FINDING THE WOLVES IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING: 
WAYS TO DISTINGUISH AND DETER LONE-WOLF TERRORISTS

by

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March 2015

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## Abstract

Despite the rise in the number of attacks by lone-wolf terrorists, the lone-wolf threat has largely been neglected by academic researchers and counterterrorism practitioners. The nature of the lone-wolf terrorist has introduced new challenges to law enforcement and counterterrorism unlike the more discussed problems of international group terrorism. This thesis suggests, however, that policies created to help deter group terrorism could be useful in detecting and deterring lone-wolf terrorists.

The existing policy framework for group terrorism deterrence may have great utility in the fight against lone wolves, but policy use and effectiveness requires a careful examination of the characteristics unique to lone-wolf terrorism to ensure that the deterrence policies match. This thesis uses the comparative method and examines three case studies of lone-wolf terrorism from the United States and Europe: the Fort Hood shooter of 2009 (Major Nidal Hasan), the Boston Marathon bombers, and Anders Behring Breivik of Norway. By examining the unique circumstances of each case, this thesis determines what policies were and were not effective and in need of adaption to deter the threat of lone-wolf terrorism.

## Subject Terms

- lone-wolf terrorism
- counterterrorism
- Nidal Hasan
- Boston Marathon bombing
- terrorism
- Anders Breivik
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The existing policy framework for group terrorism deterrence may have great utility in the fight against lone wolves, but policy use and effectiveness requires a careful examination of the characteristics unique to lone-wolf terrorism to ensure that the deterrence policies match. This thesis uses the comparative method and examines three case studies of lone-wolf terrorism from the United States and Europe: the Fort Hood shooter of 2009 (Major Nidal Hasan), the Boston Marathon bombers, and Anders Behring Breivik of Norway. By examining the unique circumstances of each case, this thesis determines what policies were and were not effective and in need of adaption to deter the threat of lone-wolf terrorism.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DOJ  Department of Justice
EU  European Union
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISC  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
ISB  Islamic Society of Boston
ISIS  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NYPD  New York Police Department
START  Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
U.S.  United States
WFO-TFO  Washington D.C. Field Office/Joint Terrorism Task Force Field Office
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The past decade has seen a rise in lone-wolf terrorism. This development, in combination with the ubiquitous nature of the Internet and social media, which are fueling radicalization across state and national boundaries, has introduced new challenges to law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. Most terrorism studies in recent years have focused on group terrorism, and many counterterrorism policies are intended to prevent or detect individuals from becoming radicalized and participating in organized terrorist activities. This thesis examines the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorism and study foiled and successful lone-wolf terrorist acts within the United States (U.S.) and Europe. It asks, How can lone-wolf terrorists be identified? Also, which counterterrorism policies must be changed or adopted to help address or identify this threat?

B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH

The nature of the lone-wolf terrorist has introduced new challenges to law enforcement and counterterrorism officials that are very different from the better examined problems of international group terrorism. The fact remains that lone-wolf terrorism is not “new” for counterterrorism efforts; rather, events like 9/11 dominate counterterrorism efforts worldwide. Lone-wolf terrorism, thus, is really an old problem reemerging. The policies that originated to help deter group terrorism could be useful in detecting and deterring lone-wolf terrorists, but only a close examination of those policies can determine how useful they might be.

The threat of lone-wolf terrorism can be seen in the rise in the recent number of terrorist attacks that span from the United States to Europe. In August 2011, President Barack Obama said that

the biggest concern we have right now is not the launching of a major terrorist operation, although that risk is always there, the risk that we’re especially concerned over right now is the lone-wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently. . . But I think the most likely
scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone-wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.\(^1\)

Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson stated before Congress:

> We must remain vigilant in detecting and preventing terrorist threats that may seek to penetrate the homeland from the land, sea or air. We must continue to build relationships with state and local law enforcement, and the first responders in our communities, to address the threats we face from those who self-radicalize to violence, the so-called “lone-wolf” who may be living quietly in our midst, inspired by radical, violent ideology to do harm to Americans.\(^2\)

The 2011 Breivik rampage in Norway looms large in the international discourse. Norway’s King Harald addressed his nation, stating that “the attacks that were carried out in Oslo and Utøya were an attack on the Norwegian society we value so highly.”\(^3\)

World leaders have spoken out about the attacks that have been conducted by lone-wolf terrorists, and have brought them to the front of the public’s mind and calling for action to stop these terrorists. However, most nations’ policies toward terrorism are still largely focused on deterring international terrorism. For example, “The Congressional Research Service lists a total of 1,649 reports on the general topic of terrorism. Only ten of them address the problem of lone-wolf terrorism and each concentrates on the lone-wolf provision of FISA.”\(^4\) This thesis hopes to identify characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists, spark a debate over policies on the subject of lone-wolf terrorism, identify possible solutions to combat the threat, and add to the short list of research on lone-wolf terrorism as a whole.

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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Many scholars have said that a lone-wolf terrorist profile does not exist. That may very well be the case, but common characteristics can be discerned; for example, a lone-wolf terrorist’s background prior to the attack, planning of the attack, and aspects of the attack itself. These three areas can be used to tip off law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies to a lone-wolf terrorist. This thesis argues further that these characteristics can be used to create a preliminary profile of a lone-wolf terrorist based on common themes that can be seen within the phenomenon, which should translate into changes in policy.

Many policies have been adopted to fight terrorism by the United States and Europe since 9/11. These policies, as they stand, have been able to fight international group-based terrorism, but the policies will need to be amended to fight the unique nature of lone-wolf terrorism.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the years since the 9/11 attacks, the academic literature on the subject of lone-wolf terrorism has been limited, compared to the large amount of work done examining the problem of international group-based terrorism. The focus on international group terrorism has persisted despite the rise in the number of lone-wolf terrorist attacks in recent years. An international terrorist incident of the magnitude of 9/11 has not occurred since 2001, but lone-wolf terror incidents have been approaching that magnitude in terms of the numbers of deaths in Europe, notably the Norwegian lone-wolf terrorist Anders Behring Breivik.

1. Lone-Wolf Terrorism Defined

How “alone” does a person have to be, to be considered a lone wolf? The term “lone-wolf terrorism” suggests a single actor, but scholars and experts somewhat disagree as to just what qualifies as lone-wolf terrorism. Jeffery Simon defines lone-wolf terrorism as:
the use or threat of violence or nonviolent sabotage, including cyber attacks, against government, society, business, the military, or any other target by an individual acting alone or with minimal support from one or two other people, to further a political, social, religious, financial or other related goal, or, when not having such an objective, nevertheless has the same effect, or potential effect, upon government, society, business, or the military in terms of creating fear and/or disrupting daily life and/or causing government, society, business, or the military to react with heightened security and/or other response.\(^5\)

By Simon’s definition of lone-wolf terrorism, the Boston bombers and the Fort Hood shooter of 2011 both count as lone-wolf terrorists.

More broadly, Ramon Spaaij defines lone-wolf terrorism:

as political violence perpetrated by individuals who act alone; who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; and whose tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction.\(^6\)

By Spaaij’s definition of lone-wolf terrorism, Anders Behring Breivik is a lone-wolf terrorist.

Simon’s definition suggests the key point is that a lone wolf is not connected with or supported by any outside group during the lone wolf’s terror plot. Spaaij’s definition of lone-wolf terrorism, on the other hand, is centered on the number of terrorists involved, rather than whether support is received from an outside group. For the purposes of the present research, a combination of both Jeffrey Simon’s and Ramon Spaaij’s definitions is used in evaluating lone-wolf terrorist. This thesis argues it is not the number of lone-wolf terrorists that determines if a lone-wolf attack occurs, but the lack of organizational support for the attack.

Peter J. Phillips states that “lone-wolf terrorism is terrorism perpetrated by a person operating alone who conceives and directs his own actions outside of any formal


or informal command structure.”  

Similarly, the Congressional Research Service offers this definition:

Lone-wolf terrorism involves terrorist attacks carried out by persons who (a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and (c) whose modus operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command hierarchy.

Meanwhile, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines lone-wolf terrorism as a form of domestic terrorism:

This type of homegrown terrorist draws ideological inspiration from formal terrorist organizations, and remains extremely anonymous limiting law enforcement detection and prevention capabilities. Despite their unnatural planning methodology and limited resources, they can create high profile; destructive attacks that can often cause substantial infrastructure damage and create complete chaos.

For the purpose of the thesis, the following definition is used to define lone-wolf terrorism:

an individual or several individuals whose act of terror is conducted without orders from a higher chain of command. The individual or individuals are not part of an organized terrorist group, but may have had contact or been trained in the past from a terrorist group. Lone-wolf terrorists may take ideological and motivational factors from known group terrorists. Lone-wolf terrorists use violence against governments, society, military and civilian targets in order to further their ideological motives.

Despite the wide variety of definitions, one concept remains the same; the terrorists themselves are not members of a known terrorist group and the terrorists do not take orders from a higher chain of command when conducting their acts of terror. No

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single accepted definition of what lone-wolf terrorism exists, which is a major issue across lone-wolf terrorism.\textsuperscript{10}

2. Motivation Factors of Lone-Wolf Terrorists

Jerry Simon describes five very different motivational factors for lone-wolf terrorists and these five factors could be used to categorize lone-wolf terror acts as well. He states that three of the five categories also apply to terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{11} The first type of lone-wolf terrorist category is the “secular lone wolf who, like secular terrorist groups, is committing violent attacks for political, ethnic-nationalist or separatist causes.”\textsuperscript{12} The second type of lone-wolf terrorist is religious, and commits violence in the name of religion.\textsuperscript{13} The third type of lone-wolf terrorist is the “single-issue lone wolf, who perpetrates attacks in the name of specific issues such as abortion.”\textsuperscript{14} The fourth type of lone-wolf terrorist is “the idiosyncratic lone wolf, who do commit terror in the name of a cause, but it is the severe personality and psychological problems that mainly drive these individuals to violence.”\textsuperscript{15} The fifth type of type of lone-wolf terrorist is truly unique from all the other types that Simon describes. This type of lone wolf is motivated by monetary gain, and thus, is called a criminal lone wolf.\textsuperscript{16} These typologies can be used to identify lone-wolf terrorist cases from other criminal acts.

3. Lone-Wolf Terrorism Scholarly Studies

Three major studies have been conducted on the occurrences of lone-wolf terrorism in the Western world and of the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists that might be used to identify them. The study conducted by Christopher Hewitt is the earliest of the


\textsuperscript{11} Simon, \textit{Lone-wolf Terrorism}, 43.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 44.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
three. He examined 3,000 cases of terrorism from 1955 to 1999 and found that 30 cases of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States occurred during that period.17 Hewitt claims that “the rate of psychological disturbance is considerably higher among lone-wolf terrorists compared to group-based terrorists.”18 The high rate of psychological disturbance could be one way of characterizing and identifying lone-wolf terrorists before their acts of terror.

Similarly, Ramon Spaaij concluded that 198 lone-wolf terrorist attacks occurred within the United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia from 1940 to 2010.19 Spaaij’s research concluded that among these cases, three out of five perpetrators had some sort of mental ailment.20

Spaaij’s research also addresses the weapons that lone-wolf terrorists used in the attacks. The weapons that lone-wolf terrorists use can vary just as much as the terrorists themselves. Spaaij writes that the most commonly used weapons of lone-wolf terrorists are firearms and bombs.21 Based on his research, and his definition of lone-wolf terrorism, firearms were used in 43 percent of lone-wolf cases, explosives 28 percent, armed hijacking of a bus or aircraft 16 percent, and arson 6 percent of the time.22 It is interesting to note that according to Spaaij’s research, lone-wolf terrorists’ use of firearms is notably higher in the United States than in any other country.23

Spaaij also notes, “the data on weapons used in lone-wolf terrorist attacks are particularly interesting when compared to weapons used in group-based terrorism . . . . [F]irearms are the most commonly weapon used by lone-wolf terrorists, [while] bombs and fire bombings are dominant form weapon used by international terrorists.”24

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17 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al-Qaeda (New York: Routledge 2003), 80.
18 Ibid., 78.
19 Spaaij, Understanding Lone-wolf Terrorism, 9–12.
20 Ibid., 49–53.
21 Ibid., 72.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 72–3.
24 Ibid., 73.
reason is that making a bomb requires technical ability and training that most lone-wolf terrorists do not have.

Finally, a study by Rafaello Pantucci published in 2011 focused on the radicalization processes and the motives of lone-wolf terrorists. His study showed that some lone wolves used the Internet during their radicalization process and had some sort of personal grievance that lead them to be associated with a violent extremist view.25 His study only looked at three cases of successful lone-wolf terrorist attacks; however, its findings may not be generalizable.

Two of the three studies help to support Hewitt’s claim that lone-wolf terrorists are in fact psychologically disturbed individuals. The three studies also show that lone-wolf terrorists have varying methods of radicalization and that the number of lone-wolf terrorist attacks has only grown over the past few decades.

4. A Path to Radicalization

The radicalization process that starts terrorists down the path to action has been widely debated. No standard profile on how the lone-wolf terrorist radicalizes exists, but Spaaij states that the radicalization “tends to result from a combination of individual processes, interpersonal relations and socio-political and cultural circumstances.”26 He also states that factors that influence most lone-wolf terrorists include, “to varying degrees and in variable combinations: personal aversion or depression, negatively perceived developments in personal life or career, interaction with extremist movements, socio-political polarization and radicalization, militant literature and Internet publications, and admired terrorism occurring elsewhere.”27 It is interesting to point out the Internet as a means and vehicle of radicalization due to the anonymous and ambiguous nature of the Internet in terms of how lone-wolf terrorists can radicalize to plain sight of law enforcement agencies. Based on Spaaij’s assessment of the

27 Ibid.
radicalization process of lone-wolf terrorists, the terrorists in question radicalize based on political and personal agendas, which is not unlike international terrorists.

The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs wrote a report that supports Spaaij’s assessment about how lone-wolf terrorists radicalize. The report is primarily concerned with violent Islamist extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown terrorist threat. The report details a four-step path to radicalization that applies to violent Islamist extremists developed by the New York Police Department (NYPD), and the same basic principles apply to lone-wolf terrorism when using Spaaij’s assessment of the radicalization process of lone-wolf terrorists:

Pre-Radicalization: … [T]he point of origin for individuals before they begin the radicalization process. It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi [ideology] … as their own ideology.

Self-Identification: … [T]he phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity, and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own.

Indoctrination: … [T]he phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause… While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, … association with like-minded people is an important factor as the process deepens.

Jihadization: …[T]he phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in [terrorist activities] and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the … terrorist attack. These “acts in furtherance” will include planning, preparation and execution.28

The NYPD’s radical Islamic path to radicalization is evident in two of the three case studies examined in the thesis, and it is a useful tool that can be used to classify not only lone-wolf terrorism, but also any case of terrorism.

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The article, “What is Lone-wolf Terrorism?: A Research Note,” found in *Terrorism Research & Analysis Project: A Collection of Thoughts, Ideas, & Perspectives*, takes the lone-wolf terrorist personal agenda towards radicalization to another level. The authors theorize, “a lone-wolf’s violence may be a response to increased isolation from other extremists. The increased isolation may occur for a variety of reasons including personal turmoil and/or group rejection.” The would-be lone-wolf terrorist has interactions with an extremist group, according to these authors, and in doing so, has a way to relive the personal frustrations by participating in extremist culture. At some point, a separation occurs between the would-be lone-wolf terrorist and the extremist group. Once the lone-wolf terrorist is cut off from the group, the terrorist loses a release valve to be able to blow off steam. Thus, frustrations mount and must be released.

Based on this sort of interaction, “the lone-wolf may perceive taking violent action as a means to restore his/her ties to the extremist world.” This theory is centered on the personal interaction, and subsequently, rejection of a lone-wolf terrorist by the larger extremist community, which then encourages the lone-wolf terrorist to act out. In this case, the lone-wolf terrorist is not part of a group at the time of the terror act, but is fueled by the rejection of the group among other reasons to go on a rampage of terror.

5. **Counterterrorism Polices in the United States and Europe**

Many policies have been enacted to combat the terrorist threat since 9/11, but very few address the lone-wolf terrorist threat specifically. The United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) all have enacted laws and policies for the prevention and apprehension of terrorists.

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30 Ibid., 331.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
The United States enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly known as the USA PATRIOT ACT. The Act greatly enhanced the U.S.’ ability to combat international group terrorism, but not lone-wolf terrorism specifically. One of the most current laws dealing with lone-wolf terrorism can be found in Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458. It states:

Under this lone-wolf provision, a non-United States person who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism is deemed to be an agent of a foreign power under FISA. This provision does not change the procedures to be used to apply for a court order authorizing electronic surveillance or a physical search under FISA. If an order is sought under this definition of an “agent of a foreign power,” however, the applicant is not required to demonstrate a connection between the target of the electronic surveillance or the physical search and a foreign nation, foreign group, or international terrorist group. Nor does the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), in approving such an order, have to find probable cause to believe that such a connection existed. Rather, if the court authorizes such a surveillance or physical search using this definition of agent of a foreign power, the FISC judge has to find, in pertinent part, that, based upon the information provided by the applicant for the order, the target had engaged in or was engaging in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore.33

Tellingly, the provision only deals with lone-wolf terrorists who are foreign nationals and does not address domestic lone-wolf terrorism.

As a policy, the FBI is the lead agency for combating and investigating domestic terrorism within the United States. This policy is outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 39. This directive “validates and reaffirms existing Federal Lead Agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to the Department of Justice (DOJ), as delegated to the FBI, for threats or acts of terrorism within the United

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States.” It is mainly the case because acts of terrorism are seen as a criminal act, as well as a threat to national security.

The United States is not alone in passing measures to prevent terrorism; other western nations have also followed suit. The United Kingdom has followed suit with the United States in passing counterterrorism laws; however before 9/11, the United Kingdom passed the Terrorism Act of 2000, which provided a legal basis for prosecuting terrorists and banning them from operating within the United Kingdom. In December 2011, the United Kingdom passed the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. This Act’s main focus is “to protect the public from a small number of people who pose a real terrorist threat to our security but who cannot be prosecuted, or in the case of foreign nationals, deported.”

The United Kingdom was not the only nation or group of nations in Europe to pass measures to deter terrorism. The EU also has taken steps to prevent terrorism among its members. The EU has a policy to counter the terrorist threat centered on four objectives, or pillars, and it is outlined in the European Union Counterterrorism Strategy. The EU has a four-pillar process for combating terrorism in general. Since the EU is made up of different nations, the EU attempts to help coordinate policies within the various nations by using the European Union Counterterrorism Strategy.

The first pillar deals with the prevention of terrorism within the member states of the EU. The prevention pillar “aims to combat radicalization and recruitment of terrorists by identifying the methods, propaganda and the instruments used by terrorists.” The policy of prevention relies on the follow key areas for the member states:

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36 Ibid.

develop common approaches to spot and tackle problem behavior; hold in check incitement and recruitment in key environments; develop inter-cultural dialogue; explain European policies better; promote good governance, democracy, education, and economic prosperity through assistance programs; continue research in this area and share analysis and experiences.38

The key areas could be useful in stopping lone-wolf terrorism, but most likely, it would help deter international terrorism.

The second pillar deals with the protection from terrorism within the member states of the EU. The protection pillar in terms of policy aims “to reduce the vulnerability of targets to attack and to limit the resulting impact of attack. It proposes to establish collective action for border security, transport and other cross-border infrastructures.”39 As a policy, the EU looks at hardening its infrastructure and protecting its members by strengthening the borders of the states themselves. The protection pillar is set up to protect against a general terrorist threat, or commonly, the international terrorist and not the lone-wolf terrorist.

The third pillar entails the pursuit of terrorists within the EU states. The pursuit pillar aims “to pursue terrorists across borders, while respecting human rights and international law. The EU wishes first and foremost to cut off access to attack materials (arms, explosives, etc.), disrupt terrorist networks and recruitment agents and tackle the misuse of non-profit associations.”40 In terms of policy within the pursuit pillar, the EU has enacted policies to stop the financing of terrorism and by disrupting the ability for the terrorists to communicate, especially via the Internet. As far as policy is concerned, the EU is looking at terrorism in a general concept and not looking specifically at lone-wolf terrorism.

The final pillar is the response pillar. The EU will handle the response to a terrorist attack in the same manner it would a natural, technological, or man-made

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
disaster within a member state.\textsuperscript{41} As a policy within the response pillar, the EU has a database of all the resources and assets of each member state has in case of a terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{42} As far as policies are concerned, it would appear that this pillar could respond to any sort of terrorist attack, lone-wolf or otherwise.

Michael Downing and Matt Mayer outlined four key policies that need to be changed or created to combat the lone-wolf terrorist better in their article entitled, “Preventing the Next “Lone Wolf” Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger Federal-State-Local Capabilities.” The case studies within the thesis are examined with Downing and Mayers’ policy suggestions to determine if their policy suggestions are valid.

6. Is the Threat Serious?

The threat of lone-wolf terrorists is real and a serious concern to the world, but is not a new phenomenon. It is just a phenomenon being reborn in the post-9/11 world. In August 2014, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security released a joint bulletin stating that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has home foreign fighters sent to possibly conduct attacks in response to U.S. air strikes in Iraq and it went on to state lone-wolf terrorists present law enforcement with limited opportunities to detect and disrupt plots, which frequently involve simple plotting against targets of opportunity.\textsuperscript{43} In 2014, the call to arms by groups like ISIS to would-be lone-wolf terrorists to attack the West is also not a new concept.\textsuperscript{44} In 2003, Osama bin Laden published an article calling for sympathizers to take action without waiting for instructions.\textsuperscript{45} In 2006, a text authored by an al-Qaeda member, Abu Jihad al-Masri, “How to fight alone,” circulated widely in jihadist forms and another prominent Salafi writer, Abu Musab al-Suri, also advocated that acts of terrorism be

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{41} Council of European Union, \textit{The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy}.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
carried out by small, autonomous cells or individuals. He outlined a strategy for global conflict that took the form of resistance by small cells or individuals and kept organizational links to an absolute minimum.\textsuperscript{46} Since the call to arms by leaders of ISIS, many nations have spoken out and have validated the threat that lone-wolf terrorists create.

The threat is serious enough that countries around the world have passed new legislation to combat and stem the growing threat better. France adopted new anti-terror legislation to combat the old threat of lone-wolf terrorism due to recent events concerning the ISIS lone-wolf threat. The French law punishes," lone wolves who plan terrorist attacks on their own, and allows authorities to block entry to any EU citizen or their relatives if their presence in France constitutes a threat."\textsuperscript{47} The French were not the only country to pass new laws in an effort to deter lone-wolf terrorism. Chile passed a new anti-terror law that included new charges for the lone-wolf offender because of the looming threat of that lone-wolf terrorists pose.\textsuperscript{48} If the threat was not serious, governments would not pass and have enacted laws to combat the old but reborn threat of lone-wolf terrorism.

According to the FBI strategic plan of 2005–2009, the lone-wolf terrorists will be the most significant domestic terrorism threat over the next five years.\textsuperscript{49} Despite their unnatural planning methodology and limited resources, they can create high profile, destructive attacks that can often cause substantial infrastructure damage and create complete chaos.\textsuperscript{50} Cleary, the FBI has taken the threat serious since 2005. The FBI was correct in the significance of the threat to the United States or elsewhere based on the numbers of lone-wolf cases that have taken place since the publication of the strategic plan.

\textsuperscript{46} Weimann, “Lone Wolves in Cyberspace,” 1–2.


\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
The Heritage Foundation compiled a list of 50 known terror plots that have been stopped from 9/11 to 2007. Forty-two plots can be considered an act of lone-wolf terrorism against the United States.\textsuperscript{51} It is evident that the number of lone-wolf terrorist incidents have increased since 9/11, as Figure 1 shows. Based on the rise of the number of incidents, the threat of lone-wolf terrorism is real and on the rise.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Group_v_Lone_actors.png}
\caption{The increase in lone-wolf actors in relation to group actors\textsuperscript{52}}
\end{figure}

The lone-wolf terrorist life cycle, when compared to group-based terrorist, is a lot longer, and thus, a lot more dangerous. According to a brief by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “on average, lone actor terrorists have a significantly longer life span as terrorists than group participants. On average, group participants “survive” 370 days from the time they commit their first preparatory activity until the time they are arrested. In contrast, lone actors “survive” in


excess of 1,900 days from date of first preparatory behavior to date of arrest.” The longer a terrorist can avoid apprehension the longer the terrorist can kill and create havoc. The lone-wolf terrorist has the longest life cycle among all terrorists, and thus makes the threat of a lone-wolf terrorist more urgent.

According to David Inserra,

of the past 62 terrorist attacks or plots against the U.S. homeland, 51 could be considered homegrown. Many of these attacks were lone-wolf attacks without formal connection to a terrorist group. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security has increased security at federal buildings in major U.S. cities and called for local law enforcement officials around the nation to be prepared for more attacks. In all, 51 out of 62 cases could be considered homegrown and lone-wolf style terror plots, which equates to 82 percent of the most recent cases of terrorism being lone wolf in nature. These numbers alone are reason enough to take the threat of lone-wolf terrorism seriously.

Based on the numbers of cases of lone-wolf terrorism, lone-wolf life cycle length, and the resurgence of lone-wolf terrorism, can be seen as a more mainstream form of

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54 Ibid.

terrorism. The lone-wolf terrorist is a very serious threat to the world as a whole and not specific to one country.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis uses the comparative method and examines three case studies of lone-wolf terrorism from the United States and Europe: the Fort Hood shooter of 2009 (Major Nidal Hasan), the Boston Marathon bombers, and Anders Behring Breivik of Norway. This method employs a structured, focused comparison across all three cases. The structure of each case study is the same to standardize the analysis of each terrorist and logically sequence the information. Lone-wolf terrorists know no borders or bounds while committing acts of terrorism. For each case study, the analysis first examines the background of the perpetrators in terms of determining if it is lone-wolf terrorism, then the specifics of the terrorist act itself, then a review of the findings of the official documents on the case, and finally, a summary of key points of the case. Current policies, laws, and counterterrorism approaches are assessed from the case to determine whether they could have prevented the lone-wolf terrorist, and new approaches or adaptations are considered if necessary.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The events of September 11, 2001 forever changed the United States and the world at large. The events of that day showed that terrorists will go to great lengths to harm the United States and its allies. In response to the events of 9/11, the United States implemented policies, such as the War on Terrorism and passed the law known as the USA PATRIOT ACT, which many experts believe has reduced the likelihood of another group terrorist attack on American soil.56 The USA PATRIOT ACT, combined with the

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War on Terror, have caused terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda to become decentralized.\footnote{John Ellis, “Terrorism in the Genomic Age,” in \textit{Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment Readings and Interpretations}, ed. Russell D. Howard, Bruce Hoffman, and Stacy Neal (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), 301–303.} One does not get more decentralized than a lone-wolf terrorist. As the likelihood of a group-based terrorist attack has been reduced, the most serious terrorist threat facing the United States and its allies in the future is likely to be the lone-wolf terrorist. The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I provides the research question, an explanation of the thesis’s relevance, the literature review, and a road map. The next three chapters—Chapters II, III, and IV—examine successful acts of lone-wolf terrorism that have exploited the unique nature of the lone-wolf terrorist phenomena. The first two of the three chapters examines domestic lone-wolf terrorists within the United States. The first chapter is the Major Nidal Hasan case study and the second is the Boston Bombings case study. The final case study chapter examines a case of lone-wolf terrorism that occurred in Norway, the Anders Berivik case study. For each case, the analysis first examines the background to the perpetrators, followed by the specifics of the terrorist acts, then reviews findings of the official documents on the cases, and finally, provides a summary.

Chapter V examines policies that may need to be changed or adopted to combat the growing threat of lone-wolf terrorism by law enforcement or counterterrorism experts. Chapter VI forms the conclusion.
II. MAJOR NIDAL MALIK HASAN

A. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 2009, Nidal Hasan went to Fort Hood with the intent of committing an act of terror for jihad. He killed 13 people and wounded 42 others in his act of terror.58 Just before he opened fire, he yelled “God is Great” in Arabic.59

For this case study—as with all the studies in this thesis—the analysis first examines the background of the perpetrators to determine what aspects of the terror act qualify as lone-wolf terrorism. Then, it reviews the specifics of the terrorist act itself. It follows with a review of the findings of the official documents on the case; and concludes with a summary of the key points of the case.

B. WHY THIS IS AN ACT OF LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

The debate is still ongoing to as whether Nidal Hasan’s shooting rampage counts as an act of terrorism. As of October 20, 2012, the U.S. government did not deem his actions as an act of terror, but rather, an act of workplace violence.60

Many commentators have discussed why the U. S. government has not declared it an act of terror. One hypothesis notes that Hasan was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army and suggests that classifying his actions as terror would bring some sort of discredit to the Army, as well as the government in general. Indeed, U.S. governmental leaders in speeches go out of their way to not call it terrorism, but The Fort Hood

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59 Ibid., 1.

shooting was the main focus of a counterterrorism lessons learned reported to the U.S. Senate.61

By using the definitions of terrorism and lone-wolf terrorism found in Chapter I of this thesis, it is clear that it was an act of terror, and not workplace violence. Raffaello Pantucii and Sarah Teich define Nidal Hasan’s shooting rampage as an act of lone-wolf terrorism.62 These scholars define this event as lone-wolf terrorism because of the aspects of Hasan’s motivations and because of the shooting massacre that he committed. Leading scholars, the Fort Hood shooting victims, and the public at large, deem Nidal Hasan’s actions as terroristic. Nidal Hasan fits one of the typologies of lone-wolf terrorists discussed in Chapter I, the religious type, who commits violence in the name of religion. Hasan is a lone-wolf terrorist.

C. LIFE LEADING UP TO TERROR ACT

Nidal Malik Hasan was born in Arlington, Virginia, in 1970. He was a second-generation immigrant; his parents were Palestinian. He was raised in a Muslim household but he was not particularly devout in his younger years.63 After he graduated high school in Virginia, he joined the U.S. Army. During his initial enlistment, he attained a bachelor’s degree in biochemistry in 1995. In the coming years, he earned a medical degree and became an Army psychiatrist.64 By these measures, Hasan began life as any number of other Americans.

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D. IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS LEADING TO TERROR ACT

In 1998, his father died, and three years later, his mother died as well. The passing of his parents seemed to leave a hole within his life. In the wake of this tragedy in his life, his renewed devotion to Islam became a catalyst for his radicalization. Shortly after his mother passed away, Hasan began attending mosques around the Washington, DC area. One mosque in particular is of significance to his ideological radicalization during this time in his life, the Dar Al-Hijrah Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia. Anwar al-Awlaki, a known Muslim extremist and recruiter with ties to al-Qaeda, was the Imam of Dar Al-Hijrah.65

The Hasan and Awlaki connection is not random or by chance. In 2011, years after the Fort Hood shooting, the FBI interviewed a subject who claimed to have met Awlaki after the shooting, and according to this third party, Awlaki said, “that Hasan had contacted him via the Internet and had asked what he could do to help Muslims and that Alwaki advised Hasan that since he was an American soldier, he should kill other American soldiers.”66 The Webster Commission Report states, “Awlaki is a prime example of a radicalization leader. For many years he blended his anti-Western rhetoric with mundane religious observations and advice.”67 For 18 months before the Fort Hood terror act, Hassan and Awlaki exchanged numerous e-mails.68 The official report on the Fort Hood Shooting in 2009 stated, “Awlaki or his rhetoric may have inspired at least four known homegrown U.S. radicals who took or attempted violent acts or training: Nidal Hassan, Michael Finton, Faisal Shahzad, and Zachary Chesser.”69

Prior to the Fort Hood shooting, Hasan showed signs of being disgruntled over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.70 Soldiers in school with Hasan reported in 2003 that Hasan attempted to preach against the “U.S. war against Islam” during a class in

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66 Ibid., 62.
67 Ibid., 34.
68 Ibid., 34–6.
69 Ibid., 34.
70 “Life and Career Nidal Hasan,”
environmental health, and he also argued for Muslims to be conscientious objectors to the fighting in Islamic countries.71

Nidal Hasan’s path to radicalization is in line with the NYPD’s four-stage model of radicalization by an Islamic extremist outlined in Chapter I. Hasan had a life situation that helped him start his pre-radicalization phase, which included the death of his parents and the U.S. War on Terror. Hasan became more religious after his life-altering event, which led him to self-identify with Islamic extremism.

At the latest, Hasan’s indoctrination phase began when he started to attend the mosque of which al-Awlaki held a leadership position at and continued for years after that. The start of the jihadization phase is also unclear, but it is known that he spoke out against the War on Terror and Muslims fighting other Muslims in the year before to his act of lone-wolf terrorism.72 This development was his call to action.

E. OFFICIAL FINDINGS

On December 17, 2008, a year before the terrorist attack, the FBI acquired a message sent from Hasan to al-Awlaki as part of an ongoing investigation into al-Awlaki.73 At this point in time, Hasan first attracted the attention of the FBI. Several more messages were sent, and Hasan’s name was discussed between two Joint Terrorism Task Force field offices in San Diego and in Washington, DC. In May 2009, the Washington Field Office conducted an assessment of Hasan within the limited Department of Defense records to which it had access and concluded he was not involved in terrorist activities.74 The WFO “chose not to interview Hasan or anyone in his command because they believed that any overt investigative steps would do more harm than good ... [T]hey also believed interviewing Hasan would jeopardize the [al-Awlaki] investigation.”75 The San Diego field office during the same time acquired 14 other

72 Ibid., 40.
74 Ibid., 6–7.
75 Ibid., 56–7.
messages and told the Washington Office that their assessment was “inadequate,” subsequently; neither field office took any other actions in the matter.\textsuperscript{76} Both field offices thought that Hasan was doing research into Islam and that it was relevant to Hasan’s military duties.\textsuperscript{77}

“The Washington D.C. Field Office/Joint Terrorism Task Force Field Office, (WFO-TFO) believed that an interview would require notification to Hasan’s commanding officer; that the interview would probably be briefed up the Army chain of command; and that this would harm Hasan’s career.”\textsuperscript{78} As a result, WFO-TFO considered an interview highly intrusive. One call to Hasan’s command would have proved this notion to be false and could have be a stepping stone to further action by the field offices that could have prevented the lone-wolf terrorist attack at Fort Hood.

In July 2009, the Army transferred Hasan to Fort Hood. and a few months later, told him he would deploy to Afghanistan. On November 5, 2009, he committed his act of terror at Fort Hood.

The FBI took no further action regarding Hasan until after November 5, 2009. Based on the Webster report, “the FBI took specific steps to improve its ability to detect and deter threats like Hasan. Those steps focused primarily on FBI-DoD information-sharing, FBI Headquarters involvement in reviewing significant National Security cases, information technology improvements, and training was looked at for improvement.”\textsuperscript{79} These actions were a direct result of shortcomings found within the Hasan lone-wolf terrorist case.

\section*{F. SUMMARY}

The case of Nidal Malik Hasan is a clear-cut case of lone-wolf terrorism, based on the commonly accepted definitions of lone-wolf terrorism and on the typology of a typical lone-wolf terrorist. This case demonstrates the complex and difficult nature of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} “Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission,” 56–7.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 57.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 57–8.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 1.
\end{itemize}
lone-wolf terrorist that law enforcement and counterterrorism experts face. For roughly a year, terrorism experts from the FBI were watching Hasan, but the experts failed to be detect and stop him. It is clear that Hasan was trying to finance terrorism in some form by donating monies to Awlaki even if he claimed to want to give the money legally. The FBI had this information via emails between the two, but yet no link to terrorism was found. The FBI never conducted a field interview with Hasan or anyone associated with him to determine a link to terrorism. The FBI never contacted local law enforcement agencies in regard to anything having to do with Hasan. In the end, the FBI failed to stop Nidal Hasan’s lone-wolf terrorist act on many different levels.

This case goes to show that lone wolves are in plain view of the public and can strike at any moment. It further shows a clear need for policy changes to distinguish and deter lone-wolf terrorists. Several policies must be examined from this case to identify, and thus, deter lone-wolf terrorists. The policies involve the Internet, community outreach programs, the FBI’s lead agency function, and contacting local authorities in possible cases of terrorism.
III. BOSTON BOMBINGS

A. INTRODUCTION

On April 15, 2013, at roughly 2:50 p.m., two explosions occurred near the finish line of the Boston Marathon and an investigation into those responsible ensued.\(^{80}\) The pressure cooker bombs killed three people and injured more than 200 people. Authorities identified the Tsarnaev brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar, as the suspects in the bombings and a manhunt began for the brothers.\(^{81}\) A police officer was killed during the manhunt; ultimately, a total of four people were killed and more than 200 people were injured in the Boston area. Tamerlan was killed in a shoot-out with police. Authorities ended the statewide man hunt by capturing Dzhokhar.

The Boston bombings shook the United States, much as the 9/11 attacks had done nearly 12 years earlier. This case study was chosen for the unique aspects and lens that it lends to the overall area of lone-wolf terrorism.

B. WHY THIS IS AN ACT OF LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

The Boston Marathon bombings are an act of lone-wolf terrorism for a variety of reasons. The first is that the bombers and the act itself are in line with the definitions used to describe lone-wolf terrorism from Chapter I. The Tsarnaev brothers were not members of any organized terrorist group and acted together in committing a terrorist attack at the Boston Marathon, which is a common trait associated with lone-wolf terrorists.

The bombers themselves fit into a certain typology of lone-wolf terrorists detailed in Chapter I. The brothers fit into the religious type, whose terrorist actions are that they commit violence in the name of religion, which is evident in that the brothers’ stated radical Islamic sentiments prior to their act of terror in various forms. The U.S.


\(^{81}\) Ibid.
government charged the younger brother with terrorism, and based on their actions and statements, it can be defined as a case of lone-wolf terrorism.82

C. LIFE LEADING UP TO TERROR ACT

The Boston Marathon Bombings that occurred on April 15, 2013, shocked the world just like 9/11 did. The United States thought it was safe from terrorist attacks, but the Boston Bombings proved that to be false in wake of the Tsarnaev brothers’ lone-wolf terrorist attack. This section describes how each brother had a uniquely different life before the terror act was carried out, but despite the differences, they still committed an act of terror.

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers, was born in Kyrgyzstan in 1986.83 In 2002, the Tsarnaev family applied for asylum within the United States after already having a tourist visa.84 Four years later, in 2006, Tamerlan was granted lawful permanent resident status. In the meantime, he had taken up boxing while he attended college at Bunker Hill Community College. He left college in 2008.85 In 2007, he began dating Katherine Russell, whom he married in 2010.86 However, during a temporary breakup, he was arrested by the Boston Police Department for domestic violence against another woman.87 He was a Golden Glove boxer in 2009, and in 2010, he could not fight in the tournament in 2010 due to this domestic violence history.88 This event was one that

would prompt him to commit his act of terror because he became disgruntled with the United States.

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was the younger brother, and by all accounts, he was well-liked and a social person with no history of violence. Dzhokhar attended high school at Cambridge Ridge and Latin School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Once he graduated from high school, he attended the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth in 2011. On September 11, 2012, he became a naturalized United States citizen. By all accounts, this brother was a normal college student, who had been a good student and athlete in high school. Dzhokhar’s involvement in the Boston Marathon attacks only shows that a lone-wolf terrorist can be anyone and come from seemingly nowhere.

D. IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS LEADING TO TERROR ACT

Several reports demonstrate Tamerlan’s willingness to radicalize for a jihad against the West. In 2011,

the FBI received a letter from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev and in the letter, the Russian government expressed concern that he had become radicalized and that he might return to Russia and join extremist groups there. The letter also noted that he had previously hoped to travel to the Palestinian territories to wage jihad, but decided not to go because he did not speak Arabic, is one such report.

The Russian government was concerned about possible ties to militants in the Caucasus, where his family is from, and a request for more information from the FBI was requested but never answered. The FBI conducted an investigation of Tamerlan, to include interviews with him and his parents, but the FBI found no link to terrorism in 2011. The FBI did not interview any of Tamerlan’s friends or known associates. Later,

90 Ibid.
91 Kirk and Brady, “From Boxing Champion to Bombing Suspect.”
93 Ibid., 13/37.
94 Ibid.
“according to some media reporting, friends of Katherine Russell claim that as time went on he took on an increasingly extremist view of Islam while they were dating.”

On January 21, 2012, Tamerlan traveled to Russia and this travel contributed to his ideological and radicalization process. After the bombing occurred, “the FBI found out that during and prior to his travel to Russia he spoke of jihad, shared extremist articles, and videos while he was in Russia.” Also discovered after the bombings, “Tamerlan had a YouTube account that he used to post and watch violent Islamic extremist videos starting around October 2013 to February 2013.”

Just like with Nidal Hasan, Anwar al-Awlaki’s influence is found in the Boston Marathon bombings. On computers that Tamerlan commonly used, the FBI found a number of jihadist articles and videos written by al-Awlaki. The article titled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” was on his computer in the online magazine Inspire created by al-Awlaki; this technique was used to create the pressure-cooker bombs used to commit the lone-wolf terrorist attack. In a public statement, the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB) Cultural Center reported Tsarnaev attended prayers at this mosque from time to time and on multiple occasions, he engaged in shouting matches with preachers at the mosque, and was asked to leave. These disputes allegedly arose from Tamerlan accusing the preacher of being a ‘non-believer’ and ‘hypocrite’ who was ‘contaminating people’s minds,’ for encouraging worshippers to celebrate American holidays.

Tamerlan was inspired by radical Islam, and this radicalization, combined with his own personal issues, were the factors that put him on the path to terror. It is evident that

97 Ibid., 19.
98 Ibid., 19–20.
99 Ibid., 20.
100 Ibid.
Tamerlan had a fascination with Islamic extremism that ultimately went unnoticed by governmental authorities.

Dzhokhar’s ideological and radicalization factors are not discussed in depth due to the on-going criminal trial for his part in the Boston Marathon bombings; the official governmental report did not go into detail and neither does this thesis.\textsuperscript{102} However, Dzhokhar looked up to his older brother and because of this admiration, he could have been heavily influenced by his brother. Before the bombings, it is clear that something changed in him because his grades dropped and he became socially awkward, which was not like him according to various friends.\textsuperscript{103} A note found by police before his capture stated that the motivation for the attack was retaliation for U.S. wars in Muslim lands.\textsuperscript{104} This statement by the youngest brother is strong evidence that this case fits the typology of a religious lone-wolf terrorist’s act.

Once again, the NYPD’s four-stage model of radicalization by Islamic extremists outlined in Chapter I can be seen in Tamerlan’s path to radicalization that led him to commit his act of lone-wolf terrorism. Tamerlan had experiences in his life that helped him start his pre-radicalization phase. One such experience was his failed boxing career, which fueled a grudge against the United States.

Tamerlan became more religious after his life-altering experiences and led him to self-identify with Islamic extremism. The start of his indoctrination phase was more than likely in 2009 due to failures in his life. One such example is his failed boxing career and the appeal he developed for radical Islam. His jihadization phase probably started after 2009 and continued up until 2013, based on his viewing of radical videos, articles, travel to Russia, and his outspokenness for extremism in mosque.\textsuperscript{105} The reason for the start of


his jihadization phase was fueled by Awlaki, as well as his own inner convictions about the United States that would ultimately led him to commit an act of terror.

E. OFFICIAL FINDINGS

By April 19, 2013, after the FBI identified the Tsarnaev brothers as suspects in the bombings. The FBI reviewed its records and determined that in early 2011, it had received lead information from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, had conducted an assessment of him, and had closed the assessment after finding no link or “nexus” to terrorism.”

Even after the assessment by the FBI, Tamerlan remained on the terrorist watch list. During the official review of what the U.S. governmental agencies knew before the Boston Bombings, the DOJ determined that the FBI counterterror agent in charge of Tamerlan assessment failed to conduct a full assessment. The DOJ stated that the agent specifically failed to “contact local law enforcement, visit the mosque Tamerlan attended, interview his wife, his former girlfriend who he was arrested for assaulting, or his friends.”

The DOJ also determined that the agent did not properly conduct the interview of him or his parents in terms of relevant questions to determine a link to terror.

During the review, the DOJ found that the FBI did not properly follow up with a request for more information from the Russian FSB in regards to the initial letter stating that Tamerlan was linked to terrorism. The FBI overlooked Tamerlan’s travel to Russia; the FBI stated during the official review that his travel to those areas in Russia would have had them re-open the terror assessment of Tamerlan. The DOJ determined that the FBI failed to use computers media and electronic tools properly in its assessment of Tamerlan, and if it would have done so, jihadist videos and articles that he subscribed to may been found. The younger brother was not mentioned in any assessment of

107 Ibid., 1/37.
108 Ibid., 9/37.
109 Ibid., 10–11/37.
110 Ibid., 12/37.
111 Ibid., 18/37.
Tamerlan, and his involvement was only known via the terror act. Currently, Dzhokhar is waiting to stand trial in federal court for multiple charges, one of which is a terrorism charge.\footnote{Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano, “60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism,” 15.}

F. SUMMARY

The Boston bombings were an act of lone-wolf terrorism. These bombings show that the American public is not safe from lone-wolf terrorists. As with Nidal Hasan, the FBI did not protect the public from terrorism. The FBI failed the public with the terrorism assessment that it conducted on Tamerlan before the bombings. The FBI claimed to have changed how it conducts assessments, but the same failures seen with Nidal Hasan can be seen in the Boston bombings. The FBI failed to contact local law enforcement in regards to Tamerlan’s terror assessment. Local officials could have helped provide information to the FBI, as well as a different view of Tamerlan that could have helped determine a link to terror.

Due to the FBI’s failures, four people lost their lives and more than 200 people were injured. This case study shows a clear need for polices to change domestically within the United States to protect the American people from the threat of lone-wolf terrorism. Many of these polices can also be see within the Hasan case, especially policies involving the Internet, community outreach programs, and the FBI’s lead agency function and its responsibility to contact local authorities in possible cases of terrorism.
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IV. NORWAY’S LONE-WOLF: ANDERS BREIVIK

A. INTRODUCTION

On July 22, 2009, Anders Breivik set off a car bomb outside Norwegian governmental buildings in Oslo that killed eight people.\textsuperscript{113} Once the damage was done in Oslo, he then traveled by boat to Utøyasland where a summer camp was being held for children of the ruling Labor Party.\textsuperscript{114} Breivik wore a police uniform at this point and told the people in charge of the camp he was there to protect them.\textsuperscript{115} Breivik then opened fire on the campers, workers, and others. In the end, he killed 69 people during his attack at Utoya Island and total of 77 people in his two lone-wolf terrorist acts.\textsuperscript{116} Anders Breivik’s lone-wolf terrorist attack was the first of its kind according to Beatrice de Graaf and Eelco Kessels. He was, they write, the “first to commit an attack of this magnitude that combined the modus operandi of Jihadists, right-wing extremist lone-wolves, and school shooters, a new tactical mix.”\textsuperscript{117}

The bombing of the federal building in Oslo and the mass shooting on the island of Utoya was the equivalent of the 9/11 attacks for the people of Norway. This case study was chosen for the unique aspects that it embodies in regards to the overall field of lone-wolf terrorism. This case study shows that lone-wolf terrorism is an international issue, and not just a domestic issue for the United States. Lone-wolf terrorists know no borders or bounds while committing acts of terrorism.

B. WHY THIS IS AN ACT OF LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

The Norway terrorist, Anders Breivik, is a classic case of a lone-wolf terrorist for a multitude of reasons. By Ramon Spaaij’s definition of lone-wolf terrorism from Chapter I, Anders Breivik is a lone-wolf terrorist. He acted alone in his act of terror and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[113] Simon, \textit{Lone Wolf Terrorism}, 49.
\item[114] Ibid.
\item[115] Ibid., 50.
\item[116] Ibid., 49–50.
\end{footnotes}
without orders from anyone. The Norwegian authorities validated this fact about Breivik during his trial in 2012, despite his claim that he was a member of a secretive group known as the Knights Templar; they found no evidence to support this claim.\footnote{118 Eelco Kessels, “Commentary: Anders Breivik: A Terrorist on Trial,” ICCT Commentaries, April 18, 2012, \url{http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-commentaries/anders-breivik-a-terrorist-on-trial}.} Anders Breivik also fits a particular typology of a lone-wolf terrorist that differs from the previous two lone-wolf terrorists’ cases. He fits the secular typology of a lone-wolf terrorist from Chapter I.

Breivik is also a major case of lone-wolf terrorism in the book, \textit{Lone-Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat} by Jeffrey Simon. Simon writes that,

The case of Breivik is one of two incidents that can demonstrate how misperceptions about terrorism can dominate the public agenda. While al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups and cells have been the most active extremists around the world in recent years, lone-wolves have come from all parts of the political, religious, and cultural spectrum.\footnote{119 Simon, \textit{Lone Wolf Terrorism}, 230.}

Breivik’s act of lone-wolf terrorism undermines the idea that only radical Islamists commit acts of terrorism in any form. Anders Breivik was the first person to commit a lone-wolf type terrorist attack in the pursuit of an anti-Islam and anti-immigration agenda in Europe.\footnote{120 Beatrice Graaf and Eelco Kessels, “Lone Wolves and their Enabling Environment,” ICCT Commentaries, July 29, 2011, \url{http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-commentaries/lone-wolves-and-their-enabling-environment}.} Magnus Ranstrop labeled Anders Breivik as a “cut and paste terrorist” due to his mixed ideologies.\footnote{121 Ibid., 1–2.} Europol also labels Breivik as a lone actor in its report on terrorism based on the fact that his targets were the Norwegian political system that included the government and the Labour Party.\footnote{122 European Police Office, \textit{TE-SAT 2012: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report} (The Hague, Netherlands: European Police Office, 2012), 9, \url{https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2012-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-1569}.}

\textbf{C. LIFE LEADING UP TO TERROR ACT}

Anders Breivik was born in London, England, in 1979 and his parents divorced when he was a year old. He never had a true relationship with his father; however, he
claimed to have a happy childhood.\textsuperscript{123} His childhood was not an unusual upbringing in Norwegian society. Anders went to an elite high school.\textsuperscript{124} At the age of 16, he joined the Progress Party Youth Organization, an anti-immigration and free-market group.\textsuperscript{125} By 2000, he began to believe that the democratic struggle against the Islamization of Europe and European multiculturalism was a lost cause; the war in Serbia played a role in his thinking that all was lost.\textsuperscript{126} This line of thinking would help him radicalize before his act of terror.

At the same time, he claimed to have had a falling out with a Pakistani Muslim friend, who apparently told another person to punch Breivik for no reason; this attack by Muslims is the second he records from his youth.\textsuperscript{127} He noted this incident in his self-published manifesto that he released hours before he detonated the bomb in part one of his attack.

From his early twenties, he worked to fund his radical cause, and by roughly 2005, he created a successful business that he shut down after the economic recession in 2008.\textsuperscript{128} He made a lot of money in his business ventures. In 2009, he described himself in his manifesto as going through a “phase shift” in his life.\textsuperscript{129} In 2011, his mother reported that he had become obsessed with talking about politics and history, and displayed paranoid behavior in the run up to the attack.\textsuperscript{130} This development shows a clear change in his life that put him on his path to terrorism based on how he viewed Norwegian society.

\textsuperscript{123} Simon, \textit{Lone Wolf Terrorism}, 27–51.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 38–21.
\textsuperscript{125} Raffaello Pantucci, “What Have We Learned About Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?” \textit{Perspectives on Terrorism} 5, no. 5–6 (2011): 27–8.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{128} Pantucci, “What Have We learned,” 29.
\textsuperscript{129} “Anders Behring Breivik Was Insane Five Years Ago, Mother Says,” \textit{Telegraph}, November 30, 2011; Pantucci, “What Have We Learned,” 29.
\textsuperscript{130} Pantucci, “What Have We Learned,” 29.
D. IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS LEADING TO TERROR ACT

Anders Breivik “was a right-wing, anti-Islamic extremist opposed to multiculturalism in Europe.”\textsuperscript{131} He self-identified with right-wing extremists. These views and key events during his life, before his terrorist attack, shaped him as a terrorist and led him to commit his act of lone-wolf terrorism. His anti-Islamic views began to transform his thinking around the time he had a falling out with Muslim friends for attacks against him. Breivik also closely followed reports of attacks against ethnic Norwegian men and Muslim immigrants who raped Norwegian women.\textsuperscript{132}

Serbia played an important role in Breivik’s ideological formation. He declared that the NATO war on Serbia in 1999 was the “tipping point” for him,\textsuperscript{133} an ideological and radicalization point in his life prior to his act of terror because he viewed the war as NATO support for Muslims against Europeans.\textsuperscript{134} This opinion was also published in his manifesto. Raffaello Pantucci describes how Breivik, “appeared to have operated on the fringes of extremist communities online. Aside from being an active participant in online forums focused on far-right or anti-Muslim views, he also appears to have been in contact at various points in his past with other individuals and groups operating on the far-right fringe.”\textsuperscript{135} He never tipped his hand in the online forums or websites. He never revealed his extremist tendencies outright. The Internet appears to have been a key asset for Breivik, both in ideological terms and in planning his terrorist act. Based on his life, Pantucci believes, “Breivik was captivated by the global clash of cultures and ideologies that have been a defining feature of the past ten years—specifically through what he sees as the Islamisation of Europe.”\textsuperscript{136}

By his own account, “Breivik claims to have been thinking about his big plot for almost a decade, certainly his direct attack planning took over a year at the very least,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Simon, \textit{Lone Wolf Terrorism}, 230.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Pantucci, “What Have We Learned,” 30.
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Simon, \textit{Lone Wolf Terrorism}, 230.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} Pantucci, “What Have We Learned,” 31.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 32–3.
\end{itemize}
with some time before that dedicated to ideological formation and raising of funds.”

Factors in his early life twisted his perception of the world around him and caused him to commit his act of terror for what he saw as the greater good of all of Europe, not just Norway. Breivik was a wolf in sheep’s clothing with a fascination for extremism, much like Tamerlan Tsarnaev.

E. OFFICIAL FINDINGS

Anders Breivik was not in the Norwegian police’s registry of right-wing extremists. In March 2011, Breivik was put on the Norwegian security services’ watch list because he bought an enormous amount of fertilizer from an online store in Poland, but later police would decide it was for a farm that he rented. Janne Kristianse, the Director of the Norwegian Police Security Service, said, “Breivik had been a law-abiding citizen, showed no signs of being a terrorist, deliberately failed to be violent in statements online, had not been a member of any extremist network, and had his guns registered.”

Breivik was able to inflict maximum casualties during his shooting spree because of the location of the island of Utøya and any response by police.

The Norwegian authority charged Anders Breivik and put him on trial for the murder of 77 people. He was found guilty of murder, and was thus sentenced to more than 20 years in prison.

F. SUMMARY

Without a doubt, Andre Breivik was a lone-wolf terrorist. His act of terror took time and planning to undertake. He ultimately killed many innocent people. Breivik is a

137 Pantucci, “What Have We Learned,” 33.
140 Ibid.; Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism, 50.
clear case that shows how lone wolves can appear to come from anywhere and out of nowhere. The good news is that authorities can stop lone wolves like Breivik before they attack. Breivik did not truly come “out of nowhere,” as he was on a terror watch list, but the authorities missed him. People close to Breivik noticed changes in his mood and behavior prior to his killing of so many innocent people. Breivik radicalized online, even though he was careful not to tip his hand so as not to arouse suspicion. These three factors together could have helped Norwegian authorities to stop him prior to his killing spree. This case suggests hope does exist for stopping lone-wolf terrorists, if governments can put in place deterrence and detection policies to stop them.
V. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES IN NEED OF ADAPTATION TO DETER LONE-WOLF TERRORISTS

The following chapter examines key policy issues seen within the three case studies of lone-wolf terrorism. Once the policy issues are detailed, the policy issues are then addressed in terms of adaption to deter and detect lone-wolf terrorists better.

A. UNITED STATES POLICIES

The United States has many policies and laws to combat terrorism, both domestically and internationally, as seen in Chapter I. Domestically, the FBI is the main governmental agency with sole responsibility for fighting terrorism within the confines of the United States. Two of the three case studies were specifically chosen for their unique case characteristics that demonstrate a need for the adaptation of U.S. polices to deter lone-wolf terrorism. In each case, the FBI demonstrated a need for its policies to be changed. An underlying struggle, particularly within the United States, to balance the protection of civil liberties with the prevention of lone-wolf terrorism exists.

Based on the two case studies of lone-wolf terrorism that occurred within the United States, governments should review several policies. In their article entitled, “Preventing the Next ‘Lone-wolf’ Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger Federal-State-Local Capabilities,” based on the Nidal and Boston Bombing case studies, Michael Downing and Matt Mayer outlined four key policies that must be changed or created to combat the lone-wolf terrorist better. After a review of the miscues by the United States within these case studies, it is clear changes are needed along the lines argued by Downing and Mayer to strengthen the United States from the lone-wolf terrorist threat.

1. First Policy

The FBI’s ability to share information with state and local law enforcement, as described by Downing and Mayer, is the first of the four policies that needs to be
examined. This point is not a new action item for the FBI in terms of combating terrorism domestically. The 9/11 Commission Report cited the same issue with the FBI after the attacks of 9/11. In the Nidal and Boston bombing case studies, the FBI failed to inform local or state law enforcement agencies of the possible terrorists or any investigation of the terrorist that was ongoing prior to the terror acts. In each case, the FBI missed out on stopping the lone-wolf terrorist acts.

In the Hasan case, the FBI failed to contact local law enforcement officials who could have kept an eye on Hasan, and by doing so, could have stopped the Fort Hood shooting. In the Boston bombings, the FBI’s counterterror agents failed to contact local law enforcement in determining Tamerlan’s link to terrorism. Tamerlan was arrested by local law enforcement after he assaulted a former girlfriend. If contacted about Tamerlan, local officials could have interviewed his former girlfriend and she could have told them about his jihadist rants. Had the FBI contacted the local police, the Boston bombings could have been prevented, as it appears that Tamerlan was the leader of the two brothers. Local law enforcement, by default, knows its localities better than an incoming federal agency. As a consequence, the local officials also likely have a better possibility of stopping would-be lone-wolf terrorists.

2. Second Policy

Local cyber assets to assess terrorism nexuses on the Internet are the second of the four required policies that needs be examined. Having cyber investigation capabilities in large urban areas like Washington, DC, or Boston as seen in the case studies, must be a primary focus because of the amount of terrorist-related activities that occur on the Internet. Tamerlan posted and viewed violent extremist videos on his YouTube account prior to the attack in Boston. Either the FBI overlooked the Internet activity, as in the

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143 Ibid.
Hasan case, or did not even look into the Internet activity during the assessments of the possible terror suspects prior to their attacks, as in the Boston case.

Providing local law enforcement the ability to monitor and track extremist activities on the Internet when a reasonable suspicion exists can only aid in the FBI’s investigation of possible terror suspects to prevent or deter lone-wolf terrorism, but it could aid in deterring group terrorism as well.\textsuperscript{144} Reasonable suspicion existed in both the Hasan and Boston bombing case studies, in that the FBI conducted assessments on each of the would-be terrorists prior to their acts of terrorism.

3. Third Policy

Using community out-reach programs and tools is the third of the four policies that needs to be examined from the case studies.\textsuperscript{145} “Such capabilities are key to building trust in local communities, and if the United States is to thwart lone-wolf terrorists’ attacks in the future, it must do so by putting effective community out-reach programs at the tip of the spear.”\textsuperscript{146} In each of the cases of lone-wolf terrorism that affected the United States, the Hasan and Boston bombings, the communities could have been engaged to help in the terror assessments of the suspects prior to the attacks. Every day the citizens of their respective communities engaged with Nidal Hasan, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. These citizens would have seen changes in their behavior over time more noticeably than an FBI agent during a short assessment.

The FBI’s assessments are a snap shot in time of the suspects. The community can give a broader view of the possible terror suspects over time versus a single snap shot. Nidal Hasan and Tamerlan Tsarnaev both attended a local mosque. In each of the cases, the FBI should have reached out to the community leaders at the mosque, via community outreach programs to determine a link to terrorism, and if so, a link to terrorism would have been found. The evidence in support of this concept is simple, these


\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 3.
terror suspects “preached” violent Islamic ideology during their radicalization phases in and around the mosques.

A successful and engaged community outreach program could have brought these crucial links to terrorism to the FBI’s attention. Law enforcement agencies’ using the community as a tool is not a new concept. Neighborhood watch programs are used throughout the United States and these programs have been successful in deterring crime in the participating neighborhoods, all without infringing on the civil liberties of citizens. If employed correctly, the community can be a vital tool in deterring terrorism.

4. **Fourth Policy**

The FBI’s lead agency function for domestic terrorism is the fourth and final required policy that needs to be examined from the case studies, which is also found within the article by Downing and Mayer. The lone-wolf attack in Boston was treated as a crime first and then a terrorist attack in many aspects.

The responsibility for public safety and the investigation of crimes at the local level rests with the local police agency, except in those cases in which the FBI determines that it will assume control over the investigation. With regard to public safety information and intelligence flow, such a policy regulates both the police department and the state sovereign to a subordinate and potentially isolated position. Therefore, this policy should be re-examined both in terms of best practices and in terms of its legal framework.

The FBI clearly failed in its lead agency function from the DOJ’s investigation of the FBI’s actions prior to the Boston bombings and the Fort Hood shooting. The FBI failed in its terror assessments of the soon to be lone-wolf terrorists. The FBI, charged with protecting the United States from terrorism domestically, has failed, as seen in the case studies of Hasan and the Boston bombings.

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149 Ibid., 4.
A key change in policy, which is not new to the post-9/11 world, is the need to connect the dots better with respect to identifying terror suspects and preventing terrorist attacks. This failure to connect the dots directly resulted in successful lone-wolf terrorist attacks, as seen in the Hasan and Boston bombing lone-wolf terrorist cases.

B. EUROPEAN POLICIES

Due to the ease with which Europeans can cross national borders, the European states rely on each other’s policies to help deter terrorism. In the case of Anders Breivik, the Norwegian authorities failed the public in their assessment of Breivik. Breivik was on a watch list due to his purchase of a large amount of fertilizer, which he used to make the bomb that went off in Oslo. Authorities determined that since he owned a farm, the fertilizer must have been for that and not for bomb making. The authorities took no further action. If Norwegian authorities had conducted an assessment on Breivik by terrorist experts, the authorities could have stopped him. A policy must be put in place that if a suspect is placed on a terrorist watch list then an assessment must be conducted on the suspect to determine any link to terrorism.

European countries must communicate better to stop lone-wolf terrorism, sharing common information related to possible terrorists. As exemplified in the Breivik case, Downing and Mayer argue that the FBI’s policy and practice of sharing information with state and local law enforcement agencies in terror-related cases must also be adapted for Europe. Europe is unique in that travel is free flowing from one country to the next with little scrutiny by authorities. It is no surprise that Breivik bought the fertilizer in a neighboring country and then transported it into Norway. A system must be in place to track, monitor, and share this information within Europe. The EU has such policies in place for its members, but the non-member states must have this advantage as well. Europe must think of itself as one “nation,” rather than a collection of discrete states, in response to the lone-wolf terrorist threat.

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The police authority to carry or use firearms and the geo-location of local law enforcement are concepts that must be examined due to the Breivik case study. The Norwegian police departments, with about 13,000 officers, are organized into 27 regional districts and seven national units.\footnote{Jean-Luc Marret and Emmanuel Clavaud, *Oslo Terrorist Attacks: Analysis, Consequences and Lessons Learned*, Transatlantic Security Paper N. 4 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2011), 5.} The geo-location of the police units and stations allowed Breivik to bomb Oslo and conduct an active shooter situation on the island of Utøya.

The second part of Breivik’s act of terrorism is what requires a change in policy, because Breivik was able to capitalize on the fact that Norwegian law enforcement’s response was constrained by the location of the island of Utøya. Vast majorities of the time, police officers do not routinely carry any weapons on their persons; they have firearms in their patrol cars.\footnote{Ibid.} The use of any type of weapon is highly restricted in Norway. The Norwegian police are reported to only have opened fire 79 times between 1994 and 2004.\footnote{Ibid.} Breivik used these facts to his advantage when conducting his terror attack because he knew that he would have little resistance, and would therefore, be able to inflict maximum causalities. The Norwegian police agency as a whole is ill equipped to deal with potential lone-wolf attacks because of the location of its stations and the restrictions placed on its police officers regarding the use of weapons. This situation should be a key warning to other European countries, in that a police force must be put in a position to protect their citizens, whether it is the location of stations or the use of weapons.

The article by Downing and Mayer also has relevance in the Breivik case in terms of policy recommendations. The case shows a need for local cyber assets to assess terrorism nexuses associated with the Internet.\footnote{Downing and Mayer, “Preventing the Next “Lone Wolf” Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger Federal–State–Local Capabilities,” 3.} Local law enforcement agencies with the ability to monitor and track extremist activities on the Internet when a reasonable
suspicion exists to do so can only help identify terrorists. The Internet was a key tool for Breivik, both in ideological and operational terms. In conducting his research on the Internet, and posting on right wing and anti-Muslim forums, Breivik found ideological support. Pantucci writes about Breivik’s operational activities online:

He also appears to have been quite innovative in his use of the Internet as a tool to obtain material and information to support his action. When planning his trip to Prague to buy weapons he used a Hyundai discussion forum for tips on how to make the trip from Oslo to Prague by car. He reports that alibaba.com, a Chinese website linking Chinese manufacturers to global retailers, is a particularly good source of chemicals and materials. He also used eBay and a number of sellers in the UK to purchase chemicals and tools. He uses a wide array of different websites to locate different tools and to collect information on building bombs, chemical mixtures, ideal body armors to use and so on. In addition to using the Internet as a source of material, he claims to have raised much of the money he uses in his action through establishing companies whose business model is based around e-commerce.

The Internet can be a vital tool to gather intelligence on would-be lone wolves. The issue in Europe and in the EU is that not every country has the resources to gather and disseminate intelligence effectively from the Internet for example. Breivik’s use of the Internet demonstrates a greater need for cyber capabilities in Norway and in Europe. Lone-wolf terrorists live within the Internet; Breivik is a prime example.

C. SUMMARY

Many policies are in need of adaptation or adoption to identify or deter lone-wolf terrorist better, both in the United States and in Europe. Many of the ideas from the policies to combat lone-wolf terrorism have already been put in place to combat group-based terrorism, but these ideas just need to be adapted to combat the unique nature of lone-wolf terrorism. The three cases studies show a clear need for counter-terror policy

156 Pantucci, “What Have We learned,” 37.
157 Ibid.
changes to protect the public better from this old form of terrorism. The question still remains as to when governments will learn from the mistakes of past lone-wolf terrorist attacks and put the safety of the public first.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. LONE-WOLF TERRORISM

This thesis shows that many issues with lone-wolf terrorism have arisen. Bakker and de Graaf write, “Attacks by lone operator terrorists provide the most puzzling and unpredictable form of terrorism.” Chapter I deals with issues of lone-wolf terrorism. One issue is how lone-wolf terrorism is defined, as well as how a lone-wolf terrorist is also defined. This thesis defines lone-wolf terrorism as acts of terrorism conducted by an individual or several individuals who act without orders from a higher chain of command. As described in Chapter 1, lone-wolf terrorists are not part of an organized terrorist group, but they may have had contact with or been trained by a terrorist group, and they may take ideological and motivational factors from known group terrorists.

Another issue is identifying lone-wolf terrorists prior to their attacks, which is especially difficult because the would-be terrorists can appear to materialize as if from thin air. It does not help that no single profile exists, as evident in the three case studies. In Chapter II, this thesis examined the Fort Hood shooting of 2009, executed by Nidal Hasan, as a case study of lone-wolf terrorism. This case study has been debated as whether it is an act of terrorism or not. This thesis has argued that it is in fact a case of terrorism. The case of Hasan also demonstrated that lone wolves use the Internet and that the FBI has failed in detecting lone-wolf terrorists. This case also showed that a community outreach program could provide valuable details about possible terrorist threats because community leaders at the mosque in Washington, DC could have helped provide crucial assessment information to the FBI if the leaders were engaged.

Chapter III dealt with the Boston Bombings in 2012 with respect to lone-wolf terrorism. The Boston bombers showed that the use of the Internet once again played a major role in their terrorist act. Once again, just as in the Hasan case, the community

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159 Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, “Preventing Lone-wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed,” Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 5–6 (December 2011): 43–4.
could have provided evidence of a link to terrorism if the FBI properly utilized the community as used a tool for information.

Chapter IV analyzed the attack by Anders Breivik in Norway as a case of lone-wolf terrorism. Breivik used the Internet extensively prior to his attack in his radicalization process, and for buying supplies for his attack. His mother and other members of the community noticed drastic changes in Breivik that could have provided an early warning to authorities before he attacked. Chapter V examined possible changes to policies or the adaptation of policies in general to combat lone-wolf terrorism. This thesis supports Michael Downing and Matt Mayer’s article entitled, “Preventing the Next ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger Federal-State-Local Capabilities.”

The case studies examined support for the policy recommendations contained within the article. In each case of lone-wolf terrorism, the terrorists used the Internet prior to their attack. Just as the lone wolves used it as a tool, governments should use the Internet as well to stop terrorists. The key is that lone-wolf terrorists can be identified, and by identifying the terrorist authorities, can stop them. The initial hypothesis of this thesis is confirmed, that policies do need to be adapted to combat lone-wolf terrorism. Governments around the world must take notice of the trends, as seen in this thesis, and then adapt or adopt policies to identify, and thus deter, the lone-wolf terrorists.

**B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

The need for further research in lone-wolf terrorism will only grow as lone-wolf terror attacks become more successful. One area for further research would be to expand the use of the Internet with regards to lone-wolf terrorism, due to lone wolves’ use of the Internet, as seen in the case studies.

A second area for further research would be to examine counterterrorism policies and lone-wolf case studies from countries, such as the United Kingdom, Israel, and Australia. Such research is important due to the large second-generation Muslim

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populations within each country, and because second-generation Muslim immigrants conducted two of the three acts of lone-wolf terrorism studied in this thesis.

A final area of research is the study of the events in lone-wolf terrorists’ lives that triggers them to radicalize, and of the factors that lead the would-be terrorists to radicalize prior to their terror acts; but it is important to focus not just on radical Islamic extremism as the only potential source of radicalization. These areas of further research could be instrumental in deterring lone-wolf terrorists.

C. CONCLUSION

A great deal of attention has been given to group-based radical Islamic extremism since 9/11, but lone-wolf terrorism, as seen in this thesis, is just as a critical a threat. Although two of the lone wolves in these cases did subscribe to radical Islam, it is not the only type of lone-wolf terrorist threat. Anders Breivik was a right wing anti-Islamic extremist opposed to multiculturalism in Europe; his case shows the diverse range of types of lone-wolf terrorism. It is this diversity that must drive governments to change policies to stop lone-wolf terrorism. This thesis shows a disturbing trend on increasing threats of lone-wolf terrorism, and that would-be lone-wolf terrorists can be anyone. However, the cases of lone-wolf terrorism examined in this thesis show that patterns and indications can be used to identify, and thus deter, lone-wolf terrorists The challenge of preventing the lone-wolf terrorist is great; this thesis has shown that the counterterrorism community can meet this challenge by adopting and adapting counterterrorism policies, many of which already exist to counter international group-based terrorism.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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