The Army of 2015 is at a crossroads. Caught inadequately equipped, ill structured, and poorly postured at the outset of hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the intervening years the organization has restructured itself in unprecedented fashion while under fire to meet the demands of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Simultaneously, the Army has sustained the capacity to engage in traditional combined arms maneuver against a near peer adversary. As today’s Army surveys the operating environment of the midterm (5-20 years in the future), it has elected to rededicate the entirety of the force to meeting this dual mission requirement. This paper argues that while the Army must indeed be prepared for either scenario, better results will result by focusing the active component (AC) on major combat operations, and the Reserve Component (RC), specifically the Army National Guard (ARNG), on the phases of war preceding these operations. This paper will demonstrate that recent history has clearly established the need for specialization of Army forces in the operating environment, while declining resources have necessitated fresh thinking about force employment. Finally, a hypothetical case study set in AFRICOM AOR will illuminate the numerous ways that the AC, the ARNG and the supported Combatant Commander will benefit from the employment of optimal Army forces at the appropriate time and place.
EVOLVING ROLES FOR THE NEXT FIGHT: AN ARMY IN TRANSITION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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ABSTRACT

The Army of 2015 is at a crossroads. Caught inadequately equipped, ill structured, and poorly postured at the outset of hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the intervening years the organization has restructured itself in unprecedented fashion while under fire to meet the demands of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Simultaneously, the Army has sustained the capacity to engage in traditional combined arms maneuver against a near peer adversary. As today’s Army surveys the operating environment of the midterm (5-20 years in the future), it has elected to rededicate the entirety of the force to meeting this dual mission requirement. This paper argues that while the Army must indeed be prepared for either scenario, better results will come about by focusing the active component (AC) on major combat operations, and the reserve component (RC), specifically the Army National Guard (ARNG), on the phases of war preceding these operations. This paper will demonstrate that recent history has clearly established the need for greater specialization of Army forces in the operating environment, while declining resources have necessitated fresh thinking about force employment. Finally, a hypothetical case study set in the AFRICOM AOR will illuminate the numerous ways that the AC, the ARNG and the supported Combatant Commander will benefit from the employment of optimal Army forces at the appropriate time and place.
INTRODUCTION

One significant legacy of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is the reaffirmation of the principle most notably espoused by Vietnam-era Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams regarding the necessity of utilizing both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) in any sustained combat action. Known colloquially as the “Abrams Doctrine,” this maxim has continually proven its utility for two key reasons. First, at the operational level, the rotational demands of a sustained operation typically necessitate the injection of fresh combat forces culled from the RC in order to ensure sufficient recuperation time for the initial wave of AC units. Second, at the strategic level, the utilization of RC forces in combat operations establishes a more direct tie with the American public than a purely AC centric campaign, thereby investing the public in the success or failure of the mission. In the post-Vietnam era, the second principle underpinning the Abrams Doctrine is perhaps ever more pertinent, given the cessation of the draft and the RC’s commensurate status as the foremost military tie back to American communities.

With the necessity of the inter-reliance of the Army’s active and reserve components now well established over many decades, it is prudent then to periodically analyze the optimal mixture of personnel, capabilities, and missions between the two entities. For many years, the two organizations constituting the RC, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (AR), have filled different roles. The ARNG has stood as the “combat reserve” of the Active Component, comprising a similar mix of combat and support units as the AC, whereas the Army Reserve has been structured as a “broadening” entity that provides niche capabilities to the force. The RC forces, representing depth and breadth

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1 Randy Pullen, “Keep the Reserves in the Fight,” Strategic Studies Institute
respectively, have proven an indispensable resource for an Army stressed to a maximal
degree by the demands of two simultaneous campaigns in Iraq (OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF).
Unfortunately, the proven utility of the ARNG in sustained combat has once again focused
Army leaders on a misleadingly simple lesson from these wars, namely that the ARNG is
merely a cost effective means of generating rotational combat power. While arguable, this
narrow perspective obscures a more holistic lesson regarding the employment of AC and
ARNG forces over the phases of war: that the ARNG can and should be used not just for
depth amid the dominate phase of combat operations, but as the go-to Army force during
shaping and deterrence phases as well.

A CHANGE BORNE OF NECESSITY

The misleading lesson of the ARNG’s legacy in OIF and OEF is an understandable
one, as a chief feature of these campaigns was the tremendous stress experienced by the AC
as it sought to prosecute two difficult operations for which, at least initially, it had poorly
prepared. The ARNG, as such, was rightly viewed by many as the indispensable force that
relieved the immediate turbulence amid the AC’s rapid expansion from 480,000 troops in
2001 to a height of 566,000 AC soldiers in 2011 in order to meet wartime demands. As
then-Lieutenant General John Riggs, the active Army’s architect for its massive growth
observed to Congress on the necessity for expansion in 2004, “I have been in the Army 39

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2 United States National Guard, “2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement”, accessed 12 April 2015,
3 United States Army, “Army Demographics FY01”, accessed 12 April 2015,
http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/docs/demographics/FY01ArmyProfile.pdf
4 The Heritage Foundation, “2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength”, accessed 12 April 2015,
http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/chapter/us-power/us-army/
years, and I've never seen the Army as stretched in that 39 years as I have today."\(^5\) As history records, the ARNG filled this force gap with remarkable efficiency and nearly unprecedented volume, boasting 525,000 post-9/11 combat deployments as of March 2014, a figure demonstrating the number of multiple deployments undertaken by many of its soldiers, and a remarkable record for an organization whose overall strength peaked at a wartime high of roughly 354,000 soldiers.\(^6\)

Once integrated, the rotational capacity of the components was generally sufficient to meet both theaters’ demands, with the AC spending the bulk of its time and effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan in Phases III and IV, Dominate and Stabilize, and the ARNG serving as a roughly interoperable entity with which it could conduct “relief in place” operations as deployment rotations came to an end. Interestingly, though for many years both the AC and ARNG trumpeted this arrangement as the embodiment of the ideal relationship between the components, subsequent discussions about the evolving roles of the components has led to Pentagon figures such as Active Army Major General John Rossi claiming that the actual ability level of the ARNG in fact left something to be desired.\(^7\) For the ARNG’s part, its senior leaders have responded that the organization performed brilliantly in combat, and that it took on all missions it was assigned despite a comparative paucity of pre-deployment resources.\(^8\)


\(^8\) Ibid.
Despite the impressive ability of the ARNG to rise to the occasion amid combat operations as General Abrams envisioned, the shift in focus toward equitably reducing the size of the Army components has marginalized another area of needed introspection for the total Army. The areas requiring the greatest scrutiny in this regard, yet thus far receiving the least, are the force gaps that were present in the operational phases to the “left” of the ARNG’s trumpeted combat surge, specifically Phases 0 and I. It is in this timeframe before hostilities commence that the ARNG can meet the noncombat operational benchmarks identified in key documents like the Combatant Commanders’ (CCDRs) Posture Statement. U.S. Africa Command, for example, makes multiple references to the necessity of engaging local populations via nontraditional military means in its 2015 document, observing that an enduring U.S. presence can indeed “help build mutual trust and confidence and enhance interoperability” in long neglected nations such as Malawi and elsewhere. Joint Publication 3-0 outlines the operational phases in question as such:

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GETTING OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT: PHASE 0 & I

Despite the proven interoperability of the AC and ARNG in combat operations, a look at the operational neglect of Phases 0 and I can leave little doubt that a change must nevertheless be undertaken. To wit: number of commentators on the Army’s struggles in the recent conflicts have taken particular note of the ways in which its soldiers on the ground were set up for failure given their lack of cultural understanding, a key tenet of successful

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Phase 0 operations. Doctrinally, at the operational level, JP 3-0 specifically observes that success hinges on efforts to “dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan.” JP 5-0 adds that Phase 0 activities are “executed continuously” in an effort to “enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives”, language that echoes the AFRICOM Posture Statement. By this standard, the Army proved ineffective in every regard in the lead up to combat operations in OIF and OEF. In Iraq, for example, the Army’s role between its 1991 withdrawal following Operation DESERT STORM and the 2003 invasion was essentially limited to a handful of periodic exercises with presumptive coalition nations in the region, as ground forces took a decade long backseat to the Air Force’s enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones dubbed Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH.

In and around Afghanistan prior to 9/11, the Army was again marginalized in deference to other arms of the U.S. government, in this case the CIA and State Department. As author Steve Coll points out in his examination of the prehistory of OEF, *Ghost Wars*, the Army’s primary contribution for many years was one of materiel support in the form of arms sales to the mujahedeen forces engaging in combat against the Soviets, an effort neither “continuously executed” nor mindful of future contingencies in the manner called for in Joint Doctrine. Ironically in fact, the shaping efforts that interagency partners undertook in the

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region in many ways ultimately worked in opposition to future U.S. efforts in the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.\textsuperscript{15}

In Phase I, “Deter” operations, which JP 5-0 identifies as those efforts to “deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force”, to include “activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is not successful”, the Army fared little better.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, there is perhaps even more damning evidence of the Army’s shortfall in this phase, given the fact that aggression by U.S. adversaries in both cases was demonstrably not deterred whatsoever. Most troublingly, this disconnect was even felt at the operational-strategic level, given the longstanding duty of the U.S. Army to serve as a de facto deterrent to conflict worldwide given its international reputation as the world’s most capable.\textsuperscript{17} Certainly, the Army’s deterrence efforts in Phase I have prevented conflict before. Amid the backdrop of the Cold War in 1958, for example, President Eisenhower needed only to move 15,000 troops into Beirut in order to secure a negotiated settlement with Lebanese militants and prevent a coup.\textsuperscript{18} Contemporary examples of this phenomenon, however, are troublingly scarce.

Broadly speaking, failings in OIF and OEF Phase 0 and Phase I operations were largely attributable to the abdication of their execution entirely. Though unfortunate, this can be explained in some respects by the fact that the now standard Joint Phasing Concept that underscored the length and significance of the pre-combat timeframe was only introduced in

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
the September 2006 update to JP 3-0. In previous versions of Joint Doctrine, by contrast, the pre-combat timeframe was devoted to preparatory tasks in support of a forthcoming major combat operation, and was known as the “prehostilities phase.” Furthermore, neither Iraq nor Afghanistan provided the sort of permissive environment required to facilitate an overt American military presence. Regardless of the causes in recent wars, this is not a mistake that the Army nor the Joint Force can again afford to make. Whether by working on the periphery of areas of foremost concern or by seeking soft power solutions as a means to gain access, U.S. forces cannot wholly abandon the early phases again. Fortunately, the present-day ARNG presents an ideal tool ready for employment in dozens of areas around the globe as the “force of choice” for Phase 0 and Phase I operations, for three primary reasons:

- The ARNG already has a robust and longstanding international presence in the form of its State Partnership Program (SPP) that affords it legitimacy, opportunity, and competency as the force of choice for early entry operations.
- The ARNG has a unique mixture of civilian acquired skills beyond the official military training of its soldiers that serves as a combat multiplier in non-hostile environments.
- The ARNG, should it assume a lead role in shaping and deterrence operations, would nonetheless continue to be able to provide rotational depth to the AC in the event of major combat operations contingencies.

**SPP: PROMISES FULFILLED OVER DECADES**

One facet of the National Guard that is often surprising to AC personnel lacking experience with the Guard is the protracted tenure of many of the 2-star generals in the 54 U.S. states and territories known as Adjutant Generals, or “TAGs.” These officers typically serve at the pleasure of the governor, although in a few states they are elected by statewide

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ballot. In many cases, TAGs enjoy terms that span the length of multiple governors, gaining valuable expertise in the state’s unique challenges and strengths. (One notably durable officer was Major General James C. Dozier of South Carolina, a Medal of Honor recipient who served an astounding 33 years as TAG.)

Though just one person, TAGs can play an important role as a senior ambassador to a foreign military as well as the joint force given his or her knowledge on the capabilities, security challenges, and focus areas for the state’s counterpart in the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). A program born of the instability of the post-Cold War European security environment, the SPP has now been in place for more than two decades, and boasts 68 state-country partnerships. In a global operational context, this sometimes means that the U.S. military officers with some of the keenest insights into foreign armies are the TAGs with whom the nations’ militaries are partnered. A 2015 conference, for example, brought together a slate of Adjutants General from SOUTHCOM AOR and senior representatives of partner states. Discussions centered on a host of high level issues pertinent to their respective nations’ militaries, from combating transnational security threats to ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, a living embodiment of the sort of activities common to Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) documents such as the Theater Security Cooperation Plan or annual Posture Statement. Fortunately for similar parties around the globe, many such discussion venues are now being explored across all of the GCCs.

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22 National Guard J-5, “Overview of the National Guard State Partnership Program” (PowerPoint presentation, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, VA, March 2014).
The TAGs, however, are merely one facet of the close and habitual relationships state National Guard forces forge with the partner nation. In fact, a Congressional Research Service study found that states regularly partner at the company, battalion, and brigade level worldwide on a host of noncombat issues, from border security strategies, to search and rescue operations, to command and control structuring.\(^{24}\) These interactions often transcend individual training missions and can last for many years, in stark contrast to the shorter timeframes in which AC personnel rotate in and out of geographically focused commands and back to the general purpose force.\(^{25}\) With each year, greater cultural expertise and mutual cooperation is generated at the individual and unit levels. In fact, some of the more mature partnerships have even extended into deployed combat roles for National Guardsmen in partner nation missions to OIF and OEF, seeming proof of the notion that despite their Phase 0 and I orientation, SPP relationships can indeed span the full spectrum of conflict.\(^{26}\)

The current slate of partnerships is shown below:


\(^{25}\) Ibid.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.
One example of the tremendous value of the SPP program relative to its size and level of resourcing is found with the partnership between Iowa and Kosovo. Though only four years old, the partnership has already yielded benefits well beyond the scope of the training-centric partnership model that defined the early years of the SPP program. In the wake of the successful Kosovar struggle for independence, the Iowa National Guard emerged not just as a military partner for Kosovar forces seeking to professionalize their force, but as an entry point for the government of Kosovo to conduct further whole of government partnering with...
the state. In short order, the Iowa-Kosovo SPP relationship has led to additional cooperation in such areas as higher education, medicine, and farming.

In addition to such relationships being established in a more formal capacity, Iowa Guardsmen have taken on mentorship roles in a personal way as well, as evidenced by an examination of this partnership by the Underrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The UNPO’s findings in this regard are best encapsulated by Iowa National Guard Public Affairs Officer Colonel Gregory Hapgood Jr., who noted that “it has been the tradition of Iowa soldiers serving in Kosovo to also engage in nation-building activities on their personal time, such as teaching students English and helping with other types of community betterment projects.”

Although a new development in the history of the SPP program, the expanding Iowa-Kosovo model shows a great deal of promise as a proof of principle for other state-country partners. In fact, this partnership and others like it might be heralded in future years as a premiere example of the long wished for interagency synthesis between the U.S. government’s national security objectives of promoting good governance and building partner security capacity. U.S. European Command, for its part, has expressed the tangible value of longstanding partnerships of this nature in its governing documents, noting in its 2015 Posture Statement the need to promote “credible, enduring capabilities that will assure, deter, and defend while shaping the theater with a coordinated whole of government approach.” With Iowa and Kosovo, that whole of government approach is well underway.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Regardless of the program’s future, the Guard’s product in existence today is already very much in line with the stated intent of Phase 0 and Phase I operations as described in JPs 3-0 and 5-0, and thus should be given strong consideration as the US Army’s primary means of providing shaping and deterrence capabilities to the supported Combatant Commander. In fact JP 3-0’s list of activities and attributes essential for successful shaping operations reads like a program description of ongoing SPP activities: continuously executed, influencing allies’ behavior in a favorable way, improving the exchange of information, and providing U.S. forces with assured access. Better yet, the program is extremely cost effective for the return on investment that it generates, accounting for just $14 million annually, or roughly .0028% of the Department of Defense’s budget appropriation for Fiscal Year 2015.

By contrast, the Army’s active component has only recently begun to focus on Phase 0 and Phase I operations in a dedicated way, via a concept known as “Regionally Aligned Forces”, or RAF. Well-meaning in design, RAF seeks to habitually align modular Army forces, chiefly Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with partner nations served by the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), with the intent of inculcating language and cultural expertise into its units. Nominally extending to the reserve components, RAF is essentially a manifestation of the AC’s recognition that it must retain the relevance and cohesion won over more than a decade of war, and that it must move out in a “total force” spirit by including the

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Army National Guard and Army Reserve. However well intentioned, in practice the compatibility of the AC with a regional model leaves much to be desired.

Unfortunately, the tenets of RAF are fundamentally incompatible with many longstanding cultural and structural features of the AC, given the fact that its soldiers rotate from unit to unit throughout their careers, thereby negating any country-specific expertise generated during their tenure. Moreover, at the tactical and operational command level, AC battalion and brigade commanders typically rotate in and out of command in 24 months, a far shorter window for senior leader cooperation than can be gleaned by an ARNG officer who may work with his SPP counterparts over many years while in and out of command roles.37 In these ways and others, the AC’s recent foray into the ARNG’s multi-decade area of expertise is a poor fit, and irreconcilable in one essential way with a key phasing tenet of JP 5-0: ongoing assessment. If, as JP 5-0 suggests, a continual assessment must be made regarding the forecasted and actual outcomes of U.S. forces’ involvement in a space, the ARNG model of enduring partnership is far more desirable than the inherently turbulent churn of personnel through AC formations.38 Arguably, rather than an expansion of the AC’s utility, RAF is instead a diversion from its core identity as the preeminent land based force structured to “gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations”.39

VALUE ADDED: CIVILIAN ACQUIRED SKILLS

39 Chief of Staff of the Army, Unified Land Operations, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), 1.
As doctrine makes clear, the character of the operating environment in Phase 0 and Phase I demands a fundamentally sustained, rather than a periodic presence.\footnote{Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Joint Operations}, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 11 August 2011), x.} As JP 3-0 points out, a sustained presence within a country or AOR “contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed”.\footnote{Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Joint Operations}, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 11 August 2011), V-10.} When examining the root causes of instability, however, one can perceive where the other instrument of national power, the military, also has a potentially helpful role in contributing to whole of government approach. Though a seemingly unusual fit for an organization like the ARNG which is made up primarily of part-time “citizen soldiers”, the lasting presence offered by the enduring bonds of SPP is in fact far more durable than virtually any other offered by the joint force.

As one example, the combat multiplier of the ARNG’s civilian acquired skills (CAS), can be quite effective in reducing the causes of instability when employed correctly.\footnote{John McRae and Mike Denny, “Guard #Operating,” \textit{The Strategy Bridge}, 9 November 2014, \url{https://medium.com/the-bridge/guard-operating-45da58ee3d1b}.} Undoubtedly, the host of reasons contributing to instability in conflict-prone states is long, from human factors such as ethnic and political divisions to environmental issues such as food and water scarcity and vulnerable agricultural capacity.\footnote{Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Editorial, “Attacking the Root Causes of Instability,” \url{worldbank.org}.} Although the U.S. Army has a role to play in setting the conditions favorable for effective governance and harmonious civil societies, the associated complement of destabilizing environmental factors may seem to be well outside the core capabilities of the organization. Fortuitously, however, the “hidden” skills of CAS within the ARNG provide a means for the GCCs to effectively address these issues. When these skills are brought to bear on an operational problem such as the

\footnote{http://www.worldbank.org/html/cgiar/newsletter/Sept97/10ifpri.html.}
introduction of sustainable agricultural practices in a conflict-prone environment, a mutually beneficial outcome is possible for the population, its leaders, and the supported GCC.

One such example helping to illustrate the value of ARNG CAS in promoting stability is the use of Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Despite the fact that these teams were deployed in Phase IV of OEF, the proof of their utility nonetheless applies to Phase 0 and Phase I operations, given the clear shaping and deterrence applications of the program, such as positively influencing host nation perceptions and developing capabilities.44 Both formalized programs and ad hoc capabilities like ARNG CAS have the added benefit of falling in line with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s guidance to the force that calls for more adaptive and agile solutions to the range of challenges presented across the spectrum of conflict.45

Like many successful adaptations borne of conflict, ADTs were developed out of sheer necessity given the demands of the operating environment. In Afghanistan, one key benchmark for the U.S. to depart was the promotion of sustainable, non-narcotic based agriculture.46 Given the limitations of joint and interagency partners in terms of resources and skill sets, the ARNG was called upon to tap into its vast depth of internal CAS and form what came to be known as ADTs. Consisting of ARNG experts in the fields of “geoscience, agronomy, veterinary science, engineering, agricultural marketing, and pest management”, and led by a colonel, these teams were empowered to work with officials at the local and regional level, university officials, and farmers themselves in order to impart best practices

45 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s 2nd Term Direction to the Joint Force (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2013), 7–8.
and cultivate new areas of opportunity. The result has been near-universal acclaim, up to and including positive notice from former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who noted the applicability of the concept to the modern operational context and expressed the desire to further tap into the reservoir of CAS within the reserve force.

Gates’ observation is telling in two ways. First, the notion of adaptive solutions like ADTs is indeed very much a function of the modern era of conflict, wherein conventional, monolithic formations have declining value against asymmetric threats and unprecedented mission assignments. Of added benefit is the fact that the tooth to tail ratio of ADTs is comparatively high relative to conventional Army formations, given its lean, mission-tailored structure of roughly a platoon’s worth of functional experts. Second, the usage of the reserve components, in this case the ARNG, as the force of choice to conduct these sorts of nonstandard, innovative missions is in essence a recognition that the ARNG and its sister reserve component services are not just an option, but the force best suited to shape future populations and environments. Both points suggest that ADTs and formations like it should increasingly be thought of in the Department of Defense as less of an anomaly and more as the preferred means of harnessing the inherent value of the total force in Phase 0 and Phase I.

**RECOMMENDATIONS: PLAYING TO OUR STRENGTHS**

Notwithstanding the potential value of the ARNG in Phase 0 and Phase I, the organization also has a longstanding role as the combat reserve of the active Army, a role that cannot be abdicated should the ARNG become the lead effort in early entry

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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
environments.\textsuperscript{49} From the roots of the nation itself, the National Guard has been the
indispensable force of choice to maintain operational depth in the face of sustained
deployment in support of combat operations. In the post-9/11 conflicts, for example, the
Army National Guard is projected to have provided roughly 53\% of the total number of
Brigade Combat Teams, the Army’s premiere platform, to the warfight.\textsuperscript{50} At its high mark,
the ARNG had nearly 14,000 soldiers deployed to Afghanistan alone.\textsuperscript{51} The Department of
Defense and the Army clearly recognize the necessity of a strong combat reserve, and have
codified the arrangement in a variety of policies over the years, most recently in the Army
Total Force Policy, which is clear on the necessity of utilizing large numbers of ARNG and
AR forces in combat operations as a means of ensuring a robust national dialogue regarding
the necessity of the conflict.\textsuperscript{52}

Clearly then, this longstanding arrangement cannot be abandoned in favor of a
bifurcated system that leaves major combat operations to the active Army alone and the
ARNG and AR on the fringes. Doing so would require a wholesale reshuffling of personnel
and equipment, leave an untenable number of Brigade Combat Teams available for CCMD
employment in future conflicts, and negate several centuries of lessons learned regarding the
necessity of maintaining operational depth of combat power in the ARNG. Fortunately, the
recommended employment of the ARNG as the force of choice for Phases 0 & I will in no
way bring about such a scenario.

\textsuperscript{49} United States National Guard, “2015 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement”, accessed 12 April 2015,
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
Taking as a hypothetical example the current security challenges posed by the militant group Boko Haram in Nigeria, one can clearly understand the ability of the ARNG to provide appropriate forces at the appropriate time to support AFRICOM objectives. Nigeria, considered for a time to be an example of relative stability in West Africa, was overwhelmed beginning in around 2013 by the increasingly brazen and violent aggressiveness of Boko Haram in conducting kidnappings, murders, and other forms of violence.\textsuperscript{53} Current estimates place Boko Haram’s victims at more than 5,000 killed with another 300,000 displaced.\textsuperscript{54} In many ways a country divided along religious and cultural lines, Nigeria was ripe for exploitation by Boko Haram leaders seeking to widen seams and impose an Islamic governing system.\textsuperscript{55}

Due to a host of political and diplomatic factors, the United States military has thus far played a limited role in countering the threat, despite its energy partnership with Nigeria and the transnational ambitions of Boko Haram on the African continent.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, the following scenario is based on a hypothetical series of escalations and accompanying force employment decisions made by the President of the United States, his National Security Council, the Governor of California, and the AFRICOM commander. All of the notional support to the GCC is in line with desires expressed in publicly available documents identifying the command’s lines of effort, such as the 2015 AFRICOM Posture Statement. For the purposes of this illustration, Phase 0 should be considered in effect beginning in 2006, the actual first year of the California-Nigeria SPP initiative.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} National Guard J-5, “State Partnership Program” (PowerPoint presentation, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, VA, March 2014).
In Phase 0, Nigeria and its SPP partner, California, would work together to develop the most appropriate mix of ARNG capabilities in order to achieve security stasis and aid in the professionalization of Nigerian security forces. In this phase, forces of the CA ARNG, particularly its 79th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, would be considered the “main effort” on the ground.

In Phase I, the CA ARNG would continue to bolster the capability of Nigerian forces, while setting the conditions to deter aggression by hostile actors. Particular focus would be paid to developing the operational functions of the host nation, specifically its C2, logistics, and intelligence capabilities.\(^{59}\)

ARNG and AC forces would conduct a handoff in Phase II, in which the AC would become the main effort, and assume responsibility for meeting adversary aggression with rapid displays of combat power.\(^{60}\) Of note, one source of potential synergy


exists in this phase with the Army’s Total Force Partnership Program (TFPP), which pairs ARNG BCTs with AC BCTs, meaning that rotational planners could plan to relieve the 79\textsuperscript{th} IBCT with their associated TFPP partner BCT.\textsuperscript{61}

- In Phases III-IV, AC forces, maintained at a high level of combat readiness, and having focused its training for major combat operations, would constitute the tip of the spear for decisive action against Boko Haram, with the ARNG then able to utilize the operational factor of time to muster its forces to sufficient readiness to provide rotational depth. This arrangement is enabled by the focusing of efforts by the ARNG on initial entry, and the AC on higher order conflict.

- Phase V would consist of a range of tasks by the AC, and later the ARNG, focused on enhancing the viability of local authority. A drawdown of AC forces and concurrent handoff to the ARNG would enable transition back to Phase 0, with tailored CA ARNG forces, driven by host nation need and enabled by CAS, helping to overcome the obstacles associated with instilling good governance.

**ALTERNATIVE POINTS OF VIEW**

Despite the arguable compatibility of the ARNG as the force of choice for CCDRs seeking to achieve the effects of shaping and deterrence, some reservations do exist. The salient viewpoint posits that the AC must remain engaged globally as the wartime requirements for its services decline, a notion most notably put forward under the auspices of RAF. Supporters of this viewpoint feel that an Army without a global role to play between conflicts is doomed to become irrelevant and undersized, as its utility to the joint force becomes less obvious.\textsuperscript{62} Even more troublingly, a languishing and undersized active Army could invite aggressiveness by state actors seeking to push boundaries and expand influence.\textsuperscript{63} The answer, then, is to ensure the AC retains a global presence that hedges


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
against aggression, with a commensurate level of resourcing that ensures it will be ready for a range of potential scenarios from major combat operations to security cooperation.\textsuperscript{64}

Additional support for the notion that the AC should be involved in Phases 0 and I comes from the Army’s own doctrine, which at various places makes the case that in order to “win in a complex world”, “Army special operations forces and regionally aligned conventional forces engage in a broad range of theater security cooperation activities including security force assistance.”\textsuperscript{65} Further rationale for a sustained AC presence abroad is predicated on the value of enduring relationships in these theaters, with a “global land network of relationships resulting in early warning, indigenous solutions, and informed campaigns.”\textsuperscript{66} The combined effect, in the view of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), is an Army less like the flat footed force of 2003 in Iraq that struggled to inculcate cultural understanding, create localized solutions to military and non-military problems, and produce a swift and enduring peace.\textsuperscript{67} Undoubtedly, these outcomes are demonstrably important for future Army formations and their supported GCCs alike.

\textbf{WHY THE GUARD IS INDEED BETTER SUITED: CLOSING OBSERVATIONS}

In the hypothetical example of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the balance of the operational factors of time, space, and force is most efficiently achieved by allowing ARNG forces to operate over a longer duration of time in Nigeria, while enhancing the combat power of the remainder of the AC force by allowing it to prepare for future decisive combat operations.\textsuperscript{68} The unappealing alternative is to have AC and ARNG forces duplicate efforts via RAF and

\textsuperscript{64}Chief of Staff of the Army, \textit{Unified Land Operations}, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), 1.
\textsuperscript{65}Chief of Staff of the Army, \textit{The U.S. Army Operating Concept}, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 October 2014), 17.
\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67}Ibid.
SPP while simultaneously attempting to maintain currency in major combat operations, a suboptimal utilization of limited resources on both sides. This scenario also constitutes a defocusing of effort within the organizations on their respective areas of expertise. This could result in an undue strain on an AC organization already toiling under the weight of a significant drawdown, a factor seemingly ignored by TRADOC’s ambitious and widespread agenda for the future active force.

At the individual level, the pursuit of a broader AC role in shaping and deterrence makes less sense still. As one AC officer observed, for AC leaders this can mean balancing “war fighting skills with new roles as an ambassador, government advisor, economic advisor, basic service provider, and cultural expert”, a suboptimal arrangement for an active Army suffering declining resources with which to prepare its leaders for a host of complex trades. For ARNG personnel on the other hand, these “new roles” are anything but. In fact, the host of CAS competencies resident in the force means that little, if any additional training would be required to purposefully reorient ARNG soldiers to the demands of Phase 0 and Phase I operations. Put another way, why invest the resources to make a full-time AC soldier a part-time diplomat when you have something like the inverse already on the payroll?

An additional benefit of the purposeful refocusing of the ARNG and AC on their respective operational phases is that the infrastructure with which to do so already exists. The SPP is a good starting point, but should be expanded to facilitate more interactions between partners beyond what a mere $14 million can accommodate annually. It should also be broadened in suitable cases to the more holistic incarnation that has been embraced between Iowa and Kosovo, an arrangement that seemingly threads the long searched for

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needle between the worlds of the Departments of State and Defense by avoiding longstanding cultural barriers like hazard aversion within the State Department, or Defense’s traditional desire to maintain an impermanent presence abroad.\footnote{Bryan Groves, \textit{Risk Culture Similarities \& Differences Between State and DoD}, Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012), 61-62.}

For the active component, its widely acknowledged predilection toward combined arms maneuver over security cooperation can now be accommodated by reducing Mission Essential Task List (METL) training for overburdened BCT commanders, while affording them more opportunities to conduct Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations via the resources saved by eliminating RAF. Noted retired Army colonel and author Dr. Gian Gentile would no doubt embrace a return to the more traditional role of the AC, given his expressed desire to once again “focus on our core function—which is to kill the enemies of the United States of America through all arms and joint operations.”\footnote{Bing West, “Learning from Our Wrong Turn,” \textit{National Review}, 21 August 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/356323/learning-our-wrong-turn-bing-west.} In that spirit, it is time to go a step further and let both the AC and the ARNG capitalize upon their respective strengths in the joint operating environment. By doing so, the risk of trying to do everything at once and failing can be substantially reduced.
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