THE TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION

by

Patrick V. Lavoie

March 2015

Thesis Advisor: James Russell
Second Reader: Zachary Shore

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A peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict has eluded the international system for sixty-seven years. As time passes, insoluble physical and political conditions in the region risk the achievement of a lasting peace. Standing in the way is the European Union’s (EU) tempestuous relationship with Israel. In order to forge a peaceful settlement of the conflict an understanding of EU foreign policy toward Israel is necessary. This thesis seeks to explain the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel using the case study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict between 1973 and 2010. In the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, three widely held international relations theories that demonstrate explanatory power for EU foreign policy are realism, constructivism, and liberalism. The case study illustrates, however, that in conformance with the principles of liberal internationalism EU foreign policy with respect to Israel is framed around the tenets of democracy, interdependent economic systems, and the employment of international institutions, which explains the volatile nature of the bi-lateral relationship. While the EU engages Israel with the breadth of its institutions and pursues an enduring economic relationship, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, perceived human rights violations, and settlement activity violate European democratic truths and strain the relationship.
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Patrick V. Lavoie
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.A., Virginia Military Institute, 2003

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Author: Patrick V. Lavoie

Approved by:
James Russell
Thesis Advisor

Zachary Shore
Second Reader

Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

A peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict has eluded the international system for sixty-seven years. As time passes, insoluble physical and political conditions in the region risk the achievement of a lasting peace. Standing in the way is the European Union’s (EU) tempestuous relationship with Israel. In order to forge a peaceful settlement of the conflict, an understanding of EU foreign policy toward Israel is necessary. This thesis seeks to explain the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel using the case study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict between 1973 and 2010. In the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, three widely held international relations theories that demonstrate explanatory power for EU foreign policy are realism, constructivism, and liberalism. The case study illustrates, however, that in conformance with the principles of liberal internationalism, EU foreign policy with respect to Israel is framed around the tenets of democracy, interdependent economic systems, and the employment of international institutions, which explains the volatile nature of the bi-lateral relationship. While the EU engages Israel with the breadth of its institutions and pursues an enduring economic relationship, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, perceived human rights violations, and settlement activity violate European democratic truths and strain the relationship.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

### B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

1. Realism
2. Constructivism
3. Liberalism

### C. HYPOTHESES

### D. METHODOLOGY

### E. THE EVOLUTION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

## II. CASE STUDY: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

### A. NASCENT EUROPEAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1973 – 1990

1. The October War and its Aftermath
   
   a. The Brussels Declaration, 1973
   b. The London Declaration, 1977
   c. The Venice Declaration, 1980

2. The Iron Fist
   
   a. Operation Peace for Galilee, 1982
   b. The Intifada, 1987–1993

### B. EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, 1991–1999

1. The Madrid Peace Conference and Oslo Accords
2. EU-Palestinian Relations
4. EU Political Resurgence in the Middle East Peace Process
   
   a. EU Special Envoy
   b. Berlin Declaration

### C. MATURATION OF THE EUROPEAN POSTURE TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE, 2000–2010

1. The Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000–2005
2. The Middle East Quartet
   
   a. The Roadmap
3. The European Neighborhood Policy
4. EU Crisis Management
5. Operation Cast Lead

## III. ANALYSIS

### A. REALIST ARGUMENT

### B. CONSTRUCTIVIST ARGUMENT

### C. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALIST ARGUMENT

## IV. CONCLUSION

### A. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED

### B. RECOMMENDATIONS
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>common foreign and security policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>common security and defense policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAD</td>
<td>Euro-Arab dialogue</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECU</td>
<td>European Currency Unit</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European political cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European security and defense policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European security strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>international relations</td>
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<td>LF</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
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<td>MEPP</td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office for the High Representative</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>occupied Palestinian territories</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>REDWG</td>
<td>Regional Economic Development Working Group</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>South Lebanon Army</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Europe and Israel is storied and complicated. Beginning more than fifty years before the establishment of the Jewish state, the association between Europe and the Jewish settlers is historically tense. Rising anti-Semitism within Europe, Zionist terrorism against the mandatory power of Great Britain, and the atrocities of the Holocaust characterized the tension between the two communities. Following the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, Israel sought legitimacy within the international system and relief from its isolation. Cultural ties, geographic proximity, and economic linkages drove Israel to strengthen its relationship with Europe.¹ To this end, Israel sought membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Although denied membership, in the 1960s, Europe and Israel forged a strengthened economic partnership setting the conditions for deeper relations. The aftermath of the October War in 1973, however, disrupted relations as the European Community (EC) recognized the plight of the Palestinian people. The Venice declaration in 1980 formalized the EC’s posture on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and derailed an already tenuous relationship with Israel.² The relationship has yet to recover.

Since the Venice declaration, The EU has failed to separate its foreign policy toward Israel from the greater Arab-Israeli Conflict. Broadly speaking, as expressed in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the EU’s foreign policy is centered on “guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity” among its Eastern and Mediterranean neighbors.³ The EU aims to achieve this through economic, social, and political cooperation.⁴ Following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the EU promulgated in the Essen declaration that “Israel should ‘enjoy special status in its relations with the

² Ibid., 151–52.
⁴ İşleyen, A Civilian Power?, 68–9.
European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interest.”\textsuperscript{5} Subsequently, the EU formalized its economic and political relationship with Israel with a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, which for the first time established political discourse between the EU and Israel.\textsuperscript{6} This relationship deepened further when the EU initiated the EU/Israel Action Plan under its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, focusing on closer bilateral political cooperation and economic integration. EU foreign policy objectives and Israeli behavior, however, ultimately, could not be reconciled causing a break in their deepening cooperation.\textsuperscript{7}

While enduring ties remain between Israel and the European Union in the economic and science sectors, politically the relationship between the EU and Israel remains volatile. Europe desires a greater role in reaching a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, yet its behavior toward Israel endangers its achievement. Why does Europe desire a greater role and what are its implications on Europe, Israel, regional stability, and the international system? The answer to these questions lies in the answer to the next question. What is the permissive cause of the EU’s foreign policy toward Israel?

This thesis will establish that liberal internationalism provides the most compelling explanation for the EU’s approach to Israel. The theories of realism and constructivism contribute to this explanation; however, only liberal internationalism yields the permissive cause.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama identified U.S. national interests as security, including U.S. allies; economic prosperity within an international free market system, the realization of universal values globally, and a stable


\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 48, 58–60, 68.
and cooperative international order.\(^8\) The Middle East is a decisive battleground for the achievement of these interests. To this end, the United States’ first objective in the region is achieving a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. For decades, the United States has assumed responsibility for facilitating peace in the region but to no avail. Failure to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict risks the security of Israel, enduring regional instability, an expanding humanitarian crisis, and the sustainment of global terrorism. In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama stated that “to solve problems, we will pursue modes of cooperation that reflect evolving distributions of power and responsibility.”\(^9\) Again, in his commencement address at the United States Military Academy in 2014, Obama reinforced his commitment to multilateral action to secure international order.\(^10\) Like the United States, the European Union (EU) supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and represents a capable partner in achieving peace in the Middle East. The United States, however, approaches the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict maintaining a special relationship with Israel, demonstrated by Israel’s status as the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign aid since World War Two, as well as its status as the largest annual recipient of aid between 1976 and 2004. Annual grants to Israel total an average of $3 billion.\(^11\) In contrast, the EU’s focus tends to be on the creation of a Palestinian state.\(^12\) In support of this objective, the EU is the largest donor of foreign aid to the Palestinians.\(^13\) In order to progress multilateral cooperation toward Middle East peace, the U.S. must establish an understanding of the EU’s policies toward Israel. It is not enough to identify European


\(^9\) Ibid., 46.


\(^13\) Ibid., 138.
foreign policy regarding Israel. The United States must identify the permissive cause of the EU’s relationship with Israel in order to facilitate U.S. engagement with the EU.

The United States Unified Command Plan places responsibility for engagement with Israel with United States European Command (USEUCOM). This assignment recognizes the historical, cultural, economic, and political ties that exist between Israel and Europe and attempts to build upon it. Possessing an understanding of why the EU engages with and responds to Israel in certain ways will enable USEUCOM leadership to more effectively facilitate cooperation between Israel and the EU as well as manage potential conflict.

Explaining the EU’s troubled relationship with Israel is significant from the academic perspective, as well. Currently, there are several studies available that attempt to provide a theoretical explanation for EU foreign policy; however, there is no compelling research available that addresses EU foreign policy as it specifically applies to Israel. In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the EU and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was the first step toward a unified foreign policy; however, it was not until the release of the first European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 that a unified foreign policy came to fruition. In that document, it states that the “resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.” With that in mind, further academic research is necessary to identify the implications of the EU-Israeli relationship on a resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Exploring the permissive cause of the EU’s policies toward Israel will contribute to a better understanding of EU political integration, as well as potential implications of the EU-Israeli relationship in the long-term.

B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

This thesis draws from international relations (IR) theory to identify the permissive cause of the EU’s relationship with Israel. There is extensive scholarship on theoretical explanations for EU integration; however, applying IR theory to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) is a recent phenomenon. Still, scholars have applied the breadth of IR theories to

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European foreign policy and specific elements of it. The literature, however, fails to address EU foreign policy toward Israel. In seeking an explanation for EU policy toward Israel, I explore the realist, constructivist, and liberal theories. A prominent argument that scholarship presents is realism, which is broken down into two sub-schools of classical and neorealism. While it is a compelling argument, for many scholars, realism fails to explain why the many actors within the EU cooperate in regard to foreign policy. They argue that social constructivism has more explanatory power. Although it has received the least attention, the liberal perspective is gaining advocacy, specifically neoliberalism and liberal internationalism.

1. Realism

Scholars of the realist school of IR theory frame their argument against the anarchic nature of the international system, one defined by the absence of a hierarchical international authority. These scholars portray realism as a family of theories that recognizes that the range of possible outcomes in IR is highly constrained and these constraints are inescapable. The result is unavoidable competition and power politics. States, the principal actors within the international system, are self-interested and egoistic and conduct themselves according to fixed interests or preferences. States’ inevitably behave in certain ways as a result of the constraints of human nature, the nature of the state, and the architecture of the international system. Classical realism and structural realism qualify the effects of human nature and the nature of the state, respectively, on the international system.

Scholarship on neorealism builds on the foundation of classical realism, which is represented by seminal arguments from Hobbes, Carr, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau. These

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16 Ibid.
18 See Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
scholars maintain that human nature, the intrinsic character of all people, drives international outcomes. Niebuhr contends that “society . . . merely cumulates the egoism of individuals and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism so that the egoism of the group has a double force. For this reason, no group acts from purely unselfish or even mutual intent and politics is therefore bound to be a contest of power.”\textsuperscript{19} Morgenthau, considered a leading figure in realist thought, expands the argument by crediting the lust for power as the driving force behind international relations, spurring domestic and international conflict as well as statecraft.\textsuperscript{20} Power is an end in itself, and furthermore, statesmen are morally obligated to its pursuit.\textsuperscript{21}

Neorealism or structural realism, formulated by Kenneth Waltz, contends that the range of possible outcomes in IR is highly constrained by the architecture of the international system. The result is unavoidable competition and power politics. Contrary to the perspective of classical realism, all states derive their preferences and behavior exogenously as a result of the structure of the international system. Waltz describes structure as a set of constraining conditions that emerges from the arrangement of the states within the international system.\textsuperscript{22} Its effects are generated “through socialization of the actors and through competition among them.”\textsuperscript{23} The social process pressures states to assume similar attributes and like behavior, and subsequently, competition expels those states that do not comply with the rules of the system.\textsuperscript{24} Although cooperation among states achieves peace, within the anarchic system it is difficult to achieve. Realist scholarship maintains that cooperation is difficult to achieve because of the collective action problem. Jean Jacques Rousseau illustrates the collective action problem through his narrative of the stag hunt. In this narrative, there are five hunters, all of which must

\textsuperscript{19} As quoted in Smith, \textit{Realist Thought}, 107.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 13, 19.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 74.
cooperate in order to kill a stag and benefit from its meat. If every hunter participates, the stag will provide enough food for them all; however, without cooperation, none of the hunters will eat. A hare will provide enough food for one hunter. Confronted by a hare, one of the hunters kills it. Because of the absence of order within the hunting party, the hunter cannot control the actions of the other hunters; therefore, he kills the hare to ensure that he will not be selected out of the system. In international politics, defection is preferred to joint cooperation because of the relative gains problem in which an adversary’s relative gains over an actor introduce vulnerability and potential victimization. In the stag hunt, the hunter acted rationally within the nature of the system or in a way calculated to reach certain ends. Likewise, structural realism maintains that states will act rationally in order to achieve their preferences within the framework of the international system. Although peace is attainable through cooperation among states, the absence of a hierarchy of authority within the anarchic international system necessitates a self-help system in which states compete in order to ensure their survival. States seek to maximize their security, and power is a means to that end.

Mearsheimer builds upon the core principles of Waltz’s structural realism in his presentation of the sub-theory of offensive realism. For Mearsheimer, like Waltz, the international system is defined by anarchy. Within this system, individual state actors are assumed to maintain offensive military capabilities. Because of the lack of ordering authority and this latent military capability, there is an enduring uncertainty regarding the actions of the other actors within the system. In the context of uncertainty, states aim to survive and will act rationally to ensure it. In offensive realism, however, because of the uncertainty and desire for survival, states “must make worst case assumptions about their rivals’ intentions,” according to Mearsheimer. To achieve security, states maximize their pursuit of power relative to the other actors within the international

25 As referenced in Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 167–69.
27 Ibid., 19–20.
29 Ibid., 45.
The desired end-state, according to offensive realists, is global hegemony, which inadvertently increases the risk of war in the international system because competing states will assume greater risk to counter the potential hegemon’s growth in power. For Mearsheimer, hegemony correlates to domination of the international system and is classified as regional or global. Furthermore, he maintains that although there has never been a global hegemon, the United States is the only state to achieve regional hegemony in modern history. Implicit with the notion of hegemony is the hegemon’s desire to maintain the status quo. Conversely, Waltz, representing defensive realism, posits that “in anarchy, security is the highest end. . . . The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system. For scholars of defensive realism, state survival is achieved not by seeking hegemonic status but by maintaining the status quo through a balance of power. Excessive accumulation of power results in a security dilemma, which increases the volatility and uncertainty of the international system and endangers state security.

There is no universally accepted realist argument supporting EU foreign policy, rather there is a plurality of explanations in mainstream scholarship that draw from the range of realist thought, to include classical realism, neoclassical realism, offensive realism, and defensive realism. Neoclassical realists contend that collective EU foreign policy is determined by a combination of material interests and normative values, while some realists maintain that it is a result of EU bandwagoning with the United States.

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32 Ibid., 40–42.


The most prevalent arguments, however, address balance of power and regional security dynamics. The regional security explanation focuses on a growing desire within the EU to establish autonomy from the United States in addressing regional threats. Proponents of the regional autonomy argument use the conflict in the Balkans in 1999 to demonstrate the establishment of a collective EU military capability and foreign policy. The American reassessment of interests following the Cold War translated to decreased American engagement in the defense of Europe. To ensure that European interests were met, while concurrently increasing U.S. interest in the EU, the member states established the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)—a token EU security force.36

Balance of power explanations include the perceived necessity by the EU member states to balance a relative rise in German power following its reunification. A second dominant explanation is that the EU is balancing against American unipolarity within the international system. Fearing the development of an unbalanced multipolar system within Europe, the first argument maintains that the major European powers of the United Kingdom and France seek foreign policy cooperation within the EU to limit Germany’s ability to increase its relative regional power and influence. The smaller member states support cooperation in order to maintain the status quo within Europe but also to gain relative power that is unattainable at the national level.37 In keeping with the framework of neorealism, advocates of the balance-of-power theory argue that the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a unipolar international system dominated by the United States. Although the EU has an enduring relationship with the U.S. United States, the structure of a unipolar system fosters uncertainty and alarm for the member states of the EU. As a result, the EU increased its political and security cooperation to achieve global power and


to influence the United States. This perspective maintains that the EU employs soft balancing to compete with the U.S.. According to Art, “balancing is as much about preserving a state’s autonomy, independence, and ability to influence international outcomes vis-a-vis a powerful state or group of states as it is about dealing with threats of direct attack from them.” Soft balancing includes regional collaboration, such as the EU; limited military expansion; and cooperative exercises.

In response to the balance-of-power theory, there are opposing arguments that claim that the EU does not have the military resources to balance the U.S.; the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the result of regional security requirements, rather than balancing; and finally that EU foreign policy supports bandwagoning with the U.S.

2. Constructivism

Championed by influential political scientists like Onuf, Adler, and Wendt, constructivism attempts to bridge the divide between material and idealist theories, such as realism and liberalism. Constructivism, like realism, focuses on the architecture of the international system and defines the international system as anarchical in nature; however, according to Wendt, international relations do not have to focus on fear and competition, rather international outcomes depend on the nature of the interactions between states. Whereas realists believe that states’ interests are fixed and derived exogenously, constructivists argue that a state’s identity and interests are endogenous to the social process. Although constructivism recognizes the potential for power politics and competition, it does not view the constraints of the international system as

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unescapable or the outcomes fixed.\textsuperscript{44} Anarchy does not determine the nature of the international system or the behavior of individual actors. Constructivist literature maintains that the range of outcomes in international politics depends on the relationship between states. States establish their identities from the historical, cultural, political, and social context of which they are immersed.\textsuperscript{45} As states begin interaction, each actor bases its behavior on the perceived probability that the other actor will be either amiable or threatening. Actors subsequently determine their interests as well as that of their counterparts as they continue to respond to each other. This interaction creates intersubjective meaning, which generates expectations of future behavior.\textsuperscript{46} The shared norms that result from persistent socialization inform state actions. As the nature of the interactions between states change, the resulting change in identities and interests will lead to a change in political outcomes and thus the potential achievement of cooperation.\textsuperscript{47} The literature pursues the constructivist argument further, attesting that material things, such as power, do not have fixed meaning as realists would argue but derive their meanings from the social process. Although states share similar factors, such as material things, they do not behave identically because they have different perspectives based on the social process. It is no more likely for a relationship between states to resemble a balance of power like realists would expect than it is for the relationship between states to be supported by international institutions.\textsuperscript{48} While constructivists concentrate on the primacy of ideas and the social process in international relations, they still account for material resources. Economic and military powers help shape actor identities and are factors in the social process.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, the ideational power of constructivism lends itself to collaboration with other theories to provide greater explanatory power in regard to foreign policy outcomes within the international system.

\textsuperscript{44} Wendt, “Social Construction of Power Politics,” 394–95.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 407.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 399.
\textsuperscript{49} Hopf, “Promise of Constructivism,” 177–80.
The application of the constructivist theoretical perspective to explain EU foreign policy is a recent endeavor. The principle argument concentrates on the emergence of a strategic culture within the EU, which unifies European foreign policy decision-making. Strategic culture, according to Meyer, “consists of the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas, and habits that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.”

The literature on the CSDP (formerly the ESDP) recognizes a nascent European strategic culture. According to Biava, Drent, and Herd, “the [strategic] culture is based on an enlarged vision of security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach to threats, implying the use of all sorts of instruments (military and civilian) in an integrated manner.” This culture is cultivated through socialization and learning. First, changing threat perceptions following the collapse of the Soviet Union have altered strategic norms. Second, supranational institutions within the CSDP, such as the European Military Committee (EUMC) and the Office for the High Representative (OHR), are altering strategic norms through the socialization of member state representatives. Third, the framing of humanitarian and security crises by European media initiate societal learning toward increased regional and global response. The EU strategic culture perspective does identify obstacles to a unified EU foreign policy. These include a lack of consensus among member states regarding foreign policy objectives and instruments, diverging national strategic cultures, and a reluctance by the member states to cede authority over CSDP to an EU executive power.

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unified EU foreign policy challenges the realist perspective and it is gaining ground among scholars.

3. **Liberalism**

Liberalism as an IR theory is dominant in western civilization. Built upon the beliefs of men like Kant and Wilson, its fundamental principles, as defined by Hoffman, are “the protection of individual freedom, the reduction of state power, and the conviction that power is legitimate only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedom.”\(^{54}\) Kant sought a peaceful world order but recognized that the international political system is defined by anarchy, and states are egoistic and self-interested profit maximizers.\(^{55}\)

Drawing from Kant, Russett and Oneal maintain that Kant’s vision of a peaceful international system requires three elements: democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations.\(^{56}\) Implicit in the notion of democracy is the protection of human rights, the right to self-determination, and the imposition of rule of law. A necessary condition for liberalism is domestic support.

According to Moravcsik, “in the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical ‘transmission belt’ by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.”\(^{57}\) Moravcsik continues, arguing that, state governments are constrained in their decision making by these domestic preferences. Liberal scholarship maintains that unlike realism, domestic preferences are generated independent of international structure, and contrary to

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constructivist beliefs, these preferences precede inter-state interaction.\textsuperscript{58} Domestic preferences, however, do not command specific state behavior, rather they influence state behavior along with the preferences of the other actors within the international system.\textsuperscript{59} Forged from the foundation of the general liberal IR theory, political scientists present neo-liberal institutionalism and liberal internationalism as two significant sub-theories in explaining EU foreign policy.

Neo-liberal institutionalism recognizes the anarchical nature of the international political system; however, its proponents, to include Keohane, conclude that the effects of anarchy can be mitigated through international institutions. Neoliberal literature is more optimistic about cooperation in the order-less international system than realist scholarship. States seek cooperation when it is in their self-interest; however, the threat of defection serves as an obstacle to cooperation. As depicted by the prisoner’s dilemma, each actor seeks to maximize its absolute gains. While the greatest gains are achieved when an actor defects and the other cooperates, if both defect then neither actor will benefit.\textsuperscript{60} Within the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, states will establish institutions to facilitate cooperation. North defines institutions as “the rules of the game in society, or more formally, [the] humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”\textsuperscript{61} Institutional rules encourage multi-iteration engagements, which increase the costs of defection and the benefits of long-term cooperation; expand interaction across issue areas; increase the flow of information; and reduce transaction costs.\textsuperscript{62} Institutions have proven effective in the economic sector but Keohane argues that institutions can be effective in the security realm as well, decreasing uncertainty among actors and enabling utility maximization through increased information sharing.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{58} Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 519.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 523.
\textsuperscript{62} Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions,” 18.
Liberal internationalism operationalizes and exports the tenets of liberalism: democracy, interdependent economies, and international institutions. Supported by the belief that democratic countries do not go to war with each other and economic interdependence discourages conflict, liberal internationalism facilitates multi-lateral action. The preponderance of contemporary literature maintains that theoretically liberal internationalism has the potential to reduce global conflict and increase cooperation; however, in practice it lacks credibility and legitimacy. Haine argues that as a sub-theory “it remains ambivalent about the use of force, ambiguous about the opportunity of humanitarian interventions, vague about the degree of involvement morally required, and relatively helpless and mute about the devastating effects of nationalism, tribalism, ethnicity, and religious extremism.”

There is a paucity of research available that tests liberal causation for EU foreign policy, specifically the CSDP. The limited literature, however, provides two diverging assessments on the behavior of EU foreign policy. The first argument is that the extent of integration and behavior of EU foreign policy is a result of domestic pressures on the member states. Moreover, national norms and perceived national interests influence EU action. Liberal scholarship maintains that the domestic preferences within member states are mostly for humanitarian and civil engagement with an emphasis on crisis management. The second argument concludes that although liberal internationalism accounts for EU policy action, the EU has failed to meet its objectives. This is a result of a risk-adverse European culture, a failure in clearly defining the appropriate means for achieving success, and a lack of sufficient military capabilities.

68 Ibid., 468–70.
C. HYPOTHESES

Drawing upon extensive scholarship in IR theory and tested against the case study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, three hypotheses are investigated in this thesis to determine the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel. Originating from the three divergent theories of realism, constructivism, and liberalism, these potential explanations encompass a broad range of causal factors. While it is likely that elements of each hypothesis influence EU foreign policy and represent sufficient causes, this thesis aims to identify the necessary cause.

The first Hypothesis stipulates that the EU seeks bi-lateral engagement with Israel and reacts to Israeli domestic and foreign policies in a manner meant to balance the United States. A defensive neorealist argument, this hypothesis maintains that the EU seeks security of its interests, which it does through increasing involvement in international politics. The EU, however, lacks the military and physical resources necessary to directly balance the United States as the unipolar power within the international system; therefore, it soft balances the United States through the employment of a divergent political posture, economic cooperation and integration with Israel, crisis management operations, and Palestinian state building.

A second hypothesis identifies a European strategic culture that is derived from shared norms, history, and interests. This constructivist perspective links congruous European and Israeli strategic cultures, which is illustrated in the EU’s pursuit of Mediterranean regional integration through the EMP and the ENP. It is these strategic cultures and half a century of socialization that have cultivated trust and expectations of behavior between the EU and Israel, subsequently driving EU foreign policy.

The third and final hypothesis posits that EU foreign policy toward Israel is framed around the tenets of democracy, interdependent economic systems, and the employment of international institutions. In keeping with the theory of liberal internationalism, the EU seeks to achieve international cooperation and stability through its foreign policy. This approach explains the volatile nature of the bi-lateral relationship. The EU continues to engage Israel with the breadth of its institutions and pursues an
enduring economic relationship; however, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, perceived human rights violations, and settlement activity violate European democratic truths and strain the relationship.

Although all three hypotheses include causal factors, this thesis argues that the most compelling explanation for EU foreign policy toward Israel is the liberal internationalist argument.

D. METHODOLOGY

To evaluate these hypotheses I use the single case study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict from 1973 to 2010. Almost every European policy decision regarding Israel has been made within the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and therefore it provides ample empirical data to test the hypotheses. The focus of this case study begins in 1973, the year of the October War, because it marks the first year in which the EC took a unified stance toward Israel. All previous engagement with Israel was executed by individual member states and, therefore, presents inadequate data. The end date is 2010 after which relevant sources become scarce and EU foreign policy remains relatively constant.

In understanding the research approach of this thesis, first a common understanding of terms must be reached. A pre-requisite for assessing the quality of the empirical data within this thesis is a common definition for the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Within this thesis, the Arab-Israeli Conflict is defined as any activity between Israel and neighboring Arabs that concerns the existence of the Jewish state and the final status of the contested land of Palestine. This treatment includes Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Palestinians. Additionally, the scope of the Arab-Israeli Conflict case study includes empirical data from almost two decades prior to the formation of the EU. During this period, it was known as the EEC and the EC. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the collection of European member states will be identified as the EU.

This thesis draws from primary source documents ranging from treaties, resolutions, and agreements to policy memorandums and speeches from EU and Israeli leadership as well as secondary sources ranging from academic journals and books to
think tank reports. These sources aim to illustrate Israeli behavior within the Arab-Israeli Conflict and its associated EU foreign policy responses in order to elucidate the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel.

E. THE EVOLUTION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

In December 1969 at the Hague Summit, the six member states of the EC, which included Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands identified the need “for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission.” In response, the Davignon report was penned and approved in 1970 establishing the framework for European Political Cooperation (EPC). Although, a step toward a unified foreign policy, the EPC only represented a forum through which the EC could communicate on matters of international politics and reconcile divergent perspectives in order to strengthen European integration. Over the next two decades EPC was formalized and increasingly integrated into the institutions of the EC; however, there was no mechanism for unified action and divergence in the foreign policies of the member states remained. In November 1993 the EC implemented the TEU. Establishing the European Union, the treaty also created the CFSP with the following objectives:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;

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70 Ibid.

to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.\textsuperscript{72}

Furthermore, the TEU foreshadowed the development of a common defense policy, which was established in the form of the ESDP at the Cologne European Council Meeting in 1999. The ESDP operationalized the CFSP, calling for an autonomous military capability within the EU that in concert with civilian capabilities could conduct crisis management operations internationally.\textsuperscript{73} Those crisis management tasks, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, include humanitarian operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict stabilization.\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, the treaty strengthened the CSFP and ESDP’s bureaucratic structure.\textsuperscript{75} Since the development of EPC, the EU has increased the scope of its integration and in turn gained prominence as an international actor, participating in more than twenty crisis management operations. The EU’s growing influence on international politics is demonstrated by its relationship with Israel and its role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.


II. CASE STUDY: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Arab-Israeli conflict began in essence with the burgeoning Zionist movement of the late nineteenth century and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which Britain declared that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Since these events, the disposition of historic Palestine has been contested. Amid increasing unrest in Palestine during the British Mandate, which began in 1920 and dissolved in 1948, Britain sought a United Nations (UN) managed solution to the crisis. In response, the UN approved resolution 181, the partition of Palestine, on 29 November 1947. The partition plan established two independent states, one Palestinian and one Jewish, and Jerusalem as an international city under UN trusteeship. Allocating fifty-six percent of Palestine to the Jewish state and forty-three percent to the Palestinian state, the UN Partition Plan was rejected by the Arabs and nominally accepted by the Zionists. In the immediate aftermath of the partition plan, however, fighting broke out between the Jewish and Arab residents of Palestine, negating the partition plan and creating a crisis that produced more than 700,000 Palestinian refugees by 1949. UN Resolution 194, enacted in December 1948, affirms the right of return for Palestinian refugees; however, the refugee problem remains a substantive issue within the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

On 15 May 1948 Zionist leader, David Ben-Gurion, declared the establishment of the State of Israel, precipitating the invasion of Israel by its Arab neighbors, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The armistice agreement, concluded a year later, confirmed Israel’s ownership of seventy-seven percent of Palestine, while Jordan

76 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli- Conflict: A History with Documents, 7th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 97.
79 Ibid., 5.
assumed control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank and Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip. These boundaries, coined the “Green Line,” held until the Six Day War in 1967. Responding to increasing tensions with its Arab neighbors and Egyptian provocation, which included the deployment of troops to the Sinai Peninsula, the expulsion of UN Emergency Force (UNEF) troops from the Sinai, and the closure of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli and Israel bound shipping, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on 5 June 1967. Within six days Israel defeated the Arab bloc, seizing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. A military defeat for the Arab states and Arab nationalism, the Six Day War demonstrated the strength of Israel and altered the future course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Subsequently, on 22 November 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, calling for Israel’s withdrawal from territories it occupied in the Six Day War, as well as “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” The resolution was ambiguous regarding specific actions to be taken and was absent any reference to Palestinian self-determination. Among the belligerents of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, it was accepted by Egypt, Jordan, and Israel but rejected by Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Still, UN Resolution 242 remains the starting point for settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

The intervening years between the Six Day War and the October War in 1973 were characterized by persistent low intensity tensions between the Arab states and

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80 Beinin and Hajjar, “Arab-Israeli Conflict,” 5.
81 Ibid.
Israel, highlighted by a “War of Attrition” between Egypt and Israel from March 1969 to August 1970. In absence of an acceptable resolution of the Six Day War, Egypt employed artillery and engaged in commando raids against Israeli forces in the Suez Canal Zone in order to establish a position of power from which to enter political initiatives. Israel responded in kind with the aim of maintaining the status quo in the Sinai Peninsula. As Egypt increased its military actions, Israel did as well, leading to air strikes targeting military facilities across Egypt, to include Cairo. This escalation of hostilities precipitated Soviet intervention and resulted in the deployment of Soviet aircraft to Egypt and the employment of Soviet manned anti-aircraft systems. Amid widespread fear of an outright war, an American initiated cease fire was accepted by both parties on 8 August 1970. The status quo of the Arab-Israeli Conflict would hold until 1973 with the outbreak of the October War. Twenty-five years after the establishment of the State of Israel and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Europe would introduce itself as a player in Middle East politics and transform its relationship with Israel in the aftermath of the October War.  


1. The October War and its Aftermath

On 6 October 1973 at just past two o’clock in the afternoon, the Second and Third Armies of the Egyptian Armed Forces commenced an attack on Israeli defensive positions at the Bar Lev line; the October War had begun. Coordinated with a Syrian attack against Israeli positions in the Golan Heights, the Egyptian forces broke the Bar-Lev line and extended their advance six miles into the interior of the Sinai Peninsula by 7 October. On the Syrian front the Syrians had overrun the Israeli positions and were threatening Israeli territory. Bolstered by the commencement of a full scale airlift of military supplies on 14 October; however, Israel assumed the offensive, retaking terrain
lost in Syria, penetrating the Egyptian front, and encircling Egypt’s Third Army.\textsuperscript{85} Guided by the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom feared escalation in the Cold War, a permanent cease fire was established on 25 October 1973 based on UN Security Council Resolutions 338 and 340.\textsuperscript{86}

The aftermath of the October War permanently thrust the EC into the politics of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Since the first EPC meeting in 1970 the member states of the EC failed to reach a unified posture toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Of the nine member states (the Nine) Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom maintained relative neutrality toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict; the Netherlands, Denmark and West Germany maintained a pro-Israel posture; and Italy and France openly supported the Arab States.\textsuperscript{87} In the years following the EC’s failure to respond to the Six Day War France, the dominant power within the EC, pushed for increased EC influence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict to sever European dependence on U.S. foreign policy and to secure European interests in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{88} The outbreak of war on 6 October presented the Nine with an opportunity to demonstrate European consensus. Unable to agree on a substantive position, however, the Nine released a statement on 13 October concerning the hostilities but limited it to support of UN resolution 242.

The Nine governments of the European Community greatly concerned over the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East appeal to those concerned to stop the fighting. The cease-fire which would spare the people suffering from the war from further tragic ordeals, must at the same time open the way to real negotiations on an appropriate basis so that the conflict may be settled in compliance with all provisions of resolution 242 adopted on 22 November 1967 by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{89}


\textsuperscript{89} Pardo and Peters, \textit{Israel and the European Union}, 106.
Although the EC failed to release a decisive verbal statement, none of the Nine opened their borders for the transit of American resupply efforts to Israel, Britain withheld spare parts for Israeli military equipment, and France continued its arms embargo against the Jewish state. European actions during the war foreshadowed the European posture toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Beginning on 16 October, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced a seventy percent increase of crude oil prices, remaining in effect until the Israeli withdrawal of the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Subsequently, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) threatened a five percent reduction in oil production each month. Additionally, OAPEC categorized its consumers based on those that were considered friendly states, neutral states, and enemy states. Based on their national foreign policies, France and Britain were recognized as friendly states and thus received no sanctions, the Netherlands was labeled an enemy state and was completely embargoed, and the remaining members of the EC were targeted by the monthly production cuts.

With forty-five percent of Western Europe’s energy resources originating from the Arab states, the oil crisis threatened the economic security of the EC. Furthermore, it was evident to the EC that the United States did not have European interests in mind as it crafted its foreign policy on the Middle East. America viewed the Middle East as a Cold War battle ground and did not want or envision European influence in the region. Any European engagement in the Middle East, according to the Nixon administration, should receive American approval first, but while Kissinger sought an incremental bilateral approach to resolving the Israeli Conflict, Europe sought a comprehensive solution.

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93 Ibid., 202.
94 Ibid., 202, 204.
a. The Brussels Declaration, 1973

Forced into action, the EC released its first substantive declaration on the Arab-Israeli Conflict on 6 November with the Brussels Declaration of 1973. The declaration contained four principle components:

(i) the inadmissibility of the acquisitions of territory by force;

(ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967;

(iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

(iv) recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.\(^\text{95}\)

The declaration also called for any peace settlement to be conducted under the auspices of the UN with the support of “international guarantees.”\(^\text{96}\) Immediately Israel’s foreign minister, Abba Eban, responded claiming that the EC declaration sought “oil for Europe rather than peace for the Middle East.”\(^\text{97}\) Publically, Israel chided the EC for ignoring the values, cultural ties, and economic relations that they shared and challenged the European assertions that territory should not be gained through war and that peace in the Middle East required an international approach.\(^\text{98}\) The state of Israel questioned the legitimacy and credibility of European political cooperation, highlighting its inability to prevent Arab aggression preceding the Six Day War and during the October War and its lack of assistance in achieving a cease-fire. Moreover, according to Eban, the EC endangered ongoing negotiations between the belligerents with its forced entry into the conflict. For Israel the conflict was between sovereign nations; its resolution would come

\(^\text{95}\) Pardo and Peters, Israel and the European Union, 107.

\(^\text{96}\) Ibid.


through direct negotiations, rather than international interference. The Brussels Declaration and Israel’s response established a volatile political climate for Euro-Israeli relations that limited European influence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict for the next two decades.

The Nine’s joint declaration marked the first time that the rights of the Palestinians were acknowledged, an inclusion that would strengthen the EC’s relationship with the Arab states and mark a turning point in Europe’s posture toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Exploiting the nascent European consensus demonstrated with the Brussels Declaration, the Arab states appealed to the EC for the establishment of a sustained relationship between the EC and the Arab League. Launched in July 1974, the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was developed to create economic cooperation between Europe and the Arab states. While the Nine desired to avoid politics, to include the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the oil crisis, the Arab League’s underlying objective was to cultivate further European support for the Arab cause in the war against Israel.100 These objectives were demonstrated early in the relationship when the Arab League pressed the EC to annul a 1975 trade agreement with Israel and sought independent PLO representation within the EAD. The EC conceded to neither of these demands.

While the Brussels declaration represented a change in the European consensus toward Israel, the EC was not yet prepared to sever ties. In 1974, half of Israel’s imported goods originated from Europe and trade with the EC accounted for a third of Israeli exports.101 Politically, the EC behaved in accordance with its November declaration represented by its voting record in the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1973. The Nine abstained or voted against any resolutions that exceeded the framework of their joint declaration.102 Still as the Euro-Arab relationship strengthened between 1974 and 1977 amid the emergence of Jewish settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian

99 Eban, “Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister.”
101 Miller, Inglorious Disarray, 61.
102 Patrick Müller, EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2012), 32.
territories (OPT) and the rise of the Likud party in Israel, the EC turned further away from supporting Israel and adopted increasingly pro-Arab views.\textsuperscript{103}

\textbf{b. The London Declaration, 1977}

Arab pressure to advance the European posture on the Arab-Israeli conflict coupled with increasingly alarming Israeli behavior caused the Nine to release the London Declaration in 1977. Reaffirming the Brussels Declaration, the new statement highlighted the need for a Palestinian homeland and the implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement. As stated in the declaration, “The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.”\textsuperscript{104} The Nine sought a role for the Palestinians in a final settlement as well as for themselves. Released four months prior to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s unprecedented trip to Jerusalem and a little more than a year prior to the Camp David Summit, the London Declaration isolated the EC since neither Israel or the United States were seeking a comprehensive settlement, rather an Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Moreover, the negotiating parties were focused on an interim period of Palestinian self-government, rather than the establishment of a Palestinian homeland.\textsuperscript{105} The Camp David Summit and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed on 26 March 1979 solidified America’s leadership in resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict and marginalized Europe’s role in the process.

Still, the EC continued to highlight the need for a comprehensive settlement based on the framework of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and the establishment of a Palestinian homeland. Europe’s increasing divergence from the Israeli and American narrative was fueled by the burgeoning European desire to establish a European role in international politics as well as a response to Israeli actions toward the Arabs and the occupied

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Pardo and Peters, \textit{Israel and the European Union}, 142.
\item Greilsammer and Weiler, \textit{Europe’s Middle East Dilemma}, 39–40.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
territories, which included the illegal establishment of settlement communities, the annexation of East Jerusalem, widespread destruction and confiscation of Arab property, and the displacement of Arab peoples from the occupied territories.106

c. The Venice Declaration, 1980

With the suspension of Palestinian autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel on 10 May 1980, the Camp David Accords failed to make progress on a broader peace settlement. Seeing an opening for a European peace initiative, the EC announced the Venice Declaration in June 1980. The most substantive European joint statement on the Middle East to date, it was an attempt to launch Europe into the center of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Panned by the PLO for being too weak, but condemned by Israel for capitulating to Arab pressure, the Venice initiative made an indelible impact on Euro-Israeli relations but failed to result in a greater role for Europe or a comprehensive peace. In accordance with its declaration, Europe commissioned two diplomatic missions to the Middle East in an effort to jump start the peace initiative; they both failed. In response to the declaration, Shimon Peres claimed that it “damages Europe first of all and reduces European influence on Israel and Middle East countries which truly seek peace.”107 The main principles on which the Venice Declaration was framed were the inclusion of the PLO in any and all negotiations and the Palestinian right to self-determination. It also reaffirmed Europe’s commitment to achieve a comprehensive settlement supported by international guarantees and confirmed its distain for illegal settlement activity.

2. The Iron Fist

By the time Menachem Begin took office as the Prime Minister of Israel in 1977, Palestinian nationalism had taken hold as the mechanism through which the Palestinian nation sought self-determination, represented by the PLO.108 Facing increasing

107 As quoted in Greilsammer and Weiler, Europe’s Middle East Dilemma, 50–51.
resistance and the emergence of civil society within the OPT, Begin and his Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, aimed to eradicate the PLO and its influence within the occupied territories. To accomplish this Begin zeroed in on Lebanon because, according to Sharon, the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon was a prerequisite for the pacification of the OPT.  

Begin’s second approach to the destruction of Palestinian nationalism was the establishment of a civilian administration over the OPT beginning in 1981. The civil administration maintained a military presence within the OPT; however, its focus was the civil affairs of the Palestinian communities. In reality, through the civil administration Israel tightened its control over the Palestinians by replacing pro-PLO municipal leadership and enacting curfews, while increasing the frequency of deportations, the seizure and demolition of Palestinian property, and arbitrary and collective punishment. Israel’s failure to pacify the Arabs within Lebanon and the OPT led to the implementation of the Iron Fist policy in January 1985 designed to use “‘might, power, and beatings’ to quell the unrest.” Ineffective in achieving Israeli political objectives, in practice the Iron Fist policy opposed the fundamental rights of human dignity, life, property, and freedom of association around which the European Union would be formed in less than a decade’s time.

a. **Operation Peace for Galilee, 1982**

On 6 June 1982, Israel commenced Operation Peace for Galilee, invading Lebanon with a 57,000 man force. By 1 July Israel had defeated the Syrian forces in Lebanon and had encircled Beirut. Cutoff from food, water, and fuel, and vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks, Yasser Arafat succumbed to Israel’s terms in August and departed Lebanon with the preponderance of the PLO. Following its siege of Beirut, Israel allowed Christian militias, namely the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the

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111 Ibid., 16–17.
112 Ibid., 45.
Lebanese Forces (LF), to operate freely in southern Lebanon resulting in the egregious treatment of the Muslim population, illustrated by the destruction of the Mieh Mieh Palestinian refugee camp and the massacre at the Sabra and Shatilla camps. As Israel’s occupation, which included an economic blockade on southern Lebanon, protracted Muslim resistance in southern Lebanon increased. Subsequently, Israel announced its withdrawal from Lebanon with the exception of a security zone in January 1985. Integrating the Iron Fist policy with its withdrawal, Israel conducted raids and blockades on Muslim village and continued its practice of terrorizing the civilian population.\textsuperscript{115} Israel maintained the security zone until 2000.

The ten members of the EC (Greece became a member in 1981) issued a joint statement on 9 June condemning the invasion on the grounds that it violated international law and basic human rights, and it endangered a settlement to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Moreover, for the first time the EC threatened joint action against Israel. Three weeks later the European Council postponed the signing of a second financial protocol to the 1975 trade agreement, canceled a scheduled cooperative meeting between EEC and Israeli delegations, froze contact between Israeli and European leadership, and individually established embargoes on military shipments to Israel.\textsuperscript{116} Although generally ineffective, the sanctions represented a strengthening of European joint action further demonstrated by its support of the UN and the multinational force in Beirut as well as its pledge to contribute to Lebanon’s reconstruction.\textsuperscript{117}

\textit{b. The Intifada, 1987–1993}

The First Palestinian Intifada began on 9 December 1987 in the Gaza Strip. Quickly expanding into the rest of the OPT, it lasted until 1993. Outraged by the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres, the forced departure of the PLO leadership from Lebanon, the absence of international support, and increasing repression, the Palestinians


\textsuperscript{116} Greilsammer and Weiler, \textit{Europe’s Middle East Dilemma}, 78; Kaya, \textit{Middle East Peace Process}, 87.

\textsuperscript{117} Greilsammer and Weiler, \textit{Europe’s Middle East Dilemma}, 92.
mobilized in a grassroots movement against the occupation.\textsuperscript{118} A non-violent uprising, the Intifada consisted of collective civil disobedience. Israel’s response, however, was violent and repressive and included economic sanctions, political assassinations, mass arrests, and torture. In total, 1,087 Palestinian civilians were killed, 237 of which were under the age of 17, and 50,000 Palestinians were arrested just within the first 18 months.\textsuperscript{119} As was the case with Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, its response to the Intifada placed it at odds with the EU.

In response to Israel’s management of the Intifada, the EC supported UN resolutions 605, 607, and 608, which recognized the illegal nature of the occupation and Israel’s execution of it, referring to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. Like in the aftermath of Operation Peace for Galilee, the EC voted against three bilateral trade protocols with Israel, however, their show of soft power was short lived; the protocols were subsequently approved months later.\textsuperscript{120}

The period of time between 1973 and 1990 represents the nascence of both European foreign policy based on consensus and a European role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. This period represents the declaratory phase of European foreign policy toward the Middle East. Beginning with its first joint statement following the October War in 1973 to its most significant statement with the Venice Declaration, Europe sought a role in international politics but lacked the capacity to assert itself forcibly into politics traditionally controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. Still, the developing European stance on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, often shaped by France, placed Europe outside of the American and Israeli blueprints for peace in the Middle East. Although complicating Europe’s relationship with the United States and Israel and effectively inhibiting its immediate influence on the peace process, Europe established the framework and position from which it would get involved in the future.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Peretz, \textit{Intifada}, 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Bregman, \textit{Israel’s Wars}, 198, 200.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} İşleyen, \textit{A Civilian Power?}, 61.
\end{itemize}

1. The Madrid Peace Conference and Oslo Accords

The coalition victory against Iraq in the Gulf War coupled with the decline of Cold War hostilities set the conditions for the United States to redirect its political efforts toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The United States sought a comprehensive settlement through an international conference with Palestinian representation based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, three positions fundamental to the European perspective on achieving peace in the Middle East. Co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Madrid Peace Conference convened in October 1991 and was organized around two negotiating tracks: bilateral and multilateral. Although a participant in the proceedings at Madrid, Europe was excluded from the bilateral negotiations at the behest of Israel and the United States. Europe did assume a role in the multilateral negotiations, however, chairing the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), which was one of five multilateral working groups concerning the issues of water, refugees, arms control, ecology, and economics. The aim of the REDWG was to establish regional economic cooperation with the secondary objective of facilitating confidence building among the participants in support of the concurrent bilateral negotiations. The bilateral talks were held between Israeli and Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian-Jordanian delegations, but they stalled within a year in part because of the absence of an independent PLO delegation.

While the bilateral negotiations in Washington, DC, stumbled secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel in Oslo, Norway led to the Oslo Peace Process and the signing of the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” in August 1993. The Oslo framework sought a final peace settlement through the establishment of confidence building measures and a five year transitional period, scheduled to end in May 1999, during which final status issues, to include border delineation, Palestinian sovereignty, arms control, the right of return for Palestinian

121 Musu, European Union Policy, 49–50.
122 Kaya, Middle East Peace Process, 97–98.
123 Müller, EU Foreign Policymaking 42.
refugees, and the status of Jerusalem, would be negotiated.\textsuperscript{124} Within the framework of the Oslo Peace Process Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, while Israel and the PLO signed a series of agreements to include the Oslo II protocol in September 1995, which designated zones and levels of Palestinian control and provided the timeline for Palestinian Council elections. Although again excluded from the negotiations, Europe was bolstered by the success of negotiations that included the PLO and Israel and the PA’s mutual recognition of each other, moves that the EU had advocated since the Venice Declaration. Moreover, the Oslo Peace Process marked a transition to a positive relationship with Israel and a greater role in the MEPP.

2. EU-Palestinian Relations

Still, throughout the Oslo Process the U.S. maintained the lead at the political level while the EU, which was inaugurated in November 1993, established its influence on the local and regional environment on which a lasting peace was predicated. Concentrating on financial and economic mechanisms, regional stabilization through multilateral approaches, and Palestinian state-building, the EU aimed to compliment the political sphere of the MEPP.\textsuperscript{125} As a result the EU became the principal financial donor to the Palestinians. EU objectives were to induce the Palestinian community to support the peace process by demonstrating the benefits of economic development, to include the moderation of radicalism; to demonstrate to Israel that a stable democratic Palestinian state supports their national interests; and finally to foster reconciliation among the Palestinian and Israeli populations through the development of civil society.\textsuperscript{126} Immediately following the signing of the Oslo Accords, the EU pledged 500 million European Currency Units (ECU) to the economic recovery and development of the Palestinian territories, representing one quarter of the total pledges received at the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Quandt, \textit{Peace Process}, 329–30.
\item \textsuperscript{126} İşleyen, \textit{A Civilian Power?}, 67.
\end{itemize}

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“International Donor Conference to Support Middle East Peace.” Moreover, between 1993 and 2001 EU financial contributions totaled €1.42 billion, and in addition EU member states committed €2.5 billion bilaterally. This assistance was used to improve the infrastructure within the OPT, establishing essential services through hospitals, schools, wells, and waste disposal as well as commercial infrastructure to include roads and the Gaza harbor and airport. European monies were also allocated in support of the Palestinian Council elections in 1996, and to assist in the establishment of rule of law through the creation of a Palestinian police force. Finally, Europe provided direct support for the budget of the Palestinian Authority (PA). While the Oslo process provided an avenue through which to influence the MEPP by providing financial and economic support to the PA, it also fostered regional cooperation between the EU and the belligerents of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and strengthened the EU’s relationship with Israel.


The Oslo process illuminated similarities between the political climate of Europe immediately following World War Two and the Middle East throughout the twentieth century. Israel came to see Europe as an example of how to achieve regional peace and stability. Shimon Peres, Israeli Foreign Minister during the Oslo Accords, stated that Israel’s “ultimate goal is the creation of a regional community of nations, with a common market and elected centralized bodies, modeled on the European Community.” He argued that regional cooperation would result in political stability, economic prosperity, national security, and democratization within the Middle East. It was in the spirit of

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128 Asseburg, “From declarations to implementation?,” 12; İşleyen, A Civilian Power?, 90.

129 Asseburg, “From declarations to implementation?,” 12.

130 Pardo and Peters, Israel and the European Union, 197.

131 Asseburg, “From declarations to implementation?,” 14.

132 Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 10.


134 Peres, Middle East, 62–64.
this renewed rapport that the EU recognized in the Essen Declaration in 1994 that “Israel, should ‘enjoy special status in its relations with the European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interests.’” To that end, the EU launched the EMP in November 1995 between the fifteen member states of the EU and the Mediterranean states of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Turkey, the PA, and Israel in an effort to increase regional cooperation through a combination of multilateral and bilateral approaches. The EMP pursued three objectives: the establishment of regional peace and stability, shared economic prosperity, and the promotion of cultural understanding within the region. According to the EMP, the principle elements necessary for stability in the Mediterranean were the same elements that had consistently framed EU declarations on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, namely respect for the territorial integrity of EMP members, respect for the right of self-determination, respect for fundamental human rights, and conflict resolution through peaceful means, all in accordance with the UN charter. One of the driving principles of the EMP was that economic underdevelopment within the Mediterranean was the root cause of regional instability; therefore, through the EMP the EU targeted regional economic development with the goal of achieving regional free trade by 2010.

Established independently from the United States, the EMP was meant to compliment the MEPP rather than replace it. It was designed to set the conditions from which the MEPP could succeed. Initially, the EMP was successful in this regard in part due to the fact that the confidence building measures built into the EMP focused on economic and regionally focused measures as opposed to those of a political nature captured by the MEPP. Moreover, the EMP picked up where multilateral forums under the Madrid process stopped including gaining the participation of Syria and Lebanon.

135 Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 65.
136 Musu, European Union Policy, 57.
138 İşleyen, A Civilian Power?, 69.
139 Musu, European Union Policy, 56–57.
both of which refused to participate in the Madrid process. Furthermore, it recognized the PA as an equal partner in the process, giving credence to the concept of Palestinian self-determination, yet another principle that the EU had advocated for more than a decade.\footnote{İşleyen, A Civilian Power?, 71.}

In regard to Israel’s participation in the EMP, the initial success of the Oslo Accords established Israel as a legitimate regional partner in the eyes of the Arab states.\footnote{Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 35.} Although Israel viewed itself as more closely aligned to Europe than the Mediterranean and it was concerned about the EMPs mission creep toward influencing the MEPP, the EMP represented a solution to Israel’s regional isolation, which presented a persistent economic and security threat to the state.\footnote{Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 36; Alfred Tovias, “Israel and the Barcelona Process: The First Five Years,” in Israel and Europe: A Complex Relationship ed. Klaus Boehnke (Wiesbaden, Germany: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2003), 50.}

In practice, the success of the EMP was dependent on the success of the Oslo Process. With the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1995 the MEPP suffered a major setback and subsequently the EMP stalled, failing to make significant progress in achieving regional peace and stability, shared economic prosperity, or cultural understanding within the region.

The bilateral component of the EMP consisted of association agreements between the EU and the individual Mediterranean states. Signed in 1995, the EU-Israel Association Agreement was an upgrade to the 1975 cooperation agreement and consisted of provisions designed to promote economic cooperation, specifically in the agricultural, industrial, financial, and scientific and technological fields. Secondly, the agreement established a political dialogue between Europe and Israel. The dialogue was meant to “develop better mutual understanding and an increasing convergence of positions on international issues” to “enhance regional security and stability.”\footnote{European Union, EU-Israel Association Agreement.}

This political dialogue was built upon “a respect for human rights and democratic principles.”\footnote{Ibid.} The political component of the association agreement failed to increase EU influence in the MEPP as Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister of Israel in 1996. Moreover, the
Likud party’s rise to power ushered in another period in which Israel tried to minimize EU political involvement in resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

4. EU Political Resurgence in the Middle East Peace Process

Popularity for the Oslo Accords waned significantly by 1994, demonstrated by Israeli and Palestinian acts of terrorism, to include the massacre of 29 Palestinians praying at a mosque in Hebron by the hand of an Israeli settler and Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets. Rabin’s assassination and the Israeli military response to Hezbollah-launched missiles against northern Israel further disrupted the peace process. The collapse of peace negotiations, however, was affirmed by the election of Netanyahu, a vocal critic of the Oslo Accords. Netanyahu entered office promoting the Israeli policy of “reciprocity” in which Israel would meet its treaty and peace process obligations when and only when the PA met its obligations. Of principal concern for Netanyahu was the cessation of Palestinian terrorism. In the spirit of reciprocity, he postponed previously agreed upon redeployments of Israeli forces from the OPTs and discontinued a four year freeze on settlement activity. Furthermore, he opened a second entrance to the Hasmonean Tunnel in East Jerusalem instigating violent riots among the Palestinians. The deterioration of the peace process and the loss of EU influence caused the EU to seek political action. In 1996, the EU began monitoring Israeli settlement activity and deployed a diplomatic mission. In November of that year the President of the European Council, Dick Spring, announced that “the EU had a responsibility both to the region and to itself to put the peace process back on track.”

To that end, an EU Special Envoy to the Peace Process was established in October.

a. EU Special Envoy

The EU Council of Ministers appointed Ambassador Miguel Moratinos, former Spanish Ambassador to Israel, as the EU Special Envoy to the Peace Process on 28 October 1996. The mandate of the special envoy tasked Moratinos, among other things,

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146 Ibid., 471.
147 As quoted in Pardo and Peters, *Uneasy Neighbors*, 12.
with keeping close contact with all parties to the peace process, promoting compliance with the standards of a liberal democracy, and scrutinizing Arab and Israeli actions that place a final peace settlement at risk.\textsuperscript{148} Most importantly, the mandate sought the special envoy’s input in EU policy-making in order to achieve the greatest political impact on the MEPP.\textsuperscript{149} Still opposed to European political or bilateral involvement in the peace process, Israel questioned EU motives while the United States reiterated its view that there was no bilateral role for Europe in the MEPP.\textsuperscript{150} In time, however, both nations accepted the EU Special Envoy, with Israel acknowledging a role for the EU in the bilateral process as a result of the envoy’s assistance in mediating the 1997 Hebron agreement, which re-established the Israeli redeployment schedule from Hebron.\textsuperscript{151} A significant event in EU foreign policy history, the Hebron agreement marked the first time the EU had a direct role in Middle East peace negotiations at the bilateral level. Subsequently, Moratinos continued supporting the United States in mediating the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as well as supporting Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Furthermore, the EU, through the special envoy, initiated an assistance program aimed at supporting PA counterterrorism efforts in order to adhere to Netanyahu’s demand for security.\textsuperscript{152} The EU maintained the special envoy until 2000 proving through the duration that the EU could influence the Arab-Israeli Conflict through political mechanisms. The Oslo process, however, was still headed for collapse by the end of the twentieth century.

\textit{b. Berlin Declaration}

The Oslo process had retarded following the Oslo II Accord in 1995 causing the Arab League to withdraw from multilateral track negotiations in 1997 due to the lack of progress. Recognizing the urgency of the political stalemate between Arafat and Netanyahu by 1997, the EU began a determined effort to save the Oslo process.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Pardo and Peters, \textit{Uneasy Neighbors}, 12; Miller, \textit{Inglorious Disarray}, 143.
\textsuperscript{151} Miller, \textit{Inglorious Disarray}, 144.
\textsuperscript{152} Musu, \textit{European Union Policy}, 61.
Releasing the “Call for Peace in the Middle East” document in June 1997, the EU called “upon the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to continue the negotiations to further the implementation of the Interim and Hebron Agreements and to resume talks on the Permanent Status.”\(^{153}\) Furthermore, the EU recognized the necessity for the parties involved to “abstain from unilateral actions prejudging the Permanent Status issues and to resume and maintain full security cooperation with the aim of fighting terrorism.”\(^{154}\) The EU followed shortly after with the Luxembourg Declaration in December, which called on Israel to make concessions in the interest of a final status agreement.\(^ {155}\) Although negotiations had been conducted in 1997 and 1998 with the Hebron agreement and Wye Memorandum, respectively, these agreements only sought to facilitate the implementation of Oslo II. Moreover, by 1999 Israel had failed to meet its redeployment timelines and subsequently suspended the Wye Memorandum causing Netanyahu’s coalition to collapse effectively halting the peace process.\(^ {156}\)

As Israel prepared for new elections in May 1999, Arafat threatened to declare Palestinian statehood on 4 May 1999, the previously established deadline for a final status agreement.\(^ {157}\) Committed to the Oslo process and recognizing that the PA’s unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state would likely result in an outbreak of violence, the Israeli annexation of the OPT, and Netanyahu’s re-election the EU made its most significant declaration to date.\(^ {158}\) On 25 March, it released the Berlin Declaration stating that

\begin{quote}
The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfilment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any
\end{quote}


\(^{154}\) Ibid.

\(^{155}\) Miller, Inglorious Disarray, 142.

\(^{156}\) Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli- Conflict, 477.

\(^{157}\) Kaya, Middle East Peace Process, 114.

\(^{158}\) Kaya, Middle East Peace Process, 114.
vetoe. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security and Israel’s acceptance as an equal partner in the region. The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above.159

Consistent with the spirit of its previous statements, the Berlin Declaration is significant because it marks the first time that the EU stated its readiness to recognize a Palestinian state. Furthermore, the EU’s statement created a linkage between Israel and a Palestinian state; however, it affirms that Palestinian statehood is a foregone conclusion that Israel must prepare for. The Berlin Declaration was successful in delaying Arafat’s proclamation, and although it further antagonized Israel’s Likud government it facilitated the renewal of the Oslo process following the election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel. Immediately receptive to opening a dialogue with the Palestinians and his Arab neighbors, Barak re-opened talks with Syria as well as the PA and withdrew all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon by 2000. In July of that year, Barak and Arafat met at Camp David with President Clinton, but excluding EU representation, for the final status negotiations. Unable to come to agreement though, the Oslo Process dissolved.

The eight years between the commencement of the Madrid process and the failure of final status negotiations at Camp David represented an evolution in EU participation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Prior to the Gulf War, the EU was kept outside of Arab-Israeli politics by the United States and Israel in large part because of its divergent perspective on the conflict. The Madrid Process, however, provided the EU an opportunity to influence the peace process and substantiated European principles regarding Middle East peace. Although the EU remained blocked from bilateral involvement for most of this period it became the most influential player in the multilateral track. Coupled with its program for regional integration through the EMP, the EU became the primary financial donor to the Palestinian Authority. It built Palestinian capacity in order to influence the

peace process positively. Making further inroads into the peace process, the EU’s employment of a special envoy helped establish European agency in the peace process. Still, critical of Israeli unilateral actions and intransigence during the latter half of this period, goodwill between Israel and the EU faded, as did its ability to serve as a critical party to the peace process.

C. MATURATION OF THE EUROPEAN POSTURE TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE, 2000–2010

1. The Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000–2005

On 28 September 2000, following Likud prime ministerial candidate Ariel Sharon’s inflaming visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem with police, politicians, and members of the media, the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in Israel and the OPT. Fueled by the failure of the Oslo process, rampant corruption within the PA, and the humiliation associated with the occupation, the Al-Aqsa Intifada resulted in the death of more than 3,000 Palestinians and 950 Israelis, only 301 of whom were members of Israeli security forces, by its completion in 2005. Unlike the widespread civil disobedience that characterized the First Intifada, this uprising was primarily carried out through the use of terror. The dominant tactic employed by Palestinian terror groups was the suicide attack, 150 of which were conducted against Israeli targets during the Second Intifada. In contrast, Israel employed a strategy that targeted the terror groups and Palestinian civilians alike, although damage to the latter was predominant. Israeli tactics included the closure of the OPT in December 2000, which drastically contracted the OPT’s economy; targeted assassinations, totaling seventy between 2001 and 2002 alone; the construction of a security fence, which when complete will effectively annex 9.5% of the West Bank; and the re-occupation of West Bank territories ceded to Palestinian control during the Oslo process. The latter tactic came in the form of Operation Defensive Shield in

spring 2002 and included mass arrests, curfews, the physical isolation of Yasser Arafat, and the destruction of Palestinian homes and infrastructure.¹⁶³

The Intifada years represent the lowest point in EU-Israel relations, but it also marks one of the most active periods for the EU in establishing itself as a political player in the peace process. Although the EU attributed responsibility for the unrest with both the Palestinians and Israel and affirmed the necessity for reform within the PA, the EU condemned Israel for weakening the PA’s capacity to enact political and administrative reforms and combat terrorism.¹⁶⁴ For the EU, Israel’s indiscriminate use of force; the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, much of which was funded by the EU; ever-increasing settlement activity; and restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement represented rampant violations of international law and withheld from the Palestinians basic human rights.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, the EU maintained that the greatest potential for establishing Israel’s security remained a “viable, democratic and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state.”¹⁶⁶ To that end, the EU continued to seek a political resolution to the conflict, simultaneously gaining agency as an effective participant in the peace process.

The EU continued to provide substantial financial assistance to the Palestinians throughout the Intifada and beyond with its aid totaling €3.3 billion between 2000 and 2009; however, it began to make an impact politically as well.¹⁶⁷ During Operation Defensive Shield, the EU negotiated the release and asylum of thirteen Palestinians following an Israeli siege of a church in Bethlehem housing Palestinian militants.¹⁶⁸ Viewed as a diplomatic success, the EU followed it up with participation in the Mitchell Committee, an American led fact-finding mission. The Mitchell report called for the cessation of violence across the board as well as Israel’s cessation of settlement activity.

¹⁶³ Bregman, Israel’s Wars, 240–42.
¹⁶⁴ Pardo and Peters, Israel and the European Union, 270, 272, 275, 277
¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 263–64.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 278.
¹⁶⁸ Kaya, Middle East Peace Process, 126–27.
Although it made little impact on the volatile situation in the Middle East it was significant in that Europe joined the United States in seeking a political resolution. This multilateralism would continue with the establishment of the Middle East Quartet.

2. The Middle East Quartet

Inaugurated in April 2002, the Middle East Quartet included the participation of the United States, the UN, Russia, and the EU. Based on the premise that the United States could not secure peace in the Middle East unilaterally as it had tried since the October War, the Quartet represented a multilateral approach to re-launching the peace process. It harnessed the international legitimacy of the UN, Russia’s historic ties to the Arab states, the EU’s primacy as a donor to the PA, and America’s role as political leader in the MEPP.\textsuperscript{169} The Quartet supported the Oslo process based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 but exceeded the confines of the Oslo process by publicly advocating for a two-state solution: the establishment of Israeli and Palestinian states “side by side within secure and recognized borders.”\textsuperscript{170} For the EU the Middle East Quartet was a mechanism through which it could influence the peace process, gain agency as a player in international politics, and influence U.S. foreign policy, especially its reengagement in the MEPP.\textsuperscript{171}

a. The Roadmap

EU influence on the peace process and the United States extended to the Roadmap, the mechanism through which the Quartet envisioned achieving a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The Roadmap was a three phased program based on an initiative drafted by the Danish EU presidency in August 2002. In its final form, it accounted for European preferences, to include reforms of the PA, the development of an international conference, a halt to all settlement activity, and improved


\textsuperscript{170} Tocci, “Middle East Quartet,” 30.

humanitarian conditions within the OPT. Phase one focused on the cessation of violence, the normalization of Palestinian life, and the establishment of Palestinian capacity to govern. Phase two consisted of the formal establishment of the Palestinian state, while phase three anticipated a final status agreement. The Roadmap sought the resolution of the conflict by 2005. Although the Quartet and the Roadmap facilitated growing EU influence, especially through its dominance in Palestinian capacity building and reform, it failed to be an effective multilateral organization. Neither Israel nor the PA honored their obligations as articulated in the Roadmap, while the United States leveraged its political might to gain Quartet support for its unilateral efforts. Still, although Israel was weary of the multilateral approach to the peace process, the EU’s participation in it facilitated Israeli acceptance of the EU as a political player.

3. The European Neighborhood Policy

While the Intifada raged and the roadmap failed to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations, the EU introduced the ENP in 2003. Expanding on the EMP and based on its premise that political and economic development of individual member actors will increase regional security and stability, the EU created the ENP reaching out to Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean. Trading economic, judicial, administrative, and political reforms for deeper bilateral relations with Europe, the ENP rewarded a member’s increasing liberalization with greater access to EU programs and expanded economic and trade integration. In December 2004 the EU and Israel agreed on an ENP action plan, a move toward achieving a degree of integration including Israeli access to the EU internal market. This agreement sought to capitalize on the goodwill generated by Europe’s significant involvement in the Middle East Quartet. Picking up where the 1995 Association Agreement failed, the EU-Israel Action Plan called for an “upgrade in the

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172 Musu, European Union Policy, 70–71.
173 Kaya, Middle East Peace Process, 130.
174 İşleyen, A Civilian Power?, 86.
The scope and intensity of political co-operation. Specifically, the increased political dialogue would consist of Israel working together with the EU, on a bilateral basis and as a member of the Quartet, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and a permanent two-state solution with Israel and a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security, in accordance with the Roadmap, and the obligations of the parties set out in it.

The action plan also promoted EU-Israeli cooperation at the multilateral level within the international community. Representing a significant strengthening of relations, the ENP established ten sub-committees covering political co-operation, justice and legal matters, and economic and financial matters, to name a few. As a result of the ENP’s success in facilitating stronger relations in the economic as well as political spheres, Israel sought an upgrade in cooperation in 2007; however, before an agreement could be implemented Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead in Gaza and in response the EU froze implementation of the upgraded bilateral agreement, marking yet another decline in EU-Israeli relations.

4. EU Crisis Management

In August 2005 Israel executed its disengagement plan, vacating the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria in the West Bank. Israel intended for the disengagement to dissolve the peace process and strengthen its hold on the West Bank while still maintaining control of Gaza by controlling its airspace, its sea access, and movement in and out of Gaza. The disengagement plan was supported by the Quartet as a step in the right direction, and in November it brokered the “Agreement on Movement and Access,” which provided humanitarian relief and facilitated economic development for the

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179 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli- Conflict, 531.
Palestinians as a result of increased freedom of movement to and from Gaza.\textsuperscript{180} Incorporated in the agreement was the employment of a third party to monitor the Rafah border crossing. The EU, again in large part because of the legitimacy that accompanied its involvement in the Quartet, assumed this responsibility establishing the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah in November 2005. With EUBAM Rafah, the EU supervised the PA’s administration of the border crossing, representing a confidence building measure and an international guarantee of which the EU had been advocating since the Brussels Declaration of 1973.\textsuperscript{181} Although the EUBAM Rafah mission was suspended in 2007 following Israel’s imposition of a blockade on Gaza in response to Hamas’s seizure of power, it was a starting point for greater EU involvement in the conflict.

Within a year of establishing EUBAM Rafah, the EU deployed another ESDP mission, the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) responsible for supporting the Palestinian police with training, equipment, and guidance in support of Palestinian reform efforts. Like the ESDP mission in Rafah, EUPOL COPPS was hampered by the aftermath of Hamas’s rise to power; however, it helped reconstitute the PA security apparatus following its marginalization and damage to critical infrastructure during the Second Intifada.\textsuperscript{182} Finally, beginning in October 2006, the EU assumed more than fifty percent of the force totals for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of peace between Israel and combatants such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. The EU even assumed responsibility for Maritime Task Force (MTF) UNIFIL, which secured the Lebanese coast from arms smuggling. Through UNIFIL, the EU assumed a critical role in maintaining peace between Hezbollah and Israel. Still in operation as of 2014, the deployment of these ESDP missions marked a turning point in EU relations with Israel. Not only was the EU the primary supporter of Palestinian reform and had established

\textsuperscript{180} Kaya, \textit{Middle East Peace Process}, 137.


\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 78.
greater political cooperation with Israel through the ENP, but for the first time in the Middle East the EU was conducting crisis management under the aegis of the ESDP, a significant expansion of its role as a political player.

5. Operation Cast Lead

On 27 December 2008, Israel commenced Operation Cast Lead, a coordinated air and ground assault into Gaza that continued until 21 January 2009. The latest and most significant of more than two dozen operations targeting Gaza since 2003, Operation Cast Lead was in response to increasing Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza and commenced mere days after the expiration of a six month cease fire between Hamas and Israel. The operation was set in the context of a suffocating blockade on Gaza that banned all exports and fuel imports, crippled the United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s (UNRWA) ability to distribute food to Palestinian refugees, and resulted in 76% of the population in Gaza living below the poverty line. Moreover, it severed the goodwill between Israel and the EU that had been burgeoning since the EU’s commitment to the Middle East Quartet and the establishment of the EU-Israel Action Plan. During the execution of the incursion 1,417 Palestinians were killed and 4,336 were wounded, while 25 government buildings, 60 police stations, 34 hospitals, and 214 schools were destroyed or severely damaged. Additionally, more than 35,000 heads of livestock were killed and 15,000 acres of farmland were destroyed.

Responding against both the blockade and Israel’s execution of Operation Cast Lead, the EU released a statement on 30 December calling for an immediate cease fire and the introduction of humanitarian aid into Gaza reiterating that the only viable solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict was through political means. Significantly, the EU

185 Ibid., 211.  
186 Pardo and Peters, Israel and the European Union, 487.
demonstrated its commitment to the peace process by deploying personnel to coordinate aid distribution, sending a diplomatic mission to the Middle East, and proposing the re-deployment of the EUBAM Rafah mission as well as additional border assistance missions.\textsuperscript{187} Finally, it affirmed its stance that a resolution to the conflict must be based on the establishment of two sovereign states side by side: Israel and Palestine.\textsuperscript{188} As mentioned previously, the EU suspended the upgraded EU-Israel Action Plan and pledged to withhold the improved relations until Israel ceased behavior that inhibited a two state solution, which included violations of international law such as settlement activity in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and human rights infringement.\textsuperscript{189} The European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, stated very clearly that the EU as Israel’s partner and friend, expects the new Israeli government to help implement the vision of a two-state solution. Recent activities intended to create new facts on the ground in and around Jerusalem run counter to this vision. Living up to past agreements, including those made in the context of multi-lateral forums, is essential.\textsuperscript{190}

Inaugurated as Prime Minister of Israel for the second time in March 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu refused to endorse a two-state solution and resented the conditional nature of EU-Israeli relations.\textsuperscript{191} To that end, he established a condition of his own: either Europe temper its statements on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict or it will be excluded from the peace process.\textsuperscript{192} By the conclusion of 2010, Israel continued the blockade of Gaza and settlement activity in the OPT, and the EU’s troubled relationship with Israel continued. Although the EU had finally achieved status as an integral player in the peace process alongside the United States, it represented a spoiler to Israel’s vision of the final status.

\textsuperscript{187} Pardo and Peters, \textit{Israel and the European Union}, 487.  
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{189} Müller, \textit{EU Foreign Policymaking} 64.  
\textsuperscript{190} Pardo and Peters, \textit{Uneasy Neighbors}, 67.  
\textsuperscript{192} Miller, \textit{Inglorious Disarray}, 193.
When the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in 2000 EU-Israeli relations were at an all-time low. Through incremental movements, however, namely participation in the Middle East Quartet and a deepening of EU-Israeli economic and political cooperation through the ENP, Israel was getting closer to achieving that special status that the EU had envisioned in the Essen Declaration. Concurrently, the EU was strengthening its political agency through its support of Palestinian state building and its nascent crisis management operations. Instability in Israeli domestic politics and Israel’s unwavering commitment to security above all else clashed with the European prejudice toward Middle East peace perpetuating the volatile EU-Israeli relations
III. ANALYSIS

In the thirty-seven years of engagement between the EU and Israel represented in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, EU foreign policy in the Middle East and specifically in relation to Israel has evolved and often set itself apart from the accepted strategies of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and the Arab world. The evolution of European foreign policy can be attributed to the nascence of a European foreign policy apparatus, namely the CSFP and the requirement to establish the necessary policy-making bureaucracy over time; however, the direction of its foreign policy is explained by the theoretical framework that underpins it. The realist and constructivist theories possess explanatory power, but they both fail to explain the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel. Liberalism, however, provides an explanation that girds the aforementioned foreign policy throughout the EU’s storied relationship with Israel.

A. REALIST ARGUMENT

In the realist perspective states seek security above all else, which is achieved through balance of power politics in which states ensure their security and maintenance of the status quo by assuming a strategy that maximizes relative power. Historically, power parity is achieved through hard balancing, which Art defines as the act of offsetting the burgeoning power of a threatening actor through increasing economic and military means.\(^\text{193}\) Essential to this interpretation is the conclusion that a physical threat to the state exists.\(^\text{194}\) The neorealist perspective maintains that the international political structure during the Cold War was based on a bi-polar system between the United States and the Soviet Union in which hard balancing had primacy. Moreover, the first twenty years of European engagement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict were set in the context of this bipolar system. The structure of this system facilitated a U.S. – EU relationship that


\(^{194}\) Ibid.
assured American protection of Europe from the Soviet threat while subordinating European interests to America’s and enabling Europe to focus on regional integration.195

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in an era of unipolarity with the United States becoming the single superpower possessing unrivaled power. This nascent unipolar international system was one in which no single state could balance against the United States.196 Structural realism maintains that the United States would use the new structure of the international system to secure its national interests without concern or appreciation for the interests and preferences of the other actors in the system thus generating fear among them regardless of the nature of America’s intentions.197 In order to ensure the achievement of European interests, arguably absent the capacity to balance the United States with military might and without fear of the United States posing an existential threat to the sovereignty of the European states, the EU accepted the unipolar structure of the international system but sought more agency in it. In affirmation of Walt’s representation of soft balancing in which second tier states establish “countervailing coalitions designed to thwart or impede specific policies” of the superpower, the neorealist soft balancing argument maintains that the EU sought to balance U.S. preferences specifically regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict using diplomatic, economic, and operational means.198 The strongest evidence in support of the soft balancing argument is the EU’s attempt at a European peace initiative with the Venice Declaration of 1980. The inherent weaknesses of the soft balancing argument, however, are that European participation in the peace process since 1991 has complemented U.S. interests, rather than balanced them; that the U.S. demonstrates benign intent toward the EU, which mitigates the need for balancing; and that EU


military cooperation fills a security void as a result of reduced American presence as opposed to growing U.S. military strength.

The Venice Declaration was released during the Cold War when the international system was still identified as a bipolar structure. Still, the EU aimed to establish political influence in the Arab Israeli Conflict autonomous from American efforts. All American engagement regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict was shaped by the context of the Cold War. Although Europe recognized the importance of the Middle East in cold war politics, it saw the conflict primarily as a regional issue. As soon as it became evident to the EU that the Camp David Accords would not achieve a peaceful resolution to the wider Arab-Israeli Conflict, Europe sought its own initiative based on a comprehensive peace settlement. In the several years preceding the Venice Declaration, the United States pursued its own interests in the Middle East. These interests were in conflict with the European interest of economic security as well as Europe’s pursuit of greater international influence. Increasing the tension was the White House’s insistence that all political participation in the Middle East be left to the United States. 199 Although the EU did not fear American aggression, it was weary of America’s ever-increasing autonomy in decision-making in the Middle East. For this reason Europe attempted to soft balance the United States with its own independent peace initiative. The Venice Declaration, however, failed to establish the conditions necessary for balancing as a result of Europe’s weak political position within the international system, Israel’s failure to recognize the EU as a legitimate actor in the region, and the United States’ depiction of a European peace initiative as “an act of open hostility towards America.” 200

While the neorealist soft balancing argument maintains that second tier states will cooperate in order to offset the unmatched power of a unipolar actor like the United States in order to defend against the direct or indirect security threat of which it poses, this does not explain EU foreign policy in the Middle East. 201 Instead, history demonstrates that the EU complemented American political power in the Middle East

199 Möckli, European Foreign Policy, 201–203.
200 Greilsammer and Weiler, Europe’s Middle East Dilemma, 45.
with its involvement in the Madrid and Oslo Peace Accords, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Middle East Quartet. During the Madrid process the EU was an active participant in the multilateral track establishing the necessary conditions for subsequent bilateral negotiations. Following the Oslo Accords Europe took the lead role in the Palestinian state-building project, which supported confidence building measures and increased the potential for sustainable peace in the region. The EU further complemented American foreign policy by establishing the EMP through which it reinforced the need to increase regional stability through economic development within the Middle East. Regional dialogue and cooperation was a necessary condition for the success of the MEPP, and it was only through the EMP that this occurred. Finally, after American unilateral efforts failed to facilitate peace, the EU joined the U.S. in the Middle East Quartet under the premise that each member state brought specific capabilities that when combined increased the likelihood for success. Throughout most of this period following the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU advocated for a different approach to the Arab-Israeli Conflict than the United States; however, recognizing that it did not have the capabilities to balance the United States, the EU chose to compliment American efforts.

Critical to the neorealist explanation of soft balancing is the notion that the unipolar power has unrivaled capacity, and it threatens the sovereignty of second-tier states with military power. No such threat has existed between the United States and Europe since the end of the Cold War. While the U.S. has fielded political postures that diverged from the European political perspective in regard to achieving peace in the Middle East, it did not represent a threat to EU security. Therefore, balancing whether through military expansion or through diplomatic and economic means was unnecessary and contrary to the interests of the EU.

The creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 set the stage for a unified European military capacity. Since then the concept has evolved and expanded, although since its inception the ESDP has pursued the capability to conduct limited military and crisis management operations on behalf of the EU. These operations

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were limited to humanitarian operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict stabilization. In support of this mission set, the member states of the EU committed to build a military force that would not exceed 15 brigades or 60,000 personnel.\textsuperscript{203} Moreover, outside of sustained operations like UNIFIL and EUBAM Rafah, these operations would be of short duration, not to exceed two years, for stability and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{204} Following the end of cold war hostilities, the EU had to account for changes in U.S. national interests and according to the former director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) “the Europeans had to reorganize themselves to assume their share of the responsibility in crisis management and in doing so, maintain or even enhance the United States’ interest within the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{205} By developing the capability for crisis management operations such as those conducted in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), the EU has established a role for itself in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: one that the United States demonstrates no interest in fulfilling. Furthermore, rather than balancing the United States, it complements American political efforts in the Middle East by enforcing stability. The realist perspective views the EU’s burgeoning military capacity as an attempt to balance the United States; however, even if its intention was to balance American military power, the gap is too great.

B. CONSTRUCTIVIST ARGUMENT

The realist explanation for EU foreign policy toward Israel is predicated on the notion that the structure of the international system is derived from its anarchical nature and that as a result of the constraints of the system’s structure states seek power as the means to maintaining state security. In the realist perspective, the architecture of the international system forces state actions and policies. The constructivist theory also maintains that the international system is based on anarchy; however, in this perspective states’ behavior is a result of social interaction between actors. As socialization occurs

\textsuperscript{203} Rehrl and Weisserth, \textit{Handbook on CSDP}, 79.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{205} As quoted in Brooks and Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing.” 91.
over time the potential for cooperation between states increases because the actors can anticipate each other’s behavior. A component of constructivism is the concept of a strategic culture and its impact on international politics. An appropriate treatment of strategic culture for this argument, as constructed by Giles’, defines it as the “shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior derived from the common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”206 From the constructivist perspective, the EU’s foreign policy actions toward Israel are formed as a result of a centuries-old socialization process with the Zionists based on complimentary strategic cultures. This relationship is demonstrated by Europe’s attempts at regional integration through the EMP and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as well as sustained economic relations. Although elements of this argument represent causal factors in the determination of EU foreign policy toward Israel, this argument is insufficient because though there are cultural ties between the Zionists and the EU, Israel has a strategic culture that is inconsistent with the European strategic culture. Furthermore, the socialization process between the two actors has only been successful in anticipating behaviors in the economic sphere and not in the political sphere.

Strategic culture derives, as argued by Jones, from “a macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics, and history; a societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society; and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations.”207 In Europe, although cultural variances exist in varying degrees among the European states, to include language, the states are linked by geographic proximity and most importantly a shared history that includes the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Integrated into this history are the Zionists whose quest for a Jewish homeland was in many ways spurred by the Enlightenment and the impact of the French Revolution

206 Gregory Giles, *Continuity and Change in Israel’s Strategic Culture* (working paper, Defense Threat Reduction Agency), 1.

and who brought with them the European liberal tradition. The strength of this cultural connection is illustrated by Kundera:

The great Jewish figures, exiled from their land of origin and thus lifted above nationalist passions, have always shown an exceptional feeling for a supranational Europe – a Europe conceived not as territory but as a culture. Even after Europe so tragically failed them, the Jews nonetheless kept faith with that European cosmopolitanism; thus it is that Israel, their little homeland regained, strikes me as the true heart of Europe – a strange heart located outside the body.

While there was cultural convergence between Europe and Israel, it was World War II and the Cold War that has had the greatest single effect on European strategic culture. Although the member states of the EU had different experiences during these periods, the common thread that emerged was that war was catastrophic and must be averted; therefore, the role of the military should be deterrence and territorial defense. Moreover, politically these states should pursue the role of civilian powers fixated on soft power, including diplomatic and economic mechanisms, to shape international politics. Through the constructivist lens, it is in the spirit of this European strategic culture, historical bond with Israel, and proclivity toward civilian power that Europe approaches its foreign policy, especially regional integration.

The Oslo Peace Accords marked a turning point in European-Israeli relations and the reaffirmation of shared culture between the EU and Israel. At this time, Israel saw the EU as an example of successful regional integration based on shared norms and values, while the EU recognizing that “Israel should ‘enjoy special status in its relations with the European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interests,’” sought to capitalize on their complimentary strategic cultures with the initiation of the EMP and, less than a


211 Ibid., 327.
decade later, the ENP.\textsuperscript{212} An attempt at generating regional stability in the southern Mediterranean, the EU developed the EMP in part to “establish a partnership in social, cultural, and human affairs . . . promoting understanding between societies and improving their mutual perception.”\textsuperscript{213} Comprised of multilateral and bilateral programs, the EMP was a continuation of the socialization process that was ongoing for decades and used the strengthening of economic relations as a mechanism for establishing closer political relations. Expanding on the progress of the EMP, the EU launched the ENP in 2003, which sought even closer political cooperation, cooperation at the multilateral level, and economic integration. Through each agreement, cooperation between the actors increased because both the EU and Israel were able to anticipate expected behavior from each other as a result of their changing identities throughout the socialization process.

While Israel established itself as a state and defined its role in the region and internationally in the years following statehood, the European Economic Community (EEC) concentrated on European integration. Seeking a partner through which it could alleviate its regional isolation, Israel immediately sought strengthened relations with the EEC, and in 1958 it became the third state to establish full diplomatic relations with the EU, but it sought more – associate membership in the EEC. Supported by geographic proximity, cultural ties, and Israeli dependence on European economic markets, the growing relationship was centered along economic lines, but it was shared history that facilitated cooperation. By 2010, the EU became Israel’s largest import partner and its largest export market with trade totaling €25.3 billion.\textsuperscript{214} Through the EMP scientific and technological cooperation increased and impediments to trade were reduced including barriers to cross-border employment. Subsequently, the ENP sought to expand EU-Israeli relations from economic and political cooperation to integration on the grounds of a “wider-Europe” that shared “the EU’s fundamental values and objectives.”\textsuperscript{215} A consistent socialization process based on congruent strategic cultures encouraged EU-

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\textsuperscript{212} Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 65.
\textsuperscript{213} İşleyen, A Civilian Power?,” 70.
\textsuperscript{214} Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 2.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 58.
Israeli cultivation along economic lines for decades; however, while Europe hoped to use that relationship to build political cooperation and behaved accordingly, this failed to materialize.

The foundation of the constructivist argument for EU foreign policy decision-making toward Israel is the similarity between the strategic cultures of the EU and Israel as a result of a storied relationship and shared history. Their strategic cultures, however, diverged following the Six Day War. Instead, Israel has adopted a strategic culture that is more aligned with that of the United States.\footnote{Efraim Inbar, “Two Sides, One Allegiance: A Partnership to Nurture,” \textit{Jewish Exponent} 221, no. 4 (2006): 35, ProQuest (227264383).} While Europe after World War II avoided building military capacity in favor of diplomatic mechanisms, Israel adopted a culture that depended on its military and security apparatus for survival. Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe has not faced an existential threat, while Israel has faced conventional threats from neighboring Arab states as well as terrorism and insurgencies from within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).\footnote{Giles, \textit{Continuity and Change}, 12.} To that end, Israel maintains a conscription-based military and commits a large percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to the development and sustainment of its military capacity.\footnote{Ibid., 4.} Moreover, it has cultivated a strategic culture characterized by unilateral action and preemption.\footnote{Inbar, “Two Sides, One Allegiance,” 35.} In contrast, the EU has employed diplomacy through multilateralism almost exclusively in international politics, while advocating conflict resolution through international mediums. While it is true that Europe has tried to exploit shared histories and like values to shape its relationship with Israel, the constructivist argument fails to explain its foreign policy behavior adequately. The radical separation between European and Israeli political perspectives, especially in regard to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, is a result of these divergent strategic cultures and the failure of their socialization process to produce stable expectations of behavior between them.

\footnote{Efraim Inbar, “Two Sides, One Allegiance: A Partnership to Nurture,” \textit{Jewish Exponent} 221, no. 4 (2006): 35, ProQuest (227264383).}
\footnote{Giles, \textit{Continuity and Change}, 12.}
\footnote{Ibid., 4.}
\footnote{Inbar, “Two Sides, One Allegiance,” 35.}
While the EU’s economic relationship with Israel is important to Europe, it has pursued strengthened relations with Israel over the last several decades with the intention of developing political relations that can be leveraged toward peace in the Middle East. Europe continued to increase the economic cooperation between the actors over the years beginning with a limited commercial agreement in 1964, a free trade agreement in 1975, the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the EU-Israel Action Plan in order to cultivate shared norms across the political spectrum. Israel, however, has consistently and successfully rejected the coalescing of economic interests and political cooperation. This separation between economic and political cooperation illustrates the weakness of the constructivist and strategic culture argument; although a causal factor behind certain aspects of European policy action toward Israel, it fails to explain the plurality of Europe’s behavior toward Israel.

C. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALIST ARGUMENT

Liberal internationalist IR theory is built on the premise that the interests of the individual are fundamental to global peace and prosperity. Moreover, as depicted by MacMillan, the theory posits “an insistence upon the moral primacy of the individual and a tradition of political and philosophical interests in the conditions of individual freedom, or autonomy.” Inherent in the liberal conception of individual freedom is the universal entitlement to human rights, to include the right to political, economic, social, and cultural self-determination; the right to economic and social benefit; the right to democratic representation; civic rights; and freedom from arbitrary authority. For political actors that subscribe to this theory, its objectives are global economic development, enduring peace, and the diffusion of liberal ideals in international politics. These objectives are achieved through the employment of democratic

220 Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations, 19.
222 Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations, 22, 25–6.
governance underwritten by the rule of law, collective security apparatus, cooperative frameworks, and multilateralism.224

Since the earliest instances of political integration among the EC following the October War, Europe’s foreign policy has been guided by the principles of liberal internationalism. The European Security Strategy (ESS) confirms the pervasiveness of this perspective with its declaration that “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the world order.”225 The ESS goes on to describe one of Europe’s foreign policy objectives as “the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning, international institutions and a rule-based international order.”226 Liberal internationalism is the permissive cause of EU foreign toward Israel. Every foreign policy action taken by Europe in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was guided by its liberal ideals. While economic security and economic interests, attempts at soft balancing the United States, and a historic connection to Israel colored EU foreign policy, it was Europe’s liberal internationalist foundation that drove its foreign policy. This explanation is demonstrated by the EU’s persistent efforts in protecting Palestinian rights, its employment of multilateralism toward resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the primacy of its role in Palestinian state-building.

The Universal Declaration of Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, declares in article 28 that “everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”227 Voted for by every European member of the UN General Assembly, the Declaration of Rights established the liberal baseline for the acceptable treatment of people within the international system. Subsequently, Europe generated foreign policy responses to violations of these rights

226 Ibid., 9.
227 As quoted in Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations, 22.
throughout the duration of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In the Brussels Declaration, the Europe’s first substantive statement on the conflict, the EU highlighted the rights of the Palestinians and Israel’s obligation to recognize those rights.228 A posture that was divergent from the United States, Europe’s initial foray into the politics of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Middle East peace established the European liberal framework for a future peace initiative. While European policy decisions regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Europe’s relationship with Israel changed throughout the duration of the conflict, Europe’s commitment to the protection of civilians, a liberal ideal, influenced all of its foreign policy behavior. Examples of this undertaking include the EU’s response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and its implementation of the Iron Fist Policy. The EU condemned Israel’s actions and the trampling of universal human rights and for the first time employed a limited sanctions regime in defense of Europe’s liberal sensibilities.229 During the First Intifada, Europe again attempted to utilize non-military coercion to influence Israeli behavior.230 Finally, in response to Operation Cast Lead, Europe deployed crisis management and humanitarian assistance personnel to alleviate Palestinian humanitarian concerns.231 Throughout the conflict and in response to Israel’s ever-increasing settlement activity, heavy-handed enforcement tactics, and repression of Palestinian political and economic freedoms Europe countered with either declaratory statements or limited diplomatic action. Most significantly, however, it increased its dedication to facilitating a solution to the conflict that would protect individual freedoms, support Palestinian self-determination, and achieve enduring peace.

Multilateralism, as defined by Ruggie, is “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct.”232 The EU assigns priority to multilateralism in pursuit of its interests.233

While multilateralism looks different across the international system, European multilateralism is founded on the principles of liberalism and is centered around the concepts of adhering to international law, consensus building as the primary method for conflict resolution, and eschewing the employment of military might. Furthermore, the attainment of global prosperity encompasses the European approach to security, rather than unilateral force.

While the EU is in itself a multilateral organization, for this argument the EU will be treated as a unitary actor. Since the Brussels Declaration, however, the EU advocated a multilateral approach to reaching a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In its first substantive statement, the EU coupled any peace settlement to international guarantees under the framework of the UN. It reaffirmed this posture in the London and Venice declarations in which the EU reiterated its support of peace negotiations inclusive of all concerned parties, to include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Although the EU was a vocal advocate for a multilateral solution to the conflict, it was not able to operationalize it until the Madrid Accords. At that time the EU assumed a critical role in the multilateral track of negotiations assuming the chair for the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). Committed to multilateralism and consistently blocked from bilateral engagement with Israel at the political level, the EU increased its efforts at multilateralism with the EMP and ENP programs. In keeping with the liberal principal of economic development and sustainable peace, it focused on measures to build economic and political cooperation regionally. The EU through this multilateral approach was able to bring all parties of the Arab-Israeli Conflict together in dialogue in a multilateral forum. Europe’s decades-long pursuit of a multilateral approach to the peace process, accepted by all parties, finally came to fruition with the establishment of the Middle East Quartet in 2002 after American unilateral efforts had

235 Youngs, The EU’s Role in World Politics, 3.
failed. Like its protection of civilians, multilateralism was a part of Europe’s liberal internationalist foreign policy posture from its earliest engagements in the Middle East.

The universal right to self-determination is one of the foundational principles of liberal internationalism. Requisite for self-determination is the cultivation of a national identity. Again guided by the principles of liberal internationalism, the EU was the first political actor to recognize publicly the Palestinians as an identity group. Moreover, the EU reaffirmed the Palestinian right to express their national identity, as well as the requirement for a homeland for that national group. This line of thinking extended to recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination with the Venice Declaration in 1980. Like the operationalization of its multilateral approach, Europe’s pursuit of Palestinian political, economic, and social freedoms was not manifested until the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Palestinian interim self-government and confidence building measures negotiated through the Oslo Accords provided the EU the opportunity to operationalize their liberal ideals and gain a foothold in the peace process. The achievement of a Palestinian state was contingent on the Palestinians demonstrating the capacity to govern, which included establishing the monopoly on violence within its territory; therefore, the EU set out to support the development of Palestinian governance. Characteristics of good governance in the liberal paradigm are that it is representative, accountable, transparent, responsive, and consistent with the rule of law. Initially, the EU establishing itself as the principal donor for the Palestinian state-building project committed millions of Euros to facilitate Palestinian Council elections and infrastructure development. This assistance increased over time to include Palestinian Authority (PA) security sector training and training and oversight of nascent Palestinian institutions. While the financial support, training and mentoring has yet to result in Palestinian statehood, it is representative of the EU’s liberal internationalist stance, which guides all of its foreign policy behavior toward Israel.

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238 Ibid., 24, 31.
The primary critique of this liberal internationalist explanation is that EU foreign policy is guided by realist thought, namely the pursuit of unilateral power, and it is merely cloaked in the ideals of liberalism.\textsuperscript{239} This critique is unconvincing. Although it is true that an economically developed Mediterranean region in which the local actors interact through multilateral forums and through which a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict can be achieved will serve European interests, the pursuit of power and self-interest is not the primary motive. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the primary factor influencing EU foreign policy toward the Middle East and specifically Israel is the pursuit of sustainable peace, economic development, and representative government – globally.

\textsuperscript{239} Youngs, \textit{The EU’s Role in World Politics}, 5, 7.
IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED

Relations between Europe and Israel can be characterized as historically strong in respect to economic cooperation, but in matters of politics and social affairs the relationship between the actors can be accurately defined as volatile. This incendiary relationship is best illustrated in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Beginning in 1973 in the immediate aftermath of the October War, formalized EU engagement with Israel fostered an ineffective and at times caustic political relationship. Maturing through the course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, however, EU foreign policy transitioned from declaratory in nature during the nascent years of European foreign policy consensus following the October War to multilateral during the Madrid and Oslo years, and finally, it assumed an operational role since the Al Aqsa Intifada. During the declaratory period, the EU established the framework from which it would base its foreign policy in the Brussels, London, and Venice declarations in response to Israeli actions following the October War, the Lebanon War, and the Intifada. The European political stance gave credence to the Palestinian cause and set itself apart from the policies of the United States and Israel. Entering the Madrid and Oslo years amid an antagonistic relationship with Israel, the EU developed positive relations following the initial success of the Madrid and Oslo processes. Demonstrating to Israel the benefits of regional integration, the EU made significant progress, primarily through multilateral mechanisms, in deepening political relations with Israel while gaining prominence in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) through its capacity-building efforts with the PA. In the aftermath of Netanyahu’s election, increased settlement activity, and the collapse of the Oslo process, the EU responded with the Berlin declaration thus once again weakening EU-Israeli political relations. In the years following the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the EU assured its presence in Middle East politics through its involvement in the Middle East Quartet as well as its crisis management operations, but again reacting to Israeli actions during the Intifada and Operation Cast Lead, it displayed a political posture in conflict with Israel. After a volatile relationship that witnessed highs and lows throughout
three decades of European engagement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the EU became a player in international politics, but it remains to be seen whether Europe can establish sustained positive political relations with Israel and whether it can be a part of the solution in achieving Middle East peace. This thesis attempts to understand the permissive cause of Europe’s foreign policy toward Israel. Through detailed examination of European engagement with Israel during the Arab-Israeli Conflict observed through the lenses of realism, constructivism, and liberalism, this study concludes that the theory of liberal internationalism possesses the greatest explanatory power.

The realist argument details Europe’s attempt to balance American regional hegemony through diplomatic and economic means in order to secure European interests and protect itself from the unrestrained power of the United States. This study elucidated the weaknesses of this argument, demonstrating that since structural changes in the international system brought on by the end of the Cold War there has been no evidence of European soft balancing in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The lone EU foreign policy action that resembles soft balancing was the attempted European Peace Initiative; however, it occurred within the context of a bipolar international system in which Europe was aligned with the United States. The empirical evidence validates this assertion by showing that EU foreign policy complemented American foreign policy regarding peace in the Middle East, the U.S. is not a credible threat to Europe, and nascent European military capacity is in response to American isolation, rather than any threatening behavior.

The constructivist argument maintains that EU foreign policy in respect to Israel is dictated by a decades-long socialization process that has occurred as a result of sustained engagement between Europe and Israel. Moreover, this socialization process has been cultivated by congruent strategic cultures. Although the actors share certain cultural attributes and historical narratives, this study demonstrates that the constructivist argument is insufficient because in truth the strategic cultures of Europe and Israel are divergent. While Europe’s response to the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War was to avoid military action and instead focus on diplomacy, Israel organized the state and its culture around the notion that security has primacy. As a result of these divergent
strategic perspectives, stable relations between Europe and Israel have manifested only through economic cooperation.

The liberal internationalist argument is framed around the liberal ideals of individual freedom, universal rights, and enduring peace and possesses the greatest power in explaining EU foreign policy toward Israel. Every European policy decision made in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was made within the structure of liberal internationalism. This study demonstrated liberal internationalism’s explanatory power by elucidating the three primary elements of EU foreign policy: protection of civilian rights, multilateralism and state-building. All three of these elements have a dominant and sustained role in European engagement with Israel and pre-dated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with the exception of Palestinian state-building. While national and supranational interests make it into the European policy-making formula, it is the ideals of liberal internationalism that ultimately shape European behavior toward Israel.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The historiography of the Arab-Israeli Conflict portrays decades of failed attempts to achieve sustainable peace in the Middle East, generate stability in the region, and establish a final solution to the question of Palestine. This effort has largely been led by the United States, although the closest the Palestinians and Israelis ever came to a final resolution was the Oslo process, which was initiated bilaterally between them without international interference. The Oslo process failed and in the decades since, the security situation has deteriorated, and Israeli settlement activity has increased; therefore, the likelihood of a bilateral solution is almost nonexistent. Arguably, the greatest chance at sustainable peace between the Palestinians and Israel is through a multilateral approach. Although the Middle East Quartet was inaugurated in 2002, it also failed to achieve a sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The failure was due in large part to a divergence in political philosophies between its members and a failure to gain leverage against both Israel and the PA.
To achieve a convergence of political perspectives and to gain leverage against the parties to the conflict, the members of the Middle East Quartet must gain an understanding of each member’s interests and the guiding forces behind their foreign policies. The identification of the ideals of liberal internationalism as the permissive cause of EU foreign policy in respect to Israel provides U.S. policy-makers the information they need to shape the actions of the Middle East Quartet around a common framework. Moreover, by understanding the conditions in the Middle East that must be met to gain European support, the U.S. can and must expend political energy domestically and bilaterally with Israel to gain support for that framework. The U.S. grants Israel more aid than any other nation and it is arguably Israel’s most important ally. In contrast, the EU is the primary financial donor to the PA and committed to creating the conditions for Palestinian statehood. Together, the unwavering efforts of both actors are essential to the successful achievement of peace in the Middle East, but first the United States must recognize that any effective multilateral approach must appeal to Europe’s liberal internationalist political perspective.
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