index are two traits used by Thomas Preston to represent presidential leadership style, need for power and conceptual complexity. Of note, Preston’s leadership style typology also includes a non-static characteristic of experience. The experience variable provides a contingency approach to account for changes over time based on learning on the job, as well recognizing interest-/experience-based variance in risk behavior across domains (domestic and foreign policy in Preston’s study). Finally, Preston’s personality-by-situation contingency approach may help provide what Boettcher seeks to determine when and how other considerations (e.g. advisors, constituencies, international/Congressional/public/media pressure) trump presidential interest and/or predispositional influence.

To Boettcher’s third point of needing a more nuanced view of the effect of uncertainty and time pressure (at least as it relates to risk-acceptant presidents and bolstering), again the relevant trait may already be hidden within the presidential risk disposition index. Breaking out the traits representing the belief in ability to control events (low scorers delay and delegate to shift blame when odds of success are poor) and conceptual complexity (complex individuals accept ambiguity but have high need for information, simpler individuals are insensitive to ambiguity and are more likely to prematurely close debate) may provide the needed nuance.

Aside from Boettcher’s own proposed refinements to the REF, there may be other structural changes to the framework worth exploring. First, by using Lopes’ connection between predispositions and risk acceptance/aversion, Boettcher limits presidential predispositions to a binary characterization of personality. Lopes basically finds that security-motivated individuals engage in bottom-up processing, and tend to be risk-averse, focusing on worst-case outcomes and maximum losses. Alternatively, potential-motivated individuals are top-down processors, being risk-takers, and focusing on best-case outcomes and maximum gains. Addressing only two personality dispositions within the two-stage decision model of prospect theory arguably disregards risk-perception as a factor. Secondly, it is not apparent how Lopes’ work serves any supporting function beyond offering the concepts of security and potential-motivation as

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74 Boettcher previously studied the effects of groups on the decision-maker’s framing of problems and risk propensity. See Boettcher, “The Prospects for Prospect Theory,” 2004.
synonyms for risk-aversion and risk-acceptance and bottom-up/top-down processing as synonyms for pessimism and optimism, respectively.

Indeed the problem Boettcher’s REF experiences with personality predispositions may come from the lack of a direct linkage between Lopes’ observations of risk-acceptant and risk-avoidant choices to personality characteristics pointing to security motivation and potential motivation. Boettcher created his Presidential Risk Predisposition Index as the tie between Kahneman and Tversky’s situation-centric prospect theory, Lopes’ process-centric individual risk behavior theory, and Kowert and Hermann’s trait-based personality theories of risk-taking propensity. Combining these strains of research gives the REF an individual-by-situation perspective. Yet he used Hermann’s PAD to code Lopes’ binary typology. Hermann’s PAD is a well-established, proven methodology, but as Boettcher points to Kowert and Hermann’s work defining risk-propensity, and again in his future plans for validating his index, it might be beneficial to skip coding Lopes’ binary characterization altogether.

Alternatively, in *Who Takes Risk?*, Kowert and Hermann offer a dispositional model of four-types and a three-stage model for decision under risk. It offers the advantage of focusing specifically on complementing and filling in the explanatory gaps in prospect theory, and its traits are already coded. More significantly, rather than using Hermann’s PAD, the Kowert and Hermann model uses the Five Factor Model of personality. It follows that a shift to Kowert and Hermann’s model might simplify and improve the REF. This does not seem too much of a reach, as Boettcher notes his vision of future research to validate his presidential risk predisposition index using Kowert and Hermann’s questionnaire.

Kowert and Hermann argue against prospect theory’s exclusion of the individual’s influence on decisions, especially in the realm of international relations, wherein, “the behavior of a single leader, shaping military…policy, often has dramatic consequences.” Also, Kowert and Hermann were among the first researchers to point out another great weakness in prospect theory, that it fails to explain roughly one-third of subjects’ behavior. Kowert and Hermann suggest this consistent finding against the framing effect is due to the decision-maker’s inherent
risk orientation. Contrary to McDermott’s assertion, “research in psychology, behavioral economics, and political psychology on inherent traits and risk-taking have found evidence of personality traits are related to stable overall risk-preferences, and risk preferences in specific types of situations (e.g. health, career, finance).” Additionally, Kowert and Hermann find a majority of subjects do not exhibit preference reversal according to prospect theory, instead demonstrating fixed risk preferences irrespective of framing.

In considering trait psychology, one of the most popular mainstream surveys in business and academia is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® (MBTI®). Developed by Isabel Briggs Myers and her mother, Katherine Briggs in the 1940s and 1950s, the MBTI was introduced in 1962 to make C. G. Jung’s theory of psychological types accessible to the public. The system prescribes order into seemingly random behaviors by understanding how people prefer to use their perception and judgment. Perception deals with how individuals prefer to collect and process information. Judgment describes how individuals prefer to come to conclusions and make decisions about what they perceive. The MBTI scores preferences from survey questions to produce a typing based on four dichotomies:

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<tr>
<th>Extraversion</th>
<th>Attitude (E/I)</th>
<th>Introversion</th>
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<tr>
<td>Outward toward people</td>
<td>…Focus…</td>
<td>Inward toward ideas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sensing</td>
<td>Perception Function (S/N)</td>
<td>Intuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibly through the senses</td>
<td>…Information gathering…</td>
<td>Abstract and theoretical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinking</td>
<td>Judgment Function (T/F)</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason, logic, rules</td>
<td>…Decision-making by…</td>
<td>Empathy, harmony, consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judging</td>
<td>Lifestyle Preference (J/P)*</td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled/Structured</td>
<td>Spontaneous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(NOTE: As used in this dissertation, J/P are treated as independent traits depicting a preference for structured (J) or spontaneous (P) living.)*


84 For more information/resources, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator

Knowing how people differ in their perceptions and conclusions about the world around them offers insight into their skills and interests. Thus in business, the MBTI caught on with human resources departments interested in matching employees’ personalities to jobs and also with teaching managers how to relate to different personality types in order to establish productive work environments. The MBTI survey is relatively quick and easy to administer and score, especially with modern computer and web-based tools. The result is the identification of preferences in each of four dichotomies, for a total of sixteen distinct personality types.86 Intended to be a self-assessment, both experts and the interested public often use the instrument to assess celebrities to include presidents.

While popular, the MBTI is not recognized as scientifically valid. Problems stem from lack of critical scrutiny as most studies are conducted by MBTI advocates. Statistical criticism is based on studies showing that populations fall in a normal distribution across the four scales instead of the bimodal distribution true dichotomies would suggest.87 Put another way, using the Extraversion scale as an example, the norm is for people to lie somewhere close to the middle between extraversion and introversion, vice having two peaks, one each on the extraversion and introversion ends of the scale. Another criticism of the survey is that it depends on honest self-reporting, so individuals can consciously or unconsciously skew their answers toward perceived desirable responses.88 Finally, some critics claim MBTI reliability is low and lacks falsifiability.89

Conversely, other studies have found MBTI scores to compare favorably to other assessments with respect to evidence of convergent and divergent validity, construct validity, internal consistency, and test-retest reliability.90 David Keirsey has answered another common

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86 Resultant combinations are ISTJ, ISFJ, INFJ, INTJ, ISTP, ISFP, INFP, INTP, ESTP, ESFP, ENFP, ENTP, ESTP, ESFJ, ENFJ, ENTJ. See The Myers & Briggs Foundation, “MBTI Basics.”
criticism of the vagueness of MBTI descriptors by expanding MBTI descriptions into a more
detailed set of four temperaments. Though not technically affiliated with the Myers-Briggs
Foundation, Keirsey correlates his temperaments with the sixteen MBTI personality types,
detailing distinctions between types in terms of language use, intellectual orientation, educational
and vocational interests, social orientation, self-image, personal values, social roles, and
characteristic hand gestures.91

Robert McCrae and Paul Costa conducted a seminal study correlating the popular but
scientifically suspect MBTI with the much more scientifically-credible Five Factor Theory of
personality. Their Five Factor Model (FFM) melds characteristics found in nearly all personality
and psychological tests. The model consists of thirty facets of personality divided into five
overall traits of extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism.
McCrae and Costa found MBTI scales to correlate strongly with four of the five FFM traits:
MBTI-Introversion correlates negatively to FFM Extraversion, MBTI-N correlates positively to
FFM Openness, MBTI-Feeling correlates positively to FFM Agreeableness, and MBTI-P
correlates negatively to FFM Conscientiousness. While McCrae and Costa generally supported
various criticisms of MBTI as it is intended and popularized, their study showed valid use for
some MBTI letter labels when treated as FFM facets or traits.92 The FFM’s traits and facets are
listed in Table 2.2.

Personality and Risk-Taking

Costa and McCrae began aggregating existing personality research typologies in the
1970s, initially consolidating three common traits, Neuroticism, Extraversion, and then through
factor analysis, Openness to Experience (thus the name NEO).93 By 1985 the remaining two
traits of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were added. In its current version, the instrument
has forms for self-assessment as well as observer ratings.94 Over the years the FFM has
withstood several attempts to add or subtract traits and facets. Its internal consistency is high,
including in other languages and cultures. Both short and long-term test-retest reliability is high

91 David Keirsey, Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence. (Del Mar, CA: Prometheus
93 Paul T. Costa, Jr., and Robert R. McCrae, The NEO Personality Inventory Manual (Odessa, FL: Psychological
Assessment Resources, 1985). NEO was a name, not an acronym by 1985. The third revision (NEO PI-R) was
current for Kowert and Hermann’s study. NEO PI-3 was released in 2005.
94 Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa, Jr., NEO Inventories: Professional Manual (Lutz, FL: Psychological
Assessment Resources, Inc., 2010).
Table 2.2. Five Factor Model Personality Traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neuroticism</th>
<th>N1</th>
<th>N2</th>
<th>N3</th>
<th>N4</th>
<th>N5</th>
<th>N6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxiousness</td>
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<td>Angry Hostility</td>
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<td>Depressiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Consciousness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impulsivity</td>
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<td>Vulnerability</td>
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<tr>
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<th>E3</th>
<th>E4</th>
<th>E5</th>
<th>E6</th>
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<td>Warmth</td>
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<td>Gregariousness</td>
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<td>Assertiveness</td>
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<td>Activity</td>
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<td>Excitement-Seeking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive Emotions</td>
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<tr>
<th>Openness</th>
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<th>O2</th>
<th>O3</th>
<th>O4</th>
<th>O5</th>
<th>O6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fantasy</td>
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<td>Aesthetics</td>
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<td>Feelings</td>
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<td>Actions</td>
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<td>Ideas</td>
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<td>Values</td>
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<table>
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<th>Agreeableness</th>
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<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>A6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Straightforwardness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
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<td>Compliance</td>
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<td>Modesty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tender-Mindedness</td>
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<tr>
<th>Conscientiousness</th>
<th>C1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>C3</th>
<th>C4</th>
<th>C5</th>
<th>C6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dutifulness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

and the “NEO-PI-R [Neuroticism Extraversion Openness Personality Inventory-Revised] scales have been found to generalize across ages, cultures, and methods of measurement.”95 Critiques include the lack of a control for social desirability, allowing individuals to paint themselves in a better light on self-assessments, and observers to skew ratings based on their personal biases.96 A second common criticism is that the FFM is purely empirical, thus atheoretical, and owes its following mostly to the reputation of its authors.97 Consistently through its development, the FFM has faced challenges to its scope, with a seemingly endless list of presumed personality

traits the system is missing. Indeed, some make the case risk-taking should be included. In the last two decades, McCrae and Costa and others have taken on the atheoretical criticism. In 1992 McCrae and John started by arguing that the FFM implicitly adopts the basic tenets of trait theory. By 1996 McCrae and Costa had published a Five Factor Theory of Personality which they continued to expand on through at least 2006.

Kowert and Hermann used two instruments to assess individual differences. The FFM factors and traits were measured using the NEO PI-R. At the time Kowert and Hermann conducted their study, the FFM was not yet considered to have a well-developed theoretical foundation, so they chose to also include the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as the most widely-used personality instrument of its day and for its nominal theoretical basis in the work of Carl Jung.

Another reason for using both the FFM and MBTI is replicability. McCrae and Costa had previously compared the two instruments, as noted above, and found strong, reliable correlations between the four MBTI dimensions and four of the five FFM traits. Kowert and Hermann replicated these relationships independently in their study. Further, to examine the relationship between personality and risk-taking, they also administered two instruments designed to measure risk propensity: the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ) describes real-life risky choice situations along with odds of payoff; the Personal Risk Inventory (PRI) asks

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102 Ibid., 616. For comparison of correlations, see McCrae and Costa, “Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,” 30-31.
about the subjects’ own experiences and desires regarding gambling, risky sports, and personal finance.  

Table 2.3. Correlation of Five Factor Model Trait Scores and MBTI Dimensions  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FFM Trait</th>
<th>MBTI Trait</th>
<th>Extraversion (E)</th>
<th>Intuiting (N)</th>
<th>Feeling (F)</th>
<th>Judging (J)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neuroticism (N)</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion (E)</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>.74***</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness (O)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.72***</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeableness (A)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness (C)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=125; *p<.01; **p<.001  
N=267; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  

Two strong, general relationships emerged: first, those low on the FFM trait of Conscientiousness (C) and MBTI dimension of Judging (MBTI-J) are more likely to take risks; second, the FFM trait of Openness (O), along with the facets of Openness to Fantasy (O1) and Action (O4), and MBTI dimension of Intuiting (MBTI-N) are positively associated with risk-taking. The first findings confirm other researchers’ findings that, generally, “low scores on conscientiousness [C], deliberation [C6], and judging [low MBTI-J equates to MBTI-P] denote people who ignore risks rather than individuals who take calculated risks.” The second finding likewise corroborates previous assertions that Open (O) and Intuiting (MBTI-N) types are novelty-seekers, “more acceptant of risks that involved them personally and immediately (e.g., sports risks) than of more abstract risks (e.g., economic risks),” pointing to an interest in adventure and novelty. Kowert and Hermann were surprised to find no strong association between Extraversion (E and MBTI-E) and risk-taking. Only the FFM facet of Sensation-

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104 Ibid., 616. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator  
107 Ibid., 617-8.
Seeking (E5) showed correlation, notably like that of Openness (O/O1/O4) and Intuiting (MBTI-N), indicating it as well indicates people aware of risk that seek it out. Also surprisingly, the FFM trait of Neuroticism (N) did not correlate with risk, though the Anxiety (N1) facet did correlate to risk-aversion. Finally, both the FFM trait of Agreeableness (A) and its Altruism (A3) facet correlated with risk-aversion, “perhaps because these individuals fear the harm that could come to others through their own risky behavior.”

In sum, Kowert and Hermann found three general relationships between personality and risk: some people ignore it, some seek it out, and others avoid it.

**Personality and the Framing Effect**

To measure the framing effect, Kowert and Hermann had their subjects respond to a series of decision problems. In order to expand beyond prospect theory’s typical economic gambling scenarios, they additionally included medical gambles and political gambles so as to include potential loss of life in the stakes. For each type of scenario, subjects chose between a certain result and a risky one. Scenarios were framed so subjects were both in the gain and loss domain with the stakes being equivalent in each. Significant framing effects were found for each type of problem, but the effect was most pronounced when the problems involved the potential for loss of life. Subjects were risk-averse (chose the certain result) for gains at a rate of 3:1 (~75% certain:25% risky), and risk-acceptant when framed as a loss at a rate of 3:2 (~60% risky:40% certain).

Seeking a personality tie to prospect theory, Kowert and Hermann correlated their subjects’ risk-taking responses under the various frames to the FFM traits, the risk-related FFM facets, and MBTI dimensions. Their results provided little evidence of personality traits (or a personality type) that is more or less likely to behave according to the propositions of prospect theory. Only three fairly weak relationships appeared -- Openness to Actions (O4), Deliberation (C6), and Judging (MBTI-J). At least the latter two seem logical. People who judge their environment are more likely to pay close attention to and deliberate over the problem scenarios, and thus be more subject to the framing effect. It is understandable, however, that Openness to Actions (O4) might lead to more options being considered, making framing more relevant.

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108 Ibid., 619.
109 Ibid., 621.
110 Ibid., 622.
Disaggregated to the frame level, Kowert and Hermann again found Open (O, O1, O4) and Intuiting (MBTI-N) subjects preferred risk “even more strongly when problems were framed as gains, a finding that runs directly counter to the predictions of prospect theory.”\textsuperscript{111} The same people did not prefer risk in the loss frame. Kowert and Hermann suggest sensation-seekers are drawn by the potential for novelty and opportunity represented by risk in the gain frame.\textsuperscript{112}

Conversely, Altruist (A3) subjects demonstrated exactly the opposite effect. Also counter to prospect theory, they were especially risk averse in the loss frame, but not in for gains. This may be due to a desire to avoid human suffering by accepting a small loss to avoid possibly greater long-term losses. A final finding was that subjects low in Anxiety (N1) and Self-Consciousness (N4) prefer risk regardless of frame.\textsuperscript{113}

In sum, people low on anxiety and deliberation are both \textit{risk and frame invariant}; they pay little attention to framing and take risks regardless of whether they face a loss. Those high on the same traits are more aware of risk and will either avoid it (high anxiety) or follow prospect theory (high deliberation). Thirdly, open and intuitive people take risks, but primarily for gains. Finally, a fourth type, agreeable altruists avoid risks primarily when facing a loss.\textsuperscript{114}

Kowert and Hermann divided subjects once more based on who took risky choices and who took certain choices. Correlating choices against personality measures again showed the same preferences. They concluded “people respond to risk in at least four ways:” as prospect theory predicts -- taking sure gains but accepting risk to avoid loss; risk and frame invariant; risk-acceptant -- will take risks primarily for gains; and, risk-averse -- preferring to avoid risk, especially for a loss. Overall, Kowert and Hermann found that, “risk taking varies not only according to how problems are framed but also according to awareness of risk (personality traits related to conscientiousness and anxiety) and according to personal style (personality traits related to altruism and sensation seeking).”\textsuperscript{115}

In concluding their argument and identifying implications for foreign policy, Kowert and Hermann make a useful assertion, namely that a decision-maker’s personality traits may provide insight into where an actor sets reference points, particularly if it is an aspiration level:

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 623.  
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 623.  
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 623.  
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 623.  
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 628.
“The special sensitivity of some individuals (the agreeable altruists) to loss may actually lead them to set unusually low reference points such that most of their decisions occur in the domain of gains. Likewise, sensation seekers may tend to set high or ambitious reference points. Their risk acceptant behavior in what seems to be the domain of gains may actually reflect a perceived failure to meet these ever-higher new standards. Consequently, behavior that appears to run counter to the predictions of prospect theory (risk aversion in the domain of losses or risk acceptance in the domain of gains) may be indicative of subjects whose reference points place them in the opposite frame. Their personal styles may help to predict the cues on which they focus to establish reference points.”

In summary, in the last decades of the twentieth century prospect theory overtook subjective expected utility theory as the leading explanation of decision making. Extending prospect theory into the real world of foreign policy and international relations exposed serious weaknesses in its internal validity and explanatory power. Determining decision-makers’ reference points and framing using situational variables alone is problematic, which brought a resurgence in personality-based explanations. These include cognitive, motivational, contextual, and trait based theories. A variety of measures of presidential personalities emerged, including two specifically focused on risk-taking. William Boettcher’s Risk Explanation Framework targets presidential risk taking in foreign policy decisions, a seemingly perfect jumping off point for this dissertation’s focus on the specific decision to disengage military forces at the proper time. However, Boettcher’s self-reported weaknesses in his REF are key to what this study seeks to show. The next chapter will detail a framework based on Kowert and Hermann’s three-stage model of decision under risk. It will explore in greater detail the theory behind the Myers-Briggs and Five Factor Models of personality. Taking MBTI typings of from Keirsey and others and FFM scores from Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, profiles will be built for Presidents Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama. Subsequent chapters will test presidential profiles in the three-stage model of decision under risk in the context of a variety of interventions.

Case Selection

The focus of this dissertation is on the intervention case studies. Individual presidents are the units of analysis used to explain disengagement decisions in the context of particular

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116 Ibid., 631-2.
interventions. Chapters Four through Six are intervention-focused expressly to avoid the perception of focusing too much on the men.

The basic criteria used are small, medium, and large-scale interventions from across the military spectrum from humanitarian operations to major combat operations. The post-Cold War period provides contemporary relevance but also controls somewhat for the international environment. Where reasonable, interventions cross administrations to show contrasts between presidential personalities.

Somalia, Operation RESTORE/CONTINUE HOPE represent a small-scale military operation other than war (MOOTW), spanning the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in Bosnia and ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, with their lead-in and follow-on operations, represent medium-scale combat operations including punitive/compellent airstrikes and peace enforcement missions. Operations are predominantly within one administration, but using the region as a control allows for a comparison within a single administration of two similar interventions. Finally, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is used as the large-scale, joint force operation including major combat ops, regime change, and nation-building. Again, the operation spans two administrations allowing a contrast between President George W. Bush’s seemingly textbook inattention to disengagement and President Obama’s determined disengagement.
Chapter Three

A Framework For Decision Under Risk

One reason transition planning has been neglected is that it is often devilishly complex, requiring a linkage between what Clausewitz called the ‘grammar’ of military operations and the ‘logic’ of political objectives. Another lies in the temperament of political leaders, who generally like to improvise and delay decisions until the last moment so as to retain maximum flexibility--ignoring the fact that postponing choices often generates more constraints. Still another reason for the neglect stems from the policymakers’ frequent overemphasis on the immediate negative possibilities of an intervention rather than the benefits over the long term.

-- Gideon Rose

The Exit Strategy Delusion

Under the US Constitution, only the President can deploy and engage military forces. The disengagement and redeployment of military forces similarly rests with the President. All interventions eventually end, but often military forces remain in place well after military engagement has ceased to be beneficial to US foreign policy. Some force or forces clearly impede the president’s decision to disengage the military element of national power. This dissertation posits a key impediment is risk.

It is interesting that when historians and political scientists study interventions, their fascination tends toward the tactics...the battles...the means. Yet on the rare occasions when the focus shifts to the decision-maker, the Commander in Chief, the President, “much of that outpouring is directed to the ends the president sought rather than the means he used to advance them, and a large portion of it bears on the merits of his policies rather than the attributes that shaped his leadership.”¹ This dissertation focuses on the means of presidential decision-making regarding disengagement -- the personality traits that shape how the President perceives disengagement risks and the predispositions toward risk-taking those traits give the President.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the foundation for this dissertation was in William Boettcher’s Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy: Prudence or Peril?² Boettcher provides a very close approximation of this dissertation’s aim, only for foreign policy decisions

generally vice disengagement decisions specifically. It is possible that in his pursuit of a broad
integration of prospect theory and personality theory, he overlooked a more parsimonious
framework. Specifically, using Lopes’ binary characterization of presidents as either security- or
potential-motivated is neat and tidy for his desired ends. In part, the typology is intended to
serve as a personality-based dispositional variable to fill a key void in prospect theory’s
undefined situation-dependent approach to determining aspiration levels and framing.
Unfortunately, the Lopes’ approach suffers from a similar lack of identified standards for
determining the disposition of an individual. Boettcher may have compounded this by the use of
Hermann’s leadership style traits as the means to create his Presidential Risk Propensity Index.
In short, Boettcher chose motivational psychology as his basis for risk predisposition and had
mixed-to-weak results. Motives no doubt play a role in setting aspiration levels and likely
contribute to skewing the framing process to the advantage of the president’s motive. However,
motives can and do change situationally. Personality traits, on the other hand, are stable, as the
concept of predispositions implies. Therefore, this dissertation pursues a trait-based approach in
the hope of finding greater explanatory power.

Methodology

Specifically, this study tests and helps develop the three-stage model of decision making
under risk first proposed but not tested by Paul Kowert and Margaret Hermann in their 1997
article, “Who Takes Risks?” This study elaborates on the over-simplified depiction of the
framework depicted in the published article, re-created in Figure 3.1 below. The framework
represents a synthesis of reference dependence from prospect theory and personal predispositions
from the five factor theory of personality. It applies to all foreign policy decisions, but is not
tested broadly in this dissertation. Scoped specifically to the foreign policy decision of military
disengagement, this study fills gaps in the areas of strategic military disengagement and the
explanatory power of personality traits in presidential decision-making under risk.

3 Paul A. Kowert and Margaret G. Hermann, “Who Takes Risks?: Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making,”
*Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41, 1997, 611-.
The motive behind the three-stage model is the failure of prospect theory to accurately predict behavior in roughly one-third of experimental subjects. Kowert and Hermann note previous failures to establish general personality models, but cite the Five-Factor Model (FFM) as an important outcome of decades of research, citing its “long history, cross-cultural replication, and empirical validation across many methods and instruments make the five-factor model a basic discovery of personality psychology – core knowledge upon which other findings can be built.”

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Figure 3.2 depicts the refined three-stage model of decision under risk, hereafter referred to as the trait-based model. More explicit than the version Kowert and Hermann published, it better depicts the specific FFM traits and facets along with the relevant MBTI dimensions that affect risk-perception, personal risk disposition, and their interactions with reference-setting and option framing. It remains, however, completely based on the findings in the Kowert and Hermann study.

![Trait-based Model of Decision Making Under Risk](source)

**Figure 3.2. Trait-based Model of Decision Making Under Risk**


**Operationalizing Presidential Risk Behavior**

To operationalize the trait-based model requires characterization of the presidents under examination. As detailed in Chapter Two, Kowert and Hermann assessed individual differences in risk-taking through three risk-propensity questionnaires and two personality inventories, the NEO-PI-R for FFM traits and facets, and the MBTI. Characterizing the Presidents for risk
perception (awareness) and risk-propensity (personal style) requires ratings for two FFM traits, seven FFM facets, and four MBTI dimensions. As depicted in the model, the relevant traits are further summarized in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1. Personality Traits Associated With Risk**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N1 (Anxiety)</td>
<td>Low is risk and frame invariant, prefers risk regardless of frame (more so in aggregate than when framed); high avoids risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N4 (Self-consciousness)</td>
<td>Low prefers risk regardless of frame (more so in aggregate than when framed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 (Excitement-seeking)</td>
<td>High prefers risk for gains...high correlation E5:O1/O4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O (Openness)</td>
<td>High prefers risk for gains, not for losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1 (Openness to Fantasy)</td>
<td>High prefers risk for gains, not for losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O4 (Openness to Action)</td>
<td>High points weakly to prospect theory; high prefers risk for gains, not for losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (Agreeableness)</td>
<td>High avoids risk in loss frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 (Altruism)</td>
<td>High avoids risk in loss frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6 (Deliberation)</td>
<td>High points weakly to prospect theory; low is risk and frame invariant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBTI-N (Intuitive)</td>
<td>Prefers risk for gains, not for losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBTI-F (Feeling)</td>
<td>Risk averse, particularly in loss frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBTI-P (Perception)</td>
<td>Risk and frame invariant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBTI-J (Judging)</td>
<td>Points weakly to prospect theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ratings in Table 3.1 are used to code the four ways people respond to risk:

1. Both risk and frame invariant (low C6, low N1, MBTI-P)
2. Risk-averse, especially when facing a loss (high A/A3, MBTI-F)
3. Risk-acceptant, primarily for gain (high O/O1/O4/E5, MBTI-N...low N4 frame invariant)
4. As prospect theory predicts, risk-acceptant to avoid a loss and risk averse to gains (high C6, high O4, MBTI-J)

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6 Ibid., 624-625.
Awareness Stage and Personal Style

Beginning in the Awareness Stage, presidents are classified for risk-perception as either Anxious and Sensitive or Calm and Insensitive. Calm and Insensitive presidents are risk-imperceptive or ignorant, scoring low on the Deliberation (C6) facet of the Conscientiousness (C) trait and the Anxiety (N1) facet of the Neuroticism (N) trait, and are Perceivers (MBTI-P). Low deliberation presents as quick decision-making, with haste and rashness at the extreme. Low anxiety presents as a relaxed and calm demeanor, extending at the extreme to obliviousness to threat. These individuals are insensitive to or ignorant of risk, so their decisions may unwittingly incur risk. Combined with overly hasty decisions, advisors may have limited ability to intervene. Perceivers present their preference for spontaneity and like to keep their options and decisions open. Their risk behavior is neither predictably risk-accepting nor risk-averse.

Conversely, Anxious and Sensitive presidents are risk-perceptive and thus begin the trait-based model. These individuals score high on Deliberation (C6) and Anxiety (N1) and are Judgers (MBTI-J). High deliberation scores imply thoughtful reflection, extending to indecisiveness at the extreme. High anxiety scores present as wariness and vigilance, with fear and anxiousness at the extreme. Judgers like schedules and structure, dislike uncertainty and ambiguity, and prefer decisions settled, so present well for trait-based decision model.

Once risk-perception/awareness is established, presidents are further classified by their personal style. Agreeable (A)/Altruists (A3) are straightforward, trusting, compliant, modest, and tender-minded. They are risk-avoidant, perhaps because they “fear the harm that could come to others through their own risky behavior.” High altruism presents as generosity, extending to selflessness. As Feelers (MBTI-F), their preferred judging function, or means of decision-making, favors empathy, seeking balance, consensus, and harmony. These individuals do not

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7 Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa, Jr., “Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator From the Perspective of the Five-Factor Model of Personality,” Journal of Personality, 57 (1989), 30-31. Costa and McCrae find MBTI “assertions about the dominance of particular preferences in inner and outer life are based solely on Jungian theory and on the use of the JP and EI scales to determine the dominant function, and are not supported by data. There is no good evidence that the JP scale has any bearing at all on the relative importance of thinking or perceiving. However, MBTI users might wish to reconceptualize the JP scale as an index of preference for structured versus spontaneous living, this view IS supported by the item content and the external correlates.”

8 Kowert and Hermann, “Who Takes Risks?” 617-625. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator

9 Ibid., 617-625. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator

10 Ibid., 619. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator
behave according to prospect theory, but instead are generally risk-averse, particularly so when facing a loss, and will choose a certain small loss to avoid the risk of a potentially greater loss.¹¹

The other personal style is the Sensation-Seeker. Overall high Openness (O), plus high Openness to Fantasy (O₁) and Action (O₄) and high Intuiting (MBTI-N) make these individuals high in conceptual complexity. The Excitement-Seeking (E₅) facet correlates strongly with O₁ and O₄, so is included as well. Openness to fantasy implies imaginative, mischievous thinking, while openness to action implies adventurousness and versatility in deed. Intuiters have high cognitive need for information, and tend to trust more abstract and theoretical information that can be understood by association with other, broader contextual information. Again, out of line with prospect theory, these individuals prefer risk more strongly when framed in the domain of gains, but not also in the domain of losses.¹²

No traits strongly predict behavior in accordance with prospect theory, but the facets of high Openness to Action (O₄) and Deliberation (C₆) and Judging (MBTI-J) offer weak support. Again, Judgers are deliberate and structured in decision-making, so are likely to weigh risks among options and be affected by reference dependence and framing effects. This logically fits prospect theory as well as the rest of the trait-based decision model.¹³ In effect, presidents that don’t meet the other criteria fall back to prospect theory. As mentioned previously, part of Kowert and Hermann’s objection to prospect theory is the roughly one-third of cases that routinely fall outside its explanatory power. Whether the trait-based model describes that one-third of outliers or describes most cases better than does prospect theory should be revealed in the upcoming case studies. Covering four post-Cold War U.S. presidents, however, cannot hope to answer that conclusively.

Aspiration Level, Reference Dependence, and the Framing Effect

According to the trait-based model, aspiration levels and framing are not determinants of decisions for three of the four personality predispositions -- Calm/Insensitive Presidents ignore risks and framing, Agreeable Altruists avoid risk, and Sensation-Seekers accept risks. Only Deliberate Judgers are expected to vary according to prospect theory’s predictions. That said, for those who are risk aware, the reference dependence effect still matters, as risks must be weighed relative to some objective, be it the status quo or an aspirational level. If Kowert and Hermann

¹¹ Ibid., 623. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator
¹² Ibid., 617. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator
¹³ Ibid., 622. See also McCrae and Costa (1989) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs_Type_Indicator
are correct, though, the reference dependence effect and framing effects may not determine decision choices, per prospect theory, but rather personality predispositions (personal styles) may influence where references are set and how problems are framed.\textsuperscript{14}

For cases where presidential risk-perception and personal style does not predict decisions, the tenets of prospect theory are expected to apply. Reference dependence, the fact that individuals base their valuation of the risk of gains/losses against a personally-framed reference point, is perhaps the greatest contribution of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory. Understanding the personality traits that influence decisions under risk helps us determine how presidents are inclined to frame options and set their aspiration levels (reference points). In the case of presidents making disengagement decisions, the president’s aspiration level is likely to be a moving target. If and when there are clearly-stated objectives for military interventions, those objectives represent the reference point.\textsuperscript{15} Focusing on disengagement decisions is expected to simplify identification of the aspiration level. Since disengagement is not generally considered a legitimate immediate option once an intervention decision has been made, some condition has to change which makes disengagement a valid consideration. As conditions change, however, initial objectives may change, whether or not they are formally restated. And as President Truman showed in Korea, the president’s aspiration level may not be exactly what has been formally stated or perceived by others.

Of final interest from prospect theory is the tendency of decision makers to renormalize gains quickly into an updated reference point, and more interestingly, the tendency to then view any subsequent loss of those gains as an absolute loss. Even in a textbook military intervention, assuming clear, concrete, militarily-achievable objectives, when the military objective is achieved and military disengagement might appear the logical next step, gains are often renormalized and new military objectives (aspiration levels) are conceived, which are arguably less well-suited to military accomplishment. Through military doctrine, as well as roles and missions, the U.S. Department of Defense has displayed a can-do attitude and embraced these

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 620. As they differentiate between the two concepts, the reference dependence effect is “the tendency of individuals to take risks to avoid losses but to avoid risks to make comparable gains” and the framing effect is “the tendency of individuals to be more risk acceptant when a given risk is put in terms of what potentially will be lost rather than of what potentially will be gained.”

\textsuperscript{15} Boettcher is among the few who endeavor to examine aspiration levels instead of just the status quo. Documented conversations and presidential decision memos are among the sources to establish a President’s personal thinking on goals and framing, beyond officially-stated intervention objectives. See also Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, \textit{Balancing Risk: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery}, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
objectives in military operations other than war (MOOTW), security, stabilization, and transition operations (SSTO), armed humanitarian operations, peace-making, peace-keeping, and myriad other euphemisms for non-major combat operations.

Testing the Trait-Based Model of Decision Under Risk

In conducting a structured, focused comparative case study, specifying the data to be collected provides the structure. Just as profiles are built based on validated, generalizable, repeatable personality inventories, so does generating general questions for application to each case help to provide structure and maintain focus. Additionally, and more importantly for the study’s validity, only by asking the same or similar questions for each case can the results be compared, synthesized, and analyzed. In focusing on a specific foreign policy decision, namely that of military disengagement, the hypotheses and structured questions used in this study are tailored to more specifically address the disengagement decision.

Kowert and Hermann did not explicitly define hypotheses nor generate questions for testing their trait-based model. They showed quantitatively that certain personality traits correlate to risk perception and risk propensities (personal styles). The five factor model of personality used for coding the presidents is based on empirical data, so the two combined should translate well to conducting a structured, focused comparative case study with process tracing.

The awareness stage of the model posits that certain personality traits affect a president’s perception of the risks involved in a decision option and the inclusion of that risk in the president’s decision calculus. Two hypotheses arise for risk perception:

H1: Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant.
H2: Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style.

For risk-aware presidents, personal style acts as an intervening variable which determines the president’s risk propensity and additionally influences how aspiration levels are set and how options are framed. Risk disposition presents three further hypotheses:

H2a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents are risk-averse, particularly when disengagement is framed as a loss.

H2b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain.
H2c: Open Deliberate Judging presidents are risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain (IAW prospect theory).

In the framing stage of the trait-based model, the president is predisposed by personal style to frame options in certain ways relative to aspiration levels. This adds rigor to the glaring gap in prospect theory, namely the lack of standards for assessing the decision-maker’s reference point. Kahneman and Tversky acknowledged that decision frames are based on, “the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice,” and are not purely objective, but rather are shaped by the, “norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker.” This dissertation maintains Boettcher’s approach to assessing aspiration level as a situational factor that represents “the minimum level goals that the president hopes to achieve or surpass...(and) may include an immediate goal, imperatives that constrain the means available for achieving the immediate goal, and other interests that reinforce the president’s commitment to achieving or surpassing his immediate goal.”

This focuses on the process of decision-making, and thus is useful for the process-tracing methodology as it presents real-world-testable hypotheses. This study assesses the president’s decision frame and aspiration level, from records of internal White House meetings, personal diaries where available, and indirectly through documented accounts of cabinet or other inner-circle advisors, and finally from biographers’ accounts. Aspiration levels and framing suggest three additional hypotheses:

H3a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents set unusually low aspiration levels.
H3b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels.
H4: The president’s aspiration level (acting as a situational constraint) is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving (or surpassing) the aspiration level in a particular case.

Under the structured, comparative case study method, cases are analyzed according to a set of common general questions. The following questions are intended to guide and focus the analysis of each case in order to find evidence to support or contradict the above hypotheses. Further, the questions drive a common organization and flow of the analyses according to the flow of the trait-based model of decision under risk. Questions are thus divided so as to

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18 Boettcher, Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy, 39. Emphasis in original.
determine the president’s risk awareness, risk propensity and aspiration level, framing of
disengagement, and the decision process. The questions below were developed prior to field
research, with refinements as hypotheses became clearer.

Risk Awareness
- What are the options under consideration? How are costs/benefits and estimates of
  success/failure discussed? How are options discussed, compared, evaluated?
  -- Identify options being examined by the president by examining memoranda, position papers,
  minutes of meetings, secondary sources, memoirs
- Does the president explicitly discuss risks of options under consideration? Does the president
  express reticence over adverse outcomes, inadequate information, flawed estimates, or
  incomplete analysis?
  -- Look for discussions of opportunity gains, savings, freeing up forces, vice failure, defeat,
  loss, sunk costs

Risk Propensity and Aspiration
- What is the president’s aspiration level (desired end state) that describes acceptable/desirable
  outcomes in a case? Is it militarily achievable? Does disengagement fit within it?
  -- Look for discussions of military objectives, overall goals, desires, hopes, needs,
  requirements, termination/transition criteria, and exit strategy in this case
- Is the aspiration level viewed as maintenance of the status quo or does it encompass a positive
  change from the current state of affairs? Are aspirations low or high? How firmly is the
  aspiration level held: are outcomes below the reference point viewed as undesirable or
  unacceptable?
  -- Look for description of commitment to goals, flexibility of objectives if the situation
  changes, discussion of failures as unacceptable, evidence of “win at any cost” mentality

Framing of Disengagement
- Does the president view/frame disengagement positively or negatively?
  -- Look for discussions of opportunity gains, savings, freeing up forces, vice failure, defeat,
  loss, sunk costs

Decision
- Is an explicit disengagement decision made? Do explicit considerations of relative risk enter
  into the process? Was decision consistent with the trait-based model of decision under risk?
- If disengagement is not chosen, what are the risk characteristics of the option selected relative
to disengagement? Are outcomes more numerous and extremely divergent? Does the
  president perceive that extreme negative outcomes are at least possible? Does the president
  recognize that estimates are flawed and may in fact be incorrect?
  -- Is the option selected viewed as “risky” or “cautious” or some similar language? Are there
  comparisons to disengagement?
  -- Does the president avoid making a decision? Does he encourage his staff to develop more
  options, provide better information and/or reevaluate the aspiration level?
-- Are options evaluated relative to the president’s aspiration level?
-- Are options rejected out of hand because the president perceives that they are incapable of achieving or surpassing the aspiration level?
-- Is there a recognizable pattern in the manner the president processes information regarding the options?

Coding the Presidents

This study focuses on what makes disengagement decisions difficult for presidents. The trait-based model of decision under risk aims to facilitate making distinctions between presidents as a means of explaining differing risk propensities. Fully testing the framework is not the object of this study. For this dissertation, it is only necessary to have assessments of the four post-Cold War presidents: George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. While these four presidents clearly have personality differences, they were not chosen because, nor is it expected that they align with, each of Kowert and Hermann’s four risk-decision types. Even if all four presidents were to match one personality type, if the trait-based model provides insight into their disengagement decision-making under risk, the framework will have served its purpose.

Presidential personality trait, facet, and dimension measures are taken to the greatest extent possible from secondary sources. Five Factor Model trait and facet measures for President George H. W. Bush, President Clinton, and President George W. Bush come from a single, comprehensive source. In *Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: Assessing the U.S. Presidents Using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory*, Steven Rubenzer and Thomas Faschingbauer collected expert ratings on each of the forty-three Presidents up to the time of their study.¹⁹ No equivalent data exists for President Obama, so his FFM profile was compiled by the author using a similar, freely-available version of the NEO-PI-R questionnaire.²⁰

For Myers-Briggs Type Index (MBTI) dimensions, a variety of different typings exist for each of the four Presidents. Authoritative MBTI types for presidents are challenging to discern.

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²⁰ Based on various public biographies of President Obama, the author completed an online emulation of the NEO PI-R called the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Representation of the NEO PI-R™. Due to copyright issues, the IPIP cannot claim equivalence to the NEO PI-R, but uses a similar 120- or 300-question survey on the same 5-point Likert scale, only available free in the public domain. Available at http://www.personalitytest.net/ipip/ipipneo300.htm
For obvious political reasons, presidents and presidential candidates typically do not submit to such psychological/personality profiles. Neither do close advisors nor family members often provide peer-ratings, for the same reasons. Professional academic literature is limited as well, due to the questionable scientific foundation of the MBTI. However, as testimony to MBTI’s popularity in organizational and human-resources circles, there are numerous other sources for interpretation, as depicted in Fig 3.3 below. As presidents are singularly identifiable by the public at large, they are common targets for MBTI typing. For the purposes of this study, the starting point is the Keirsey Temperament Sorter and companion book, *Please Understand Me II*.\(^{21}\) Keirsey’s ratings are compared with other sources and consensus is sought where possible, at least for the relevant subscales. Where there is no clear consensus of opinion, examples in foreign policy decision making will be used to establish the likely rating.

Additional supporting information will be pulled from other related personality profiles of the Presidents of interest. This may include, but not be limited to, the previously-mentioned presidential leadership personality assessment at a distance (PAD) data collected by Margaret Hermann and Thomas Preston.\(^{22}\) A number of presidential biographies, including psychobiographies, are used to offer additional supporting examples for FFM and MBTI ratings.

**Five Factor Model Personality Traits and Facets**

The Five Factor Model is a comprehensive, empirical, data-driven research finding. Adding to the relevant MBTI facets, other trait/facet scores for the trait-based model are drawn primarily from a data set collected by Rubenzer and Faschingbauer in *Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents*.\(^{23}\) Rubenzer and Faschingbauer issued NEO-PI-R surveys geared for completion by third party observers to specialist raters (presidential biographers or other presidential experts), and a similar form to a group of generalist raters (not specialists in a specific president, but rather the presidency). Generally, presidents were rated by either three or four raters (low 1, high 13, average 4.1) to

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\(^{23}\) Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, *Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House*.  

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provide the most valid data.\textsuperscript{24} Table 3.2 below summarizes the relevant scores for the three presidents rated by Rubenzer and Faschingbauer. Unfortunately, the team has not conducted a similar study of President Obama. Additionally, President G. H. W. Bush was rated by only one specialist rater who admitted to holding an unfavorable opinion of him. Further, President George W. Bush was rated only by Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, not by any specialist or generalist raters. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer discounted their assessments and comparisons of both Bushes accordingly. For the purpose of this study, the ratings are accepted as the best available data, but case study evidence is weighed with consideration of potential rater bias. Similarly, while companion scores for President Obama do not exist from the same study, other relative evaluations of President Obama on relevant traits/facets (e.g. “very deliberate”) are included in the table where available.

Table 3.2. Five Factor Model Trait Scores for Trait-based Model

\textit{Source: Dr. Steven J. Rubenzer}\textsuperscript{25}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>N1 (Anxiety)</th>
<th>E5 (Excitement Seeking)</th>
<th>O (Openness)</th>
<th>O1 (Openness to Fantasy)</th>
<th>O4 (Openness to Action)</th>
<th>C6 (Deliberation)</th>
<th>A3 (Altruism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G. H. W. Bush</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>56.6*</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>52.6**</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>70.9!!</td>
<td>59.1**</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>59.3!</td>
<td>36.2**</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. W. Bush</td>
<td>35.6**</td>
<td>60.9**</td>
<td>14.3!!</td>
<td>30.9!</td>
<td>27.7!</td>
<td>24.4!!</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean (All Presidents) | 48.7 | 51.8 | 43.9 | 46.5 | 43.2 | 48.9 | 46.9 |
| Standard Deviation   | 10.6 | 9.2  | 12.5 | 8.7  | 8.9  | 13   | 10.1 |
| Min/Max               | 24.5/72.4 | 35.3/71.7 | 14.3/73.7 | 26.5/61.5 | 26.5/61.5 | 21.1/71.3 | 20.5/69.1 |

* = .5 SD (leans high/low); ** = 1 SD (high/low); ! = 1.5 SD (very high/low); !! = 2 SD (extremely high/low)

In describing distinctions between Presidents, specific adjectives are used to give relative weight. A score at or near the mean is \textit{average}. Half a standard deviation or more is \textit{leans}

\textsuperscript{24} Paul T. Costa, Jr. and Robert R. McCrae, \textit{NEO PI-R Professional Manual}, (Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources, 1992), 48. According to the manual, four is the optimal number of raters; “there are diminishing returns for aggregating more raters.”

\textsuperscript{25} Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, “FFM Ratings for the Presidents,” 2013. Dr. Rubenzer provided a spreadsheet of compiled FFM ratings for all presidents through George W. Bush.
high/low. One standard deviation is high/low. One-and-a-half standard deviations is very high/low. Two standard deviations is extremely high/low.

From Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s assessment, President George H. W. Bush’s personality is fairly moderate compared to other U.S. Presidents.26 Only on Openness to Action (O4) does he vary significantly from the mean, scoring just over one standard deviation (high) above the mean. This trait is reflected in President Bush’s foreign policy decisions to intervene militarily in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia. While perhaps surprising to some who recall the media representation of Bush as a wimp, or a staid northeastern plutocrat, the senior Bush leans high on the Extraversion trait of Excitement-Seeking (E5). This is supported by the empirical correlation between Excitement-Seeking (E5) and Openness traits/facets (O, O1, O4), but also anecdotally in Bush as the Navy’s youngest combat pilot in World War II, the self-made millionaire who eschewed his father’s coattails to become a wildcatter in the oilfields of Midland, Texas, and continuing today in the former president’s decennial birthday skydives.27 Bush’s Deliberation (C6) and Altruism (A3) scores are right at the mean for presidents. Average Deliberation fits the balance of a president known for prudence but open to action. Average Altruism might at first seem low considering Bush’s lifelong charitable works culminating in recent disaster relief efforts with President Clinton, but makes sense as those efforts are likely more attributable to the sense of duty instilled by George H. W. Bush’s parents, Prescott and Dorothy Bush.28

As much as George H. W. Bush’s personality fell right in the mean of presidents, President Bill Clinton stood out on the personality facets of interest to risk. Only on Altruism (A3), Openness to Fantasy/Imagination (O1), and Anxiousness (N1) is he very near the mean. Clinton is extremely high on Excitement-Seeking (E5), more than two standard deviations above the mean, and second only to Theodore Roosevelt overall. When thinking of reckless, foolhardy behavior, most minds skip straight to Clinton’s widely-publicized history of sexual indiscretions, but in terms of foreign policy, excitement-seeking is evidenced in his grandiose global aspirations. The reckless quest for novelty correlates to Openness to Action (O4), where Clinton

26 Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, Personality, Character, and Leadership In The White House, Kindle Edition, 202-203. Authors caution that George H. W. Bush’s scores are based on only two raters who did not always agree and expressed very low levels of respect for their subject relative to another group of experts.
28 Naftali, George H. W. Bush.
again approaches two standard deviations above the mean and is very near the highest score among all presidents. President Clinton’s national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement reflects this extreme openness to involvement around the world. Clinton’s Deliberation (C6) score leans low in the Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study, very nearly one standard deviation below the norm. This fits Clinton’s frenetic pace and impatience with the pace of the bureaucracy, but is at odds with Clinton’s reputation for indecisiveness.

“Like father, like son” could hardly be less true than in comparing President George W. Bush to his father in terms of risk profiles. George W. Bush only hovers near the presidential mean on Altruism (A3). In every other risk-relevant trait except one, he is significantly low. He is very low on Anxiousness (N1), very low on Openness to Ideas (O1), and extremely low on Openness (O), Openness to Action (O4), and Deliberation (C6). His sole high score is on Excitement-Seeking (E5), but considering this trait’s normal correlation to Openness (O/O1/O4), in Bush’s case his E5 appears to be more about personal, physical risk (e.g., fighter pilot, alcoholic) than foreign policy decision-making. Bush’s low Anxiousness (N1) and extremely low Deliberation (C6) make him a prime candidate for risk-invariance. Combined with his extremely low Openness (O/O4), we see not only a decisive President, but a non-reflective one as well. Indeed, evidence shows his advisors did little to question Bush’s thinking or get him to slow down to fully consider consequences. Press Secretary Scott McClellan notes, “once Bush set a course of action, it was rarely questioned. That is what Bush expected and made known to his top advisors....there would be no hand-wringing, no second-guessing of the policy once it was decided and set in motion.”30 One author compares Bush to his predecessor Clinton using philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s familiar fox and hedgehog metaphor: “Bush, whose hedgehog-like mind clears away contradiction and nuance like so much underbrush on his Texas ranch, has the instincts of an absolutist. He believes in a hierarchy of values and gravitates naturally to simplicity – what’s right is right and what’s wrong is wrong.”31

29 Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, *Personality, Character, and Leadership In The White House*, Kindle Edition, 301. Authors caution that George W. Bush’s scores depart from their methodology. No Bush biographers returned their questionnaires, so the authors read biographies and then rated him. Dr. Aubrey Immelman, not a Bush expert, provided ratings at the last minute as well.


Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s study only compiled FFM data for the Presidents through George W. Bush. Neither has completed a profile on President Barack Obama to date. As a result, President Obama’s profile was derived by the author from biographies and other expert personality portraits. Obama’s two autobiographies provide a start on the portrait, but as they clearly were campaign-motivated, other sources were required and are detailed below. FFM scores are thus not directly comparable to Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s, so adjectives that are more general are used. Table 3.3, below details the assembled data.

Table 3.3. Five Factor Model Trait Scores for President Barack Obama

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rater</th>
<th>N1 (Anxiety)</th>
<th>E5 (Excitement Seeking)</th>
<th>O (Openness)</th>
<th>O1 (Openness to Fantasy)</th>
<th>O4 (Openness to Action)</th>
<th>C6 (Deliberation)</th>
<th>A (Agreeableness)</th>
<th>A3 (Altruism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immelman</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barondes</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Avg</td>
<td>Avg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achenbach</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Brown IPIP-Long</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Brown IPIP-Short</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall35</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: In IPIP, 0-30 is Low, 31-69 is Average, and 70-100 is High compared to 41-60 year-old US males.

According to Dr. Aubrey Immelman, “the variable that most distinguishes Obama from the two previous presidents is conscientiousness,” continuing to characterize him as “the type

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32 Based on various public biographies of President Obama, the author completed an online emulation of the NEO PI-R called the International Personality Item Pool Representation of the NEO PI-R™.
34 The IPIP tool classifies individuals as scoring low (lowest 30% of population of similar age and sex), average (middle 40%) or high (highest 30%) for a trait. The numerical score is reported as a percentile estimate.
35 Scores for the other presidents, used in previous tables, drawn from Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, were relative to American males in his age group. Overall ratings for Obama are therefore subjectively weighted to account for findings from the Rubenzer and Faschingbauer study. Notably, the presidential mean is significantly lower than the average American on Agreeableness (A) and Openness (O), and significantly higher on Conscientiousness (C). Agreeableness was particularly noteworthy, as no president scored above the 82nd percentile of Americans in general.
who could, say, run a masterfully efficient political campaign, exercise daily, even while on the road, and make methodical decisions.”Therefore, C and C6 should at least be markedly higher than Clinton and G. W. Bush, which may not mean much considering both rated very low on Deliberation (C6). In a student-conducted study Immelman sponsored, Obama’s personality type, labeled by the researchers as a confident conciliator, also includes potential risk-related traits of Self-Assuredness (-N4, risk acceptant regardless of frame), Agreeableness (A, MBTI-F), and a preference for mediation and compromise (+A4, MBTI-F) as conflict resolution strategies. With his focus on clinical diagnostic terminology, Immelman’s typology includes Winter’s motive imagery, classifying confident conciliators as primarily driven by need for achievement (+C4), with “substantial affiliation needs and a modest need for power.” Additionally, the researchers expect Obama to be “more pragmatic (-O5, MBTI-N) than ideological, more task-than relationship-oriented, likely to act as a strong advocate in his administration, using his powers of persuasion to advance his policy vision.” More than three years into Obama’s presidency, Immelman’s personal overall assessment had not changed, reaffirming Obama as “a leader with a healthy dose of adaptive narcissism (-N4) and a stronger accommodating (+A4) tendency than most presidents.” In terms of risk propensity, the low Self-Consciousness (N4) indicates risk acceptance, yet his relatively high tendency toward overall Agreeableness (A) would suggest a level of risk aversion. The conflict between these traits plays out in President Obama’s proclivity to remain somewhat aloof and above the fray.

Stephen Wayne’s book, *Personality and Politics: Obama For and Against Himself*, explains the key decisions of the Obama presidency in light of his key personality traits. Wayne finds Obama to be: extremely self-disciplined (++C5) and self-restrained (-N5); very competitive

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36 Aubrey Immelman, *What Makes President Obama Successful*. Accessed 19 Sept 2012. Available at: http://www.oprah.com/money/What-Makes-President-Barack-Obama-Successful#ixzz275TNEP1p. Dr. Immelman, PhD, Associate Professor of Psychology at the College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University in Minnesota, also served as the only third-party expert evaluator for President George W. Bush in Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s study.


38 Ibid.

extremely ambitious and confident (approaching vanity and arrogance); driven by a need for consensus; pragmatic and frustrated by Washington ideologues, “with whom he finds it difficult to reason;” risk-averse, cautious, and deliberate; and with a decision model of rigor, logic, and rationality (MBTI-T), “so much so that he has explicitly stated that decisions should be made based on logic and evidence, not emotions.”

Recalling George W. Bush’s boast, “I’m not a textbook player, I’m a gut player,” Joel Achenbach quoted Wayne in a Washington Post article, saying, President Obama is “not an instinctive decision-maker as Bush was. He doesn’t go with his gut, he thinks with his head...” Achenbach went on to assess Obama as almost defiantly deliberative and methodical. Describing Obama’s executive style, Achenbach says he goes into Spock mode, saying, “You’ve got to make decisions based on information and not emotions.”

Finally, Achenbach cites an Obama interview in U.S. News & World Report in which Obama claimed he is not afraid of doubt and is comfortable with uncertainty.

Psychologist Samuel Barondes finds Obama’s overall Openness is high, but his overall Extraversion lower than most successful politicians. Indeed, Obama’s debate coach in the 2008 campaign, himself a politician, said of Obama, “he is a classic loner...very self-contained. He is not needy.” Former Obama aide Neera Tanden, now president of the Center for American Progress, said in an interview with New York Magazine: “Obama doesn’t call anyone, and he’s not close to almost anyone. It’s stunning that he’s in politics, because he really doesn’t like people...My analogy is that it’s like becoming Bill Gates without liking computers.” Barondes feels Obama does not exude Altruism, but suggests it is at least average. He further scores Obama high on all facets of Conscientiousness. Barondes writes of Obama, “he ranks especially high on deliberation, examining all sides of a problem,”

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42 Ibid.
noting it brings “criticism that he is too professorial and indecisive.”\textsuperscript{45} Finally, “Obama’s Neuroticism [N] score is also notably low—so low that his advisers must sometimes prod him to express negative emotions.”\textsuperscript{46}

Five factor model traits and facets provide most of the profile needed to test the trait-based model. As the studies of both McCrae and Costa and Kowert and Hermann correlated the MBTI to the FFM, it is relevant to include MBTI profiles for the Presidents as well.

\textit{Meyers-Briggs Type Indicators (MBTI)}

As previously stated, the MBTI scales as used for this study are taken from the perspective of McCrae and Costa, which is to say they are treated as facet/subscale scores within the five-factor model (FFM). While MBTI is popular in industry, many question its scientific validity; therefore, McCrae and Costa (and subsequently Kowert and Hermann) only use MBTI scales as they correlate statistically to the more rigorous and scientifically-accepted FFM.\textsuperscript{47} As summarized in the trait-based model (Fig 3.3), McCrae and Costa found E/I correlated to peer-rated Extraversion, N/S with peer-rated Openness, F/T with peer-rated Agreeableness, and P/J with peer-rated Conscientiousness.\textsuperscript{48} So there is no mistaken impression that McCrae and Costa (or Kowert and Hermann, or this study) validates MBTI, it is important to note McCrae and Costa’s analysis,

“found no support for the typological theory the instrument (MBTI) is intended to embody…no evidence that preferences formed true dichotomies…and, contrary to hypothesis, the theoretically dominant function was no more clearly preferred than the auxiliary.”\textsuperscript{49}

The last finding is particularly important for those familiar with the MBTI who might otherwise question how perceiving and judging functions should be represented depending on whether the individual is an extravert or introvert. “According to MBTI theory, individuals classified as EJ or IP have a dominant judging function (i.e., T/F), whereas those who are classified as EP or IJ have a dominant perceiving function (S/N).”\textsuperscript{50} Specifically for introverts,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Barondes, \textit{Making Sense of People}, 27.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 141.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} McCrae, Robert and Paul Costa, Jr. “Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator From the Perspective of the Five-Factor Model of Personality.” \textit{Journal of Personality}, 57: 17-42. 1 March 1989. 17-18.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} McCrae and Costa, “Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,” 31. MBTI scales are ordered such that correlations are positive (i.e. E to Extraversion, N to Openness, F to Agreeableness, and J to Conscientiousness.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} McCrae and Costa, “Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,” 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} McCrae and Costa, “Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,” 32.
\end{itemize}
this drives some mental gymnastics to interpret differences between the person’s MBTI type preferences and the type they project to the outside world. In light of McCrae and Costa’s findings, and the fact the relevant MBTI scales are effectively treated as FFM facets, such gymnastics are not required; MBTI ratings of N, F, P, and J are taken as-is. In short, N implies Openness, F implies Agreeableness, P implies low Conscientiousness, and J (low P) implies Conscientiousness.

In assessing MBTI dimensions, the writings of Katharine Briggs and her daughter Isabel Briggs Myers, and those of their acolytes at The Myers-Briggs Foundation have to be the starting point. The Foundation’s website provides access to published books and articles as well as a bibliography of over 11,000 entries, including studies and research.51 Many contributions come from human resources organizations that profit from MBTI, which can be seen as a conflict to their objectivity. The Foundation is dedicated to carrying on Briggs’ and Myers’ work, and also to protecting their legacy. As Table 3.5 shows, there is seemingly no limit to the number of websites and blogs using the MBTI, nor to the variety of types they posit for incredibly well known people. The popularity of the system can be a liability when it leads to misinformation and confusion.

What the Myers & Briggs Foundation does not do is produce typings of celebrities such as US Presidents. As such, it becomes tempting to look to David Keirsey’s typology of Temperaments, mentioned previously, as the starting point for assessing the relevant MBTI dimensions. There is good reason for this, as Keirsey has written a number of books on the subject and has extensive web-based resources as well. Keirsey’s wide-ranging information on popular topics, including ratings of presidents, makes his temperament ratings common stock on the web. Many typing sites refer to Keirsey’s profiles, and some use them exclusively. However, as mentioned previously, while Keirsey uses the same sixteen types as Myers-Briggs, he is not affiliated with the foundation or its methods. Keirsey takes a different approach to the psychological basis of personality types, tying his typings and definitions to an ancient model of temperaments. This is neither good nor bad, but presents the potential for confusing the definitions of the MBTI dimensions associated to risk.52

51 The Myers & Briggs Foundation website. Available at http://www.myersbriggs.org/more%2Dabout%2Dpersonality%2Dtype/books%2Dand%2Darticles/
52 Ross Reinhold and Danielle Poirier, “Your MBTI, Best Fit Myers Briggs, and an Introduction to the 16 Myers Briggs Personality Types - Part 1,” Personality Pathways website. Available at
Table 3.4. Survey of MBTI Typings for Presidents G. H. W. Bush Through Obama

Source: Author-conducted internet search

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Keirsey Temperament</th>
<th>Personality Pathways</th>
<th>MBTI Truths</th>
<th>c2</th>
<th>Personality Desk</th>
<th>Type Logic</th>
<th>Typology Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G. H. W. Bush</td>
<td>ISFJ (Guardian-Protector)</td>
<td>ISFJ</td>
<td>ISFJ/ISTJ</td>
<td>ISTJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>INTJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (ENFP)</td>
<td>ESFP (Artisan-Performer)</td>
<td>ENFP</td>
<td>ENTJ</td>
<td>ENFP</td>
<td>ESFJ</td>
<td>ESFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. W. Bush</td>
<td>ESTP (Artisan-Promoter)</td>
<td>ESTJ</td>
<td>ENFJ</td>
<td>ESTP</td>
<td>ESTJ</td>
<td>ESTP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>ENFP (Idealist-Champion)</td>
<td>INFJ (chg fm INFJ)</td>
<td>ENFP</td>
<td>ENFJ</td>
<td>ENFJ</td>
<td>ENTJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President George H. W. Bush -- ISFJ

Raters typically agree that President George H. W. Bush is best rated as an ISFJ, or Guardian-Protector temperament in Keirsey’s typology. Guardians (SJ) are dependable and make stabilizing leaders. Judging their environment, they are humble, dutiful, cautious, and focused on traditions. They believe in law and order, respect for authority, and right and wrong as means to provide stability in a fast-paced world. Sensing (MBTI-S) types focus on concrete facts, and do not tend to read much into the information they receive. Experience speaks louder than words and theory. Feeling (MBTI-F) correlates to Agreeableness (A) overall and Altruism (A3) specifically. Judging (MBTI-J) correlates to Conscientiousness (C) and suggests a preference for order and structure. Some argue Bush is a Thinking type, favoring facts- and

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http://www.personalitypathways.com/type_inventory2.html. Reinhold warns that Keirsey’s four basic categories are the most helpful. Further one follows the temperament model, the more one diverges from MBTI.


rules-based decisions, perhaps mistaking his shyness for cold logic.55 Either way, the fact that he is a Judging type suggests risk awareness and makes him a potential candidate for situation-dependent risk variance (a prospect theory explanation).

Bush was often criticized for his patrician upbringing, but his father instilled a deep commitment to service which shows in his SJ tendency to serve in and preserve institutions.56 His mother strictly enforced humility and avoidance of patrician pretension. These influences combined to make a President who took the duties and responsibilities of the office very seriously and strived to serve and govern with humility. Added to this, he was a worrier and emotional, so his “key decisions were wise and considered.”57 Introverted Feelers tend to be reserved but warm-hearted; George H. W. Bush’s seriousness about his public persona led him to cultivate a stoic image. A fine example was President Bush stating, “I am not an emotional kind of guy” to explain his low-key response to the fall of the Berlin Wall.58

President Bill Clinton -- ENFP

President Bill Clinton is an interesting case for personality typing. Opinions are split, primarily on the question of whether Clinton prefers Sensing or Intuition. Keirsey considers him an ESFP, or Artisan-Performer temperament. Artisans (SP) generally are optimistic, live in the now, and pride themselves on being bold and spontaneous. They are troubleshooting leaders who trust their impulses and seek stimulation. Artisans have a devil-may-care attitude that may lead them to take actions others might consider risky or impossible. They can be impulsive, competitive, and irrationally optimistic. Finally, Artisans need freedom to do what they want, when they want, without constraints. Artisan-Performers are smooth and quick, like to live in the fast lane, and are incurably optimistic, preferring to avoid worries and troubles by ignoring them as long as possible.59 As a Feeling/Perceiver, Clinton potentially fits the profile of being either Risk Averse (F) or Risk and Frame Invariant (P). Keirsey’s profile of Clinton highlights

56 Naftali, George H. W. Bush, 151.
57 Ibid., 3-6.
58 Ibid., 85.
the Performer-Artisan’s delight in risk, focusing on impulsiveness and avoidance of worries and troubles by avoiding them as long as possible.60

What brings Keirsey’s typing of Clinton into question is the wide-spread rumor that Bill Clinton actually took an MBTI survey at some point and self-typed as an ENFP.61 The MBTI is intended to be a self-assessment of preferences, vice an empirical assessment of actions, so a self-assessment carries great weight. In Keirsey’s terms, ENFPs are Idealist-Champions. Idealists (NF) are enthusiastic, trust their intuition, prize meaningful relationships, and dream of attaining wisdom. They pride themselves on being loving, kindhearted, and authentic. Idealists are spiritual, focused on personal journeys and human potentials, and make inspirational leaders.62 Idealist-Champions (ENFP) consider intense emotional experiences vital to life and have great passion for novelty. They want to experience all the meaningful events and fascinating people in the world. They are exceptionally outgoing, are tireless talkers, and cannot wait to tell others of their experiences. Champions possess a strong drive to speak out on issues and events, and when combined with their enthusiasm, they are the most vivacious and inspiring of all the Keirsey’s temperaments.63 There is more consensus on Clinton’s preferences for Feeling (MBTI-F) and Perceiving (MBTI-P). Feeling correlates with Agreeableness (A), including the non-risk facet of Tender-Heartedness (A6). Clinton is the highest-scoring president in Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s study (over two standard deviations above the mean), no surprise for the President famous for his statement, “I feel your pain.”64 Intuiting (MBTI-N) and Perceiving both correlate to Openness, another Clinton hallmark. In terms of the trait-based model, being a Perceiver may suggest he is risk invariant. If instead he is risk-aware, the Sensing/Intuiting (S/N) preference is relevant when considering whether or not Clinton has a propensity for risk-acceptance. For the sake of this dissertation, President Clinton is believed to be an ENFP.

60 Ibid.
61 H. Rutledge, “Type and Politics: The Election of 2008,” APTi Bulletin of Psychological Type, 31(3), 2008, 36-37. The CEO of OKA (which offers MBTI training) indicates Bill Clinton has taken the MBTI and reports ENFP.
64 William J. Clinton, 27 March 1992. Response to AIDS activist Bob Rafsky at the Laura Belle nightclub in NYC.
President George W. Bush -- ESTP

As with President Clinton, there is a solid dissenting case against Keirsey’s characterization of George W. Bush. While there is no unanimous assessment for any of the four presidents examined here, in the younger Bush’s case the division is clearly between two camps. Keirsey and sites that follow his assessments characterize President George W. Bush as an ESTP, or Artisan-Promoter. Surveyed sources, including but not limited to those listed in Table 3.5, are split on whether he is best typed as ESTP or ESTJ. Most everyone agrees that George W. Bush is an Extrovert. It is similarly clear to most assessors that he prefers Sensing in information-gathering and Thinking in decision-making. The debate is over the Judging or Perceiving preference, which as an ESTx is the only factor important to the trait-based model’s initial assessment of risk-awareness. If Bush is seen as an ESTP, he shares the general Artisan (SP) traits discussed above for Clinton. The SP’s realistic optimism and spontaneity point toward an impulsive, bold, risk-taking tendency that is certainly appealing in explaining the younger Bush’s intervention decisions. In Keirsey’s typings, the differences between Clinton and Bush are effectively the differences between the Feeler and Thinker in terms of decision-making. Thinkers are “bold and daring at heart, and ever-optimistic that things will go their way; Promoters will take tremendous risks to get what they want, and seem exhilarated by walking close to the edge of disaster.”65 Keirsey offers an old Apache proverb as a motto for Promoters that may be perfect for Bush’s demonstrated willingness to go it alone: “He who travels fastest, travels alone.”66 With Clinton’s self-assessment as Intuiting (MBTI-N) vice Sensing, however, we have both functions (information gathering and decision-making) differing.

Sensing types are concrete, factual thinkers, but also enjoy living in the moment. The young George W. Bush was the play-hard, party-hard family clown, a cheerleader and fraternity president, and the stereotypical, excitement-seeking, playboy fighter pilot. His college major in history and his reported affinity for history books also point to an MBTI-S. On the Thinking (MBTI-T) point, speechwriter David Frum pointed out his acerbic, sometimes dismissive tone.

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66 Ibid.
Typical of the Thinking type, he is very skeptical of people and human nature generally, and shows heavy task emphasis as a harsh taskmaster.\(^6^7\)

This leaves us with the question of whether Bush is a Judger or Perceiver. In Keirsey’s terms, Judgers are schedulers and Perceivers are spontaneous. When one looks at George W. Bush in the White House, it is difficult not to see him as a Judging (MBTI-J) type. Judgers prefer structure and are decisive. Laura Bush’s first word to describe him is “disciplined.”\(^6^8\)

Bush is famously predictable in his personal schedule, down to the specific page of the Bible he reads on a given day every other year.\(^6^9\) In contrast, during the Clinton administration the White House reporters coined the term Clinton Standard Time as he was always late and, “acted as if he was genuinely unaware of how his schedule affected the rest of the world.”\(^7^0\)

If the dissenting assessments are correct and Bush is an ESTJ, George W. Bush shares his father’s Guardian (SJ) traits, using concrete language, being somewhat fatalistic about the past, presenting as stoic and focused on preserving heritage. Guardians are concerned, trust authority, and seek security, finding self-respect in their beneficence. They aspire to the ultimate judging powers of an executive.\(^7^1\) In this view the distinctions between father and son are in George W. Bush’s Extraversion and preference for Thinking over Feeling in decision-making.

In sum, Bush is seen as tradition-minded, valuing order, punctuality, and coordination.\(^7^2\) Perhaps the best self-assessment of Bush’s Judging preference is his famous, “I’m the decider, and I decide what is best.”\(^7^3\)

In deciding between the two camps, it is important to remember that assessments can be skewed by too narrow a focus. Examining only candidate or President Bush, or even more specifically only decisions in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, tends to introduce constraints and imperatives of the job which may overshadow personal preferences. Personality profiles need to include broad timeframes, particularly considering pre-political, pre-presidential experiences.

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\(^{6^9}\) Ibid.

\(^{7^0}\) John F. Harris, *The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2005), 54.


\(^{7^2}\) Boozer, *What Is The Personality of George W. Bush?*

before image management overwhelms true preferences. Taking this view, Bush’s rigidly predictable schedule as President is an edifice of the job, a staff function to keep him focused. Much as he came to realize his drinking “magnified aspects of my personality that probably don’t need to be larger than they are,” enforcing a rigid schedule repressed natural tendencies he would consider unbecoming of the office. His behaviors before age forty were more clearly those of an ESTP, very much in-the-moment. But Bush clearly took the presidency more seriously than he takes himself, making it easy for him to adopt Judging tendencies for himself and impose structure on his administration.

ESTPs are sometimes called the ultimate realists: “This heavily action-oriented type, more than any other type, lives for the moment.”74 Bush said exactly this about himself on the campaign trail, “I live in the moment.”75 “Their fearlessness in trying anything at least once, and their keen sense of competition, makes ESTPs doers, problem-solvers.”76 Again, as though reading from a script, Bush told the New York Times, “Now that we've gotten into the kind of psychoanalyst world of trying to figure me out, I think it's -- I say that sarcastically because, you know, this is not the way I am,” he said. “I mean, I'm a doer. I'm a problem-solver. I get things done.”77 From the same quote, we see Bush's lack of self-reflection actually reflects a certain self-understanding. Keirsey advises one expect “[n]o high-flown speculation…no deep meaning or introspection” from an ESTP.78

ESTPs are “blunt, straight-forward risk-takers…willing to plunge right into things and get their hands dirty. They live in the here-and-now, and place little importance on introspection or theory. They look at the facts of a situation, quickly decide what should be done, execute the action, and move on to the next thing.”79 Whether as President, Governor, or as a businessman, George W. Bush is a man of action, consistently interested in results, getting to the bottom line, and moving on. At no point in his various biographies or memoirs does he appear at all interested in reflection or introspection. Further, ESTPs are impatient with theory, and see little

76 Kroeger and Thuesen, Type Talk.
78 Keirsey, Please Understand Me II.
use for it in their quest to get things done. Another point of confusion is that intuition is an ESTP’s weakest trait. This can be confusing, because Bush boasts of being a gut player and a decider, making whatever decision feels right at the moment. Intuition (MBTI-N) in the MBTI sense is not the same as gut feeling. An ESTP like Bush falls back on concrete experiences and acts spontaneously, without extensive theorizing and analysis. For the sake of this dissertation, George W. Bush is considered an ESTP.

President Barack Obama -- INFJ

President Barack Obama is far more enigmatic. Seven sources delivered five separate typings. As the candidate of hope and change in 2008, some of this is attributable to people projecting their aspirations on to him as a blank canvas.

Keirsey types Obama as an ENFP, significant in Keirsey’s view because it would make Obama the first Idealist U.S. President. It is however, the same Idealist-Champion temperament as Bill Clinton’s self-typing. Significantly, most sources at least agree on the Idealist (NF) portion. As discussed for President Clinton, Idealists generally are enthusiastic, trust their intuition, and seek personal growth and development. Inspirational leaders, Idealists are giving, trusting, and focused on human potential. Idealists do not like confrontation and conflict, and dream of creating harmony.

Within the trait-based model of decision under risk, being an Intuiting Feeling Judger (xNFJ) places Obama as a potential for three of the four risk behavior types; all except risk invariant. The lack of consensus on Obama’s type again highlights the key problem with MBTI as it is popularly used; the surveys are usually meant as self-assessments of preferences, not third-party assessments based on interpretations of public behaviors. Politicians by definition have ample motivation to avoid self-typing and it is difficult if not impossible for outsiders to access unguarded behavior.

One of the more interesting of the debates is over Extraversion/Introversion. Though not a factor for risk perception or propensity, it is important in how MBTI assessors evaluate other functions. If nothing else, the debate shows again how subjective the MBTI can be when assessed at a distance. While the surveyed typing sites mostly agree that Obama is an Extrovert,
there are multiple individual assessments that suggest he in fact favors introversion. Ross Reinhold at PersonalityPathways changed his assessment from ENFJ to INFJ based on seeing an interview with Jodi Kantor, author of *The Obamas: An Intimate Portrait of the President and the First Lady* in which Ms. Kantor said President Obama is an introvert. It is easy to assume politicians, and especially Presidents, must be extroverts, but some introverts are easily able to deliver moving speeches to large groups like campaign rallies; their preference simply makes them view the room as more of a thing than a mass of individual people. In President Obama’s case, introversion may explain his dependence on teleprompters. Understanding what motivates people by way of insight is paramount for INFJs. “What people often first encounter with INFJs is their drive for closure and for the application of their ideas to people's concerns.”

Conscientious and committed to their firm values, they develop a clear vision about how best to serve the common good. INFJs are organized and decisive in implementing their vision.

Journalist, author, and presidential biographer Joe Klein has written personality portraits of both President Clinton and President Obama, which psychologist Samuel Barondes opines shows Obama to be lower on the Extraversion trait and many of its facets than most Presidents or indeed other successful politicians. Obama does not live for rope lines as did President Clinton and needs time alone to recharge after group meetings and events. Barondes further notes Obama as comparable in Openness to Clinton (both high), which supports an Intuiting (MBTI-N) rating. Klein and Barondes cite Obama’s self-contained, non-needy demeanor in rating him very low on Neuroticism, noting Maureen Dowd’s monikers of “President Cool” and “No Drama Obama.” Neuroticism does not correlate with MBTI dimensions, but Obama’s coolness might also show up as Agreeableness, which does correlate to Feeling (MBTI-F). Finally, Barondes claims Klein’s portrait shows President Obama to rate high on all six facets of Conscientiousness, and particularly high on deliberation, “bringing him praise for his

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thoughtfulness but criticism that he is too professorial and indecisive. Additional high Conscientiousness correlates to Judging (MBTI-J).

Questions remain regarding Obama’s decision-making preference. Most raters come down on Feeling over Thinking, but in reading ratings, it is often apparent that people are misinterpreting the words. On one hand, raters assume a progressive with a background in community organizing must be a Feeling type, and on the other hand, other raters clearly assume a Feeling style denies logic and somehow insults President Obama’s intelligence. The important distinctions are that Feeling is not emotion, nor is Thinking intelligence. It seems likely that Obama’s decision-making preference is Feeling, with his professed demand for rigor, logic, and rationality an expression of his Openness (O, O4), Deliberation (C6), and Judger’s (MBTI-J) need for structure. More to the point, though, his balance of Feeling and Thinking factors supports the statistical probability that he is relatively close to the mean of the trait. With that in mind, for the sake of this dissertation President Obama is evaluated as an INFJ.

These four presidents clarify why MBTI alone is dubious as an assessment tool for presidential decision-making. Clearly a better model is needed. It is good to recall that only a few MBTI traits are correlated to, and then are treated as, Five Factor Model personality traits and facets for use in the trait-based model.

Conclusions

The trait-based model of decision under risk offers to help explain presidential risk behavior for the roughly one-third of subjects who consistently do not behave as prospect theory predicts. Also, it may offer a means for determining where and how leaders set reference points and frame decision options, including disengagement. Finally, it may in fact offer a better explanation for cases currently thought to be explained by prospect theory.

Testing the model requires a combination of FFM trait and facet scores with relevant MBTI dimension scores acting as FFM facets. Operationalizing the model in this way combines the quantitative, statistical correlation of personality traits to risk behavior with the well-established qualitative, empirical evidence supporting the FFM. Presidents are coded using

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88 Barondes, Making Sense of People, 27.
89 Martin, Looking at Type. Summary available at http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics/thinking-or-feeling.asp
Using this method, President George H. W. Bush is expected to be risk-aware and either behave according to prospect theory or perhaps moderately risk-acceptant. President Bill Clinton might be risk and frame invariant, but has all the traits consistent with a risk-acceptant propensity. President George W. Bush is expected to be risk and frame invariant. Finally, President Obama is expected be risk-aware and behave according to prospect theory or perhaps with a moderate propensity for risk-acceptance. The rationale for these expectations is summarized in Table 3.5 below. These profiles will be used to test the model’s explanatory model in the cases that follow.

Table 3.5. Summary of Risk Traits for Presidents G. H. W. Bush Through Obama

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Risk/Frame Invariant</th>
<th>Risk Averse</th>
<th>Risk Acceptant</th>
<th>Prospect Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-C6</td>
<td>-N1</td>
<td>MBTI-P</td>
<td>+A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush ISFJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton ENFP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. W. Bush ESTP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama INFJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Four

Somalia

_The first, the supreme, the most-far-reaching act of judgment...is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature._

-- Carl von Clausewitz, _On War_

_The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A nation’s sense of idealism need not be at odds with its interests, nor does principle displace prudence._

-- President George H. W. Bush

Introduction and Overview

With the end of the Cold War, decades-long constraints seemed lifted, and an opportunity opened to define a new world order. President George H. W. Bush, a humble maintainer by temperament, led the world’s sole superpower. A concrete, here-and-now thinker, Bush’s instincts were never strategic.¹ If Bush lacked “the vision thing,” it thankfully muted the over-exuberance of others.² When Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev earlier used the term new world order to define the nature of the post-Cold era, his vision was much more broad and idealistic. Viewed in light of the Soviet Union’s growing internal crisis at the time, perhaps his vision was for the UN to contain the world’s remaining superpower.³ The “listening Bush” did not mind appearing detached while pondering his rather more realistic and restricted vision for the new world order that came to be defined by the 1990 build-up to the Gulf War.⁴ Both visions included superpower cooperation and collective security, a vision the UN happily endorsed.

For Bush’s part, “he believed that the United States had a national interest in world order, peace, and American leadership.”⁵ In Desert Storm, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, collective defense is permissible when a member state is attacked, but ever prudent, President

³ For the defining statement of Gorbachev’s vision, see his 7 December 1988 speech to the UN General Assembly. Available at http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index-34441.html
⁴ Naftali, _George H. W. Bush_, 68.
Bush preferred to preempt even the strictest legal interpretations if possible.\(^6\) He thus made a point of getting UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing force and building a multinational coalition. Similarly, Bush wanted formal approval from the US Congress and the Soviet Union, all for US credibility if nothing else. Critics of opening this door for UN bureaucratic meddling included, most vocally, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher believed seeking UN approval delayed justified action which increased suffering, but more importantly implied “sovereign states lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf.”\(^7\) For the UN’s part, if it could become accepted that UN approval was needed to use military force, the flip side of the coin might mean the UN could compel the US and other powerful states to use military force for other than individual national interests.

As the US waited a month for the UN Security Council to reach consensus on a resolution affirming the Gulf War cease-fire and setting conditions for its permanence, Saddam regrouped his military and focused them on crushing rebellions in the north and south. By the time UNSCR 687 passed on 3 April 1991, and before the Government of Iraq endorsed it on 6 April, the UN Security Council had to pass a special resolution on 5 April 1991 to protect the Kurds in the north (UNSCR 688). President Bush wished to remain disengaged, avoiding mission creep and a “slippery slope of being sucked into a civil war.”\(^8\) On 8 April 1991 at the European Community’s (EC) Luxembourg summit, the British and French proposed setting up UN safe havens in northern Iraq to facilitate the return of Iraqi Kurds to their homes. Forcibly setting refugee centers inside Iraq represented a significant violation of the UN Charter’s traditional doctrine against interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Ironically, Margaret Thatcher, though now out of office, prodded her successor to take action for the Kurds, effectively denying the sanctity of Iraqi sovereignty.\(^9\) Despite building pressure from the EC, the UN, and the US Congress and public, President Bush would not be rushed. In a 13 April 1991 speech, the President insisted he “did not want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq that has been going on for ages.”\(^10\) Within a few days, President Bush reversed


\(^{10}\) Ibid., 423-4. Cites Bush speech delivered to Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, 13 April 1991.
course, announced US military participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, and aligned it as best he could with existing US policy in Iraq.\textsuperscript{11} As a humanitarian operation, Provide Comfort was quite successful, ending on 24 July 1991.

The legacy of UNSCR 688 and Operation Provide Comfort would be seen the following year in Somalia. On 1 January 1992 a new UN Secretary General took the post. Boutros Boutros-Ghali entered with a much more expansive and activist vision of the UN’s role in the new world order. Having established a precedent in northern Iraq that a government’s repression of its own citizens constituted a threat to international peace and security, a higher bar was set for acceptable state behavior, and with it a lower bar for potential UN intervention. By the middle of 1992, President Bush was again persuaded to intervene in a situation with little US interest. By the end of 1992 he had been voted out of office, to be replaced by Bill Clinton, a more activist type with a deeper buy-in for a more expansive vision of the new world order. Indeed, Clinton’s campaign critique was rooted in the claim Bush had done too little, not too much.\textsuperscript{12} UN expansion and a change of US presidents brought differences not just in experience and party, but also personalities. As a result, an intended two-month humanitarian operation to provide security for distribution of food aid turned into a 16-month debacle.

The three cuts examined below trace the early steps of expanded military intervention, from an armed humanitarian operation to an unprecedented peacemaking and nation building operation. Somalia is interesting because it was an early post-Cold War challenge, it tests the disengagement hypotheses for a small-scale operation, and it offers the opportunity to compare and contrast two presidents. The first cut examines Bush’s decisions with respect to his stated intent to disengage before handing over the Presidency to Bill Clinton. Second is Clinton’s opportunity to disengage at the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in May 1993. The third cut is the final decision to disengage after the Blackhawk shootdown in September 1993. In all these timeframes, the president had a stated intent or a clear interest in disengaging military forces. The disengagement decision carried significant risks.

Each opportunity under examination follows the same structure. First, an overview provides necessary contextual information. Next, the relevant hypotheses are tested starting with

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 424.
the president’s risk awareness, then if risk propensity affects his aspiration level and his framing of disengagement, and the final decision.

The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM, now UNOSOM I) mission began on 24 April of 1992 as response to a humanitarian disaster spawned by the civil unrest of the Somali Civil War. Fighting had resulted in “nearly one million refugees and almost five million people threatened with hunger and disease.”\(^\text{13}\) The UN had brokered a ceasefire among the various factions fighting to fill the vacuum after the 1991 overthrow of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre’s ruling socialist Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) government. UNOSOM I, initiated with the passing of UNSCR 751, had the mandate to, “monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia; and to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres (sic) in the city and its immediate environs.”\(^\text{14}\) As warring factions continued to interfere with UNOSOM I efforts and the numbers threatened with famine exceeded 1.5 million, the size and scope of the mission expanded on 28 August 1992 (UNSCR 775) to allow protection of convoys and distribution centers throughout the country.\(^\text{15}\)

After humanitarian conditions continued to deteriorate in the face of ongoing fighting and disruption of deliveries, in November 1992 the US offered to lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The UN accepted, and on 3 December 1992, with UNSCR 794, the Security Council authorized the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), “to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”\(^\text{16}\) UNITAF consisted of representatives from 24 UN nations and was authorized to use “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts. UNITAF forces quickly had aid flowing by year's end. UNOSOM continued protecting deliveries and political efforts to end the war, which continued to garner more agreements from the warring factions. UNITAF was always intended to be a transition to an expanded UNOSOM II peacekeeping operation, which took place in May 1992. UNOSOM II carried over UNITAF’s authorization to use force if necessary to secure a


\(^{16}\) United Nations Department of Public Information, “UNOSOM I Mandate.”
stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; however, the mandate again expanded to include assistance in reconstructing Somalia’s economic, social, and political life.\textsuperscript{17} Put another way, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law, and order. However, while UNITAF had patrolled less than half of the country with 37,000 well-equipped troops, UNOSOM II’s 22,000 UN peacekeepers were to cover all of Somalia. By the time the original UNOSOM II charter ran out in October 1993, the humanitarian situation that initially motivated the intervention was resolved. By that same time, it having become clear to most that the UN had overreached its capabilities, and in the shadow of dramatic increases in violence against UN forces, the US and other key players announced their plans for withdrawal by early 1994. UNOSOM II was concluded and the remaining forces withdrawn in early March 1995.\textsuperscript{18}


US involvement in Somalia began in August 1992 with Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, the deployment of 10 US C-130 cargo aircraft and 400 personnel to support the UN-led relief effort, airlifting aid to remote areas and thereby reducing the need for convoys.\textsuperscript{19} In September, President Bush added four ships.\textsuperscript{20} Successful in its limited scope, the airlift was insufficient to overcome growing UN struggles with ongoing militia fighting and interference with aid deliveries. Major intervention began on 5 December 1992 with the US-led, UN-sanctioned UNITAF mission, Operation Restore Hope. The mandate was to use “all necessary means” to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{21} Inasmuch as UNITAF was chartered to provide conditions to enable delivery of humanitarian aid, the operation was successful in saving an estimated 100,000 lives.\textsuperscript{22}

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and many foreign service professionals around the world saw the fall of the Soviet Union and America’s emergence as the world’s sole superpower

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} United Nations Department of Public Information, “UNOSOM I Background.”
  \item \textsuperscript{18} http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 64.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Only the second time Chapter VII was used for an internal issue, the first being UNSCR 688 to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq.
\end{itemize}
as a double opportunity to both engage in new relations between nations and to use America’s overwhelming military power for multilateral, collective action.\textsuperscript{23} Boutros-Ghali wanted to expand the scope and power of the UN and the powers of the Secretary-General, and wanted to do it in Somalia. He clearly favored a large, multinational military operation, and when his special envoy instead recommended political reconciliation, he forced him out.\textsuperscript{24} As noted previously, Boutros-Ghali authorized actions in Somalia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Many, including former US ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick, considered UN intervention in a civil war to be contrary to the UN Charter. While Chapter VII authorizes the use of force, force is only to be considered “to maintain international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{25} Not only was the humanitarian crisis in Somalia not a threat to international peace and security, but the UN was also not supposed to intervene in internal affairs of nations. Civil wars are internal matters with which the international community should not interfere.\textsuperscript{26}

Nor was Somalia the only case open for consideration. Many believed the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia better warranted US and UN attention, both strategically and as a humanitarian crisis. Neither the Bush administration, nor the new UN Secretary-General agreed. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in particular were adamantly opposed to the US getting involved in the former Yugoslavia. On the UN side, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali held Africa as a high priority.\textsuperscript{27} Boutros-Ghali’s public pressure on the members of the Security Council was not lost on President Bush, specifically the accusation the Security Council members were, “fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.”\textsuperscript{28}

Where did President Bush fall on this spectrum? Bush was a strong supporter of dealing with international crises through multilateral action coordinated through the UN, and offered US

\textsuperscript{23} Kirkpatrick, \textit{Making War to Keep Peace}, 56.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 64-66.
\textsuperscript{26} Kirkpatrick, \textit{Making War to Keep Peace}, 67. See also UN Charter, Article 2.7.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 62.
help to the UN Secretary-General. Still, Bush had limits. His offer explicitly kept US forces under US command, separate from UN auspices; they would secure sea and air ports and roads in central and southern Somalia; they would stay three-to-four months until the UNOSOM force could take control; and finally, their objectives would be specific and strictly limited.

So why Somalia? “The United States had no significant national interest, economic or strategic, in Somalia and no history of significant involvement.” Interestingly, the Somali Civil War was to some degree an unintended consequence of the drawdown of the Cold War through the 1980s, which had weakened Somalia’s strategic importance and thus its outside support. To intervene, Bush had to go against his Joint Staff, who were extremely wary of Somalia as a military mission. Many Joint Staff papers paraphrased former journalist and current US ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone’s warning:

“There is little reason to believe that the bitter and long-standing clan rivalries that have turned Somalia into a particularly murderous African Lebanon will yield to outside intervention….Tragic as the situation is in Somalia … the dissolution of the Somali nation-state does not affect vital USG security interests. Accordingly, USG should think—and think again—before allowing itself to become bogged down in a quagmire without the promise of offsetting concomitant benefits.”

Indeed, no one, US nor UN, had undertaken an operation quite like UNITAF/RESTORE HOPE, “a situation that threatened no US security interests and met none of the historic criteria for intervention.” But President Bush “himself was deeply interested in international operations, collective action, and promoting cooperation in a UN context.” Dr. Margaret Hermann finds such unique situations with little to no precedent lessen constraints on decision makers and enables risk-taking. Desert Storm’s successes left Americans generally positive about collective action, the role and value of the UN, and the acceptable use of force.

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29 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 57.
30 Ibid., 68.
31 Ibid., 60.
34 Ibid., 8. Cites Message, Nairobi 243067, Smith Hempstone, US Ambassador to Kenya, to SecState, 30 Jul 92 (C-OADR, now unclassified), J-5 MEAF File. Not long afterward, Ambassador Hempstone paid a visit to Somalia. The State Department then instructed him not to visit the country again.
35 Ibid., 5.
36 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 68.
The American public experienced the so-called “CNN Effect” of round-the-clock broadcasts of powerful images of starving Somalis, with their accompanying tendency to create crisis without context, and generate emotion with few facts. Taken with the afterglow of recent successes in Iraq, the situation was favorable for Somali operations. There was pressure on Bush as leader of the most powerful country in the world to do something, both in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia. This pressure was magnified late in a presidential campaign year. In the presidential candidates’ debate on 11 October 1992, President Bush was asked, “Mr. President, how can you watch the killing in Bosnia and the ethnic cleansing, or the starvation and anarchy in Somalia, and not want to use America’s might, if not America’s military, to try to end that kind of suffering?” President Bush couched his view as based on lessons from Vietnam, stating “I am not going to commit US forces until I know what the mission is, until the military tell me that it can be completed, until I know how they can come out.” As is often the case, getting involved on a small scale, beginning with the minor involvement in airlifting aid in August, quickly increased the perceived urgency of greater intervention. These forces converged in November 1992, immediately in the wake of Bush’s reelection defeat, yet were enough to cause President Bush to offer a 90-120 day intervention less than 90 days from his departure. Of the two competing crises in Somalia and Yugoslavia, Somalia was seen as “doable;” a problem the US could solve, only the US could solve, and at a relatively low cost.

Ultimately, doing nothing was not seen as an option, and from President Bush’s perspective it was as good a place as any, and better than some, to start building the new world order and he decided the US should play a “leading, visible role.” “What is at stake is more than one small country,” Bush said. “It is a big idea, a world where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance.”

38 Ibid.
39 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 69.
40 Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order (New York: Cassell, 1999), 220. Also cited in Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 325.
41 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 7.
Table 4.1. Summary of Risk Traits for President George H. W. Bush

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Perception/Awareness</th>
<th>Calm/Insensitive / Perceiving</th>
<th>Risk Averse Agreeable/ Altruist/Feeling</th>
<th>Risk Acceptant Sensation-Seeking/Intuiting</th>
<th>Prospect Theory Open/Deliberate/Judging</th>
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<tr>
<td>Risk Propensity</td>
<td>Risk Invariant</td>
<td>Risk Averse Agreeable/ Altruist/Feeling</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant Sensation-Seeking/Intuiting</td>
<td>Prospect Theory Open/Deliberate/Judging</td>
</tr>
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<td>-C6 -N1 MBTI-P +A +A3 MBTI-F +O +O1 +O4 +E5 MBTI-N +C6 +O4 MBTI-J</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Bush ISFJ</td>
<td>47.7 51.1 J 44.4 45.7 F 40.9 48.7 52.6 56.6 S 47.7 52.6 J</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets</td>
<td>X X X X X X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* -.5 SD < Average (Avg) < +.5 SD; +.5 SD < Leans High (LH)< +1 SD; +1 SD < High < +1.5 SD

Figure 4.1. President George H. W. Bush’s Expected Risk Behavior
Risk Awareness

As noted Chapter Two, the three-stage model begins with an assessment of the president’s risk-perception or awareness. Based on President Bush’s personality profile (Chapter Three and Table 4.1. above), we should expect him to acknowledge the risks inherent in disengaging US forces and for those risks to influence his behavior. This discounts hypothesis H1 (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant) in favor of H2 (Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style). To test hypothesis H2 on risk-perception we need evidence of the discussion and consideration of disengagement risks.

George H. W. Bush’s personality profile does not build a clear expectation for his risk propensity. It is worth noting here that George H. W. Bush was rated by only two experts in Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s study, and the authors thus recommended caution with their interpretations. Those two specialist raters gave considerably lower appraisals of Bush’s job performance than did the generalists. Additionally, there were wide variances between the two specialist raters on traits of Openness (O) and Conscientiousness (C) as well as on the facets of Openness to Fantasy (O1) and Openness to Actions (O4). More raters might indicate greater or lesser risk-acceptance. As seen in Table 4.1, President Bush most closely matches the profile for risk variance, either disposed to risk-acceptance or following the predictions of prospect theory. His high Openness to Action (O4) suggests either possibility, and thus offers a good test. Is his personality disposition toward Excitement Seeking (E5) enough to bias him toward risk, independent of framing, per hypothesis H2b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain)? If risk propensity is not convincing, is prospect theory better, per hypothesis H2c (Open Deliberate Judging presidents are risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain)?

What is clear is that President Bush was risk-aware. He drew the line on risk at giving control of US troops and determination of their rules of engagement to the UN Secretary-General. Bush knew Boutros-Ghali saw Somalia as only the first of many potential military operations in African failed states. Giving control to Boutros-Ghali would cede authority to

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determine when the environment was secure enough for US troops to withdraw and UN troops to take over. The president repeatedly fended off efforts of the secretary-general and others to broaden the UNITAF mission, to include total disarmament of Somali clans. Bush knew disarmament was “neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations” and would lead to an open-ended commitment. Bush reiterated, in a letter to Boutros-Ghali, “the mission of the Coalition is limited and specific, to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping force.” President Bush unquestionably was risk-aware, negating hypothesis H1 and confirming H2.

Risk Propensity and Aspiration Level

As mentioned above, and as shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, President George H. W. Bush has some personality traits consistent with a Risk-Acceptant, Risk-Averse or Risk-Variant personal style, but does not perfectly match any of the three types. While Bush’s two expert raters agreed exactly on his E5 score, they varied widely on O, O1, and O4. Furthermore, the overall Openness trait does not correlate with Bush’s ISFJ MBTI type or his generally accepted traditional conservative image. It appears most likely he is an Excitement-Seeker (E5) with a particular Openness to Action (O4), perhaps providing a modest propensity toward risk-acceptance.

Alternatively, while President Bush is generally considered a Feeling type (ISFJ), he is rated very near the mean for presidents on the Five-Factor Model (FFM) Agreeableness (A) trait and Altruism (A3) facet specifically. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer noted the senior Bush’s emotionality is debated, which is also evident in variance between MBTI raters on whether he is a Feeler or Thinker. Recalling that in statistical studies MBTI dimensions are normal distributions vice bimodal dichotomies, Bush is likely very close to the middle between Feeling and Thinking in his preferred decision style. He is therefore unlikely to have a propensity toward risk aversion.

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44 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 73-74.
46 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 74.
47 Data received from Dr. Steve Rubenzer as used in Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, Personality, Character & Leadership in the White House.
Finally, to be characterized as Risk Variant, depending on the framing of the situation, Bush should be Deliberative (C6), Open to Action (O4), and a Judging type. While President George H. W. Bush is rated high (greater than one standard deviation above the mean) on Openness to Action (O4) and is decidedly a Judging type (MBTI-J) who seeks closure and likes things settled, he only scores very near the mean for Deliberation (C6). Judging as a trait correlates to Conscientiousness, as does Sensing. In Keirsey’s temperament terms, Sensing-Judging (SJ) types are Guardians, known for being meticulous and cautious, “better to go slowly, they say, and look before you leap.”

This is supported by an aide in the meeting to authorize Operation Just Cause in Panama, who noted Bush would, “exhaust every policy option almost to the point of humiliation.” All this taken together, and considering the empirical evidence from Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, it is difficult to imagine George H. W. Bush as only average on Deliberation, but we must recall Bush’s average rating is compared to all other US presidents. Still, as art imitates life, if asked for one quote that characterizes President Bush, many would respond with comedian Dana Carvey’s parody of Bush stating, “it wouldn’t be prudent at this juncture.”

His clear and repeated statements of concern that Restore Hope not be an open-ended operation are the clearest example of his judging preference.

Whether or not Bush is merely average on Deliberation, the trait-based model allows he may be expected to be risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain, that is according to prospect theory, per hypothesis H2c. If instead the trait-based model offers a better alternative explanation to prospect theory, Bush’s is more likely to be risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain, per hypothesis H2b. Accordingly, as a Sensation Seeker (though not strongly Intuiting), he would also be expected to set high or ambitious aspiration levels, per hypothesis H3b.

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50 Of note, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer report evidence that raters have more difficulty rating Conscientiousness facets and choose neutral responses more often than for other traits. For Conscientiousness, neutral results in a below average score compared to US norms. See Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, *Personality, Character & Leadership in the White House*, 306. Kindle Edition.

The president’s aspiration level can be inferred from official or unofficial operational objectives or minimum goals the president hopes to achieve. To evaluate hypothesis H4, that the president’s aspiration level, acting as a situational constraint, is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving or surpassing the aspiration level in a particular case, requires documentary evidence of President Bush’s desired end state and how disengagement fit into his objectives. This requires evidence of discussions pertaining to desired/acceptable outcomes for this time. Relevant documents need to address Bush’s goals, desires, hopes, needs, and/or requirements for the operation overall and seeks evidence of positive/negative framing of disengagement (win/lose, gains/losses, pros/cons, etc).

President Bush’s aspiration level for Operation RESTORE HOPE was to, “stabilize the military situation to the extent necessary to deliver relief supplies.”\(^{52}\) His aspiration for disengagement was relatively explicit, whether taken to be before his successor’s inauguration - 20 Jan 1993; 90-120 days from the offer - early Feb/Mar 1993; or 90-120 days from initiation - early Mar/Apr 1993. Despite the calendar disconnect, there is ample evidence Bush wanted the operation’s US military involvement to end before he left office. Bush’s operational objective was limited, reasonable, and achievable, but the means available for achieving his goal were so severely constrained by time as to make the overall aspiration ambitious to the point of absurdity. Indeed by the time UN SCR 794 was approved on 5 December 1992, President Bush had only 46 days remaining in his presidency. Getting forces in, having the desired effect, and merely beginning a transition to a UN-led force in such a short time would certainly still be ambitious, but perhaps doable, if indicative of how truly limited in scope and strictly transitional in nature Bush envisioned the mission. In his favor, the traditional constraints of the Cold War, namely the risk/fear of Soviet reactions to US initiatives, were greatly if not totally diminished.

President Bush’s commitment to achieving or surpassing his immediate goal was reinforced by his desire to not leave his successor a mess, and by his fear that leaving forces in place any longer than absolutely necessary would prove a slippery slope into an open-ended intervention. This complex combination of goals and constraints formed the aspiration level that guided Bush’s decision-making in this period. President Bush’s aspiration level was well articulated

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and documented, and supports hypothesis H4. President Bush’s aspiration level of stabilizing the situation to facilitate relief and transition to a UN force likely precluded disengagement of US forces before the UN replacement force was in place.

It may be that President Bush dismissed disengagement purely because it was unable to achieve his aspiration level in the severely limited time available. Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, who actually had to implement the intervention decision, publicly stated almost immediately that disengagement by 20 January 1993 was unrealistic.53 However, no documentary evidence was found to support an explicit dismissal by Bush himself, so the trait-based model (including prospect theory) may yet offer insight.

President Bush’s overall aspiration level required a positive change to the situation of looting, violence, and obstruction insofar as the anarchic conditions prevented efficient and effective delivery of food and medical aid. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali continued pushing for greater US commitment, including his insistence, four days after Bush announced Operation Restore Hope, that US forces must at least neutralize the factions’ heavy weapons nation-wide. Bush limited neutralization only to weapons that could interfere with relief work, and only to southern Somalia where humanitarian need existed.54 Like UN Envoy Mohamed Sahnoun, however, Bush realized the core problem of breakdown in order was not solvable militarily, but required political reconciliation. To this end, he steadfastly held to strictly limited interpretations of what counted as a secure environment for the purpose of humanitarian aid delivery.55 Likewise, his aspiration to transition to UN control and disengage US forces in a fairly defined period held firm, even when it became clear the defined period would fall outside his control.

**Framing Disengagement**

Philosophically, President Bush clearly viewed disengagement positively. He saw in timely disengagement the ability to avoid the many predictable pitfalls of a continuing presence such as mission creep due to an inflated sense of interest in developments that otherwise might be ignored if US forces were not already engaged. More than is the case in most interventions of any scale, President Bush made disengagement a central tenet of his operational plan. Viewed

54 Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 23.
this way, per prospect theory Bush could be seen to be risk-averse for the gains offered by disengagement.

Herein lies the problem with framing in prospect theory. Is disengagement framed as an option or is prospect theory concerned with the president’s overall decision frame? By the time the decision to intervene in Somalia was worked through the UN, Bush had lost his bid for re-election to Bill Clinton. Leaving office only 46 days after authorization, and with the UN dragging its feet, President Bush could not realistically claim to have achieved his objectives to a point that justified withdrawal. In this view, Bush was deciding in the frame of losses. Prospect theory would thus predict Bush would be risk-acceptant to avoid a loss. Leading the US into a quagmire was the greatest term risk in Bush’s mind, and in the moment the risks of disengaging were almost entirely on the downside, neither numerous nor divergent. Continuing what had so far been a positive intervention was far riskier, but at least promised the potential of a complete hand-over in the near term to a UN force. Disengagement before meeting his minimum aspiration would risk the loss of recent gains in stability and delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, the loss of US credibility inherent in leaving so quickly, and the loss of trust and prestige that would surely accompany the departure of US forces before their UN replacements arrived. A prospect theory explanation would thus say that Bush accepted the greater risks of continued intervention to avoid the losses of disengagement.

Either of the above explanations conform to hypothesis H2c, but would a risk-propensity based explanation offer equal or better insight? As explained earlier, Bush’s apparently weak preference for Feeling (MBTI-F) is insufficient to suggest a propensity for risk-aversion IAW hypothesis H2a (Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents are risk-averse, particularly when disengagement is framed as a loss). Likewise, though President Bush certainly emphasized keeping US goals and objectives limited and achievable, it cannot be said that his aspiration level was inordinately low, per hypothesis H3a (Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents set unusually low aspiration levels). President Bush’s preference for a quick, limited engagement appears driven by practical, pragmatic considerations of what was achievable in Somalia. President Bush distrusted the UN’s ability and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s motives, and thus was uncooperative with UN demands for broader missions. Sympathetic to the humanitarian plight in Somalia, nonetheless President Bush’s desire to limit the mission and disengage as soon as possible was not evidently driven by an inordinate concern over risks of
loss of lives. Hypothesis H3a aims to offer an alternative explanation for cases that appear to run counter to prospect theory when in fact the individual sets aspirations so as to skew the framing of the issue to allow his predisposed decision. In this case, evidence would have to suggest President Bush set his aspiration level very low in Somalia so as to be perceived as operating in the domain of gains where even the losses inherent in disengagement achieved his minimum aspiration. No evidence in this case suggests the President needed to skew frames in order to see the gains of limiting US involvement in Somalia.

Examining the other alternative to prospect theory, risk-acceptance, is more promising. According to the trait-based model, if President Bush has a propensity for risk-acceptance, he will choose a relatively riskier option. We know he aspired to disengage US forces before leaving office, fearing the great and ever-growing risk of mission creep and expansion the longer US forces were engaged. Yet he took the higher risk option in order to try to meet his minimum aspiration. Therefore, the risk-acceptance explanation says Bush accepted the greater risk of continued engagement in order to achieve his objective, per hypothesis H2b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain).

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

As noted in Chapter Three, President Bush (identified as a Judging, Open, and Sensation-Seeking president) is expected to be risk and frame variant according to the predictions of prospect theory, and perhaps with a personality predisposition toward risk acceptance (hypotheses 2 and either 2b or 2c). Bush aspired to disengage as quickly as possible, and preferably before leaving office. While he framed disengagement positively as an option, within the exceedingly tight time constraint he faced, President Bush could not prudently implement his preferred decision. Evaluating the relevant hypotheses requires examination of the manner in which disengagement was considered against other alternatives.

The major factors reinforcing Bush’s commitment to achieving or surpassing his objective of disengagement were his desire to avoid leaving his successor a mess and his fear that leaving forces in place any longer than absolutely necessary would lead to mission creep and an open-ended intervention. His advisors in the Deputies Committee, in keeping with the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, actively included an exit strategy in their deliberations over the Somalia intervention from as early as 28 September 1992. At the extreme, and unsolicited by the Deputies, on 30 October 1992 Ambassador Hempstone advocated disengaging after Operation
Provide Relief, in effect not taking on UNITAF, proposing, “Now is the time to declare victory in Somalia and go home, if only to regroup for other missions.” This spoke to both reinforcing forces, but no evidence was found to suggest President Bush was aware of Ambassador Hempstone’s recommendation. As a point of fact, the National Security Council (NSC) Principals did not meet about Somalia until late November 1992. Disengagement did not win the day in the face of images of starving Somalis and UN predictions of 1.5 million Somalis facing imminent starvation.

The major constraint Bush faced was time, aggravated by bureaucratic inertia in the UN, some by normal process and some apparently intentional, as Boutros-Ghali and others did not just accept President Bush’s offer for a US mission, but rather hoped to get greater commitments from either Bush or his successor. John Murtha, Democrat US Congressman from Pennsylvania, opined in early January 1993, “The UN is doing nothing but dragging their feet. I’d like to see the Americans out of here as soon as possible, because the longer we’re here, the more involved we get.” Bush’s personality type, including the SJ’s traditionalism and thoroughness, relatively low belief in his ability to control events, and low need for power, leads him to honor constraints. During a 23 November 1992 Deputies Committee meeting, among the many options considered for UNITAF, members argued that the President “should be made aware that a timetable of four to six months was meaningless; events would determine the pace of progress and withdrawal. At Bush’s decision meeting on 25 November 1992, General Powell advocated for a large-scale intervention if the President was determined to intervene; however, Powell warned, “it would be foolish not to anticipate taking on the full spectrum of Somalia’s problems. If the United States intervened, other consequences would follow and getting out would prove difficult.” At the same meeting, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said, “US troops would have to be out of Somalia by 20 January, and both General Powell and Secretary Cheney promptly advised Scowcroft that this deadline could not be met.” As much as Bush may have wanted to have the intervention wrapped up before leaving office, withdrawing forces so soon after their arrival would be contrary to all the imperatives that justified the intervention in the first place.

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56 Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 12.
57 Ibid., 7.
58 Ibid., 6.
60 Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 18-19.
61 Ibid., 21.
No evidence was found to suggest President Bush formally made or delayed a specific
decision on disengagement after the kickoff of Restore Hope. With President-elect Clinton
supportive and arrival of UN forces for UNOSOM II by 20 January 1993 unrealistic, President
Bush effectively made his disengagement decision when he ordered execution of Operation
Restore Hope on 4 December 1992. According to US Central Command’s (USCENTCOM)
concept of operations (CONOPS), the four-phased operation could take eight months or roughly
until early August 1993:

**Phase I**, D-Day (9 December) through D+24: Marines secure the port and airfield
at Mogadishu. Follow-on Marines and initial Army elements occupy Baidoa and
Baledogle airfield, about seventy miles northwest of Mogadishu.

**Phase II**, D+24 through D+90: Army brigade secure the lodgement area around
Baidoa. Occupy three specified relief centers.

**Phase III**, D+90 through D+180: Secure the port and airfield at Kismayo, the
land route between Baidoa and Bardera, and Bardera itself.

**Phase IV**, D+180 through D+240: Transfer responsibility to UN peacekeeping
force.62

Timelines in CONOPS are conservative by design. In reality, meeting virtually no resistance
from the warlords, phases I-III were effectively accomplished by D+15, 24 December 1992.63
This left phase IV, which was beyond US control, reaffirming the lesson of disengagement that
the less objectives depend on others, the greater their chance of realization.

Moreover, on 10 December 1992 the NSC determined the UN would need to strengthen
UNOSOM’s mandate if it were to take over effectively from UNITAF.64 Again, now that the US
was involved, the administration was more interested in all facets and had more to lose if the
follow-on operation did not go well. The Joint Staff looked at whether and how the US should
participate in UNOSOM II, examining the option of a total US withdrawal against the option of
pulling combat troops and leaving behind unique support forces (e.g. communications,
engineering, logistics, air traffic control, medical, civil affairs).65 UN Secretary General
Boutros-Ghali delayed action on increasing UNOSOM’s mandate, awaiting direction from
President Bush and President-elect Clinton.66 Therefore, while President Bush did not formally
decide against disengagement, he effectively did so informally by allowing the Deputies and

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62 Ibid., 25.
63 Ibid., 25.
64 Ibid., 26.
65 Ibid., 27.
66 Ibid., 29.
Joint Staff to continue planning, generating expanded requirements. As a closing note, in the field the UNITAF Commander, Lieutenant General Johnston, reported on 28 January 1993, one week after Bush left office, that factions were neutralized, major weapons were reduced, humanitarian aid was flowing and local markets had reappeared; he considered UNITAF’s mission complete and ready to transition to UNOSOM II.  

President Bush’s disengagement decision in Somalia was a non-decision. He simply let the operation continue, as his desired course of action, disengagement, was impractical and deemed unable to meet his minimum objective given the time available.

**Summary**

President George H. W. Bush led a judicious, humanitarian peacekeeping mission that avoided the temptation to overreach. By the end of December 1992, relief efforts were back on track. Results on the ground might have made a case for disengagement before the 20 January 1993 inauguration of President Clinton, but delays in the UN’s ability to field follow-on forces pushed the transition date to May 1993. To disengage US forces and effectively end Operation RESTORE HOPE before UNOSOM II was ready to take over would have risked a quick swing back to the lawless environment that existed prior to December 1992.

President George H. W. Bush’s decision not to disengage in Somalia can be explained by prospect theory, but better as a demonstration of his personality traits favoring risk-acceptance. He was risk-aware and framed disengagement positively, and was accordingly risk-averse for the gains of disengaging, especially constrained as he was by the extraordinarily short time left in his presidency and the UN’s ability to get replacement forces in country. Ultimately, however, the strongest argument is that the time constraint effectively led Bush to dismiss disengagement as a near-term option for meeting his intervention aspiration level, though there is no direct evidence Bush specifically gave up on the soonest possible disengagement. Indeed, perhaps as a final nod to his true aspiration, President Bush made a symbolic gesture by redeploying 556 Marines on 20 January 1993.

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68 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 60.
May 1993: President Bill Clinton

On 20 January 1993, as Bill Clinton took the oath of office and assumed the presidency, approximately 24,500 US troops remained in Somalia as part of UNITAF and it was assumed the US would leave several thousand support personnel behind to support UNOSOM II. The situation was relatively stable, relief was flowing, and a peace conference was in the works, but UNOSOM II forces were not yet in place for transition. US forces were scheduled to withdraw within 3 months, and the departing president had opened the door to disengagement by withdrawing the first two percent of the force from Somalia on inauguration day.

Whether or not he recognized the open door, the new president initially followed Bush’s policy and withdrawal schedule. Indeed, President Clinton announced the continued withdrawal after a spate of riots in Mogadishu in late February. Gradually, though, as Secretary General Boutros Ghali renewed pressure on Clinton to expand US missions, new missions were indeed added and new troops were sent, this time under UN command. The change of administration eased the way for mission creep and loss of vision as the top leadership changed out while lower echelons continued planning for contingencies. It is a truism that the longer forces stay, the deeper they get, and the transition between administrations only added to that time, both as the Clinton administration settled in, and as the UN awaited stability and direction for US commitments to UNOSOM II. Media attention predictably shifted after the inauguration as well, so the general public missed the mission shift in Somalia. Lack of continuity at the top, the unprecedented nature of the operation itself, and different personalities and interests of the key players combined to obscure the significance of Boutros-Ghali’s requests for expanded powers including command. Looking back to Hermann again, the ambiguity, uniqueness, and lack of public pressure in the transition made risk-taking and/or ignorance easier.

While the new administration’s Deputies Committee promptly took up a review and validation of the Somalia strategy, the NSC Principals and President Clinton himself were not involved until October 1993. Troops continued the withdrawal that began on 20 January 1993. On 1 March 1993, 17,000 troops remained in Somalia, and US special envoy Robert Oakley

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70 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 32.
71 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 79.
72 Ibid., 79.
73 Leader personality will be more important when policy issues are ambiguous and when institutional constraints are thereby lessened. In Kowert and Hermann, “Who Takes Risks?” 631-632.
74 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 33.
urged the UN to assume responsibility for the effort promptly. In accordance with the original
schedule, Oakley left Somalia on 3 March 1993, declaring the US mission to, “stop the killing
from war, famine, and disease...has largely been accomplished.”

UN SCR 814, approved on 26 March 1993, marked the transfer of power from UNITAF
to UNOSOM II, and the return to United Nations leadership. As mentioned previously, the
UNOSOM II mandate changed the mission to nation-building. The US did not fully withdraw
all forces, but continued support to UNOSOM II under Operation Continue Hope. Again,
UNITAF was only meant to provide a secure environment for the resumption of previously-
suspended UNOSOM missions. When UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali deemed the
UNITAF mission successful in its humanitarian relief role, in recommending the transition to
UNOSOM II, he noted that a secure environment did not yet exist. As a result, the Secretary-
General concluded UNOSOM II needed enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United

Where did President Clinton himself fall? Whether from conviction or just desire for
contrast with the foreign-policy-expert-incumbent President Bush, in the 1992 presidential
campaign Clinton attacked Bush for not doing enough in Somalia. Like Bush, Clinton strongly
supported multilateral action coordinated through the UN. Also like his predecessor, he
wondered how a great power could exert itself as a force for good. A fellow liberal
internationalist, he also agreed the US could not do nothing. Where he differed from President
Bush was in degree and limits. With no foreign policy experience beyond protesting against the
Vietnam War, Clinton perhaps naively saw the UN as an instrument of US leadership. Somalia
would educate the new President on the limits of this approach. Where the military veteran
Bush explicitly drew the line on UN participation at keeping US forces under US command,
candidate Clinton endorsed a standing UN army in the campaign. Later a draft administration

75 Stuart Auerbach, “Oakley Calls Mission in Somalia a Success; US Envoy Laments Leaving Before Marines,”
Washington Post, 2 March 1993. Quoted in Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 79. Kirkpatrick also cites
Stuart Auerbach, “It Just Seems Our Job Is Done: Tired Marines, Eager to Return Home, Await UN Takeover in
Continue Hope provided personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and
other elements.
79 Harris, The Survivor, 125.
policy directive allowing US forces under UN command caused uproar when leaked. On the specifics, Bush intended to disengage US forces once the UNOSOM II force could take control, though he had lost momentum on that by the time he left office. Bush steadfastly kept US forces’ objectives specific and minimum. By contrast, President Clinton’s advisors assumed US forces would remain in support of UNOSOM II, and his vision was more expansive and less specific.  

President Clinton’s personality type seeks excitement and firsts. That there had never been an operation quite like UNITAF/RESTORE HOPE is appealing to a leader who craves novelty. Again, Dr. Margaret Hermann finds such unique situations with little to no precedent lessen constraints on decision-makers and enable risk-taking. At least initially, though, Clinton showed little interest in Somalia or other foreign policy issues. It cannot be known if President Clinton would have intervened in Somalia if US forces were not already engaged, but foreign policy was deliberately de-prioritized in the new administration. What is known is being there made it easier to get sucked deeper into the quagmire.

Table 4.2. Summary of Risk Traits for President Bill Clinton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Perception/Awareness</th>
<th>Calm/Insensitive/Perceiving</th>
<th>Anxious/Sensitive/Judging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Propensity</td>
<td>Risk Invariant</td>
<td>Risk Averse Agreeable/Altruist/Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-C6</td>
<td>-N1</td>
<td>MBTI-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton ENFP</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rating*</td>
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<td>Avg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*R -1 SD<Low<-.5 SD; -.5 SD < Average (Avg) < +.5 SD; +1 SD < High < +1.5 SD; +1.5 SD < Very High (VH)< +2 SD; +2 SD<Extremely High (EH)

80 Ibid., 125. Bush’s position from Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 68.
Bill Clinton is expected to ignore risks and may act spontaneously. He has high information needs. Decisions may appear risk averse or acceptant dependent on circumstances.

**Figure 4.2. President Bill Clinton’s Expected Risk Behavior**

**Risk Awareness**

Again, the three-stage model begins with an assessment of the President’s risk-perception or awareness. This assessment is less clear for Clinton than for Bush. Clinton scores low on the FFM trait of Conscientiousness (C), particularly on the facet of Deliberation (C6), where he is nearly a standard deviation lower than the presidential average.81 Journalist, author, and presidential biographer Joe Klein additionally paints a picture of Clinton that psychologist Samuel Barondes opines shows Clinton to be below average on overall Neuroticism (N), noting “he is unusually capable of brushing off criticism that would make most of us crumble.”82 This is at odds with Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s findings of average overall Neuroticism (N) and

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Anxiousness (N1), depicted in Table 4.2 above. His low Deliberation (C6) score correlates with his Perceiving MBTI type, making him a candidate for risk insensitivity. However, his Anxiousness (N1) is not low, but average at just a bit above the mean. If President Clinton is risk and frame invariant, we should expect him to obviously disregard the risks of disengagement and/or show a demonstrable lack of awareness of those risks. Interestingly, though Clinton matches none of the criteria for the Risk Perception/Awareness stage, he is a perfect match for the risk-acceptant propensity. According to the trait-based model, President Clinton should be expected to be insensitive to risk, though being average in Anxiety (N1) suggests he may still be influenced by framing. As the match is not perfect, it is prudent to examine both risk-perception hypotheses, hypothesis H1 (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant) and hypothesis H2 (Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style). Either case requires evidence of the discussion and consideration of disengagement risks.

President Clinton certainly was not as leery of the UN generally or the Secretary-General specifically as President Bush was. In transition and for most of his early months in office, however, Clinton was rather aloof regarding foreign policy, committed to his campaign promise to “focus like a laser beam” on the economy. The 28 January 1993 NSC Principals Committee recommended leaving as many as four thousand support and logistic troops behind for UNOSOM II, but there is no evidence of any discussion or decisions by the President on Somalia or other agenda items, beyond ordering an interdepartmental review of policies. Evidence suggests the new civilian officials were not aware that the UN’s ability to take on the responsibilities of UNOSOM II was very much in question.

Based on President Clinton’s overall personality profile, however, we might expect his personal style to counter his tendency to downplay risk. Along with Risk-Insensitive, Clinton also exhibits all the traits of a Risk-Acceptant type, or Sensation-Seeking Intuiting in Kowert and

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83 Interestingly, Keirsey’s temperament assessment as ESFP would further the case for insensitivity to or ignorance of risk, as ESFPs (Artisan-Performers) avoid risks by ignoring them as long as possible. As noted, though, Keirsey’s temperaments differ from Myers-Briggs interpretations, and in correlating MBTI and FFM, Sensing (S) correlates to Conscientiousness.


86 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 35.
Hermann’s terms. Psychologist John Gartner finds Clinton extremely intellectually curious, or Open to Experience (O4), documenting friends’, political associates’, and Hillary Clinton’s anecdotes that, “he is insatiably curious about everything.” According to Barondes’ interpretation of Klein’s biography, “Clinton ranks high on most facets of O,” though Openness to Fantasy (O1) is not explicitly noted. Barondes also finds Clinton to be high on all facets of Extraversion, including Excitement-Seeking (E5). This leaves only the Intuiting trait (MBTI-N) missing. Recalling from Chapter Three, Bill Clinton allegedly took the MBTI, self-assessing as ENFP. This dissertation accepts ENFP, countering Keirsey’s assessment of ESFP and thus making Clinton perhaps the first Idealist-type president. More significantly to the trait-based model, Clinton’s self-assessment as an Intuiting (MBTI-N) type correlates to overall Openness (O) and completes the risk-acceptant personal style. Supporters of the ENFP type point out that “NF” types excel at tact with people, have a breadth of interests, and think as they talk. This goes along with the Perceiver’s (MBTI-P) preference to be open-ended and spontaneous. NF types tell others to loosen up and are characterized by the tendency to act first, think it through, then act again. ENFPs rarely get confrontational and even then tend to be defensive. Clinton is a diffuser, trying when possible to empathize with attackers and uses self-effacing humor to avoid true-false answers.

If personal style can overcome a president’s propensity to ignore risk, Clinton’s Sensation Seeking Intuiting style should lead him not only to be risk-acceptant, but also to show an intensified preference of risk for gains. In order to test hypothesis H2b on risk-perception (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain), we need evidence of the discussion and consideration of disengagement risks.

Here it is informative again to recall Hermann’s condition that for presidential personality to be a determining factor, the president must be highly interested and involved, and the “situation is ambiguous and demands definition.” The Clinton administration transition was

88 Barondes, Making Sense of People, 26.
89 Ibid., 24.
91 Ibid.
notoriously chaotic, and even under the best of circumstances it might be excessive to expect a serious foreign policy shift only six weeks into a new administration. In fact, “Clinton administration spokespeople later claimed that it never considered the transformation of the Somalia mission at the highest level.” As previously noted, the only evidence of specific presidential decisions on Somalia between Clinton’s inauguration on 21 January 1993 and UNOSOM II on 26 March 1993 are President Clinton’s ordering of an interagency review of Somalia policy in early February 1993 and his statement that the withdrawal of forces would continue after riots in Mogadishu in late February. The interagency review focused on preventing Somalia from slipping back into anarchy and famine, a clear sign of awareness of disengagement risks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were told to examine issues involving the Quick Reaction Force, to include the criteria for its withdrawal; what is not clear is whether this was Clinton’s order or was specified by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This may be read as implicit acknowledgement that the famine mission was successful and also shows a fear of losses of recent gains. It is also typical of Clinton’s high Openness, or intellectual curiosity and his Intuiting Perceiver (ENFP) type that he would start by gathering more information.

Risk Propensity and Aspiration Level

If Bill Clinton is not risk and frame invariant, his personality traits are consistent with a Risk-Acceptant personal style. To be categorized as Risk-Acceptant, Clinton should be a Sensation-Seeking, Open, Feeling president. Despite the fact Clinton is generally considered a Feeling type (ENFP), which can be associated with risk aversion, he is also an Intuiting type (ENFP), indicating a preference for accepting risks for future gains. He is rated very near the mean for presidents on the FFM facet of Openness to Fantasy/Imagination (O1) facet. He is high (one standard deviation above the mean) on the Openness (O) trait, very high (one-and-a-half times the standard deviation) on Openness to Action (O4), and is extremely high (two standard deviations above the mean) on Excitement-Seeking (E5). Clinton would thus be expected to behave according to hypothesis H2b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain) and hypothesis H3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels).

93 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 85.
94 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 35. Cites Memo, DATP(NSA) to VCJCS et al., “Somalia Core Group-Taskings,” 8 Feb 93.
95 Data from Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, Personality, Character & Leadership in the White House.
In the early weeks of the Clinton administration before this May 1993 opportunity to disengage, the president’s aspiration level can best be considered to have defaulted to maintenance of the status quo. Official operational objectives for Operation Restore Hope did not change explicitly. However, in the absence of positive action from the new President, institutional inertia in the UN, the US Departments of State and Defense, and specifically in the Joint Staff and USCENTCOM, had implicitly taken full disengagement at the end of Restore Hope off the table. Thus, the status quo was effectively an expanded mission from that adopted by President Bush. To evaluate hypothesis H4 (The president’s aspiration level [acting as a situational constraint] is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving [or surpassing] the aspiration level in a particular case) requires documentary evidence of President Clinton’s desired end state and how disengagement fit into his objectives. This requires evidence of discussions pertaining to desired/acceptable outcomes for this time. Relevant documents need to address Clinton’s goals, desires, hopes, needs, and/or requirements for the operation overall and seeks evidence of positive/negative framing of disengagement (win/lose, gains/losses, pros/cons, etc).

President Clinton’s aspiration level for Somalia specifically, and the US role in UN peacekeeping missions generally, was more expansive than was President Bush’s. While some deflect responsibility from Clinton, as the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was “unthought-through,”96 others point to Clinton’s commitment, made clear in the 1992 presidential campaign, to “expanding multinational UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations, strengthening the UN staff, and providing US troops for UN-commanded operations.”97 Though certainly not in evidence so early in the domestic-focused administration, Clinton’s eventual National Security Strategy was the first significant departure from the variations on Containment that had shaped US foreign policy from President Truman forward. The campaign positions eventually coalesced into the so-called Clinton Doctrine, entitled Engagement and Enlargement. The strategy focused on US engagement around the globe, including with former-Soviet satellites, and the enlargement of US and Western influence, including the enlargement of multi-national, extra-governmental, collective security institutions such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty

97 Kirkpatrick, *Making War to Keep Peace*, 85. This expansion was socialized in Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), which initiated a review of policy on American participation in international peacekeeping activities. PRD-13 discussed committing US forces to greatly expanded roles for the United Nations, including placing US troops under UN command. See also https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd13.htm
Organization) into the former Soviet bloc. Clinton and his inner circle believed the fall of the Soviet bloc and end of the Cold War opened the door for the US and UN to expand the promotion of collective action and global governance. The Clinton Doctrine expanded national interests, broadened definitions of national security, and grew the domain of military missions to include humanitarian operations, democracy building, nation building, and new attitudes toward the use of force. While the overall doctrine may not have been apparent in the early days of the administration, Clinton’s Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, coined the term assertive multilateralism specifically to describe the policy implemented in Somalia in March 1993.

So about a month into office and into Bush’s planned troop withdrawal, President Clinton said the drawdown would continue as planned, but in reality he gradually gave the troops a new mission, sent new troops, and placed them under UN command. This mission creep proved Congressman Murtha’s prescience…the longer US forces stayed, the deeper their involvement grew. While it is true enough that before leaving office President Bush had lost the momentum for total disengagement upon transition to UNOSOM II, he had not lost it as his personal aspiration. The change of administrations, however, left that vision by the wayside. Moreover, the media, so critical to the initial decision to intervene, had moved on after Clinton’s inauguration and drawn public scrutiny of the Somalia mission with it. When Ambassador Oakley reported the US mission largely accomplished on 3 March 1993, the UN criticized Oakley for overstating the security situation to help hasten US departure. Furthermore, on the same day Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali again sought the larger nation-building mandate President Bush had earlier rejected. The ambiguity and unprecedented nature of the operation obscured the significance of Boutros-Ghali’s requests for expanded powers including command. As Hermann suggests, ambiguity, uniqueness, and the lack of public pressure made either risk-taking or ignorance easier.

98 Ibid., 85.
100 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 79.
Based on the evidence above, President Clinton’s aspiration level for closing out Operation Restore Hope was not total disengagement of US forces, but a transition to UN control under UNOSOM II including specific US support forces. His overall aspiration level required a positive change to the situation, and that positive change expanded President Bush’s original intent. For all intents and purposes, the continued US mission became that of UNOSOM II, as approved in UN SCR 814 on 26 March 1993. The mission was chartered to operate until 31 October 1993, and included the “crucial importance of disarmament.”

As a further expansion, the mission provided two key objectives to the UNOSOM II Commander: “consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia,” and “the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.” The Resolution was drafted by US government agencies, so cannot be refuted as a misunderstanding between the administration and the UN, and thus can be accepted as President Clinton’s aspiration level, including expanding the mission to include the entirety of Somalia, the inclusion of disarmament, and rebuilding the nation.

The new ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright portrayed the administration’s view clearly, calling the resolution, “an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.”

**Framing Disengagement**

President Clinton viewed disengagement negatively, as evidenced by his February 1993 order for an interagency review of Somalia policy. The objective of the review was framed negatively...how do we not lose our gains? On its face, disengagement is anathema to Clinton’s vision and strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Without the Cold War tying up the US military in large forward-based defensive posts, forces were free for wide-ranging, small-footprint military operations other than war (MOOTW). Accordingly, Clinton’s aspiration for disengagement was ambiguous. Where Bush always had timely disengagement as an explicit concern, Clinton was never so clear, though he did support the position of his commanders in the field, as presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To his credit, President Clinton resisted relentless pressure to extend and enlarge UNITAF’s mandate from Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.

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102 Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 37.
103 Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 111.
104 Ibid., 37.
105 Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 111.
106 Ibid., 111.
President Clinton’s commitment to achieving or surpassing his overall goal was reinforced by his desire to see UN peacekeeping in Somalia succeed as a model for other nations. He did not share President Bush’s fundamental fear of leaving forces in place too long in open-ended intervention. President Clinton’s acceptance of the broad expansion of the UNOSOM II mission and of enhanced, continued US participation, taken with the lack of any clear aspiration for disengagement specifically, supports hypothesis H4: President Clinton’s aspiration for Somalia to validate his policy of assertive multilateralism led him to preclude the consideration of disengagement as incapable of achieving his minimum aspiration level.

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

President Clinton excluded disengagement from consideration, but was not ignorant of the risks of remaining engaged in Somalia. It is tempting to view his aloofness as ignorance, but his resistance to Boutros-Ghali’s repeated attempts at expanding the US-led UNITAF mission in favor of a bolstered US support contribution to a UN-led UNOSOM II mission provide strong evidence that Clinton was aware of risks and actively sought to mitigate them. A prospect theory explanation might view Clinton’s behavior as risk-acceptant to avoid the risk of losses after disengaging. However, fresh off of winning the presidency, in his honeymoon with the media and public, and with the mission mostly going well, Clinton could be seen as deciding in the frame of gains, and thus be risk averse to what he viewed as the greatest risk, namely disengagement. Or taking the Kowert and Hermann proposition, Clinton’s personality led him to set extremely ambitious aspiration level which kept him permanently, if artificially, in the domain of losses, thus justifying the risks inherent in staying engaged in an ever-expanding and decreasingly militarily-achievable mission.

President Clinton’s low level of direct involvement, lack of specific decisions regarding disengagement, and the administration’s presumption of continued presence in UNOSOM II makes it impossible to assess fairly hypotheses 1 and 2 on risk perception/awareness. That said, Clinton did appear aware of and responsive to the risks of disengaging (H2), namely the risk of losing recent gains. At the same time, his aloofness to Somalia specifically and to foreign policy generally can be seen as ignorance of risks. Consistent with hypothesis H4 and Clinton’s personality traits, however, opting against disengaging completely at the point of the UNITAF-to-UNOSOM II transition supports hypothesis 3b: As a Sensation-Seeking Intuiting President, Clinton set high or ambitious aspiration levels, artificially keeping himself in the loss frame, and
thus accepting the greater risks of continued involvement with broader objectives less likely to be achieved militarily. At the same time, Clinton increased the dependence on others to achieve the aspirations, presuming to reduce the threat to US troops in UNOSOM II by limiting participation to support functions.

President Clinton pursued the status quo, allowing troop withdrawal to continue as scheduled, while he ordered an interagency review to fill in gaps in his information. In the absence of outside pressure, Clinton himself remained focused on domestic policy and his handlers reinforced that preference. Time pressure was not acute as the transition to UNOSOM II had slipped from March to May and media/public attention was not focused on Somalia.

President Clinton made no specific decision on disengagement at the completion of Operation Restore Hope. Evidence suggests it was simply assumed some number of US troops would remain in Somalia under UN command to support UNOSOM II. Disengagement was never considered as an alternative. To be fair, President Bush’s policy would also have left some US forces behind to support UNOSOM II, so Clinton’s lack of decision was a decision for the de facto status quo. The differences lie in the expanded scope of UNOSOM II operational objectives, which amplified existing questions of the UN’s ability to carry out the mission, opening the door to expanded participation of US combat troops.

The major constraint Clinton faced if he were to disengage forces at the end of Operation Restore Hope was time. As an ENFP type, whether he is viewed as risk-insensitive or risk-acceptant, Clinton is inclined to resist constraints. In the absence of significant outside pressure to decide, his preference was delay.

Summary

President Bill Clinton was aware of the risks associated with disengaging US forces from the Somalia mission and framed disengagement negatively, as risking the loss of UNITAF gains. Both by assimilating gains into a new status quo and by imposing his own more ambitious aspirations for US involvement in expanded UN peacekeeping and nation-building missions, President Clinton excluded disengagement as a viable option. By default more than decision, Clinton accepted the risks associated with the alternative of the status quo, continued US involvement under conditions of mission creep, greater UN control, and an unprecedented mission which was less able to be accomplished by military forces. The risk associated with disengagement, if realized, would be realized in the near term. Instead, he preferred the risks
associated with continued involvement, which would likely be down the road if realized. In the end, the key to President Clinton’s course of action was not risk or time, but simply the incompatibility of disengagement with his larger aspirations for greater US and UN involvement in solving global problems. Put another way, his personal style did not drive his decision in terms of a propensity for risk-acceptance, but was evident in how he set his aspiration level and how he framed disengagement.

The important take-away in terms of the trait-based model is that while Clinton’s personality profile suggests he will follow his preferred course despite risks, his disposition toward risk-taking is still important to how he sets aspirations and then frames options to support his preferred course of action. He does not ignore risk so much as he mitigates it.

25 March 1994: President Bill Clinton

President Clinton’s direct involvement in Somalia decision-making remained minimal as UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope evolved into UNOSOM II. The NSC Principals Committee met on 28 January 1993, when the president ordered the interdepartmental review of US policy, but not again with the president until “after the October 1993 ambush in Mogadishu.”107 The Deputies Committee decided on 29 March 1993 that the US commitment to UNOSOM II should “stay at four thousand logistics and Quick Reaction Force troops through August 1993, then decrease to fourteen hundred by January 1994.”108 Mission creep thus occurred “without a full discussion of the implications...On a domestic matter, Clinton would never have been so unaware of the implications of his own policies. In foreign policy, however, he assumed the professionals knew what they were doing”...that Powell and Aspin had it handled.109

The role of US forces changed almost immediately, as the French warned General Hoar they would withdraw unless the US kept some combat forces ashore. The decision essentially to duplicate the afloat Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with one ashore significantly affected the US role but was not made at even the Principals or Deputies level. Otherwise, the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred promptly and smoothly. The final handoff, including dissolution of UNITAF, was completed on 4 May 1993, ahead of schedule.110 In remarks on the

107 Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 79.
109 Harris, The Survivor, 122.
110 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 38.
South Lawn on the White House on 5 May 1993, President Clinton reported, “Mission accomplished,” continuing on to praise the over thirty thousand American military personnel who had served in Somalia.111

Yet mission accomplished did not denote the end. A moment later in the same address, President Clinton noted the returning forces left “behind a UN peacekeeping force with a significant American component…a reflection of the new era.”112 In this new era, the President insisted, “our involvement in multilateral efforts need not be open-ended or ill-defined,” but rather the US could go abroad, “accomplish some distinct objectives, and then come home again when the mission is accomplished.”113 President Clinton’s personal interest increased during UNOSOM II. On 19 May 1993, through Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC-6 President Clinton laid out the way ahead for Somalia, splitting US participants in UNOSOM II into two components; the four thousand support forces would remain under UN command, and would draw down to fourteen hundred by January 1994. The QRF troops, however, would stay under USCINCCENT’s command unless/until it was deployed in the field in accordance with agreed US/UN emergency situations, in which case they would work under the tactical control of UNOSOM II’s American Deputy Commander. PDD/NSC-6 specifically addressed disengagement, targeting withdrawal of the QRF from Somalia during the summer of 1993, to begin only on President Clinton’s order.114 The requirement for the president’s direct decision in order for disengagement to begin was a break from the norm, as was approval of the Deputies Committee for major redeployments, both surprises for the Joint Staff.115

No one on the UNITAF side pushed for delays in turning responsibilities over to the UNOSOM force, yet the doubts President Bush had originally expressed regarding the UN’s abilities to manage such a complex mission continued to grow. Problems were compounded by a new administration that was overly optimistic, over-rated UN capabilities, and brought in its transition a campaign mentality, distrustful of Bush administration carry-overs.116 Only a month

112 Ibid., 755.
113 Ibid., 755.
114 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 38.
116 Ibid., 39-40.
into the new operation, on 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani UNOSOM II soldiers were ambushed and killed in Mogadishu in what was intended to be a new normal process of inspecting allowed weapons storage sites. Several simultaneous, coordinated attacks occurred across Mogadishu, emboldening militias and leading to more clashes and additional UNOSOM and civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{117} The response was hasty. Working with UN and enraged Pakistani officials, Clinton administration officials drafted what would become UN SCR 837, authorizing Secretary General Boutros-Ghali “to take all necessary measures” to bring those responsible to justice.\textsuperscript{118} This led to a spiral of violence as UNOSOM II mission was sidetracked on a manhunt for Mohamed Farah Aideed and a focused effort against his clan. On 13-14 June 1993, AC-130 gunships struck arms caches, followed by ground troop sweeps to confiscate weapons and round up militiamen. A similar mission was undertaken on 17 June, which “proved to be UNOSOM’s last major offensive effort.”\textsuperscript{119} Air strikes were crucial, but as something only the US could do, this necessarily put a US face on a UNOSOM mission the US had intended to support only logistically. Violating the cardinal rule of peacekeeping missions, the UN and US had chosen sides, and chosen the dominant clan as its adversary.

After two separate mine explosions on 8 and 19 August left four US soldiers dead and four more wounded, General Powell and General Hoar reluctantly decided to recommend putting Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Somalia to capture Aideed. “We have to do something,” General Powell advised Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, “or we are going to be nibbled to death.”\textsuperscript{120} On 25 August 1993, three days after another land mine wounded six more American soldiers, another 440 US personnel arrived in Mogadishu. A crisis mentality was emerging in the administration, as the French and Belgians announced their departure by the end of 1993. “General Hoar judged them irreplaceable and warned Powell that their departure could lead to UNOSOM’s ‘progressive deterioration and collapse.’”\textsuperscript{121} Some members of Congress were calling for withdrawal in the face of casualties and the obvious growth from the Bush mission. Urgency to capture Aideed grew, and on 27 August 1993, “Secretary Aspin publicly announced that the QRF would stay until violence in Mogadishu had been quelled, faction leaders

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 41. See also Pike, “Operation Continue Hope.”
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 43-4.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 48. Cites GEN Powell Interview; Washington Post, 3 Apr 94, pp. 10, 12 and 30 Jan 94, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 48.
surrendered heavy weapons, and a national police force had begun operating in major population centers.”¹²²

After a 5 September 1993 ambush that killed seven Nigerians, General Hoar argued to General Powell that UNOSOM must either change its strategy or add significant forces for command and control. No one else but the US could or would provide the needed capabilities and the US Congress and public were unlikely to support sending several thousand more combat troops. “If the only solution for Mogadishu is large-scale infusion of troops and if the only country available to make this commitment is the US, then it is time to reassess,” Gen Hoar concluded.¹²³ By mid-September, others in the administration were pushing for a shift to a more political, less military strategy. On 27 September 1993, administration personnel publicly announced a shift in Somalia operations away from capturing Aideed and toward rebuilding without him, but no real change was evident and Somalia remained an NSC Principals agenda item but a Deputies action item.¹²⁴ The President himself denied any change to the strategy on the ground, claiming only that Somalis needed to be in charge of Somalia and that peacekeeper-providing nations needed to know “there is a fixed date for their ultimate disengagement in Somalia.” He elaborated, “because in the end every peacekeeping mission or every humanitarian mission has to have a date certain when it’s over, and you have to in the end turn the affairs of the country back over to the people who live there.”¹²⁵

As early as the week of 27 September 1993, Secretary Aspin had a trusted associate, Mr. Clark Murdock, attend Somalia Working Group meetings to help devise an exit strategy. Murdock immediately determined things were worse than the Principals understood and that he would recommend to Aspin that the US should “bug out.”¹²⁶ The tipping point came on 3 October 1993, when 18 US QRF soldiers died and 84 more were wounded in an ambush that turned into an overnight battle in the streets that ultimately resulted in over 1,000 Somali casualties.¹²⁷ Congress turned decisively against staying in Somalia.¹²⁸ Responding to public

¹²³ Ibid., 50.
¹²⁴ Ibid., 52-4.
¹²⁶ Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 55.
¹²⁷ Pike, “Operation Continue Hope.” See also Poole, 57, citing Somali claim of 312 dead and 814 wounded.
pressure, President Clinton immediately acted “to safeguard forces on the ground and to decide exactly when the US military presence in Somalia would end.”\textsuperscript{129} The US immediately moved to reinforce its presence of 4,650 personnel (2,600 logistics/support, 1,450 QRF, and 450 Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) on 3 Oct), adding 1,700 Army troops. As President Clinton announced the deployment publicly on 7 October 1993, he simultaneously declared US troops would exit Somalia by 31 March 1994, with the exception of “a few hundred support personnel in non-combat roles.”\textsuperscript{130} Sweden joined Belgium and France in deciding to withdraw their contingents.\textsuperscript{131}

Most US forces were withdrawn by 25 March 1994, ending Operation Continue Hope.\textsuperscript{132} With only about 1,000 US civilians and military advisors remaining as liaisons, the Security Council changed the UNOSOM II mission again in early 1994, stressing assistance for reconciliation and reconstruction, and setting a March 1995 deadline for the mission.\textsuperscript{133} The last of the Americans withdrew with the UN in March 1995. During the three-year effort (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II), 157 United Nations peacekeeping personnel had died. Nevertheless, the United Nations had brought relief to millions facing starvation, helped to stop the large-scale killings, assisted in the return of refugees, and provided massive humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Risk Awareness}

Beginning the three-stage model, assessing President Clinton’s risk-perception or awareness is more clear for Clinton’s second decision opportunity that it was for the UNITAF-to-UNOSOM II transition. Going forward after May 1993, Clinton had more time in the seat and demonstrated a greater sense of ownership over UNOSOM II decisions. Recalling President Clinton’s risk profile from Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, his low Deliberation (C6), and Perceiving (MBTI-P) preference make him potentially risk insensitive, but as he is not below the mean on Anxiousness (N1), his decision-making may yet be susceptible to framing. Still, as President

\begin{footnotes}
\item[128] Poole, \textit{The Effort To Save Somalia}, 56.
\item[129] Ibid., 58.
\item[133] UN, “UNOSOM II Background.”
\item[134] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Clinton’s first disengagement opportunity suggests, even if he is merely risk-insensitive, and still subject to framing effects, we should nonetheless expect him to obviously disregard the risks of disengagement and/or show a demonstrable lack of awareness of those risks. In order to test hypothesis H1 on risk-perception (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant), we need evidence that shows President Clinton was never briefed on the risks of disengaging forces from Somalia, did not himself recognize or acknowledge said risks, or was clearly dismissive of risk in his decision making.

There is evidence of risk ignorance, or at least discounting. President Clinton’s very low Deliberation (C6), evidenced in hasty and rash decisions, at times precluded sufficient risk assessment. As an example, the hasty drafting of UN SCR 837 after the ambush killing of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 proved critical to expanded US involvement, and to the proportionally decreased prospects for disengagement. Drafted and adopted by the evening of 6 June, “a more deliberate review might have drawn attention to its potential pitfalls.”

Though the president did not attend Principals meetings on Somalia, it cannot be said he was unaware of the gravity of the degrading situation. On 30 September 1993, his last day as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell “advised President Clinton that the situation in Somalia was unraveling and all US and UN troops should be withdrawn.” After the 3 October 1993 killing/wounding of over 100 US QRF troops, Clinton was certainly aware of the risk that Congress would move to take control of disengagement away from him. Only after the attack garnered major media, public, and Congressional attention did President Clinton himself attend an NSC Principals meeting.

As discussed for the UNITAF transition, there is plenty of evidence of risk awareness, but that does not necessarily translate to caution. The focus of President Clinton’s interdepartmental review of Somalia policy suggests Clinton himself recognized the risk of a precipitous slide back into anarchy and famine if US forces were withdrawn too soon. This could be an acknowledgement of the risk of losing recent gains, but seeking more information might just as easily be seen as a delaying action, as disengaging US forces at the end of Operation Restore Hope did not meet Clinton’s expansive aspiration for the US role in UN peacekeeping operations. Similarly, President Clinton’s insistence on his personal initiation for

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135 Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 42.
136 Ibid., 4, 56.
disengagement to begin suggests a desire to control the risks associated with disengagement, but might just as easily reflect a level of distrust for leaving the decision to military commanders.

President Clinton was aware of risk, but not overly concerned. In fact, he was asked directly how much risk he was exposing US forces to by deciding to involve them in Somalia and similar concurrent peacekeeping operations in Macedonia. Clinton couched Macedonian operations specifically as carrying minimal risk and maximum gains, continuing, “Americans know and have to know that whenever we send people around the world, even if they’re on peacekeeping missions, there is some risk to them.”

Risk Propensity and Aspiration Level

Whether or not Bill Clinton is risk and/or frame invariant, his personality traits are consistent with a propensity for risk-acceptance. To review, Clinton is an Intuiting type (ENFP), indicating a preference for accepting risks for future gains. He is rated very near the mean for presidents on the FFM facet of Openness to Fantasy/Imagination (O1). He is high (one standard deviation above the mean) on the Openness (O) trait, very high (one-and-a-half times the standard deviation) on Openness to Action (O4), and is extremely high (two standard deviations above the mean) on Excitement-Seeking (E5). Clinton is expected to behave according to hypothesis H2b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain) and hypothesis 3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels). Both are evident in the preceding paragraph.

As previously noted, once UNITAF was discontinued, President Clinton’s aspiration level was the mission of UNOSOM II, as approved in UN SCR 814 on 26 March 1993: “consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia,” and “the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.” The initial aspiration for disengagement was thus implied to be withdrawal at the end of the mission charter, 31 October 1993. For Clinton’s aspirations for the nation-building mission and disengagement to be coherent, this, “unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country,” including expansion across the entire nation of Somalia and adding disarmament and

138 Data from Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, Personality, Character & Leadership in the White House.
139 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 111.
the building of all national governmental structures, was implied to be achievable in six months.\textsuperscript{140}

At best, Clinton’s aspiration for disengagement of US forces can be inferred from the October 1993 UN mandate for UNOSOM II. The means available for achieving his goal were constrained primarily by abdicating decision-making to the UN. The withdrawal plan General Hoar proposed to Chairman Powell on 27 January 1993 included no timeline, but the following phases:

- **Phase I:** Reduce to 15,500 troops ashore and 4,500 afloat
- **Phase II:** Reduce to 12,000 ashore and 4,000 afloat. Hand over nine humanitarian relief sectors to UNOSOM one-at-a-time
- **Phase III:** Reduce to 6,000 ashore and 4,000 afloat, including only a quick reaction force and limited logistics support units
- **Phase IV:** Reduce to 1,400 ashore and 4,000 afloat, moving the QRF to ships over the horizon and leaving only logistics support units ashore\textsuperscript{141}

Note first that the completion of the four-phase withdrawal plan still did not end with total disengagement. The Clinton administration’s aspiration level was not only vastly expanded from the purely humanitarian one upon which President Bush initiated the intervention, but it was also a moving target. Due to his lack of direct personal involvement in directing Somalia policy, we have little insight on President Clinton’s personal aspiration level. Most policy decisions were being made in the Deputies Committee, which, though the presence in Somalia was predominantly military, after the August 1993 mine attacks shifted to the State Department’s preference for capturing Aideed. Doing so required the addition of even more US troops under a separate, US-commanded JSOTF. Within a month, the focus began to shift back toward reconciliation vice personalization, and Secretary Aspin specifically began working toward an exit strategy. This wavering continued until the 3 October 1993 ambush brought the situation to a crisis level warranting President Clinton’s direct involvement. At this point the aspiration level shifted away from grandiose nation building and toward disengagement, as “any option other than prompt withdrawal had become unattainable.”\textsuperscript{142} In his 7 October 1993 address, President Clinton redefined the US mission, and his aspirations, to include:

- Force protection
- Keep roads, ports, and lines of communication open for relief flow

\textsuperscript{140}Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 111.
\textsuperscript{141}Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 34-35.
\textsuperscript{142}Ibid., 3-4.
- Keep pressure on attackers, “not to personalize the conflict but to prevent a return to anarchy”
- “Help make it possible for the Somali people…to reach agreement among themselves so that they can solve their problems and survive when we leave”\textsuperscript{143}

President Clinton continued to propose a plan for as lengthy a disengagement timeline as he thought he could get Congress to support. He set a date certain to “conduct an orderly withdrawal,” 31 March 1994, promising to “do what we can to complete the mission before then.” Still he hedged, hoping to leave a few hundred support personnel in noncombat roles.\textsuperscript{144} Really just a hoped-for bargaining position as he addressed the nation, by the time Joint Task Force Somalia stood up on 20 October 1993, its mission was essentially what President Clinton outlined on 7 Oct, but with a specific charge for disengagement:

- Protect US forces
- Support UNOSOM II as the QRF
- Ensure flow of relief
- Prepare for withdrawal of US forces\textsuperscript{145}

\textit{Framing Disengagement}

As initially evidenced by the interagency review of Somalia policy in February 1993, disengagement remained anathema to Clinton’s vision and strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. President Clinton ignored or discounted risks that did not meet his greater goals, including the greatest risk his predecessor feared, the broad expansion of the UNOSOM II mission with an enhanced US role. President Clinton’s aspiration for Somalia to validate his policy of assertive multilateralism led him to preclude the consideration of disengagement as incapable of achieving his minimum aspiration level. Only when Congress left Clinton with an aspiration level of disengagement as his only attainable option was he willing to consider it.

Framing is a means of shaping aspirations to make preferred courses of action more readily acceptable. After 3 October 1993, Clinton reframed disengagement somewhat, accentuating the positives to make the risk acceptable for gains. Still, he accepted disengagement grudgingly. Backed into a corner politically, he cast the harshest, most negative frame not on disengagement, but rather on too precipitous an exit. He wanted to:

“finish leaving Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two administrations have accomplished there. For, if we were to leave today, we

\textsuperscript{143} Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Somalia, October 7, 1993,” 2023-24.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 2024.
\textsuperscript{145} Poole, \textit{The Effort To Save Somalia}, 61.
know what would happen. Within months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets. Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-cold-war world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.  

Even when forced to accept disengagement as his only option, President Clinton negotiated with Congressional leaders for more time. Beyond just Somalia, Clinton saw too quick a withdrawal as imperiling future multilateral peacekeeping operations. As with his first decision point, the President’s commitment to achieving his new goal was grounded in and reinforced by his desire to avoid tarring peacekeeping generally with the Somalia brush. Also consistent with his earlier decision, the ultimate decision to disengage supports hypothesis H4: President Clinton’s aspiration for Somalia to validate his policy of assertive multilateralism led him to preclude the consideration of disengagement until it became his minimum aspiration level.

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

Between the transition to UNOSOM II and the dramatic casualties of the 3 October attack in Mogadishu, the Deputies Committee and some Principals were beginning to look for ways out of Somalia. By the last week of September 1993, Clark Murdock and General Colin Powell were advising a US bug out or an overall US/UN withdrawal respectively. After US casualties began mounting in August 1993, pressure from Congress to quickly withdraw mounted steadily. What was once partisan pressure was increasingly becoming voiced by Democrats. The pressure clearly led President to rethink risks he may have too easily dismissed soon after taking office. By the end of September, Clinton revealed to reporters that he and other world leaders were “perhaps more sensitive than was the case in the beginning of this Somali operation about the…dangers of it, and the need to have a strict set of limitations and conditions before involvement occurs.”

146 Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Somalia, October 7, 1993,” 2024.
148 Poole, The Effort To Save Somalia, 54.
Such comments prove the 3 October attack did not singularly put disengagement on the agenda, but it was the sandpaper that gave it traction. General Powell’s recommendation to President Clinton on 30 September was not an off-hand comment. The UNOSOM Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, had provided General Powell with three courses of action for disengaging two days earlier, focused on their relative effect on UNOSOM:

1. 45-Day Withdrawal (15 November 1993): High probability of UNOSOM collapse and rapid exodus of contributors
2. 90-Day Withdrawal (1 January 1994): Medium-to-low probability UNOSOM would stay viable. Reasonable possibility of avoiding characterization that departure was a tactical defeat brought about by Aideed.
3. 180-Day Withdrawal (1 April 1994): Consistent with US commitments and a reasonable probability of continued UNOSOM engagement.\(^{150}\)

Powell’s recommendation also came immediately on the heels of the Senate’s non-binding “Sense of Congress” resolution on 29 September, stating President Clinton should seek Congressional authorization by 15 November in order for US troop deployments to continue. President Clinton realized “the urgency of getting the political track back on pace, because in the end, every peacekeeping mission, or every humanitarian mission has to have a date certain when it's over.”\(^{151}\) Still, no evidence was found to suggest President Clinton himself considered disengagement as an option prior to the 3 October attacks. By 7 October 1993 when President Clinton addressed the nation, his personal aspiration level for Somalia had collapsed from the idealistic goals of peace making and nation building to the concrete, realistic goals of getting out. As Congressional action loomed after 3 October 1993, the major factor reinforcing Clinton’s commitment to achieving his new aspiration of disengagement was his desire to avoid losing the initiative to Congress and leaving his presidency looking weak so early in his term.

The major constraint Clinton faced in meeting his new disengagement objective was his overarching desire to validate UN peacekeeping as a legitimate use for US military forces. The risk in a US withdrawal was the unraveling of UNOSOM II. “Other nations felt the US had pressed them to participate, so why take on risks the US was unwilling to take?”\(^{152}\) Thus, the related constraint was Clinton’s desire not to have any subsequent failure of UNOSOM II

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\(^{150}\) Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 54.


\(^{152}\) Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 62.
attributed to the US withdrawal. With these constraints in mind, Clinton chose the longest-term option, a 31 March 1994 deadline for US withdrawal. After 3 October 1993, Clinton decided on a strategy of disengagement. To diffuse the immediate concerns and to demonstrate clearly a change of course, on 19 October 1993, President Clinton ordered 750 US Army Rangers, the most-recent additions for tracking Aideed and high-casualty recipients of the Mogadishu attacks, out of Somalia.\textsuperscript{153} On 28 November 1993, a four-phase withdrawal plan was approved:

1. Prepare air and sea points of exit
2. Reduce forces to 5-6,000; transfer most logistics to contractors by 31 December 1993
3. Transfer all logistics functions; give QRF to UN forces by early March 1994
4. Complete withdrawal by 31 March 1994\textsuperscript{154}

After 3 October 1993, President Clinton was forced by situational constraints to reconsider his aspirations for Somalia. Specifically, Congress was anxious to withdraw US forces from Somalia and presented a legitimate, bipartisan threat to do so against the President’s will. Loss of control of the employment (and disengagement) of US military forces as Commander-in-Chief was a risk Clinton could not ignore. His only alternative to Congressional intervention was to beg for more time. He ultimately had to lobby and cajole enough senators to pass a compromise measure that forced US troops out within six months unless Congress approved otherwise.\textsuperscript{155} His decision was to disengage, but to delay final disengagement as long as possible.

\textit{Summary}

President Clinton was clearly aware of the risks of disengaging US forces too precipitously after the attacks of 3 October 1993. Yet even when disengagement became the objective, his personal aspiration to salvage some credibility for multilateral peacekeeping operations moderated disengagement. He was aware of the risks, but did not heed them due to high deliberation, a preference for structure, or high anxiety. Instead, President Clinton behaved as his personality profile would suggest; he did not simply ignore the risks, but rather tempered them through framing. His Sensation-Seeking Intuiting personal style led him to frame


\textsuperscript{154} Poole, \textit{The Effort To Save Somalia}, 62.

\textsuperscript{155} Branch, \textit{The Clinton Tapes}, 4. The author documents his presence during approximately a half hour in which the President called five key senators he needed to sway.
disengagement negatively, as a certain loss, making most any alternative an exciting, risky opportunity worth taking. This approach supported his lofty aspirations for peacekeeping and nation-building elsewhere, even when faced with no alternative to disengagement in Somalia.

President Clinton again demonstrates that though he has two of the three traits of a Calm Insensitive Perceiving president, and none of those of an Anxious Sensitive Judging one, his personal style of a Sensation Seeking Intuiting president still seems to factor into his decision-making. Clinton’s high overall Openness (O) appears to work with his Intuiting (MBTI-N) trait to offset his Perceiver’s (MBTI-P) spontaneity and low Deliberation (C6) tendency toward rash decision-making. Slow and reversible decisions are a Clinton hallmark, and his Openness to Action (O4), adventurous nature (E5), and abstract Intuition (MBTI-N) left him open to a drastic new direction after a dramatic change in the facts. Clinton was aware of the risks of disengagement, but initially set the bar of his aspiration level so high that disengagement was out of the question, IAW H4. Only after the situation changed so dramatically that Clinton risked losing executive authority to Congress did he lower his aspiration level not only to include disengagement, but to include it almost exclusively. When forced to change his aspiration level by Congressional and public pressure, Clinton still opted for the longest withdrawal option that best mitigated the risks of UN failure, a perceived victory for Aideed, and the loss of personal and national prestige from cutting and running. In effect, he framed protracted disengagement positively in order to accept its risks for gains.

Ultimately, President Clinton’s behavior suggests as an Insensitive Perceiving (though not unusually Calm) president, his disengagement decisions were risk (but not frame) invariant (H1); as a Sensation-Seeking Intuiting president, he was risk-acceptant for disengagement’s gains (H2b) and set ambitious aspiration levels (H3b); but by setting high aspirations, and framing disengagement negatively, Clinton tended to preclude disengagement from consideration (H4).

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156 Clinton opted for a compromise deal with Senator Robert Byrd (D-WVa) that bound Clinton to withdraw forces in six months unless Congress expressly agreed to an extension. The Byrd compromise narrowly beat Senator John McCain’s (R-AZ) immediate withdrawal amendment. See Branch, *The Clinton Tapes*, Kindle Location 133.
Conclusions: Presidential Risk Behavior in Disengagement from Somalia

Table 4.3. Summary of Results of the Somalia Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risk Perception</th>
<th>Risk Predisposition &amp; Framing Effect</th>
<th>Reference Effect</th>
<th>Aspiration Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>H2a</td>
<td>H2b</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.H.W. Bush</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clinton (May ’93)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clinton (Oct ’93)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note: (X = model prediction  Shading = observed)

H1: Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant.

H2: Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style.

H2a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents are risk-averse, particularly when disengagement is framed as a loss.

H2b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain.

H2c: Open Deliberate Judging presidents are risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain (IAW prospect theory).

H3a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents set unusually low aspiration levels.

H3b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels.

H4: The president’s aspiration level (acting as a situational constraint) is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving (or surpassing) the aspiration level in a particular case.

As summarized in Table 4.3, the trait-based model accurately predicted and explains President George H. W. Bush’s disengagement decision-making in Somalia. His risk profile is that of an Open to Action (O4), Excitement-Seeking (E5), Judger (MBTI-J). He is expected to be aware of risks and consider them in setting his aspiration level and framing disengagement. Average in most measures of risk-related traits, his personal style suggests at least a moderate predisposition toward risk-acceptance. At the same time, he shows the traits suggesting, however weakly, a potential for the reference effect in accordance with prospect theory. He should either accept a riskier (higher variance) strategy regardless of frame, or alternatively be risk-averse for disengagement gains. In the Somalia case, President Bush was clearly aware of the risks in both engagement and disengagement. Containing mission creep and disengaging as soon as the mission objectives were met were central to his aspirations. Bush viewed staying engaged in Somalia as the riskiest option in the long-term, fearing a quagmire of mission creep and expectations that would rise even as their achievability declined. Yet he accepted the riskier option, discounting disengagement as impractical in the extremely limited time he had remaining.

Prospect theory fails to offer a convincing explanation for President Bush’s behavior expressly because it offers so many alternatives. On the one hand, Bush framed disengagement
positively, and as his days in office waned proved averse to claiming those gains, so can be seen as risk-averse for gains. Alternatively, deciding from the frame of losses, Bush can be seen as accepting the greater long-term risk of continued engagement to avoid the near certain loss of disengaging before achieving the mission’s objectives. Considering finally that the correlation of risk-associated traits with prospect theory is weak, and that President Bush does not fully match the weak profile, the decision begs a better explanation.

Bush is not only average in Deliberation (C6), but is low overall in Conscientiousness (C), which by its correlation to Judging (MBTI-J) suggests he is not a strong Judger. Conversely, Openness-to-Action (O4) is also a trait for risk-acceptance, and President Bush is high on Excitement-Seeking (E5), though not otherwise particularly Open (O/O1) or Intuiting (MBTI-N). A risk-acceptant explanation proves better because Bush accepted what was to him the riskiest option in the timeframe within which he had to decide. President Bush clearly framed disengagement positively, but framing was inconsequential as the UN simply was not ready for handover of responsibility before he left office. The President believed in disengagement’s gains, and it may have been the relatively riskier immediate option due to timing, but he did not choose it precisely because the time constraint precluded disengagement. Put simply, President Bush wanted to disengage, but not at all costs. The core mission objectives, including an orderly handover to the UN, had to be achieved first. This is the difference between Somalia and Operation Desert Storm, where Bush accepted the risks of disengagement for their perceived gains. We cannot know how President Bush’s disengagement decision might have changed given more time, only that he actually discounted disengagement as unable to fully meet his aspiration in the time allowed. Instead, he initiated the withdrawal and deferred to his successor.

Bush’s successor, President Bill Clinton’s behavior is not as clearly predicted or explained by the trait-based model. The key observation is in the Risk Perception Stage of the model, where President Bill Clinton’s personality profile most closely matches that of a Risk and Frame Invariant type. Clinton is an Insensitive Perceiver, with low Deliberation (C6) and prone to Spontaneity (MBTI-P). As such he may be unaware of risk or more likely ignore the risk factors in his decisions. Here we see a challenge to the trait-based model, as it might forego Clinton’s personal style going from the awareness stage straight to the decision stage. However, as he lacks the overly low Anxiety (N1) facet, he is expected to be influenced by framing, which
in turn shapes aspirations. Setting aspirations and frames reflects Clinton’s Sensation-Seeking Intuiting profile, specifically a propensity for risk-acceptance in the gain frame. So while President Clinton can be seen as inclined to ignore risks, it is more accurate to say he is aware of risk and considers it in his decision-making calculus, but is inclined to spin (frame) risk to support his desired course of action. A lawyer at heart, one biographer notes Clinton is, “the supreme relativist...he believed in right and wrong, surely, but also believed that on most questions there were all manner of ways to split the difference.”157 The core of his famous third way, in terms of risk-related personality traits, is his high Openness (O), extremely high Excitement-Seeking (E5), and Intuiting (MBTI-N) nature. The resultant fascination with novel problems and seemingly unending analysis of alternatives overwhelms his much less extreme predilection toward Spontaneity (MBTI-P) and low Deliberation (C6).

Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) was a humanitarian mission that evolved into a UN peacekeeping mission with UNOSOM II, but broke with UN traditions for peacekeeping. Since its first deployment of peacekeepers in June 1948, UN peacekeeping missions stuck to six core principles:

1. Oversee compliance with extant cease-fire or armistice
2. Deploy with consent of conflicting parties
3. Be neutral
4. Operate under supervision of UN Secretary-General
5. Be lightly armed and use force sparingly
6. Not to be drawn from the five permanent members of the Security Council.158

UNOSOM II initially violated at least two (4, 6) and eventually perhaps all six of these principles.

Judging by the UN’s record, disengagement seems antithetical to the standing principles of peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping is a means for containing problems, not solving them. At the time of RESTORE HOPE, nearly every peacekeeping mission ever undertaken remained in place. Such deployments were typically small and consisted of either no American forces, or only a small contingent of specialized support personnel. Some might take that to mean disengagement would not be particularly important as US forces began participating in

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157 Harris, *The Survivor*, 68.
peacekeeping operations. However, overextension can become as great a problem in several small-scale enduring peacekeeping operations as in one major combat operation. Further, there is no denying that being involved at any level increases the chances of escalation. The explosion of small-scale operations defined the situation in the 1990s. President Bush noted in September 1991, “The United Nations has mounted more peacekeeping missions in the last thirty-six months than during the first forty-three years.”\(^{159}\) From 1988 to 1992, the number of peacekeepers deployed worldwide grew from 11,000 to 44,000, and to over 80,000 by December 1994. If the US was to begin engaging in UN peacekeeping operations, disengagement would thus be even more critical.

On 1 December 1992, just before the first US Marines landed at Mogadishu, Ambassador Smith Hempstone sent the State Department a cable titled “The Somali Tarbaby” that proved remarkably prescient:

“Somalis...are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run attacks...If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.

To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)?...I have heard estimates...that it will take five years to get Somalia not on its feet but just on its knees....

Finally, what will we leave behind when we depart? The Somali is treacherous. The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as tough as his country, and just as unforgiving...We ought to have learned by now that these situations are easier to get into than to get out of, that no good deed goes unpunished.”\(^{160}\)

Both President Bush’s and President Clinton’s advisors in the Deputies Committee, in keeping with the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, actively included an exit strategy in their deliberations over the Somalia intervention from as early as 28 September 1992. Ambassador Hempstone’s December cable to the State Department was preceded by his 30 October 1992 unsolicited warning to the Deputies Committee. Hempstone advocated disengaging after Operation Provide Relief, in effect not taking on UNITAF, proposing, “Now is the time to declare victory in Somalia and go home, if only to regroup for other missions.”\(^{161}\) No evidence


\(^{161}\) Poole, *The Effort To Save Somalia*, 12.
was found to suggest President Bush (nor President-elect Clinton) was aware of Ambassador Hempstone’s recommendation, as the National Security Council (NSC) Principals did not meet about Somalia until late November 1992. Disengagement did not win the day in the face of images of starving Somalis and UN predictions of 1.5 million Somalis facing imminent starvation. With the transition to the expanded UNOSOM II mission, disengagement fell farther from President Clinton’s new, higher aspiration level of disarmament, peacemaking, and nation building. Disaster and a looming threat of Congressional intervention forced the bar back down. A year after Ambassador Hempstone’s advocacy note to the Bush’s Deputies Committee, in November 1993 the Joint Staff “J-5 advocated an intensive media campaign declaring UNOSOM’s primary mission a success because starvation had been stopped, and placing Somalia’s future squarely in the hands of its people.”

One outcome from the lessons of Somalia was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, which hoped to mitigate presidential risk behavior by setting standards similar to those of the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine for US participation in UN peace operations. Per PDD-25, the US would call for or vote for multilateral peace operations when:

1. UN members provide forces and funds
2. Political and military objectives are judged clear and feasible
3. UN involvement represents the best means of advancing US interests
4. US or competent regional command (e.g. NATO) if combat is likely

If the CNN effect was influential in getting the US engaged in Somalia, it was similarly influential in disengagement. President Clinton’s UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright noted, “Television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan.” The effect was not lost on adversaries either. Osama bin Laden publicly noted, “when tens of your soldiers were killed

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162 Ibid., 6-7.
163 Ibid., 63.
in minor battles [in Somalia] and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.”\textsuperscript{166}

Images of dead Americans clearly erode public support and all the more so when vital US interests are not at stake. One of the consistently recognized and enunciated risks in disengagement is the concern that withdrawing without a clear victory will significantly damage US prestige. Reversing course and disengaging from such an operation is comparatively easy when vital interests are not at stake, but it is fuel for foreign and domestic adversaries who will always find fault with any course of action. The important flip side to this fear that is underappreciated is that especially for conflicts and crises which do not directly threaten key US interests, once the US is no longer involved, attention is no longer overwhelming, and certainly doesn’t compare to the stark critical attention direct involvement brings.

The twenty-one month US involvement in Somalia was led by two presidents with very different personalities. Despite different awareness profiles, both appeared risk aware and both seemed to consider the risks of disengagement in their decision-making. They shared similar views on multilateral internationalism in the new world order, but framed the risks of military disengagement very differently; Bush saw the upside in avoiding quagmires, Clinton mainly the downside of diminished influence. Still, despite their personality differences, their similarities led them both to risk-acceptant decisions. President Bush actively fought to keep aspiration levels low and realistic, yet ironically, given the extreme constraints of time and reliance on UN action, his aspiration proved over-ambitious. He framed disengagement positively, but could not realize his disengagement goal and provide a smooth, realistic handoff to the follow-on UN force. He thus accepted the greatest risk in his view, mission creep and getting sucked deeper into a quagmire, over a premature disengagement that would leave the UNOSOM II mission unprepared. He started the process in a token way, but delayed the final disengagement decision so as not to limit the new President. President Clinton, conversely, brought a much more expansive vision of the US role in UN peace operations, one which raised the aspiration level far beyond what disengagement could achieve. Where Bush saw the gains in disengagement in terms of avoiding an open-ended commitment to a potential quagmire, Clinton saw the risks of disengaging in terms of lost opportunities to prove his expansive vision. Only when domestic

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 4. Cites Bin Laden, Osama Bin Muhammad, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” August 23, 1996. Translation to English from Arabic by the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, originally published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper (London)
pressures made the risks of continuing too great to bear did Clinton reframe disengagement in a way more palatable to his preference for risk for gains.

President George H. W. Bush’s behavior supports the predictions of the three-stage model of decision under risk, including those of prospect theory, and perhaps more convincingly those of risk-acceptance. Unfortunately, the extreme time constraint involved precludes a clear conclusion. President Clinton’s behavior in Somalia, however, raises questions about the validity of the risk-invariant track of the three-stage model as presented. Clinton mostly matches the profile for both a risk-invariant and risk-acceptant President. The trait-based model appears to require more nuance to accommodate President Clinton’s risk-acceptant personal style if the risk-invariant type is valid. Though it certainly appears Clinton acknowledged the risks of disengagement, it can be argued that he ignored the risks of disengagement and his behavior in Somalia was instead influenced by something other than risk, namely framing, along with domestic political, media, and public pressure. On balance it seems Clinton behaved according to the expectations of the trait-based model for a Sensation-Seeking Intuiting President, accepting risks, especially for gains, and setting high aspiration levels which precluded disengagement until the aspirations were forced down to the point the President effectively had to disengage. Still, because of the lingering question of Clinton’s risk perception/awareness, it is important to consider President Clinton’s handling of another intervention of a different type.
Chapter Five

Balkans

*Those who understand the nature of this conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on unwilling participants.*

-- President George H. W. Bush

Introduction and Overview

Like Somalia, US interest in the collapse of the former Yugoslavia was a product of the end of Cold War, the New World Order, and the potential expansion of the UN Charter. At least in its early years, it was seen as an internal civil war. Unlike Somalia, however, the former Yugoslavia held the legacy of value to US and NATO in the traditional Cold War sense. The George H. W. Bush administration deliberately avoided becoming entangled in what it viewed as a no-win situation that was at least an internal issue, and at most a European issue.\(^1\) Establishing America’s role in the New World Order was important, but compared to Somalia it was much easier to stay out of Bosnia. The Russians were understandably more interested in Eastern Europe than the Horn of Africa, and as mentioned previously, the UN was more interested in US intervention in Africa than in the traditional white, western domain of Europe. While this was enough to keep the domestic-focused Clinton administration on the same course for some time, by a process of slow escalation and small footprints, eventually Clinton engaged US military forces in various operations that in sum would commit forces to the former Yugoslavia for nearly 15 years.

The cuts examined below trace the escalation of military intervention in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse. The Bosnia and Kosovo interventions are interesting because they test the disengagement hypotheses for small- and medium-scale operations, ranging from humanitarian airdrops, to compellent punitive airstrikes, to ground force peacekeeping operations. Further, they offer a variety of looks at President Clinton in different stages of his presidency, in contrast to the transitional phase under which Somalia unfolded.

The first period reviewed is the year of implementation after the Dayton Accords. President Clinton went against his stated positions by inserting US ground forces as part of the

UN peacekeeping force, and then failed to disengage those forces at the end of his stated one year timeframe. The second focal point similarly examines the opportunity to disengage US forces after the end of Operation Allied Force in 1999. Again, President Clinton resisted employing ground forces in combat operations, but subjected tens of thousands to a decade of deployments afterward.

As with the Somalia cases, each disengagement opportunity under examination follows the same structure. First, an overview provides necessary contextual information. Next, the relevant hypotheses are tested starting with the president’s risk awareness, then if risk propensity affects his aspiration level and his framing of disengagement, and the final decision.

The Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed along with its Communist Party as the Cold War ended. In the absence of its strong central government, the federation of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia quickly spun apart along nationalistic, religious, and cultural lines. Yugoslavia’s federal army, dominated by Serbian nationalists, in trying to hold the federation together actually exacerbated independence movements in the republics. The United Nations involvement began in the spring of 1992, when the UN Provisional Forces (UNPROFOR) entered Croatia several months after the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared independence in June 1991. With a significant Serb population and weak defenses, Croatia lost a quarter of its territory to Serbian forces. UNPROFOR was tasked with monitoring a negotiated ceasefire, but sporadic fighting broke out throughout late 1992 and 1993.²

In the US, pressure to engage began with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s declaration of independence in March 1992. The Bush administration had opposed recognition of breakaway states Croatia and Slovenia, fearing aggravation of the internal issues of Yugoslavia. Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia first by Germany and then by the European Community (EC), however, spurred Bosnia to split off as well in order to prevent domination and ethnic cleansing at the hands of Serbia. As feared, Bosnia’s proclamation, recognized by the US and EC in April 1992, brought Serbian forces quickly into Bosnia to take control of the new state. The UN expanded the UNPROFOR mandate to Bosnia in June 1992, sending 7,500 peacekeepers to monitor the many intermittent ceasefires. Paralleling Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s expansion of the UN Charter in Somalia, in August 1992 UNSCR 770 invoked

Chapter VII to authorize “all measures necessary” to facilitate humanitarian assistance. The US Air Force began what would become the longest airlift/airdrop operation in US history, initially flying supplies into the Sarajevo airport to bolster the besieged city.

Deepening UN and US involvement, UNSCR 781 established a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 1992, which led to a NATO-led, US-dominated enforcement mission, Operation Deny Flight, beginning on 12 April 1993. Among other sanctions and diplomatic actions, most critical proved to be an arms embargo the UN imposed on all players, which turned out to be a great advantage to the more powerful Serb forces. For the reasons discussed previously, President Bush limited US involvement at every turn, a fact on which candidate Clinton attacked him during the campaign. Once in office, President Clinton’s rhetoric was more assertive, but in action his policy toward Bosnia was largely as restrained as Bush’s had been.

President Clinton continued to pressure Western European countries throughout 1994 to take strong measures against the Serbs. Nevertheless, in November 1994, as the Serbs seemed on the verge of defeating the Muslims and Croats in several strongholds, Clinton changed course and called for conciliation with the Serbs. After the Bosnian Serbs shelled a Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August 1995, NATO, led by the United States, launched Operation Deliberate Force. The air campaign, a series of 3,500 sorties over two weeks, centered on airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets and was paired with a counteroffensive by a better-equipped Muslim and Croatian forces. The Bosnian Serbs were compelled to negotiate seriously, and ultimately the actions resulted in a peace agreement known as the Dayton Accords, leaving Bosnia as a single state made up of two separate entities with a central government. In the classic mold of normalizing gains into mission creep, the cost of success at Dayton was the continued use of military forces to keep the negotiated peace. President Clinton’s personality is apparent in the, “fundamental choice between narrowly construed peacekeeping (supervising a cease-fire, manning de facto borders, monitoring troop withdrawals, and redeploying weapons),” which Clinton the pragmatist executed, and the Dayton Accords’ rhetoric espousing, “a more expansive mission that would include significant involvement in such activities as the arrest of indicted war

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4 Ibid.
criminals, the return of people forced to leave their homes, and supervision of elections.”\(^5\) Here we see the classic Clinton trait of expansive goals balanced by pragmatic implementation. As a result of Dayton, the US committed 20,000 ground troops to a UN peacekeeping mission, for one-third of the UN force.

President Clinton promised the public and Congress that US ground forces would remain as part of the UN mission for only one year, but events on the ground continually delayed withdrawal. Still, in terms of casualties, and thus media attention, the next few years were relatively quiet.

The Balkan situation heated up again in the spring of 1998 as ethnic Albanian and Muslim residents of the autonomous province of Kosovo pushed for independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (union of Serbia and Montenegro). The UN, NATO, and the US attempted to impose the Rambouillet Agreement, effectively siding with the Kosovars and threatening the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav government with airstrikes if they did not comply. This led to the NATO-sanctioned, US-led Operation Allied Force, an air campaign beginning on 24 March 1999. Unlike previous operations in Bosnia, Allied Force was not approved or sanctioned by the UN General Assembly or Security Council, as Russia and China, both permanent Security Council members, strongly opposed NATO’s use of force in what they viewed as an internal Yugoslav matter. Operation Allied Force continued until Yugoslav leaders agreed to a NATO peace plan for Kosovo and Serb forces withdrew in June 1999.\(^6\)

**20 December 1996: President Bill Clinton**

The date of 20 December 1996 represents the expiration of the one-year mandate for the UN Initial Force (UNIFOR). It is significant because President Clinton explicitly promised the American people US ground forces would only be in Bosnia for one year to enforce the Dayton Accords. Per the initial agreement, and unlike the UN delays in Somalia, the UN established the follow-on Stability Force (SFOR) mission according to schedule on 12 December 1996. By the initial plan and promise, this should have been the opportunity to disengage US military forces and deescalate the situation from an extra-national intervention to a traditional non-US, UN peacekeeping mission, if not a strictly regional issue. So what took disengagement off the table?


\(^6\) Wikipedia ,"Foreign policy of the Bill Clinton administration.”
To understand the decision to remain after 20 December 1996 requires tracing President Clinton’s aspirations for the conflict from the beginning of his presidency. When President Clinton entered the Oval Office on 21 January 1993, US involvement in Bosnia was decidedly minimal. The US Air Force and Navy were conducting humanitarian airlift missions into Sarajevo in support of UN Operation Provide Promise. US Air Force units in Europe had participated locally in humanitarian airlift operations to provide relief supplies to Sarajevo as early as May 1992, but the main airlift mission under Operation Provide Promise began on 3 July 1992. However, President Bush and his key advisors “were united in the belief that the United States should avoid becoming bogged down in a protracted civil war.” Even UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was in agreement that Bosnia was not an American affair, at least if the tradeoff was US involvement in Somalia instead. President Bush’s stated aspiration was to provide humanitarian supplies to the besieged city of Sarajevo. His personal aspiration was to limit American involvement to delivery of humanitarian supplies until such time as the UN and/or NATO could secure a peaceful settlement, somewhat akin to what had happened earlier in 1992 in Croatia.

President Bush acknowledged that the airlift was not without risk. Just two months into the operation, an Italian cargo aircraft was downed by a surface-to-air missile, killing all four crewmembers. These proved to be the only deaths in the operation, but the lost aircraft was one of 93 hit by hostile fire and 270 total security incidents over the three-and-a-half year operation. In a 2 October 1992 exchange with reporters, Bush stated, “I wish I could say there is no risk of attack against these flights” as he restarted airlift operations.

Nine days after President Bush restarted airlift operations into Sarajevo, candidate Clinton exploited Bush’s lack of more aggressive action in Bosnia as a means to differentiate himself from the president on the campaign trail, particularly important, as President Bush’s greatest strength was foreign policy. In the 11 October 1992 presidential candidates’ debate, President Bush said he must not commit forces to Bosnia or Somalia until, “I know how those young men and women are going to get out of there as well as get in, know what the mission is

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and define it.”  

Clinton followed, applauding Bush’s advocacy of the no-fly zone and his push for enforcement of it. He went on to insist the US must do more, suggesting greater sanctions against the Yugoslav government and consideration of lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians. Finally, he agreed with Bush’s reluctance to commit ground forces, saying, “we can’t get involved in the quagmire, but we must do what we can.”

Candidate Clinton certainly wanted to differentiate himself from President Bush as more hawkish on Bosnia, and his comments were certainly tactical maneuvers, but “they also reflected the convictions of W. Anthony Lake, the campaign's foreign policy coordinator who became President Clinton's national security adviser.” In the 1992 campaign, Lake sat down in the Governor’s mansion in Little Rock to go over a draft speech and define where Clinton stood on foreign policy issues. Clinton quizzed Lake and audibly agreed to items he believed. Lake noted Clinton’s insistence that each item connect to his core beliefs, but also was impressed how little Clinton had considered the issues before. This is consistent with Clinton’s inexperience in foreign affairs, but also indicates his average Openness to Fantasy/Imagination (O1), or what Dr. Walter Weintraub notes as “a paucity of creative thinking,” Clinton’s strength as a leader instead being his, “ability to transmit other people’s ideas.” President Clinton’s aspiration level thus began as something more than Provide Comfort. The nebulous aspiration of more in Bosnia was constrained by Clinton’s assumption the public would not accept the introduction of US ground forces--what one administration official termed the “anti-Powell doctrine”--and by Clinton’s concerns over any policy that would embarrass Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

More to the point, and especially in the first year of his first term, President Clinton “seemed not very interested in foreign policy...and had no regularly scheduled meetings with his foreign policy team,” thus leaving Bosnia policy formulation largely to the National Security

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11 Ibid.
Council Principals Committee.¹⁶ The President reserved final policy decisions to himself, expecting options to choose from then letting Lake and others worry about the implications.¹⁷ At the end of a third long Principals meeting on 5 February 1993, Tony Lake invited President Clinton in to join the group to make his first decisions on what more would mean. President Clinton “rather casually” decided to: become directly involved in humanitarian action (airdrops into Muslim safe areas); ask the UN to authorize enforcement of the no-fly zones; seek tightening of economic sanctions; appoint an envoy to ongoing talks mediated by UN envoy and former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and European Community (EC) envoy Lord Owen of Britain (the so-called Vance-Owen Plan); reiterate President Bush’s warning to Serbia not to cause trouble in the autonomous region of Kosovo; and help enforce any peace agreement willingly signed by all parties.¹⁸

President Clinton’s aspirations clearly required a positive change from the status quo. US military involvement would escalate from airlift operations into Sarajevo to include airdrops into contested territory, would include active enforcement by combat aircraft of no-fly zones in contested airspace, and most importantly, would eventually deploy ground forces as peacekeepers. This last commitment is significant as it was contrary to traditional UN peacekeeping norms barring participation by Security Council permanent members.¹⁹ Given the history of failed ceasefires, Secretary of Defense Aspin expressed doubts about the viability of any enforcement regime privately and publicly, but General Colin Powell had agreed to the mission in a Principals meeting and later in a confirmatory phone call from President Clinton, so the commitment was made.²⁰

In the immediate wake of these decisions, President Clinton drew the most fire for intervening in the Vance-Owen negotiations, which called for the division of Bosnia into ten

¹⁶ Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 144-5. The Principals consisted of Anthony Lake (National Security Advisor), William Christopher (Sec State), Les Aspin (Sec Def), Colin Powell (Chmn, JCS), James Woolsey (CIA Dir), and Madeleine Albright (Ambassador to UN). Sandy Berger (Asst NSA) and Leon Feurth (VP Gore’s NSC rep) also sat in most meetings. When President Clinton attended, VP Gore and Mack McLarty (Clinton’s Chief of Staff) would also attend.
¹⁸ Drew, On the Edge, 146.
¹⁹ As noted in Kirkpatrick, Making War to Keep Peace, 69. Since June 1948, UN peacekeeping missions followed six core principles: 1. Oversee compliance with extant cease-fire or armistice; 2. Deploy with consent of conflicting parties; 3. Be neutral; 4. Operate under supervision of UN Secretary-General; 5. Be lightly armed and use force sparingly; 6. Not to be drawn from the five permanent members of the Security Council.
²⁰ Drew, On the Edge, 147. Between the start of hostilities and Jimmy Carter’s December 1994 agreement, no less than 13 cease-fires were agreed to and broken. For more, see Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 38.
semi-autonomous provinces. Clinton felt the Vance-Owen Plan as it existed rewarded Serb aggression, was unfair to the Bosnian Muslims, essentially was being imposed on the minority Muslims, and that its maze of borders was effectively unenforceable.\textsuperscript{21} Clinton appeared to be taking sides in the conflict, also contrary to UN norms, though he believed the European powers had already done so, showing anti-Muslim biases.\textsuperscript{22} On the same day William Christopher announced the new policy decisions, 10 February 1993, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali endorsed Vance-Owen and obliquely blamed Clinton’s criticism of the plan for building up hope for a better plan among the Bosnian Muslims and thus causing their unwillingness to accept Vance-Owen.\textsuperscript{23}

Showing his characteristic openness, President Clinton was open to alternative peace plans. Dr. Margaret Hermann points out that Clinton’s profile suggests a leader who prefers to be reactive, waiting to see how a situation is likely to play out before taking a position. Such leaders want to lead only when the odds are in favor of success and like to test ideas before deciding, their caution making it possible to blame others for setbacks.\textsuperscript{24} Since the campaign, candidate Clinton had felt the Bosnian Muslims were at a fundamental disadvantage, worsened by the arms embargo. He found it morally wrong to prevent a people under attack from defending themselves. By late March 1993, the Bosnian Muslims had agreed to sign a modified Vance-Owen plan, so Tony Lake began pushing the Principals to move to a new phase in US Bosnia policy. President Clinton wanted to lift the arms embargo as a cost-free way for the US to affect the war, but the allies with peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia opposed the move.\textsuperscript{25}

Through April 1993, the new additions to Clinton’s Bosnia policy solidified into a proposal known as lift and strike. Lift and strike was an outgrowth of a request in the summer of

\textsuperscript{22} Taylor Branch, \textit{The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), Kindle Locations 229-235. Clinton said the UK and France considered Bosnia “unnatural” as the only Muslim nation in Europe, and claimed they favored the embargo precisely because it locked in Bosnia’s disadvantage. “While upholding their peacekeepers as a badge of commitment, they turned these troops effectively into a shield for the steady dismemberment of Bosnia by Serb forces.” Clinton said President François Mitterrand of France had been especially blunt in saying that Bosnia did not belong, and that British officials also spoke of a painful but realistic restoration of Christian Europe.
\textsuperscript{23} Lewis, “U.N. Chief Backing Vance-Owen Plan.”
1992 from Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović to lift the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims in order to balance the conflict, while simultaneously threatening air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Clinton had initially opposed lift and strike, but as the presidential campaign progressed, he adopted the policy, leading some to believe it was only an expedient to contrast himself with President Bush. Once in the White House, he had not led with lift and strike, but a White House meeting with Bosnian President Izetbegović on 26 March seems to have revived the idea. Unlike the initial decisions in February, however, in April President Clinton demonstrated his more typical drawn-out decision style. He postponed decisions through a series of April NSC Principals meetings.

It appears President Clinton was wrestling with inconsistencies in his aspirations for lift and strike. He wanted to level the playing field by lifting the embargo, but faced opposition from NATO and the UN. He wanted an agreed peace between parties who were content to keep fighting. He wanted no US ground force presence, but had already relented to forces for peace enforcement. He wanted to use air strikes to compel the Bosnian Serbs to agree to his revised Vance-Owen plan, but his own military and intelligence assessments suggested the target list was too sparse to render the desired effect. For the aspiration to be militarily achievable, a large contingent of air and ground forces would be required to ensure success, but then, policymakers were told, “you might not be able to get out.” Disengagement was clearly a concern for President Clinton, as in the April Principals meetings he would repeatedly question advocates of various policies on, among other things, “How do we extricate ourselves if we do X?” Perhaps the overarching aspiration was for the US to help in Bosnia without making it an American problem. Yet, continuing debate of options consistently exposed the problem that “any result achievable without a great commitment of force would in effect recognize ethnic cleansing.”

After a month of agonizingly long meetings one high-level official characterized as not “policy-making [but rather] group therapy,” all that had been determined by the President was

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29 Ibid., 149.
30 Ibid., 150.
31 Ibid., 149.
that the US would not act unilaterally. The American public overwhelmingly opposed unilateral action and lack of public support would make gaining the support of allies more difficult, which in turn would further poison domestic public opinion. Again typical of Clinton, foreign policy decision-making was influenced heavily by domestic public opinion. Still, public opinion was not completely pacific. Americans and the world watched the siege of Srebrenica as the city was reportedly about to fall on 16 April 1993. The next day in a press conference, President Clinton was asked about the situation, and responded, “At this point, I would not rule out any option except the option I have never ruled in, which was the question of American ground troops.”

President Clinton was committed to his aspiration of not introducing US ground forces into an active shooting war, but nonetheless found his aspirations for lift and strike constrained by the NATO allies’ UN ground forces. The United Kingdom and France felt lift and strike put their peacekeepers at risk. Germany and Russia agreed. At the same news conference in which he ruled out ground troops, Clinton was asked about US leadership regarding lift and strike. He responded, “I think the time has come for the United States and Europe to look honestly at where we are and what our options are and what the consequences of various courses of action will be. And I think we have to consider things which at least previously have been unacceptable to some of the Security Council members and some of those in NATO.”

All this culminated in a decision at the 1 May 1993 NSC Principals meeting. President Clinton committed to making a decision, but this meant the meeting lasted five hours, as every option except US ground forces was reexamined. While this might seem contrary to Clinton’s low Deliberation (C6) score, in his case it is more indicative of his high Openness (O) and very high Openness to Action (O4) traits, or in Myers-Briggs terms his Intuiting (ENFP) preference for information gathering and open-ended solutions. This particular personality trait was consistent and maddening to subordinates, as “[a]ny matter that seemed to be closed was sure to be reopened. This was Clinton’s way of reassuring himself that all risks had been considered.”

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32 Ibid., 149.
33 Ibid., 149.
35 Drew, On the Edge, 151.
36 Harris, The Survivor, 80.
Table 5.1. Summary of Risk Traits for President Bill Clinton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Perception/Awareness</th>
<th>Calm/Insensitive / Perceiving</th>
<th>Anxious/Sensitive/Judging</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Propensity</td>
<td>Risk Invariant</td>
<td>Risk Averse Agreeable/Altruist/Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-C6 -N1 MBTI-P +A +A3 MBTI-F +O +O1 +O4 +E5 MBTI-N +C6 +O4 MBTI-J</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton ENFP</td>
<td>36.2 49.2 P 42.8 47.7 F 59.1 49.5 59.3 70.9 N 36.2 59.3 P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>48.9 48.7 42.9 46.9 43.9 46.5 43.2 51.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rating*</td>
<td>Low Avg Avg High Avg VH EH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meets</td>
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* -1 SD<Low<-.5 SD; -.5 SD < Average (Avg) < +.5 SD; +1 SD < High < +1.5 SD; +1.5 SD < Very High (VH)< +2 SD; +2 SD<Extremely High (EH)

Bill Clinton is expected to ignore risks and may act spontaneously. He has high information needs. Decisions may appear risk averse or acceptant dependent on circumstances.

Figure 5.1. President Bill Clinton’s Expected Risk Behavior
Risk Awareness

Beginning the three-stage model, assessing President Clinton’s risk-perception or awareness starts at the same point as his initial disengagement opportunity in Somalia. The key difference is that candidate Clinton had been much more vocal about Bosnia than Somalia and unlike Somalia, US participation was minor overall and there were no ground forces in Bosnia when Clinton took over decision-making. While the President would at times complain of inheriting Bosnia as he had about Somalia, he was clearly more engaged and interested in Bosnia. By staking a more hawkish position in the campaign, he also owned Bosnia policy more decidedly than that of Somalia. To review, President Clinton’s low Deliberation (C6), and Perceiving (MBTI-P) preference make him potentially risk insensitive (risk but not frame invariant), though he is slightly above the mean on Anxiousness (N1). If this is the case, we should expect President Clinton to obviously disregard the risks of disengagement and/or show a demonstrable lack of awareness of those risks. In order to test hypothesis 1 (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant) on risk-perception, we need evidence that shows President Clinton was never briefed on the risks of disengaging forces from Bosnia, did not himself recognize or acknowledge said risks, or was clearly dismissive of risk in his decision-making.

There is some evidence of risk ignorance in President Clinton’s decision-making in Bosnia. However, only in his initial policy decisions on 5 February 1993 is President Clinton’s very low Deliberation (C6) apparent as rashness. Upon closer examination, though, the 5 February decisions did not include much by way of specific new engagement actions. Clinton is known for wanting it both ways, effectively hedging the often extreme risks evident in his rhetoric with comparatively passive action. He decided to become more directly involved in “non-combat” humanitarian action, sought actions from the UN, inserted the US into peace talks, and reiterated Bush’s warnings. None of these actions was specific enough to raise concern over how to disengage from them if they proved ineffective. The one decision that would become problematic was Clinton’s pledge to help enforce a peace agreement. While this too was non-specific in terms of means, it very quickly turned into a commitment of ground forces. In light

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38 Drew, On the Edge, 146.
of the UN Secretary General’s push to expand the scope of peacekeeping operations into the realm of nation building, in retrospect this proved a commitment that could have benefitted from more thought.

Rashness in these decisions may be attributed fairly to lack of presidential experience and attention. By design, Tony Lake’s role as National Security Advisor carried over a responsibility from the campaign, keeping foreign policy off the President’s screen so as to not interfere with his domestic business.³⁹ Unlike Somalia, however, lack of attention to Bosnia was not central. The Principals did meet extensively on Bosnia and the President was personally involved in decision-making.

Alternatively, if Clinton is risk-aware, we expect his personal style as a Sensation-Seeking Intuiting president to lead him to be risk-acceptant, with the preference intensified for risks framed as gains, IAW hypothesis 2b. Additionally we should expect him to set unusually high or ambitious aspiration levels, IAW hypothesis 3b. In order to test hypotheses 2b and 3b, we need evidence of the discussion and consideration of disengagement risks.

From the campaign debates throughout execution, evidence for Clinton’s risk awareness is abundant. The imagery of getting mired in a quagmire was a continuing theme in discussions on Bosnia, from “we can’t get involved in the quagmire”⁴⁰ in the campaign to, “This thing is a no-winner, it’s going to be a quagmire. Let’s not make it our quagmire.”⁴¹ But the risk of getting mired is effectively the opposite of the risks incurred by disengaging. Getting mired is the risk of not being able to disengage, vice the risks incurred by disengaging. The disengagement decision must overcome whatever interests led to intervention. President Clinton clearly acknowledged the risk of getting mired and finding it difficult to disengage. There is less evidence of concern over what might happen if and when US involvement was curtailed.

Candidate and President Clinton felt the US needed to do “whatever it takes to stop the slaughter of civilians” in Bosnia.⁴² The problem with such idealistic platitudes is once you commit to them, disengaging without a total stop to the slaughter appears as a moral retreat. President Clinton had a “propensity for making public statements indicating strong action on

⁴⁰ Bush, “Presidential Debate in St. Louis.”
⁴² Harris, *The Survivor*, 44.
Bosnia before he had a policy,” and members of his foreign policy team talked to him about it.\textsuperscript{43} That he didn’t take the actions he spoke of shows he was risk aware, retreating from idealistic/moralistic stances in favor of pragmatism/practicality.”\textsuperscript{44} What is interesting in President Clinton’s case is that for all the concern he expressed over the risks involved in injecting ground forces into the mix in Bosnia, no evidence was found that he was concerned about how to disengage from the various air operations he initiated. Perhaps he simply assumed once a peace agreement was reached, disengaging from airland missions into Sarajevo and airdrop missions over safe areas would simply end when no longer needed. At the same time, it is possible the President intended no-fly zone enforcement and other air operations to become the US contribution to a UN peace enforcement mission. This would be consistent with President Clinton’s hedging strategy toward risk, whereby he could keep the US involved in multilateral operations, but in a way that minimized the physical risk and commitment.\textsuperscript{45}

Disengagement concerns arose when peace agreements appeared imminent. First was the panic in September 1993 when an agreement seemed likely, raising the issue of getting the public and Congress behind a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia while both were pushing for disengagement from a similar mission in Somalia. Second was the period during which the Dayton Accords were being negotiated through the end of the promised one-year peacekeeping mission. In both cases, the concern was that the failure to deploy peacekeepers at worst could prevent the signing of a peace agreement, or at best would undermine the word of the President of the United States. Specific to the second case, as talks concluded and the principals initialed the agreement in Dayton, the President began his push for Congressional and public support of the required troop deployment. In his initial press conference announcing the agreement he stated, “All the parties have asked for a strong international force to supervise the separation of forces and to give them confidence that each side will live up to their agreements. Only NATO can do that job.” He went on to assert, “the United States as NATO’s leader must play an essential role in this mission.” This set up his definition of the risk of disengagement: “Without us, the hard-won peace would be lost, the war would resume, the slaughter of innocents would

\textsuperscript{43} Drew, \textit{On the Edge}, 159.
\textsuperscript{44} Harris, \textit{The Survivor}, 52.
begin again, and the conflict that already has claimed so many people could spread like poison throughout the entire region.\textsuperscript{46} 

President Clinton repeated these talking points in his public address to the American people on 27 November 1995. With the country’s and his own personal credibility on the line, Clinton now needed public support. The administration's official position was that it would welcome Congress' approval for the deployment but did not require it to send US troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{47} That said, the President built up the justification, drawing parallels to the two World Wars and the Marshall Plan, warning, “America’s commitment to leadership will be questioned if we refuse to participate in implementing a peace agreement we brokered right here in the United States.”\textsuperscript{48} While all this was deemed necessary to build support for the deployment, at the same time it set a high aspirational bar to attain in the one year the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs Chairman projected would be necessary for the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to achieve its mission.

By November 1996, the press was already picking up rumblings that the one-year IFOR commitment likely would be extended until at least March 1997. When questioned if the US would leave troops behind as part of a Stabilization Force (SFOR), the President first claimed the three-and-a-half month timeline was only the required drawdown period, then adding that NATO had been asked to consider a different, smaller, more limited mission than IFOR. At the time, he couched IFOR as having “worked very well,” but did not commit to a follow-on to IFOR, nor did he answer the direct question if any US forces would stay over for SFOR.\textsuperscript{49} A week later, on 15 November 1996, President Clinton stated in a press briefing, “IFOR has succeeded beyond our expectations. As a result, its mission will end as planned on December 20th, and every


single item on IFOR’s military checklist has been accomplished.”50 It seemed the textbook definition of a lead-in to the disengagement plan as he proceeded to outline the remarkable achievements. Then with a giant unspoken, “but,” President Clinton revealed that civilian progress had not matched that of the military. A “strong but limited military presence in Bosnia, able to respond quickly and decisively to any violations of the ceasefire” would be necessary to “prevent a resumption of hostilities so that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation can accelerate.”51 The good news to take away was that the IFOR force, while not completely withdrawn, would shrink to less than half its size, or about 8,500 troops. The President promised reviews every six months, with an expected further drawdown of about half by December 1997, and finally the withdrawal of all forces by June 1998.52 The risk in disengaging, again, was that of losing recent gains. There can be little doubt that this decision was eased by the fact there were no combat casualties during the IFOR mission.53 Risk ignorance, per hypothesis H1, is not completely absent, but as in Somalia, President Clinton’s course was not determined by risk. Rather, he minimized risks and spun them in ways that supported his desired way ahead. The result is weak support for hypothesis H1 but observed behavior more in keeping with hypothesis H2, though Clinton possesses no traits of the Anxious, Sensitive, Judging profile.

**Risk Propensity and Aspiration Level**

Bill Clinton may be invariant, but he is acutely sensitive to framing and indeed is adroit at its practice. His dominant personality traits are consistent with a Risk-Acceptant personal style. To be categorized as Risk-Acceptant, Clinton should be a Sensation-Seeking, Open, Intuiting president. While Clinton is generally considered a Feeling type (ENFP), which can be associated with risk aversion, his FFM scores suggest he is average, so statistically unlikely to have a dominant Feeling preference. It is more likely that MBTI typers confuse Clinton’s famous empathy for Altruism (A3). More significant from MBTI is that Clinton is likely an Intuiting type (ENFP), indicating a preference for accepting risks for future gains. He is rated very near the mean for presidents on the FFM facet of Openness to Fantasy/Imagination (O1)

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51 Ibid., 2394.
52 Ibid., 2394.
facet. He is high (one standard deviation above the mean) on the Openness (O) trait, very high (one-and-a-half times the standard deviation) on Openness to Action (O4), and is extremely high (two standard deviations above the mean) on Excitement-Seeking (E5). Clinton is therefore expected to behave according to hypothesis 2b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain) and hypothesis 3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels).

Clinton’s core belief, and thus his overarching aspiration in Bosnia was for the US to be involved and engaged in a leadership role. Yet as a pragmatic politician, he understood he had to accommodate the national will. As John Harris observed in The Survivor, “Clinton was first a romantic. But he was second -- and more emphatically -- a realist.” So in Bosnia the US had to be more involved, but without the risks inherent to ground force involvement. Yet as time went on and ground troop involvement became inevitable, President Clinton warmed to the low-risk employment of US ground forces. So long as the risks to ground troops could be minimized, Clinton rationalized, disengagement was not necessarily desirable. The President’s 3 June 1995 radio address was very revealing, stating:

“We will use them [ground forces] only if, first, if there is a genuine peace with no shooting and no fighting, and the United States is part of policing that peace. That’s exactly what we’ve been doing in the Middle East since the late 1970s without incident. It’s worked so well that I imagine most Americans don’t even recall that we still have forces there.”

What the President did not say may be equally revealing. From at least December 1995, internal talking points included one promise that failed to make any of the President’s final speeches, “American troops will not be part of a police force or a nation-building force.” These statements suggest Clinton’s openness to using the US military as a global police force and thus a lack of interest in military disengagement so long as the risks of military force could be minimized. This parallels Clinton’s view of airpower as a relatively low-risk, asymmetric

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54 Data from Rubenzer, Steven J., and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, Personality, Character & Leadership in the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2004).
55 Harris, The Survivor, 79.
means of employing US power. Furthermore, it reflects an inconsistency between Clinton’s expansive use of military forces while simultaneously reducing the size of the force by over one-third.

This brings us to the one year period of IFOR, codenamed Operation Joint Endeavor. The Dayton Accords committed President Clinton to put US troops into Bosnia as peacekeepers, but what were his aspirations for the peacekeeping mission? In his address to the nation, President Clinton insisted US military participation required that:

“the mission will be precisely defined with clear, realistic goals that can be achieved in a definite period of time. Our troops will make sure that each side withdraws its forces behind the frontlines and keeps them there. They will maintain the cease-fire to prevent the war from accidentally starting again. These efforts, in turn, will help to create a secure environment, so that the people of Bosnia can return to their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission should and will take about one year.”

As approved, and in accordance with the Dayton Accords, NATO assigned IFOR the following primary military tasks:

- Ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire;
- Ensure the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their respective territories, and ensure the separation of forces;
- Ensure the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces;
- Create conditions for the safe, orderly, and speedy withdrawal of UN forces that have not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR; and
- Maintain control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What was missing from the President’s speech and IFOR’s mission was an explicit exit strategy. What happens if and when the military tasks are accomplished? Do ensure, create, and maintain have time limits? Evidence from internal administration talking points proposed an expected timeline for the IFOR’s “focused and limited” mission:

- Immediately and throughout…maintain the ceasefire
- First 45 days…enforce zones of separation between opposing forces

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In a matter of months…supervise the transfer of forces to their appropriate sides

- Ensuing months…create conditions for military stabilization and balance
- Duration…the entire mission will last about one year

These aspirations could be achieved militarily, and indeed most were achieved within the first 180 days. The NATO mission had a one-year mandate, which at least implies an aspiration of military disengagement. By definition, IFOR aspired to implement the Dayton Accords, and thus required positive change to the status quo. Invoking imagery of the World Wars raised the stakes, making disengagement without achieving the aspirations unacceptable. No evidence was found relating Clinton’s aspirations to the continued use of US airpower.

As he had adopted a position on Bosnia in 1992 to be viewed positively relative to George Bush, by July 1995 at least part of Clinton’s aspiration was to resolve Bosnia to get “the war off the front pages in an election year.” The upcoming election and continued pressure from Congress, not just events on the ground, finally made it clear to Clinton that he needed an alternative to muddling through. Though he had successfully resisted employing US ground forces, his administration’s foreign policy was nonetheless stuck in the quagmire of Bosnia. Paradoxically, Clinton had fought introducing US ground forces due in part to the unpopularity of the move, only to end up sending in 20,000 troops in an election year. This need for resolution could favor disengagement, but resolution was not presumed, only progress. Importantly, a one-year commitment after Dayton put the target date after the 1996 presidential election. Lake again retrospectively acknowledged, “it was clear by the end of ’96 that we weren't getting it done on the civilian side, and therefore were going to have to stay longer. I think that it should have been stated clearly before the election, rather than after it. But the final

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61 Wentz, Lessons From Bosnia, 29.
64 Sciolino, “The Clinton Record.”
recommendations on this weren't made until after the election." Testing hypothesis H4 at the end of the one year IFOR commitment, President Clinton’s aspiration level as defined by the IFOR mandate should not have necessarily precluded the consideration of disengagement.

Yet at the end of the one-year mandate when its stated objectives were met, President Clinton did not accept the risks of disengaging, but rather extended the commitment. The risk of losing recent gains was deemed greater (or at least less acceptable) than the risks of maintaining a military presence. President Clinton both did and did not behave as his personal style would predict. He set an ambitious aspiration level per hypothesis H3b, and expanded it when it was achieved. By so doing, Clinton appeared to keep himself artificially in the domain of losses, making it necessary to accept new and different risks to achieve new, higher aspirations. In effect, upping his aspiration level met hypothesis H2b by way of hypothesis H4, so disengagement was precluded by Clinton’s aspiration to continue doing more.

**Framing Disengagement**

From as early as the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Clinton sent mixed signals on disengagement. A vocal supporter of the UN and multilateral interventions, he professed the need for the US to do more in Bosnia, but at the same time accepted the American public’s opposition to injecting US ground forces into the quagmire. Quagmire imagery suggests a positive framing of disengagement, by way of limiting engagement. Viewed this way, President Clinton demonstrated his famous ability to find a “third way” between the two poles, increasing US diplomatic involvement in the UN and in the Vance-Owen peace plan, and militarily through the use of airpower. Lift and strike was the embodiment of a minimal risk engagement strategy.

Once forced by Dayton to deploy US ground troops for peace enforcement, President Clinton framed disengagement negatively in his 27 November 1995 national address, equating its proponents with isolationism:

> “With the cold war over, some people now question the need for our continued active leadership in the world. They believe that, much like after World War I, America can now step back from the responsibilities of leadership. They argue that to be secure we need only to keep our own borders safe and that the time has come now to leave to others the hard work of leadership beyond our borders.”


66 Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, November 27, 1995.”
To further increase the pressure for Congressional and public support, the President flipped the script on military deployment, making disengagement a choice for war. “I ask all Americans, and I ask every Member of Congress, Democrat and Republican alike, to make the choice for peace. In the choice between peace and war, America must choose peace.”67

It is certainly understandable that the President preferred to have the public behind his action, but overblown justification for action proportionally raises the bar that must be cleared to justify disengagement. In this case, the public did not believe vital US interests were at stake in Bosnia. Polls consistently showed opposition to employing US ground forces for anything more than emergency protection and extraction of UN peacekeepers. In one July 1995 poll, 80 percent of Americans preferred the US remain neutral; in another only 31 percent believed the US should do more.68 Despite a massive outreach campaign including the standard television appearances and op-eds, but also pioneering efforts to reach new media such as talk radio and internet chat rooms, Clinton failed to move public opinion significantly. In public opinion polling, Americans continued to fear Bosnia, “would turn into another Somalia, or worse, another Vietnam.”69 Congress narrowly blessed the deployment, 69-30 in the Senate and 287-141 in the House, but most importantly, neither house blocked funds.70 President Clinton deployed troops for peace enforcement, further complicating the prospects for disengagement.

As the promised one-year IFOR deadline approached, President Clinton continued to frame disengagement negatively. As NATO requested IFOR transition to SFOR, Clinton framed disengagement as an abdication of America’s leadership of NATO. “As the leader of NATO and the principal architect of the Dayton peace,” President Clinton stated, “the United States must continue to lead in this new mission to consolidate the peace in Bosnia.”71 Unlike Somalia, the US had experienced no combat casualties in the year of IFOR. This, combined with the reduced

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67 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 254-5.
vulnerability to public pressure the President gained after his reelection, surely made
disengagement less urgent and favorable and opened the door to President Clinton’s more
interventionist tendencies.

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

Whether due to an overarching moral or idealistic belief of America’s role in the world or
as a political expedient in a presidential campaign, President Clinton entered office with an
expectation that he would expand US involvement in Bosnia. Disengagement was an option, but
realistically was blocked from consideration by ambitious aspirations.

President Clinton decided against disengagement at the completion of IFOR/Operation
Joint Endeavor. No combat casualties had been incurred during the year, which made the
immediate risks of maintaining 8,500 troops on the ground favorable to the risk of potential
renewed warfare and ethnic cleansing. No evidence was found that disengagement was ever
considered as an alternative. Exposing any number of US troops to continued violence in a civil
war famous for broken ceasefires, and thereby establishing a precedent for open-ended rotational
deployment commitments for non-combat military operations other than war, was by far the
riskier option, with more numerous, disparate, and uncertain potential outcomes. Nevertheless,
the unrecognized risks were less immediate than the more clearly imaginable risks posed by
disengagement.

Aside from his personal disinterest, the major constraint to disengagement President
Clinton faced at the end of IFOR/Operation Joint Endeavor was NATO’s request for a continued
US presence under UNSCR 1088, adopted 12 December 1996. Indeed the president viewed the
constraint as a reinforcement. That the operation was NATO-led had the dual benefit to the
President of preventing Russian interference in the UN while at the same time allowing critical
Russian participation in a cooperative fashion with NATO. Engaging the Russians and other
Partnership for Peace countries while validating the continuing post-Cold War relevance of
NATO supported multiple pillars of Clinton’s national security strategy, which would come to be
known as Engagement and Enlargement. Conversely, disengaging US forces might help public
opinion, but at the risk of unraveling the successes of Dayton and IFOR. Finally, whether
deliberate or serendipitous, timing the disengagement decision after the 1996 presidential
election certainly helped mitigate and control the risks associated with staying put.
Summary

As in Somalia, in the Bosnia case we see that while President Clinton demonstrates the traits of an Insensitive Perceiving president, lacking the Calm element of low Anxiousness (N1), his personal style as a Sensation Seeking Intuiting president appears more relevant. Clinton’s high overall Openness (O), shown as high contextual complexity and intellectual curiosity, work with his Perceiving (ENFP) flexibility to offset his low Deliberation (C6) tendency toward rash decision making. Slow and reversible decisions are a Clinton hallmark, and his Openness to Action (O4), adventurous nature (E5), and abstract Intuition (ENFP) left him open to various routes to a suitable peace deal, even to the point of reopening seemingly settled issues such as lifting the arms embargo and adjusting the Vance-Owen plan. Clinton was aware of the risks of disengagement, set his aspiration level so high as to preclude disengagement, and as his stated aspirations were met, added ever-higher aspirations. President Clinton framed disengagement negatively, seeing with it a certain loss of US influence, so absent a mass casualty event, which could levy enough public and Congressional pressure to endanger his personal political career seriously, he consistently stuck with his basic aspiration to do more. By setting ambitious and even ambiguous aspirations, President Clinton kept disengagement off the table. At first blush, it would seem as though he behaved according to prospect theory, accepting risk to avoid the sure loss of disengagement. Instead, it seems his propensity for risk acceptance led him to paint a picture of urgent need for continued engagement even after all his end-state objectives were met. Put another way, he was clearly in the domain of gains, but operated as though he was in the loss frame and needed to risk further engagement.

Clinton did not want to own Bosnia, but ultimately ended up doing just that. As he had done with IFOR, President Clinton promised the extension for SFOR would be for a set time, eighteen months this time. A year in, on 18 December 1997, he announced an extension, and decided not to set a new target date. He continued with the same justification, claiming, “if we pull out before the job is done, Bosnia will almost certainly fall back into violence, chaos and ultimately a war every bit as bloody as one that was stopped.” Re-election relieved pressure on President Clinton to disengage after IFOR on 15 December 1996, so delay after delay piled up until seemingly never-ending nation-building missions and their impact on the greatly down-

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sized Clinton military became an issue in the 2000 presidential election and US troops remained in their one-year mission nearly a decade later.73 As SFOR/Operation Joint Guard turned to SFOR/Operation Joint Forge in June 1998, US troop numbers were down to 5,000 that would rotate on a six or twelve month basis indefinitely. NATO’s SFOR mission, and US participation finally ended on 2 September 2004.74

Finally, it is interesting to see if these traits are indeed stable across the President’s two terms, or if some of the phenomena observed in Somalia and Bosnia were influenced by President Clinton’s short time in the job and his lack of foreign policy experience early in his first term. Looking at another Balkan intervention much later in his administration should be instructive.

12 June 1999: President William J. Clinton

As with Bosnia, the Kosovo intervention did not come to an end with the end of Operation Allied Force. In the waning days of the air campaign, President Clinton was resigning himself to the possibility he would have to commit to a ground invasion. It turned out US ground forces were not required to end the fighting, but again thousands were required to keep the peace. There are still over 5,100 KFOR troops, including several hundred Americans, in Kosovo today.75 Without continuous rolling death tolls on the news, these interventions do not come to be seen as Vietnam-style quagmires, but nine and fourteen-year long rotational deployments take an extensive toll on US armed forces.76

It is not fair or accurate to conflate Bosnia and Kosovo as a single, continuous intervention; however, neither can the two be separated from their common threads of the dissolution of the Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was a stated concern of both Presidents Bush and Clinton, but the issue in Kosovo was not self-determination or national rights as with Bosnia.

Instead, Kosovo hinged on how to protect minority and human rights. The Bosnian intervention in 1995 effectively, however tenuously, settled the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thereafter, Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia mostly focused its nationalist repression inward. Serbian repression radicalized many ethnic Albanians in the autonomous region of Kosovo and it became clear in the mid-1990s that “only violence gets international attention.” As a practical thread, the US tied Yugoslavia’s treatment of Kosovo to a so-called outer wall of sanctions that remained after the Dayton Accords.

Attacks by Kosovar Albanians on Serb forces in Kosovo initiated serious fighting. On 5 March 1998, Serb police massacred 60 Albanians, including eighteen women and ten under the age of sixteen. Madeleine Albright stated that “this crisis is not an internal affair of the FRY.” This ignored a key difference between Kosovo and Bosnia; once Croatia and Slovenia gained recognition of independence, the precedent was set for the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo, though allowed significant autonomy, had long been part of Serbia, making it an intrastate issue.

On 23 September 1998, the UN adopted UNSCR 1199, again under Chapter VII. Responding to reports of over 230,000 Kosovars displaced from their homes by “the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army,” the UNSC demanded that all parties in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire. NATO increased readiness for air strikes on 24 September 1998. Attempts were made to persuade both sides to stop attacks, for the Kosovars to drop their demand for independence, and for Milošević to permit NATO peacekeeping troops to enter Kosovo. President Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to negotiate with Milošević in October, but Milošević saw little to lose in stalling and continually gave just enough to forestall action. China and Russia would block UN resolutions authorizing force and NATO required unanimous

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79 Ibid., 10.
concurrency from all sixteen members to act independently of the UN. Holbrooke got a cease-fire agreement from Milošević on 12 October 1998 by convincing him NATO had reached concurrency and would soon authorize air strikes, which could be averted only by a cease-fire. Holbrooke then got NATO to issue an Activation Order (ACTORD) authorizing strikes within 96 hours. On 15 October, the NATO Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) Agreement for a ceasefire was signed.\(^{83}\)

The KVM Agreement lacked any enforcement mechanism and constrained air power by introducing unarmed civilian peace monitors into Kosovo. Additionally, the agreement only focused on Serbian aggression, doing nothing to constrain hostile actions from the other side, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). As the deal was recognized to be inadequate, both sides broke the ceasefire and fighting resumed in December 1998. The net positive effect was that the deal bought time to get the most vulnerable refugees through the winter.\(^{84}\)

The tipping point came after a winter of Kosovar attacks and Serb reprisals culminated when “45 Kosovan Albanian farmers were rounded up, led up a hill and massacred.”\(^{85}\) NATO decided the conflict could only be settled by introducing a military peacekeeping force to forcibly restrain the two sides, so on 30 January 1999 NATO announced, “the NATO Secretary General may authorize air strikes against targets on FRY territory” to “[compel] compliance with the demands of the international community and [to achieve] a political settlement.”\(^{86}\) The two sides were summoned to peace talks in Rambouillet, France.

The Rambouillet talks began on 6 February 1999, with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana negotiating with both sides. By 23 February 1999, the group had reached a consensus on substantial autonomy for Kosovo and the sides were finalizing conditions of an invited international military presence in Kosovo. Then NATO, at Albright’s insistence, sought an imposed military presence. Ultimately, on 18 March 1999, the Albanian, American, and British delegations signed what became known as the Rambouillet Accords. The Serbs and Russians refused to sign as it called for unrestricted movement of NATO throughout Serbia. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia, a


\(^{84}\) Ibid., 51-9.


force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law.\textsuperscript{87}

A second round of talks took place in Paris from 15-18 March 1999, at which the Serbian delegation again refused to sign. Serbian ethnic cleansing operations escalated and on 20 March, the KVM was withdrawn. With this, President Clinton said Milošević’s behavior had crossed the line and sent US envoy Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade for a last push for agreement.\textsuperscript{88} The Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy for Kosovo and non-military parts of the agreement on 23 March 1999, but refused to sign off on free access for NATO troops to all of Serbia.\textsuperscript{89} Holbrooke proclaimed the efforts a failure, formally turning Kosovo over to Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, for military action.\textsuperscript{90} Air strikes were not the President’s preferred option, but Milošević would not budge.\textsuperscript{91}

NATO’s operation, Operation Allied Force, lasted from 24 March to 11 June 1999. Over 1,000 aircraft flew over 38,000 combat missions over eleven weeks.\textsuperscript{92} NATO’s objectives were:

- A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
- The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
- The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
- The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations;
- The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{93}

Put simply, the goal was “Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back.”\textsuperscript{94} Whether because early strikes were hampered by bad weather, or because Milošević truly saw Kosovo as a purely

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} Dominic J. Caraccilo, Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 44.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 61.
\item \textsuperscript{93} NATO, “NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo.”
\end{itemize}
internal matter, NATO clearly underestimated his will to resist. Serbs stepped up ethnic cleansing operations such that “half a million people arrived in neighbouring (sic) areas in the course of about two weeks, and a few weeks later the total was over 850,000.”95 The air campaign was expected to last days, so quickly ran through the list of air defense and other significant military targets. As Milošević held out and atrocities on the ground escalated, targeting increasingly switched to Serb ground units and equipment. Dual-use military/civilian targets including bridges, factories, power stations, and telecommunications facilities were added after attacks on purely military strategic targets failed to cow Milošević.96 One of the most memorable events of the campaign was the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Passed off as an intelligence and targeting error due to outdated maps, it was later revealed the Chinese were harboring key Serbian military intelligence personnel.97

By April, NATO was beginning to believe a ground operation would be required to force a settlement. President Clinton was extremely reluctant to commit American forces for a ground offensive, though by May he publicly stated he would “not rule out other military options.”98 Instead, he issued a finding for the CIA to investigate cyber attacks and other means of destabilizing Milošević’s government.99 Only when faced with the stark reality that Russia would not intervene beyond harsh rhetoric, and that NATO was increasingly preparing for a ground invasion did Milošević accept terms to end the fighting on 3 June 1999. NATO ratified the agreement and suspended air operations on 10 June 1999. The UN-sponsored, NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which had been preparing for combat operations, entered Kosovo permissively on 12 June for peacekeeping. The initial US forces were greeted by Albanians

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96 Wikipedia, “Kosovo War.”
cheering and throwing flowers as US soldiers and KFOR rolled through their villages. Many, many cycles of deployments later, their successors remain there today.\textsuperscript{100}

President Clinton was much more directly interested and involved in Kosovo decision-making. With nearly six years of presidential experience, foreign policy was no longer as mysterious and daunting as it had been in Somalia and Bosnia. Also, a booming economy made it easier for the President to focus on his more grandiose interests in fusing domestic and foreign policy, or globalizing American prosperity. Moral internationalism was easier once it was no longer just “the economy, stupid.” There was little question US forces would be involved in enforcing whatever peace settlement was reached. Nevertheless, how did President Clinton come to disregard disengagement after the successful air campaign?

\textit{Risk Awareness}

Beginning the three-stage model, assessing President Clinton’s risk-perception or awareness starts with his decision to intervene. The President had a much more surer grasp of foreign policy by 1999, and was also very comfortable with the Balkan problems. The Bosnia analogy informed his decision-making, especially for disengagement as IFOR and SFOR had provided no mass casualty events of the type that had forced his about-face in Somalia. To review, despite President Clinton’s average Anxiousness (N1), his low Deliberation (C6), and Perceiving (ENFP) preference make him potentially risk insensitive, but still susceptible to framing. If this is the case, we should expect President Clinton to obviously disregard the risks of disengagement and/or show a demonstrable lack of awareness of those risks. In order to test hypothesis 1 on risk-perception (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant), we need evidence that shows President Clinton was never briefed on the risks of disengaging forces from Kosovo, did not himself recognize or acknowledge said risks, or was clearly dismissive of risk in his decision making.

There is evidence to support a simple explanation that President Clinton was insensitive to the disengagement risks in Kosovo. Viewed as a continuation of the Bosnia operation, it might be argued the President simply extended what was already working in Bosnia. While cognitive biases undoubtedly make up a part of personality, this dissertation focuses on trait-based influences. Still, his increased foreign policy self-confidence (very low Self-Consciousness N4) and average Anxiousness (N1) in following the Bosnia analogy very likely

\textsuperscript{100} Wikipedia, “Kosovo War.”
supported his low Deliberation (C6) in disregarding disengagement as an option. Paired with his Intuiting-Perceiver’s (ENFP) preference for open-ended decisions, it is easy to see why Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan saw Clinton as dismissive of the risks of an open-ended commitment in the Balkans, “a place you can go and you can get lost and never be seen again or heard from again.”\textsuperscript{101}

Dismissive perhaps, but it cannot be said that President Clinton was unaware of the risks of disengaging US forces in a volatile situation as he made the case for an open-ended engagement. He acknowledged risks in both staying and leaving. He acknowledged the risks of intervention, but he and his supporters found them outweighed by the risks of idleness on US and NATO credibility. Detractors noted, “we have no exit strategy...no concept of how we want to settle this situation.”\textsuperscript{102} As he had justified IFOR and SFOR after Bosnia, the President “created an interest because of all the talk of American and NATO credibility.”\textsuperscript{103} Also as with Bosnia, Clinton found the engagement of ground forces in a hostile combat environment too risky, preferring to capitalize on the asymmetric advantages of airpower. With proper assurances of minimal risk to peacekeeping forces however, Clinton publicly showed little if any concern for the risks of an open-ended engagement. There was irony in this, as by1999 Clinton had acknowledged that his earlier cuts to military force structure were presenting problems in the face of escalating deployment requirements. Inasmuch as it can be said Clinton ignored risk in his decision-making, that ignorance was only made easier by his earlier successes in Bosnia.

Though Clinton clearly does not match the profile of an Anxious Sensitive Judging President, his risk-acceptant disposition again appears to influence his aspirations and framing, per hypothesis H2. This suggests a flaw in the awareness stage of the three-stage model.

In announcing the start of Operation Allied Force, President Clinton highlighted that he was aware and wanted the American people to be aware of the risks of intervening. “This action is not risk-free,” he stated, “however, I have concluded that the dangers of acting now are clearly outweighed by the risks of failing to act, the risks that many more innocent people will die or be driven from their homes by the tens of thousands, the risks that the conflict will involve and destabilize neighboring nations. It will clearly be much more costly and dangerous to stop later

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., Quotes John McCain.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., Quotes Richard Haass.
than this effort to prevent it from going further now.” On its face this is as clear a statement of risk awareness and weighting as one could hope to find. Unfortunately, as is Clinton’s ENFP way with words, on closer examination it is abstract, vague, and devoid of details. What is clear is that if doing something beats doing nothing, the bar for a future disengagement decision is very high indeed. Once committed, the doing nothing option becomes a truly negative action, and very hard to sell. The interesting irony is in the deceptive spin this puts on Clinton’s decision-making process. It is no surprise critics so often consider Clinton risk-averse, as he couches his decisions as the lower risk of bad alternatives, when in the macro view his preferred options so often include much more numerous and disparate potential outcomes. That he does not choose the riskiest conceivable option at the risky end of the spectrum makes him appear moderate. Such hair-splitting is no surprise from the lawyer/president who famously questioned “what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”

The President was consistent with his message that the risks of intervention were outweighed by the risks of doing nothing, noting, “Unquestionably, there are risks in military action, if that becomes necessary. US and other NATO pilots will be in harm’s way. The Serbs have a strong air defense system. But we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction. If we don’t act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not be able to contain it without far greater risk and cost.” In an interview with Jim Lehrer, Clinton was asked about criticism that Kosovo apparently was not worth risking American lives for, Clinton refuted the claim based on the threats to American aircrews flying various missions over Kosovo, including the two aircraft that were shot down. More importantly, he recognized the difficult risk-to-reward calculus of a ground operation, saying,

“If we had put a ground force in for an invasion, it still wouldn’t be done today. That is, all this bombing we did, we would have had to do anyway...there was no way to mobilize and implant a force quick enough to turn it (the 40,000-strong Serbian force already in and around Kosovo) back...even if we had announced on


day one we were going to use ground forces, it would have taken as long as this bombing campaign went on to deploy them, probably longer.”107

What would happen after any presumed peace settlement was presented less clearly in terms of risks, but more in terms of assumed responsibilities. Clinton clearly and consistently used analogies to Bosnia. Like Bosnia, Clinton believed, “If NATO is invited to do so, our troops should take part in that mission to keep the peace. But I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”108 As early as February 1999 Clinton acknowledged, “NATO is a partnership, and they have the right to expect the United States, which has been the leader of NATO for 50 years now, to be part of that.”109 Therefore, the risks of disengaging militarily after hostilities ended were summed up in President Clinton’s larger aspirations for a strong US leadership role and presence. Disengagement of military forces was anathema to Engagement and Enlargement absent other pressures such as casualties, domestic public opinion, or Congressional threats to force a withdrawal.

In fact, the disengagement risk which seemed to be most on President Clinton’s mind was that of projecting and subsequently being forced to defend an end date. The absence of public and Congressional pressure was evident when the President announced the deployment of KFOR elements on 25 May 1999. Clinton reported to the public that the air campaign was succeeding in returning Kosovars to their homes with security and self-government and that the KFOR troops would deter new hostilities and provide security and confidence for returning home and getting on with their lives. He made little effort to frame the deployment as an implied threat of ground invasion while nonchalantly announcing the overall force and the US contribution would be nearly double what he had previously estimated.110 This was followed by a letter to Congress announcing increased aircraft and force deployments in support of intensified NATO operations as well as additional US forces for humanitarian assistance operations. Learning from Bosnia and with no particular pressure coming from Congress, President Clinton mixed the deployments

108 Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets,” 517.
for combat escalation with those for KFOR and did not predict or promise an end date, saying only, “it is not possible to predict how long these operations will last. The duration of the deployments depends upon the course of events in Kosovo, and specifically, on Belgrade’s acceptance of the conditions set forth by the United States and its allies.”

*Risk Propensity and Aspiration Level*

Though he may be risk invariant, tending toward if not actively pursuing risky decisions, President Clinton’s personality traits are consistent with a Risk-Acceptant personal style. He is an Intuiting type (ENFP), indicating a preference for accepting risks for future gains. He is rated extremely high (two standard deviations above the mean) on Excitement-Seeking (E5), which supports his extreme interest in new things, firsts, or opportunities. This could explain Clinton’s discounting the risks of disengagement in favor of the potential for a strengthened and enlarged NATO along with a US role in a peacekeeping mission that fostered US-Russian cooperation in a former Eastern Bloc region. Taken with his very high Openness to Action (O4), and high overall Openness (O) trait, we can easily expect Clinton to behave according to hypothesis H2b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain) and hypothesis H3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels).

As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated in 1998, President Clinton wanted a political/diplomatic solution that both defined Kosovo’s self-government and respected the territorial integrity of the FRY. In a statement on 12 October 1998 announcing President Milošević’s agreement to comply with UNSCR 1199, President Clinton defined the US, UN, and NATO objectives:

“All along our objectives have been clear: to end the violence in Kosovo which threatens to spill over into neighboring countries and to spark instability in the heart of Europe; to reverse a humanitarian catastrophe in the making as tens of

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thousands of homeless refugees risk freezing or starving to death in the winter; and to seek a negotiated peace.”

Three key aspirations were contained in the above statement. First, Clinton preferred a diplomatic solution negotiated by the parties involved, as had occurred in Dayton. Second, he wanted to reverse the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, not just stop it as in Bosnia. This required quick action to get displaced persons back to their homes before winter and rolled up the third objective, which was to prevent refugee burdens on neighboring countries. All indications suggest using the Bosnia analogy led the President to realize if military force was required to compel a settlement, then a military presence would be required to guarantee it.

That said, true to the Bosnia analogy, President Clinton wanted the force element to be air power only. Threatened airstrikes were averted in October by Milošević’s agreement. As had been seen earlier in Bosnia, however, Milošević’s promise was a delaying tactic aimed at giving just enough ground to avoid military action, hoping that delay would erode the international community’s resolve. President Clinton preferred Kosovar autonomy as a compromise peace plan. His preference for conciliation, however, only ensured neither side would be satisfied; Milošević considered Kosovo an integral part of Serbia and the Kosovars wanted independence, not autonomy. The October agreement averted the looming humanitarian crisis by getting refugees back to their homes, but also delayed airstrikes during the winter months when both sides typically scaled back the fighting anyway.

Timeliness was the key to Clinton’s aspirations. After the years of muddling through before decisive American leadership turned the corner in Bosnia, President Clinton wanted to avoid dragging out what through late 1998 and into early 1999 was coming to be seen as an inevitable need for US/NATO intervention. The hard-learned lesson from Bosnia was that with Milošević, failure to engage was not an option. In his 19 March 1999 news conference, five days before commencing air strikes, Clinton said, “if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.”

conflate Bosnia and Kosovo, he did recognize and point out to the American people, “you can’t divorce what happened in Kosovo from what happened for four years in Bosnia.”\textsuperscript{115}

With intervention, and especially with US leadership of any intervention, came the inevitable requirement for peace enforcement. NATO enforcement was the cost of getting the Kosovar Albanians to sign at Rambouillet, agreeing to stop their insurgent attacks and disarm. Clinton accepted US participation in a NATO peace enforcement mission as a necessary part of US leadership, but ideally wanted ground forces involved only in a permissive environment. This aspiration led to one of Clinton’s most-criticized statements of the Kosovo campaign. Announcing the initiation of air strikes in Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999, Clinton professed, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”\textsuperscript{116}

Overshadowed by the no troops pledge, the intended highlight of the announcement was President Clinton’s case to the American people for why intervening in Kosovo was in America’s interest. He outlined three objectives for the operation: “First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for peace; second, to deter President Milošević from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and third, if necessary, to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.”\textsuperscript{117}

Demonstrate, deter, and damage if necessary; only the last hinted at the possibility of a long campaign. Indeed, “it was accepted as a given by the Clinton administration that Milošević would settle quickly.”\textsuperscript{118} It is here that the Bosnia analogy finally failed Clinton on another time-based aspiration, that of a quick concession by Milošević under US/NATO airstrikes. By 1 April 1999, it was clear the demonstration had not deterred Milošević, and the President’s aspirations consolidated to punishing Milošević by damaging his capacity to continue his policy of ethnic cleansing. A week into bombing, Clinton cited half a million Kosovar refugees, concluding, “Had we not acted, the Serbian offensive would have been carried out with impunity. We are


\textsuperscript{116} Clinton, “Remarks Announcing Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets,” 513.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 513.

\textsuperscript{118} Lambeth, NATO’s Air War For Kosovo, 20.
determined that it will carry a very high price, indeed.” Then he added a larger strategic context to his aspirations, saying, “We also act to prevent a wider war.”\textsuperscript{119}

So Clinton’s Kosovo policy was not about Bosnia, but neither was it just about Kosovo. As with Bosnia, the President characterized the stakes in Kosovo, and the Balkans generally, as a humanitarian crisis, but more importantly as a threat to European stability and both NATO’s and the US’s credibility. Perhaps more so than in Bosnia, failure to act would likely reignite other historical animosities throughout southeastern Europe and potentially spill over into Asia and the Middle East. Conversely, “by acting now we can help to give our children and our grandchildren a Europe that is more united, more democratic, more peaceful, more prosperous, and a better partner for the United States for a long time to come.”\textsuperscript{120}

By the third week of Allied Force, NATO’s strategic goal shifted to enforcing a withdrawal of Serb forces and the return of refugees, President Clinton’s stated intent to seriously diminish Serb capabilities to ethnically cleanse having passed.\textsuperscript{121} President Clinton remained committed to his aspirations to let airpower lead in his strategy of force and enforce. Though secretly disappointed the demonstration of resolve represented by air strikes did not quickly compel Milošević to the negotiating table, Clinton was willing to “pay the price of time.”\textsuperscript{122} He held firm, however, on his aspiration of not paying the price of ground troops for the force mission, preferring to preserve them for enforcement only.

President Clinton bucked traditional wisdom with his resistance to ground engagement, especially as the air campaign lingered on without much apparent movement. Many pushed for ground force engagement, whether for an invasion to accelerate the peace process, from the belief that airpower alone was not enough, or simply to keep all options open. To the first two doctrinaire points, “I think Milošević still has the initiative and until we get the initiative away from him he will dictate the pace of settlement,” said Gen. George A. Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during the Bosnia campaign, “Bombing alone won't take the initiative

\textsuperscript{120} Clinton, “The President’s News Conference, March 19, 1999,” 471.
\textsuperscript{121} Lambeth, \textit{NATO’s Air War For Kosovo}, 32.
\textsuperscript{122} Clinton, “Remarks to the Military Community at the Norfolk Naval Station, April 1, 1999.” 567.
away.” President Bush’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft took the final, diplomacy-focused position, “If I were Milošević, I would be more encouraged than I was at the beginning,” said Scowcroft, “Milošević thinks he doesn't have to worry about anything further.” An impatient media goaded NATO and the US, warning it was not, “just NATO whose credibility is at risk,” but also US post-Gulf War prestige.

The NATO summit in Washington D.C., April 23-25, 1999, scheduled as a 50th anniversary celebration “was pivotal in solidifying NATO’s collective determination not to lose.” According to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, the NATO leaders unanimously agreed, “We will not lose. Whatever it takes, we will not lose.” The primary motivation was American and European public reaction to television images of ethnic cleansing. While the “humanitarian crime of ethnic cleansing gave the Serbs an immediate tactical advantage, it also came at the long-term cost of virtually forcing NATO to stay the course.” After the NATO summit, NATO’s Master Target File grew from only 169 targets to more than 976 targets by the end of the campaign as the alliance determined to shift its military focus to “punishing Belgrade’s political and military elites, weakening Milošević’s domestic power base, and demonstrating...he and his fellow perpetrators...would find no sanctuary.”

Also in April, a frustrated General Wesley Clark requested a group of US Army strategists to begin drawing up secret plans for a range of ground operations from peacekeeping and policing to a full-scale land invasion, believing that “moving into ground-force preparations would exponentially increase [NATO’s] leverage against Milošević.” The study quickly revealed good reasons to avoid a ground invasion, as “only about a dozen roads led into Kosovo from Albania...(all of which were)...heavily mined and defended, with...troops well positioned on

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124 Ibid.
126 Ibid., 38.
128 Ibid., 38.
129 Ibid., 26.
130 Ibid., 38-9.
the high ground.”132 President Clinton, Secretary Cohen and Sandy Berger all resisted General Clark’s pushes for ground troops, but Clark found an advocate in British Prime Minister Tony Blair.133

As Allied Force continued into May, some NATO allies, foremost among them the United Kingdom, were advocating for a ground offensive. At a minimum, they pushed for KFOR troops already prepositioned in neighboring countries to train for combat as well as peacekeeping. Still, Clinton would not even hint at public debate, perhaps due to public opinion polling. Asked in early May if he was ready to continue bombing through to September, Clinton held, “I think that the clearer we are in our determination to do that, the more likely we are to see it terminated before then. But I’m perfectly prepared to do it.”134 By 18 May, war fatigue was setting in and US public support was waning, down to 58% from 65% in late April with opposition to the air campaign rising as well.135 A week later, President Clinton backed off his no ground troops pledge, insisting he had “always said...we have not and will not take any option off the table.”136

Amidst the pressure to expand the engagement, May also saw the emergence of another component of Clinton’s aspiration for peace. Asked about the UN, Clinton responded:

“I believe it would be very, very helpful if the United Nations would endorse a peace process if it is a peace process that will work...there must be a multinational security force there that NATO is a core part of. Now, the U.N. did so in Bosnia. We were there as—under the umbrella of the U.N. NATO was there; Russia was there; Ukraine was there. It worked. And it will work again and, obviously, would be much better.” 137

In building the case for UN support, President Clinton continued by recognizing that the Russians had just for the first time publicly endorsed an international security as well as a

132 Ibid., 46.
civilian force in Kosovo and asserted his belief that, “if the Russians support this, the Chinese will support this.”

With clear progress from the air campaign proving elusive, and faced with increasing pressure from allies and General Clark, on 22 May 1999 President Clinton decided to press for the quick deployment of 50,000 NATO troops into neighboring areas. The move could be seen as necessary preparation for KFOR or as a threat of ground attack to help sway Milošević. The latter is a classic prospect theory argument that risks to ground forces might have to be accepted in order to avoid an embarrassing loss, and while valid, Clinton’s aspirations remained stable.

Still, to support the implied threat, NATO and the Pentagon left open the option to enter Kosovo without Milošević’s permission. The US contribution to the 50,000-strong KFOR would be about 7,000. NATO already had about 13,000 KFOR troops prepositioned. The US had others in Macedonia and Albania, including 5,000 Army personnel deployed with Apache helicopters.

“By most accounts, the turning point in facing up to the need for a serious ground option came on May 27, when Cohen met secretly...with...the British, French, German, and Italian defense ministers” to weigh merits and costs of a land invasion. Coincidentally, 27 May 1999 was also the day Milošević was indicted for war crimes by a UN tribunal. If the first was evidence that Clinton’s resolve was weakening, the second might well have bolstered his faith, as the indictment was a major milestone toward Clinton’s aspiration to get rid of Milošević.

In any event, Milošević’s acceptance of the international peace proposal on 2 June 1999 precluded the need for a decision on a ground invasion. The final agreement was signed on 9 June 1999 and the UN Security Council passed a resolution putting Kosovo under international civilian control and peacekeepers under NATO command, but UN authority. Gaining UN sponsorship met another of President Clinton’s aspirations. The air campaign was suspended while Serbs withdrew, then was formally ended on 20 June 1999.

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138 Ibid., 838.
140 Lambeth, NATO’s Air War For Kosovo, 47-8.
141 Ibid., 70.
142 Ibid., 56, 70.
143 Ibid., 60.
144 Ibid., 60.
The end of Operation Allied Force might have provided an opportunity to disengage US military force but for early commitments of US participation in peace enforcement. Thus under the Bosnian model, US military disengagement after a peace agreement was again off the table. In fact, no evidence was found that President Clinton ever considered realistic any plan that would not involve at least US peacekeepers. Announcing the settlement, the Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, President Clinton highlighted other aspirations beyond Kosovo. The President stated the policy was designed to advance other interests, namely preventing the spread of violence to other nations in southeastern Europe, to achieve the aims of a strengthened and unified NATO alliance, and to strengthen US relations with a democratic Russia.\textsuperscript{145}

Also included in the announcement of the end of airstrikes after 79 days, President Clinton revealed to the American and Yugoslav people another aspiration, the removal of Slobodan Milošević from power in the FRY. “As long as he remains in power, as long as your nation is ruled by an indicted war criminal, we will provide no support for the reconstruction of Serbia. But we are ready to provide humanitarian aid now and to help to build a better future for Serbia, too, when its Government represents tolerance and freedom, not repression and terror.”\textsuperscript{146}

This apparently was not a new aspiration as later reporting cited a NATO official quoting General Clark as saying, “you must understand that the objective is to take Yugoslavia away from Mr. Milošević, so we can democratize it and modernize it. That’s our objective.”\textsuperscript{147}

In assessing hypothesis 4, we see President Clinton’s aspiration level precluded the consideration of disengagement from the start as it was incapable of achieving his aspirations for Kosovo. The President believed the US had to do something and that if the US did not lead, nothing would happen. While he steadfastly resisted the introduction of ground forces, he actively, if not aggressively, used airpower to gain an asymmetric advantage while limiting the risk to allied aircrews and Serbian civilians. Broader aspirations for US leadership, strengthening and enlarging NATO, and engaging Russia and China in multinational cooperation


\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.

virtually ensured a US peacekeeping presence even if Milošević had agreed to peace terms at Rambouillet or before.

**Framing Disengagement**

From the start, disengagement, in the form of continued inaction, was framed as an implausible option. Special envoy and UN representative-designate Richard Holbrooke asserted on 15 February 1999, “The dilemma for the United States now is that we face a choice between a relatively early involvement, by which to prevent worse tragedy, or a more costly involvement later, after tragedies even greater than we’ve already seen.”

In his 19 March press conference, days before the start of Operation Allied Force, a reporter pointed to President Clinton’s justification for action--if we don’t act, the war will spread--noting the similar justification for Bosnia, where troops remained over three years later. In response to a question of how he could assure the American people he was not getting them into a quagmire, Clinton noted about 70 percent of US forces were home from Bosnia, so it was not a quagmire. “I was convinced we would lose fewer lives and do more good over the long run if we intervened when we did. I feel the same way about Kosovo.” This did not bode well for disengagement from the pending Kosovo operation, as the President effectively expressed his belief that if the numbers were low enough and the situation remained quiet enough, the campaign could go on indefinitely and the American public would forget about them as they had those in the Middle East.

In contrast to his handling of Bosnia, however, President Clinton would not speculate on an end date for the peace enforcement mission, stating, “I don’t want to get in the position in Kosovo that I was in in Bosnia...So I can just tell you that I think that we have tried to limit our involvement, we have tried to limit our mission, and we will conclude it as quickly as we can.”

The absence of a clear exit strategy was put in stark relief on day two of Allied Force when a reporter asked President Clinton specifically for one, to which the President replied, “The exit strategy is what it always is in a military operation. It’s when the mission is completed.” Three months later, upon announcing the settlement, Clinton was again asked how long NATO

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148 Schmemann, “Kosovo Troop Plan Sparks Fears.”
149 Clinton, “The President’s News Conference, March 19, 1999.”
150 Ibid.
peacekeepers, including US forces, would have to stay. He remained non-committal, but not only did he say, “I don’t think we should put a timetable on it,” but continued, “we will define our objectives and proceed to implement them.” Not only was the President going to avoid setting time milestones for which he could be called to account, but neither was he prepared to outline objectives by which to measure when the mission would be complete.

As the Bosnian analogy framed the engagement in Kosovo, so too was Bosnia the model President Clinton used to frame peace in Kosovo. Demonstrating his empathy with the plight of the Kosovar Albanians, Clinton told NBC anchor Tom Brokaw if he were an Albanian, “I wouldn’t go back home without the United States and NATO, without our allies being involved there, not after what they’ve been through.” US military disengagement would be a deal-breaker in Clinton’s mind. Continuing with themes that had proven effective after Dayton, President Clinton again built the straw man of isolationism and burned it down with his case for continued Engagement and Enlargement. He tied continued US presence to his higher aspirations beyond Kosovo, telling a VFW audience, “At our NATO Summit last month we agreed to deepen our security engagement in the region, to adopt an ambitious program to help aspiring nations improve their candidacies to join the NATO Alliance.” To reinforce the imagery, he reminded the audience of the recent anniversary of V-E Day, recalling, “Though America celebrated that day in 1945, we did not pack up and go home. We stayed to provide economic aid, to help to bolster democracy, to keep the peace and because our strength and resolve was important as Europe rebuilt, learned to live together, faced new challenges together.” He expanded the Marshall Plan comparison to NATO itself. In sum, his argument against military disengagement condensed down to, “War is expensive; peace is cheaper. Prosperity is downright profitable.”

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

Unlike Somalia and Bosnia, President Clinton’s handling of Kosovo carried little immediate baggage from his initial entry into the presidency. Though the Clinton administration

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152 Clinton, “Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange With Reporters, June 10, 1999,” 1074.
155 Ibid., 885.
156 Ibid., 885.
repeatedly reiterated President George H. W. Bush’s secret December 1992 “Christmas Warning” to Milošević that Serbian aggression would bring a unilateral US response, after six years and the Bosnian campaign even a deflector like President Clinton could not claim he inherited Kosovo. Disengagement was discounted as an option from the start, per hypothesis H4.

President Clinton decided against disengaging military forces upon completion of Operation Allied Force combat operations even before the operation began. He met with his NSC and other foreign policy advisors on 11 February 1999 to discuss “NATO planning, US costs and KFOR exit strategy.” If indeed a KFOR exit strategy was discussed, no public record was found. The President announced his intent to deploy 4,000 US troops for the KFOR peace enforcement mission in his 13 February radio address. In a letter to Congressional leaders dated 5 June 1999, the deployment requirement had grown 75% to approximately 7,000 for KFOR/Operation Joint Guardian. These were in addition to the letter’s purpose of announcing an estimated 4,000 extra troops to deploy to Albania to augment the 1,000 US troops already assisting in refugee relief under Joint Task Force Shining Hope. Additional unspecified increases were reported for Task Force HAWK, the Army Apache helicopter deep strike force, also in Albania, already numbering 5,500. Another 1,500 were reported deploying to Macedonia to facilitate the flow of support to KFOR. Far from an alternative for disengagement, as a settlement approached the US commitment tripled from the 4,000 troops announced in February. No scheduled end date was projected. The reported exit strategy for the multiple components were vague, “ultimately, responsibilities for refugee relief will be transferred to the UNHCR;...Task Force HAWK...will continue...until no longer required;...[and] KFOR will be progressively reduced as the security situation permits.”

Disengagement was not part of President Clinton’s aspiration level in June 1999. His aspirations were only minimally constrained by public opinion and Congressional pressure.

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158 McCathran, Presidential Daily Diary.
Despite Clinton’s lame duck status, Congress lacked the unity between or within the parties that would be necessary to hinder seriously Clinton’s executive power. Before, during, and after Operation Allied Force, Members of Congress questioned the strategy, the mission, and Congress’s constitutional role in deciding the use of force. However, Congress lacked the unity of will either to declare war against the FRY or to order the disengagement of US forces. Congress did consider alternative strategies, including a ground invasion of Serbia and promoting internal Serbian opposition to Milošević’s rule, but without consensus did not significantly adjust Clinton’s aspirations. After the settlement in June 1999, Congressional debate of alternatives centered on the level of US commitment and burden-sharing with NATO in peace enforcement.¹⁶¹

Though President Clinton chose not to define an end date, Congress attempted to legislate a pullout of US troops a year after the end of Allied Force and the entry of KFOR. Narrowly defeated in the Senate, the effort nonetheless expressed Congress’s increasing unease with Clinton’s open-ended commitment in the Balkans.¹⁶² As had been the case in Somalia, the leader of the charge was Clinton’s fellow Democrat, but staunch defender of separation of powers, Senator Robert Byrd. Byrd sponsored the withdrawal amendment, and wrote in a New York Times op-ed,

“The United States should take steps to turn the Kosovo peacekeeping operation over to our European allies. NATO undertook the Kosovo mission with an understanding that Europe, not America, would shoulder the peacekeeping and reconstruction duties. The United States, with its outstanding military forces and weaponry, effectively won the war; the European allies were to keep the peace.”¹⁶³

By the spring of 2000, President Clinton was no longer as worried about pressure from Congress as he did not face reelection. External pressures weighed less on his decisions as his Bosnia analogy had held up regarding casualties.

Facing few real constraints, President Clinton’s aspirations were reinforced by the lack of casualties in Operation Allied Force, the insistence of NATO allies and Kosovar Albanians, and general consistencies with the Bosnian analogy. That Slobodan Milošević remained in power in the FRY further reinforced the perceived importance of maintaining a US presence. Yet even when that situation changed with Milošević’s ouster on 5 October 2000, the achievement of one of Clinton’s aspirations only further reinforced his resolve to keep US forces engaged as he pursued even greater aspirations for Engagement and Enlargement.

Summary

In the Kosovo case, President Clinton demonstrates some traits of a Calm Insensitive Perceiving president, which implies risk insensitivity, but also the personal style of a Sensation Seeking Intuiting president, which implies risk acceptance. If the proposed three stage model of decision making under risk is valid, Clinton should simply be expected to ignore risk in his disengagement decisions, but this does not appear to be the case. It is thus prudent to evaluate the effects of personal style/risk propensity and framing effects on his decision-making, and Clinton’s risk propensity did indeed seem significant. Six years of presidential experience and the lessons of Bosnia made President Clinton more proactive, but his actions remained consistent with his personality. His low Deliberation (C6) and Perceiving (MBTI-P) traits found in the Bosnia analogy a blueprint for action in Kosovo that made ignoring or dismissing risks easier. Specifically regarding disengagement, as a Perceiver (ENFP) he learned from the Bosnia analogy that he should avoid committing to an end date for the peace enforcement mission as he had no way to control events and would likely have to answer for an eventual extension. As a result, the US continues to provide the majority of troops in KFOR to this day.

Again President Clinton’s personal style was evident. His high overall Openness (O), coupled with his Intuiter’s (ENFP) preference for information gathering might be expected to counter any rashness he might exhibit in following the Bosnia analogy. This was less evident than in earlier cases. By 1999 Clinton was comfortable making foreign policy decisions and was confident in the applicability of the Bosnia analogy and his own knowledge of what to do. Consequently, he was not as open to alternatives as he had been in the muddling through period of 1993-1995. Yet at the same time, the casual, risk-insensitive decisions could be reinforced by Clinton’s impulse to do something, supported by his very high Openness to Action (O4) and extremely high Excitement Seeking (E5).
As with Somalia and Bosnia, the dilemma Clinton presents in the Three Stage Model is that his traits align to those of both risk insensitive and risk acceptant presidents. Clinton may either ignore or accept risks because of his combined beliefs that he can control events and that there is always another chance to un-do or re-do a bad decision. Also similar to Bosnia, it might appear Clinton accepted the risk of an open-ended ground presence in KFOR to avoid the perceived loss of disengagement, in accordance with prospect theory. Again, though, prospect theory alone cannot explain his consistent willingness to take these types of risks. Reflecting back on Kowert and Hermann, it seems as a Sensation Seeker (E5) Clinton’s expansive aspiration levels may artificially keep him in the domain of losses, feeling he has to accept risks to avoid failure.164 This explanation casts disengagement aside as incapable of achieving Clinton’s lofty aspirations. In terms of disengagement in the Kosovo case, Clinton was clearly aware of the risks, and dismissed disengagement by framing it as a sure loser, incapable of meeting his aspirations.

Clinton owned Kosovo. He learned from Bosnia that nothing good would happen if the US did not lead. He also learned that setting arbitrary dates for withdrawal were unnecessary, unhelpful, and counterproductive to his larger aspirations for Engagement and Enlargement. Legacy replaced re-election as a motivation for Clinton, even as the wisdom of continued peace-enforcement/nation-building in the Balkans and elsewhere was an issue between the 2000 presidential candidates.

Conclusions: Presidential Risk Behavior in Disengagement from the Balkans

Table 5.2. Summary of Results of the Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Risk Perception</th>
<th>Risk Predisposition &amp; Framing Effect</th>
<th>Reference Effect</th>
<th>Aspiration Level</th>
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<td></td>
<td>H1</td>
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<td>Clinton (Dec ‘96)</td>
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<td>Clinton (Jun ‘99)</td>
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Note: (X = model prediction  Shading = observed)

H1: Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant.
H2: Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style.
H2a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents are risk-averse, particularly when disengagement is framed as a loss.
H2b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain.

H2c: Open Deliberate Judging presidents are risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain (IAW prospect theory).
H3a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents set unusually low aspiration levels.
H3b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels.
H4: The president’s aspiration level (acting as a situational constraint) is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving (or surpassing) the aspiration level in a particular case.

President Clinton’s risk profile is that of an Insensitive Perceiver, whose low Deliberation (C6) and Spontaneity (MBTI-P) suggest he may be unaware of or ignore the risks inherent in his decisions. His personal style, however, is clearly that of a Sensation-Seeking Intuiting type, who should show a propensity for risk-acceptance, particularly for gains. This presents a significant challenge to the trait-based model, as the risk-invariant profile as presented should bypass personal style altogether, jumping straight to the decision stage, with the basis of his decision-making being something other than risk…such as principle or ideology. Yet Clinton’s personality profile is an exact and compelling match for risk-acceptance. Moreover, Clinton very clearly is aware of risk and considers it in his decision-making calculus, as depicted in Table 5.2 in the H2 column, where such behavior is not predicted by the model, but is observed nonetheless. In fact, President Clinton’s thorough consideration of risks led some aides to consider him “the most tactical, risk-averse President we’ve ever had -- all that polling and market-testing.” In reality, Clinton takes is prone to risk-taking, but whether he ignores risks or actively seeks risky options, he generally takes measured risks. To his aides’ assessment, Clinton’s fascination with polls is not a sign of risk-aversion, but rather seems more a factor of his exceedingly high Openness (O) driving his insatiable need for information. Furthermore, President Clinton’s extreme Excitement-Seeking (E5) and Intuiting (MBTI-N) nature combine to further encourage his proclivity for analyzing a novel problem from every possible angle, thus checking his milder tendencies toward Spontaneity (MBTI-P) and low Deliberation (C6).

Hermann notes that charismatic leaders tend to avoid both high and low risk options. Clinton consistently swings between soaring rhetoric and pragmatic action. He manages risk the same way, choosing risks from the higher end of the spectrum, but stepping back from the highest of the high risk choices available. He then reverses frames to paint his choice as the lower-risk, more rational option. Clinton’s famous third way between doing nothing in Bosnia and owning the intervention aimed to keep America’s hand on the controls, but by the lowest-

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risk means possible. Born from Vietnam and tempered in Somalia, President Clinton operated
under a firm assumption that the US public would not tolerate casualties, and thus was risk
averse mostly to casualties. In lieu of a mass casualty event, he framed disengagement
negatively. If the US was not engaged militarily, he had little control or influence over
outcomes, which he viewed as a certain loss. What he failed to see, or chose to ignore, was how
having a presence and being involved, opened the door to mission creep and deepened
involvement. This was true in Vietnam, as advisors became combatants, and Clinton had
overseen it personally in Somalia, as his logistics-support forces inevitably grew to QRFs and
JSOTFs. Risk-taking is choosing a high-variance strategy relative to other alternatives, so while
disengagement has risks, those risks clearly offered less variance than continued engagement in
Clinton’s view.167 Consequently, President Clinton eliminated disengagement as an option,
keeping his aspirations high enough to falsely put him in the loss frame, thus justifying the
riskier choice of continued involvement for greater prospective gains. Clinton behaved as the
Trait-Based Model would predict, as risk-acceptant.

President Clinton's determination to avoid a ground force conflict bordered on obsession.
This assumption precluded the potential for quicker resolutions and overall decreased civilian
atrocities in both Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time, however, it prevented quagmires by
avoiding the sunk cost argument fostered by high-casualty, ground force engagements. In the
process, Clinton's interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo proved efficacies of airpower theretofore
only theorized. Colin Powell speculated, “I just don’t think Bill Clinton wanted to have a major
ground war on his watch.”168 This may be true, and perhaps shows his appreciation for the fact
that the type of force used matters, with ground forces being the most likely to incur mass
casualties, get mired, or force escalation. He may have also understood the difficulties of
disengaging militarily once ground forces are engaged. The irony is that while Clinton
steadfastly resisted injecting US ground forces into both Bosnia and Kosovo, his decision-
making was constrained by ground forces in both cases. In Bosnia, President Clinton was

167 Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann
168 Blaine Harden and John M. Broder, “CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: Washington Memo; Clinton's Aims: Win the
constrained by vulnerable UNPROFOR troops in country. In Kosovo, the effectiveness of his strategy was constrained by his overt, announced rejection of a ground option.169

Bosnia showed that, as “a matter of temperament, Clinton always tried first to be an accommodator.”170 The UN was clearly driving the operation in Bosnia. Between 30 May 1992 and 9 November 1995 there were 46 Security Council resolutions dealing specifically with the situation in Bosnia.171 After two-and-a-half years of muddling through, attempting to follow the UN’s and NATO’s lead, President Clinton realized there would be no peace in Bosnia unless the United States made it happen and that his own political future would be imperiled if the war continued.172 US leadership shortly brought a peace agreement, but with it a commitment of ground forces that would remain in place nearly a decade later. These lessons formed the Bosnia analogy, which Clinton would follow in Kosovo. Both peace enforcement/nation building operations would extend beyond Clinton's presidency, becoming the inheritance of his successor.

In the Balkans, we see two medium-scale compellent interventions that were fundamentally different from an international legal standpoint, but shared many variables, including the lead antagonist, making it easier to compare and contrast President Clinton's risk behavior over time to evaluate the effect if his personality traits were consistent over time and with differences in experience. Indeed, in both cases, Clinton demonstrated behavior consistent with his typing as a risk-acceptant president. In both cases he effectively ruled out disengagement early on by setting aspiration levels far in excess of what disengagement could achieve. Interestingly, Clinton's behavior brings into question whether the Trait-Based Model is accurate and complete in totally disregarding personal style traits for potentially risk/frame invariant presidents.

It is tempting to look at the military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and more recently in Libya, with their heavy emphasis on airpower, and conclude they did not require boots on the ground. That is to overlook or ignore the actions of allied ground forces. Also, because of

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170 Harris, The Survivor, xxvi.

171 Cutts, The Humanitarian Operation In Bosnia, 1992-95, 2. Cutts notes this includes all Security Council resolutions after SCR 755 of 20 May 92 which recommended that Bosnia and Herzegovina be admitted to membership of the United Nations, and before 15 December 1995 when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed.

airpower's lower emotional impact when compared to US ground forces engaged in combat, it is equally easy to think the US involvement is over when the bombing stops. It seems a brilliant exit strategy, but it ignores the Airmen who remain deployed policing the air, and the soldiers that begin interminable deployment rotations as peacekeepers.173

In Bosnia, the US intervention provided an asymmetric advantage to the Bosnian Muslims in the form of airpower…airstrike, aerial reconnaissance, close air support, and planned airstrikes. Two weeks of airstrikes in Operation Deliberate Force coupled with a massive Croatian-Bosnian offensive made the difference in Dayton. However, US ground forces were a condition of getting agreement on the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, effectively continuing the intervention. That US presence in Bosnia remained until 1 Dec 2004 when they were replaced by an EU force that is still there today in reduced numbers. But why? Were US peacekeepers critical to reaching the settlement in Dayton? Did President Clinton want to be done with Bosnia after Dayton?174 The evidence suggests he did not. Whether or not Clinton wanted to be done in the Balkans after Bosnia, it was not to be. Dealings with Kosovo played out very much in line with the Bosnian analogy. US and NATO airpower provided similar asymmetric advantages to the Kosovar Albanians, but the fundamental difference in Milošević’s valuation of Kosovo vice Bosnia paired with the absence of a credible ground threat required two-and-a-half months of air strikes to compel terms from Milošević vice Deliberate Force's two weeks.

The Balkan cases matter because Bosnia and Kosovo often are used to bolster arguments for other proposed US interventions. American airpower can provide an asymmetric advantage in many countries, and absolutely offers advantages in terms of disengagement. However, it is important to understand what happened in Bosnia and Kosovo after the bombs stopped dropping. Once the US commits to any type of intervention, it only becomes easier to get more and more entangled as superpower credibility always arises.175 Anthony Lake may have best summed up the Clinton Administration's turnabout to the Bush Administration’s position: “I don't think you can use American or NATO or other forces to change human hearts. That is not something outsiders can do.”176

173 Larison, “Misunderstanding and Misrepresenting NATO Interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo to Sell a Syrian War.”
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Sciolino, “The Clinton Record: Foreign Policy; Bosnia Policy Shaped by US Military Role.”
Chapter Six

Iraq

If we’d gone to Baghdad and got rid of Saddam Hussein -- assuming we could have found him -- we’d have had to put a lot of forces in and run him to ground some place. He would not have been easy to capture. Then you’ve got to put a new government in his place and then you’re faced with the question of what kind of government are you going to establish in Iraq? Is it going to be a Kurdish government or a Shia government or a Sunni government? How many forces are you going to have to leave there to keep it propped up, how many casualties are you going to take through the course of this operation?

-- Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense

U.S. withdrawal is made easier by the fact that both the Iraqi government and the new U.S. administration want American troops out...

-- Peter Galbraith

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them.

-- T. E. Lawrence

Introduction and Overview

Before the Iraqis had accepted the formal cease-fire agreement (UNSCR 687) on 6 April 1991, and barely a month after the end of the ground campaign, the UN and the UK coaxed President George H. W. Bush into taking action on UNSCR 688, condemning Saddam Hussein’s repression of Kurds in northern Iraq. The European Union (EU) established a UN safe-haven and no-fly zone north of the latitude 36 degrees north on 8 April 1991 to protect the Kurds, encourage their return to their homes, and to protect humanitarian operations under Operation Provide Comfort. That President Bush succumbed demonstrates the truism that being engaged in a theater elevates events to the national interest that might not otherwise merit intervention. It is arguable, if not a given, that the US engaged in a humanitarian operation in northern Iraq mostly out of some sense of responsibility for encouraging the sedition for which the Kurds were being

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punished. Reflecting back on Speier’s tenets of disengagement, the US had tried to disengage from an enemy who remained capable of posing a credible threat, even if only to overly broad Wilsonian-internationalist interests. Again, as involvement begets greater involvement, when the humanitarian crisis President Bush signed up US forces to deal with was averted and Operation Provide Comfort stood down on 24 July 1991, the very same day Bush stood up Operation Provide Comfort II as a predominantly military operation to prevent Iraqi aggression against the Kurds. When asked by the Government of Turkey to end the operation on 31 December 1996, a different US president, Bill Clinton, complied, but in name only, initiating a new no-fly-zone enforcement mission, Operation Northern Watch the next day.²

UN SCR 688 did not expressly call for no-fly-zones or their enforcement. Based on the Provide Comfort model, however, on 26 August 1992 President Bush, along with the British and French, imposed a similar stricture in southern Iraq, below the 32nd parallel.³ In October 1994, the southern exclusion zone mission was expanded to include heavy weapons, a so-called no-drive zone, and in 1996 the no-fly-zone border was expanded north to the 33rd parallel.⁴ The demand to maintain perpetual rotations of deployed Airmen eventually forced the Air Force to develop an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept in order to maintain training and readiness for worldwide wartime missions while keeping an average of 5,000 Airman in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.⁵

Weakened internally and militarily, Saddam came to rely on the US/coalition presence both to rally nationalist support at home and for international attention at the UN. There were opportunities to disengage, but so long as Saddam remained in power, it never seemed a credible option. When USAF forces began to withdraw after nine quiet months in 1994, Saddam promptly sent Republican Guard forces to the Kuwait border, eliciting a huge buildup of US forces in the region and stiffening the US resolve to enforce the no-fly zones and contain Iraq. Containment and presence thus became the proxy for the militarily unachievable mission of

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compelling compliance with the US/UN imposed ceasefire terms. No-fly zone enforcement was a mission without a positive aspiration. It became increasingly apparent that a positive change was needed to free the US from the Iraq quagmire. Had US forces completely disengaged, even in 1994, and then Saddam had followed through with aggressive action against Kuwait, it would have provided a new opportunity to decide on the terms of any intervention. Those terms might well have included regime change the second time around.

Intuitively, it seems a change of presidents should offer an opportunity to break the momentum of an intervention. Where George H. W. Bush’s hands perhaps were tied in Iraq after Desert Storm, Bill Clinton had an opportunity to divorce US foreign policy from Provide Comfort II in northern Iraq. As described in detail in Chapters Four and Five, however, foreign policy was deliberately placed on the back burner in President Clinton’s transition, generally left to coast with Bush’s policies. The new President’s first significant act regarding Iraq, in fact, was a punitive cruise missile strike on 28 June 1993 against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad, retaliating for Saddam Hussein’s foiled plot to assassinate ex-President Bush.6 On 14 April 1994, American pilots mistakenly shot down two American Black Hawk helicopters in the northern Iraq no-fly zone, killing twenty-six allied soldiers.7 Losing a similar number in Somalia had shifted Clinton’s naturally expansive aspirations toward disengagement. Perhaps because it was a friendly fire accident, or because Congress did not assert the pressure it had over Somalia, the effect was not the same. Clinton himself included trust for multinational military operations among his reasons for persevering.8 For whatever reasons, Bill Clinton did not view disengaging as a desirable option throughout his presidency. Instead, the status quo prevailed, with periodic punitive strikes such as Desert Strike in August 1996 and Desert Fox in December 1998.

Desert Strike was another series of cruise missile strikes against Iraqi forces oppressing Kurds in northern Iraq. Some, including French President Jacques Chirac, “accused Clinton of staging gratuitous military action for political reasons -- to look tough before the presidential election.”9 President Clinton argued the genocidal persecutions were prohibited by UNSCR 688, that missile strikes were the best practical alternative, and that doing nothing would only

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7 Ibid., 129.
8 Ibid., 134.
9 Ibid., 393-4.
undermine the Security Council’s pledge of collective protection for Iraqi civilians. Two years later, on 31 October 1998, Saddam again defied UN weapons inspectors, leading Clinton to order Desert Fox in December 1998. Most governments, including most Arab states and even the traditional roadblocks to action, the French and Russians, supported the four-day campaign of retaliatory air strikes. To Clinton, his administration, and many in the west, Saddam’s actions seemed blatantly self-destructive, as UN inspectors were very close to recommending a pull back from inspections to monitoring which could soon lead to an easing of the crippling economic sanctions. What seemed irrational, however, made sense to those who understood Hussein’s personality and aspirations. To Saddam and many Iraqis, concessions on sanctions earned from earlier acts of defiance in October-November 1997 and January-February 1998 were wins. Likewise, when the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors left in December 1998 in advance of Desert Fox and were not allowed back, the Iraqi people saw a major victory for Saddam. The limited nature of the air strikes, using precision weapons targeting military capabilities and preoccupied with avoiding collateral damage to civilians, meant the Iraqi people saw and felt little effect from Desert Fox. Saddam came through unscathed, with greater internal support upon which his survival in power depended. Throughout 1999 and 2000, there were seemingly daily incidents in the Iraqi no-fly zones. Much as Clinton had once noted of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) mission in the Middle East, no-fly zone operations in Iraq had become so routine and accepted as to be almost unnoticed. Not, however, because the missions were innocuous; routine sorties in January and February 1999 resulted in the destruction of more of Saddam’s military infrastructure than had the pre-planned bombing campaign of December 1998. On the one hand the 1990s saw Saddam’s ability to threaten his neighbors severely diminished, but on the other hand his ability to stand up to the US and UN bolstered his internal support. President Clinton summed it up to his unofficial diarist thusly: “While we believed there could never be peace in that part of the world with Saddam in power, our first duty was to keep him weak.”

10 Ibid., 393-4.
11 Ibid., 517-8.
13 Branch, The Clinton Tapes, 536.
So low were the NFZ operations in the media’s awareness, that they generated no questions in the 2000 Presidential debates. Candidate George W. Bush had to bring up Iraq in the context of the Middle East peace process, noting that the UN sanctions coalition was unraveling and Iraq and UN members were routinely violating the sanctions. He warned Saddam had “better not be [developing weapons of mass destruction] or there's going to be a consequence should I be the president.”

President Bush laid out his administration goals in his inaugural address before a joint session of Congress on 27 February 2001. The new president addressed neither Iraq specifically nor foreign policy generally. After September 11, 2001, however, in his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush’s focus and tone had changed. He described Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as part of the “axis of evil”: “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world....And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.”

A year and a day after the 9-11 attacks, and flush with military success in Afghanistan, on 12 September 2002 President Bush told the UN General Assembly:

“If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable.”

A month later, on 10-11 October 2002, the US Senate and House of Representatives authorized the use of force in Iraq in Section Three of the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq:

“AUTHORIZATION. The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to: defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat

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posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.”

On 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council approved Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 reaffirming all previous disarmament resolutions and giving Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.”

UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq after nearly a four year hiatus on 18 November 2002. On 7 December, Iraq submitted a declaration to the UN claiming they had no banned weapons, but two weeks later President Bush approved the deployment of US troops to the Gulf.

In his third State of the Union address on 28 January 2003, President Bush announced he would ask the UN Security Council to consider Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world, saying, “let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

The UN refused to authorize force for the disarmament of Iraq and pulled UN inspectors, humanitarian workers, and observers out of Iraq on 17 March 2003 when President Bush gave Saddam a final 48-hour warning to step down or face war, adding regime change to his stated aspirations. With no action from Saddam, President Bush announced the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm Iraq on 19 March 2003.

Baghdad fell on 9 April 2003. Advancing US troops were met by cheering Iraqi citizens. Looting of government offices began almost immediately and within a few days looting and civil unrest were out of control. On 15 April, retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed to run Iraq until a new government was in place. Garner led the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), established on 20 January 2003, responsible for post-combat governmental administration until a democratically elected Iraqi government could take over.

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On 1 May after landing in a Navy S-3B Viking onto the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush gave a victory speech and announced “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” This, including the period through the end of 2003, is the first opportunity for disengagement examined below. The President noted that reaching the desired end state would require more:

“We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes. We've begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated. We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.”

Ten days later Jay Garner was abruptly replaced by L. Paul Bremer as Chief Executive of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Garner said it was planned from the start that he would not be the implementer of the plans he drew up at ORHA, but skeptics insisted he was fired over his differences of opinion with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on the way ahead in Iraq. Bremer held full executive, legislative, and judicial power for his fourteen months in country. On 13 July 2003, Bremer established the Iraqi Interim Governing Council, a group of twenty-five hand-picked representatives from various groups in Iraqi society. Among his most notable and controversial decrees were CPA Order Number One, 14 May 2003, banning all Ba’ath Party members from participation in the new government, and CPA Order Number Two, 23 May 2003, which dismantled the Iraqi Army.

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The UN re-entered Iraq with UNSCR 1483, approved on 22 May 2003, ending sanctions and outlining UN responsibilities in Iraq’s transition back to self-governance. An insurgency was already forming, highlighting once again that nation-building broke with the traditions of UN peacekeeping missions, in that there were elements actively fighting against UN and non-governmental organizations (NGO) presence and participation in Iraq. The UN headquarters building in Baghdad was truck-bombed on 19 August 2003, approaching Somalia among the worst attacks against UN personnel.29 Two months later, on 27 October 2003, twelve were killed by a suicide bomber in the first-ever suicide attack against the International Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters.30

Despite the deteriorating situation, the end of 2003 brought achievement of another major milestone toward reaching the military end state and disengagement with the capture of Saddam Hussein on a farm in Tikrit on 14 December 2003.31 This left establishing a new, elected government and the search for WMD as the largest remaining tasks going into 2004. Approaching the one-year point, on 8 March 2004 the Iraqi Interim Governing Council signed an interim constitution. Also in mid-March 2004, amid a growing insurgency and mounting casualties, Spain’s new Prime Minister threatened to pull out of Iraq unless the UN took over the “chaotic occupation.”32 George W. Bush did not share his father’s and his predecessor’s faith in the UN, and refused to abdicate responsibility for the operation. On 18 April 2004, the Spanish government announced it was pulling its troops.33

On 28 June 2004, Bremer formally transferred limited sovereignty to Iraq through the Iraqi Interim Government and enacted the interim constitution. Four days earlier Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr declared a ceasefire with US forces in Baghdad’s Sadr City region, providing hope for a reduction in insurgent activity.34 With a UN-endorsed sovereign government in place, this provided an opportunity to disengage military forces if so desired. The remainder of 2004 saw the US military increasingly engaging the Sunni insurgency, including a massive operation

32 Palast, “General Jay Garner.”

With Saddam out of power and in custody and the WMD search over, 30 January 2005 offered a realistic opportunity to disengage. Iraq’s first competitive, free election in over fifty years saw over sixty percent of eligible voters turn out.\footnote{Tony Karon, “Making Sense of Iraq’s Vote,” Time.com, January 31, 2005, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1022720,00.html.} But American forces stayed. Obviously, we know disengagement was not the option chosen. Instead, US forces were sucked deeper into the quagmire of the insurgency. On 11 April 2005 thousands of Sadr’s Shia followers demonstrated in Baghdad, and in a rare showing of Muslim solidarity, called for Sunnis to join in as well to protest the continued US presence two years after Saddam’s overthrow.\footnote{“Shia Protest Over US Presence in Iraq,” Al Jazeera, April 11, 2005, http://www.assatashakur.org/forum/afrikan-world-news/5034-shia-protest-over-us-presence-iraq.html.} The establishment of a President and Prime Minister further diminished US reasons for staying.\footnote{BBC, “Iraq Profile,” BBC.com, October 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763} At the end of May 2005, the new Iraqi Army executed its largest-to-date counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad to prove their ability to take over security operations.\footnote{Stratfor, “Iraq: The Politics of Operation Lightning,” Stratfor.com, June 3, 2005.} On 15 October 2005, the Iraqi voters approve a new constitution creating an Islamic federal democracy.\footnote{BBC, “Iraq Profile.”} Just as the year started with an opportunity to disengage, so it ended with another, as the Iraqi people voted for a new Iraqi Parliament on 15 December 2005. This parliament would choose the first full-term, four-year government. For the first time, Sunni participation was high and overall violence was low.\footnote{John Fisher Burns, interview by Jeffrey Brown, “PBS News Hour: Iraq Votes,” PBS.org, December 15, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec05/vote_12-15.html}

With no party gaining an absolute majority in the December election, the Iraqi government stalled for months until re-elected President Jalal Talabani asked Shia compromise candidate Nouri al-Maliki to form a new government on 22 April 2006.\footnote{BBC, “Iraq Profile.”} This is the second period examined below.

If Al-Qaeda in Iraq was a primary motivation for staying engaged in Iraq, progress on that front came with the killing of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi on 7 June 2006. Zarqawi had long
been the face of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, including the 2003 UN headquarters bombing and the videotaped beheadings of two Americans. He had been overtly targeting Shiites since at least September 2005, according to some hoping to spark a broader sectarian civil war that might convince the US to withdraw.\textsuperscript{44} The year ended with the release of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report on 6 December 2006. The bipartisan ten-member team found the situation in Iraq “grave and deteriorating” and offered 79 recommendations for a way forward. Most importantly, the ISG report called “for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.”\textsuperscript{45}

On the military front, the ISG report correctly noted the future was in the hands of the Iraqis. To accelerate the Iraqis’ ability to fully take over security responsibilities, the report recommended a significant increase in the number of US personnel, including combat troops, “imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units.”\textsuperscript{46} President Bush responded by announcing just such a troop surge of nearly 20,000 personnel on 10 January 2007.

On 1 May 2007, four years after his “Mission Accomplished” speech, President Bush vetoed congressional legislation setting a date certain for the start of troop withdrawals from Iraq as 1 October 2007. He reasoned: “It makes no sense to tell the enemy when you plan to start withdrawing.”\textsuperscript{47} This would continue as an issue, however, including in ongoing negotiations with the Iraqi government over the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Two days before the US troop surge ended on 16 July 2008, Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for a US withdrawal timetable.\textsuperscript{48}

Barack Obama was elected President on 4 November 2008. Just over three weeks later, on 27 November 2008, the Iraqi Parliament passed a SOFA requiring all US forces to withdraw to bases outside Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009 and to withdraw from Iraq entirely no later than 31

\textsuperscript{44} Raj Purohit and Golzar Kheiltash, “In the News: Don’t Let Zarqawi Get Away With Genocide,” \textit{Citizens for Global Solutions}, http://archive2.globalsolutions.org/in_the_news/news_dont_let_zarqawi_get_away_genocide
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., xvi.
Before Obama took office, the first implementation action of the SOFA took place on 1 January 2009 with the hand-off of Baghdad’s Green Zone to the Iraqi government. The Iraqi flag was raised over the Presidential Palace for the first time since Baghdad fell on 9 April 2003. Thirty days later, and eleven days into Barack Obama’s Presidency, Iraq held its second nationwide election. Unlike the 2005 elections, 40% of eligible Sunnis voted and election day was peaceful and smooth.

On 27 February 2009, President Obama announced, “by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.” That meant the withdrawal of most of the 42,000 combat troops in Iraq, leaving between 35,000-50,000 troops to train and advise Iraqi security forces, hunt terrorist cells, and protect American civilian and military personnel. US forces met the 30 June 2009 requirement to move out from Iraq’s cities. The Iraqi government declared the day a national holiday. President Obama met his objective to be under 50,000 troops by the end of August, withdrawing down to 49,700 by 24 August 2010.

The President announced the official end of combat operations to the nation in a televised address on 31 August 2010:

“...Tonight, I am announcing that the American combat mission in Iraq has ended. Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country...Going forward, a transitional force of U.S. troops will remain in Iraq with a different mission: advising and assisting Iraq’s Security Forces, supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counterterrorism missions, and protecting our civilians...As our military draws down, our dedicated civilians -- diplomats, aid workers, and advisors -- are moving into the lead to support Iraq as it strengthens its government, resolves political disputes, resettles those displaced by war, and builds ties with the region and the world.”

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With total troop numbers down seventy percent from their peak and with those remaining out of the cities and destined by the SOFA to be out by the end of the year, 2011 was relatively quiet. The year was intended to be about wrapping up the transition to Iraqi control and the logistics of withdrawal. Some in the Sunni and Kurdish minorities wanted the Iraqi government to ask the US to maintain some level of presence to help assure their protection from Shiite domination.  

The last convoy of US military personnel and equipment left Iraq on 18 December 2011. Between 150-200 military personnel stayed behind at the US embassy in Baghdad for specialized training, foreign military sales, and security cooperation missions. The final two-and-a-half years under President Obama is the third opportunity examined below.

The three cuts examined below trace the steps from the end of major combat operations and into the quagmire of nation building. Iraq is interesting foremost because it was a large-scale, joint major combat operation. Additionally, the case is interesting because it was in part a continuation of an ongoing carryover operation leftover from Desert Storm twelve years earlier. Finally, it offers an opportunity to compare and contrast the two most recent US Presidents along with connections to the two Presidents examined in previous cases.

First is President Bush’s opportunity to disengage upon declaring the military mission accomplished. If stated intentions were met, US forces would have been withdrawn by September 2003. The second opportunity came with the nominal accomplishment of President Bush’s stated objectives at the initiation of the intervention. The period begins with the end of major combat operations and extends to after the successful election of an Iraqi government. The third cut examines President Obama’s period of control, from his first major action as President through to the withdrawal of the last US troops. In all timeframes, the president had a stated intent or a clear interest in disengaging military forces. The disengagement decision carried significant risks.

Each opportunity under examination follows the same structure. First, an overview provides necessary contextual information. Next, the relevant hypotheses are tested according to

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where the president fits in the three-stage model, to include risk-perception, the president’s risk propensity and aspiration level, his framing of disengagement, and his final decision.

1 May 2003: President George W. Bush

President Bush ran on a different view of the use of force than he implemented after 11 September 2001. In the first presidential debate on 3 October 2000, asked when he would use force, Bush emphasized his difference from the Clinton/Gore administration on nation building. In contrast to Clinton’s anti-Powell Doctrine, Bush roughly outlined the Powell Doctrine as his criteria for using force. He opined that the US cannot “be all things to all people in the world.”

Bush accentuated the difference between himself and Al Gore as being Gore’s belief in nation building, stating he “would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed the president’s views in his “Beyond Nation-Building” speech on the USS Intrepid on 14 February 2003. Speaking of America’s role in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld emphasized that the administration’s intent was not nation building, where “well-intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems and say let's fix it...a disservice in some instances because when foreigners come in with international solutions to local problems, if not very careful they can create a dependency.” Rumsfeld noted, “A long-term foreign presence in a country can be unnatural...Despite good intentions and the fine work of humanitarian workers individually, there can be unintended adverse side effects.” For examples, Rumsfeld listed restaurants and supermarkets in East Timor, out of reach to citizens as they targeted international workers making two-hundred times the local average wage, and Kosovo cab drivers making ten times the salary of university professors. Keying on Kosovo, Rumsfeld went on to note how three years after the intervention the UN continued to run the nation by executive orders, with parliamentary decisions dependent on UN signatures to be valid.

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59 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
Both of Bush’s ideas, his adherence to the Powell Doctrine and his aversion to nation building, would change. Success in Afghanistan with a small, high-tech, agile force supporting seasoned indigenous forces seemingly bolstered Donald Rumsfeld’s military transformation vision. Ironically, the Afghanistan operation was really a CIA improvisation, as on 11 September, DoD had no plan for Afghanistan. The CIA briefed President Bush within 48 hours on their plan to use the intelligence community and military Special Forces, coupled with the Northern Alliance, to defeat the Taliban and close al Qaeda’s sanctuary. Still, in the afterglow of overwhelming military success in Afghanistan with a tiny footprint of about 110 CIA officers, 316 special operators, and massive airpower, in 2003 President George W. Bush adopted Rumsfeld’s version of an anti-Powell Doctrine--go in fast with a small footprint and “assume risk.” This was a stark contrast with President George H. W. Bush’s approach in 1991, using the Powell Doctrine to “go in big, and end it quickly” with overwhelming force to guarantee victory. In both Afghanistan and Iraq Bush found regime change required nation building to ensure gains.

We cannot know President Bush’s National Security Strategy absent the attacks of 9/11 and the resultant Global War on Terror. The best approximation lies in his speech at The Citadel in September 1999. From the Cold War, candidate Bush saw a victory for freedom:

“We won a victory, not just for a nation, but for a vision. A vision of freedom and individual dignity – defended by democracy, nurtured by free markets, spread by information technology, carried to the world by free trade. The advance of freedom – from Asia to Latin America to East and Central Europe – is creating the conditions for peace.”

Like other post-Containment doctrines, George W. Bush’s saw new threats including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet it defined US interests more narrowly, highlighting the key paradox of Engagement and Enlargement under peace dividend budgets. He cited “back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and equipment, and rapidly declining readiness” for lowering military morale. Defense spending was at its lowest since before World War II, yet personnel were deployed much more frequently, affecting recruiting, retention, and readiness. Bush’s vision favored strategic military disengagement, promising “an

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64 Woodward, State of Denial, 78, 81-83, 100.
immediate review of our overseas deployments,” to cull “open-ended deployments and unclear military missions.” The object was not to cut and run, but to ask, “What is our goal, can it be met, and when do we leave?” He sought “an orderly and timely withdrawal from places like Kosovo and Bosnia,” requiring more from allies. “We will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties,” he pledged. Bush recognized, “our allies know that if America is committed everywhere, our commitments are everywhere suspect. We must be selective in the use of our military, precisely because America has other great responsibilities that cannot be slighted or compromised.”

The language of defense transformation and the revolution of military affairs were already present in the Citadel speech. Forces needed to be more agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require less logistical support to project power over long distances quickly and with small footprints. What was missing was any notion of preemptive war.

We do know that the strategy that came out of 9/11, the Bush Doctrine, was a significant departure from Containment as well as Engagement and Enlargement. Its call words became preemptive war, but for all its differences, in the macro view it remained a Wilsonian internationalist doctrine.

Another known is that George W. Bush is decisive. Decisions are important to him. He said as much in his first Presidential debate in 2000 when asked how voters should choose who was better suited for making military and foreign policy decisions: “We have too much polling and focus groups going on in Washington today. We need decisions made on sound principles.” He values decisiveness: “I’m the decider, and I decide what is best.”

We see this in “his most consequential decision as president -- the decision to invade Iraq.” We see it in his choice for the title and structure of his presidential memoir, Decision Points. Finally, we see it today in the George W. Bush Presidential Library, with its interactive attraction, the Decision Points Theater, which lets visitors make their own decisions for the major events in Bush’s presidency.

By Bush’s inauguration in January 2001, Iraq had lingered as the poster child for an open-ended UN military commitment for nearly ten frustrating years. If any foreign policy issue

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66 Ibid.
represented the contrast in philosophies between Clinton and Bush, and the need for a decider to resolve it, Iraq was it. Had it not already been on President Bush’s interests list, *The New York Times* put it there on the new President’s first Monday in office. The paper noted a new intelligence estimate that Iraq was rebuilding factories for biological and chemical weapons, framing it as a challenge of Bush’s promise to “take a tougher stance against” Hussein than President Clinton.  

Iraq was an early priority for Bush’s National Security Council. Saddam’s air defense forces fired on US aircraft on inauguration day and Bush’s first notable military action was approval of a strike against Iraqi air defense sites near Baghdad. Such strikes had become somewhat routine, but action outside the no-fly zones required presidential approval. The new President was unsatisfied with the tit-for-tat approach and determined the US must take a harder line with Saddam. In February 2001, when President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, they discussed Iraq, specifically focused on restructuring the increasingly contentious sanctions so as to more effectively constrain Saddam while at the same time not hurt the Iraqi people. They spoke about *if* Saddam was working on WMD, not *that* he was.  

In the wake of 9/11, the anthrax scare in October 2001 turned on the WMD spotlight. Four sources told ABC News the anthrax found in a letter to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle was sophisticated, treated with the chemical additive bentonite. Iraq being the only country known to use bentonite in the production of biological weapons, ABC called it “a trademark of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons program.” Peter Jennings suggested some could see it as the “smoking gun.” Scott McClellan, then Deputy White House Press Secretary, claims the press office strongly refuted ABC’s report, but ABC never fully retracted the inflammatory story. McClellan reports the anthrax attacks deeply affected Bush’s thinking. He was determined not to let another terrorist attack happen on his watch and to challenge regimes believed to be seeking weapons of mass destruction.  

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73 Ibid., 111.
74 Ibid., 111-2.
Confirming Saddam’s disarmament was the legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the cornerstone of the argument for those who believed the US had unfinished business in Iraq. After 9/11, the Global War on Terror added aiding and abetting terrorists to Bush’s reasons for being wary of Saddam. At an 11 September 2001 NSC meeting, Rumsfeld asked, “Why shouldn’t we go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda?” Bush did not answer, but it showed Rumsfeld’s belief that George H. W. Bush “had failed by not taking out Saddam.” By 26 November 2001, experiencing quick success in Afghanistan, President Bush showed his Sensing (ESTP) preference for rigid, black and white, dogmatic thinking when he threatened Iraq:

“If anybody harbors a terrorist, they're a terrorist. If they fund a terrorist, they're a terrorist. If they house terrorists they're terrorists...If they develop weapons of mass destruction, that will be used to terrorize nations, they will be held accountable. And, as for Mr. Saddam Hussein, he needs to let inspectors back in his country to show us that he is not developing weapons of mass destruction.”

By President Bush’s 12 September 2002 speech before the UN General Assembly, he was molding these two and one larger rationales into a “carefully scripted campaign to win broad public support for a possible military confrontation.” Bush’s far more ambitious rationale was to replace Saddam’s repressive dictatorship with a free and democratic government. Saddam’s brutality toward Iraqis, his willful disregard of UN Security Council Resolutions regarding disarmament, and Saddam’s support of terrorists made him “a grave and gathering danger” that could no longer be ignored in a post-9/11 world. This ultimatum essentially told the UN to deal with Iraq toughly and with zero tolerance for further deception or the US would.

In his third State of the Union address on 28 January 2003, President Bush outlined his basic aspiration of disarming Iraq, saying “The United States will ask the UN Security Council to convene on Feb. the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world...But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

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78 Ibid., 119.
79 Ibid., 120.
Table 6.1. Summary of Risk Traits for President George W. Bush

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Perception/Awareness</th>
<th>Calm/Insensitive / Perceiving</th>
<th>Anxious/Sensitive/ Judging</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Propensity</td>
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<td>-N1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rating*</td>
<td>EL</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
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<td>Meets</td>
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*Extremely Low (EL)<-2 SD; -2 SD<Very Low (VL)<-1.5 SD; -1.5 SD<Low<-1 SD; -1 SD<Leans Low (LL)<-.5 SD; -.5 SD < Average (Avg) < +.5 SD; +1 SD < High < +1.5 SD

Figure 6.1. President George W. Bush’s Expected Risk Behavior
**Risk Awareness**

Beginning the three-stage model, in George W. Bush we see all the markers of a Risk-Invariant propensity. As reviewed in Table 6.1 above, Bush shows all the personality traits of a Calm Insensitive Perceiving President. George W. Bush is expected to ignore risks, closing debate and making quick, instinctive decisions on principle. Decisions may therefore appear risk-averse or risk-acceptant dependent on circumstances, as mapped in Figure 6.1. In order to test hypothesis 1 (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant) on risk-perception, we need evidence that shows President Bush was never briefed on the risks of disengaging forces from Iraq, did not himself recognize or acknowledge said risks, or was clearly dismissive of risk in his decision making.

Scott McClellan claims Bush decided to confront Iraq early on, well before his campaign to sell the war started in the fall of 2002. As an ESTP type, Bush is what Keirsey terms a concrete utilitarian. He speaks of black-and-white principles and does whatever works to get quick, effective results. Ever optimistic that things will go his way, Bush is willing to take tremendous risks to get what he wants. In selling action in Iraq, as with all policies, Bush liked to control the message and be the only one in the administration to make news, and wanted everyone to stay on message. The message in September 2002 was that the threat Saddam posed was serious. “None of the possible unpleasant consequences of war -- casualties, economic effects, geopolitical risks, diplomatic repercussions -- were part of the message,” and Bush was very upset when his chief economic advisor Larry Lindsey speculated on potential costs of war to the media. This is clear evidence of risk-ignorance, at least in messaging. More so, it is indicative of Bush’s deep-seated optimism. When he decides on a course of action, he argues like a trial lawyer. He does not publicly acknowledge gaps or contrary evidence, but rather presents his best facts and the rest is the other side’s responsibility.

A long-term, open-ended nation-building operation was never in the plans for Iraq. Disengagement of military forces upon accomplishment of their militarily achievable objectives

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85 Ibid., 131.
was the intent of Operation Iraqi Freedom from the start. Once President Bush decided on the invasion plan, its disengagement assumptions were fixed. The details were not sorted fully, but the stability phase boiled down to twin commitments. As Secretary Rumsfeld put it in February 2003, the US sought to “stay as long as necessary, and to leave as soon as possible.”

President Bush was aware of the risks of invasion and all that could go wrong which might well bog US forces down. His foreign policy team discussed the pros and cons regularly at NSC meetings. Bush’s low Deliberation (C6) and Perceiving (ESTP) traits did not play out as rashness or impulsive action, but rather worked hand-in-hand with his low Openness (O) trait and facets to settle on a course of action early. His non-deliberative, spontaneous personality makes him non-reflective. Once decided, Bush moves forward. He tends to close debate on alternatives and focus on fleshing out the chosen course. Bush Press Secretary Scott McClellan contends, “When Bush was making up his mind to pursue regime change in Iraq, it is clear that his national security team did little to slow him down, to help him fully understand the tinderbox he was opening and the potential risks in doing so.”

The war plan had gone through many iterations since its beginning in November 2001 as the somewhat boilerplate and clearly pre-Rumsfeld OPLAN 1003-98. McClellan believes Bush had already decided to go to war when he tasked Rumsfeld to review the plan:

“In the back of his mind, he would be convinced on Iraq, as on other issues, that until he gave the final order to commence war the decision was never final. But as I would learn upon reflection, war was inevitable given the course of action the president set from the beginning.”

The nature of war planning, by virtue of many reviews and changes, is that it creates an air of inevitability that war will happen once the plan is good enough. This may be exaggerated for a risk-invariant leader, supporting an illusion that a plan put through the wringer so many times certainly must be well-thought-through and have all realistic contingencies covered.

The broadest criticism of OIF is that President Bush and his administration assumed away post-combat operations. It seems intuitive that peace is easier than war. It is easy then to conclude a lack of appreciation or awareness of the risks involved; but that grossly oversimplifies the facts. In Decision Points, President Bush himself insists, “That sure isn’t how

86 Rumsfeld, “Beyond Nation Building.”
87 McClellan, What Happened, 144.
88 Ibid., 127.
I remember it.”89 Bush details planning led by Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley in the the fall of 2002. Douglas Feith, DoD Undersecretary for Policy, worked with Hadley in interagency meetings and wanted to lead the postwar effort. Feith and Rumsfeld wanted to ensure Iraq was not another Bosnia, that reconstruction and political issues were worked out in advance. Feith told Bob Woodward, “We do not want to be in a position where the failure of somebody to do those things ties our forces down indefinitely the way they seem to be tied down in Bosnia indefinitely.”90

On 20 January 2003, President Bush formally established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in DoD to tackle Iraq postwar planning with National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-24.91 Extensive planning was done with international non-governmental organizations to pre-position food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies in anticipation of starvation and refugee crises. Reconstruction plans focused on infrastructure, rule of law, and policy issues, with each of ten specific areas having government or non-governmental leads. Governance and security were the toughest hurdles, but in both cases, risks of alternatives were key considerations. Rather than a lack of planning, Bush likens it to the old military adage that “no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.”92

Indeed, it is in Bush’s decisions after first contact with the enemy that we see rashness in reactive decision-making have far-reaching negative effects. Things started out focused enough, with universal agreement on post-combat objectives at an NSC meeting on the second day of the invasion, 21 March 2003. Among the objectives, “place as many Iraqi faces in positions of visible authority as quickly as possible.”93 In his classic style, President Bush consistently projected confidence in April’s NSC meetings, dismissing second-guessing about the operation, though in the 9 April 2003 NSC meeting, Bush acknowledged, “This guy’s spent 20 to 30 years ruining this country. It’s going to take a while to rebuild it.”94 He did not, however, relate this to any change in plan to get combat forces out of Iraq quickly, nor did he explicitly tie the US to the rebuilding commitment.

89 Woodward, State of Denial, 91.
92 Bush, Decision Points, 248-250.
94 Ibid., 161.
Then came the “Mission Accomplished” speech. General Franks’ idea, the intent was to expressly define the military end state so as to convince international organizations and forces that major hostilities were past and it was time for them to enter Iraq. In conjunction, Franks recommended calling Jay Garner’s ORHA team to Baghdad early. Secretary Rumsfeld, eager to show the small force could win quickly and go home, endorsed both. President Bush, always fond of showing that he supported the judgment and recommendations of his field commanders, decided with little deliberation to go with these recommendations. Though Bush spoke strategically on the *Lincoln*, saying, “The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time,” and “Our coalition will stay until our work is done,” the tactical stagecraft backfired and became a symbol of a President that had failed to appreciate the risks in his actions.95

If “Mission Accomplished” was a tactical messaging blunder with strategic effects, what followed ORHA’s early move to Baghdad was arguably the key strategic mistake that negated all post-war planning. The approved plan had Garner’s team moving in sixty days after combat ended, with military civil affairs troops stabilizing things in the interim. Messaging was again the first symptom, sending Garner in and almost immediately replacing him with Paul Bremer. The seemingly impromptu swap-out led some to conclude Garner ran afoul of Secretary Rumsfeld or his deputies as Garner was known to prefer getting elected Iraqis in charge very quickly.96 Though this was established policy, Doug Feith’s plan envisioned a full-scale occupation of Iraq under a General MacArthur-esque viceroy.97 The chaos was only exacerbated by Bremer’s release of CPA Order Number One on de-Ba’athification and CPA Order Number Two disbanding the Iraqi Army within his first three days in Baghdad. The CIA Station Chief in Baghdad confronted Bremer on the de-Ba’athification order, informing Bremer, “You will put 50,000 people on the street, underground and mad at Americans.”98 Those people were among the most powerful, well-connected elites from across the spectrum. Worse still, disbanding the army left another 250,000 Iraqi men on the streets, out of work, armed, and angry. Perhaps worst of all, the action directly contradicted leaflets the US military had dropped during the invasion promising Iraqi soldiers continued employment.99 These momentous decisions were a break with policy for which no one claims responsibility. President Bush has blamed Bremer;

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95 Bush, *Decision Points*, 257.
96 Palast, “General Jay Garner.”
98 Ibid., 194.
Bremer implied his orders came from Rumsfeld; and Rumsfeld told Garner, “That came from somewhere else.”[^100] What the President had decided through the normal NSC process, on 10 and 12 March 2003 respectively, was that Ba’athists would be vetted with an estimated ninety-five percent kept in their positions; and that Saddam’s Republican Guards would be disbanded, but most of the regular army would be vetted and kept on duty.[^101] George W. Bush is not inclined to change decisions once made, which makes it unlikely that he decided a different course after a unanimous decision before the NSC Principals. Unfortunately, the same traits may well have disinclined Bush to reverse Bremer’s CPA orders once announced. As a risk-invariant type, it is further possible that once the decisions were announced, Bush pressed forward without deliberating significantly on the consequences of the changed approach.

With consideration of military intervention discussed publicly for nearly a year-and-a-half before action, it is impossible to argue President Bush was unaware of the risks involved. The media, Congress, the UN, and the international community more broadly all expressed the risks of action. Risks were understood and considered from both sides. Invading Iraq risked potentially massive casualties and huge costs, as well as causing great instability in the form of a power vacuum. On principle, President Bush believed “the situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq” with Saddam gone.[^102] Inaction risked the continuing decay of the sanctions regime along with a commensurate growth in Saddam’s power. With more money and freedom, Saddam’s ability to rearm and use or provide WMD to terrorists could only grow. As the President told a crowd in Cincinnati, Ohio on 7 October 2002, “Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them or provide them to a terror network.”[^103] In the same speech, President Bush noted “there is no easy or risk-free course of action. Some have argued we should wait, and that’s an option. In my view, it’s the riskiest of all options, because the longer we wait, the stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will

[^103]: Ibid.
After military victory and the toppling of Saddam Hussein, disengaging risked forfeiture of gains and influence over developments. Yet of greater risk to President Bush and some advisors like Rumsfeld, was staying and building among Iraqis a dependency on US support.

Garner thought the level of risk General Franks was encouraging to get combat troops out of country, “was just plain crazy,” according to Gordon and Trainor. Yet Garner knew Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense were dead-set against Bosnia and Kosovo-style open-ended military interventions, and were committed to withdrawing most US forces within three-to-four months. Ironically, in an effort to ensure the State Department could not mismanage post-combat operations in Iraq as he felt they had in the Balkans and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld aggressively hoarded all post-combat authorities for Defense. In stark contrast to Secretary of State Powell’s so-called Pottery Barn Rule of “you break it, you own it,” Rumsfeld’s view was allegedly conveyed as, “We don’t owe these people a thing. We gave them their freedom.”

In George W. Bush we see strong support for hypothesis 1; a Calm Insensitive Perceiving President, Bush’s disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant. President Bush is aware of risks, but does not tend to focus on risks or allow them to deter him from what his gut tells him is right. He is aware, but ignores risks when they run counter to what he sees as higher principles.

Risk Propensity and Aspiration

As a Calm Insensitive Perceiving President, the trait-based model as presented would not expect George W. Bush’s decision making to be influenced by any risk propensity. In fact, his personality profile shows only one such trait, Excitement-Seeking (E5); however, that trait is quite high. Analysis may reveal whether that single trait is enough to inject a risk disposition into his aspiration-setting, which may in turn affect his disengagement decision-making. In the absence of a propensity for any specific risk behavior, we can still expect disengagement decisions to be affected by his aspiration level, per hypothesis H4 (the president’s aspiration

104 Ibid.
106 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 464. Quote is from an interview with Colonel Paul Hughes, a Garner associate who had been negotiating with Iraqi Army commanders to recall their troops. Hughes attributed the quote to Rumsfeld aide Lawrence DiRita, rejecting the notion the US bore responsibility for reconstructing Iraq.
level is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving the aspiration level in a particular case).

Not unlike his predecessor, Scott McClellan reports, George W. Bush believes “America has an obligation to use its power to lead the rest of the world toward a better and more secure future.” As President Clinton eventually learned after early years of muddling through foreign policy, President Bush entered office with the belief that “a leader should think and act boldly to strive for the ideal.”107 This strongly supports the profile of an Excitement-Seeker (E5), drawn to novelty. An a Sensing (ESTP) type, George W. Bush is an instinctive leader, not inclined to long intellectual debates over policy options, instead famously going with his gut-level convictions. McClellan believes the core belief that drove President Bush’s Iraq policy is “that all people have a God-given right to live in freedom.”108 His “ambitious and idealistic post-9/11 vision of transforming the Middle East through the spread of freedom” certainly would support hypothesis H4, that his ambitious aspirations precluded disengagement.109 Interestingly, his extraordinarily ambitious aspirations for Iraq serve as a convincing effect suggesting a dispositional cause, per hypothesis H3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels).

In his address to the nation announcing the commencement of combat operations in Iraq on 19 March 2003, President Bush stated the basic objective as “helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country,” noting it would, “require our sustained commitment.” Disengagement was included, as the President asserted the US had “no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people,” adding that US forces would come home “as soon as their work is done.” In the same speech, though, Bush dealt disengagement expectations a tough blow, saying “we will accept no outcome but victory.”110

After twelve years of muddling through in Iraq, President Bush sought to upset the status quo. His aspirations were “transformational: to disarm and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government and to establish a democracy in Iraq that would inspire political change throughout the Middle East.”111 He sought to change the international order, not preserve it.

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108 Ibid., 127-9.
109 Ibid., 127-9.
Yet through it all, and despite his lofty aspirations, President Bush continued to discuss, consider, and desire disengagement. President Bush met with his foreign policy team on 15 April 2003 to discuss plans for withdrawing US forces. The Joint Staff plan, “Iraq Phase IV: Gaining Coalition Commitment,” turned over post-combat operations to three foreign divisions and other foreign constabularies to keep order and train the Iraqi police. Ironically for a such a unilateralist, this was very much in keeping with a classic view of UN peacekeeping operations; but the UN view had changed and there first had to be a peace to keep. Unlike the Balkans, the Iraq War would not include an open-ended troop commitment. CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks gathered his service component commanders in Baghdad on 16 April and told them US combat forces would pull out within sixty days. New units would rotate in for stability operations, but some level of Iraqi government would be functioning within thirty-to-sixty days, so Franks laid down the rule that commanders should accept risk getting out just as they had going in. As stated, the US troop presence in Iraq would go from over 140,000 to about 30,000 by September 2003.112

President Bush did not believe no US military presence would be required after combat operations, but he did distinguish between the combat troops of the invasion army and the engineers and technicians of a rebuilding army. His aspiration was to keep the US military component of the stability phase as small as possible, counting first on the Iraqi Army for about half of the three-hundred thousand troops needed to provide security and sustainment, with the remainder coming largely from coalition forces as mentioned above.113 Still, in a meeting with prominent Iraqi exiles on 10 January 2003, he promised not only that the US would not abandon Iraq, but specifically pledged “to the people of Iraq that the U.S. Army itself will rebuild every power station or installation that might be damaged during the military operations.”114

**Framing of Disengagement**

In the trait-based model, George W. Bush’s decision-making is insensitive to risk and framing. This is not to say Bush does not frame issues. Based on Candidate Bush’s remarks at The Citadel and throughout the 2000 campaign, President Bush seems philosophically to have

112 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 457-9. Statement on risk is from interviews with senior military officials. Gordon and Trainor cite Lt Gen Earl Hailston, the senior Marine in the region, and Maj Gen Gene Renuart, USAF, both of whom attended the meeting.
113 Draper, *Dead Certain*, 211.
114 Ibid., 188. Draper cites comments gleaned from interviews with Kanan Makiya, Andy Card, Ari Fleischer, and one other participant in his Notes, p. 432).
framed disengagement positively. He recognized the damaging effects of open-ended, ill-defined deployments, with limited militarily achievable objectives, on morale, equipment, and overall readiness. A prospect theory explanation of President Bush’s decision might suggest he was risk-averse for the gains of disengaging from Iraq between May and September 2003. Yet a similar outcome could result if he was deciding in the domain of gains based on early successes in Iraqi Freedom. Either approach to this explanation is unsatisfying, as they require ignoring his larger aspirations for finding WMD and ensuring a free, democratic Iraq. The prospect theory approach to this dismissal would be that Bush was operating in the domain of losses because the status quo at all points between May and September 2003 did not begin to approach the lofty aspiration level Bush had set. By this logic, he thus accepted the greater risks of remaining engaged.

At the risk of further flogging a dead horse, prospect theory would also support an argument that 9/11 altered Bush’s view of disengagement. If Bush truly believed the riskiest option in Iraq after 9/11 was to do nothing, after invading and unseating Saddam he could be seen as framing disengagement as a loss of control over the future of Iraq. This view is evident in Bush’s comments in an NSC meeting the day after the 19 August 2003 bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad: “We’re at war. It’s a different kind of war, but war nonetheless, and we will win it. Terrorists want us to retreat and we cannot. We need to redouble our efforts against terror.” The imagery of disengagement as retreat is negative, suggesting under prospect theory that Bush accepted the ambiguous and more divergent risks of continued engagement to avoid the sure loss of disengagement. This suffers from the standard flaw of how to establish frames and aspirations under prospect theory, an open door to arguments that frames are rationalized to fit the outcome. As one prospect theory critic puts it, “because policy is often incoherent and evolves with the situation, it is usually possible to find evidence for a variety of different reference points.”

Given the right mix of reference point and frame, one can find many prospect theory explanations for Bush’s behavior. All, however, are less parsimonious than hypotheses H1 and H4. Again, the purpose of the three-stage model of decision under risk

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is to remedy this flaw in prospect theory, and it bears repeating that George W. Bush has none of the personality traits that indicate prospect theory is likely to explain his behavior.

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

President Bush made an explicit decision to disengage US military forces in the 15 April 2003 meeting. The approved plan included a quick transition to a peacekeeping operation that did not involve a long-term US troop presence. No evidence was found suggesting any weighing of relative risk among alternatives. Bush appears to have made his decisions without specific regard to risks, but rather by what he believed to be right.

Failure to disengage was not the result of another decision by the President so much as it was his approved plan being overcome by events on the ground. The level of violence thwarted DoD’s intent of drawing forces down to as few as twenty-five thousand by September 2003. Instead, around 130,000 troops remained and the longer ground forces stayed engaged after 1 May 2003, the more invested they became.118 The greatest change to course came with Bremer’s radical departures from the established plan, specifically CPA Orders One and Two. Bremer followed the Douglas MacArthur model, both in his Japan-esque dictatorial image in governing Iraq and in his Korea-esque disregard for his president’s aspirations. Adding to CPA Orders One and Two, on 8 September 2003 Bremer defined the US role in Iraq as an occupation in a Washington Post op-ed “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty,” redefining the policy and mission without NSC coordination.119 As Truman allowed MacArthur to make decisions that drew America into a larger war in Korea, President Bush’s reticence to reverse Bremer’s game-changing decisions arguably precluded US military disengagement from Iraq for the foreseeable future.

On principle, Bush did not want to occupy Iraq or have America seen as an occupier. “Nobody wants to be occupied. We wouldn’t want to be occupied,” he repeatedly said. Yet without countermanding Bremer and creating an impression of US incompetence, Bush was trapped in Bremer’s long sovereignty process.120 Bob Woodward claims by October 2003 there was, “little or no evidence that he [Bush] engaged in much substantive policy debate at this point in the war cabinet meetings. His role was to express confidence and enthusiasm.”121 Consistent

120 Woodward, State of Denial, 263.
121 Ibid., 260.
with his personality traits, Bush stuck to decisions made and pressed forward, ever optimistic that one way or another things would turn out his way. At the end of an October NSC meeting, Bush closed:

“We are going to succeed in Iraq despite the difficult times we are going through. Nobody should be in any doubt. We will do the right thing irrespective of what the newspapers or political opponents say about it. Success in Iraq will change the world. The American people need to have no doubt that we’re confident about the outcome. We may not succeed by the time of the election. So be it.” 122

Whether by an explicit decision or not, President Bush both kept US combat forces engaged in Iraq and did not engage the ninety-thousand follow-on forces originally envisioned.123 Staying in Iraq and taking on nation-building responsibilities was a riskier option than disengaging, but the possible outcomes of staying were much more numerous and divergent, including President Bush’s larger aspirations of finding WMD, capturing or killing Saddam Hussein, and ultimately overseeing a transition to a freely-elected democratic government that might influence a democratic transformation in the Middle East. Conversely, no matter how desirable Bush viewed disengagement philosophically, as an option between May and September 2003 it promised a virtually guaranteed unfavorable outcome. As the President said in a 6 November 2003 speech, “The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region.”124

Summary

As with Bill Clinton in 1992, George W. Bush entered the presidency lacking any direct experience with, or specific interest in, foreign policy. Also like Clinton, Bush preferred to focus foreign policy on the big issues of relations with Russia and China. Unlike Clinton, though, President Bush entered wary of UN entanglements and extensive US involvement in peacekeeping and nation-building missions. Faced with perhaps the greatest foreign policy challenge in over half a century, however, Bush did not muddle through or acquiesce to multilateral internationalism. True to his personality profile as a Calm Insensitive Perceiving president, he quickly coalesced the situation into a Global War on Terror. He was himself

122 Ibid., 262.
123 Ibid., 257. Invasion plan was 185,000 plus 90,000 more after the start...Rumsfeld told Woodward turning off the extras was at Franks’ recommendation.
124 Ibid., 268.
aware, and was further made aware by his advisors, of the risks involved in opening a second front in Iraq. President Bush, better than most, was fully aware of the reasons his father had not pursued regime change in Iraq after Desert Storm in 1991. Risk, however, is not a driver of George W. Bush’s decision-making. Nor does framing directly affect Bush’s disengagement decisions, at least not in the context of risk. Yet his propensity for setting grandiose aspirations suggests his dominant risk-related trait of Excitement-Seeking does provide a disposition toward choosing risky options more so than simply stumbling into risks purely through ignorance or insensitivity.

An Artisan-Promoter (ESTP) in Keirsey’s terms, President Bush instinctively believed eliminating the Saddam problem once-and-for-all was the right thing to do. He saw an opportunity in the wake of success in Afghanistan, and was optimistic it would end up best for all involved. His extremely low Deliberation (C6) and Perceiver’s (ESTP) spontaneity did not lead to rash, immediate action. Bush went through the motions of building a coalition and getting a sixteenth UN resolution, but he had decided early on to invade. Typical of an Artisan-Promoter, he spent a year-and-a-half promoting his position and convincing the public, the Congress, and the international community to have confidence in his gut and go along with his proposal. Bush’s low Anxiety (N1) supports his unflinching optimism and leaves him disinclined to second-guessing, hand-wringing, and introspective reflection. Kiersey suggests this lack of analysis of mistakes makes it difficult for presidents like Bush to learn from errors, but at the same time Bush’s personality leads him to bull forward, figuring “that’s life and the next roll of the dice will work out.” Ultimately, consistent with his personality, Bush set high, even grandiose aspirations for Iraq, per hypothesis H3b, and those aspirations precluded disengagement as a realistic option, per hypothesis H4. First and foremost in the three-stage model, however, is Bush’s insensitivity to risk in his decision-making, IAW hypothesis H1.

22 April 2006: President George W. Bush

“I am Saddam Hussein, the duly elected president of Iraq, and I am willing to negotiate,” the filthy, haggard man pulled out of a spider hole reportedly answered, when asked to identify himself on the evening of 13 December 2003. A Delta Force soldier replied, “Well, President

126 Ibid., 976, 1029-1030.
Bush sends his regards.” If President Bush’s aspiration in Iraq was regime change, the removal of Saddam Hussein without the possibility of his return to power, the night of 13 December 2003 presented an opportunity to disengage military forces from Iraq.

By the fall of 2003, however, it was clear the ground war had morphed into a violent insurgency and whatever opportunity might have existed to begin a meaningful disengagement in May was past. In headquarters, operations centers, and on the streets, military forces half-jokingly referred to being in Phase Three-and-a-half. Replacing Saddam with a stable, freely elected democratic government was still the overarching aspiration. Uncovering and dismantling Saddam’s WMD program had been the primary lever used to justify intervention, but when the WMD search ended in December 2004, a year after Saddam’s capture, it too was overcome by events. If nation building is the “use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation ... [including] comprehensive efforts ... aimed to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction,” America was now nation building in Iraq. With “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty” now the objective, the decision problems became what constituted sovereignty and when it could be achieved. Many milestones presented prospective opportunities to disengage US military forces.

The first milestone was the turnover of sovereignty in June 2004 from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government. Though somewhat trapped by Bremer’s uncoordinated public statements, President Bush still wanted Iraqis running Iraq as quickly as practical. Bremer’s MacArthur-esque, so-called “outside-in” approach projected a much longer occupation than President Bush had envisioned. Favoring, and hoping for, a more “inside-out” Iraqi-led approach, on 12 November 2003 Bush decided for early sovereignty, effective 30 June 2004. Bush had met privately with Bremer on 9 November 2003 and Bremer reworked his sovereignty

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128 Refers to phases of military options, from Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001. Phases are: I: Deter/Engage; II: Seize Initiative; III: Decisive Operations; IV: Transition. In asking President Bush to give the “Mission Accomplished” speech, General Franks was formally announcing the move from Phase III to Phase IV operations. Phase III.5 was the unofficial recognition that combat ops had not been decisive.
130 Bremer, “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty.”
Their November 15 Agreement was a hybrid of “outside-in” and “inside-out,” setting caucuses to pick a national assembly upon which to convey sovereignty, and establishing Transitional Administrative Law pending a constitution drafted by the elected Iraqis. On 11 May 2004, President Bush signed NSPD-36, shifting responsibility for the transition to the Department of State upon termination of the CPA and opening of a US Embassy in Baghdad.\(^{132}\) With America on a fast track to Iraqi sovereignty, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan believed it was time to re-enter Iraq despite the historic losses endured in the August attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad.\(^{133}\)

Iraq’s sovereignty on 28 June 2004 was nominal. The Iraqi Interim Government was not elected formally and lacked the authority and ability to stand on its own. The next major milestone was the parliamentary election of 30 January 2005. US and coalition forces were essential to provide the security and stability necessary to work toward political and military sovereignty. The Sunni insurgency in Anbar, focused in Fallujah, along with a Shiite uprising in Najaf and across the South, made most everyone from Allawi to the UN question the viability of elections by January 2005. President Bush, however, remained steadfast against delays, knowing elections were critical to America’s exit strategy.\(^{134}\) Security for elections was unlikely to improve dramatically without government legitimacy and that in return required elections. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) had 162,000 troops in country, 140,000 of which were Americans.\(^{135}\) The MNF-I Commander, General George Casey, though he shared Secretary Rumsfeld’s distaste for nation-building and belief that US forces needed to disengage as quickly as possible to avoid building Iraqi dependency, arranged for another ten thousand troops to enhance security before the election. These troops were in addition to the thousands already held over since the spring of 2004.\(^{136}\) Naysayers aside, the elections occurred as scheduled, with 58% of eligible Iraqis voting despite 300 insurgent attacks.\(^{137}\) Bush took it as vindication of both his Iraq policy and his freedom agenda.\(^{138}\)

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 312.
\(^{134}\) Ibid., 90, 129.
\(^{135}\) Ibid., 92.
\(^{136}\) Ibid., 90, 129.
\(^{137}\) Ibid., 135.
After the successful parliamentary election, no party won the super-majority needed to name a prime minister, so it took until 7 April 2005 to finally break the deadlock and name Ibrahim al-Jaafari Prime Minister and Jalal Talabani President. On the military side, General Casey labeled his strategy for 2005 the “transition to self-reliance.” With the election past and with the Iraqi military projected to be largely trained and equipped by mid-year, American forces would take a more advisory role with Iraqis in the fore. The guidance from Secretary Rumsfeld’s office was clear, “Hand this thing over to the Iraqi Government.” Casey planned to consolidate bases through 2005 and begin a drawdown in 2006 from 160,000 to 91,000 coalition troops. General Casey’s mid-2005 review of his campaign strategy echoed his assessment from December 2004 that it was “broadly on track.” Nevertheless, incoming-Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, with Casey, commissioned a civilian-military red team to assess the strategy’s prospects for success. The red team found the strategy had almost no prospect for success defeating the insurgency; instead, it just pulled US forces out leaving behind an immature, inadequately funded and trained, and inexperienced Iraqi force to do what the coalition could not.

On 15 October 2005, the New Iraqi Constitution was approved. In mid-2003, this would have seemed a major milestone to showing the Iraqis were in charge. By late 2005, it was still so politically, but did little to signal US military disengagement in light of the continuing insurgency. The same can be said for the 15 December 2005 elections for a new parliament. With the constitution ratified, this election represented the last of Bremer’s steps to true sovereignty -- an Iraqi government freely and democratically elected under an Iraqi constitution ratified by Iraqis. With one-third the attacks seen in the January 2005 election, this most important election went off relatively peacefully and without a Sunni boycott. Not everything would be smooth and quick though, as the prime minister was not directly elected, but rather nominated from the largest bloc of parties in parliament. This provision led to an extended deadlock, with the new government finally forming on 22 April 2006. With this done, Saddam was out of power, the WMD hunt was closed, and Iraq had a freely elected democratic government in place.

139 Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 139-40.
141 Ibid., 160-1.
142 Ibid., 183-4.
Recalling President George W. Bush’s profile from Table 6.1, beginning the three-stage model, President Bush is expected to behave as Risk-Invariant (Figure 6.1.), IAW hypothesis H1 (Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant). George W. Bush may be fully aware of risks, but is expected to ignore risks, closing debate and making quick, instinctive decisions on principle. Decisions may therefore appear risk-averse or risk-acceptant dependent on circumstances. In order to test hypothesis 1, on risk-perception, we need evidence that shows President Bush was never briefed on the risks of disengaging forces from Iraq, did not himself recognize or acknowledge said risks, or was clearly dismissive of risk in his decision-making.

President Bush clearly saw the risks in being seen as an occupier during a long path to sovereignty. Yet in announcing the early sovereignty plan to the nation in a speech to the Army War College in Pennsylvania on 24 May 2004, Bush acknowledged the risks to the plan if military forces were to withdraw according to DoD’s advertised schedule. The terrorists in Iraq, the President said, sought “the return of tyranny and the death of democracy.”143 Similarly, the risk of insurgents disrupting the handover from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government led to Bremer’s early departure from Baghdad, having closed down the CPA and sworn-in Ayad Allawi as Prime Minister on 28 June 2003, two days ahead of schedule. Viewed cynically, disengaging risked the US completely losing control of the developmental direction of the fledgling Iraqi government. More practically, President Bush recognized the risk of an Iraqi government collapse under the weight of its own inexperience if given too much control after 30 June 2004, noting at a 13 February NSC meeting, “We have to have sovereignty with limits.”144

Staying the course remained the only core option President Bush considered. He perceived risks in staying engaged and clearly understood the risks inherent in disengaging from an active, determined enemy. Risk calculus simply does not appear to have weighed heavily in Bush’s decisions. Leaving while the status of the Iraqi government was in question was simply wrong.

144 Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 48.
The mechanics of strategy in Iraq were debated by a variety of advisors. Ambassador Khalilzad’s red team assessment of General Casey’s strategy in 2005 was just one effort to get the President to reconsider the Iraq strategy. Yet the recommendations would have steered strategy further from Casey’s and Rumsfeld’s “take the hand off the bicycle seat” approach, focusing on defeating the insurgency vice containing it to a level the Iraqis could manage alone. Regardless, the red team assessment got no traction. President Bush ultimately heard about it in a round-about way from UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, after which it virtually vanished from deliberations. After becoming Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice and her counselor Philip Zelikow began working on their own recommendations for a more active State Department role in modifying the strategy. Reflecting on lessons from Vietnamization and recent successes with provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, they went so far as to begin injecting the phrase “clear, hold, and build” into public discussions of strategy. Finally, also in 2005, National Security Advisor Steven Hadley hired Duke professor Peter Feaver to run a strategic planning cell on the NSC. Feaver found that for all the criticism that Bush had no plan, the fact was Bush’s plan was precisely what most critics said they wanted, a phased withdrawal after handing off responsibility to the Iraqis. All these efforts tinkered with the approach, and thus the divergence of potential outcomes from varied processes -- in other words changing the warfighting processes to manage or mitigate both upside and downside risks. Yet none of them changed the fact that President Bush’s personality steered his fundamental interest not toward the process, but rather to the results.

Increasingly, the imagery of victory dominated Bush’s rhetoric. When Feaver’s Iraq strategy document was published, it was titled, The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, though Feaver believed the policy objective should be success. Bush himself increasingly used such rhetoric in public speeches: “We will never back down; we will never give in; and we will never accept anything less than complete victory.”

Intrinsically connected to the public imagery of victory was the sunk cost argument that Bush continually used to defend staying the course. Repeatedly in Bush’s own Decision Points,
McClellan’s *What Happened*, and Woodward’s series, Bush equates disengaging before the job is done as a political expedient that would render the lives lost to date to be in vain. So again we see Bush is clearly aware of the risks, both of disengaging and failing to disengage, but the question remains if he ignored those risks in his decision-making. If he did, his insensitivity to risk and framing might account for potential shortfalls explanations of his behavior based on either prospect theory or inherent risk propensity.

*Risk Propensity and Aspiration*

Again, based on his personality profile, the trait-based model does not expect George W. Bush to exhibit any defined risk propensity. The first case, however, raises the question of whether his Excitement-Seeking (E5) trait is sufficient to influence his aspiration setting per hypothesis H3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels) despite him being neither Open nor Intuiting. If so, his aspiration level may prove important to understanding why or how he ignored risks. Finally, we can always expect disengagement decisions to be affected by hypothesis H4 (the president’s aspiration level is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving the aspiration level in a particular case).

Justification for the intervention was dominated by the WMD argument, yet as it became increasingly clear that significant WMD would not be found, Bush’s stated aspirations shifted ever more toward building a lasting democratic government in Iraq. Scott McClellan contends the freedom agenda was always President Bush’s primary motivation and that WMD was merely the more sellable case for intervention. While it in no way diminishes the reality that the central sales pitch for intervention turned out to be tragically flawed, McClellan’s contention is consistent with Bush’s personality traits. Again, we see the President’s “ambitious and idealistic post-9/11 vision of transforming the Middle East through the spread of freedom” supporting hypotheses H3b and H4, thus precluding disengagement.149

President Bush’s aspiration, as reflected in the strategy over this period, commonly is stated as “stand-up, stand-down.” The intent was to have a functioning, democratically elected government that could and would provide security equitably for all Iraqis across sectarian lines. Naturally the governance piece was not achievable by the military alone; their role was to provide a security environment conducive to good governance, to train a new Iraqi Army and

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police force, to transition to an advisory role as soon as possible, and then to withdraw. Disengagement was inherently part of the strategy, though it was increasingly impractical in the face of a growing, resilient insurgency.

The President’s aspirations clearly encompassed a change in the current state of affairs. The status quo was unacceptable, though by the end of 2003 Saddam Hussein was captured and by the end of 2004 the WMD issue was effectively resolved. The remaining, overarching aspiration of a free and stable, democratic Iraq serving as an example for the region, however, was far higher, less militarily achievable, and far less under the control of the US-led coalition. “Despite almost universal pressure to abandon Iraq,” Bush writes in *Decision Points*, he held firmly to his highest aspiration, noting, “history’s perspective is broader. If Iraq is a functioning democracy fifty years from now, those four hard years [2003-2006] might look a lot different.”150 The fact is, President Bush’s aspirations were out of sync with the strategy his military leaders, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, and MNF-I Commander General Casey, were trying to implement. Bush’s enduring loyalty to his close advisors in his war cabinet might well have caused him to continue to endorse a strategy of exit long after he knew it was unrealistic.

**Framing of Disengagement**

For this entire period, President Bush framed military disengagement negatively. He came to this position as it became clear the insurgency was growing and strengthening and that the Iraqi government was unlikely to coalesce quickly into a mature, responsible body capable of putting the needs of the whole population above the politics of personal and sectarian power. It is more precise to say disengagement simply did not offer any hope of achieving his aspiration and thus was excluded from serious consideration. The President wanted to get US troops out of Iraq as much as anyone did, he just would not do it at any cost. Disengaging from either a capable and determined Al-Qaeda in Iraq-led Sunni insurgency or from a clearly hostile, authoritarian, Sadrist-led Shiite majority would be retreat. In Bush’s view, overthrowing Saddam offered an opportunity for freedom for twenty-six million Iraqis. Disengaging before a freely elected Iraqi government was in place and had been given a chance to make something of that opportunity was unconscionable to Bush. Disengagement would be retreat. It would be surrender to terrorists or Islamic extremists. The terrorists wanted to use the vacuum created by

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an American retreat to gain control of the country and build a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against America and nonradical Muslim governments.\textsuperscript{151} If the US disengaged, all the deaths, casualties, and all other costs to date would be in vain.

Such rhetoric, in terms of prospect theory, suggests Bush was risk-averse for the backslide risks of disengagement. If we consider Bush’s reference point to be his original objectives of March 2003, all were met by 22 April 2006, and so he should be operating in the domain of gains. Risk aversion would therefore be appropriate, but we know Bush’s aspirations, or at least his rhetoric, had escalated to his freedom agenda. For prospect theory, the more ambitious aspiration flipped Bush into the domain of losses. Still, his decisions could be explained by prospect theory. Framing disengagement as an option, if Bush truly felt it was the riskiest option, he would accept risk to avoid its almost certain loss. Taking Bush’s decision frame writ large as the domain of losses would similarly justify the risks of continued engagement in hopes of an eventual victory. As with the first decision opportunity, though, none of these offer more satisfying or parsimonious explanations than do risk and frame invariance (H1), and artificially-ambitious aspirations (H3b) leading to discounting disengagement as an option (H4). Recalling from Kowert and Hermann that Excitement-Seeking (E5) does not significantly correlate with the framing effect, Bush’s decisions appear uninfluenced by framing.\textsuperscript{152}

\textit{Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision}

President Bush made no explicit decision on disengagement in this period. He steadfastly supported his commander on the ground, however, who was trying to execute a strategy of disengagement. He endorsed General Casey’s “they stand up, we stand down” strategy, yet consistently asked his generals if they had everything they needed including all the troops to get the job done. They had decided on a course of action and Bush was reticent to change horses in the middle of the stream. His experts had a plan and he would give the plan time to work. While various groups worked their own adaptations and modifications to the strategy, there was no process explicitly weighing relative risks of one to another or to the existing strategy. Consistent with his personality profile, President Bush acknowledged the risks of disengagement, but his decision-making was not apparently driven by the risks. In retrospect, Bush points to

\textsuperscript{151} Bush, “Remarks on the war on Terror in Anchorage, Alaska, November 14, 2005,” 1714.
disengaging US forces too early—both those immediately withdrawn after Baghdad fell and the 90,000 in reserve whom were never deployed—as “the most important failure of execution in the war.” In 2003, as the insurgency swelled, US forces shrank from 192,000 to 109,000, most focused on training a new Iraqi Army and police force to replace those disbanded by Bremer instead of providing security for the Iraqi people. It is a sad irony that disengaging some forces too soon to avoid being seen as imperialist occupiers led to actions that made disengaging the occupying forces much more difficult.

Throughout General Casey’s tenure, he persistently briefed a series of plans focused on the withdrawal of US forces. President Bush clearly was not determined to disengage US forces at any cost, at least telling Casey, “We may not need to go that fast.” By 2006 Bush finally told his NSC, pointedly using Secretary Rumsfeld’s metaphor, “if the bike starts to wobble, we’re gonna put our hand back on the seat.” He repeated this theme in a 17 August 2006 video teleconference when Casey again predictably said he had enough US troops. President Bush stressed more American troops were available if needed: “We must succeed. We will commit the resources. If they can’t, we will. If the bicycle teeters, put our hand back on it.”

Only at the end of this period did Bush finally make an explicit decision on disengagement. He chose against it, opting instead for a surge of twenty thousand more troops. Once the President decided to change the strategy, loyalty to its proponents naturally had to change as well. President Bush cleaned house, firing Donald Rumsfeld, promoting General Casey out of the way, and putting General Petraeus in Iraq. In the end, the potential outcomes of the surge were more numerous and divergent than were those of disengagement.

**Summary**

In the period between September 2003 and 22 April 2006, President George W. Bush settled into exactly the foreign policy foible he had campaigned the most vigorously against—nation building. As Colin Powell had predicted, Iraq “took all the oxygen out of the room,” dominating all administration policy. True to his personality profile as a Calm Insensitive Perceiving president, he accepted his status as a wartime president. As the situation on the ground in Iraq changed his war of choice into a war of necessity, he adapted his aspiration to disengage quickly to the necessity of settling in to do the right thing by the Iraqi people. He

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recognized the risks of both staying and leaving, including the risks that staying mired in Iraq could pose to his upcoming reelection chances. As was seen after the initial successful invasion, what risk predisposition George W. Bush has is evident in his aspiration setting rather than through framing.

With the issues of Saddam and his WMD threats resolved once-and-for-all, President Bush instinctively believed the US owed the Iraqi people the best possible chance to take advantage of the opportunity to live in freedom. As that opportunity was threatened by the insurgency and sectarian extremism, his extremely low Deliberation (C6) and Perceiver’s (ESTP) spontaneity allowed him to swallow his distaste for nation-building and adopt a long view of what his gut told him was ultimately right for Iraq. Typical of an Artisan-Promoter, he made it his job to spread optimism, relentlessly supporting his commanders and the troops, keeping the American and Iraqi publics’ spirits up. Even more so than in the run up to intervention, we see Bush’s low Anxiety (N1) support his unflinching optimism. He is a decider who moves on, letting decisions play out vice second-guessing or changing horses mid-stream. Again the lack of introspective reflection, paired in this period with his abiding loyalty to his comfortable, trusted inner circle of advisors, made it difficult for President Bush to make needed personnel and strategy changes even when it was clearly apparent to him that those people and their efforts were discordant with his aspirations. Bush’s high, even grandiose aspirations for Iraq may well have been fueled by his proclivity for Excitement-Seeking (E5) per hypothesis H3b, which in turn precluded disengagement per hypothesis H4, but first and foremost in the three-stage model is Bush’s insensitivity to risk and framing in his decision-making, IAW hypothesis H1.

27 February 2009 - 15 December 2011: President Barack Obama

The nearly three years between the Iraqi national election and ultimate selection of Nouri al-Maliki as Iraqi Prime Minister on 22 April 2006 and the end of George W. Bush’s presidency set the stage for US military disengagement from Iraq. Yet the date for withdrawal would not occur in Bush’s term. Saddam and his sons were dead; his WMD threat had been proven almost entirely bluster for the sake of maintaining his power posture both internally and regionally, and; the democratic processes of electing and seating a government representative of all Iraqis under a constitution written by and for Iraqis was complete. Yet final disengagement, and what forces might contribute to a long-term US-Iraq relationship were to be resolved by a new President.
President Bush’s change of strategy, the so-called surge, changed the focus of most US and coalition forces to counter-insurgency. The decision provided further evidence of Bush’s ignorance of risk, at least domestic political risk, in his decision-making. A Fox News poll on 18 January 2007, eight days after the President announced the surge, reported fifty-nine percent of respondents opposed sending more US troops to Iraq, mirroring roughly sixty-forty splits in other polls of the period. Having just lost the House and Senate in the 2006 mid-term elections, Bush also faced near-universal resistance from the Congress, including a 16 January 2007 non-binding resolution from the House of Representatives declaring it “not in the national interest of the United States to deepen its military involvement in Iraq.” In a sense, Bush’s change even flew in the face of recommendations of the Iraq Study Group released only a month before his announcement. The ISG did however call for a change of the primary mission of US forces with the aim of getting US forces out responsibly, and though not as one of its seventy-nine recommendations, it did suggest as an aside the potential for an increase of troops to accelerate progress.

General Petraeus’s report to Congress on the surge in September 2007, only a few months after all troops had arrived in Iraq, was in part a political stage for 2008 presidential election contenders. Petraeus knew there would be pressure to discuss when the surge would end and when US forces would leave. In his last VTC with Bush before his testimony, Petraeus recommended releasing the smallest of the surge units shortly after his testimony, with the next in December, and then spreading out into summer 2008. President Bush was more cautious, emphasizing success first, encouraging Petraeus to give his own best advice without feeling pressure from the JCS or Pentagon. “If we need twenty brigades for as long as we can do it that’s what we’ll do.” The new CENTCOM Commander, Admiral Fallon, continued to push the old Abizaid/Casey line of a smaller presence sooner, encouraging President Bush to take on what the President deemed the greater risks of disengagement. Bush biased his support to the

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commander on the ground, General Petraeus, replying, “I’m not sure we’re ready to take on more risk in Iraq. It’s still pretty early in this new plan, and I like the new plan.”

Senator Obama was not yet a front-runner by the September 2007 hearings, and had spent only a day-and-a-half in Iraq, that in January 2006. In 2006’s *The Audacity of Hope*, Obama opined the US should begin a phased withdrawal based on the Iraqi government’s ability to provide security, the degree to which the US presence motivated resistance, and the odds of withdrawal causing civil war. By January 2007, to distinguish himself from his presidential primary opponent Hillary Clinton, Obama included a 1 May 2007 redeployment start date and 31 March 2008 deadline for withdrawal of combat brigades in his Iraq War De-escalation Act in January 2007. In effect, he adopted the Iraq Study Group’s withdrawal timeline, albeit without the recommended flexibility. Obama proposed disengagement by a date certain, despite advice to the contrary from ISG co-chair Lee Hamilton. Hamilton warned, “If you set a deadline, then it drives policy. Everything then is pointed to getting out by blank date and it distorts the whole policy and it is very inflexible. You cannot react to events on the ground.”

Obama used his time in the September 2007 hearings as a campaign speech instead of asking questions of General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, establishing himself as the candidate of disengagement. The day after the hearings, in an Iowa campaign speech, Obama clarified, “The best way to protect our security and to pressure Iraq’s leaders to resolve their civil war is to immediately begin to remove our combat troops. Not in six months or one year -- now.”

For his part, President Bush knew full well he could not have Iraq resolved before leaving office, but he was determined to hand-off to his successor as firmly-established a way-forward as he could. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) thus became his focus, as it was essential to keeping US forces in Iraq after the UN mandate expired at the end of 2008. Bush had steadfastly held to his conviction that strict timelines were counterproductive, that withdrawal

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159 Ibid., 426-7.
164 Ibid., 514.
must be conditions-based, and could only be determined by the situation on the ground. To get the deal done, in June 2008 he gave his SOFA negotiators leeway on establishing a withdrawal schedule. This helped Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki politically, but Bush continued to warn him to couch timelines as aspirational, telling Maliki on 17 July, “be careful,” and don’t present them as a “set timetable, but a goal based on conditions.” President Bush wanted 2015 as the ultimate withdrawal date, but Maliki wanted 2010. In a 30 July 2008 video teleconference with Maliki, Bush and Maliki agreed to a mid-2009 US pull-back from Iraqi cities and an end-of-2011 complete withdrawal, excluding whatever continuing presence was agreed to in the SOFA. President Bush put the final draft SOFA before his NSC on 3 November, the day before the election, and sent it to Maliki on 4 November. The final document was signed on 14 December 2008, President Bush affirming he and Prime Minister Maliki were “leaving the next President with a stable foundation for the future and an approach that can enjoy broad bipartisan support at home.” It was at this point that an Iraqi journalist famously threw his shoes at President Bush.

Barack Obama had campaigned against the Iraq war and against the surge. As he entered office, the SOFA was signed and the Iraqi government held Baghdad’s Green Zone. On 31 January 2009, Iraq held its second and most inclusive nationwide election.

President Obama spent his first month aligning his campaign promise to withdraw US troops from Iraq in sixteen months with the reality on the ground. The difference between his sixteen-month promise, implying complete withdrawal by May 2010, and President Bush’s agreed final withdrawal date of 31 December 2011, was resolved by adding a milestone in between… the end of the US combat mission. On 27 February 2009, President Obama spoke to Marines at Camp Lejeune, with the stated purpose of outlining, “how the war in Iraq will end.” Making it clear he would “not let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals,” the President announced “by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.”

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165 Ibid., 530.
166 Ibid., 539.
Table 6.2. Summary of Risk Traits for President Barack Obama  
*Sources: Author’s IPIP, Achenbach, Barondes, Klein, Immelman, Wayne (See Table 3.3.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Perception/Awareness</th>
<th>Calm/Insensitive/Perceiving</th>
<th>Anxious/Sensitive/Judging</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk Propensity</td>
<td>Risk Invariant</td>
<td>Risk Averse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama INFJ</td>
<td>-C6</td>
<td>+A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rating*</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Meets</td>
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</tbody>
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*Extremely Low (EL)<-2 SD; -2 SD<Very Low (VL)<-1.5 SD; -1.5 SD<Low<-1 SD; -1 SD<Leans Low (LL)<-.5 SD; -.5 SD < Average (Avg) < +.5 SD; +1 SD < High < +1.5 SD

Figure 6.2. President Barack Obama’s Expected Risk Behavior

**Risk Awareness**

Based on President Barack Obama’s profile in Table 6.2, beginning the three-stage model, President Obama is expected to behave according to the predictions of prospect theory.
As a Sensitive Judging (though not Anxious) president, his risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to his personal style (hypothesis H2), and more specifically as an Open Deliberate Judging president, he is expected to be risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain (hypothesis 2c, IAW prospect theory). According to the profile, Barack Obama is risk-aware, uses perceptions of risk in setting his aspiration level, and makes disengagement decisions consistent with his perceived decision frame. As an interesting converse to President Clinton’s risk awareness profile, in which his average Anxiety (N1) opened his otherwise risk-insensitive personality to his strong predisposition for risk-acceptance, Obama’s low Anxiety (N1) score may diminish his sensitivity to framing. This could be significant as his profile suggests prospect theory, which is dependent on framing. In order to test hypotheses 2 and 2c, we need evidence showing President Obama was briefed on the risks of disengaging forces from Iraq, recognized or acknowledged said risks, and clearly included risk calculus in his decision-making. As previous cases have suggested risk dispositional influences from incomplete profile matches, evidence of risk-aversion and risk-acceptance will be noted, per hypotheses 2a and 2b.

President Obama wanted to keep his promises from the campaign. He had campaigned on a sixteen-month withdrawal plan and said he would call the Joint Chiefs to the White House day one and direct them to bring the war in Iraq to a “responsible close.” So on the day after his inauguration, the new President met with his national security team. His immediate problem was that his sixteen-month plan reflected only what was logistically possible, not what was realistic considering the situation on the ground. Campaign rhetoric bumped against ground truth and Obama opened the meeting insisting his “only objective” was to “get this right.” His MNF-I Commander, General Ray Odierno, stressed “significant risk” in a 2009 drawdown. Obama had two plans on the table, his sixteen-month plan and Bush’s existing thirty-five month one. He ordered an assessment of risks of each from General Odierno and Ambassador Crocker to find the right answer.169 According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the new President, “asked for at least three options, one of which had to be his earlier sixteen-month timetable.”170

A week later, on 29 January 2009, in “Options for a Responsible Drawdown in Iraq,” Odierno and Crocker argued the President should not execute major troop withdrawals until after

169 Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 560-1. Authors cite interview with a participant.
the “window of highest risk” which closed sixty days after the upcoming parliamentary elections. The pair argued the new milestone, the end of the combat mission, be set in twenty-three months, at the end of 2010. The third option was Gates’ recommended course of action, a middle ground of nineteen months, 31 August 2010, which offered a compromise closer to Odierno’s window while keeping the date prior to midterm elections. Odierno and Crocker rated Gates’ plan as “significant to high risk.” Finally, the pair rated President Obama’s promised sixteen-month plan:

“The overall risk is extremely high. This option demands that US forces place primary focus on withdrawal operations to include equipment withdrawal and base closure within the window of highest risk, thereby undermining the oversight necessary to ensure successful execution of key events such as national elections.”171

Odierno noted that nothing in the twenty-three month precluded accelerating to nineteen or even sixteen months if conditions on the ground allowed, but his deferral option lost out as President Obama opted for Gates’ nineteen-month plan.172

What Obama did in this review—accepting the basic premise of General Odierno’s argument and acknowledging the associated risk calculus, but then choosing a politically expedient middle ground—is consistent with his personality profile as a conciliator. The President did not want the Iraq war but for practical purposes was locked into Bush’s counterinsurgency strategy by Bush’s placement of General Petraeus at CENTCOM and General Odierno in Baghdad. President Obama showed his Openness (O) to others’ ideas by accepting a compromise position that made him adjust his campaign-promised timeline. At the same time, he showed that he was more willing to risk a clear victory to keep his promise of a virtually unconditional withdrawal from the unpopular war.173

Therefore, we see Obama is clearly risk-aware, acknowledging both upside and downside risks of disengaging US forces in Iraq, per hypothesis H2. He ordered comparative risk assessments of competing courses of action. But does his personality give him a clear disposition toward decision-making under risk?

171 Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 564-5. Authors cite interview with a participant.
172 Ibid., 573.
173 Ibid., 574.
Risk Propensity and Aspiration

Unlike his predecessor, we expect President Obama to have a predisposition toward considering risks in decision-making. Recalling his profile from Chapter Three, with traits of all three risk-variant profiles, the question is whether his partial matches for risk-averse or risk-acceptant profiles trump his complete match for the weakly-supported prospect theory profile. Barack Obama’s dominant risk-related personality trait is Deliberation (C6), which in the trait-based model points to prospect theory. Still it bears repeating that Kowert and Hermann found the personality tie to prospect theory to be quite weak.

Is Obama risk-averse? He is a Feeling (INFJ) type, though probably not too far off the mean. This is supported by Feeling’s correlation to Agreeableness (A), on which Obama scores average overall. Only his high Altruism (A3) facet suggests any propensity for risk-aversion. Occasional political opponent and media pundit portrayals to the contrary, Obama’s personality profile does not suggest a strong predisposition for risk-aversion. Perhaps compared to George W. Bush, but Obama’s immediate predecessor is not typical, even among presidents. Few would state it as clearly as Bush did in considering General Petraeus and the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations for drawing down forces after the 2007 surge in Iraq. Asked if they were at the point of winning in Iraq or breaking the force, Bush told Vice President Cheney and the group, “Somebody has got to be risk averse in this process, and it better be you, because I’m sure not.”

Seventeen months later, before their 21 January 2009 meeting with the new President, Secretary Gates warned military leaders including Odierno and Crocker that, “Obama likely would not make a decision ‘on the spot,’ as Bush had done so often,” but likely would take time to ask questions and explore options for some time. Though frustrated generals might perceive the change as a shift toward risk aversion, it is more likely caused by an Open (O) Deliberate (C6) Intuiter’s (INFJ) high need for information.

In fact, the above traits are more indicative of a propensity for risk-acceptance. Obama lacks facets of Openness to Fantasy (O1) and Excitement-Seeking (E5), but is otherwise high on overall Openness (O) and Openness to Action (O4), consistent with his Intuiting (INFJ) preference. This implies acceptance of risk not for thrill or novelty, but rather an eyes-wide-open calculation of rewards. Interestingly, non-risk-related personality potentially masked

175 Ibid., 5872-3.
perceptions of Obama’s openness. Where Bush’s predominant trait in dealing with his top commanders was his engaging personal charm and informality, President Obama was more cerebral and distant. Where Bush delegated details to his advisors and commanders in the field, content with the military’s preferred big picture overviews in PowerPoint, Obama wanted the equivalent of legal briefs. Commanders would propose and support alternatives and the President would decide based on the arguments.\footnote{Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Endgame}, 561.}

President Obama’s aspirations for Iraq centered on getting US forces out, but not at all costs. He quickly came to understand his sixteen-month timeline was untenable, so demonstrating his lawyerly skills for spin, he fell back on the fact he had never committed to removing \textit{all} troops from Iraq. This allowed the setting of a new milestone that came within a few months of nominally keeping his withdrawal promise while maintaining the cover of the Iraq Study Group’s vision of twenty to sixty thousand residual troops remaining for advise-and-assist missions agreed to under the SOFA.\footnote{Ibid., 562-3.} US forces would be out of Iraq’s cities by 31 August 2009, the combat mission Operation Iraqi Freedom would end by 31 August 2010, and all US forces remaining under the transition mission, Operation New Dawn, would be out of Iraq by 31 December 2011, barring an expanded SOFA.\footnote{The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq,” August 02, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/facts-and-figures-drawdown-iraq}

While the timeline effectively remained unchanged, Obama’s aspirations for reaching the milestones and the ultimate end state were scaled-back from Bush’s. Gone from Obama’s 27 February 2009 announcement of his Iraq policy was Bush’s freedom agenda aspiration of a democratic Iraq as the model for a new Middle East. In its place was a less ambitious, “clear and achievable goal” of “an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.”\footnote{Obama, “Remarks on Military Operations in Iraq at Camp Lejeune,” 2.}

President Obama faced two classic disengagement dilemmas in 2010. First was US dependence on others for achievement of his aspirations for disengagement. In a repeat of 2006, the parliamentary elections failed to define clearly which bloc would form a government. Obama faced a potential problem of how he could declare the end to combat operations in August if there was no firmly established Iraqi government. This dovetailed into the second classic disengagement dilemma of disengaging only to have the withdrawal be blamed for Iraq’s
subsequent backslide into civil war.\textsuperscript{180} The crisis was averted with Maliki’s retention as Prime Minister, again as a compromise candidate. The US met Obama’s new milestone, holding a formal ceremony on 1 September 2010 marking the end of its combat mission in Iraq and the redesignation of Operation Iraqi Freedom as Operation New Dawn, declaring, “the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country.”\textsuperscript{181}

President Obama’s personal aspirations regarding a long-term presence in Iraq remained ambiguous. Maintaining any military presence after 2011 would require a new or extended SOFA. Obama had campaigned for Congressional coordination on Bush’s 2008 SOFA for fear Bush would hide commitments for troops or defense of Iraq in the agreement. He had dropped the requirement only as it became clear that Congress failing to endorse a SOFA the Iraqi parliament endorsed offered no benefits and could only cause trouble. Obama had gone out of his way to ensure it did not appear he wanted bases or a continuing presence in Iraq, but made it clear he would respond favorably to a specific request for assistance from the Iraqi government. Sure such a request would come, Vice President Joe Biden opined, “Maliki wants us to stick around because he does not see a future in Iraq otherwise. I’ll bet you my vice presidency Maliki will extend the SOFA.”\textsuperscript{182}

Obama’s commitment to any aspiration for a continued presence is brought into question by a Congressional delegation that travelled to Iraq in May 2011 to push for the SOFA, only to find the Obama administration had neither proposed a plan nor offered an acceptable number of troops. It seemed the President was content to sit and wait for a formal request.\textsuperscript{183} Indeed, it was an unanswered question within the administration. Only at the 29 April 2009 Principals meeting were options considered for a US military presence beyond 2011. Options on the table were for eight, ten, and sixteen thousand, though the commander, General Lloyd Austin, had previously assessed the need between twenty and twenty-four thousand for moderate risk. Ordered to revise, Austin gave a nineteen and two sixteen thousand troop alternatives, with a ten thousand

\textsuperscript{180} Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Endgame}, 628.
\textsuperscript{183} Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Endgame}, 663.
troop floor. The military consensus was that having too few troops was worse than having none. JCS Chairman Admiral Mullen advised National Security Advisor Tom Donilon that the eight and ten thousand troop options constituted high risk and echoed the Iraq and CENTCOM commanders’ opinions that no force at all was better than a force too small to be effective.184

Further evidence of personality differences between Bush and Obama is seen in their relationships with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. Bush, very relationship-focused in all things, saw his role as a mentor to Maliki, responsible for encouraging him and bolstering his courage to lead. Bush was invested in Maliki as his best hope for resolution in Iraq, but was also invested in Maliki as a budding leader. Obama, also consistent with his personality, was detached. Obama’s video teleconference discussion with Maliki on 2 June 2011 constituted his first discussion with the Iraqi PM all year. Obama took the position that he was willing to partner with Iraq if Maliki remained committed to a peaceful and prosperous Iraq, but any extended SOFA would have to be approved by the Iraqi parliament. Obama was anxious to avoid looking like he wanted a continued presence, setting a 1 August 2011 deadline for any request for continued presence. “For the president the situation in Iraq was fast approaching ‘good enough.’”185

Still it appears President Obama at a minimum was torn on the question of a continued US presence in Iraq. As 2011 began many in Iraq wanted the US to stay: The Shiite-dominated government was quietly unsure of the Iraqi military’s and police’s ability to maintain security without US intelligence, logistics, and medevac support at a minimum. Many Sunnis wanted US protection against Shia domination. Kurds appreciated Americans as the guarantors of their autonomy. Indeed, the biggest hurdle to requesting a US extension was the return of Muqtada al-Sadr from nearly four years in voluntary exile in Iran. Sadr’s clear intolerance of a lingering US presence made it very difficult for Maliki to support the other factions of the government against the will of one of his coalition’s most powerful blocs.”186

That Obama wanted to be asked was evident in the mid-year push for agreement on an extended SOFA. Considering the logistics of getting the remaining forty-six thousand US troops out by the end of December, Obama’s 1 August 2011 deadline for a request imposed a difficult burden on an Iraqi government notoriously unable to agree to even the simplest actions until the

184 Ibid., 655-6.
185 Ibid., 666.
last minute or more often the first minute after deadlines. As the deadline approached, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made a desperate last minute press on the Iraqi government. Though hopeful before Congress in June, by July Panetta would only tell reporters he would “encourage them to make a decision so that we'll know where we're going,” continuing that the longer the Iraqis waited, the more difficult it would be for the US to say “yes.”187

By 2011, with combat forces withdrawn and remaining forces less exposed, Obama’s aspiration became maintenance of the status quo in Iraq after the withdrawal of the US transitional forces. Clearly, he preferred there be no continuing requirement for a significant US presence in a non-permissive environment. Moreover, he favored rolling some forces and resources to Afghanistan while keeping the rest at home. Yet the downside risks of disengagement continued to nag at the President, leading him to try at least to open the door to an invitation for further involvement. President Obama’s aspiration for Iraq was considerably lower than President Bush’s had been, but still represented a tough task with little in his complete control. Importantly, though his revised aspiration was still ahead of the status quo when he assumed the presidency, an endgame timeline already existed that made disengagement not only a realistic option, but better still a default position upon which President Obama could fall with limited personal political risk.

Framing of Disengagement

As a complete profile match for a prospect theory explanation, framing is expected to be important to President Obama’s decision process. Though there is evidence Obama might have felt it best to have a continued presence in Iraq, he consistently presented favorable views of disengagement. He repeatedly spoke in terms of the opportunity costs of staying and the gains both in freeing up forces for Afghanistan as well as in freeing up funds for other priorities. The Odierno/Crocker withdrawal options session of 29 January 2009 was not the first indication that President Obama saw clear opportunity costs in remaining in Iraq.

During the campaign, on 21 July 2008, Senator Obama sat down with General Petraeus in Baghdad to review the surge and redefine the situation in terms of a presumptive Obama presidency. Obama acknowledged the successes of the surge, but informed Petraeus that the political debate at home was not purely military, but also about opportunity costs created by the

weakened US economy, burgeoning debt and deficits, and other domestic constraints. Petraeus reported, “We can do this mission with fewer forces, but this will incur greater risk.” Obama asked Petraeus if he was making the best the enemy of the good. Obama pushed Petraeus for some level of endorsement for his sixteen-month withdrawal plan, countering that “The risk is that this [Iraq] takes so long to do that we lose it elsewhere [Afghanistan].” Obama continued, “The timetable is needed because of the assessment of risk. Afghanistan is the central front in the war on terror.” Petraeus responded, “Actually, Senator, Iraq is what Al-Qaeda says is the central front.” Obama, favoring going after AQ leadership in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), closed saying as commander in chief he would only have so many resources he’d be willing to commit to Iraq: “At some point, you have to ask, ‘Do you just say this is good enough?’ You are so invested. You are reaching for excellence, not just adequacy.”

In the campaign and throughout his first term into 2011 President Obama framed military disengagement from Iraq positively. He clearly saw disengaging US forces from Iraq as an opportunity either to recapture funds from supplemental appropriations for contingency operations or to redirect those funds, personnel, and other resources to Afghanistan, which he viewed as the right war, “not a war of choice… a war of necessity.” His argument for disengagement was positive; leaving Iraq allowed proper focus on Afghanistan and would improve America’s tarnished image in the world.

According to one view of prospect theory, Obama behaved as expected, risk-averse for the gains of disengagement right up until the clock ran out on the 2008 SOFA. The same logic fails if President Obama is seen as operating in the domain of gains fresh off his election as President. Operating in the domain of gains, he should be risk-averse to riskier options. But was disengagement riskier than continuing to pay not just the opportunity costs, but the tangibles of lives and treasure? More likely, Obama entered office clearly perceiving himself in a losing frame. Iraq was a quagmire that had already claimed over 4,000 American lives, injuring over 35,000 more, and costing over $880 billion. Though his ultimate aspiration was to disengage, the cold reality of office made clear that positive gains

from the status quo were required to enable that aspiration. Staying the course represented an almost certain loss, so he chose to bear the risks of disengagement to avoid that certain loss.

Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision

Entering office in January 2009, President Obama inherited a timeline for withdrawal from President Bush. His alternatives to total disengagement by December 2011 included a faster withdrawal as he promised in his campaign, or maintaining a presence beyond 2011 by negotiating a new or extended SOFA. Off the campaign trail and in the Oval Office, Obama quickly adopted the sunk cost logic that disengaging too soon would not just mean blood and treasure spent in vain, but leaving the wrong Iraq behind would have farther reaching consequences for the future of US national security.191

Where most focused on the downside risks of disengagement—the backslide into sectarian violence and perhaps civil war, the accompanying loss of US credibility, and the questions of why we lost so many lives and spent so much capital to fight consequences that are now acceptable—Obama also saw and emphasized the upside risk. The opportunities included refocusing on Afghanistan, paying attention to broader foreign policy problems like China’s expanding sphere of influence in the Pacific, stopping the loss of US lives, and the ability to shift contingency operations funds toward domestic priorities. Where Bush had envisioned “victory to yield a rich strategic and political payoff” in a fundamentally changed Iraq and Middle East, Obama flipped the vision to one of disengaging from Iraq to achieve his primary goal of fundamentally transforming America.192  Remaining engaged forestalled all these gains and kept money and blood pouring into the quagmire for little hope of real gain. Viewed thusly, disengagement was the riskier option. Obama was determined to accept this risk for its gains, in direct contrast to prospect theory, and instead consistent with his risk-acceptant personality traits.

In reality, the real risk for Obama came in disengaging at all. Nearly six years into the war as he took office, it made little difference if US forces withdrew in sixteen, nineteen, or twenty-three months. The downside risk remained essentially the same; what would Obama do

if Iraq collapsed in the wake of the US withdrawal?\textsuperscript{193} Time with relative calm would mitigate this risk. Thirty-five months was a more substantive problem in terms of honoring campaign promises. The problem of accepting Bush’s timeline or keeping his campaign promise for a sixteen-month withdrawal timeline was solved by adding the milestone of the end of combat operations. With that done, Obama essentially defaulted to Bush’s timeline for the complete withdrawal of US forces. It is risk acceptance for gain, while mitigating foolhardy excess risks which promised little extra gain. Disengaging according to the existing SOFA timeline allowed Obama to deflect potentially negative outcomes to Bush and/or Maliki.

The remaining question was only whether or not there would be a new SOFA to extend the US presence. If nothing changed, US forces would leave Iraq by 31 December 2011. At the 19 May 2011 NSC meeting, President Obama opted to redefine the SOFA issue. In effect, he wanted to behave as though US forces were already disengaged. Putting the war in the past, the President cast the presence issue as one in which Iraq was completely independent of the US. If the Iraqis wanted US assistance, they would have to ask for it as though US forces were not already there. If the Iraqis asked, he decided, he was willing to provide up to ten thousand troops.\textsuperscript{194} In short, President Obama did not decide the issue, but rather put the ball in the Iraqi government’s court to ask specifically for assistance, which he would then decide to support…or not. Working with the assumption they were to make the request happen, and constrained by the 1 August logistical deadline, the US diplomatic team managed to get a memorandum of understanding requesting trainers. Once achieved, the team learned it was not enough. On 4 August, the Deputies Committee determined Maliki had not committed himself. The SOFA proposal or troop request would have to be more specific, as the White House was risk averse over the question of immunities for Americans after the recent detention of a CIA contractor in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{195}

Well below what the Principals discussed as reasonable post-2011 numbers, and beginning from the absolute floor the military leadership had unanimously recommended considering, the SOFA debate continued after the 1 August deadline for a request had passed. Five options were on the table for the President, ranging from ten thousand troops down to


\textsuperscript{194} Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Endgame}, 664.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 668.
sixteen hundred troops. On 13 August, President Obama decided to push for US special operations forces to work with Iraqi commandos for counterterrorism missions, as well as for a small contingent of US Air Force aircraft to protect Iraqi airspace if requested. Obama envisioned a continuous presence around thirty-five hundred with as many as fifteen hundred more on regular rotations. If requested, US forces would still require parliamentary approval of the presence and immunity from prosecution. This discussion lingered until Obama’s second and last video teleconference with Maliki on 21 October 2011. With Maliki unwilling or unable to give immunity, the SOFA talks were over.  

President Obama’s decision to close SOFA negotiations was a decision for disengagement. He framed disengagement as a win, so the lack of a SOFA was not taken as a loss, but rather as doing due diligence to an available alternative. US forces had already begun their final withdrawal by this point, and by 18 December 2011, the last US forces crossed the border into Kuwait.

The ultimate decision to disengage US military forces from Iraq was consistent with the three-stage model of decision under risk. As his personality profile suggests, President Obama was obviously aware of the risks inherent in both withdrawing and extending the US presence in Iraq. Furthermore, he clearly factored the risks of disengaging too early into his decision calculus. Like President Bush, he recognized the importance of staying until the job was done. The difference was Senator Obama had opposed the war in Iraq and campaigned on the promise of ending the US involvement. He did not share Bush’s emotional or political investment in the outcomes in Iraq, and so his aspirational threshold for the job being done was considerably lower than that of his predecessor. As long as the Iraqi situation was good enough, President Obama was biased toward disengagement. His lowered aspirations were bolstered by domestic and international political pressures.

President Obama explicitly aspired to withdraw US forces from Iraq. Because he framed continuing with the status quo as a losing situation and thus framed disengagement positively, the risks that came with disengaging were worth taking in order to avoid the sure loss of remaining mired in an Iraqi domestic situation that was beyond his or any outside power’s ability

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196 Gordon, “In U.S. Exit From Iraq, Failed Efforts and Challenges.”
to control. With aspirations lowered and focused on what he could control, Obama framed US accomplishments to date positively; Saddam’s regime was gone, a sovereign freely elected government was in place, al-Qaeda was disrupted, and Iraq had been lifted from "tyranny and terror." By securing successes instead of cutting losses, Obama essentially declared victory based on present accomplishments.198

Still, as he had added a new milestone in order to spin a semblance of keeping his sixteen-month withdrawal promise while in fact disengaging on Bush’s thirty-five-month schedule, President Obama recognized the potential for extreme negative outcomes in Iraq after US withdrawal. He thus attempted to hedge his bet on total military disengagement by framing a continued US presence as a decision completely divorced from the war. If the Iraqis came to the US requesting specific assistance, President Obama would consider it as he would for any US ally.

In a sense, and consistent with his extremely high Deliberation (C6) score, President Obama actually avoided making a specific decision on disengagement. Doing nothing defaulted to President Bush’s withdrawal timeline as spelled out in the 2008 SOFA. Laying the burden of a formal request for specific assistance on the Iraqi government recused Obama of having any decision to make. If US disengagement led to poor outcomes, it would ostensibly be due to the flawed agreement signed by his predecessor or due to a failure of the Iraqi government to ask an outside power to intervene in its domestic political affairs.

Summary

In the period between taking office on 21 January 2009 and the last US forces leaving Iraq on 18 December 2011, President Barack Obama handled decisions on US military disengagement consistent with his personality profile, to include in accordance with prospect theory, but also a risk-acceptant disposition. True to his personality profile as a Sensitive Judging (though not Anxious) president, he was perceptive of risks and factored them into his decisions. As an Open Deliberate Judging president, he solicited options and weighed alternative courses of action. Assuming office, he quickly realized the disparity between the campaign trail and the realities on the ground in Iraq and his Open Intuiting nature allowed him to adapt his position to accommodate both. Risk informs Obama’s aspirations and framing and

thus affects his disengagement decisions, but with a consistent predisposition toward risk acceptance, especially for gains. Perhaps because his low Anxiousness mitigates framing effects on him, or because the personality link to prospect theory is weak, Obama’s decision does not follow prospect theory convincingly.

President Obama “ranks especially high on deliberation [C6], examining all sides of a problem,” which tends to earn him “criticism that he is too professorial and indecisive.” The contrast is especially stark as Obama succeeded the consummate decider, George W. Bush. Obama’s extremely high Deliberation [C6] and Judging (INFJ) preference lead him to keep options open and preserve wiggle room. Typical of what Keirsey terms an Idealist-Counselor (INFJ) temperament, Obama seeks compromise positions and tries to avoid making decisions personally that will not foster harmony. We see hints of Obama’s Anxiety (N1) in his determination to not be seen as wanting or pushing for a continued US presence, though he seems to accept it would probably be best for all involved. Obama’s overarching aspiration for Iraq was disengagement. Ironically, upon entering office, he already had a course laid out for him that would achieve his core aspiration--commonly perceived to be the riskiest option--without the need to incur undue personal risk. Consistent with his risk-acceptant personal style, President Obama accepted the risks so many feared from disengagement, in order to realize the prospective gains, in accordance with hypothesis H2b. Interestingly, however, his low and achievable aspiration, bolstered by claiming victory in past accomplishments, helped him make the disengagement decision. This does not support hypothesis H3b (Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels). Perhaps this is because Obama lacks the Excitement-Seeking (E5) trait that paired with Openness to Action (O4) leads to a sensation-seeking motivation for risk-taking.

Conclusions: Presidential Risk Behavior in Disengagement from Iraq

Table 6.3. summarizes the performance of the trait-based model in predicting and explaining President Bush’s and President Obama’s disengagement decisions in Iraq. President George W. Bush’s risk profile is that of a Calm Insensitive Perceiver, expected to ignore risks. Aside from being an Excitement-Seeker, the younger Bush has no personality traits that strongly indicate any predisposition toward risk.

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### Table 6.3. Summary of Results of the Iraq Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risk Perception</th>
<th>Risk Predisposition &amp; Framing Effect</th>
<th>Reference Effect</th>
<th>Aspiration Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>H2a</td>
<td>H2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.W. Bush (May '03)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.W. Bush (Apr '06)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Obama (Dec '11)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** (X = model prediction  Shading = observed)

H1: Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant.
H2: Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style.
H2a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents are risk-averse, particularly when disengagement is framed as a loss.
H2b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain.
H2c: Open Deliberate Judging presidents are risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain (IAW prospect theory).
H3a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents set unusually low aspiration levels.
H3b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels.
H4: The president’s aspiration level (acting as a situational constraint) is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving (or surpassing) the aspiration level in a particular case.

In both decision points examined, the evidence supports the trait-based model’s predictions of risk and frame invariance. In both instances, President Bush discounted and disregarded disengagement as it did not promise to meet his more ambitious aspirations. Always the cocksure absolutist, Bush decided to invade based on principle, and stubbornly adhered to that principle. “In Bush’s mind, the risks of bold action were less than the risk of inaction.”

One interesting note regarding the trait-based model is that George W. Bush set very ambitious aspiration levels, as the model predicts for a risk-acceptant type, despite only scoring high (albeit extremely high) on the Excitement-Seeking (E5) facet. It is possible his extremely high disposition toward excitement-seeking and novelty contributed to his setting a very high aspirational level, and then by association framing disengagement negatively.

However one chooses to view the wisdom of President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, it is hard to deny that something needed to change. Though kept below the threshold of US casualties, the US was definitely stuck in a quagmire in Iraq. True to Speier’s tenets of disengagement, three US Presidents found they could not disengage unilaterally as Saddam Hussein possessed the capability and intent to pose a threat. Incrementally, humanitarian and no-fly zone enforcement missions morphed into low-intensity punitive air actions.

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campaigns. Even Northern Watch, the less intensive of the two NFZ operations, required over 36,000 sorties between 1997 and 2003, with over 40,000 Airmen deployed. This was over and above the 42,000 sorties flown in the previous five-and-a-half years of Provide Comfort. More than seven years after the end of Desert Storm, ONW saw its most intense combat between the summers of 1998 to 1999, with 485 weapons employed against 225 targets.\(^{201}\) This was a heavy burden on a shrinking Air Force, imposing a high toll on Airmen, airplanes, and the institution, in addition to being an indecisive foreign policy.

Once in Iraq, “the Bush administration’s initial endgame was that the invasion would culminate in a speedy handoff to the Iraqis.”\(^{202}\) Bush’s hostility to nation-building aside, he soon “learned that his father’s apprehension about an American ‘occupying army’ trying to administer Iraq reflected wisdom, not irresolution.”\(^{203}\) By the end of 2003, it was clear nation building was required, but the means dedicated to the task never matched Bush’s exceedingly ambitious desired end state. Bush intimated victory while the strategy being implemented aimed merely at beating down the insurgency just enough to leave it as the Iraqi Security Force’s problem. This fundamental disconnect persisted through 2006, by which time Baghdad was Balkanized, and some were proposing Bosnia-like partitioning solutions as the way ahead. President Bush found it necessary to go in bigger in order to get out sooner, changing to a counterinsurgency strategy with an accompanying surge of forces.\(^{204}\)

Before all the surge forces were in place, in April 2007 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declared in a press conference, “this war is lost.”\(^{205}\) On 13 June 2007, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi called the surge a failure and repeated her intention to call for an early withdrawal of US combat forces. President Bush never caved to such domestic political negativity, only maintaining an ever-more upbeat attitude toward progress and prospects in Iraq. Though such extreme Congressional action was never a huge risk, as most in Congress did not want any liability for any potential failure in Iraq, the point is Bush was never swayed by the domestic

\(^{202}\) Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 685.
\(^{203}\) Hess, Presidential Decisions for War, 281.
\(^{204}\) Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 685.
\(^{205}\) Gates, Duty, location 1102.
public and political unpopularity of his policies. He ignored those risks to pursue what he believed what right.206

By the 2008 elections, the conventional wisdom in the mainstream American media held, however reluctantly, that the surge had worked.207 By January 2009, President Obama inherited a much-improved military situation. Still, he had to find a work-around to accommodate the reality on the ground within his promised withdrawal. In the case of the withdrawal timeline and later in discussions of residual assistance forces, President Obama consistently met his commanders part of the way, unlike Bush who tended to meet them all the way on their requests.208 As the inheritor of a war he mostly opposed, Obama had the advantage of not sharing Bush’s personal and political investment in Iraq. He “saw America’s involvement there not as an opportunity, or even as containing opportunities, but rather as a leftover minefield, a path out of which had to be charted as quickly as possible.”209 This made it possible for disengagement not only to be included in Obama’s aspirations, but to be central to them.

At first blush, the trait-based model is limited for President Obama. He has traits in every category except Risk and Frame Invariant. Closer analysis suggests his Feeling (INFJ) trait is likely overrated, and empirical evidence of risk-aversion is lacking. On the other hand, his risk-acceptant traits were evident in his behavior. On the question of personality versus situation, evidence suggests President Obama’s personality traits predispose him to take risks for gains more than any dependence on framing does. Perhaps the most interesting observation in Obama’s case is the apparent effect of his Judging (INFJ), Openness to Action (O4) and Deliberation (C6), his most pronounced trait/facet. By judging his environment, being open to unconventional approaches, and most importantly deliberating over options, he opens the door to doing nothing when nothing is needed, and to letting situations play out without his acting. This in itself is risky behavior in Washington, where someone always seems to be demanding action. As Stephen Walt has noted, Obama “takes his time, remains calm, and prefers to pass the buck

208 Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 688.
209 Ibid., 689.
to others whose interests are more directly affected.”\textsuperscript{210} For all the criticism Obama receives for leading from behind, his instinct to let other bear the main burden is not so different from George W. Bush’s stated policy before 9/11.

To be fair, Iraq may not be the best case to examine, for while Obama inherited the problems of Iraq, he also inherited the ultimate resolution. Like any politician, President Obama is quick to take credit for positive actions on his watch, but the ultimate disengagement of US forces in Iraq took place as much by a lack of decision as by a specific decision by President Obama. Though Candidate and President-elect Obama was critical of the SOFA as Bush negotiated and signed it, arguing US troops should be withdrawn sooner, the final withdrawal of US forces happened under the terms of the 2008 SOFA.\textsuperscript{211} Obama is willing to accept risk for gains, but is not drawn to unnecessary risks that bring few rewards.

Disengagement occurred in Iraq finally because it was central to President Obama’s aspirations. How he defined terms like stable and democratic were shaped by the simple fact that his central desire was to disengage. Good enough was not held hostage to perfect. To be sure, there are strategic consequences to leaving no US presence in Iraq. Iraq has no air defense capability with which to either block Iranian arms shipments to Syria or Israeli strikes in Iran. There are no Americans left to track sectarian violence or other domestic internal situations. Yet it is equally true that Iraq did not collapse after American and coalition forces withdrew.

In the Iraq case, both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama made disengagement decisions as the trait-based model of decision under risk predicted. President Bush ignored the risks of disengagement, favoring his gut instincts for what was right. Disengaging before the Iraqi people had a democratically-elected government administering Iraq under an Iraqi-written and validated constitution would be irresponsible and immoral. Explaining President Obama’s behavior is more complicated, but still consistent with his profile. While prospect theory offers an explanation, it is less parsimonious than the trait-based explanation.


Chapter Seven

Conclusions and Outlook for Afghanistan

Bush’s goals are extraordinarily ambitious, involving remaking not only international politics but recalcitrant societies as well, which is seen as an end in itself and a means to American security. For better or (and?) for worse, the United States has set itself tasks that prudent states would shun.

-- Robert Jervis

Overview

This dissertation sits at the nexus of research into risk behavior, personality predispositions, and foreign policy decision making. The objective of linking these strains of thought is to help explain why it is often so difficult for presidents to disengage from military interventions using a personality-based model of risk behavior.

This study examined eight opportunities to disengage US military forces from four interventions. The results of the process-tracing analysis for each decision point are summarized at the end of Chapters Four, Five, and Six following discussions of each president’s decision and relevant conclusions for the conflict. This chapter compiles and compares those results both across presidents and across interventions. The significance and consequences of these empirical results are then analyzed in the context of theory and methodology, as introduced in Chapter Two. Negative and inconclusive results are assessed next. Potential changes to the three-stage model of decision under risk follow, along with potential future research opportunities. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of implications from the findings in this dissertation on US disengagement from Afghanistan.

Starting with Boettcher’s findings relative to presidential risk behavior, and expanding on a notion he suggested as a possible improvement to his model, this dissertation instead implemented a three-stage model of decision under risk proposed by Kowert and Hermann. The Kowert and Hermann model correlated Five Factor Model personality traits to risk perception and risk predispositions. Their three-stage model aims to find a personality-based alternative to prospect theory, or at least enhance prospect theory by offering insight into the roughly thirty percent of subjects who do not behave according to the predictions of prospect theory. Kowert and Hermann use Costa and McCrae’s Five Factor Model personality traits, replicating Costa
and McCrae’s correlation of traits to the more popular but less scientific Myers-Briggs Type Index. McCrae and Costa show personality traits are predominantly stable and have predictive value. Kowert and Hermann provide evidence that, contrary to prospect theory, at least some people have identifiable and consistent risk propensities that are independent of framing, and furthermore these propensities correlate to personality traits. These traits are Anxiety, Deliberation, Excitement-Seeking, Openness to Experience, Openness to Fantasy, Openness to Action, Agreeableness, and Altruism. Additionally, Myers-Briggs factors that correlated highly were treated as traits indicating Intuitiveness, Feeling, Structure, and Spontaneity. Hypotheses were derived to test Kowert and Hermann’s three-stage model of decision under risk, using disengagement decisions to limit the domain.

The presidential personality profiles used in this dissertation were derived using a combination of FFM traits taken from or consistent with the methodology used by Rubenzer and Faschingbauer. The four most recent US presidents’ disengagement decisions were studied using empirical evidence from four military interventions. The dissertation shows that the presidents’ core personalities have systematic effects on their decision-making relative to disengagement. Who leads as president matters, and knowing the personality predispositions of the president can make a difference for advisors and other domestic leaders, but also to opponents of the president, be they domestic or foreign.

Case Study Results

In the macro view, the case studies indicate that leaders do vary in their risk propensities, and that these traits influence their disengagement decisions. Reviewing the summary of results for the case studies immediately reveals one immediate finding; people defy easy typing. Even with a relatively small collection of relevant traits, myriad combinations present themselves. Presidents will typically have traits suggesting varied, often conflicting profiles. More complete matches matter, particularly for risk awareness and frame sensitivity; however, especially for risk propensities, it appears partial matches can still trump prospect theory.

Table 7.1. depicts differences between observed behaviors and those predicted by the trait-based model. George H. W. Bush is a near match for prospect theory, but a pair of dominant traits favoring risk-acceptance in an otherwise average personality exhibit extraordinary effect over the purely situational explanation of prospect theory. In Table 7.1. we see that while the model’s predictions (Xs) for prospect theory were observed (shading), Bush’s
personal propensity for risk-taking was also evident, though not predicted. Moreover, a clearly dominant personality predisposition can exert a strong influence on risk propensity where the model as presented would predict none. In President Clinton’s case, his risk disposition shone through his propensity for spontaneity and low-deliberation in the risk awareness stage. This points out the importance of individual traits to a profile, but also suggests a flaw in the model which will be addressed later. George W. Bush advances the Clinton finding as a single, dominant trait, his extremely high Excitement-Seeking (E5) facet, exerts a strong influence on how he sets aspirations and frames disengagement. Indeed, it might even act alone to give him a propensity for risk-taking, despite his strong match for risk and frame insensitivity. This observation supports Gallagher’s finding of Excitement Seeking (E5) as the most consistent predictor of foreign policy risk-taking.¹ In Obama’s case, we see a partial match for risk-aversion not suffice, while at the same time a partial match for risk-acceptance does overwhelm his nearly complete match for a prospect theory explanation. George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama both corroborate the weakness of the FFM correlation to prospect theory. Conversely, George W. Bush and Obama also point to the power one extremely strong facet can have; Bush’s Excitement-Seeking (E5) and Obama’s Deliberation (C6) stand out. Deliberation (C6) is especially interesting as Gallagher found high scorers to be more risk-acceptant rather than prone to prospect theory. This refutes Kowert and Hermann, and would further explain President Obama’s propensity for risk-acceptance.² A word of caution is warranted, however, as President Obama’s profile suffers from a different and more limited evaluation than the other presidents. Coupled with the pronounced blank canvas effect for him among media and biographers alike, it is prudent to note this as an observation that supports the general finding.

¹ Maryann E. Gallagher, Who Ups the Ante? Personality Traits and Risky Foreign Policy (Atlanta, GA: Emory University, 2010), 256. Gallagher’s quantitative and qualitative analyses find high scorers on E5 more likely to use force and to escalate immediately in response to a crisis.
² Ibid., 256. Gallagher further found Altruism (A3) to suggest risk-aversion, IAW with Kowert and Hermann, but found Openness to Action (O4) minimally-related to foreign policy risk-taking, and in the opposite direction as Kowert and Hermann.
## Table 7.1. Summary of Results of the Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risk Perception</th>
<th>Risk Predisposition &amp; Framing Effect</th>
<th>Reference Effect</th>
<th>Aspiration Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>H2a</td>
<td>H2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.H.W. Bush</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jan ’93)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (May ’93)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (Oct ’93)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (Dec ’96)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (Jun ’99)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.W. Bush</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(May ’03)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.W. Bush</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Apr ’06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama (Dec ’11)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (X = model prediction  Shading = observed)

H1: Calm Insensitive Perceiving presidents’ disengagement decisions are risk and frame invariant.
H2: Anxious Sensitive Judging presidents’ risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to personal style.
H2a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents are risk-averse, particularly when disengagement is framed as a loss.
H2b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents are risk-acceptant, particularly when disengagement is framed as a gain.
H2c: Open Deliberate Judging presidents are risk-acceptant when disengagement is framed as a loss, and risk-averse when disengagement is framed as a gain (IAW prospect theory).
H3a: Agreeable Altruist Feeling presidents set unusually low aspiration levels.
H3b: Sensation Seeking Intuiting presidents set high or ambitious aspiration levels.
H4: The president’s aspiration level (acting as a situational constraint) is likely to preclude the consideration of disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving (or surpassing) the aspiration level in a particular case.

### Comparison of Models

The object of the trait-based model is not just to explain presidential decision-making, but also to compare that explanation to that of the dominant current model, prospect theory. This study aimed first to offer personality predispositions as a better explanation than the situational basis of prospect theory. Second, it will suffice if the trait-based model can fill in prospect theory’s glaring gaps of reference setting and framing. Finally, at a minimum the trait-based model should help explain the roughly thirty-percent of cases that cannot be satisfactorily explained by prospect theory. The study succeeded on all counts.

Comparing the trait-based model to prospect theory, the study finds the trait-based model successfully explains all eight cases. As Table 7.2. depicts, however, the model unambiguously predicted only two of the eight outcomes. Four of these are due to the previously noted flaw in
the model that led to a prediction of risk and frame invariance for President Clinton. This is not a failure of the model so much as an education in profile interpretation. By way of contrast, prospect theory effectively explains only four of the eight cases, using the president’s decision frame. In all four cases, prospect theory predicted the outcome (risk acceptance), but the rationale (to avoid loss) was opposite of the observation.

Table 7.2. Comparison of Trait-Based Model to Prospect Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Decision Frame</th>
<th>Framing of Disengagement</th>
<th>Riskiest Option Considered</th>
<th>Prospect Theory Prediction</th>
<th>Trait-Based Model Prediction</th>
<th>Observed Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bush (Jan 93)</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Negative (unable to meet min aspiration)</td>
<td>Remain engaged (mission creep)</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant to Avoid Loss</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant for Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (May 93)</td>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>Negative (unable to meet min aspiration)</td>
<td>Expand mission</td>
<td>Risk Averse for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Invariant/ Acceptant for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant for Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (Oct '93)</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Positive (only option allowed by Congress)</td>
<td>Disengage (only option left)</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant to Avoid Loss</td>
<td>Risk Invariant/ Acceptant for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant for Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia/Kosovo</td>
<td>Decision Frame</td>
<td>Framing of Disengagement</td>
<td>Riskiest Option Considered</td>
<td>Prospect Theory Prediction</td>
<td>3-Stage Model Prediction</td>
<td>Observed Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (Dec '96)</td>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>Negative (unable to meet min aspiration)</td>
<td>Long-term troop presence</td>
<td>Risk Averse for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Invariant/ Acceptant for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant for Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (Jun '99)</td>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>Negative (unable to meet min aspiration)</td>
<td>Long-term troop presence</td>
<td>Risk Averse for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Invariant/ Acceptant for Gain</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant for Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Decision Frame</td>
<td>Framing of Disengagement</td>
<td>Riskiest Option Considered</td>
<td>Prospect Theory Prediction</td>
<td>3-Stage Model Prediction</td>
<td>Observed Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush (Sep '03)</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Negative (unable to meet min aspiration)</td>
<td>Nation building and counter-insurgency</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant to Avoid Loss</td>
<td>Risk Invariant</td>
<td>Risk Invariant/ Acceptant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush (Apr '06)</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Negative (unable to meet min aspiration)</td>
<td>Troop Surge for counter-insurgency</td>
<td>Risk Acceptant to Avoid Loss</td>
<td>Risk Invariant</td>
<td>Risk Invariant/ Acceptant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Disengage</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Theoretical, Conceptual, and Methodological Significance

The empirical conclusions from the case studies in chapters four through six generally provide support for the three stage model hypotheses. The cases suggest that presidents perceive risks differently; evaluate options by judging risk against an aspiration level; are often predisposed to risk-acceptance (risk aversion was not noted); and may frame decision options in a way that plays to that predisposition. Moreover, the cases support the assertion that certain personality traits can predict these differences, and that advisors and others close to the president may be able to use this knowledge to more effectively inform and/or influence decision-making. While this of course opens the door for manipulation of information to induce a decision, on a positive note, contemporary researchers, analysts, and other observers outside the president’s inner circle can use this knowledge to understand presidential decision making better without waiting twenty-five years after the administration for archives to reveal the behind-the-scenes view.

One traditional problem in studies of risk is the consideration of risk as a binary variable, risky versus a sure thing. As an example, Kam and Simas found that risk acceptance does not necessarily vary with frames.\(^3\) They further found “an individual’s preference reversal across successive frames will depend upon risk acceptance,” meaning risk-acceptant types are especially likely to choose the risky option, and risk-averse types are especially prone to sure-things regardless of framing.\(^4\) Though consistent with Kowert and Hermann, one concern is that they retain the economic/gambling logic of Kahneman and Tversky. In the real world of foreign policy decisions probabilities are not known and there are no sure things, though often options like disengagement are ruled out by virtue of framing and setting high aspirations, as though their outcomes were certain.

\(^3\) Cindy D. Kam and Elizabeth N. Simas, *Risk Attitudes and Bioterrorism*, http://tessexperiments.org/data/kam593.html. This was contrary to the researchers’ hypothesis that the loss frame would induce risk-acceptant types to accept risk as “nothing to lose,” while inducing risk-averse types to shun risk as a “worst case scenario.”

\(^4\) Ibid.
This dissertation accepts and supports the finding that “both frame and risk orientation are significant predictors of preference” for risky decisions. However, it also accepts that risk is relative and subjective, its probabilities not subject to finite quantification. This dissertation followed Boettcher’s construction of comparative risk, with relatively riskier options being defined as having “more numerous and extremely divergent outcomes, the perception that extreme negative outcomes are at least possible, and recognition that estimates of potential outcomes and the probabilities associated with the occurrence of those outcomes are potentially flawed and may, in fact, be totally incorrect.” Furthermore, it recognizes the reality that political debates over military interventions, including decisions on when and how to disengage, routinely hinge on speculation regarding the potential costs and benefits of those decisions. Neither side of such foreign policy debates can eliminate the inherent uncertainty of future consequences, but competing sides frame the potential consequences in ways favorable to the selection of their preferred decision option.

The relativity of risk is particularly important in respect to disengagement decisions. In military interventions, regardless of the effectiveness of operations to date, withdrawal of forces always risks a deterioration in the situation which will negatively affect US interests or credibility. That risk thus has to be weighed against the risks of continued military engagement at some level. Unfortunately for disengagement, an easy and tempting risk mitigation strategy when no sure thing exists is to find a middle ground. Recognizing risk is subjective, the cases then demonstrate that the relative riskiness of options is context-dependent. Relative risk is measured against the context of the president’s aspiration level for the intervention, which may determine or be determined by how the president frames disengagement. Put another way, personality traits that influence presidents’ risk dispositions lead them to frame disengagement positively or negatively to support their aspiration level, or conversely may lead them to set an aspiration level that favorably supports their framing of the disengagement option.

The most significant theoretical contribution of the case study results is their support for the three-stage model’s utility as a personality trait-based alternative to prospect theory. First, the model demonstrates explanatory value where prospect theory is lacking. Moreover, it appears the model can better explain some instances where prospect theory may at first appear

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5 Ibid.
adequate. This is at least partly because prospect theory is “a reference-dependent theory without a theory of the reference point.” When considering prospect theory explanations within the trait-based model, risk propensity and framing are situational vice personality-based preferences. Prospect theory uses the status quo as the reference point, so if the status quo is acceptable the decision-maker is in the domain of gains and will be risk-averse; if the status quo is unacceptable, the decision-maker is in the domain of losses and will be risk-acceptant. Conversely, the trait-based model is personality-based, uses aspiration levels as reference points, and decision-makers frame decision options. At a minimum, the three-stage model improves the understanding of how aspirations and frames are set. At most, the cases support the Kowert and Hermann proposition that some behaviors which appear to match prospect theory are perhaps cases of artificially-set frames.

Another significant result from this dissertation is the added empirical support for the notion that decision makers measure variance of risks from their aspiration level, not the status quo as prospect theory predicts, nor as a final asset position as expected utility would predict. The cases reveal that presidents spend much of their time establishing their aspiration level, by which they then measure the relative value of alternatives. Consistent with Boettcher’s findings, the presidents in these cases “appeared to implicitly discount the value of outcomes that fell below the aspiration level, while simultaneously privileging outcomes that fell above the aspiration level.” This is a powerful suggestion as to why Presidents discount or table disengagement until it becomes the aspiration. It is intuitive that when a decision-maker has aspirations requiring positive change from the status quo, disengaging is unlikely to contribute to achieving those aspirations. In such a case, disengagement’s risks will be all downside risks; with no upside risk, the disengagement option is unlikely to have the highest variance or divergence.

The fundamental practical contribution of this dissertation is a new explanatory variable for why US presidents find it difficult to disengage military forces in a timely manner. Getting the country bogged down in decade-long quagmires, losing lives and fortune long after achievable military objectives are attained can be understood in the president’s inherent predisposition toward risk. Only when the gains of disengagement are truly valued by a

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8 Gallagher, Who Ups the Ante? 32.
9 Boettcher, Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy, 173.
president and become a serious, if not central, component of the president’s aspirations, will disengagement’s up and downside risks combine to give it the most numerous and divergent potential outcomes.

Potential Explanations for Negative Results

Overall, the trait-based model performs well across all cases for all presidents examined. As concluded in chapters four through six, however, not all cases supported all relevant hypotheses unequivocally. Table 7.1. speaks to the effectiveness of the hypotheses. Empirical evidence from the cases supports hypotheses H1 and H2 on Risk Perception. They are accurate as written, but are incomplete, missing the nuance between the two ends of continuum between Calm Insensitive Perceivers and Anxious Sensitive Judgers. The Clinton cases highlight the significance of this oversight. This allowance does not explain George W. Bush’s case, as he perfectly matches the risk- and frame-insensitive profile, but still demonstrates a propensity for risk-taking.

On Risk Predisposition and the Framing Effect, H2a was not adequately tested by the presidents and cases studied. Only Barack Obama’s profile truly suggests the traits of an Agreeable Altruist Feeler, though George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton are both marginal Feelers (ISFJ and ENFP respectively). Still, while Obama’s Altruism (A3) may be higher than other modern presidents, it was still weak and, at least in the one case studied, President Obama did not demonstrate risk aversion for gain. Despite some seeing Obama as relatively agreeable and conciliatory, the fact remains that these traits are uncommon among US presidents specifically and among politicians generally. An accurate test for this hypothesis might best be accomplished using a case during the administrations of Presidents Hayes, Taft, Harding, or Ford. On the other hand, hypothesis H2b received support from all cases. President Clinton’s cases offered strong support for H2b, despite the model’s prediction that he should be risk invariant. Clinton is a strong match for the profile of a Sensation Seeking Intuiting president, and his behaviors matched the hypothesis. Both Bushes demonstrated risk-acceptant dispositions based on their Excitement-Seeking (E5) trait (and Openness to Action [O4] in the elder Bush’s case), and in both cases beyond the conservative predictions of the model as presented. Obama also demonstrated a propensity for risk-acceptance despite a partial profile matches, though his match is stronger than either Bush’s, and lacks their Excitement-Seeking (E5) trait. Finally, George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama both show a propensity for risk-acceptance despite also
matching the admittedly weak profile for prospect theory. Both Bush’s and Obama’s behavior support hypothesis H2c, but the personality-based explanation proves superior for both men.

Findings for Aspiration Level hypotheses H3a and H3b are similar to those for H2a and H2b. President Obama again offers an inadequate test of hypothesis H3a. Unlike hypothesis H2b, however, H3b only Clinton and George W. Bush demonstrated a tendency to set high aspirations. Clinton’s decisions support the predictions of H3b in all cases, as do Bush’s, though Bush’s do so despite his risk- and frame-invariant profile and his match to only one facet of the profile. Bush’s behavior represents the more significant finding relative to hypothesis H3b. President George W. Bush’s propensity for setting high aspiration levels suggests first that even risk and frame invariant presidents are susceptible to personality influences when setting aspiration levels, and second that a particularly dominant trait or facet can provide influences consistent with larger personality predispositions. In Bush’s case, his extremely high Excitement-Seeking (E5) facet appears to provide the influence of the larger Sensation-Seeking Intuiting type. Finally, hypothesis H4, a retest from Boettcher’s study, received support in every case. Disengagement, perhaps more than any other option in military interventions, is victimized by this hypothesis.

Where hypotheses fall short, in every case the cause has to do with conservative type characterizations. In Bill Clinton’s case, his personality profile nearly matches that of a Risk-Invariant type; he is an Insensitive (low C6) Perceiver (ENFP), but is not Calm (low N1). Conversely, though, he does not match any element of the alternative type of Anxious, Sensitive, Judging. As the model is presented, the first step of Risk Perception eliminates personal style influences for Risk-Invariant types, which empirical evidence clearly refuted in Clinton’s case.

George W. Bush’s behavior in Iraq reveals another instance of decisions beyond what the model would predict in the Awareness Stage. Bush matches the Risk-Invariant type and his disengagement decisions are consistent with the model’s predictions, but one of his dominant personality traits nonetheless appears to influence how he sets aspiration levels. He is not a Sensation-Seeking (high O/O1/O4) Intuiting (MBTI-N) type (Bush is ESTP), only demonstrating the Excitement-Seeking (E5) facet, but does tend to set overly ambitious aspiration levels.

George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama reveal a similar problem, but in the second stage of the model where they have at least some traits of multiple propensities. Both are strong matches for susceptibility to prospect theory. Obama’s is the more pronounced, as his
personality profile has facets of every risk-variant type, making type specificity difficult to determine. This led to cautious predictions across all three sub-types (Prospect Theory, Risk-Aversion, and Risk-Acceptance), settling on prospect theory as the most complete match. He has traits of both Risk-Averse and Risk-Acceptance predispositions, however, none of the traits or facets are particularly dominant. Only Deliberation (C6) is extraordinarily high, a point noted in all personality assessments reviewed. The second reason for the difficulty of typing President Obama appears to be the blank canvas effect. Most media assessments of Obama’s personality come from sources sympathetic to his ideology and/or rely heavily on Obama’s own autobiographies and campaign-oriented sources. For the purposes of this dissertation, this is an observation, not a finding. As Rubenzer and Faschingbauer caveat profiles of both George H. W. and George W. Bush due to anomalies in their rating methodology, this study must do the same for Barack Obama’s profile.10

Revised Framework and Research Agenda for the Future

Though all cases are found to at least arguably align with the predictions of the trait-based model, arriving at those findings required some variation from the model. The Clinton cases point out weaknesses in the Awareness Stage of the model as presented. The author’s modifications to the Kowert and Hermann three-stage model are responsible for this weakness. Reviewing the three-stage model as depicted by Kowert and Hermann, the Awareness Stage is in fact depicted as a continuum, not two separate, distinct types. The case studies clearly reveal the existence of some connection between the Risk and Frame Invariant type and personality predispositions. In Clinton’s cases, his average Anxiousness (N1) left him susceptible to personality-based influences on framing and aspiration setting. George W. Bush is a complete match for the invariant type, but his dominant personality trait still influenced his aspiration setting.

From George W. Bush’s cases, it appears that at a minimum, aspiration levels remain relevant to risk/frame invariant types. Aspiration levels are related to framing and are clearly influenced by personality predispositions. Every case supported hypothesis H4 (The president’s aspiration level, acting as a situational constraint is likely to preclude the consideration of

10 Of note, the author’s IPIP-NEO assessments of both Bushes and Clinton were generally consistent with Rubenzer and Faschingbauer’s ratings. Taken alone, the author’s IPIP-NEO profile of Obama rates him average in relevant facets of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, removing much of the ambiguity regarding either a risk-averse or risk-acceptant predisposition.
disengagement unless/until it is viewed as capable of achieving or surpassing the aspiration level in a particular case). This hypothesis, which found almost universally strong support in Boettcher’s study, was included to test its repeatability.

Accepting that the president’s aspiration level is clearly important in all cases, and then adding Kowert and Hermann’s suggestion that perhaps both risk-acceptant and risk-averse types artificially set their frame to support their personal risk predispositions, it would suggest that personal style should be considered for all presidents, at least for setting aspiration levels. Aspiration setting occurs early in the decision process, so may need to be considered as the first step of the model.

Implications

Given the narrow nature of this study, clearly the results are only part of a greater universe of factors that affect presidential decision-making. Likewise, while the results hopefully shine light on some facets of why disengagement decisions are so difficult for presidents to choose, this dissertation in no way answers the whole question of why the US tends to get stuck in quagmires or how to prevent such mistakes in the future. The secondary intent of this dissertation is exploration of the problem of disengagement through one of many possible frames, the human frame of personality’s effects on decision-making. Taken with the emerging literature in this domain, this dissertation positively contributes to a context-sensitive theory of presidential risk behavior.

Although data constraints and scoping limit the empirical analysis of this dissertation to US Presidents, the trait-based model of decision-making under risk should be expandable to all leaders as the five factor model (FFM) of personality is cross-cultural. Future researchers should apply the trait-based model to other leaders and other decision sets.

One of the more important suggestions from this study is the connection between risk propensity and aspiration levels. Indeed, perhaps the key gap in prospect theory’s utility for explaining foreign policy decision-making is its lack of a basis for determining reference points, and thus the flawed default to the status quo. In none of the decision points examined in this study was the president’s reference point the status quo. Indeed, such a reference point would preclude disengagement almost by definition. Personality traits indicating risk propensity, whether individually or all-inclusive, are useful in predicting a president’s aspiration levels. The evidence shows presidents with higher risk propensities tend to set higher aspiration levels.
While the presidents examined in this study did not demonstrate the converse, it is at least evident that presidents with relatively lower risk propensities tend to set relatively lower aspiration levels. This disparity between setting comparative risks relative to the status quo or relative to an aspiration level skews the framing of options. It is this effect that allows the trait-based model both to enrich prospect theory explanations while also providing alternative explanations.

**Afghanistan and Beyond**

Based on the findings and recommended changes to the model, how would the revised trait-based model of decision under risk predict President Obama will go forward regarding disengagement of US military forces from Afghanistan? Below is a quick application of the model. The trait-based model is descriptive, not prescriptive, but in describing personality predispositions aims to answer the inevitable “so what” call for prediction.

**Aspiration Level**

Shortly after being elected President, in a 21 November 2008 meeting, Obama told Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that he “didn’t want to build a Jeffersonian democracy” in Afghanistan.\(^\text{11}\) Obama’s earliest stated objective for Afghanistan was “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies, their support structures and their safe havens in Pakistan and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”\(^\text{12}\) Put another way, his aspiration is to disengage from Afghanistan without the government collapsing, the Taliban returning, and the country thus reverting to being a haven for terrorists. His stated intention is to leave an undetermined number of US forces in place as advisors for the indefinite future, but it is apparent that if he could disengage all forces at the end of 2014 he would. Some might argue against disengagement being Obama’s driving aspiration, as he increased the US footprint in Afghanistan so dramatically in his first term. However, the so-called Afghan surge was seen as the positive action necessary to make the progress required for disengagement to become viable. During Obama’s 2009 Afghanistan strategy review, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta summed up the situation simply: “We can’t leave, and we can’t accept the status quo.”\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., 99. Based on strategy review by Bruce Riedel briefed to and endorsed by the president on 20 March 2009.

Obama’s aspiration level is certainly and deliberately lower than President Bush’s, which even Robert Gates, carry-over Secretary of Defense from the Bush to Obama administration, called, “too ambitious for us to achieve.”14 John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism at the beginning of the Obama administration, warned against ambitious plans, advising the President, “using terminology like ‘success,’ like ‘victory’ and ‘win’ complicates our task.”15

While any substantive aspiration requiring positive action from the Afghan government may be argued to be overly ambitious, Obama’s aspirations in Afghanistan are nonetheless relatively low and definitely include disengagement as a preferred option. As Gates notes of the transition between administrations, “White House references to ‘exit paths,’ ‘drawdowns,’ and ‘responsibly ending the wars’ vastly outnumbered references to ‘success’ or even ‘accomplishing the mission.’”16

Disengagement was clearly part of President Obama’s aspiration, despite multiple decisions early in his tenure to add counterinsurgency forces. In deliberations over one such plus-up in late 2009, Obama stated, “We need a sustainable effort that the country can absorb…We need to be hardheaded about an exit strategy.”17 The week before his 1 December 2009 speech at West Point announcing another 30,000 troops, President Obama clarified to General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry that he would not spend the trillion dollars an Afghanistan-wide counterinsurgency strategy would require. They would reassess the situation in December 2010, the president continued, but that reassessment would, “not result in holding the numbers we now have or adding numbers. It will only be about the flexibility in how we draw down, not if we draw down…Everything is calibrated on us thinning out…”18 In the West Point speech, along with the deployment, President Obama also announced he would, “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.”19

This and other milestones were met. Obama’s focus in 2014 is on what type of residual force might remain in Afghanistan after December 2014. The stated objective since the NATO

14 Ibid., 5051.
15 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, picture 10.
17 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 260.
18 Ibid., 329.
summit in Chicago in May 2012 has been to leave a “new mission with a new role for NATO,” not “ISAF with a different name,” according to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.\textsuperscript{20} Whether or not there is a follow-on mission, Obama’s core aspirations for Afghanistan remain fundamentally unchanged. As with Iraq, however, it is not completely clear that the president might not welcome not being invited to stay.

\textit{Risk Awareness}

President Obama’s personality profile is clearly that of a Sensitive Judging president, though his Anxiousness is average among presidents; thus his risk disposition for disengagement decisions varies according to his personal style (hypothesis H2). President Obama’s dominant trait is Deliberation (C6), and was evident from day one of his presidency: “Obama’s handling of the Afghanistan conundrum has been a spectacle of deliberation unlike anything seen in the White House in recent memory. His strategic review of Afghanistan operations took over two months.”\textsuperscript{21} Bob Woodward opined that the new President dragged out the Afghanistan strategy review to mitigate the risk of his general in the field boxing him in with troop requests, effectively committing Obama to a larger disengagement problem. Obama also saw the risk that his growing ownership of the Afghanistan campaign could suck the oxygen out of everything, as it had with Bush.\textsuperscript{22}

As the end of 2009 approached, President Obama realized the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan would not support disengaging without first breaking the resurgent Taliban’s momentum with “an extended surge.”\textsuperscript{23} Three days before his West Point speech, Obama was wavering on his compromise of providing General McChrystal 30,000 of the 40,000 troops he had requested, with the proviso that the troop withdrawal would begin in July 2011. On one hand Obama was warned about going against his military leaders and risking a flurry of high-level resignations. On the other hand, Obama’s Coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Lt Gen Doug Lute, along with National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, reminded Obama that he while he would still be there to deal with the number of troops in Afghanistan in July 2011, most of the military leaders pushing for more troops would be long gone. Lute enumerated four risks

\textsuperscript{22} Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 281.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 317.
in continuing the war: US dealings with Pakistan; governance and corruption in Afghanistan; the Afghan National Security Forces, and; maintaining international support. He warned President Obama that the strategy review considered the risks discretely, when in fact they were linked and cumulative. Risk in one would increase risk in the next, turning what seemed like a calculated risk into an incalculable gamble. “I can’t tell you that the prospect here for success is very high,” Lute advised, “and if you add those risks up and ask me where I think we’ll be in July 2011, sort of your big decision point, I’m telling you I think that we’re not going to be a whole lot different than we are today.”24 This sentiment is echoed today by recognition that a full withdrawal of US forces in December 2014 risks a reinvigorated push from the Taliban, caving of Afghan National Security Forces, and a collapse of the government.25

Barack Obama is risk-aware, and his risk propensity influences his perceptions of risk both in setting his aspiration level and in framing the disengagement decision option. The president is clearly aware that disengagement has risks, as evidenced by his willingness to leave anywhere from a few thousand special operators to perhaps as many as ten-to-twelve thousand trainers/advisors for long-term nation-building and peace sustainment.26

Risk Propensity

The trait-based model suggests Obama is a candidate for a prospect theory explanation, in accordance with hypothesis H2c. The personality basis for prospect theory proved weak in the case studies, as the Kowert and Hermann study suggested. Further, the case studies showed that even partial matches to risk disposition profiles, at least the risk-acceptant disposition, provide a better explanation for a president’s risk propensity than do purely situational factors. Specifically, President Obama’s trait profile suggests a predisposition to accept risk for gains, based on his open and intuiting nature, vice for any thrill in risk-taking. This predicts behavior consistent with hypothesis H2b, whereby Obama will accept the riskier option if the promised gains are sufficient.

President Obama’s blank canvas effect has unquestionable diminished, but continues to be evident in his second term. Where some see a risk-averse president “leading from behind,”

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24 Ibid., 320.
others see the same president threatening attacks against Syria in the late summer of 2013 as a, “calculated risk taker…willing to take risks…where the potential payoff is large.” The raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan is the clearest, widely known example of this propensity. Vice President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Robert Gates both opposed the raid; Biden feared the political risks of failure, while Gates focused on the huge downside risks an angry Pakistan could bring to the Afghanistan operation. Further, as a former CIA analyst himself, Gates knew the evidence of bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad was more instinct than hard fact, meaning the downside risks of angering Pakistan may well have no upside reward. As Gates put it, “we were risking the war in Afghanistan on a crapshoot.” Gates’ view was also tainted by his personal memories of the failed hostage rescue mission in 1980, and he advised President Obama that perhaps that made him too cautious. Obama showed his openness by forcefully disagreeing with Gates and emphasizing that he valued diverse experience and advice on such decisions.

Expectations for the interaction of risk propensity and aspirations are interesting in this case. Will the traits that predispose Obama to taking risks for gain also lead him to set overly ambitious aspirations? The Iraq case suggests not. We further know Obama lowered expectations in Afghanistan relative to George W. Bush’s. It is speculative based on only the Iraq case, but it may be that Obama’s low Openness to Fantasy (O1) and low Excitement-Seeking (E5) traits make him less susceptible to setting over-ambitious aspirations. Taken with the fact that disengagement is again central to President Obama’s aspirations for Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq, and with the fact that Obama’s dominant trait is Deliberation (C6), it is fair to expect Obama to now behave according to hypothesis H3b.

Framing of Disengagement

Framing is again important for President Obama, particularly because his profile so closely matches that for prospect theory. We know Obama generally views disengagement

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29 Ibid., 9867.
positively and war negatively. In Afghanistan, however, he can neither frame disengagement as absolutely positive, nor the war as absolutely negative as he did in Iraq. Having repeatedly portrayed Afghanistan as the right war, or at least the necessary one, he owns responsibility for its closure much more so than he ever did for Iraq. Furthermore, entering office he lacked the pre-determined settlement he had in Iraq, where the 2008 SOFA provided the luxury of deciding nothing and deflecting blame if poor outcomes resulted.

Recalling that framing in prospect theory refers to the situation, we know President Obama and his administration framed Afghanistan as a losing situation when he took office. Lieutenant General Lute briefed Obama before the election, “We’re not losing, but we’re not winning, and that’s not good enough.”³⁰ The status quo was unacceptable and required positive action, so at least initially, disengagement had to be off the table.

The new president decided to increase US forces in Afghanistan nearly sixty percent within his first two months in office. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlights both the President’s negative framing of the situation and his preference for disengaging over escalating in his account of the President’s receipt of General Stanley McChrystal’s assessment of the situation in Afghanistan in September 2009. In a personal memo to President Obama on the same day he delivered McChrystal’s report to National Security Advisor General Jim Jones, Gates informed the President that further troop decisions would likely have to come soon, warning “that ‘as usual,’ all the options were unpalatable.”³¹ In the context of 2009, all options were bad, but disengagement was not really even considered an option at the time as it could not meet the new President’s aspiration level (hypothesis H4).

The context of 2014 is much different, though it is likely a truism that in presidential decision-making there are “almost never ‘good’ options available.”³² Prospect theory tells us individuals are risk-averse in choosing amongst gains and risk-acceptant when dealing with losses, so looking for the least bad solution to a problem can certainly represent a negative frame for most decisions. A President like Obama who philosophically frames disengagement positively, therefore, is set up to find disengagement as the least bad option. The operative question becomes whether the least bad option is the relatively riskier one.

³⁰ Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 43-44.
³¹ Gates, Duty, 6619.
³² Ibid., 2761.
If the President’s public statements represent his true aspirations, he wants some residual presence in Afghanistan after 2014 to train Afghan forces and to conduct limited counterterrorism missions, including drone strikes into Pakistan. One might argue a small advisory mission realizes most of the cost savings and reductions in casualties offered by disengagement, while maintaining some level of influence in Afghanistan and relatively easy access to Pakistan, making its outcomes more numerous and divergent. Obama is unlikely to see it as such, however, because he frames disengagement so positively, and as a point of fact the NATO follow-on mission is really a compromise of his true aspiration. Total disengagement is then the higher risk option, as it forfeits all direct control and renders continued counterterrorism strikes into Pakistan much more difficult if still possible at all. In the frame of losses, prospect theory predicts Obama will accept the risk of disengagement to avoid a loss. To choose disengagement under prospect theory, Obama should have no other acceptable option; otherwise, disengagement should be rejected as unable to meet his aspirations.

As an alternative to prospect theory, according to his personality traits Obama’s risk-acceptant disposition should lead him to favor a comparatively riskier option, particularly for gains. Under the trait-based model, framing does not determine risk propensity, but rather options are framed based on the individual’s predispositions; therefore, the model would predict Obama would frame disengagement as an acceptable alternative to an untenable situation, such as US troops in Afghanistan without immunity. President Obama’s 25 February 2014 order to prepare for a full withdrawal of US forces by the end of the year could be just such a move.33

**Consideration of Alternatives and Final Decision**

In the simplest terms, President Obama has two real alternatives from which to choose in Afghanistan; he can keep US military forces engaged in some significant numbers or he can disengage all or most US forces. Continued engagement has branches and sequels, including the administration’s stated preferred approach of leaving some small force in place, but not regular combat troops. Different force structure options offer varying degrees of disparate possible outcomes, and thus relative riskiness. Getting regular combat forces out meets President Obama’s stated deadline, but leaves flexibility for what counts as non-combat forces. Trainers and advisors are less vulnerable to combat losses and special operations forces are more covert

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by nature; both help President Obama mitigate the risks of both continued regular combat operations and the lack of control inherent to a total withdrawal.

Indications are, however, that President Obama personally prefers to get out of Afghanistan. Reports suggest at least two senior administration officials find total withdrawal, the so-called zero option, “strategically viable and politically acceptable.” Obama views any active long-term military engagement in Afghanistan as a sure losing situation, reinforcing disengagement as the riskier option with more disparate potential outcomes. This works for both a trait or situational-based explanation, as according to the reference effect, disengagement is the risk worth taking to avoid a sure loss. Reinforcing President Obama’s aspiration for disengagement is the domestic and international fatigue associated with the war in Afghanistan. Domestic politics in a mid-term election year cannot be ignored as a reinforcer, as polls suggest a majority support accelerating the US withdrawal and action to do so would necessarily be well underway before the November 2014 elections.

The major constraint facing President Obama in meeting his aspiration for disengagement from Afghanistan is his ownership of the mission. Iraq’s descent back into chaos less than two years after the US withdrawal creates pressure not to let the same or worse happen in Afghanistan. This constraint is actually weak, as both sides point to Iraq’s decline. While violence has increased, the American public largely either has not noticed or does not find it alarming enough to counter their relief over being disengaged. After five years in office and a massive increase in US presence, President Obama cannot deny Afghanistan as at least partly his war. Learning from Iraq he may be willing to make it Karzai’s disengagement if the Afghan president persists in his refusal to sign BSA. The President wants to disengage, yet he finds himself facing the classic disengagement problem of being reliant on others to meet his objectives. All three pillars upon which his aspirations sit are beyond his control. The government may stand or fall, the Taliban may return or be shunned, and terrorists may or may not re-establish their safe haven; all depend mostly on Afghans. Recalling Speier’s tenets of disengagement, President Obama cannot disengage unilaterally from an enemy (the Taliban and al-Qaeda), cannot forcibly disengage while that enemy offers a credible threat, and cannot

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34 Parsons, “Obama Willing To Extend Deadline.”
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
credibly assume that other elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) will suffice to keep the notoriously corrupt Afghan government afloat.

Ironically, President Obama’s lack of a relationship with the mercurial Afghan President Hamid Karzai might well prove his ticket out of owning Afghanistan, and in the process reinforce his aspiration for disengagement. As with Iraq, Obama has established a date certain for an end to the US military mission and may be able to divorce any follow-on presence from the current operation. The NATO follow-on is contingent on Karzai signing the BSA, which appears unlikely. Waiting until after the April presidential election and its presumed runoff leaves little time for US forces to act, as President Obama told President Karzai on 25 February: “The longer we go without a BSA, the more challenging it will be to plan and execute any U.S. mission…Furthermore, the longer we go without a BSA, the more likely it will be that any post-2014 U.S. mission will be smaller in scale and ambition.”\textsuperscript{37} If the Afghans miss the deadline as the Iraqi government did, Obama could disengage US forces and deflect responsibility to the Afghan government for failing to act on a BSA in time.

Even if the US and Afghanistan agree to the BSA or another SOFA, President Obama may yet have another hedging strategy. According to a recent report, the military’s request for at least ten thousand troops to remain after the end of 2014 also entails bringing that “number down to almost zero by the end of President Obama's term.”\textsuperscript{38} Such a plan would mitigate President Obama’s personal political risks in the event of a post-US Afghanistan slide. He could claim disengagement from America’s longest war on his watch while deflecting any potential negative outcomes to his successor.

Recalling that Kowert and Hermann found the linkage between personality traits and prospect theory weak and unconvincing, and also that Gallagher found Deliberate (C6) Presidents to be more risk-acceptant, a risk-acceptant explanation or expectation for Obama’s disengagement decisions is more likely. Both approaches may work, but part of the aim of the trait-based model it to better describe and explain presidential risk behaviors currently explainable by prospect theory. Contorting personal preferences to fit a situational construct, as


outlined above, is singularly unsatisfying. Prospect theory seems counter-intuitive in this regard. President Obama aspires to disengage US military forces from Afghanistan as quickly and as completely as the situation allows. The President frames disengagement positively, as a winner in terms of ending exorbitant expenditures in blood and treasure. He absolutely recognizes the risks of disengaging and thereby losing influence and control in Afghanistan. While not in it for the excitement inherent in taking the risks, through his studied deliberation he will facilitate his preferred decision to disengage. Ironically, President Obama’s Openness and Deliberation also incline him toward compromise solutions, which mitigate risks but also prevent clear, decisive disengagement.

The trait-based model predicts Obama will accept the risks of disengagement, so long as disengagement promises to meet his minimum aspirations. It cannot, however, predict the circumstances in the President’s decision window. The US may disengage by default, as in Iraq, by failing to reach an acceptable BSA. The US may keep some small force in place to ensure Afghanistan’s security, or perhaps only to maintain the air base structure necessary to continue remotely-piloted aircraft counter-terrorism operations in neighboring Pakistan. This may continue through the end of Obama’s presidency or beyond.

In the end, a President’s personality does not determine situations, nor does it determine his or her decisions. Still, the significance of individuals’ personality traits should not be overlooked in studying disengagement or other aspects of policy decision-making. Traits are stable tendencies that can be used to both explain and help predict behavior. They are not deterministic, but understanding how personality traits predispose presidents to certain tendencies in their interactions with other situational variables is explanatory. Most importantly, this explanatory value exists contemporaneously, when rich supporting information may not be accessible.
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