NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE INTEGRATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM INTO THE DNA OF AMERICAN POLICING

by

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The central theme of this thesis is how local law enforcement (LE) can integrate counterterrorism (CT) into its traditional mission. The basis of this research is that local LE is well positioned to be significant contributors and can use its existing strengths in a CT role to enhance homeland security (HS). In the 13 years since September 11, 2001, it is unknown to what extent CT has been fully embraced by local LE. This question is not easy to answer, as it is not easily quantifiable; this level of LE comprises nearly 18,000 individual agencies. This thesis asserts that doing nothing is unacceptable and argues that integration is an important part of securing the homeland. This thesis proposes the development of a conceptual prescriptive model known as L.E.A.D, leadership, education and training, actively gather intelligence and detect terrorists. L.E.A.D asserts that HS starts with hometown security, which begins by individual local LE agencies leading the way toward the integration of CT into their existing missions.
The central theme of this thesis is how local law enforcement (LE) can integrate counterterrorism (CT) into its traditional mission. The basis of this research is that local LE is well positioned to be significant contributors and can use its existing strengths in a CT role to enhance homeland security (HS). In the 13 years since September 11, 2001, it is unknown to what extent CT has been fully embraced by local LE. This question is not easy to answer, as it is not easily quantifiable; this level of LE comprises nearly 18,000 individual agencies. This thesis asserts that doing nothing is unacceptable and argues that integration is an important part of securing the homeland. This thesis proposes the development of a conceptual prescriptive model known as L.E.A.D, leadership, education and training, actively gather intelligence, and detect terrorists. L.E.A.D asserts that HS starts with hometown security, which begins by individual local LE agencies leading the way toward the integration of CT into their existing missions.
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<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>September 11, 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>al Qaeda</td>
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<td>AQAM</td>
<td>al Qaeda and Allied Movements</td>
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<td>AQAP</td>
<td>al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>BCOT</td>
<td>Building Communities of Trust</td>
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<td>CHDS</td>
<td>Center for Homeland Defense and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>critical operational capabilities</td>
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<td>COMPSTAT</td>
<td>compare stats</td>
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<td>CONTEST</td>
<td>counterterrorism strategy</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>community policing</td>
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<td>CSG/EKU</td>
<td>Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DNA</td>
<td>deoxyribonucleic acid</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DUI</td>
<td>driving under the influence</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordinance disposal</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FBI-JTTF</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation—Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FLETC</td>
<td>Federal Law Enforcement Training Center</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
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<td>HSPI</td>
<td>Homeland Security Policy Institute</td>
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<td>IACP</td>
<td>International Association of Chiefs of Police</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>ILP</td>
<td>intelligence led policing</td>
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<td>IQ</td>
<td>intelligence quotient</td>
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<td>IRTPA</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>K9</td>
<td>canine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Los Angeles Police Department</td>
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<td>LE</td>
<td>law enforcement</td>
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<td>L.E.A.D.</td>
<td>leadership, education &amp; training, actively collect, detect</td>
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<td>LEMAS</td>
<td>law enforcement management and administrative statistics</td>
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<td>NIPP</td>
<td>National Infrastructure Protection Plan</td>
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<td>NSI</td>
<td>National SAR Initiative</td>
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<td>NYPD</td>
<td>New York Police Department</td>
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<td>PRSBI</td>
<td>prevention and response to suicide bombing incidents</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>suspicious activity report</td>
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<td>SLATT</td>
<td>State and Local Law Enforcement Anti-Terrorism Training Program</td>
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<td>SLTT</td>
<td>state, local, tribal, and territorial</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>Special Weapons And Tactics Team</td>
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<td>TLO</td>
<td>terrorism liaison officer</td>
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<td>TRIPwire</td>
<td>technical resource for incident prevention</td>
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<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the 13 years since 9/11, it is unknown to what extent counterterrorism (CT) has been fully embraced by local law enforcement (LE). This question is not easy to answer, as it is not easily quantifiable; this level of LE is comprised of nearly 18,000 individual agencies, and the CT mission manifests itself differently from agency to agency.

According to Jack K. Riley et al., in Think Locally: Act Nationally, “Virtually everyone agrees that the U.S. war on terrorism should involve local and state agencies. Nonetheless, to date, such efforts have been spotty, incomplete, and devoid of a coordinated national strategy.”¹ Key to the effort of thwarting terror plots is the more than 17,000 state and local LE agencies that collectively represent terrorism’s “first-line preventers.” Despite the vast size of this network, and the growing recognition of their importance in the CT process, state and local resources are still commonly underutilized.

This thesis seeks to determine how local LE can integrate CT into its traditional mission. The core of this research is that local LE is well positioned to be significant contributors and can use their existing strengths in a CT role to enhance homeland security (HS).

L.E.A.D. MODEL

The L.E.A.D. model is characterized by the following acronym.

L—LEAD
E—EDUCATE & TRAIN
A—ACTIVELY COLLECT INTELLIGENCE
D—DETECT TERRORISTS

Lead (L): This thesis asserts that HS does start with hometown security, and begins by individual local LE agencies leading the way toward the integration of CT into their missions, which begins with an understanding of the threat. Local LE leaders must

educate themselves on the threat of terror from homegrown and international entities. Only then will they begin to understand the ideologies, tactics, and methods of those who would seek to do harm in their communities. The next step is to develop viable relationships with a regional fusion center and a Federal Bureau of Investigation—Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI-JTTF) to foster two-way information sharing. Thirdly, explore federal grant funding opportunities to facilitate CT activity. Once terrorism is understood, an agency must acknowledge that the threat exists and incorporate this possibility into its strategic plan.

**Education & Training (E):** This topic starts with a holistic approach of raising the terrorism intelligence quotient (IQ) within each individual locality that includes local LE, other local government agencies, citizens, elected officials, and the private sector. Local LE can lead this effort by first educating and training themselves and then developing training programs that target the aforementioned groups. Local training can be accomplished through participation in “no cost” Department of Homeland Security (DHS) training programs available on-line, “in house,” or off site, such as the State and Local Law Enforcement Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT) by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). A start for local LE in this direction is to identify and develop an “in house” subject matter expert (SME) through the aforementioned training opportunity. These individuals can provide CT instruction to department personnel at all levels and liaise with state and federal partners on issues related to HS. An important aspect of this role is that it can be performed in duality with existing duties, much like a field training officer or firearms instructor; it does not disrupt core service, but does provide an agency-based SME to coordinate CT activity.

In the protection of local communities, local LE cannot be the only contributor or entity engaged in CT. This thesis asserts that LE should be the catalyst for CT locally, but that a holistic approach is needed to include the training and education of other government agencies, elected officials, the community, and the private sector to assist in CT. This approach ties into the third component of L.E.A.D., the active gathering of intelligence from local communities related to terrorism.
Actively Gather Intelligence (A): Local LE is already heavily engaged in intelligence gathering related to traditional criminal activity; once a department’s personnel have been trained and educated on terrorism, all that is needed is the “how” and “who” to share information related to terrorism. Engagement in suspicious activity reports (SAR) is a “no brainer” for local LE. Once command and field personnel have been initially trained, SARs can be quickly integrated into existing policing efforts. This thesis asserts that terrorism-related information is different from traditional criminal information, in that such information may have national or international implications, and therefore, it is of vital importance to share terrorism-related information in a timely and standardized manner with local FBI-JTTF and state fusion centers. National SAR Initiative (NSI) documents found within this thesis provide detailed guidelines for the implementation of SAR at the local level.

Local LE officers have numerous opportunities during the performance of their duties to gather intelligence related to terrorism. It is assumed that local police conduct daily debriefs of arrestees, suspicious persons, confidential sources, and concerned citizens on a host of issues related to traditional criminal activity. Thus, an opportunity exists for CT integration, with minimal disruption of existing practices. In an effort to detect and mitigate terrorist activity, local LE questioning and consensual contact can slightly shift to include inquiries also related to extremism and radicalization. A significant factor in successfully thwarting an attack is to develop information and identify the perpetrators pre-attack, as terrorists operate in the shadows and do not operate overtly. The final element of L.E.A.D. is the goal of the first three components, the detection of terrorists who may be planning or hiding within a local community.

Detect (D): Jonathan White states that the task facing American police is not so much the incorporation of new tactics or technologies, but the establishment of a CT mindset in everyday LE operations. No community in America can remain 100% immune from violence or terror, but local LE is duty bound to use all the tools and resources available, to protect, lead, and educate their citizenry in respect to terrorism. It is the view of this thesis that a failure to engage in CT at the local LE level, not only
creates a significant gap for overall United States (U.S.) HS, but is also a negligence of duty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The L.E.A.D model provides a simple and flexible model designed to assist any local LE entity to evolve from zero or little engagement in CT, to a comprehensive integration that becomes part of an agency’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). It is a progressive model reliant on following the steps in sequential order, but is based upon a low-tech, easy-to-develop and low-cost application that can be expanded into Anytown, USA.

It is recommended that local LE agencies without a CT strategy consider L.E.A.D as an alternative to doing nothing. Local departments need only to envision themselves post-attack, and ask why they did not integrate CT into their policing strategies, when they may have had the opportunity to make a difference and save lives.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank Dr. Lauren Wolman and Patrick E. Miller for their patience, support, and assistance in guiding me through this project. Their insight and dedication toward my success were an invaluable resource.

My entire experience at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), master’s program has been outstanding, due to the exceptional level of instruction and interaction from faculty and staff, which made this program a “life changing” and extremely worthwhile endeavor. In addition, the friendships developed in Cohorts 1303/1304 through our “pain and suffering” of this thesis project and CHDS are relationships that will be long lasting.

Secondly, I would like to thank and recognize Richmond Police Department Deputy Chief John Buturla, who brought this program to my attention, recommended me, and supported me through the end, as did many members of the Richmond Police Department.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, daughter, and son, who went above and beyond in their support, patience, and help, in working to get me through this project over the past 18 months. They each made many sacrifices throughout, but were always available to encourage and keep me going!
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM SPACE

“Virtually everyone agrees that the U.S. war on terrorism should involve local and state agencies. Nonetheless, to date, such efforts have been spotty, incomplete, and devoid of a coordinated national strategy.”1 Key to the effort of thwarting terror plots are the more than 17,000 state and local law enforcement (LE) agencies that collectively represent terrorism’s “first-line preventers.”2 Despite the vast size of this network, and the growing recognition of their importance in the counterterrorism (CT) process, state and local resources are still commonly underutilized. While regional and state fusion centers have helped promote partnerships and information sharing, considerable challenges remain.3

The aforementioned points to this thesis’ main research questions of how local LE can integrate CT into their traditional policing mission, and what are the key components of integration? What existing strategies or tools can be applied by local LE to enhance the synergy of these two activities? Do simple, low-cost strategies that complement rather than disrupt traditional crime fighting duties exist; and can they be used by Anytown, USA in the protection of their locality and the enhancement of overall national homeland security (HS)?

Academic studies reviewed for this thesis that assessed the role of local LE in CT, reveal that in many instances, locals do not prioritize CT, and in fact, dedicate limited resources to this area. A distinction can also be drawn between larger departments, which have more manpower, resources, and threat potential, and smaller agencies with limited resources and a reduced threat of attack, as contributors to a lack of involvement in CT.

3 Ibid.
Michael Andreas examined issues impacting LE integration and CT in his 2008 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, in which he asserts that many municipal police chiefs accept the status quo and create an atmosphere in which long-standing practices and methodologies are memorialized. In some cases, Andreas notes, local agencies are hampered by complacency and a “business as usual” mentality: “Police leaders do not fully comprehend the threat of terrorism or the significant positions their agencies can occupy in America’s homeland security strategy. They continue to go about their daily lives, concentrating on traditional crime, as if they and their communities are uniquely immune from terrorists and their lethal schemes.” This mentality is a significant impediment to CT integration, as a failure to acknowledge, understand and recognize the threat of terrorism can represent a major impediment toward an agency’s decision to incorporate CT into their existing mission.

This thesis argues that regardless of size, populous, or perceived threat, all agencies at the local level have the capability and an obligation, as public safety entities, to contribute in a CT role. The integration of policing and CT is not directed at the idea of local LE taking the lead on terror investigations, but rather the infusion of CT into the policing continuum or mindset. A relevant example can be found within the routine policing response to the crimes of burglary or robbery, which are commonplace, and for which training and operating procedures are standardized. At present, a consistent approach by local LE toward crimes of terror that are potentially being plotted within their jurisdictions does not exist.

Traditionally, local LE has concerned itself primarily with preventing and solving crimes, such as burglary, theft, and robbery; crimes that have an immediate and visible impact on the local community and affect citizens quality of life. In the face of unknown future terrorist threats, however, local LE organizations will have to adapt existing policing strategies to fulfill the requirement of HS. The U.S. National Strategy for

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5 Ibid.
Homeland Security defines HS as, “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”

On April 15, 2013, the Boston Marathon bombings signified the unfortunate and horrific reality that terrorism can strike anywhere and at anytime within the United States (U.S.) homeland. In August 2014, federal authorities urged LE across the country to be alert for possible attacks inside the United States in retaliation for U.S. airstrikes against the Islamic group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In a joint bulletin issued to local, state and federal LE, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI said that while they were “unaware of any specific, credible threats against the Homeland,” they could rule out attacks in the United States from sympathizers radicalized by the group’s online propaganda. These examples reaffirm the significance of a committed effort by local LE to leverage their existing strengths in traditional crime fighting toward an engagement in CT.

Local LE stands in a unique position to be contributors to HS by combining their existing duties toward a role in CT, which is defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual as, “Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” Although domestic LE efforts stand in stark contrast to military operations, the LE approach to CT is to incapacitate terrorists via the legal system with minimal force, and to involve criminal investigation and due process.

The local level of LE provides 24/7 policing service to their communities and is comprised of nearly 18,000 individual agencies spread across the nation. The primary

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policing philosophy employed today is community policing (CP). CP is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to address proactively the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues, such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.12

Stanley Supinski, director of Partnership Programs at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), says, “Research is clearly showing that implementing community oriented policing strategies and tactics can assist law enforcement agencies with preventing both crime and terrorism.”13 A strategy that combines local LE and community networks with existing crime fighting efforts seemingly makes sense, as both are aimed at targeting those who seek to commit violence within society.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The basis of this research is that local LE is well positioned to be significant contributors in the HS enterprise; experts, government leaders, and entities from within the HS community, who assert that CT should be part of the local LE continuum, reaffirm this point. Locals possess strong attributes, such as proximity to the public, existing community networks, and intelligence collection capabilities that could all be beneficial to a role in CT.

This thesis seeks to examine how local LE can local fully integrate CT at the leadership, education and training, and intelligence levels, and proposes a conceptual model of local LE and CT integration.


C. HYPOTHESES

Although it is clear that a gap of engagement in CT at the local level exists, it is partly attributable to prioritization, competition with traditional crime, confusion, apathy, and resistance, along with numerous other impediments to doing it.

This thesis asserts that doing nothing is an unacceptable condition and argues that LE and CT integration is imperative to securing the homeland and must become part of local LE’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). In the protection of their communities, the threat of terrorism cannot be ignored by local LE or shouldered by only two levels of government. This thesis proposes the development of a conceptual prescriptive model demonstrating how LE and CT can be integrated in Anytown, USA within their traditional mission. Considering that the average size of an American police department is 42 sworn officers, the development of an all-encompassing model to integrate LE and CT would need to be applied in an environment of minimal resources, limited technological augmentation, and minimal disruption of traditional LE duties to accommodate any size department.14

Through a review of scholarly articles, academic research, government publications, and smart practices related to local LE and CT this thesis seeks to build a conceptual model centered on three topical areas that transect local LE and CT. These topics were selected based upon the importance of each, in relation to the subject of this thesis: “The integration of counterterrorism into the DNA of American policing.”

The first topical area is leadership, which was identified due to its significance as the catalyst for change or transformation of an organization at the strategic level. In the application of a new or different activity, direction and buy-in from organizational leadership is an essential component of development. Secondly, in the implementation of a new idea, concept, or strategy, education and training is a fundamental component of the process. Its significance is rooted in providing an initial foundation of knowledge for new, veteran, and specialized officers in the area of CT, as well as a continual platform to

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educate on evolving issues related to the field of terrorism. The third area, intelligence
gathering, was identified because it is an existing core competency of local LE. Based
upon local LE’s existing collection capacity, proximity to the citizenry, and existing
networks, local LE can make a significant contribution to the HS spectrum in this area.

D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

In assessing the integration of local LE and CT, research has determined that
strategies and practices vary, as they are spread across the thousands of individual
agencies that comprise this level. Local engagement ranges from zero involvement in CT
to the examples of two of the largest police departments in the country that are leading
the way in local CT efforts. The New York Police Department (NYPD) deploys its own
informants, undercover terror-busters, and a small army of analysts; a preventive
approach that former Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly calls the most effective way
for police departments, small or large, to fight terrorism.15 The Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) agrees, and states that a key way to crush incipient terrorist cells and
thwart terrorism is to use local laws and follow locally generated leads, which is what
good police departments do best. Relying on this low-key approach, the LAPD has
arrested some 200 American citizens and foreigners with suspected ties to terrorist groups
since September 11, 2001 (9/11).16

Understandably, most local agencies cannot replicate the efforts of the NYPD and
LAPD, nor should they, but this thesis asserts that doing nothing is an unacceptable
condition. Local LE is already actively engaged in traditional criminal investigations and
intelligence gathering within their jurisdictions. The United States has approximately
708,022 full-time sworn police officers compared with 11,633 Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) special agents of who only about 2,200 work directly on terrorism.17
This disparity of personnel affords local LE a greater opportunity to develop sources of

15 Judith Miller, “On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism,” City Journal, Summer 2007,
http://www.cjgsu.net/initiatives/on_the_front_line.htm.
16 Ibid.
information or have contact with suspicious persons, as locals have a much greater presence on the streets throughout the country.

Some in the LE community have made the assertion that CT should be an integral part of the local policing continuum. Two such advocates for the greater involvement of police in preventing terrorism are renowned criminologist George L. Kelling, and NYPD Commissioner William J. Bratton, an expert on modern day policing. They state, “Counter-terrorism has to be woven into the everyday workings of every department. It should be included on the agenda of every meeting, and this new role must be imparted to officers on the street so that terrorism prevention becomes part of their everyday thinking.”18 This integration has not consistently occurred throughout the local LE environment, especially in smaller agencies. This lack of integration is attributable to a variety of factors impacting local CT. These factors include an unclear need for doing it, especially in communities with few known terrorist agents or events, the costs of doing it, especially in the face of shrinking budgets, and unclear ways of doing it in a manner that does not disrupt core LE services or damage community relations.

This thesis responds to those questions, concerns, and challenges by asking what an ideal model for local LE and CT integration might look like, based upon the examination of three core components of the traditional policing mission: leadership, education and training, and intelligence gathering. Essentially, integration will be outlined as a local agency incorporating CT as a core competency of its policing duties, similarly, to how traditional methods are used in relation to issues, such as robbery, burglary, and traffic accidents that are part of an agency’s standard operating procedures (DNA). The integration of CT and policing would be exhibited by an agency’s inclusion of CT into its policing mission and involve the following three topical areas that intersect with CT and policing.

- **Leadership**—defined by the prioritization of CT by executive leadership and expressed in policies and procedures

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• **Training/Education**—inclusion in department education at the basic, in-service and specialized levels, to include other government, community, and private sector entities

• **Intelligence Gathering**—policies and procedures for collection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence related to HS

This research looks to identify factors within each of the above components that influence integration in seeking to develop a prescriptive model based upon the identification of smart practices that can be utilized by all local LE executives to work toward integrating CT into their traditional LE mission.

### E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

A continual theme of this thesis is that CT application can be integrated as another layer in the overall operations of a local LE agency. Just as strategies for combating traditional threats are applied to the policing mission, CT does not have to “drive the policing train,” but based on the continual threat, in the protection of local communities, terrorism should be one of the cars in the train.

The development of a conceptual model to integrate local LE and CT serves as a starting point or enhancement for locals to think, train, and gather intelligence within their communities related to terrorism, in an overall effort to foster improved national HS. It is not the intention of this thesis to develop a “one size fits all” model, as it is not practical for the thousands of agencies that comprise this level and vary in size, geography, and population. Eugene Bardach states that smart practices are internally complex and content-sensitive,\(^\text{19}\) and that it should be left to local implementers to figure out the details of the generic practice that makes sense in their own context.\(^\text{20}\) Allowing for the local adaptation of nonessential features not only serves common sense but also encourages greater buy-in by the locals in that it is being imported from the outside.\(^\text{21}\) A CT integration model could be personalized to the needs, resources, and threats of

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\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
individual localities and is intended to be simple, flexible, and broad in scope to foster acceptance and facilitation.

F. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH

Perceptions of the current terrorist threat have changed over the past decade. In the immediate shadow of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, intelligence efforts focused on preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack from abroad. There was also concern that al Qaeda sleeper cells might already be present in the United States. They turned out not to exist; there was no jihadist underground in place, although al Qaeda has inspired a number of local terrorist plots since 9/11.22

As the threat of terrorism progresses, LE has an opportunity to impact their locality positively. By having superior knowledge of their specific patrol jurisdictions, they can work as the eyes and ears of U.S. CT efforts and are much more likely to come across a terrorism suspect than a federal LE agent simply due to the law of probability.23 This knowledge is seemingly a strong attribute, as one of the most significant reasons why local police departments can and should play a vital role in American CT efforts is the size of their collection resources, which dwarf those of the federal government. Although policymakers, the news media, and general public continue to conceptualize terrorism and CT as an activity best addressed by national resources, the potential personnel and material resources of local and state LE far exceed those of Washington.24 The failure to apply the strengths of local policing in a CT role may create an opening that results in deadly local consequences, such as a successful terrorist attack in an American community.


G. THESIS OVERVIEW

The structure of this thesis is designed to start out by providing the reader in Chapter I with an understanding of the problem and its significance. This section is followed by research questions, and a thesis overview of the topical areas to be examined.

Chapter II is a review of literature related to the threat of terrorism, CT and policing, and the topical areas of leadership, education and training and intelligence gathering.

The intent of Chapter III is to describe the current threat and implications for local LE related to terrorism, which is followed by a detailed examination of post-9/11 policing that outlines the benefits and issues related to local LE implementation of a CT strategy.

Chapters IV–VI are centered on the three core competencies for local integration of CT and LE. In Chapter IV, local LE leadership is the focal point with an emphasis on local ownership, organizational culture, and obstacles related to the integration of CT and LE. Chapter V is concentrated on training and education for local LE at numerous levels and how it impacts the integration of CT into the traditional policing mission. Chapter VI examines the intelligence-gathering component of CT at the local level and is divided into numerous sub-chapters that explore local efforts, suspicious activity reports (SAR) and intelligence led policing (ILP).

The final chapter, Chapter VII, provides a conceptual prescriptive model known as L.E.A.D., or leadership, education and training, actively collect, detect, to assist Anytown, USA with a simple and flexible strategy to apply CT into their existing policing mission. This model uses elements of the aforementioned core competencies, leadership, education, and intelligence gathering for local LE and CT integration. L.E.A.D is based on the research and resources available to local LE and smart practices that may be applicable.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review includes the following areas of focus: (1) government documents outlining the present day threat of terror to the U.S. homeland, (2) academic research and studies related to the existing conditions of CT and policing, (3) literature promoting the importance of executive leadership toward the integration of CT and policing and known obstacles, (4) research and government documents that relate to the state of training and education for local police in the area of CT, and (5) academic studies, reports, and government guides that assess and provide guidance on the intelligence gathering efforts of local police in CT.

A. THREAT

In the application of CT by local LE, an understanding of the threat is an essential element in the integration of this activity. Bruce Hoffman, author of *Inside Terrorism*, is one of the world’s foremost experts on terrorism; his book has remained a seminal work for understanding the historical evolution of terrorism and the terrorist mindset.25 Hoffman states, “It is useful to distinguish terrorists from ordinary criminals. Like terrorists, criminals use violence as a means to attain a specific end. However, while the violent act itself may be similar, the purpose or motivation clearly is different. The criminal is not concerned with influencing or affecting public opinion.”26

The threat of terrorism is rooted in two sources, foreign-based threats, and domestic or homegrown threats. The National Counterterrorism Center’s *2011 Report on Terrorism* outlines the global threat of terror, which documents that over 10,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2011 that affected nearly 45,000 victims in 70 countries and resulted in over 12,500 deaths.27 With respect to the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil, Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman state,

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26 Ibid., 36.
Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack.28

They describe the complexity of the threat this way:

A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated.29

Local LE must recognize that terrorist activity is not exclusive to “Jihadists.” An analysis of thwarted terrorist plots between 1999–2009 by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions reports that Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM) and AQAM inspired plots were responsible for a plurality of attacks in their study (40 out of 86). White supremacist and militia/anti-government groups were also responsible for a significant number of attacks (20 and 12 plots, respectively).30 A 2013 Congressional Research Service report specifically focused on the domestic threat of terror and revealed that while plots and attacks by foreign-inspired homegrown violent jihadists have certainly earned more media attention, domestic terrorists have been busy, and noted that in terms of casualties on U.S. soil, Oklahoma City is second only to the events of 9/11.31

It is important to recognize that a terrorist organization does not need to be physically within U.S. borders. Evidence of al Qaeda’s (AQ’s) efforts to inspire acts of terror can clearly be found in the online magazine named Inspire, which is published by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). American investigators concurred that after

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29 Ibid.
the Boston Marathon attack, the Tsarnaev brothers were careful and obedient readers of *Inspire*.\(^{32}\) They have also become the poster boys for the new breed of grassroots and “lone wolf” jihadists who are changing the nature of terrorism. In recent years, as it has become more and more difficult for Al Qaeda’s dwindling leadership to plan and execute the kinds of grand attacks that made it famous, the group has focused on radicalizing would-be terrorists who live in North America and Europe and have no formal ties to known organizations through this digital publication.\(^{33}\)

More recent literature depicts a different view of the threat posed by Islamic extremists to the U.S. homeland. In 2014, RAND National Defense Research Institute published “A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists” by Seth G. Jones. This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West.\(^{34}\) Some argue that al Qa’ida, especially core al Qa’ida, has been severely weakened, and a major threat to the United States from Salafi-jihadist and other terrorist groups no longer exists. Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Marc Sageman concludes, “al Qaeda is no longer seen as an existential threat to the West” and “the hysteria over a global conspiracy against the West has faded.”\(^{35}\) Brian Jenkins argues that few of America’s jihadists were dedicated or competent terrorists, and resembled “stray dogs” rather than “lone wolves.”\(^{36}\) According to Jenkins, of the 32 jihadists terrorist plots uncovered since 9/11, most never moved beyond the discussion stage. Only 10 had what could be described as an operational plan, and of these, six were FBI stings. By comparison, the United States saw an average of 50 to 60 terrorist bombings a year in the 1970s and a greater number of fatalities. Some contend that the most acute threat to the United States


\(^{33}\) Ibid.


\(^{35}\) Ibid.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
comes from homegrown terrorists. Still others maintain that al Qaeda is resilient and remains a serious threat to the United States.\textsuperscript{37}

Some of the concerns related to integrating CT by local LE are rooted in the disparity between terror incidents and traditional acts of violent crime, like murder. According to Charles Kurzman of the Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, 16 Muslim-Americans were indicted for or killed during violent terrorist plots in 2013, similar to the 2012 total of 14, which brings the total since 9/11 to 225, or less than 20 per year. Meanwhile, the United States suffered approximately 14,000 murders in 2013. Since 9/11, Muslim-American terrorism has claimed 37 lives in the United States, out of more than 190,000 murders during this period.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{B. COUNTERTERRORISM AND POLICING}

The literature reviewed in this section provides evidence of an inconsistent and limited approach by local LE in the activity of CT. In written testimony for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution stated, “No police forces in the country except New York’s have created more than skeletal counterterrorism units to integrate their normal police work with counterterrorism efforts.”\textsuperscript{39} This testimony reflects a disparity in local LE integration of CT, and reveals a need for individual local agencies to combine existing crime fighting efforts more effectively with CT.

Further literature supporting a lack of CT engagement by local LE can be found in research conducted by David H. Bayley and David Weisburd in 2009, who studied the role of traditional policing in combating terrorism. Their research details the advantages and disadvantages of police engaging in a CT role; they surmise that despite 9/11,

\textsuperscript{37} Jones, “A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qaeda and Other Salafi Jihadists.”


American police still seem to be searching for their role in CT. Their research revealed the following factors that influence a police agency’s participation in CT:

- **Local Incidents of Terrorism**: Since terrorist violence is frightening and traumatic, it requires a visible response from government, the police, and other emergency services.

- **The Structure of a Police Organization**: The higher the governmental level at which police are organized, the more likely it is that preventive CT will be undertaken. An American study found that 75% of state LE agencies had specialized CT units versus only 15% at local levels.

- **The Size of the Police Unit**: Specialization of function can only occur in organizations of scale.

This condition is further examined in *Policing Terrorism*, in which Max Waxman states, as to the issue of specialized expertise and local knowledge, a common mantra since 9/11 has been that local police are the “eyes and ears” or “front line” of the domestic war against terrorism. However, a dearth of systematic study of the effectiveness of state and local counter-terrorism programs remains.

An academic study conducted by Cynthia Lum, Maria (Maki) Haberfeld, George Fachner, and Charles Lieberman sought to answer the question, “What are police doing to counter terrorism?” The study concluded with one major lesson emerging. Despite the proliferation of and spending on police CT efforts, very little is known about the nature and effectiveness of police CT strategies. Their study examined three existing studies that surveyed multiple LE agencies about their CT activities to gain a general understanding of the tendencies of LE efforts.

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41 Ibid., 88.
42 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 103.
The first one, *The RAND Studies on State and Local Law Enforcement Preparedness*, conducted a survey of local and state LE CT preparedness after 9/11, but prior to the creation of the DHS. RAND questioned hundreds of U.S. law LE agencies about their CT response to solicit information on resource allocation, threat perceptions, vulnerabilities, and preparedness activities. The RAND study revealed that “counterterrorism” in the United States often involves more long run and strategic planning activities that could be interpreted as somewhat general, ambiguous, and vague. Differences also exist in the capacity for, interest in, and engagement of these activities by state and local jurisdictions, which indicate how different types of jurisdictions view their CT roles and responsibilities in relation to the broader LE community.

A second source for understanding police responses to terrorism is a study conducted by *The Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University (CSG/EKU)*. The aim of this study was to gauge how the terrorist attacks of 9/11 affected the operations and organization of LE agencies by probing agencies about their allocation of resources, interagency relationships, interactions with the private sector, and involvement in HS initiatives. Seventy-three statewide LE agencies in the United States (state police, highway patrol, and general investigative bureaus) were surveyed, as well as 400 local police and sheriff agencies. The study indicated that state agencies were more likely to reallocate resources for infrastructure security, special events, intelligence gathering and analysis, and terrorism-related investigations than local or smaller agencies.

The third existing source of knowledge about police CT responses is the most recently published *Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey (LEMAS)*. It was given to a substantial sample of agencies in the United States, including all agencies with 100 or more sworn officers (denoted as “large”) and a representative

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46 Lum et al., “Police Activities to Counter Terrorism: What We Know and What We Need to Know,” 104.

47 Ibid., 105.

48 Ibid., 106.

49 Ibid.
sample of agencies with fewer than 100 officers (“small”). The study revealed that when agencies were asked about their use of personnel to address HS tasks (Figure 1), interestingly, a majority of agencies that participated in the LEMAS simply did not respond to this question (69%), which is reflected in the almost complete non-response (98%) of small agencies. Additionally, for those agencies that did respond, the vast majority indicated that they addressed the problem without creating or using a specialized unit. This response may indicate that even for larger U.S. agencies, CT is not prioritized over other functions that do require specialized resource allocation.

Table 5.1 Personnel allocation for terrorism-related tasks (Question 27t)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total (n = 2,859)</th>
<th>Large (n = 891)</th>
<th>Small (n = 1,968)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized unit with full-time personnel</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated personnel, but no specialized unit with full-time personnel</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addresses the problem but without any dedicated personnel</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not address problem</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response given</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. LEMAS Survey

This thesis does not submit to the idea of additional LE personnel to be tasked with CT as the LEMAS study depicts, but rather, a department-wide approach, so that all personnel are trained in how to detect, interdict, and report terrorist activity. In his book, *Defending the Homeland*, Jonathan R. White of Green Valley State University states that operational training should be focused on patrol and non-specialized investigations, and that patrol officers need to develop abilities to recognize potential terrorist situations during routine field contacts.

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50 Lum et al., “Police Activities to Counter Terrorism: What We Know and What We Need to Know,” 106.

51 Ibid., 107.

A review of the three studies reveals inconsistencies and significantly less involvement by local LE in CT, especially in smaller departments. Overall, these studies provide a foundation for gaining a sense of the tendencies of the American LE response. In particular, most police agencies in the United States do not appear to prioritize CT in their daily work and do not specifically dedicate large amounts of resources or personnel to such activities (strategic or tactical).53

Literature supporting local efforts toward a role in CT can be found in the following two publications related to local engagement. An August 2011 White House report, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, encourages local LE to utilize their existing relationships with members of the community to identify potential extremists and take action on the ground.54 The Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) initiative was published in 2012 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and is designed to help develop trusting relationships by bringing together local LE leaders, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, fusion centers, and community representatives to engage in open dialogue about how these groups can work together to help protect their communities against crime and terrorism.55 These documents promote LE engagement at the “grass roots” level, and seek to leverage the strength of existing community networks to impact HS.

The 2010 RAND report, The Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, addresses some of the issues related to locals participating in CT. The report revealed that LE agencies have found it more and more challenging to make the case, both internally and to local government, that investing in CT and HS is more important than having sworn officers dedicated to routine crime-fighting or other local priorities.56 Agencies that assigned personnel to a dedicated


role in CT and HS in general must compete with other priorities within a department, such as addressing gang crime or violent crime in a region.57

Examples cited by interviewees of the RAND study cited the following issues related to dedicated CT personnel. A department started a terrorism liaison officer program, which required an existing patrol officer position taking from each station to create the new program. However, as noted by an interviewee of that department, from the station captain’s perspective, “What does the terrorism liaison officer do for me? It means I’ve lost an officer in a radio car to this position.” Another interviewee in charge of a CT unit similarly noted, “I’ve heard senior leadership say they don’t know what CT does, what it accomplishes, how it helps them.” In their view, it does not help leadership make the case to local officials about what the department is doing to combat gang crime, for example, or other high-priority types of crime.58

Like most cops, combating terrorism is not one of the daily concerns and understandably so, states Matt Ernst in a 2014, PoliceOne.com article.59 He finds many cops feel that they think only cities like New York City and Los Angeles have to worry about terrorists:60 “While our high-profile cities will always be the popular targets, we need to recognize that terrorists are living all over the U.S. and they can be plotting an attack against a target even while living several states away. Terrorists are mobile and travel the nation’s highways in order to recruit, raise funds, purchase resources, conduct surveillance, and ultimately carry out an attack.”61 LE officers need to focus their training not only on responding to an attack, but also on learning the non-criminal indicators of terrorism. LE is much more likely to encounter these indicators on traffic stops or while handling those everyday calls.62

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
In 2010, the FBI confirmed that 4,876 alleged terrorists had contacts with U.S. LE, usually for reasons not related to terrorism. It has also been estimated that 20,000–30,000 known terrorists on the Terrorist Watch List are in the United States at any given time. Based on Ernst’s research, 36 U.S. states either have been the intended target of a terrorist plot, or have been the location at which terrorists have been arrested, lived, or attended college.

The literature reveals that the integration of CT into the traditional LE mission is not a consistently applied or an accepted practice. At this point, the component of leadership becomes an integral part of a LE transformation. Leadership must serve as the catalyst to effect change and make CT relevant in the local LE environment.

C. LEADERSHIP

Former IACP president Bart Johnson points out that police must have a better understanding that CT is part of their responsibility in preventing and mitigating crime, and that some people try to separate terrorism from LE activity, but terrorism is a crime.

Leadership in its simplest form is essentially an individual’s ability to influence others, and with respect to the integration of a relatively new practice (counterterrorism) into an existing one (traditional policing), leadership is an integral part of the process. Arlington, Texas, Deputy Police Chief Fred Collie writes in his 2006 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “Leaders in law enforcement organizations can provide leadership in the homeland security realm by appropriately and skillfully influencing their members, that they must provide purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to prevent terrorist attacks in their respective communities.”

He argues that local LE has an important role to play in HS, although to fulfill that role effectively, it must be institutionalized in concepts, principles, and practices. Collie’s research reveals that the concept of the

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63 Ernst, “How Local and State Cops Fit in Counterterrorism.”
institutionalization of HS and local LE is in its infancy and has not been a widely accepted practice as of 2006.

Engagement in CT by locals is not mandated or directly funded by another level of government; therefore, it is reliant upon the prioritization level of individual departments. Numerous government publications have been created to stimulate local interaction in CT, which is the intent of the 2008 U.S. DOJ’s, *Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide*. This guide is designed to help police executives meet the new challenges involved in countering the threat of terrorism by summarizing writings on the essential components of a CT plan.  

This comprehensive guide provides an excellent starting point for local LE integration of CT, but falls short in specifically addressing the importance of leadership toward a local role in CT, as engagement must start from the top for it to be taken seriously and foster department-wide implementation.

The importance of local LE leadership in CT as an integral component of an agency’s CT plan cannot be underestimated, as the decision to engage on some level in the first place is essential. In the effective protection of an individual’s locality, police executive leadership must take the threat of terrorism seriously, because ultimately, an agency’s decision to engage in CT must be accepted, supported and implemented by personnel at every level of an organization.

**D. EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

In the evaluation of the integration of CT into the policing mission, a key area to assess is training and education of the topic. Local LE engagement in CT would require a slight modification of mindset and mission, as CT falls outside of the traditional policing model. The significance of education and training related to this topic is discussed further in the following literature.

The foundation of an officer’s knowledge, skill, and ability on terrorism is rooted in training, a point reiterated by Chief Deputy Jose Docobo, who writes about the

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importance of training in the transformation of locals toward HS in the Homeland Security Affairs article, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level.”

A recommendation of a 2010 study conducted by the Institute for Homeland Security, *Solutions Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots*, discusses the importance and opportunity for LE to contribute in terrorist detection. The report states,

> We must ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Nearly one in five thwarted plots were foiled ‘accidentally’ as a result of investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Law enforcement personnel need proper training and the necessary checks and balances within their agencies to ensure that they identify and follow-up on situations where an investigation of an ordinary crime may be potentially terrorism-related.

In an assessment of the topic of terrorism as a core competency for local LE, the primary focus of research conducted by Lieutenant LD Maples’ 2008 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge About the “What and Why” of Terrorism as a State and Local Law Enforcement Competency” was to assess the current state of terrorism training for state and local LE officials. His thesis looked at whether the subject of terrorism is a core professional competency for LE officials in every state and conducted a qualitative analysis to assess course content at the basic training level. He concluded that terrorism-related courses and training are not a required LE certification standard or competency in every state; his research points to a gap in terrorism training at the academy level for at least 40% of states. This percentage represents a substantial

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67 Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level.”
69 LD M. Maples, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the “What and Why” of Terrorism as a State and Local Law Enforcement Competency” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), V.
70 Ibid., 40.
hole in the training of LE. This thesis seeks to develop a model to close or reduce this gap of training on the topic of terrorism.

An idea proposed of how to address training for all local LE is the establishment of a standardized terrorism-training curriculum, which was a key recommendation of Colonel Blair Alexander’s 2005 United States Army War College thesis, “Strategies to Integrate America’s Local Police into Domestic Counterterrorism.” He asserts that a CT training curriculum should be standardized for local agencies at both the recruit and in-service levels through the close coordination of key LE training agencies.71 Brett M. Ringo also sought to standardize these subjects throughout the LE community in the conclusion of his March 2013 Naval Postgraduate thesis, “Domestic Terrorism: Fighting the Local Threat with Local Law Enforcement,” Ringo states that police departments around the country need to develop a universal syllabus that provides efficient and effective instruction on CT to police officers.72

In an effort to integrate this subject matter into the DNA of an organization, the incorporation of this topic at the basic and in-service levels of LE training seemingly makes practical sense, as it provides not only a starting point, but also a continual platform to teach the tactics, techniques, and threats related to terrorism as they evolve.

Another important element of CT integration and training is related to the effective application of information sharing within the LE environment. This element can be accomplished through individual agency interactions with their state and regional fusion centers that provide an outlet to share information directly gathered by locals in the form of SAR. Such reports are supported by standardized guidelines and reporting procedures, which can be facilitated through the National SAR Initiative (NSI), who provide training opportunities to enhance LE information sharing, facilitate interaction, and ensure standardized collection and reporting. Fusion centers often play a significant role in facilitating and coordinating this training. Between August 1, 2012 and July 31,

71 Blair C. Alexander, “Strategies to Integrate America’s Local Police Agencies into Domestic Counterterrorism” (USAWC strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2005), 6.

2013, 193,451 individuals, including 123,144 frontline police, fire, emergency management, and EMS officers, received SAR training through the NSI’s two training programs.\footnote{“2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report,” June 2014, 29, https://www.chds.us/?pr&id=3171.}

Local officers need to be trained properly and consistently in the area of terrorism to be able to apply CT continually into their policing mindset. Once educated and trained on the topic, in concert with knowing how to report it effectively, locals are primed to engage in gathering information that may be related to protecting their communities from an act of terrorism.

E. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

An examination of the integration of policing and CT includes an assessment of intelligence gathering by police, who routinely gather criminal intelligence during the course of their traditional policing duties. The following literature outlines the issues related to local LE intelligence gathering efforts. In 2008, the \emph{Los Angeles Times} reported that since 9/11, authorities have urged local police to become the front line in domestic CT, and to gather street-level intelligence about crimes and suspicious activities that could foretell another attack. However, for various reasons, it has not worked out that way. The nation’s local LE agencies have gathered information in their own haphazard ways or not at all, experts say.\footnote{Josh Meyer, “LAPD Leads the Way in Local Counter-Terrorism. A Commander’s Checklist Is a Link from Traditional Police Work to Collecting Data to Combat Terror Attacks,” \emph{Los Angeles Times}, April 14, 2008.}

A 2010 Institute for Homeland Security Solutions report, “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009,” states, what is particularly problematic has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs)—reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911
calls, and tips from the public. This lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information.\textsuperscript{75}

The following study and subsequent thesis provide details of a local LE intelligence effort that falls short and is in need of improvement. A look at the capabilities of local police intelligence gathering was conducted in 2011 by researchers at the Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) at George Washington University. They collected survey data of police intelligence commanders for the 56 largest cities in the United States. Their survey revealed a consensus that the United States lacks an adequate understanding of the intelligence enterprise as it relates to CT. As a result, police intelligence capabilities are lacking, collection is haphazard, resources are underutilized, and agencies have a limited ability to develop anticipatory knowledge concerning future attacks, mitigate risks, or respond to emerging threats.\textsuperscript{76}

In Michael Andreas’ analysis of the intelligence function of local police departments, he found that the majority of police departments do not have assigned terrorism liaison officers (TLOs), and the intelligence situation is much worse. He states that, “there is no one inside most municipal police departments who is specifically trained to investigate suspicious and terrorism-related incidents. No one is proactively scouring police reports, public documents, or the community for information that could be utilized in the war on terror.”\textsuperscript{77}

Local LE does have access to publications designed to assist local LE policy makers in enhancing their intelligence gathering efforts. The U.S. DOJ, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, \textit{Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies} is the most recent intelligence publication and comprehensive manual to assist local agencies in this endeavor. It is

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authored by David L. Carter, Ph.D. and directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal
LE agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function.
Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is
directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer assigned to create an intelligence
function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources.\(^{78}\)

By and large, local LE does not have the capacity to undertake intelligence
gathering focusing on terrorism, nor could it analyze the information that might be
collected. Most intelligence about terrorism comes from federal sources, apart from a few
large cities like New York and Los Angeles.\(^{79}\) The ability to gather intelligence locally is
a key strength of LE engagement in CT, as “raw” information can be gathered from the
“street,” compiled into a SAR, forwarded to a fusion center, and potentially, developed
into an active FBI investigation that subsequently links all three levels of government in
the HS network.

F. CONCLUSION

In the 13 years since 9/11, the United States has had limited occurrences of
terrorist activity within its borders. The threat of terrorism remains, and in light of actual
incidences of terrorism, the local level of government cannot ignore the possibility that an
attack could occur. The importance of LE and the general public in preventing attacks
must be recognized, and supported through investments in education and reporting.
Between 1999–2009, more than four in five foiled U.S. terrorist plots were discovered via
observations from LE and the general public.\(^{80}\)

Numerous Naval Postgraduate School theses discussed in this literature review
have addressed the issue of improved local LE and HS or CT integration, but a dearth of
engagement still exists. The literature suggests that this issue can be partly attributed at
the local level, especially in smaller agencies, to no incidences (perceived threat of

Agencies*, iii.

\(^{79}\) Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of Police in Counterterrorism,” 87.

\(^{80}\) Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist
attack), prioritization, confusion, apathy, resistance, and competition with traditional crime.

However, clearly, the opportunity exists for local LE leadership to incorporate CT better into their traditional policing mission. Based upon the present condition and a review of the literature, this thesis asserts that the catalyst for integration is rooted in the following topical areas that are discussed in greater detail in the coming chapters: leadership, training and education, and intelligence gathering related to terrorism.
III. COUNTERTERRORISM AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is organized into three sections that progress from an assessment of the threat posed by terrorists to the U.S. homeland, into a description of the primary entities at the state and federal level that play a role in domestic CT. The final segment of this chapter focuses on the post-9/11 LE mission, and highlights the strengths and benefits of CP and local engagement in a CT role. It concludes with a review of the CT strategies of two international LE agencies for smart practices and the identification of issues for consideration related to a U.S. local LE strategy that employs CT.

B. THE THREAT

In the 21st century, technology has connected the political, social, and economic environment of this nation’s ever-changing world more closely than in any other time in history and sets the stage for unprecedented global collaboration and the potential for both prosperity and conflict. For those who seek to influence United States policy and strategy through fear, whether they are foreign or domestic entities, terrorism offers a means to do so. Hoffman defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”81 This definition would logically imply that the potential for acts of terror on U.S. soil would perpetually be a future threat to this country’s citizenry.

In Spring 2014, the 12th and most recent issue of Inspire magazine was released by AQAP. This issue devotes a lengthy section to what AQAP calls “Open Source Jihad,” and seeks to motivate and educate aspiring lone wolf jihadists who do not have the ability to receive more formal training.82 A “lone wolf” is defined as, a person who acts individually without orders from or even connections to an organization. The theory

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81 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism,” 40.

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is that this distance will prevent the disclosure of attack planning to informants or technical surveillance, and therefore, provide superior operational security.\textsuperscript{83}

The latest publication of \textit{Inspire} clearly puts the United States in the crosshairs for would-be attackers. The author states that America “is our first target” and advises jihadists that they should target places “flooded with individuals, e.g. sports events in which tens of thousands attend, election campaigns, festivals and other gatherings. The important thing is that you target people and not buildings.”\textsuperscript{84}

The threat of terrorism does exist within U.S. borders, and underlines the importance of local LE engagement in CT. It is important to recognize that a core function of LE is the protection of their citizenry from violent offenders, and would seemingly also include terrorists.

C. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM

1. Introduction

Two primary entities interact with local LE in the area of terrorism and information sharing: state and major urban area fusion centers and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (FBI-JTTFs), which serve distinct but complementary roles in securing the homeland.

Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local entities and are uniquely situated to empower front-line LE, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, and private sector security personnel to gather and share threat-related information lawfully. The FBI created, coordinates, and manages JTTFs, which primarily focus on terrorism-related investigations. Both rely on expertise and information derived from all levels of government to support their efforts.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} Burton and Stewart, The “Lone Wolf” Disconnect.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation—Joint Terrorism Task Forces

The FBI is the lead federal LE agency charged with CT investigations. Since the 9/11 attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive LE agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.86

According to the FBI, JTTFs are the nation’s front-line on terrorism and are based in 103 cities nationwide. JTTFs provide one-stop shopping for information regarding terrorist activities; and are comprised of local, state, and federal LE.87

3. State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

The ability to share information effectively within the LE environment is a challenging endeavor, as fusion centers are the localized entities created to assist all three levels of government with LE sharing. Today, fusion centers serve as primary focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLATT) partners.88 During the 2010 National Fusion Center Conference, the federal government and fusion center leaders distilled the baseline capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers into four critical operational capabilities (COCs), as shown in Figure 2.89

Fusion centers have proven to be an effective and valuable resource in the realm of LE information sharing, as demonstrated by statistics found in the 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. In the 2012 assessment period, fusion centers submitted a total of 3,500 SARs to the FBI. Of the 5,883 SARs submitted in 2013, 193, or 3.3% of the total, resulted in the initiation or enhancement of an FBI investigation, including JTTF investigations. In 2012, 88 SARs submitted by fusion centers resulted in the initiation or enhancement of an FBI investigation.90

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D. POLICING POST 9/11: THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION

Homeland security begins with hometown security, and our efforts to confront threats in our communities are most effective when they are led by local law enforcement and involve strong collaboration with the communities and citizens they serve.91

—Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano (2010)

1. Introduction

Local LE are the subject matter experts (SMEs) of their locality and have superior knowledge of the people and places that comprise their jurisdiction. Terrorist attacks may be transnational in origin or homegrown, but wherever they come from, much of their activity occurs in locations in which the most significant governmental presence is the local police.92

Local LE along with local citizenry are well positioned to be the “eyes and ears” of local HS efforts. Through the formation of these partnerships, it is believed that LE will satisfy HS responsibilities by encouraging citizen participation, which can exhibit informal social control and surveillance in the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks.93

2. Community Oriented Policing

CP is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to address proactively the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues, such as crime, social disorder,

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and fear of crime. These partnerships, which are based on trust and mutual respect, consequently provide a platform for information gathering between police and community members.

Efforts to counter AQ-linked or influenced terrorism are increasingly drawing upon community-based initiatives based upon engagement and partnership work between police officers and members of Muslim communities, in the United Kingdom (UK), in some parts of northern Europe, and North America. Communities are being seen as key partners in countering the threat and community-policing models are increasingly being drawn upon, and utilized, to work toward countering AQ terrorism-related crime.

In “Homeland Security and Community Policing: Competing or Complementing Public Safety Policies,” R. Friedmann and W. Cannon argue that a successful HS policing strategy must be built on a community policing philosophy. Based upon their similar strategies, which both promote partnerships between public and private agencies, as well as between police and citizens, they are proactive and advocate information gathering, data analysis, community partnerships, collaboration, and crime prevention.

In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings, former Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis cautioned that local police departments must rely on their local communities to provide information on malefactors rather than depending exclusively on information in databases. Davis states, “There is no technical means we can point to; there is no computer that is going to spit out a terrorist’s name. It’s the community being

94 U. S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined, 3.


97 Ibid.
involved in the conversation and being appropriately open to communicating with law enforcement when something is awry and identified.”

3. Benefits of Local Engagement

Most Americans can relate to having some contact with a local LE officer. It has been estimated that one out of five Americans 16-years of age and older have one face-to-face contact with police each year. This number amounts to almost 44 million contacts, of which 20 million occur in traffic stops. This number, therefore, amounts to a huge opportunity for local LE to detect, identify, or arrest an individual engaged in direct or ancillary terrorist activity.

Examples of the opportunity for local contact are exemplified in two incidents related to the 9/11 hijackers.

Mohammad Atta was given a ticket by Broward County, Florida, sheriff’s deputies for driving without a license four months before the attack on the World Trade Towers. Because he skipped his court appearance, a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days before 9/11, a Maryland State Trooper stopped Ziad S. Jarra, who was on a CIA ‘watch’ list, for speeding in Pikesville, Maryland. Although hindsight is always wiser than foresight, these examples show the remarkable extent of routine contact that police have with criminals, including potential terrorists.

History is strewn with incidents of LE contact with high profile targets on U.S. soil during the performance of their duties. Timothy McVeigh, for example, was arrested and subsequently tried for the Oklahoma City bombing after being stopped by an Oklahoma State Trooper for having an invalid license plate. In 2010, in Times Square, a vendor on the sidewalk saw smoke coming out of vents near the back seat of a vehicle.

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100 Bayley and Weisburd, “Cops and Spooks: The Role of the Police in Counterterrorism,” 91.
101 Ibid.
parked awkwardly at the curb with its engine running and its hazard lights on. The vendor called to a mounted police officer and a bomb was discovered in the vehicle.\textsuperscript{102}

In the prevention or mitigation of an attack, the opportunity to have contact with a terrorist and the utilization of informal ties with the community to solicit information provides two significant benefits of integrating CT into the local LE mission. The ability of local LE to refine and enhance constantly the who, what, where, when, and how of their individual jurisdiction, is an advantage that a state or federal LE entity cannot come close to replicating.

4. Victoria, Australia

In the search for a smart practice related to local LE and CT engagement, Australian efforts offer some worthwhile examples. Pickering, McCulloch, and Wright-Neville state in \textit{Counter-terrorism Policing: Community, Cohesion and Security} that the Victoria Police are the best example for community CT policing worldwide and are a case study for illustrating continuities and dissonance between those undertaking daily community policing functions, and their approach to community and CT.\textsuperscript{103} This approach is based upon their social cohesion community policing model, which ensures that laws are applied in ways that enhance social cohesion, safety, and the rights of citizens. They work to strengthen the dialogue between minority groups in the community and police. This dialogue is instrumental in reducing fear and anxiety, and promoting trust and information sharing.\textsuperscript{104} Three components of the Victoria Police CT and policing strategy have merit for U.S. local LE integration.

\textbf{a. Organization-Wide Responsibility}

While CT has traditionally been seen as the responsibility of a few specialist areas of Victoria Police, they now seek to raise the level of CT awareness among all members;


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
everyone must recognize that they have a critical role in the broader counter terrorism effort. In particular, frontline police can assist in the collection of intelligence, as well as build relationships with communities to help reduce the appeal of ideologies central to the spread of violent extremism.¹⁰⁵

b. **Partnership Driven**

Victoria Police understand that the community is a crucial element in all aspects of CT, from the reporting of suspicious behavior on the one hand, to supporting individuals who might be at risk of being recruited into terrorism on the other. Their relationship with community groups is based on trust and a long history of engagement around an equally diverse range of issues and concerns.¹⁰⁶

c. **Respect for Law and Human Dignity**

Their approach to CT is grounded in a set of core organizational values, including a commitment to treating all people with respect and dignity. In undertaking CT activities, they do not target specific religious or ethnic groups, in the understanding that individuals who support or engage in terrorist behavior are not representative of the larger communities from which they emerge.¹⁰⁷

5. **The United Kingdom**

In response to terrorism, the government of the UK has taken the threat seriously and has made significant progress in minimizing their risk.¹⁰⁸ The police in the UK focus on creating a hostile environment for terrorists to operate within, by embracing a dual strategy of effectively targeting crimes and behaviors associated with terrorist activities

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¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

and developing a public communications strategy that can make the public an effective partner in CT intelligence gathering.\textsuperscript{109}

In 2006, the UK developed a comprehensive national strategy for countering terrorism, known as CONTEST (Counter Terrorism Strategy) and its aim is to reduce the risk to the UK from terrorism.\textsuperscript{110} CONTEST is organized around four work streams.

- **Prevent**—To stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; an effort by the government to curb radicalization and reach out to those who based on socio-economic, geo-political, cultural, or religious disposition, may be at a high risk for involvement in an act of terrorism.\textsuperscript{111}

- **Protect**—To reduce the vulnerability of their critical national infrastructure crowded places, the transport system, and borders.\textsuperscript{112} In the UK, counter terrorism security advisors are in every police force and their core role is to identify and assess local critical sites within that might be vulnerable to terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{113}

- **Prepare**—To mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack, by improving resiliency, mitigating consequences, and responding to attacks.\textsuperscript{114} In the UK, their Security Service (MI5) provides formal CT training to all rank levels of police; as well as specialized training for CT operations.\textsuperscript{115}

- **Pursue**—To stop terrorist attacks;\textsuperscript{116} the UK applies a nationalized effort toward the pursuit of terrorists.\textsuperscript{117}


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 6.

6. Issues for Consideration—Community Relations

In the implementation of a local CT strategy, agencies must consider their existing community relations. How a local CT strategy is implemented is important; an aggressive or the perception of a heavy-handed approach could lead to community alienation and mistrust, which may damage all facets of police and community relations.

David Thacher, a University of Michigan professor of public policy and urban planning, states that when the local police get too involved in HS, which emphasizes surveillance, identification, and the investigation of particular people suspected of terrorism, it is often done at the expense of community policing.\textsuperscript{118} In particular, people who share ethnic, religious, and immigrant resemblance with individuals involved in terrorist organizations may feel threatened by enhanced police surveillance.\textsuperscript{119} Traditional crime is certainly more prevalent in U.S. neighborhoods. A CT strategy could be perceived as an over-reach by police, as in the unnecessary profiling of persons based upon limited actual incidences.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined a clear and existential threat of terrorism within the U.S. homeland, and underscored the importance of local LE and CT in the protection of their citizenry. A description of the two primary entities with a role in domestic CT at the state and federal level, fusion centers and FBI-JTTFs, followed. The post-9/11 paradigm shift in policing was discussed, which specifically outlined how the CP model can be leveraged toward local engagement of CT and the strengths of local LE through their numbers, proximity, and traditional duties beneficial in CT. A look at international LE CT efforts revealed smart practices with merit for U.S. local LE implementation. Finally, this chapter presented issues for consideration that may have an adverse impact on a local LE CT strategy.


This thesis asserts that the ability of local LE to contribute in a CT role can be positively impacted by the topical areas of Chapters IV–VI, which address their influence on the integration of local LE and CT. These chapters are listed in progressive order of their importance toward influencing the integration of CT into the DNA of local policing, leadership, education and training, and intelligence gathering.
IV. LEADERSHIP

A. INTRODUCTION

In the context of this thesis, “leadership” stands as the topical level with the greatest potential to impact local LE engagement in CT. The application of this activity into the policing continuum is dependent upon acceptance by the leaders of an organization. “Leadership is critical to forming and implementing strategy and without it, good strategy does not happen.”120 This concept ultimately contributes to the increased opportunity for it to become part of an agency’s DNA.

In general, local LE is already demonstrating that they are competent and proficient in the performance of their traditional duties. By applying CT as a positive layer in something locals already do well, it may add value to the organization and community stakeholders, and consequently, challenge the status quo with a new approach to enhance overall public safety.

LE has experienced many paradigm shifts throughout its existence, from a decentralized structure to centralized, from one of rigid hierarchy to one promoting greater autonomy within the ranks, from one distant from the community to one actively engaged with it that address shared concerns and develop interested community stakeholders.121 If state and local authorities are now to become equal partners in combating the emergent threat of domestic terror and homegrown extremism, it is necessary that a culture of awareness and responsibility be fully developed within the LE enterprise, which can only be achieved through inspired leadership.122

Leadership related to terrorism starts with local ownership of the problem, not a deferral to the federal government or a hope that the likelihood of an act of terrorism is so


122 Ibid.
remote it is not worth understanding or acknowledging. The transformation of an agency’s organizational culture begins and ends with its leaders.

B. LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Local LE takes the lead on all traditional criminal threats affecting their jurisdiction, but in the pursuit of terrorists and extremists, the effort put forth has not risen to the same level as conventional criminal pursuit. Issues attributable to this condition are addressed in Section D of this chapter. Locals have the opportunity to apply their traditional strengths in a CT role in support of national HS efforts.

Aside from their numerical advantage, local police are often better suited to perform CT functions because of their superior familiarity with their local communities. Federal LE officials are tasked with investigating specific federal crimes, while local police functions include preventing and investigating crime, as well as maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services. As a result of these wider mandates, local police are positioned naturally to collect and process information about communities and activities within them. All these elements place local LE in a position to contribute greatly in a CT role by having pre-incident contact, as was outlined in Chapter III.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The task of a wholesale re-engineering of American local LE toward a CT role is complex and unprecedented. If U.S. LE is to move forward to a national role in HS, then practical, focused, and effective training must be a cornerstone of this transformation. Without appropriate and ongoing training of both current and new LE personnel, HS is

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This change cannot be accomplished without the vision and support of an agency head, the chief of police or sheriff, who must understand that HS starts at the local level; a more bottom-up than top-down strategy is required.

To integrate HS, it must be adopted agency-wide to realize its full potential and effectiveness. Integrating the HS responsibility into the agency’s mission statement, goals, policies and procedures, training programs, and other systems and activities that define organizational culture, should reflect this adoption. CP took many years to be accepted, understood, and effectively integrated into the local LE mission, but is now the primary policing standard. The same effort can be applied to the integration of CT with the support of leaders who keep CT relevant.

D. OBSTACLES OF INTEGRATION

In the research of local LE and CT integration, numerous issues were revealed that are impacting the interaction of these two activities. This segment addresses these problems and examines issues partly attributable to them.

For local LE, pressing police priorities are handling calls for service and protecting the public within their jurisdictions, all while trying to control crime. These priorities ultimately take precedence over terrorism prevention programs and potential terrorist threats. It becomes difficult for LE executives to justify dedicating resources to CT when most agencies are located in areas not perceived to be primary targets or to possess significant critical infrastructure. Countless LE leaders have articulated that they are just barely getting by with their personnel handling traditional crimes. Complacency is not the reason their agencies are not working to further CT efforts, they argue; it is the fact that it is just not practical or justifiable to make CT their top priority.

125 Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level.”
126 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
According to Chief Walter McNeil, reasons and perceptions that impede an agency’s involvement in CT include perceptions that an agency is too small, that it is the responsibility of the federal government, and that most departments are simply trying to focus on day-to-day crime and do not have the resources to get involved in protection of the homeland.\textsuperscript{129} In addition, a major issue confronting police administrators is how to monitor police performance and its impact on crime.\textsuperscript{130} In many departments, this monitoring is accomplished with COMPSTAT, short for Compare Stats, a process by which crime is analyzed for police administrators to identify problem areas and respond accordingly.\textsuperscript{131} COMPSTAT does not track, analyze, or include any areas related to terrorism or HS, as it is focused on traditional Part I crimes, which guide the focus of an individual agency on a day-to-day basis. This cycle can create “tunnel vision” for police executives, who remain focused only on traditional crime reduction. Thus, in some cases, ancillary issues, such as terrorism prevention and detection, do not necessarily fit into the crime reduction equation and are viewed as unimportant.

\section*{E. CONCLUSION}


You might feel that your town is too small and insignificant to attract the attention of terrorists.\textsuperscript{132} You might well be right, if only because there are many thousands of towns and cities in the United States and terrorist attacks are rare. Some experts, however, believe that it is this very insignificance that might attract terrorists because an attack on an unremarkable and unexpected target might generate more fear. Whether this is true or not, you cannot take risks with the lives of people in your community: you must make plans to prevent an attack and to respond quickly and efficiently if one occurs.\textsuperscript{133}


\textsuperscript{130} Edward A. Thibault et al., \textit{Proactive Police Management} (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2009), 122.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} Newman and Clarke, \textit{Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide}.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
In the formative process of developing a strategy to integrate CT into the local LE mission, this thesis asserts that the next level to be addressed after leadership is the organizational education and training of the activity. The area of education and training provides the foundation to enhance a local department’s knowledge, skill and ability of the subject matter. Chapter IV lays the framework for how local LE can raise their IQ on the subject of terrorism and what educational and training opportunities are available for individual agencies to integrate this subject matter into their policing continuum.
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V. TRAINING AND EDUCATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Shifting to a LE culture with an indelible awareness of the domestic terror threat requires a tremendous commitment on the part of LE leaders and administrators. However, a commitment in name constitutes only one aspect of the change process. The true manifestation of change begins with the training regime provided for nascent officers, as well as the value placed on its content. Early and consistent training provides the foundation and values that officers entering the workforce will incorporate into their daily activities.

A fundamental component in the implementation of a new idea, concept, or strategy is training and education. In local LE, the opportunity to indoctrinate an officer in the policies and practices of an agency begins at the basic level. This indoctrination generally occurs in the form of a police academy, which adheres to a combination of standardized, state-mandated requirements and training specifically developed for the needs of an individual agency. State and national accreditation standards may also be a factor in the training and educational curriculum of an agency.

In the policing world, the opportunity to further train and educate is conducted on an annual or semi-annual basis, through the application of in-service or annual training. Many agencies are positioned to conduct training in a classroom, the field, via computer-based program, or a combination of all three. The training requirements for this level parallel the basic level but in an abbreviated manner.

A third component of training in local LE is specialized training, which may be based upon an officer’s assignment in the organization, for instance, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), canine unit (K9), explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), or gang unit. Specialized training may also include department-wide training opportunities, for

134 Mayer and Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-Century Threats.”
135 Ibid.
example, advanced patrol tactics, driving under the influence (DUI) enforcement, and undercover operations.

Based upon the three aforementioned subcategories, this chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of each level. This research is directed at an attempt to identify the importance and relevance of each level as it relates to the integration of local LE and CT.

**B. BASIC LEVEL—RECRUIT**

The basic level is the first logical place to train and educate on the integration of CT into the DNA of American policing. It provides the opportunity for an agency to integrate terrorism into the initial education of a new LE officer. Gone are the days of a county sheriff handing his buddy a badge and gun and “deputizing” him to go out on the street and enforce laws in which this individual has never been trained. In today’s modern LE world, police training is as important as doctors attending medical school or lawyers passing the bar exam. Without properly trained police officers, society could not successfully function.

In *Defending the Homeland*, Jonathan R. White discusses the importance of embedding a CT element into the initial education of a police officer. He states that training is the starting point for CT operations, and asserts that operational training should be focused on patrol and non-specialized investigations, and that patrol officers need to develop abilities to recognize potential terrorist situations during routine field contacts. White claims that officers should learn to recognize the “who, what, where and how” of terrorism, just as they recognize the characteristics associated with a robbery or burglary.

A lack of training related to CT would logically equate to a lack of integration and engagement at the local level. In the protection of their communities, all threats must be

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137 Ibid.

138 White, *Defending the Homeland*, 64–68.

139 Ibid., 65.
understood and addressed, which starts with training at the basic level. This level can serve as a building block in the education of an officer, and can be continually developed upon throughout an officer’s career during the next level of training.

C. **IN-SERVICE LEVEL—VETERAN**

Pre-9/11, most CT activities and investigations were federal initiatives, but post-9/11, every police officer in the United States plays some role in the nation’s overall HS effort, and thus, requires training for state and local LE. A change of mindset for local LE is required, which includes veteran officers who have been trained and conditioned to police within the traditional model.

A challenge of training and educating veteran officers on a new practice or way of doing business is a resistance from within police culture, and more specifically, a sentiment of “cynicism” to new ideas. In his classic work, *Behind the Shield*, Arthur Niederhoffer showed the stages of cynicism as the police recruit moves from the idealistic role models of the police academy to the street. He describes the first stage as pseudo-cynicism that occurs at the recruit level, an attitude that barely conceals the idealism and commitment beneath the surface. The second stage, romantic cynicism, occurs within the first five years, and finally stage three, aggressive cynicism, happens when resentment and hostility become obvious, a subculture of cynicism, the death of a spirit.

A negative view by veteran officers of integrating CT into the traditional policing mission can greatly hamper implementation and stifle an agency’s efforts to apply a new activity, while reaffirming the importance of leadership and sound policies supporting CT integration in conjunction with a training and educational component. “Buy-in” and support from all levels of an agency are critical to the shifting of the traditional policing paradigm to include CT. A starting point of department-wide training for all personnel, allows an agency to “sell” the importance, benefits, and relevancy of CT in today’s 21st century policing environment.

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140 Thibault et al., *Proactive Police Management*, 284.
141 Ibid., 18–19.
Present LE efforts have not been sufficient in altering the more fundamental issue underlying the most effective methods for policing terrorism; an organizational culture that truly values the emergent threat of domestic terror and homegrown radicalization. An essential component of shifting LE culture is training requirements and continued education directives that increase the awareness levels of state and local LE personnel.

A recent article in *Law Enforcement Today* discusses an absence of CT training for LE. Its author observes that an effort to incorporate terrorism awareness training into the traditional policing strategies of most police agencies is simply lacking, and in turn, this nation’s communities are exposed. According to Detective Brian J. Smith, a 16-year veteran police and DHS certified antiterrorism instructor, such training must be part of 21st century policing in America and be incorporated into basic recruit academy training and annual in-service training at a minimum.

Once the first building blocks of terrorism have been established, further instruction for local officers may be enhanced based upon their assignment or the needs of their department. This area of training is depicted in this thesis as the specialized level of training.

**D. SPECIALIZED TRAINING**

In regard to specialized training related to CT, the state of California has led the way with the establishment of specialized CT officers within an agency. These officers are known as TLOs. The TLO program has also been implemented in coordination with state fusion centers in many other states throughout the United States. A TLO is an individual who functions as the principle point of contact for a public safety agency for

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142 Mayer and Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-Century Threats.”
143 Ibid.
other government agencies in the HS environment in matters related to terrorism information.\textsuperscript{145}

A 2013 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security observed that many TLO programs are in their infancy.\textsuperscript{146} They have been slow to roll out, and are too small to provide adequate coverage.\textsuperscript{147} Additionally, the TLO program is not a standardized practice nationally and has many variations, names, and applications.

Another example of specialized terrorism training available for officers to develop their knowledge in CT is the DHS \textit{Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents (PRSBI)} training course for first responders. It has been in existence since 2003, and PRSBI was developed to provide state, tribal and local emergency responders with the knowledge and skills needed for the prevention, interdiction, response, and mitigation of a suicide bombing attack.\textsuperscript{148}

E. CONCLUSION

Maples’ 2008 research revealed that clear, core competencies exist that LE officials in this country must be exposed to in relation to the causes, nature, and dynamics of terrorism. Currently, these core competencies are not being addressed in a consistent and standardized manner.\textsuperscript{149} A conclusive finding of his research was the fact that terrorism-related courses and training are not a required LE certification standard or competency in every state.\textsuperscript{150} This research points to a gap in terrorism training at the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Transformation Liaison Officer Information Network, “What Is a Terrorism Liaison Officer?” http://www.tlo.org/what_is_tlo.html.
\item Michael T. McCaul and Peter T. King, \textit{Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers}. The United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 113th Cong. (July 2013).
\item Ibid.
\item Maples, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the “What and Why” of Terrorism As a State and Local Law Enforcement Competency,” 73.
\item Ibid., 40.
\end{enumerate}
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academy level for at least 40% of the states.\textsuperscript{151} This percentage represents a significant gap in the training of LE and a potential vulnerability for national HS.

The training and education of local LE, as with any profession, will always be a work in progress, but the opportunity exists for local agencies to incorporate the topic of terrorism into their present and future educational curriculums. Ongoing international and domestic events clearly point to a legitimate threat of terrorism to the U.S. homeland by known terrorist groups. These events underscore the significance of having the local level of LE trained and educated to protect, prevent and mitigate an attack.

Many of the practices and tactics presently taught to identify, detect, and combat criminal activity can be applied to a CT mission, as they are closely aligned with existing LE duties. Through an acknowledgement and prioritization of the threat, followed by training and education on the topic, the next step toward the integration of LE and CT can be introduced by a directed effort toward the gathering of information related to terrorism.

\textsuperscript{151} Maples, “Terrorism 101—Knowledge about the “What and Why” of Terrorism As a State and Local Law Enforcement Competency,” 73.
VI. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

A. INTRODUCTION

An examination of the integration of policing and CT includes an assessment of domestic intelligence gathering by local LE. The most effective weapon in the war on terrorism is intelligence, the detailed analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of information. The nucleus of this weapon is information collected and shared by federal, state, and local LE agencies. Intelligence begins as bits of raw information or data. Information becomes intelligence when it is organized, analyzed, and interpreted with a specific focus. The primary challenge for local LE is understanding and then utilizing intelligence in a community-policing context.

B. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING

In the detection, identification, and apprehension of a potential terrorist hiding in a community, existing relationships between local LE and the community could be the keys to developing information that may uncover someone plotting a future attack or someone planting the seeds of radicalization. Local LE has many lines of communication to gather information anonymously and overtly from the community. Local police are much more likely to come across a terrorism suspect than a federal LE agent, simply due to the law of probability. Stanley Supinski points out that cooperation, along with solid communication networks and increased trust, allows police to develop sources for information inside the community, which could provide vital intelligence relating to potential terror activity.

The gathering of intelligence and the subsequent sharing of such within the LE spectrum are critical elements in the mitigation of an attack within local communities.

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153 Ibid.

Using existing relationships, local LE can use informal ties with the community to act as intelligence gatherers to aid in the prevention of terrorist attacks. Terror-related information developed from the “street” can be quickly disseminated to local FBI-JTTFs and fusion centers for more in-depth analysis.

America’s highly decentralized police system is both a strength and a weakness. It is a great strength because the police are better attuned to their local communities and are directly accountable to their concerns. However, it is also a terrible weakness in the post-9/11 world, where information sharing is key. Once LE has the information, it needs to make sense of it and share it immediately. It is critical that both horizontally and vertically LE overcomes its traditional reluctance to share information in a meaningful and timely fashion. Timely coordination and collaboration by local LE with federal and state partners is an important element of the intelligence process related to CT.

Erroll Southers, a professor of CT at the University of Southern California, notes that much like the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the July 2005 bombings in London, the terrorists’ familiarity with the target area afforded them critical situational awareness that facilitated their ability to plan and execute local attacks, but it also made them part of a community that could have singled them out and reported their suspicious behavior. Local LE can have a significant HS impact in this area, especially in the case of lone-wolf activities far smaller in size and scope and more difficult to detect than larger conspiracies. Thus, lone-wolf plots are not likely to cross the federal radar. No entity providing domestic security is better equipped to handle such threats than local LE agencies, which know and understand their own communities. Local LE’s ability to observe, receive, or develop information is clearly a major attribute of merging their existing mission with a role in CT. The following section outlines a standardized, simple,

157 Ibid.
158 McCarter, “A Failure to Connect the Dots in Boston.”
159 Mayer and Erickson, “Changing Today’s Law Enforcement Culture to Face 21st-Century Threats.”
and easily applied practice to capitalize upon local LE’s collection capacity and enable this level of LE to contribute easily in the information-sharing process related to HS.

C. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS

Realistically, many small- and medium-sized local LE departments simply may not have the resources, funding, or willingness to staff, develop, and oversee a dedicated homeland or CT intelligence function. As previously discussed, a resource to support national information sharing is The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which grew out of the findings in the 9/11 Commission Report.\textsuperscript{160} The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing indicate both legislative and executive intent to establish locally controlled distributed information systems wherein potential terrorism-related information could be contributed by SLTT LE agencies for analysis to determine whether patterns or trends are emerging. Following this guidance, the SAR NSI was developed.\textsuperscript{161} The NSI provides the following training opportunities for officers and executive staff, which are facilitated through local fusion centers.

- **Line Officer Training (On-line):** Assists LE officers in understanding what kinds of suspicious behaviors are associated with pre-incident terrorism activities, documenting and reporting suspicious activity, and protecting privacy, civil rights/liberties when documenting information.\textsuperscript{162}

- **Suspicious Activity Reporting Executive Briefing Training:** Designated for command personnel; noting that LE executives play a vital role in ensuring that the SAR process is not only successfully implemented but effectively supported, SAR executive briefings focus on executive leadership, policy development, privacy and civil liberties protections, agency training, and community outreach.\textsuperscript{163}


\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
From a LE perspective, the appeal of SARs is obvious. A SAR program reduces the opportunity costs of intelligence-led CT work because officers on the street continue to perform their traditional crime-fighting duties.\footnote{164}{Michael Price, “National Security and Local Police,” \textit{Brennan Center for Justice}, 12–13, 2013, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf.} They can follow protocols for reporting suspicious activity potentially related to threats with no substantial diversion from their “core mission of providing emergency and non-emergency services in order to prevent crime, violence and disorder.”\footnote{165}{Ibid.} SARs also reinforce the notion that every cop is the “eyes and ears” of the national CT effort. Consequently, both the Justice Department and DHS have encouraged police to adopt standardized SAR programs through the NSI.\footnote{166}{Ibid.}

SAR provides a basic starting point for local LE to engage in intelligence gathering related to CT. The other end of the spectrum is a policing concept known as intelligence-led policing, which is directed at full integration of intelligence gathering into the traditional policing mission.

\section*{D. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING}

ILP is based on a common understanding of intelligence and its usefulness. ILP is defined as “the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end-product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels.”\footnote{167}{Loyka, Faggiani, and Karchmer, “Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series VOL. 4: The Production and Sharing of Intelligence,” 19.} For ILP to be effective, it must become an “integral part of an agency’s philosophy.”\footnote{168}{Ibid.} ILP is a management orientation in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse. Managers must be prepared to deviate from traditional policing philosophies, and move towards action rather than reaction. Above all, it requires commitment.\footnote{169}{Ibid.}
ILP is the attempt to capitalize on this routine work, not for its traditional purpose of solving crimes, but proactively, to prevent and deter crime and now terrorism. To do this, computerized systems are needed to capture and structure the scraps of information in an easily accessible format. In this form, the scraps of information are called collated data. Data are not intelligence; to become intelligence, trained officers who use their knowledge and experience to recommend actions based on patterns in the data must analyze the data.\textsuperscript{170} ILP is an expensive enterprise and requires a total transformation of an agency’s policing strategy. This change can be a challenge for many local agencies struggling with shrinking budgets and diminished resources.

The NYPD is the leading proponent of intelligence-led policing to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{171} No department has embraced ILP as fully as the NYPD.\textsuperscript{172} In the aftermath of 9/11, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly dedicated 1,000 officers to CT duties and recruited David Cohen, a 35-year CIA veteran, to run the intelligence division. The NYPD’s intelligence operations extend to bordering states, as well as overseas. No other local police department has a comparable program.\textsuperscript{173} Domestic police departments cannot match this investment, although it requires only a computerized database, intelligence officers and analysts. In smaller agencies, these resources are generally used to support investigations rather than to direct operations.\textsuperscript{174} Thus, for most, a general intelligence-gathering framework already exists to support departments that may consider the ILP model, which is a major component of the NYPD’s CT strategy.

Newman and Clarke state in their \textit{Policing Terrorism an Executive’s Guide} that agencies should promote ILP, but know its limits. Intelligence is highly skilled work, often beyond the capabilities of the officers that can be deployed.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{170} Loyka, Faggiani, and Karchmer, “Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series VOL. 4: The Production and Sharing of Intelligence,” 19.
\textsuperscript{171} Newman and Clarke, \textit{Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide}.
\textsuperscript{172} Price, “National Security and Local Police,” 7.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Newman and Clarke, \textit{Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide}.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
E. CONCLUSION

Dr. George Kelling has persuasively argued that police can prevent terrorism with many of the same mechanisms they have developed over the last 20 years to prevent crime. Local intelligence gathering can seemingly be applied as a useful tool in the application of CT. The opportunity for local LE officers to encounter or gather a vital piece of intelligence related to terrorism clearly exists during the performance of their traditional duties.

Intelligence gathering is the operational component in the formative process of local LE and CT integration. The combining of this element with the components of leadership, and education and training, finalizes what this thesis asserts, the three most significant components in local LE to establish the groundwork to incorporate CT into their existing policing mission. The next chapter outlines a conceptual model that demonstrates how these components can be applied in Anytown, USA to integrate CT into their existing LE mission.

VII. LOCAL INTEGRATION = L.E.A.D.

A. INTRODUCTION

To address the issues surrounding the integration of local LE and CT, this thesis proposes a prescriptive model known as L.E.A.D. The intent of this model is to assist Anytown, USA in incorporating CT into their existing LE mission. Like traditional crime, terrorism is a local crime issue and is a responsibility shared among federal, state, and local governments, traditional crime and terrorism are inextricably linked.\textsuperscript{177} International and domestic terrorist groups are well organized and trained, and demonstrate the sophistication of other, traditional organized crime groups. These groups commit ancillary crimes like fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, and theft to provide the resources for their terrorism. Due to the similarities between traditional crime and terrorism, departments that have already adopted a community policing philosophy should find it a seamless transition to addressing terrorism and terrorism-related crime. Officers should already have the skills to analyze the terrorism problem, perform threat analysis, develop appropriate responses, and reflect these efforts in the mission, goals, and objectives of the department.\textsuperscript{178}

It is oftentimes said in the traditional policing world that, “crime is everyone’s business,” meaning LE, other government agencies, citizens, and the private sector are all part of the solution. This thesis asserts that HS is also everyone’s business and a 360-degree approach is needed to protect this nation’s communities. The L.E.A.D. model is characterized by the following acronym.

\textit{L—LEAD}

\textit{E—EDUCATE \& TRAIN}

\textit{A—ACTIVELY COLLECT INTELLIGENCE}

\textit{D—DETECT TERRORISTS}

\textsuperscript{177} Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level.”

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
This chapter provides a description of the individual components of L.E.A.D. and shows how they can build upon each other to form ultimately a comprehensive conceptual model for local LE to incorporate CT into their traditional policing mission. Additionally, how this model can be applied in a simple, flexible and low cost manner without the disruption of core local LE competencies is demonstrated. Once again, leadership is the catalyst or starting point for the integration of CT into the DNA of local LE.

B. LEAD (L)

This thesis asserts that HS does start with hometown security, and begins by individual local LE agencies leading the way toward the integration of CT into their existing missions. CT should fall under their responsibility of proactively contributing to the safety and security of their localities. Although, this integration requires individual agency leadership and ownership to address the threat of terror directly in a cooperative effort with their state and federal partners.

Effective police leaders become adept at responding to challenge. Like other organizations, police agencies must balance constancy and predictability with adaptation and change. Even as they strive to standardize operations, most police leaders recognize the fluid context in which their agencies operate. They also understand that forces exist to which police organizations must adapt and evolve to remain effective in a changing world. Those forces drive organizational change and create new models for conducting the business of policing.179

A central theme of this thesis is that a failure to apply the strengths of policing may create an opportunity with deadly local consequences. Local agencies that fail to embrace some form of CT and rely solely on the federal government to prevent terrorism seemingly do so at the perilous risk of their communities. This thesis asserts that CT integration starts by chiefs, sheriffs, and command personnel accepting the reality that in

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the 21st century, the threat of terrorism is real, constantly evolving, and not going away anytime soon, as difficult as that may be to acknowledge.

Acronyms are commonplace in the policing world and stand as easy to use catch phrases for meaning and memory. The following acronym reiterates the potential threat of terrorism to local LE leaders, as in “U ARE Vulnerable,” which is outlined as a subcategory in the (L) of the L.E.A.D. model.

1. U—UNDERSTAND the Threat

Local LE leadership must educate themselves on the threat of terror from homegrown and international entities. Only then will they begin to understand the ideologies, tactics, and methods of those who would seek to do harm in their communities. Leaders must understand that a domestic attack could occur at any time and in any place. In the effective protection of local communities, LE leadership must take the threat of terrorism seriously.

A significant basic step toward CT activity for local LE is in the reporting of suspicious activity observed or reported in their locality, which starts with local leaders establishing a viable relationship with their local fusion center and FBI-JTTF. This endeavor can be initiated by participation in fusion center sponsored NSI SAR executive briefing training for command personnel.

Another starting point to “jumpstart” CT at the local level is outside funding. Newman and Clarke in *Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide* recommend that agencies go after terrorism grants, stating, “Grant funds can help you meet your responsibilities regarding terrorism by paying for equipment, training, and overtime.”180 The guide provides numerous state and federal resources for grant funding. Grant writing is not a new dynamic for local LE in the search for funding to solve problems and supplement dwindling budgets. Local agencies just need to identify and apply for existing grants opportunities related to HS. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which provides state and local governments with preparedness

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program funding in the form of non-disaster grants to enhance the capacity of state and local emergency responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from a weapons of mass destruction terrorism incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive devices, and cyber-attacks.\textsuperscript{181} The DHS has also prioritized prevention activities through their grants that directly support local LE efforts to understand, recognize, prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist pre-cursor activity, and separately, to raise public awareness and vigilance.\textsuperscript{182}

The key components of understanding the threat are enhancing an agency’s command level IQ of terrorism, initiating information sharing with state and federal partners, and exploring federal grant funding opportunities to facilitate CT activity. Once terrorism is understood, an agency must acknowledge that the threat exists and incorporate this possibility into its strategic plan.

2. **ACKNOWLEDGE the Threat**

In the aftermath of an attack in Anytown, USA, pre-incident local efforts of prevention, detection, and protection will certainly be spotlighted. This thesis argues that now is the time to acknowledge rationally the threat of terrorism and develop a “game plan” for contributing to the mitigation of an attack. Local LE is already proactively identifying, detecting, and protecting the public from violent criminals, which should also include terrorists.

The Boston Marathon bombers, the Tsarnaevs, got recipes for the pressure-cooker IEDs common on battlefields in Afghanistan and “elbow” pipe bombs from online instructions published four years ago in *Inspire*, a terrorist magazine published by al Qaeda’s affiliate AQAP. AQAP offered wannabe jihadis instructions for both types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) under the headline “Make a bomb in the kitchen of


This level of access is important, because in the United States, unfettered Internet access is available to all, which provides for a communication, educational, and financial platform for would-be terrorists that emphasizes the continual need for proactive local LE efforts in a CT role.

The attack in Boston serves as a recent tangible reminder that terror can strike any place, at any time. Basic crime prevention is based upon two principles, harden the target and reduce the opportunity, which this thesis argues can also be applied to terrorism. Many police chiefs concede that CT is not a high priority in their jurisdictions; however, in areas in which the threat is less urgent and less defined, lower-priority environments especially, police can gain “economies of preparedness” by building CT into their routine work. Every citizen-police interaction is an opportunity to pursue anomalies by asking the next question. Every training session provides a way to impart awareness. Merging LE and CT in this way cannot only make this nation’s states and cities safer, but can also save them money.

Engagement in CT does not need to be a new stand-alone practice that requires additional resources; integration can be achieved with minimal change in the existing LE mission.

3. R—REASSESS the Mission

CT under this model is not necessarily a separate function requiring separate new staff or the creation of a unit that is going to do CT only. “It’s about getting everybody involved at some level,” Tim Connors, Director of the Center for Policing Terrorism, explains. Maintaining that involvement is the key to maintaining vigilance in this country, in a world in which terrorism will, it is hoped, remain rare.

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183 James Gordon Meek and Brian Ross, “Could the Boston Bombers Have Been Stopped?,” ABC News, April 15, 2014.


185 Ibid.
Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard once said, “There are two ways to be fooled. One is to believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true.”

Local LE cannot ignore or disregard the potential for terrorism to strike in their communities. The burden of terror detection and mitigation cannot fall on one or two levels of government; it must include all three.

The cornerstone of local LE engagement in CT is dependent upon the development of standardized training curricula and policies related to CT for all personnel of that agency. A universal curriculum for all LE agencies presents a significant challenge for 18,000 agencies, but this thesis asserts that individual agencies can develop CT training and policy with support from existing federal training programs that can be tailored to the needs, resources, and threats of their localities.

The following section explains how the strengths of existing local LE practices can be applied in CT when combined with the incorporation of smart practices from two international LE entities.

4. E—ENGAGE in Counterterrorism

In the protection of their communities, local LE are identifying, targeting, and pursuing traditional violent criminals, those who pose a significant threat to the safety and security of their community. LE utilizes the strengths of community-oriented policing to garner support and empower the community to be an active partner in the eradication of crime. Engagement in CT at the local level can be implemented by using the same techniques to combat traditional criminal activity; remembering that in the detection and mitigation of crime, strong communication ties with the community have proven to be an invaluable resource of this endeavor.

a. The Australians

Two components of the Victoria, Australia police are important to note for U.S. local LE implementation. The first is an organization-wide responsibility of not assigning
CT duties to an individual unit or officer. Their strategy is a broad, all-encompassing one that demands engagement from all members of the organization. This thesis asserts that for U.S. efforts, especially in smaller departments, it is a practical approach to emulate.

Secondly, the partnership driven part of their strategy complements existing CP efforts already widely used in the states by local LE; the incorporation of CT into this practice would seemingly be easy to accomplish. A partnership driven approach also fosters a holistic approach to CT, the benefits of which are discussed further in the conceptualization of the L.E.A.D. model.

b. CONTEST

Elements of the UK’s CONTEST can be applied into the U.S. local LE mission by implementing the following.

- **Prevent:** Utilize the strengths of CP to partner with their citizenry in the identification of vulnerable citizens who may be headed toward radicalization. Mandate DHS sponsored programs to educate and train personnel and the community in the countering of violent extremism (CVE).

- **Protect:** Through DHS programs, develop and create CT security advisors for each local LE office, station, or precinct to identify and assess critical sites, in conjunction with existing duties, and not as a stand-alone assignment. This implementation can be started by using DHS’ “National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” which provides guidance and training for local governments, private businesses, and citizens to participate in the protection of their communities.187

- **Prepare:** Establish a TLO in every local LE office in a two-fold capacity. As a direct liaison between state and federal entities on matters related to HS, and to ensure officers are trained and up-to-date on the most current trends, tactics, and methods related to terrorism. This implementation can be initiated by participation in no cost DHS training programs available on-line, in house, or off site, such as the state and local LE anti-terrorism training program. Once again, resources are not needed for a stand-alone position; these duties can be performed in concert with traditional duties.

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• **Pursue:** Local LE can apply the detection of potential terrorists as another layer in their policing package, in a coordinated effort with their state and federal counterparts just as locals seek to identify, target, and apprehend traditional violent offenders who threaten their communities. Who, what, where, when, and how of terrorists can be applied to patrol activity, intelligence gathering, and community interactions.

The words terrorist and criminal need to be synonymous in the policing environment; the same tools used to identify, target, and apprehend traditional criminals in local communities can be applied to terrorism. A threat clearly exists, locals are in a position to contribute, and community partnerships have proven to be an effective tool in curbing crime and assisting in CT. “Homeland security begins with local law enforcement and the community. The collection of information at the community level is critical to the overall homeland security mission. That’s where it all starts for every city and town in the United States.”

Building upon the understanding, acknowledgement, and engagement of local LE leadership, the next step of this model is to educate and train on the subject matter. The next section details how local LE and their community stakeholders can accomplish this task.

**C. EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

“Terrorism was by no means a new problem for the United States in 2001, nor were state and local governments uninvolved in the counterterrorism effort before then. The 1990s alone saw the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the series of attacks by “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski.” This thesis asserts that to achieve a secure homeland, all three levels of government must be engaged in CT. In this nation’s effort to protect its citizens effectively from terrorism, the absence of HS cannot exist within any local community.

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This protection starts with a holistic approach of raising the terrorism IQ within each individual locality that includes local LE, other local government agencies, citizens, elected officials, and the private sector. Local LE can lead this effort by first educating and training themselves and then developing training programs that target the aforementioned groups.

1. **Local Law Enforcement Training**

   The state of California has led the way in the United States with the establishment of specialized CT officers within an agency, who are known as TLOs. Further recommendations of U.S. local LE and TLO implementation were outlined in the “prepare” section of letter “L” of this model. This duty could be executed in concert with their existing position, and therefore, not deplete resources from the field or create new positions or units.

   Local training can be accomplished through participation in “no cost” DHS training programs available on-line, “in house,” or off site, such as the SLATT by the U.S. DOJ. SLATT provides the tools necessary for officers to understand, detect, deter, and investigate acts of terrorism in the United States by both international and domestic terrorists.190

   A start for local LE in this direction is to identify and develop an “in house” SME or TLO, through the aforementioned training opportunities. These individuals can provide CT instruction to department personnel and liaise with state and federal partners on issues related to HS in a TLO capacity. An important aspect of this role is that it is performed in duality with existing duties, much like a field-training officer or firearms instructor; it does not disrupt core service, but does provide an agency-based SME/TLO to coordinate CT activity.

   

a. **Basic Level**

The basic or academy level is the most logical point to integrate a new concept or practice into an individual’s and department’s policing package. This thesis recommends a four- to eight-hour block of instruction related to the threat, tactics, techniques, and practices of terrorists for inclusion in each agency or state basic LE training curriculum. A pre-designated and pre-trained agency TLO or SME would coordinate and conduct such training. This thesis asserts that in the post-9/11 policing environment, CT training is a necessary and essential component of the 21st century local LE training curriculum. Once new officers have been exposed to an initial instruction of the topic, their knowledge and skill can be continually enhanced and updated through annual department-wide training.

b. **Department-Wide Training**

It is recommended that each local LE officer be initially trained in an eight-hour block of instruction that is developed in the same manner as the basic level on CT. This type of training can be integrated into annual in-service training requirements, again, taught at no cost, by trained and predetermined officers from within their department. It is further recommended that post-initial training, a minimum of four hours of CT updates, trends, and tactics can be taught online or through roll call training to every officer each calendar year by their TLO/SME.

Based on the needs and resources of an individual agency, the next level of training can be extended or limited. It is important to note that in the integration of CT as a core competency, the specialized level is a key component of the process.

c. **Specialized Training**

This level of training can be directed at agency TLO/SMEs and personnel assigned to specialized duties within a department. A source of training is the DHS, which provides terrorism training to local LE through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). FLETC provide tuition-free and low cost training to state, local, campus, tribal, and territorial LE agencies. Programs are conducted across the
United States and are normally hosted by a local LE agency. Training is also conducted at FLETC facilities located in Glynco, Georgia, Artesia, New Mexico, Charleston, South Carolina, and Cheltenham, Maryland.191

The Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire) is DHS’s free, online information-sharing resource on IED incidents, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as corresponding IED prevention and protective measures. TRIPwire enhances domestic preparedness by giving the nation’s security and emergency services professionals valuable information and resources to prevent, protect, respond to, and mitigate bombing incidents.192

Additionally, since 2003, the DHS has sponsored training in the PRSBI for first responders. The PRSBI course was developed to provide senior state, tribal, and local emergency responders with the knowledge and skills needed to develop policies for the prevention, interdiction, response, and mitigation of a suicide bombing attack.193 PRSBI is a five-day course conducted in Socorro, New Mexico, at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, and is taught by local and state LE SMEs from across the country. The training, transportation, and lodging are at no cost to first responders. PRSBI includes the observation of actual detonations of suicide device designs, and students also receive instruction in threat tactics unique to suicide bombing scenarios and appropriate, effective countermeasures.194

The above examples provide options for local LE to educate, train, and raise their level of knowledge in CT, all without incurring significant cost, time, or the exhaustion of significant local resources. An added benefit of the federally supported training programs is that these programs are continually updated and evolving to the emerging

trends of terrorism. Individual agencies can develop a dynamic training continuum based upon their needs, resources, and threat conditions; “a one-size fits all” approach is not recommended, nor is a one-time training effort. CT training must be continual and evolve with the tactics, techniques, and methods employed by terrorists.

At the local level, LE cannot shoulder the entire burden for terrorist detection and mitigation of attack. The L.E.A.D. approach emphasizes that contributions from throughout a community are needed to implement an effective local CT strategy.

2. **A Holistic Approach to Local Counterterrorism**

In the protection of local communities, local LE cannot be the only contributor or entity engaged in CT. This thesis asserts that LE should be the catalyst for CT locally, but that a holistic approach is needed to include the training and education of other local government agencies, elected officials, the community, and private sector entities to assist in CT.

*a. Fire Service*

A logical local partner with an opportunity to contribute in a CT role would be the fire service, which in all localities routinely interacts with the community, responds to emergency incidents, and conducts residential and commercial inspections. With their access to private property, their contacts in the local community, and the levels of trust they enjoy, firefighters can do more than simply respond to situations posing physical danger. They can actually gather, make sense of, and report on circumstances that might hint at terrorist involvement and intent, helped in part by community networks they construct to recognize risks.195 Training on the who, what, where, how, and why of terrorism can be conducted by local LE on a continual basis to enhance firefighters’ ability to recognize suspicious persons, materials, or activity, and create a sustainable partnership with local fire departments.

Individual localities need to be mindful of issues of concern related to the fire service and CT, as the potential exists for the abuse of authority and the damaging of community relations. Given the broad license that firefighters have to enter all kinds of buildings without a search warrant, the question arises, should firefighters actively serve as the eyes and ears of CT efforts; that is, go beyond their normal responsibilities of inspection and actually search for evidence of possible terrorist activity? Therefore, both fire and police need to establish clear policies and protocols for fire service information collection and sharing, to ensure that fire departments do not engage in active intelligence gathering, but rather, are trained to recognize and report suspicious activity to LE.

b. Other Municipal Departments

The training of other municipal government departments by local LE, such as public works and public utilities, on the recognition of suspicious activity would enhance a local “eyes and ears” strategy of detecting a pre-operational terrorist, as these departments are active in the community and stand in a position to observe and report something suspicious from many unconventional vantage points. Once again, direct engagement by local LE with these entities can strengthen partnerships, build trust, and potentially, create an outlet to gather information, which may lead to the mitigation of a local attack.

c. Elected Officials

In the implementation of a new, possibly misunderstood and controversial activity, the training and education of locally elected officials is an essential element of CT and LE integration. Local LE leadership can work to educate officials on an understanding of the threat, what local CT engagement does and does not mean, and how local integration of CT is an essential element of overall HS.

An example of a municipal government engaging its citizenry on the topic of terrorism is the City of Boston, which in partnership with the Boston police department,

196 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruszzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism.”
publishes a “Community Response Guide for Terrorism,” whose target audience is residents, workers, and visitors of their city. See Figure 3. Former Mayor Thomas M. Menino had asked the people of Boston to join with public safety personnel “to secure our City.” He stated, “As the nation’s concerns about terrorism intensify, we must educate ourselves so that we are able to respond effectively and appropriately in the event of an emergency. While we must remain vigilant and aware of the serious threat of terrorism, we must not allow our concerns to consume us.”

A significant benefit of the ability of LE to educate elected leaders is funding, which through “buy in” could facilitate efforts to integrate CT into a locality’s policing mission. The importance of CT must be framed to elected officials in the following context, “It is important to remember that in the unfortunate event of an attack, the eyes of the world will descend on their community and ask what they did or did not do to prevent this tragic loss of life from occurring.”

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d. The Community

Local LE in most cases is already heavily invested in community crime prevention efforts to reduce crime and protect their citizenry that includes public awareness, training, as well as social and traditional media outlets for reporting suspicious activity. The inclusion of the topic of terrorism can be accomplished in the same manner, in concert with existing efforts rather than as a competing strategy. Public events, community meetings, casual interaction, and official department communication all provide an opportunity to educate the public on how they can assist local LE in the protection of their communities from terrorism. The signs and indicators of suspicious activity, persons, and materials related to terrorism can be conveyed to the public using the strengths of community policing. A resource that can easily be applied at the local level is the DHS nationwide, “If You See Something, Say Something” public awareness campaign (seen in Figure 4), which provides a simple and effective program to raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, and to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper local LE authorities.198

Figure 4. DHS See Something Say Something Poster

The DHS sees this resource as a way to both empower Americans to participate in this nation’s security and to build important relationships between citizens and local LE agencies to ensure local authorities have the information they need to stop terrorist attacks. The strength and benefits of training and educating the local populous is to encourage quality and relevant information that may have a nexus to terrorism or criminal activity, rather than overburdening local LE with an influx of irrelevant or vague information that can waste time and drain resources.

e. Private Sector

The private sector has an important role to play in local hometown security for the following reasons. In some cases, it may have critical infrastructure responsibilities, and may be the target of an attack, such as a symbolic location, critical resource, or heavily populated location. For this reason, it is essential to engage the private sector and create viable relationships. Additionally, items of interest to terrorists may be sold by private entities within an individual’s jurisdiction. An available online DHS resource to assist local LE with businesses involved in the sale of lawful materials that could be used as components of an IED is the Office of Bombing Prevention’s TRIPwire program, which offers printable bomb making awareness posters and cards that can be printed and distributed by local LE to the related businesses in their jurisdiction.

In the UK, a program designed to protect, enhance resiliency, and partner with the private sector is Project ARGUS, which has been widely popular. Project ARGUS is an initiative that asks businesses and other organizations to consider their preparedness for a terrorist attack. It achieves this preparedness by guiding people through a simulated multi-media attack, which identifies the measures that can assist in preventing, handling, and recovering from such an incident. It explores what is likely to happen in the event of a terrorist attack. It highlights the importance of being prepared and having the necessary plans in place to help safeguard staff, visitors, and assets. The events are free of charge and most last for approximately three hours. Once local LE TLOs have been

199 “If You See Something Say Something.”
established, they can serve as liaisons to partner, train and develop programs like ARGUS to empower local businesses to reduce their opportunity of a terrorist activity.

The second section of the L.E.A.D. model outlined the three levels of local LE training that can have an impact on the integration of CT into the policing continuum, in addition to a community or “holistic” educational approach that involves the fire service, other municipal departments, elected officials, citizens, and the private sector. This approach directly ties in to the third component of L.E.A.D., the active gathering of intelligence from local communities related to terrorism.

D. ACTIVELY COLLECT INTELLIGENCE

CT begins with basic information. It is not some exotic notion straight out of the latest James Bond movie. LE becomes too confused by the bureaucratic rules and regulations, a misunderstanding of intelligence, and its own fetish for secrecy. Good information comes from everyday sources, and intelligence gathering is often nothing more than good police work; the key is knowing what to look for and knowing when, where, and how to share information.201 Local LE is already heavily engaged in intelligence gathering related to traditional criminal activity; once a department’s personnel have been trained and educated on terrorism, the how and who to share information related to terrorism with is all that is then needed.

A comprehensive manual directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal LE agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function is the DOJ, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources.202

201 White, Defending the Homeland, 39.
At a minimum, an easy and simple starting point for local LE to share information that may be related to terrorism or HS is through a SAR program. An outline of this program, along with the ways local LE can integrate SAR into their existing duties, is provided in the following section.

1. Suspicious Activity Reporting

Engagement in SAR is a “no brainer” for local LE. Once command and field personnel have been initially trained, SARs can be quickly integrated into existing policing efforts. This thesis asserts that terrorism-related information is different from traditional criminal information, in that such information may have national or international implications, and therefore, it is of vital importance to share terror-related information in a timely and standardized manner with local FBI-JTTF and state fusion centers. The following NSI documents shown in Figure 5 provide guidelines for the implementation of SAR at the local level.
Observing suspicious activity and taking appropriate action can solve crimes and save lives. Often, crimes begin at the local level. By maximizing information from citizens, law enforcement, and public safety officials; employing intelligence-led policing; and collaborating with fusion centers and appropriate partners, agencies can use actionable information and intelligence to effectively and efficiently detect and deter criminal acts. Your part in the process is vital to our nation’s information sharing environment.

A report entitled Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project was developed to describe the all-crimes approach to gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity by local law enforcement agencies. The report and its recommendations (including the continued emphasis on the protection of privacy and civil liberties) are important for establishing national guidelines that will allow for the timely sharing of SAR information. Although every jurisdiction will develop policies and procedures that take into account the unique circumstances and relationship with its community, below are some strategies your agency can use to integrate the SAR process into its operations.

Suspicious activity is described as “observed behavior reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.”

1. **RECOGNIZE** the importance of suspicious activity reporting (SAR), understand your role in the SAR process, and know that your involvement makes a difference. Strong leadership is an essential element. Gain support from personnel, leadership, and policymakers both internally and externally.

2. **DEVELOP** a data collection process and a secure standardized reporting format for sharing suspicious activity. Review other agencies’ SAR process missions/Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to better understand the process and identify promising practices. Define and communicate trends in terrorism-related activity, geographically specific threat reporting, dangers to critical infrastructure, and general situational awareness.

3. **LEVERAGE** and adopt the use of common national standards to enhance the capability to quickly and accurately analyze suspicious activity data, such as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard (FS) for Suspicious Activity Reporting, the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), and the Records Management System (RMS) and Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) functional standards.
INCORPORATE appropriate guidelines and concepts into your operations, such as intelligence-led policing, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Fusion Center Guidelines, the Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project, and privacy and civil liberties templates. Use these guidelines to establish and integrate the SAR process.

IMPLEMENT and adhere to your agency’s privacy policy, and ensure that the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of citizens are protected. Evaluate and update, if necessary, your privacy policy to ensure that gathering, documenting, processing, and sharing of information regarding terrorism-related criminal activity are specifically addressed. Ensure that the privacy policy is transparent, and communicate the policy to the public and stakeholders.

TRAIN all agency personnel on the SAR process and institutionalize it within your agency. Ensure that law enforcement and public safety personnel understand the SAR process and what internal policies or protocols exist to share appropriate information. Learn about available training to increase or enhance abilities, such as the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) training programs, available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov, or the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program, available at www.SLATT.org.

INSTITUTIONALIZE the gathering of suspicious activity information at the street level, and standardize the reporting of such data so that it may be shared with other appropriate public safety partners, such as your criminal intelligence unit, the state or regional fusion center, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and other law enforcement and public safety partners, as appropriate. Once your agency’s SAR process is developed, continuous improvements will ensure the integrity and institutionalization of the process within the agency.

EDUCATE citizens, businesses, and partners on suspicious activity reporting and how to report activity to the appropriate officials. Consider instituting a Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) program to engage community leaders in your efforts. Guidance on how to establish a BCOT program is available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/BCOT_Fact_Sheet.pdf. Develop outreach materials to educate the public on recognizing and reporting behaviors and incidents indicative of terrorism or other criminal activity. Additionally, existing SAR awareness training programs, such as the NSI’s Homeland Security Partners Training programs available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx, can be leveraged to educate those partners with similar missions to law enforcement.

PARTNER with other law enforcement, public safety, private sector, and state or major urban area fusion centers. Foster interagency collaborations to maximize each other’s resources and create an effective and efficient information sharing environment.

CONNECT to a major information sharing network, such as the Regional Information Sharing Systems® Secure Intranet (RISSNET™), the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). Leverage proven and trusted technology to share information, communicate, and access additional resources.

FOR MORE INFORMATION
Please visit the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) at www.ncirc.gov or e-mail nsinformation@ncirc.gov.
The integration of SAR into any size department should start with a keen understanding by agency leadership of how to capture suspicious information lawfully and with whom to share it in a standardized format. NSI-sponsored programs administered through state and major urban area fusion centers are available to facilitate that need. This training should be mandated by individual department policy to ensure all personnel engaging in SAR activity have been properly trained and are adhering to standardized practices to protect civil liberties.

In the performance of its traditional duties, local LE has numerous opportunities to gather information related to terrorism actively. The collection of this information can be accomplished in concert with existing duties of gathering intelligence related to criminal activity within their localities.

2. Local Intelligence Integration

Local LE officers have numerous opportunities during the performance of their duties to gather intelligence related to terrorism, via personal observation, citizen interaction, and criminal interdiction. It is assumed that local police conduct daily debriefs of arrestees, suspicious persons, confidential sources, and concerned citizens on a host of issues related to traditional criminal activity, such as violence, robbery, gangs, drugs and guns. Thus, an opportunity exists for CT integration with a minimal disruption of existing practices.

In an effort to detect and mitigate terrorist activity, local LE questioning and consensual contact can slightly shift to include inquiries related to extremism and radicalization also, such as, “Do you know anyone with radical views who may be looking to commit a violent act?” Local LE should continue to focus on traditional crime, but integrate CT into their overall mission, to include intelligence gathering. A significant factor in successfully thwarting an attack is to develop information and identify the perpetrators pre-attack, as terrorists operate in the shadows and do not operate overtly.

Local LE uses the strengths of its partnerships, contacts, and relationships through the CP model to impact criminal activity. This same strategy can be applied to the detection of terrorists or extremists hiding within their communities.
3. **Countering Violent Extremism**

In the UK, the *Prevent* component of their CONTEST identifies pre-incident engagement with members of the community as a key objective; essentially, to engage the hearts and minds of the local citizenry, “To disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support people living in the communities where they may operate.”\(^{203}\) Basically, it is a concerted effort by police to curb radicalization and reach out to those who based on socio-economic, geo-political, cultural, or religious disposition, may be at a high risk for involvement in an act of terrorism.\(^{204}\) In the 21st century, police, community partnerships are essential in reducing crime, and in CT, through *Prevent* and other LE initiatives, as UK CT police emphasize the value of police-community relationships and the importance of learning. These valuable lessons are stressed because of the vital role they play in building community-based CT capabilities.\(^{205}\)

In August 2011, the White House released a report, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. This report states that government and LE at the local level have well-established relationships with communities, developed through years of consistent engagement, and therefore, can effectively build partnerships and take action on the ground.\(^{206}\) As part of its effort to support local networks to counter violent extremism, the DHS has launched a number of core initiatives.

- **DHS Conferences and Workshops on CVE:** The DHS hosts conferences and workshops for LE to educate them better about CVE.

- **Training Initiatives:** The DHS is working with the DOJ, and has trained hundreds of thousands of front line officers on SAR and CVE.

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204 Ibid.


• **Grants:** The DHS has prioritized prevention activities through grants that directly support local LE efforts to understand, recognize, prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist pre-cursor activity.207

Through DHS support, local LE can develop CVE programs in concert with existing community policing efforts to identify individuals in the community who may be headed toward radicalization. A CVE community outreach is especially important based on recent ongoing events in Syria and Iraq, where ISIS has been incredibly successful in recruiting westerners to join the fight. The potential of trained and experienced Jihadists re-entering the United States and assimilating back in to local communities should be of concern to local LE and their citizenry, as these individuals may pose a risk of plotting an act of terrorism on domestic soil.

4. **Community—Power of the People**

Locals are the closest LE entity to the people, who are literally, the “eyes and ears” of a community. Outside of traditional LE contacts, information solicited and received from an educated public could be the invaluable piece of information needed to connect the “proverbial dot” to thwart an attack. As the FBI pointed out immediately after the Boston attack, terrorists are somebody’s neighbor, co-worker, friend, or relative. It is clear that this nation’s safety depends on all U.S. citizens reporting suspicious activities, regardless of the intimate relationship they may have with the people they suspect. While it is not desirable to return to the days of the Red Scare, when many Americans lived in fear of being falsely accused of having communist ties, it is crucial not to become complacent. Since 9/11, many have become detached from the reality that terrorists continue to organize, train, and scheme to harm the United States and its people.208

Chapter III discussed CP as a key component of community relations, which also significantly applies to the development of a model to integrate CT at the local level. The 2012 IACP publication *Building Communities of Trust: A Guidance for Community*

207 “Countering Violent Extremism.”

Leaders is a comprehensive guide for local LE leaders to use as they move toward the integration of CT into their policing mission. LE agencies have long recognized the need to develop trusting relationships with the communities they serve.

As engagement in CT may be a new concept for many local LE agencies; such efforts may be misunderstood or pose uncertainty for members of the community. The BCOT initiative is directed at abating fear and building faith in LE within a community to impact crime and terrorism. A particular focus of BCOT has been working with immigrant and minority communities that have historically had negative or distrusting relationships with LE, which makes it especially important to help these communities address any concerns the community members may have with LE, so that everyone can work together to prevent criminal and terrorist activity. Information garnered from community members may provide key information to facilitate the prevention of a potential attack, and residents are more likely to report this activity to LE if a positive, trustworthy relationship is in place.209

The greatest contribution local LE can make to the HS intelligence collection process is to use the strengths of their core competencies and synthesize toward terrorism. The American police officer does not have to abandon any of the crime-prevention tools successfully developed over the past decades to meet the challenge of AQ and its cohorts. Ultimately, these crime-prevention tools, along with police professionalism, training, and wealth of real-world experience, will make America’s police forces the nation’s most valuable HS asset.210

As Jonathan R. White states, in Defending the Homeland, “Someone in every American law enforcement agency should be assigned to collect and forward terrorist intelligence.”211 Local LE is not being overwhelmed with terrorist activity or intelligence; integrating a CT intelligence function can easily be applied to either existing

211 White, Defending the Homeland, 68.
criminal intelligence functions or as a specialized position based on the needs and resources of an individual agency.

The final element of L.E.A.D. is the goal of the first three components, the detection of terrorists who may be planning, operating, or hiding within a local community. This thesis asserts that the question for local LE agencies without a CT strategy is, “Do you know the who, what, and how of terrorists in order to detect them, or are you relying on luck or the federal government to detect them within your jurisdiction?”

E. DETECT

The objective of the leadership, education, and gathering intelligence components related to terrorism are all ultimately directed at being able to identify the “bad guys” pre-attack. No community in America can remain 100% immune from violence or terror, but local LE is duty bound to use all the tools and resources available, to protect, lead, and educate their citizenry in respect to terrorism. It is the view of this thesis that a failure to engage in CT at the local LE level not only creates a significant gap for overall U.S. HS, but is also a blatant negligence of duty.

The task facing American police is not so much in the incorporation of new tactics or technologies, but in the establishment of a CT mindset into everyday LE operations. A simple strategy implementing CT planning, intelligence gathering, and community partnerships into existing police crime-prevention and response procedures will go a very long way toward making America’s communities hostile places for terrorists to operate.212

Adding CT as a layer in the local LE policing package makes practical sense, in that locals are already using all their resources to “detect” violent and non-violent criminals within their jurisdictions. Potential terrorists, whether derived from domestic or international soil, pose the same threat to local communities as well known violent

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212 White, Defending the Homeland, 16.
criminals. All that is required for a local LE agency to detect terrorists is a change of mindset and an organizational wide commitment.

F. IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

In the 21st century, the failure of local LE to engage in CT is an unacceptable condition, regardless of agency size, geographic location, or available resources. The L.E.A.D. model provides a simple and flexible model designed to assist any local LE entity to evolve from zero or little engagement in CT, to a comprehensive integration that becomes part of an agency’s DNA. L.E.A.D. is a progressive model reliant on following the steps in sequential order, but is based upon, by design, a low-tech, easy-to-develop and low-cost application that can be expanded into Anytown, USA.

It is recommended that local LE agencies without a CT strategy consider L.E.A.D as an alternative to doing nothing. Local departments need only to envision themselves post-attack, and ask why they did not integrate CT into their policing strategies, when they may have had the opportunity to make a difference and save lives. As federal and state support is available in the form of training, guidance, funding, and partnerships to assist local LE in a CT mission, all that is required is for individual agencies to be willing and able.

Presently, in the absence of state or federal mandates, local engagement in CT is left solely up to the 18,000 individual agencies across the United States. L.E.A.D provides a basic model for Anytown, USA to integrate CT into it existing mission, to harden its target and reduce the opportunity for terrorist activity within its community.

G. WHAT DOES AN AGENCY USING L.E.A.D. LOOK LIKE?

Small, medium, or large LE agencies that integrate the L.E.A.D. model into their policing mission will demonstrate and integrate the following components, but can adapt integration based on their own environment and ever-changing landscape.

• **Leadership:** CT will be woven into all facets of their traditional duties, from everyday patrol, investigative work, to pre-planned events. CT will be viewed as a continual priority and not a passing trend. Domestic and international events, trends, and tactics related to terrorism will be applied to their CT application. The strengths of community policing, trust, and
partnerships, will be refined and continually applied to open dialogue and solicit information related to HS.

- **Education and Training:** CT will be a key component of all levels of an agency’s training curriculum. New training related to terrorism will be continually sought out and an agency’s terrorism IQ will continue to mature and grow, and not remain the same and stagnate. An agency will continually seek out new opportunities to train and educate the local populous, other government agencies and the private sector; a constant work in progress that intersects with traditional policing duties.

- **Intelligence Gathering:** Ensure all personnel have been properly trained on SAR and develop viable relationships with local FBI-JTTF and fusion centers for the sharing of information. Incorporate CT-based questioning into traditional policing, such as traffic stops, citizen interaction, and formal interviews.

- **Detect:** Proactively work to protect local communities from the threat of terror by integrating the aforementioned components into an agency’s DNA by using traditional LE tactics to detect and mitigate terrorist activity. Utilize the strength of new and existing relationships to identify and deter radicalization with the use of community partnerships. Lastly, continually work to reduce complacency and keep CT relevant from a local perspective, regardless of the level of activity a community endures.

H. CONCLUSION

The case can clearly be made that an existential threat of terrorism exists and that local LE has the ability to contribute greatly with minimal disruption of their core services. LE can apply the strengths of their traditional mission toward terrorism with minimal resources, financial obligations, and restructuring. In addition, CT can be integrated into local communities through education, open dialogue, and applying CT in a dignified and transparent manner.

The application of integrating an effective policing and CT strategy will take time, training (multiple dimensions) and coordination with state and federal partners. Using the strengths of CP to integrate a CT component in the overall strategy of securing local communities makes practical sense. Members of the community may have knowledge of terrorist activities but without the strong relationship between the police and the community, that information will not be brought forward to the authorities. In
fact, gaining intelligence to prevent future terrorist acts is one of the most important aspects of HS. This thesis reiterates again, “Local agencies that rely solely on the federal government to investigate terrorism in their communities, when they have the opportunity to make a significant contribution, do so at their own community’s risk.”

With the proper implementation of L.E.A.D. and using the strengths of CP, local LE agencies can build a solid intelligence base in their community, which can serve to strengthen state and national HS efforts. Traditional crime fighting and CT efforts can complement each other and both effectively work toward the goal of protecting the citizenry of their jurisdiction. America’s genius has been and always will be its empowerment of local institutions. Empowering local commanders on the ground to make tactical decisions is how wars are won. Empowering local police to act as the front line for HS is how Americans can win the war on terror.

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214 Kelling and Bratton, “Policing Terrorism.”
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