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THESIS

IMPROVING MILITARY INTEGRATION IN COALITIONS IN AFRICA

by

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December 2014

Thesis Co-Advisors: Erik Jansen
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### Abstract

Given the enormity and complexity of Africa’s conflicts, the international community has realized that collaboration and strong coalition relationships can be much more effective in generating security and long-term stability than any one country’s individual efforts. Today, the international community is engaging these fragile states as international coalitions, using holistic approaches simultaneously to improve and build self-sufficiency across multiple sectors, including security, governance, economic, humanitarian aid, and human rights. This broader coalition approach is a departure from traditional military thinking of coalition operations. This thesis studies coalitions that are conducting long-term, holistic stability operations with the premise that, if the political and operational environments have changed and the coalition structure has changed, then it is reasonable to believe that the military’s system of integration and coordination must also change. Using case-study analysis and interviews, this thesis argues that militaries can be more effective in these modern coalitions by integrating their planning efforts directly into their countries’ country teams or delegations.

### Subject Terms

Africa, Mali, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, coalitions, military, country team, embassy, interagency coordination, international coordination.
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Given the enormity and complexity of Africa’s conflicts, the international community has realized that collaboration and strong coalition relationships can be much more effective in generating security and long-term stability than any one country’s individual efforts. Today, the international community is engaging these fragile states as international coalitions, using holistic approaches simultaneously to improve and build self-sufficiency across multiple sectors, including security, governance, economic, humanitarian aid, and human rights. This broader coalition approach is a departure from traditional military thinking of coalition operations. This thesis studies coalitions that are conducting long-term, holistic stability operations with the premise that, if the political and operational environments have changed and the coalition structure has changed, then it is reasonable to believe that the military’s system of integration and coordination must also change. Using case-study analysis and interviews, this thesis argues that militaries can be more effective in these modern coalitions by integrating their planning efforts directly into their countries’ country teams or delegations.
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-Led Mission in Support of Mali</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>Africa Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National Pour la Defense du Peuple</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Counter-Piracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPTF</td>
<td>Counter Piracy Task Force</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>European Union’s Capacity Building Mission</td>
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<td>EUFOR RD CONGO</td>
<td>European Union Force to the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EUPOL RD CONGO</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission–République Democratique du Congo</td>
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<td>EUSEC RD CONGO</td>
<td>European Union Security Mission–République Democratique du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>FRS</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Somalia</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>HLC</td>
<td>High Level Committee</td>
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<td>HLPF</td>
<td>High Level Partnership Forum</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>International Community</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IEMF</td>
<td>Interim Emergency Multi-National Force</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Forces</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Assessment Cell</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unites pour la stabilisation en Republique Democratique du Congo</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Forces – Iraq</td>
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<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberations of Azawad</td>
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<td>MTWG</td>
<td>Military Technical Working Group</td>
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<td>MUJWA</td>
<td>Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSP</td>
<td>National Security and Stabilization Plan</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unites au Congo</td>
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<td>PMPF</td>
<td>Puntland Maritime Police Force</td>
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<td>PRED</td>
<td>Pour la Relance Durable</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PTWG</td>
<td>Police Technical Working Group</td>
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<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
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<td>SJSTWG</td>
<td>Security and Justice Sectors Technical Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somalia National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPPTWG</td>
<td>Strategic Planning and Programming Technical Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Since the mid-1940s, when African countries first began earning their independence, Africa has been repeatedly rocked by coups, acts of terror, internal and external conflicts, ethnic genocide, disease outbreaks, and natural disasters. Malaria kills one million Africans annually and annual refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) flows consistently number in the millions. While only half of the continent’s 188 coups have been successful, they have greatly affected the political and military landscape on a regular basis. In addition, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda (AQ), Boko Haram, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are four of the more significant terrorist groups working, recruiting, and training on the continent today.¹

The international community at times has taken great interest in Africa, with interests spanning a wide range: defeating terrorism and non-state threats, investing in lucrative economic markets, reducing human suffering and human rights abuses, combating government corruption, and preventing mass migrations of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).² For decades the international community, as well as various African organizations, have tried to repair these many fragile states, but have only seen mixed results in achieving lasting stability. Initially, international aid was dominated by purely monetary assistance. Africa received a massive amount of foreign aid over the years—nearly $600 billion—however, there are few signs of permanent success.³

Given the enormity and complexity of Africa’s problems and the lack of successful past assistance efforts, the international community has come to realize that collaboration and strong coalition relationships can be much more effective in generating

² Ibid.
security and improving stability than any one country’s individual assistance. Today, the international community is now engaging these fragile states as international coalitions, using a holistic approach to simultaneously improve and build self-sufficiency across multiple sectors, including security, governance, economic, humanitarian aid, and human rights. This approach requires a high level of coordination and support between the international coalition members, as well as a singular strategy.

This new coalition approach is a departure from traditional military thinking concerning coalition operations. Traditionally, coalitions involved militaries who would deploy to a country and fall under a formal military coalition chain of command, as was seen with the International Coalition in Operation Desert Storm, the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I), the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, or traditional UN-led Peacekeeping Operations (“Blue Hat” missions, as they were sometimes called). Figure 1 illustrates how coalitions are traditionally seen: formal, hierarchical, and military-led. After receiving political guidance, these military coalitions were then given a great deal of authority to plan and execute strategy with the host nation. This is the coalition structure into which the military is used to integrating; however, this is not the coalition structure that is being employed in Africa today.

The differences are several: first, militaries are remaining under their national commands. Second, Western militaries are usually not deploying to officially declared theaters of war, or even deploying in a combat role. Third, military and civilian operations are occurring simultaneously, not sequentially, meaning that the military is not executing its own operation and then transitioning the area to a civilian-led operation. Rather, military and civilian-led operations are occurring at the same time, and sometimes in the same locations. As a result, the civilian-led departments, ministries, and agencies are playing much larger and more important roles in the coalitions. As shown in Figure 2, these new coalitions are more complex, less formalized, and not military-led. The militaries are no longer under a single coalition command. Moreover, the militaries are not given broad authority to develop and execute coalition strategy, as they had in the past, with the host nation or other coalition members. Rather, coalition strategy is being
developed through diplomatic lines, and militaries are later given operational requirements to fulfill.

Figure 1. Traditional military coalition construct

Figure 2. Prevalent military coalition construct in contemporary Africa
If the political and operational environment has changed, and the coalition structure has changed, then it is reasonable to believe that the military’s approach to integration and coordination must also change.

B. OVERVIEW

This thesis focuses on a better understanding of the coalition efforts in Africa, and then analyzes how militaries can be better integrated into these coalitions. Specifically, this thesis studies coalitions that are making a concerted, holistic effort to assist a host nation in defeating and dismantling an insurgent movement, and ultimately stabilizing its country. This thesis is not focusing on international responses to crises (e.g., evacuations), nor is it focusing on specific military operations (i.e., drone strikes, hostage rescues), but rather efforts geared towards long-term national stability.

To examine these issues, this thesis focuses on three case studies of coalitions in Africa: Mali, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The rebellion in Mali was initially a crisis in which France responded to prevent the collapse of the government. Following France’s initial response, an international coalition emerged to assist Mali in defeating the Tuareg rebellion and rebuilding the failed government in order to re-stabilize the country. In Somalia, an international coalition recently formed to assist Somalia in reclaiming its land from Al-Shabaab and building a stable, self-sufficient country. Similarly, the DRC’s long history of governmental instability and insurgent groups prompted the creation of an international coalition effort. However, unlike Mali and Somalia, this coalition effort has had little success, largely due to its inability to effectively utilize coordination mechanisms between coalition members.\footnote{Mark Edwards, “United Nations in the Congo: Success or Failure?” (University of California, Santa Cruz, April 3, 2009), http://history.ucsc.edu/undergraduate/undergraduate-research/electronic-journal/journal-pdfs/Edwards2009.pdf.}

From this research, a common trend emerged regarding how these coalitions formed structurally, and why they did so. First and foremost, national interests are the dominant force driving coalition stakeholders. Between stakeholders, these interests can be mutually supporting, competing, or opposing. Moreover, stakeholders only remain in the coalition as long as their national interests are being furthered. Additionally, the host
nation, the nation that is receiving coalition assistance, is the only true permanent stakeholder, as all other stakeholders retain the ability to exit at will. This is the international environment in which these coalitions exist, and there are no signs that this environment will be changing.

To be successful in such an environment, coalitions in Africa have adopted a semi-formal structure that allows multi-lateral coordination, but bi-lateral execution. The semi-formal structure attracts more stakeholders than a formalized structure could. The coalition benefits from collaboration and the combined effects of all of the stakeholders, while stakeholders are able to maintain their autonomy to pursue their interests.

In this type of coalition, the Country Team becomes both the critical external and internal coordination node. Externally, the Country Team level is where the coalition’s strategy and operational levels meet. Key professionals and experts within each Country Team are able to interact frequently and easily with their international counterparts. The coalition strategy is developed at this level, as are the multitude of supporting assistance programs. Internally, a stakeholder’s entire inter-agency community is represented in the Country Team. Experts from all departments of the government are able to interact on a daily basis. From this interaction, a stakeholder is able to develop a holistic national strategy in which all of the resulting assistance programs can be mutually supporting.

If the Country Team is the critical coordination node, the question of how militaries can better integrate into these coalitions becomes clearer. This thesis strives to illustrate why the Country Team is the critical coordination node in this complex international environment and resulting flexible, semi-formal coalition construct. We conclude by arguing that integrating military planning efforts directly into the Country Team would not only better serve the military and its nation, but also the overall coalition effort.
C. THESIS QUESTION

How can militaries integrate more effectively into today’s coalitions in Africa?

D. KEY TERMS

To better understand some of the organizational elements and interactions that are discussed in this study, the following terms need be defined.

1. **International Coalition** – A group of states or International Governmental Organizations (IGO) providing assistance to a host nation. The coalition, for this thesis’ purpose, does not necessarily need to be a formalized and codified organization. Rather, a coalition represents the group of states and IGOs consciously working together, whether it is formalized, semi-formal, or purely informal.

2. **Stakeholders** – The states and IGOs that are actually contributing to the coalition effort. While IGOs (like the United Nations and European Union) can be comprised of multiple stakeholders, when the IGO launches an assistance effort, that effort falls under a single flag. For example, following internal discussions and debates among its members, the EU agreed to send a EU Delegation with an accompanying EU Training Mission (EUTM) to Mali. The EUTM reported to the EU Delegation, which reported to the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS). In this context, IGOs are treated as a single stakeholder in a coalition effort.

3. **Formality** – Degree of explicit rules, procedures, and hierarchical control that exists within a coalition.

4. **Semi-Formal Coalition** – A coalition that has little hierarchical control over the various stakeholders. Instead, the majority of the coordination and collaboration is done through lateral, horizontal communication lines between stakeholders at various levels.

E. METHOD

This thesis uses a combination of case studies, interviews, and organizational design analyses. The case study analysis examines the coalition efforts in Mali, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, focusing specifically on the coalitions’ stakeholders, structure, strategy, and coordination processes. All three case studies depict coalitions that are undertaking holistic approaches to assist the host nation in defeating an insurgent group and stabilize the nation. In each case study, the stakeholders are providing a wide array of assistance. That is, the military assistance is part of a larger
multi-sector assistance effort. The Mali case study only has a few major coalition stakeholders working together to provide this holistic effort. The Somalia case study also illustrates a coalition effort undertaking a holistic assistance approach, but with far more stakeholders than in the Mali case study. The DRC case study shows similar problems, conditions, and coalition structure as the first two case studies; however, unlike the first two case studies, the DRC stakeholders are failing to collaborate effectively. To complement and reinforce this analysis, interviews with the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the Operations Command of the German Federal Armed Forces provide additional historical, political, and military information concerning ongoing and future coalition and military efforts.

The key findings of each of these case studies are summarized within each respective case. Chapters II, III, and IV analyze the coalition efforts in Mali, Somalia, and the DRC, respectively. From this analysis, Chapter V identifies the common trends in these coalition efforts, examines how these trends are likely to persist beyond the bounds of these specific cases, and presents recommendations for how the military can adapt and better integrate itself into future coalition efforts in Africa.
II. MARI CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

Mali is home to the largest population of Tuareg people, holding nearly 621,100 of the 2,000,000 total Tuaregs living across the Saharan countries. Throughout the Saharan states, the Tuaregs are poorly represented in just about every national government, especially in Mali. Living mostly in the poverty stricken areas to the north, they are often victims of income inequality, government prejudice, and racism. As a result, the Tuaregs have fought against the past governments that condone or promote these injustices. This toxic relationship has led to five separate Tuareg uprisings in Mali: 1890, 1910, 1962, 1990, and 2006. Unfortunately, these rebellions and toxic relationship have had devastating consequences for the Tuaregs, affecting their communities, class structures, and local economies.

Constant marginalization has prompted Tuareg tribes to put aside their tribal rivalries and band together in a common cause. Out of necessity and desperation, Tuaregs have also banded together with Islamic radical groups with similar political grievances. Islamic radical groups, such as the National Movement for the Liberations of Azawad (MNLA), the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA),

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6 Ibid., 2.
8 Ibid.
and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are all supporting the current conflict.\textsuperscript{12} Tuaregs do not necessarily share the same overall religious aspirations as these extremist groups, but this partnership is seen as a necessary evil if the Tuaregs ever want to achieve their goals.\textsuperscript{13}

In 2012, Tuareg rebels, partnered with various Islamic extremist groups, threatened to take over the entire country.\textsuperscript{14} Though proving to be an extremely difficult fight, Mali, France, the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have formed a semi-formal coalition to counter the rebellion. This coalition began with a military focus, but has since grown into a holistic assistance and reform effort. France and the AU’s Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were initially focused on stopping the rebellion militarily, thus preventing a government collapse. However, when the military offensive operation soon changed to a stability operation, the UN and EU joined the coalition.\textsuperscript{15} Today, the coalition’s mission and strategy include a holistic effort to improve the country’s stability and address the root causes to the Tuareg rebellion.\textsuperscript{16\textsuperscript{17}} This study examines the formation and evolution of this coalition, as well as the unique relationships between the coalition stakeholders.

\section*{B. THE REBELLION AND INITIAL COALITION RESPONSE}

In January 2012, Tuareg separatists in the north, under the flag of the National Movement for the liberation of Azawad (MNLA), declared a rebellion against the

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\textsuperscript{12} Onuoha and Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns.”
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\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\vspace{1pt}
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 2.
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government of Mali. The Malian military, however, was too poorly trained and ill equipped to handle the intense fighting; and Tuareg rebels quickly took control of nearly two thirds of the country. The military grew angry of President Touré’s leadership, and blamed Touré’s administration for the military’s losses and lack of appropriate equipment and training. Discontent led to protests and a military coup ultimately removed Touré from office, in March.

After Touré’s removal, an interim government took over and began trying to reestablish governance and stability with the assistance of the AU. But as the rebellion pushed closer to the capital city of Bamako, Mali’s interim government was forced to reach out for more immediate support. Mali first looked to ECOWAS for support, in September 2012. ECOWAS responded to Mali’s request with a two-pronged approach. First, ECOWAS attempted to mediate a peace agreement between the government, MNLA, and the other factions. This negotiation process would continue for several months. ECOWAS also pursued a military response, in case the negotiations failed. UN Resolution 2071 was a major step in this process as it allowed ECOWAS to develop military response options with Mali and other interested international members.

As the negotiation process stretched out, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement decreased. The situation became more difficult when the MNLA lost control of the smaller factions and terrorist groups. These terrorist groups not only rejected the

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22 Ibid., 4.
negotiations, they also took control of several cities from the Tuaregs.\textsuperscript{25} With ECOWAS’ diplomatic approach failing, ECOWAS turned to its military option.

In December 2012, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2085, authorizing the deployment of military combat forces to Mali.\textsuperscript{26} The resolution authorized the creation and deployment of an AU military force, called the African-Led Mission in Support of Mali (AFISMA) to assist and strengthen the Malian security forces.\textsuperscript{27} Though authorized in December, it was unclear how fast AFISMA could actually deploy its forces. In the meantime, the terrorist groups continued their offensive, capturing additional towns and territory.\textsuperscript{28}

In response to the increasing threat and the slow AFISMA deployment, France, with Mali’s approval, deployed its own military force, Operation SERVAL, in January 2013. The French forces led the counter-offensive alongside the Malian military. AFISMA, though struggling logistically, was able to slowly deploy its forces in a piecemeal fashion.\textsuperscript{29} Because AFISMA and SERVAL deployed nearly at the same time, there was little opportunity for the two entities to coordinate combined operations or outline a unified strategy.\textsuperscript{30} Both SERVAL and AFISMA operated through their own bilateral agreements with Malian Government.\textsuperscript{31} There were no documents or agreements that outlined a formal coalition command relationship. Coordination and de-confliction between AFISMA, SERVAL, and the Malian military was accomplished through direct and ad-hoc leadership meetings. Through these meetings, it was determined that the


\textsuperscript{26} UN Security Council, “UNSC Resolution 2071,” 1–5.


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 6.


French SERVAL mission would lead offensive military operations against the rebellion, while AFISMA would hold and secure the ground that the French forces recaptured. These two military efforts should be seen as complementary operations, though they were executed separately. Figure 3 illustrates the ad-hoc relationship between these two stakeholders. France, ECOWAS, and their respective military efforts coordinated and synchronized mostly through lateral communication channels.32

![Initial coalition construct in Mali](image)

Within a few months of operation, the coalition was able to stop the rebel advance and begin taking ground back from the rebels. While both SERVAL and AFISMA were having success, there is no evidence to suggest that either SERVAL or AFISMA had a long-term plan, in the event that they were required to stay beyond their initial mandate. As a result, there was no unified strategy, nor did either stakeholder plan address the post-conflict and reform period.33

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32 Christophe Berthier, Interview with French Officers at the desk of the French LNO to USAFRICOM, July 16, 2014.

C. MATURING COALITION

As AFISMA and SERVAL pushed the rebels back, ECOWAS and Mali continued to engage the UN for assistance. The military offensive phase was coming to a close and the focus was now shifting to stability operations. As a result, the coalition stakeholders had to refocus their efforts and develop a new post-conflict strategy. A long-term stability strategy for Mali would be needed in order to capitalize on the military successes and provide lasting effects. The UN was extremely interested in Mali’s long-term stability, so the UN created the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in April 2013. MINUSMA would assume the AFISMA’s responsibilities and would also expand international assistance into governance, economic, humanitarian aid, and human rights sectors. The AFISMA forces would now work under MINUSMA; they began conducting community patrols, promoting legitimate and transparent governance, and securing voting and polling stations for the upcoming election.

Ever since France’s SERVAL mission, the European Union was also planning to offer assistance. However, the EU was not inclined to become involved in a combat mission. Instead, the EU was pursuing a security assistance role that was in line with the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) was created in February 2013, but wasn’t deployed to Mali until April 2013. Through a bi-lateral agreement with Mali, the EUTM would work directly with the Malian military to train four new battalions. The EU fell into the existing semi-

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34 Barrios and Koepf, “Building Peace in Mali: The Elections and beyond.”


36 Barrios and Koepf, “Building Peace in Mali: The Elections and beyond.”


39 Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of the EUTM.”

40 Wiklund and Skeppstrom, “European Union Training Mission Mali – Challenges and Opportunities.”
formal coalition construct, coordinating efforts multi-laterally with France and MINUSMA. The EU Delegation to Mali would oversee the EU’s overall efforts in Mali, and would coordinate with Mali and the other stakeholders’ embassies. A EU Special Representative for the Sahel was also created to help implement, coordinate, and develop the EU’s comprehensive strategy in the Sahel. This Special Representative and his staff would work closely with the EU Delegation to Mali.41

For the coalition to be effective in providing long-term assistance, it needed some kind of unifying strategy. The coalition also recognized two facts: (1) stakeholder support would vary over the long-term, and (2) Mali needed to accept the strategy and be held accountable. As a result, Mali, with help from the stakeholders, developed a Plan Pour la Relance Durable (PRED), or Plan for Sustainable Recovery.42 This plan outlined Mali’s assistance needs across all sectors, to include security, humanitarian assistance, democratic and transparent governance, judicial system reform, infrastructure development, basic government services, public finance, economic growth, education, health services, and women’s rights. Moreover, Mali created a national-level Monitoring Committee, with four sub-commissions, to maintain accountability and provide periodic status reports.43

Mali then presented this 4.3-million euro plan to the international community at the High-Level Conference on Support and Development of Mali. France, the EU, and UN organized this conference, as a means to highlight the coalition’s shift to long-term stability assistance, show their commitment to Mali’s Plan, and garner additional donor support. The Presidents of Mali, France, and the European Commission co-chaired the conference to underscore the importance of the plan and coalition’s commitment. In the

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43 Ibid.
end, 108 countries attended the conference and pledged a total of 3.25-billion euros to support Mali’s Recovery Plan.44

The coalition now had new stakeholders, a unifying strategy, and funding. Overall, the coalition construct would remain the same, with the stakeholders coordinating multi-laterally, and executing assistance programs bi-laterally with Mali. Direct coordination would still be important at the operational levels. For example, SERVAL and MINUSMA had detailed knowledge of Mali’s current military training and equipment shortfalls, so EUTM was able to draw from this knowledge, as it developed and refined its military assistance program.

However, most of the multi-lateral coordination would now occur between the Country Teams and Delegations, as the majority of the assistance efforts were non-military. For example, MINUSMA, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, was responsible for all of the UN-related assistance. Besides the UN security assistance effort already on the ground, the UN was now also managing new assistance programs that covered human rights, rule of law, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, demining, agriculture, emergency food and shelter, and education.45 Figure 4 illustrates the current coalition construct, with the majority of the coordination occurring between the stakeholders’ Country Team and Delegations.


D. **ANALYSIS**

1. **Stakeholders and National Interests**

This case study highlights how changing stakeholder interests drive a coalition’s focus. The initial Tuareg rebellion only immediately affected a few stakeholders. Neighboring countries, like Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania, realized that the rebellion threatened not only regional stability, but also their respective national economies.\(^{46}\) As members of ECOWAS, these countries pressured the AU to take immediate action in assisting the Malian military. The AU was interested in assisting Mali, not only because Mali is an AU member state, but also because the AU wanted to prove that it is an effective organization. Past AU assistance efforts to build a lasting peace between the Mali government and Tuaregs had failed.\(^{47}\) Moreover, the AU believed that greater African participation could offset the negative perceptions of French intervention in a former colony.

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\(^{46}\) Boukhars and Peace, *Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara*.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.
Similarly, France’s interests were immediately threatened by the rebellion. Nearly 12% of Mali’s imported goods come from France.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, much of Mali’s imports from Senegal are actually products from France.\textsuperscript{49} France was also worried about the stability of its uranium supply from Nigeria, as the mines were located near Mali’s border.\textsuperscript{50} Finally, France still had nearly 40,000 French citizens living in Mali, whose safety posed an immediate political issue in France. As a result of these interests, France and the ECOWAS nations were the first to respond to Mali’s crisis. Both stakeholders were focused solely on stopping the rebellion, which would remove the immediate threat to the stakeholder interests.

These two stakeholders were willing to coordinate their efforts, as their interests were mutually supporting. France, as the larger and more capable stakeholder, took the lead in the counter-offensive against the Tuareg rebellion. AFISMA supported the offensive by providing security behind France’s forces, ensuring there was no power vacuum or loss of governance. The military successes of France’s SERVAL mission and ECOWAS’ AFISMA mission effectively protected France’s civilians and ensured that Mali’s government and economy would not collapse. The coalition focus could now shift to long-term stability and assistance. With this shift, additional stakeholders were now willing to join the coalition. The UN had significant interests in regional stability, transparent governance, and human rights.\textsuperscript{51} When the coalition switched its focus to stability and long-term assistance, the UN was willing to create the MINUSMA mission. Similarly, the coalition’s new stability focus was in line with the EU’s CSDP as well as the EU member state’s broader interests, reflected in the 1975 Lome Agreement.\textsuperscript{52} As a result, the EU was able to gain enough member support to deploy a EU Training Mission,


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., fig. 1.


create a Special Representative for the Sahel, and implement a comprehensive approach to the crisis in Mali. With a new focus and new stakeholders with mutually supporting interests, the coalition could continue to coordinate multi-laterally.

2. Semi-Formal Coalition Structure

This coalition benefited from the fact that the stakeholders shared many mutual goals, and there were no major conflicting interests. The initial coalition between France and ECOWAS-AFISMA adopted a semi-formal structure, because there was a critical need to respond quickly. There was no time for the stakeholders to enter into a formal coalition agreement. Discussions on national caveats, coalition command, and coalition mission scope would have delayed the military response. Instead, coordination and collaboration occurred in an ad-hoc and informal manner between military units at the operational level, and between national leadership at the strategic level. After coordinating, the stakeholders then bi-laterally executed their plans with Mali.

When the coalition moved into its current stability phase, the need for quick response was replaced with the desire to maintain autonomy and flexibility. By maintaining a semi-formal construct, the coalition could remain flexible to changing stakeholder support. The coalition would continue to coordinate and synchronize efforts, ensuring a more unified effort. At the same time, by having the stakeholders execute bi-laterally with Mali, the stakeholders maintained the autonomy to further their national interests, and Mali remained empowered and accountable for its own recovery. Because there were only four major stakeholders in the coalition, there was no need for the creation of additional coordinating mechanisms or a coalition command. Mali was given the responsibility of “managing” the overall strategy, while France, the EU, the UN, and the AU coordinated the coalition effort. With the overall coalition assistance effort growing more complex and diverse, the stakeholder Country Team and Delegations assumed more of the coordination responsibilities.
3. The Key Coordination Node

The initial France-ECOWAS coalition relied on direct coordination between military units. This made sense because the coalition only had a few military objectives. However, when the coalition’s focus shifted to stability and long-term assistance, there was a need to shift the primary coordination role to the Country Team/Delegation. The coalition would now provide assistance to Mali’s security, governance, economic, and humanitarian sectors. The Country Team/Delegation, with its multi-agency representation and location in Bamako, were best suited to take on this complex coordination task.

The Country Teams/Delegations, particularly the French Embassy and EU Delegation, played an important role in assisting Mali with the development of its Plan for Sustainable Recovery (PRED). Not only did the Country Teams have to ensure that the plan adequately addressed Mali’s needs, but that it also addressed the stakeholders’ interests and expectations. The stakeholder input into the PRED is evident by the emphasis on women’s rights, environmentalism, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. These are stakeholder interests that Mali likely had to address in order to receive assistance in its security and economic sectors.

With the coalition now providing broad assistance, the Country Teams are responsible for overseeing the assistance efforts and ensuring that Mali fulfills its accountability and transparency obligations, as outlined in the PRED. The Country Teams are also responsible for ensuring that there is no duplication of effort between the stakeholders. The EU and UN seem to have closest working relationship in this regard, as both are providing the widest range of assistance efforts. The EU is currently providing assistance in the security sector via EUTM and EUCAP, and to the transportation, agriculture, water & energy, economic, and migration sectors through the EU Delegation.\footnote{European Union External Action Service, “EU Delegation Projects in Mali,” EU Delegation Mali, (August 15, 2014), http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/projects/index_fr.htm.} \footnote{European Council, “EUCAP Sahel Mali: EU Support Mission for Internal Security in Mali Established” (European Union, April 15, 2014), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142239.pdf. The European Union’s Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) is the EU’s newest training mission, tasked with training Mali’s police and gendarmerie.} Meanwhile, MINUSMA is managing assistance programs being
executed by a variety of UN organizations, including UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UN Women, WHO, WFP, IOM, and UNDP.\textsuperscript{55} Finally, there are other minor stakeholders, like the United States, who are providing some assistance to Mali, both directly and indirectly, through either the EU or MINUSMA.\textsuperscript{56} It’s clear that the coalition is providing a substantial holistic effort to Mali, under a unified strategy. That said, from the long-term perspective, this coalition effort is still in its infancy. While many of the assistance efforts are having immediate positive effects, it is still too early to assess the long-term effectiveness of the coalition effort.


\textsuperscript{56} Military Officer at U.S. AFRICOM, Interview with Military Officer, July 2014.
III. SOMALIA CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

Somalia’s recent instability and insurgency problems began with escalating clan clashes that ultimately resulted in civil war and the 1991 government collapse.\(^{57}\) From 1991–1995, the international community made a concerted effort to stem the violence, stabilize the country, and bring humanitarian assistance to the Somali people. However, in 1995, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) withdrew its forces from Somalia, effectively ending the international ground efforts.\(^{58}\) Diplomatic efforts continued for the next twelve years. However, it wasn’t until 2006 that the international community would once again come together to assist the Somali government in restoring security and stability to the country. Today, there are well over a dozen countries and international organizations working together to assist Somalia across a broad array of sectors: security, justice, governance, economy, Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR), and Counter-Piracy (CP).

A great deal has happened in Somalia, since the 1991 collapse: the formation of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), the rise of Al-Shabaab, the creation of a transitional government, the reestablishment of a government in Somalia, national elections, and the ratification of a constitution, just to name a few. Against the backdrop of these events, this case study focuses on the recent international coalition effort, which grew out of the diplomatic efforts by the United Nations (UN) and growing interests of several stakeholders. This study uses the U.S. and EU in several diagrams and examples to illustrate various points; however, these points can be applied to any of the stakeholders involved in Somalia.


B. EARLY INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Following UNOSOM II, the UN created the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) on April 15, 1995 “to pursue peace and reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations, and the states and organizations concerned.” From 1995–2006, UNPOS, with the assistance of the African Union (AU) and many East African countries, worked to create a new Somali Transitional Federal Government and build international support for Somalia. UNPOS did this through bilateral, multi-lateral, and UN Security Council meetings. While these meetings were successful in discussing the political, military, and security situations in Somalia, they failed to form a coordinated international effort that could be projected into Somalia.

Despite the lack of international commitment, there was no lack of interested stakeholders. The AU and UN, as major international organizations, want to build a strong, functional government that could stabilize the country. Ethiopian and Kenyan interests are not necessarily focused on reestablishing a strong Somalia government, but rather protecting their borders and citizens from the increasing threat of the UIC and Al-Shabaab. Somalia’s instability also threatens a joint Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan oil pipeline venture with a port terminus in Lamu, near the Somalia border. In addition to economic interests, Uganda has security and political interests in Somalia. First, demonstrating its military capabilities in Somalia could serve as a deterrent to potential insurgent actors in and around Uganda. Uganda could also use the AMISOM mission to increase its CT and military relationships with the U.S., while also increasing its influence regionally, as well as within the AU and the UNSC.63

60 Ibid.
Other stakeholders like the EU and U.S. have interests in Somalia that are more closely linked to terrorism, international shipping, and economic markets. The U.S. is particularly interested in denying Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab a sanctuary from which they could project terrorism abroad. Increased stability would also improve foreign investment in not only East African markets, but would also open up foreign investment in Somali markets, particularly oil, fisheries, and shipping. Despite all of these interests, there wasn’t sufficient political will for the stakeholders to commit ground forces between 1994 and 2006.

Due to the increasing UIC and Al-Shabaab threat, Ethiopia was ultimately the first country to offer direct military support to the new Somali government. In a bilateral agreement with Somalia in 2006, Ethiopia committed forces to retake Baidoa and then Mogadishu. By December 28, 2006, the UIC and Al-Shabaab had been pushed out of Baidoa and Mogadishu, and the Somali transitional government had reestablished itself in the capital.

Ethiopia’s successful military operation served as a catalyst for more tangible international support, and the UN was now able to muster additional contributor countries. The AU immediately announced its desire to assist Somalia, with Uganda and Burundi pledging military troops. The UN Security Council (UNSC) then passed UNSC Resolution #1744, authorizing the AU to organize an 8,000-man peacekeeping mission—the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

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68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 519.
Though the AU members were providing ground forces, the AU lacked the means to logistically support and finance the AMISOM mission. This was solved, at least temporarily, through a series of bi-lateral agreements with other international contributors. The European Union (EU) primarily, along with a few other contributing countries, agreed to finance the AMISOM mission. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to provide strategic airlift assets. Separate from the NATO agreement, the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (UK), and France also agreed to fund and support various logistical and sustainment requirements. Additionally, the UN was able to reallocate equipment from the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) to the AMISOM forces. All of this was accomplished through an ad-hoc collaboration process between the stakeholders, using a series of multi-lateral and bi-lateral meetings.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF A COALITION

With a coalition effort finally on the ground, the next challenge was to develop a unified strategy and a long-term plan for international support. Initially, the international community continued to use the same ad-hoc processes. Countries and organizations spoke bi-laterally, and occasionally came together in a multi-lateral forum. In June 2008, the UN made the first big step in bringing the international stakeholders together in a meaningful collaborative process. As part of the Djibouti Agreement, UNPOS and the Somali government established a Joint Security Committee (JSC) and a High Level Committee (HLC). The JSC was created to “ensure the effective implementation of security arrangements as per the Djibouti Agreement,” and was co-chaired by UNPOS and the AU. While the JSC focused on the security sector, the HLC focused on “issues

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74 Ibid.
relating to the political cooperation between the Parties, Justice, and Reconciliation,” and was chaired by the UN. Moreover, the JSC and HLC would meet at least monthly (a relatively high frequency in the international political world) to keep pace with new developments and progress. The JSC and HLC would help identify specific focus areas and help coordinate the international effort. However, the actual execution would still be done bi-laterally. In this way, the JSC and HLC provided formal forums for informal collaboration. Figure 5 depicts how the High Level Committee and the Joint Security Committee facilitated the collaboration not only between stakeholders, but also with the Somalia government. Outside these committees, the stakeholders still continued to meet, with the Country Teams and Sector Representatives speaking several times a month or even weekly, and the Foreign Affairs Components speaking once every 1–3 months.

![Diagram](image_url)

Figure 5. Initial coalition construct in Somalia, Creation of the HLC and JSC

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With this semi-formal coordination structure installed, the UN now had to readdress the logistical and financial support to AMISOM. AMISOM’s mission scope, task force size, and area of operations were all expanding, straining its current logistical structure. The UN agreed to take on this logistical expansion, and created UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). To help fund UNSOA’s mission, the UNSC created a “Trust Fund,” where any willing country or organization could contribute.77 The UN also held an International Donors Conference in Brussels, under the joint auspices of the UN, EU, AU, and League of Arab States. The conference exceeded the UN’s expectations, by raising an additional $213-million for support to AMISOM and Somalia.78 From 2009–2012 alone, stakeholder donations into this Trust Fund provided $729-million for UNSOA support to AMISOM.79

D. MATURING COALITION

If the overall support efforts were to have any long-term success, Somalia had to take a greater role and responsibility in the collaboration processes. This transformation began in August 2010, with the transformation of the JSC. In the new JSC Terms of Reference (TOR), the Somali government would now be a co-chair, alongside UNPOS and the AU.80 The JSC would be responsible for coordinating the International Community’s (IC) support to Somalia, ensuring transparency and accountability, and providing strategic guidance to the JSC’s newly created Technical Working Groups.81

Under the JSC, five Technical Working Groups would help to coordinate international support within specific sectors. A Somali Ministry-level representative and

81 Ibid.
a UNPOS representative would chair each of the working groups. The five groups were the Military Technical Working Group (MTWG), the Police Technical Working Group (PTWG), the Security and Justice Sectors Technical Working Group (SJSTWG), the Strategic Planning and Programming Technical Working Group (SPPTWG), and the Counter Piracy Task Force (CPTF). Figure 6 shows how the technical working groups provided a more formalized coordination mechanism for sector specific efforts. EU and U.S. military advisors, used as examples in Figure 6, would meet with Somali MoD representatives at the Military Technical Working Group.

Figure 6. Coalition construct in Somalia, HLC and JSC with Working Groups.

Though the JSC’s formal structure was increasing, stakeholders still had a great deal of flexibility. Contributing countries and organizations only attended the working groups that corresponded to the type of assistance that they were willing to give. For

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82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
example, the MTWG sought to coordinate specific support, funding, and training to the Somali National Army. Any stakeholder willing to provide support (whether it be money, equipment, troops, or a combination of those) to the Somali Military would attend the MTWG. As stakeholders offered up support, the MTWG would recommend ways for that support to be incorporated into the overall ongoing effort. However, neither the JSC nor the Working Groups could force a stakeholder into providing a specific type of support. Additionally, support programs were still ultimately executed bi-laterally, and stakeholders were not technically required to attend the MTWG meetings. A stakeholder could bypass the JSC-Working Group structure and coordinate bi-laterally, with or without the JSC’s knowledge.

With the Somali government now taking increased ownership of the coordination process, a single strategy was needed. With the assistance of UNPOS and other major stakeholders, Somalia developed a National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), which was released in October 2011. The NSSP outlined Somalia’s current situation, threats, key challenges, strategic objectives, and accountability implementing measures. The NSSP also addressed human rights, gender, and religious rights, protection of children and minorities, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), and refugees. Finally, the NSSP outlined a general Implementation Action Plan, which assigned key issues, priorities, and benchmarks to specific Somalia Ministries. The Ministries would then bring those priorities to the Working Groups.

Between 2011 and 2014, international support continued to increase. The AMISOM mission grew, with Kenya and Djibouti joining in 2011, Sierra Leone in 2012, and Ethiopia in 2014. UNSOA’s logistical support also increased during this period. In a November 2013 Resolution, the UNSC authorized UNSOA to also provide support to

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86 Ibid., 26.
Somalia National Army (SNA) forces operating alongside AMISOM forces. The international community’s official recognition of the Federal Republic of Somalia and lifting of the arms embargo opened the door for even more international support to Somalia.

The JSC-Working Group structure also continued to evolve. The Working Groups developed their own sub-committees—some permanent, others temporary—each focusing on more specific issue areas. For example, the MTWG’s Training Subcommittee coordinated critical training requirements. AMISOM forces took on much of the infantry training tasks, while EUTM provided specialty training tasks, including Combat Lifesaver, battalion staff training, communications, and mine clearance. The working groups continued to meet formally monthly. However, with increased security in Mogadishu, many of the stakeholders were moving offices into Mogadishu. This allowed the stakeholders’ representatives to meet informally several times a month.

The 2013 Somalia Compact outlined the latest evolution of the international coordination mechanisms. Drafted by Somalia, the UN, and the EU, the Somalia Compact sought to further formalize the Somalia strategy and the coordination mechanisms for international aid to Somalia, in an effort to improve its effectiveness and accountability. The Compact addressed five Peace and State-building Goals (PSG): Inclusive Politics, Security, Justice, Economic Foundations, and Revenue and Services. The Compact also identified new forums for international coordination, as well as monitoring and reporting mechanisms for the implementation of programs. A High

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91 Military Officer at U.S. AFRICOM, Interview with Military Officer.
93 Ibid., 5.
94 Ibid., 16.
Level Partnership Forum (HLPF) replaced the HLC. Meeting quarterly, it would attempt to align the Somalia’s PSG priorities with those of the international contributors. Below the HLPF, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) was created to “achieve greater alignment of international financing with the Compact priorities, reduce the fragmentation of aid, and increase Somali ownership and leadership of the transition process.”95 Figure 7 shows this current coalition construct, with the addition of the SDRF. Like the HLPF, the SDRF would meet quarterly. The JSC and its Working Groups would continue working, as already designed, below the SDRF.

Figure 7. Current coalition construct in Somalia.

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95 Ibid., 13.
E. ANALYSIS

1. Stakeholders and National Interests

National interests had the greatest impact in shaping the coalition effort. In Somalia’s case, there are a wide variety of interests among the coalition stakeholders. The AU, UN, and EU, as major international organizations, were unique in that they actually shared most of Somalia’s own interests: security, governance, economy, and human rights. Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and several other African countries had national interests centered on their own security, economic, and political interests, rather than on Somalia’s interests. The non-African stakeholders, mostly western countries, had interests in counter-terrorism, international trade, and global markets.

As coalition partners, there is a natural pairing between African and Western countries. The African stakeholders were willing to commit their own security forces and take the lead in the coalition ground operations. Today, the AMISOM mission has over 22,000 soldiers, all of them African. Complimenting this African military effort are the western countries, which are providing the most of the funding, specialty training, and advisors. Equipping, training, deploying, and sustaining AMISOM and the Somalia National Army (SNA), represents the largest cost. Between 2007 and 2012, the UN, EU, and U.S. were the largest western donors to AMISOM, providing $730-million, $533-million, and $340-million (respectively) to such training and support programs. This division of efforts seems to make sense, as security is an essential element of the overall strategy, but the western stakeholders are politically unwilling to commit large numbers of their own security forces.

Western stakeholders have taken the lead in improving Somalia’s governance, economy, and public infrastructure, as these are cost intensive projects and more aligned with their national interests. Combined, the U.S., EU, UK, and UN have provided at least $271.5-million in humanitarian aid, public infrastructure projects, business loans, development of fisheries, agriculture improvement, small loans, vocational training and

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school, and livestock ranching. The true total value of international assistance to Somalia’s economic, governance, and public infrastructure development is likely much higher, as data on stakeholder contributions are not widely available, and some stakeholders prefer not to disclose such investments.

2. **Semi-Formal Coalition Structure**

The coalition structure had to balance the need for a unified international effort, and the stakeholders’ needs to achieve their own interests. Some stakeholders, like the U.S., UN, UK, and EU contribute across all of the sectors, as their interests are quite broad. Other stakeholders have more limited interests. Italy, Greece, and the Shell Corporation, for example, have contributed significantly to some of the UN counter piracy efforts, but not to any of the other efforts. Ethiopia preferred to operate alone, and long fought the international pressure to join AMISOM, the unified African Peace Support operation. The coalition effort couldn’t afford to lose stakeholders or their contributions, so the coalition adapted by developing a semi-formal coordination structure. Strategy and assistance programs would be discussed in a multi-lateral environment. However, stakeholders would maintain their autonomy, and would ultimately execute their assistance programs bi-laterally with Somalia—not as a single coalition.

The initial collaboration and early coalition both relied on semi-formal, horizontal communication. The bi-lateral and multi-lateral meetings allowed experts from each stakeholder to interact with their international counterparts, and discuss various issues at length. Any assistance proposals would ultimately have to be staffed, approved, and resourced by each individual stakeholder. Through this method, UNPOS, the AU, EU, U.S., UK, and France were able to stand-up and support the AMISOM mission and the Ethiopian military operation.

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98 Hadley and Farah, “Somalia Economic Growth Strategic Assessment.”


Later, this same semi-formal collaboration method was used to start a support program for the Somalia National Army (SNA). The EU agreed to fund and man a training program, while the U.S. focused on SNA recruitment and military infrastructure improvements. Additionally, UNPOS agreed to manage international coordination and additional stakeholder recruitment.\textsuperscript{101} All of these agreements and commitments were executed bi-laterally, though these major contributors were operating in collaboration with each other.

The JSC-Working Group structure gave the coalition better horizontal coordinating mechanisms, while maintaining flexibility to accommodate fluid stakeholder support. Stakeholders were still able to participate, without being forced to overcommit or scared away. Many experts believe the effort in Somalia will take at least 10–15 years.\textsuperscript{102} Any holistic assistance and reform effort, particularly in Somalia, is a long-term commitment. Realistically, few countries would be politically willing to publicly commit to a 15-year coalition effort in a foreign country. The semi-formal HLC and JSC-Working Group structure essentially gives the coalition effort long-term stability and direction, even as stakeholders, and their contributions, are likely to change over the years.

The HLC, JSC, and working groups improved the ability for the stakeholder experts and decision makers to collaborate horizontally, without having to be bogged down by a new coalition bureaucratic system. Goals and efforts did not have to be staffed through coalition systems for implementation. Rather, these goal and efforts were folded into each stakeholder’s own strategy and planning documents.\textsuperscript{103,104,105} It was then each


The coalition effort seems to be most coordinated in the security, justice, accountability, and human rights sectors, as increased security, reduced corruption, oversight, and human rights are in the interests of nearly all stakeholders. The Military Technical Working Group seems to be the most developed and robust working group, with several sub-committees and even a newly formed Military Coordination Center that focuses specifically on supporting the operational needs of the AMISOM and SNA forces. Similarly, the major contributors have made a coordinated push for the Somali Government to begin implementing mechanisms to ensure funding accountability and human rights protections. However, there seems to be less collaboration in other sectors. In the economic development sector, there is a mix of collaboration and competitiveness between the stakeholders. The stakeholders recognize the mutual benefits in improving governance and finance management, but their collaboration is minimal as they are still competing for influence in limited economic markets.

Much like the JSC-Working Group structure, the overall strategy is also semi-formal. Moreover, it is technically Somalia’s strategy. The stakeholders are only supporting various aspects of the strategy. The only enforcement mechanism was the major stakeholders’ and Somalia’s diplomatic powers. Major stakeholders, like the UN, EU, and U.S., could use diplomatic tools to ‘encourage’ other stakeholders to cooperate with the international effort and support Somalia’s strategy. However, as previously illustrated, these tools had their limits and the stakeholders had to choose which diplomatic battles to fight. Somalia could technically refuse aid, if that assistance did not support the overall strategy. However, given the realities of Somalia’s weak internal political control, lack of control of its borders and land, and great need for any outside assistance, it would be incredibly difficult for Somalia to refuse aid or prevent a stakeholder from bypassing the central government and engaging regional or local authorities within Somalia.

106 Military Officer at U.S. AFRICOM, Interview with Military Officer.

Of course, no coalition system is without its challenges. While this semi-formal coordination is a strength of this coalition structure, it only works if all stakeholders actively use the coordination mechanisms. For instance, Ethiopia had a SNA training program in western Somalia that was not coordinated with the larger EU-AMISOM training effort. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also prefers to deal with Somalia bilaterally, rather than collaborate with the coalition. While much of the UAE’s aid is uncontroversial, like its significant humanitarian aid and relief support, the UAE’s support of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) has been very controversial. The UAE-funded PMPF has been effective in keeping the UAE’s key shipping lanes free of pirate attacks. However, the PMPF is also a force loyal to Puntland’s President, rather than to Somalia’s central government, which could prove problematic to the coalition’s political reform efforts and potentially destabilizing to the country. The PMPF’s existence and operations continues to be a point of contention.

Additionally, because the coalition had no central command authority or centralized functional organization (for funding), stakeholders have sometimes been caught in significant decision-making and budget-cycle issues. External reports found that, without a decision-making body, disputes over support priorities, timelines, synchronizing support efforts were sometimes left unresolved. Additionally, each stakeholder has different budget processes and approval timelines. If separate programs had to occur sequentially or simultaneously, a failed funding request from one stakeholder could threaten another country’s already funded program, and damage the coalition’s overall effort in that sector.

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3. The Key Coordination Node

In this semi-formal coalition, the Country Team is the key international coordination node. This is the level where strategic planning and operational execution meet. Each Country Team is composed of a variety of professionals, experts, and technical specialists, who were able to interact with their international counterparts on a weekly or daily basis. This relatively easy and frequent interaction allowed the international community to work closely in analyzing the various problems and develop potential solutions. For example, the U.S., UK, EU, Turkey, and UN military representatives met during and also outside the official monthly Military Technical Working Group. These representatives were able to synchronize much of their countries’ efforts, to ensure that even equipment and training from different stakeholders were compatible and complimentary.112 While higher-level military leaders met only quarterly with their international counterparts, the military representatives at the country team level were able to meet as often as they liked.

The Country Team/Delegation is also the key internal coordination point for all of the various agencies and departments/ministries within that country. Each Country Team/Delegation had officers from across the government’s departments/ministries, who specialized on the various assistance sectors: political, humanitarian aid, military/police, justice, economic development, infrastructure, and human rights. These officers were able to collaborate with one another, in order to develop a more comprehensive national assistance strategy, with supporting programs. For example, Country Team officers working on security sector assistance programs often collaborated with the officers focused on Somalia’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) policy and strategy. These DDR officers also worked with Economic and humanitarian assistance officers, as employment programs or other assistance programs could benefit the DDR’s reintegration strategy. The Country Team’s Public Affairs Office was involved as well, as messaging was essential to building a successful and credible DDR

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112 Thomas Lainis, Firsthand Experience as the Security Assistance Officer to the U.S. Somalia Unit, 2014.
program, and all programs had to support the political policies and messages.\textsuperscript{113} Using the U.S. as an example, Figure 8 shows how the U.S. Somalia Unit (the U.S.’ diplomatic team to Somalia) is the central coordination point for the U.S. inter-agency and international community. The Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was allowed to attend the Military Technical Working Group, but only after coordinating with the U.S. Somalia Unit.\textsuperscript{114}

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\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
IV. DRC CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the third-largest country geographically on the African continent. Despite its enormous mineral wealth, its population is one of the poorest in the world. The DRC still suffers from the effects of its past dictatorship that has lasted decades and an on-going civil war, which has devastated its social and humanitarian situation. On the UN’s Index of Human Development (HDI 2013), the DRC’s position is 186 out of 187 states. Since 1998, at least four million people have died in the DRC directly from war, as well as war’s indirect effects, such as malnutrition, plagues, and epidemics. Exasperating DRC’s problems was the arrival of approximately two million Rwandan refugees, who fled across the Congolese border, and the 1996 and 1998 incursions of Rwandan and Ugandan rebel strike forces. Moreover, between 1998 and 2002, several groups of Congolese rebels, as well as soldiers from at least six other countries, fought each other for power over the country’s mineral wealth.

The current crisis in the DRC cannot be completely understood without knowledge of its post-colonial history. During the decolonization period, the Belgian Congo attained its independence in 1960. Just days after the declaration of independence, disorder broke out nationwide. In response, but without the agreement of the Congolese Government, Belgium sent its troops into the DRC to protect its Belgian nationals. The UN accused Belgium of acting as an aggressor, and the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the DRC. Though not even a year old, the DRC was compelled to request the help of the UN, and in response, the UN authorized the creation of the Congo Opération des Nations Unites au Congo (ONUC) on July 12, 1960. Four years later, the military phase of ONUC ended; however, the UN civilian-led

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humanitarian assistance continued, operating with nearly 2000 experts at its peak.\textsuperscript{117} It wasn’t until the late 1990s that an international coalition re-emerged and attempted to assist DRC in stabilizing the country.

This case study will focus on this most recent coalition effort in the DRC’s decades-long history of instability and international assistance. Today, the DRC has one of the largest peacekeeping operations in the world, with almost 20,000 personnel on the ground. Several countries and international organizations now work to assist DRC across a broad array of sectors: Security, Justice, Governance, Economy, and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Analysis into this case will provide insight into how this coalition functions, and how the military roles have changed and evolved.

\textbf{B. EARLY ASSISTANCE}

Since DRC’s independence in 1960, the UN has tried to find ways to stabilize the country. During the Cold War, the UN was caught between the east-west conflicts, which limited its effectiveness to act in Africa. The UN’s efforts in DRC did not begin in earnest until August 31, 1998, when the Security Council made a simple call for peace.\textsuperscript{118} After the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, between the DRC and its five neighbor States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe), the Security Council established the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo (MONUC), via UNSC Resolution 1279. MONUC’s initial mandate was to only observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces, as well as to liaison with all parties of the Ceasefire Agreement. The Council then expanded the mandate to include the supervision and implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. After the first elections on July 30, 2006, MONUC remained on the ground and continued to implement political, military, rule of law, and capacity-building tasks, as well as attempting to resolve ongoing conflicts in several DRC provinces.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Edwards, “United Nations in the Congo: Success or Failure?.”
Maintaining the peace in the DRC proved to be too difficult for the UN forces, particularly in the Ituri province, and the UN was forced to ask for additional assistance. The EU answered the UN’s request, by authorizing the deployment of the EU Interim Emergency Multi-National Force (IEMF). This force consisted of approximately 230 French and Swiss Special Forces and 1000 French regular army soldiers. Under Operation ARTEMIS, the IEMF deployed to Bunia to assist the UN in re-establishing security in the region. As the name implies, the IEMF was only a temporary mission to assist the UN’s MONUC effort. It was also the EU’s first independent military mission outside of Europe. Although the IEMF was assisting the UN mission, the EU insisted on maintaining control of its force. As depicted in Figure 9, the UN and EU controlled their own forces, and would, in theory, coordinate with one another at the strategic and operational levels.

Figure 9. Coalition construct in DRC, during MONUC–IEMF

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Like all semi-formal coalitions, the success of this coalition would depend heavily on lateral coordination at both the strategic and operational levels. At the operational level, the two military forces coordinated closely with one another. Unfortunately, since the EU viewed this DRC deployment as only a temporary military operation, the EU sent no civilian representative. As a result, it fell on the IEMF military commander to coordinate with the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). At the strategic level, there was little coordination. After accepting the UN mission request, the EU did little to coordinate or synchronize a unified strategy. As a result, the two operations were largely viewed as disjointed efforts, which damaged the effectiveness of the overall coalition effort.122

Shortly after the EU completed its first mission to the DRC, the UN again requested the EU’s assistance, in March 2006. The EU again deployed a military force, this time called the EU Force to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD CONGO), for a four-month election support mission. As in earlier deployments, the EU sent no civilian representative to manage the EU’s overall efforts, and a semi-formal coalition was formed, with both the UN and EU maintaining control of their forces. However, instead of coordinating laterally at both the strategic and operational levels, the EU created a single, formalized coordination process, outlined in the EU Council Joint Action message.123 Any MONUC request to EUFOR could not go directly from commander to commander. Instead, the request had to be routed from MONUC (in the DRC) to the UN (in New York) to the EU (in Brussels) to the EUFOR Headquarters (in Germany), and then finally to EUFOR (in the DRC).124 This formalized request process greatly inhibited EUFOR’s ability to adapt and respond to events on the ground.125 Figure 10 shows this coordination process overlapped on the coalition structure.

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123 Ibid., 31.
125 Ekengard, “Coordination and Coherence in the Peace Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 32.
C. MATURING COALITION

In April 2005, the DRC government asked the European Union for security sector support. This led to a bi-lateral agreement between the DRC and EU, and the creation of the European Union Security Mission—Republique Democratique du Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) and the European Union Police Mission—Republique Democratique du Congo (EUPOL RD Congo). Combined, these two missions consisted of only 40 EU advisors, who partnered with DRC police and military. This represented a major shift in the EU’s assistance approach to the DRC, as the EU was no longer just committing larger units for short-term peacekeeping operations, but rather committing specialized advisors to a long-term Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort and long-term stability improvement.

EUPOL provides “assistance, mentoring, support and advice to the Congolese authorities for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the fields of policing and its interaction with the justice system. It also operates in cross-cutting areas of SSR, particularly human rights, gender, the protection of children in armed conflicts, and the fight against impunity for sexual violence.”126 EUSEC aimed to assist and integrate the military and

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governmental leadership, in order to improve the DRC’s overall security sector performance. While there were other international stakeholders providing security sector assistance, EUSEC RD Congo was the only organization fully dedicated to reforming the military and security sector in the DRC.\textsuperscript{127}

Along with EUPOL and EUSEC, the EU Delegation was also sent to the DRC, providing diplomatic representation for the EU in the DRC. The EU Delegation would also manage any EU assistance that fell outside the EUPOL or EUSEC mandates.\textsuperscript{128} Unfortunately, while the EU was now taking a more holistic assistance approach, the EU managed these various efforts back in Brussels, rather than by a single EU leader located in the DRC. Figure 11 displays the three distinct EU efforts in the DRC. The coalition was still semi-formal in design, so the EU Delegation, EUSEC, and EUPOL did coordinate with their international counterparts. However, the EU continued to insist on centralizing all of the strategic planning efforts in Europe.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{coalition_construct.png}
\caption{Coalition construct in the DRC, beginning in 2006.}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{128} European Union External Action Service, “EUPOL RD Congo.”

D. CURRENT COALITION

In 2010, MONUC was replaced by the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), which would eventually grow to become the largest UN peace mission in the world. Currently, it is comprised of 20,000 soldiers, 715 military observers, 1,200 UN policemen, approximately 1000 civilian special envoys, as well as 600 UN volunteers and 2,800 local employees. In March 2013, the UN Security Council decided to establish an Intervention Brigade, consisting of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a Special Force battalion, and a Reconnaissance Company to combat armed groups of rebels in Eastern Congo.129

While MONUC focused mainly on “supervision” and “implementation” of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the new MONUSCO mission was authorized to “use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating ... to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.”130

The EU and UN remain the two major stakeholders, in that they are managing the largest assistance efforts on the ground, and are driving the overall strategy. However, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of “minor” stakeholders. These stakeholders are considered minor, not because their contributions are minor, but rather because they are not trying to drive the coalition’s strategy or structure. Instead, they are only collaborating with the EU and UN to determine how they can contribute to the coalition effort, in a manner that supports both the coalition’s interests, as well as their own interests. These contributions usually come as either direct assistance to the UN or EU, or a bi-lateral program with the DRC that fills a gap in the coalition’s overall strategy.

129 United Nations, “MONUSCO.”
130 Ibid.
For example, the U.S. has become MONUSCO’s largest financial donor, as the
interests of the U.S. and UN are mostly mutually supporting in this area. The U.S.
State Department has also filled gaps in overall coalition strategy, by providing over
$254-million in assistance programs, spanning good governance, agricultural
development, natural resource management, military professionalism, basic service
delivery, small business loans, grants, and conflict resolution. Similarly, Belgium used
its historical political influence to assist the coalition in developing a DDR program with
the DRC government. Belgium helped in the planning efforts, but did not actually fund
the DDR program. This was done through a different organization and program, the
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The current
coalition construct, as displayed in Figure 12, shows the two major stakeholders with
their coordination mechanisms, and the supporting minor stakeholders.

Figure 12.  Current coalition construct in the DRC

131 Alexis Arieff and Thomas Coen, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy”
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., 44.
Most members of the coalition realize that the root causes of the DRC’s instability can only be solved with a holistic approach, including political decentralization, reform of the security sector, reconciliation, and democratization. One of its current challenges is getting the DRC to fully embrace this approach and develop its own holistic strategy, similar to that of Mali’s PRED or the Somalia Compact. Such a strategy would give the DRC greater responsibility and develop an accountability and assessment mechanism.

E. ANALYSIS

1. Stakeholders and National Interests

The UN and the EU, being major IGOs, seem to be two of the few stakeholders truly focused on making permanent improvements in this fragile state. Other ambitious members of the international community are more self-interested, wanting to gain access to the DRC’s raw materials, without worrying about its long-term ramifications. The available mineral wealth in the DRC draws enormous economic interest; and this interest is not always in the best interest of the DRC.

Currently, the most important partner for the DRC is the European Union. Beyond the security assistance provided by EUSEC and EUPOL, the European Union is also an important partner in the DRC’s political and the economic development. From 2008–2013, approximately one billion euros was set-aside for the DRC by the EU’s European Development Fund. The major focus areas in the EU’s Development and Cooperation Program are good governance, public finance management, infrastructure, health care, and private sector development. The DRC also represents a potentially lucrative source of oil and gas, if Europe is able to develop the DRC’s oil industry.134

Because the African Union has a broad range of goals and principles, including the promotion of democratic principles, human rights, good governance, peace, security, and stability, the African Union normally takes an active role in major assistance efforts in Africa. However, in the case of the DRC, the AU’s participation has remained

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strangely limited. Though the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) can order the
deployment of peacekeeping missions, and recommend military measures to the
Assembly of the Heads of State, in order to restore peace and security, the AU has
decided to act mainly in a supporting role to the UN’s MONUSCO effort. The last
session of the PSC highlights this position, by recording that “The most decisive role for
the DRC is played by the United Nations Security Council with its efforts to enhance
regional economic cooperation, bilateral and multilateral partners to support the ongoing
actions in this field, and looks forward to the outcome of the Follow-up Ministerial
Conference scheduled to take place in Brussels, from July 1–2, 2014, under the auspices
of the United Nations, the AU and the World Bank.”

In addition to these three international organizations, there are several state
stakeholders involved in the DRC, all of whom are pursuing their own national interests.
These national interests sometimes support one another, and other times contradict one
another. For some stakeholders, like the U.S., the national interests support the EU and
UN efforts, and are beneficial for the DRC. U.S. foreign policy is focused on regional
stability, the DRC’s economic importance as a source of global mineral commodities,
democracy and governance, human rights abuses against women, and the conflict mineral
trade. Secretary of State John Kerry said that achieving a lasting peace in Congo is a
“high-level priority” with “very significant stakes.” While the U.S. has no major
ground efforts, like EUSEC, in the DRC, the U.S. is using other diplomatic, economic,
and legal tools to assist the coalition effort. For example, the Dodd-Frank Financial
Reform Act requires any company that might be using conflict minerals to register itself

Union Commission, June 17, 2014, http://appablog.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/442nd-psc-meeting-on-the-
situation-in-the-east-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-drc-and-the-implementation-status-of-the-

136 Nicolas Cook, “Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses” (CRS
www.crs.gov.

137 John Kerry, “Press Briefing Announcement Regarding Great Lakes Special Representative”
Washington, D.C.: Department of State, June 18, 2013,
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and then disclose its supply chain.\(^{138}\) Valuable minerals like cassiterite, wolframite, coltan, and gold, used to be extracted from Eastern Congo, and passed through a variety of intermediaries before being purchased by multinational electronics companies.\(^{139}\) These profits fueled various warlord and rebel groups in the DRC. With the Dodd-Frank Act, western tech companies could now be exposed as supporters of these warlords and their atrocities. Many companies, seeking to avoid such negative publicity, abandoned any supply chains that led back to the DRC or West Africa. As a result, more than two-thirds of DRC mines once controlled by warlords have closed.\(^{140}\)

Other stakeholders are pursuing interests that do not support the international effort or the DRC. The DRC’s relations with its eastern neighbors, Rwanda and Uganda, have been historically tense, as both Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of supporting multiple rebel groups, including the infamous M23 rebel group. M23 grew out of the DRC’s Congrès National Pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), and is still active in the Kivu area.\(^{141}\) There have even been several recent occasions in which the DRC and Rwandan armies have clashed in the border regions.\(^{142}\)

China is also interested in building economic ties, and is extremely committed to expanding its foreign economic markets. While China has built road and rail systems from Kinshasa inland, these transportation systems exist solely to tap into the Congolese mineral wealth. Since 2005, the Chinese have been securing considerable quantities of raw materials, by allocating credits for infrastructure projects in the country.\(^{143}\) These


\(^{141}\) Arieff and Coen, “R43166,” 8.


economic agreements have benefited China tremendously, while doing little to build a stable and self-sufficient economy for the DRC.\textsuperscript{144}

2. Semi-Formal Coalition Structure

As in the previous case studies, national interests were again the major driving force in shaping the coalition structure. Though the UN was the leading stakeholder initially, it accepted a semi-formal coalition construct, in order to appease the EU’s desire for autonomy. A formalized coalition, under a UN command, might instead have driven the EU away.

While a semi-formal structure is more accommodating to stakeholders, this structure is only effective if the stakeholders voluntarily work together. In this case, many of the other stakeholders had national interests that did not align with those of the coalition. This is especially evident with the DRC’s neighbors. Rwanda and Uganda have supported rival groups in the DRC, and have even launched their own incursions across the DRC’s borders.\textsuperscript{145} Other countries only seek to exploit the DRC’s mineral wealth, which does little for the DRC’s long-term stability. It therefore seems that realistically, there were few options for the coalition, other than a semi-formal construct. A formal coalition may have fallen apart, or the self-interested stakeholders might have never joined in the first place. The semi-formal construct would at least allow stakeholders to collaborate.

While the major coalition stakeholders did collaborate, the EU, unfortunately, compartmentalized its assistance efforts. As shown in the current coalition construct (Figure 12), the EU created separate missions for each major assistance effort, yet did not link these efforts under a unified leadership (whether military or civilian). MONUSCO, on the other hand, managed all of the UN programs, under the leadership of the SRSG. The EU’s stove-piped structure created an imbalance in the coalition structure, and is responsible for many of the coordination issues within the coalition.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Arieff and Coen, “R43166.”
3. The Key Coordination Node

As highlighted in the previous case studies, the Country Team or Delegation should be the key coordination node, given this stakeholder environment and semi-formal coalition construct. However, this case study illustrates the problems that occur when the stakeholders avoid using this coordination node or, in some instances, insist on formalized coordination processes.

The initial coalition strategic coordination effort was pretty dismal. After answering the UN’s request for assistance, the EU made no real coordination effort at the strategic level. The lack of the EU Delegation also greatly hurt the coalition’s coordination effort, and as a result, no unified strategy was ever developed. Additionally, no governance, security, economic, and other experts were able to collaborate with one another. Military ground commanders were left to pursue avenues of informal coordination, in an attempt to offset this lack of strategy.

The coordination process swung to the other extreme, when the EUFOR RD CONGO deployed, and the EU insisted on a highly formalized and hierarchical coordination process. Even if the EU had a delegation present in the DRC, this formal coordination process would have rendered the delegation ineffective. The coordination process was criticized widely for making the EU unresponsive to changing events, and greatly hindered lateral collaboration.146

During this time period, the UN did attempt to create coordination mechanisms to improve stakeholder collaboration. In one attempt, MONUC created a Joint Mission Assessment Cell (JMAC), but failed to invite any of the non-governmental organizations or many of the other stakeholders. Not surprisingly, by not including all of the stakeholders, the JMAC was rendered ineffective and was soon abandoned.147 MONUC also created a SSR Coordination Center, which included a steering committee and technical advisors. Unfortunately, many of the stakeholders rejected this Coordination

146 Ibid., 40.
147 Ibid.
Center, believing it to be too restrictive and disruptive to their national interests. Like the JMAC, the Coordination Center was also abandoned.  

Since the creation of MONUSCO, the EU and UN have made some progress in improving their lateral coordination. There is now a EU Delegation in the DRC that can communicate directly with MONUSCO and the SRSG. Additionally, the EU has updated its Common Security and Defense Plan (CSDP). The CSDP now stresses the need for a habitual relationship with the UN, in order to improve EU-UN coordination for all peacekeeping operations and crisis management operations.  

While the EU and UN are now emphasizing the need for improved coordination at the strategic level, this desire has not translated to a unified coalition strategy or synchronized operations in the DRC. Meike Froitzheim and Fredrik Söderbaum highlighted this specific shortfall in their study of the DRC. In a separate study, Alexis Arieff and Thomas Coen echoed this same point stating, “It is difficult to document clear signs of structural improvements in the security sector; however, and donor efforts appear to have been challenged by a lack of strategic planning and coordination; conflicting policy goals, structural reform versus the negotiated settlement of conflicts through integration; limited justice sector capacity; and limited political will and sustainability.” Froitzheim and Söderbaum further elaborated, by stating that the coalition could produce a more unified strategy and synchronized effort if the EU and UN would reexamine their structural relationship, and empower their DRC-based leaders and experts to plan and implement strategy and programs.  

While the coalition effort in this case study has been consistently plagued by poor coordination, it is interesting to see that only the UN used an integrated and empowered

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148 Ibid., 44.  
Delegation (i.e., Country Team). As the UN effort changed from a military effort to a holistic effort, the UN developed what they called an Integrated Mission Concept. Based on this concept, coordination and decision-making authorities were pushed down to the Delegation level. In late 2004, the Deputy SRSG took on additional duties to better synchronize military, political, developmental, and humanitarian efforts. While this concept still had some difficulties in execution, this case makes clear that the integrated concept served the UN well in coordinating its own efforts, especially when compared to the EU approach.
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V. CONCLUSION

States and their militaries are operating in a different international environment than those of the past; and within this environment, a new coalition construct has emerged. In fact, this environment and coalition construct may not just be limited to the African continent. The growing international coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) currently shows the same coalition characteristics illustrated in this study – several stakeholders, with partially divergent national interests, trying to cooperate and collaborate in a semi-formal coalition in order to develop and execute a holistic strategy.

This study began with the basic premise that if the international environment and the resulting coalition structure have changed, then the military’s system of integration should also change. This thesis then sought to better understand the new international environment and resulting coalition constructs, specifically as they relate to stability operations and other long-term coalition efforts in Africa. Our research found that the Country Team (or Diplomatic Delegation) is the critical node for coordination and collaboration, especially for holistic coalition efforts. In this new coalition construct, the military can improve its effectiveness by more thoroughly integrating planning and coordination efforts into the Country Team.

A. STAKEHOLDERS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

Each case study illustrated the importance of national interests in the international environment. National interests are the driving force in the formation and longevity of a coalition. As national interests change, stakeholder participation in long-term assistance efforts and stability operations can be expected to vary as well. Moreover, coalition stakeholders will not always share mutual interests. Sometimes, they may possess competing or opposing interests. This dominance of national interests creates a complex international environment for the coalition and its potential stakeholders, which must be constantly navigated by the stakeholders’ Foreign Affairs Components (e.g. Department of State or Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
B. SEMI-FORMAL COALITIONS

In response to this complex environment and stakeholder challenges, international coalitions are increasingly adopting a semi-formal construct. The semi-formal structure provides the flexibility necessary to attract and retain stakeholders in a coalition. Stakeholders can avoid overcommitting politically, or losing control of their resources and forces to a coalition command. Moreover, stakeholders can participate in a coalition without first coming to a formal agreement over issues like national caveats, coalition command and control, or administrative structure and procedures. In return, the host nation and stakeholders can all benefit from the combined effects of a coalition effort. This also allows the coalition to be more flexible and adaptive to the changing environment and conflict.

A semi-formal coalition’s flexibility stems from its combination of multi-lateral coordination and bi-lateral execution. Through multi-lateral coordination, stakeholders can develop a coalition strategy and synchronize international efforts. Larger stakeholders can provide a broad range of assistance, while smaller stakeholders can find niches of assistance. Together, these assistance efforts create a more complete holistic approach that can more effectively target the root causes of the host nation’s instability. At the same time, bi-lateral execution allows stakeholders to maintain autonomy to ensure that their national interests are being furthered. As a result, even as stakeholders and their assistance efforts change over time, the overall coalition effort can continue.

C. KEY COORDINATION NODE

In these semi-formal coalitions, the stakeholder’s Country Team/Delegation becomes the key coordination node. Dialogue and coordination at the national and ministerial levels of government are important. However, at these levels, international coordination cannot occur on a sufficiently frequent basis. Instead, it is Country Teams, led by Ambassadors that conduct the high-frequency meetings and coordination. They are able to navigate through the various stakeholder interests and international politics, to develop actual coalition consensus and strategy, while ensuring their national interests are being addressed.
The multi-agency representation inside the Country Team allows the Country Team to discuss strategy and assistance efforts across security, governance, economic, humanitarian, and other sectors. Country Team experts are able to collaborate directly with their international counterparts. The Mali case study illustrates how a few major stakeholders were able to coordinate directly with one another, while the Somalia case study illustrates how the coalition can develop a few semi-formal coordinating mechanisms to bring experts from several stakeholders together. Conversely, the DRC case study illustrated the problems that arise when the Country Team is circumvented by a more rigid and formal coordination mechanism. Whether accomplished directly or through semi-formal mechanisms, the majority of the detailed collaboration and synchronization between stakeholders in such coalitions is now occurring at the Country Team level.

The case studies also revealed that the Country Team is the key internal coordination node for each stakeholder. Since the Country Team has multi-agency representation, they are able to function as a true interagency organization. Aside from the national level, there are almost no other points where interagency experts and professionals are assigned together and able to interact on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{153}

In addition to its importance for international and internal coordination, the Country Team also has access to the host-nation government and intimate knowledge of the problem and conflict at hand. Moreover, the Country Team is frequently the most lasting form of stakeholder representation in a host nation. While the military, and other agencies might have sporadic deployments or engagements to that country, the Country Team is a permanent fixture. Finally, Country Teams have diplomatic authorities and are responsible for overseeing all of the stakeholder’s efforts in the host nation. No other government entity can claim the same capabilities, knowledge, and access.

D. INTEGRATING INTO THE COUNTRY TEAM

Currently, militaries generally create their own strategies and plans separately, but “in coordination with” (as commonly stated in doctrine) the Country Team. We recommend integrating military planning directly into the Country Team. Integrating military planning efforts into the Country Team gives the military an increased ability to coordinate and collaborate with the rest of the interagency and its international counterparts. While militaries do make efforts to collaborate with other militaries directly, the Country Team seems to offer the highest frequency of interaction and, more importantly, interaction with military representatives focused on the same conflict.

Interagency collaboration would allow the military to employ its forces more economically, by leveraging the expertise and capabilities of the other agencies. As shown by these case studies, stakeholders are leveraging their Foreign Affairs Economic Sections, Treasury Departments, and Foreign Aid and Development organizations to develop much more powerful economic programs than the military could ever achieve. In each case study, there are multi-million dollar economic and development programs. If the military were integrated into the Country Team, it could help shape these programs to better support military objectives and develop better military efforts to support these programs.

These case studies also showed that certain assistance programs do not fall solely under the purview of one agency or department. DDR, for example, is neither solely a security/defense matter nor solely a civilian matter. In the Somalia case study, a complete DDR program is being addressed by military, police, judicial, economic assistance, and humanitarian aid experts, because no single sector could fully address the DDR issue.

We thus recommend increased integration into the Country Team, because the Country Team is the “natural” coordination node in this international environment and new coalition system. Figure 13 illustrates how the Country Team is the natural coordination point between international stakeholders, as well as the stakeholder’s interagency. If the military truly wants to integrate its efforts more effectively with its
interagency partners and international partners, then the Country Team is the natural point to do so.

Interestingly, three prominent U.S. leaders – Dennis Blair (former Director of the U.S. National Intelligence), Ronald Neumann (former U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and Afghanistan) and Eric Olson (former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command) – came to the same conclusion in an August 27, 2014 article in which they explored the internal bureaucratic challenges in current U.S. approaches to assisting fragile states. In their article, they argued that interagency integration at the Country Team, coupled with increased Country Team authorities and responsibilities, would reduce interagency friction and produce more effective holistic U.S. strategies.\footnote{Ibid.} Country Teams, if manned and supported properly, could produce a plan “that is balanced between the short and the long term, that includes the most effective
applications of the capabilities of the different departments and that realistically matches the needs on the ground."\textsuperscript{155} The authors go on to elaborate how the Country Team could produce more realistic and effective plans, best react to changing ground conditions, and better integrate all of the United States’ capabilities.\textsuperscript{156}

E. CHALLENGES

This study revealed three challenges that must be addressed, if militaries are to be successful in integrating their planning efforts into Country Teams. The first challenge is structural. Most governments currently operate through stove-piped departments, with the national executive leadership being the only truly integrated point of government. Below this point, the departments, ministries, and agencies develop their own strategies and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level. There is some lateral coordination between the departments, but nothing that can be considered truly integrated.

This stove-piped system can be illustrated using the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense as an example. Figure 14 illustrates how the National Security Council creates an integrated National Security Strategy. From this strategy, each department then creates its own strategies and plans. It is a top-down and largely compartmentalized planning process.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
By the time these various plans reach the operational and tactical levels in the host nation, U.S. forces and agencies must reconcile the difference between the several plans, each with their own policy objectives, strategies, and goals. The U.S. Military’s Joint Publication 3–08 on Interorganizational Coordination even recognizes this point, stating, “The various [US Government] agencies often have different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which make unified action a challenge.”157 While these plans and strategies are important for the departments and agencies to communicate their efforts and use of funding to national leadership and its citizens, the current planning system fosters compartmentalized efforts and would likely inhibit a Country Team-led integrated planning effort.

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This friction from competing goals was seen in the US’ planning efforts in Somalia. While much of the U.S. interagency planning occurred within the U.S. Somalia Unit (the U.S. Country Team to Somalia), the military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), located in Djibouti, led the military planning effort. Despite efforts to coordinate and collaborate, it was clear that CJTF-HOA had different priorities than the U.S. Somalia Unit and U.S. State Department. This led to a great deal of frustration, especially when CJTF-HOA would brief military proposals that clearly did not support the Ambassador’s objectives or Somalia Unit’s Strategy.158

Whereas the U.S. has created multiple strategies and plans, Germany suffers from a lack of military involvement in strategic planning. Germany’s ministerial structure is very similar to the U.S.’ department structure that was shown in Figure 13. However, Germany, as a matter of policy, is reluctant to use its military as a tool in its own foreign security policy. Instead, Germany focuses much of its military’s efforts through the EU and NATO.159 As a result, when Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs develops its foreign policy, the military effort is frequently not synchronized with its diplomatic, economic, and other efforts. Well-developed EU and NATO security strategies contribute to Germany’s overall security, and it is commendable that Germany is taking an active role in these organizations. However, the need still remains for Germany to incorporate its military into its own country specific strategies.

The second challenge is the planning capability within the Country Team. While the Country Team has interagency representation, it does not have a fully developed and integrated planning process or planning support staff. As Blair, Neumann, and Olson, highlight, Foreign Service Officers possess a great deal of expertise and diplomatic skills. However, planning and managerial skills are not stressed or sufficiently developed.160 This observation is common among all countries and embassies. If the military integrates

158 Lainis, Firsthand Experience as the Security Assistance Officer to the U.S. Somalia Unit.
160 Blair, Neumann, and Olson, “Fixing Fragile States.”
its planning efforts into the Country Team, the Country Team should develop the planning skills and processes to better leverage all of its agencies’ capabilities. Ideally, this planning process would be integrated into each agency’s internal planning and resourcing processes. Moreover, if the Country Team is to become a more integral player in strategy development and execution, then they will likely require further resources for improvements in professional development and education.

Finally, there is a cultural challenge that must be addressed. The military, because of its great size and capabilities, prides itself on being proactive and taking a leading role in planning. Integrating into the Country Team means that the military must allow the civilian leadership to lead the strategic planning efforts. The military must not ‘militarize’ the Country Team, because the Country Team is still, at its core, the country’s diplomatic representation.

Militaries have already realized that international collaboration is increasingly important, and have taken the initiative to strengthen their relationships with other militaries. These improved relationships will enable militaries to better share information, lessons learned, and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). Moreover, this initiative will open the door for more international training engagements and exercises. However, in doing so, militaries need to be cognizant that they are creating parallel coordination lines to the Country Teams. While this initiative will improve military knowledge, training, and doctrine, militaries should not use these direct communication lines as a primary means of strategic planning, as it could contradict the country team’s integrated planning efforts.

While these challenges may seem daunting, they must be addressed if the military is to improve its effectiveness in coalitions. The traditional military thinking of coalitions is no longer suitable for these new semi-formal coalition constructs. Coalition efforts are no longer always military-led, nor solely security focused. Rather, they are holistic efforts, focused on long-term reform and stability. These semi-formal coalitions rely on country teams to bring a wide range of stakeholders and experts together to develop and implement a unified holistic strategy. Country teams are synchronizing both international and interagency efforts to provide a holistic assistance effort. The current military system
of conducting its own planning, within its own headquarters, fails to maximize the use of this natural and critical coordination node. Integration into the country team will allow the military to provide valuable advice during strategy development, will improve the military’s ability to coordinate its efforts with its interagency and international partners, and will ultimately result in more effective coalition efforts.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
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