IDENTIFYING AND LEVERAGING TRUST AS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE SALT LAKE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT’S INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

by

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September 2014

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Romantic collaboration into a key component of success will provide additional focus to the development and implementation process.

The questions this thesis answers are, can trust be identified as a significant factor in successful, collaborative working relationships? And if so, how can focusing on developing trust add value and sustainment potential to the SLCFD intelligence gathering use and dissemination program? The research uses appreciative inquiry in combination with multiple case studies, examining elements of successful and unsuccessful collaborative efforts in the arena of the fire service and national security.

This thesis investigates the rise and fall of the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s national security effort for the time period spanning pre-2002 Olympics to 2014. Components responsible for the diminished involvement since the Olympics are examined, evaluating each based on the role of trust. The nexus between those constructs and trust is the foundation for the recommendations for rebuilding the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s intelligence program. Developing strong, trusting relationships and addressing the concerns of all stakeholders are identified as key components in the successful case studies. Trust has been identified as the underpinning to the recommendations for the redevelopment of an intelligence program in the Salt Lake City Fire Department.
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ABSTRACT

Laying the foundation for the reestablishment of the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s intelligence program requires several steps: Establishing a need; identifying the stakeholders; developing an implementation and sustainment plan based on the key constructs of successful collaboration; and providing a continued mechanism for evaluation and adjustment. Distilling the constructs of collaboration into a key component of success will provide additional focus to the development and implementation process.

The questions this thesis answers are, can trust be identified as a significant factor in successful, collaborative working relationships? And if so, how can focusing on developing trust add value and sustainment potential to the SLCFD intelligence gathering use and dissemination program? The research uses appreciative inquiry in combination with multiple case studies, examining elements of successful and unsuccessful collaborative efforts in the arena of the fire service and national security.

This thesis investigates the rise and fall of the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s national security effort for the time period spanning pre-2002 Olympics to 2014. Components responsible for the diminished involvement since the Olympics are examined, evaluating each based on the role of trust. The nexus between those constructs and trust is the foundation for the recommendations for rebuilding the Salt Lake City Fire Department intelligence program. Developing strong, trusting relationships and addressing the concerns of all stakeholders are identified as key components in the successful case studies. Trust has been identified as the underpinning to the recommendations for the redevelopment of an intelligence program in the Salt Lake City Fire Department.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR  After Action Report
ACLU  American Civil Liberties Union
ALF  Animal Liberation Front
BCOT  Building Communities of Trust
CAD  Computer Aided Dispatch
CHDS  Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CPNI  Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CST  Civil Support Team
CT  Counter Terrorism
CTDP  Center for Terrorism and disaster Preparedness
DHS  Department of Homeland Security
DPS  Department of Public Safety
EM  Emergency Management
EOC  Emergency Operations Center
EPCRA  Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency
FDNY  Fire Department of New York
FEMS 2002  Fire and EMS 2002
FISA  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
IAFC  International Association of Fire Chiefs
IC  Intelligence Community
ILO/TLO  Intelligence Liaison Officer/Terrorism Liaison Officer
ISIS  Islamist State in Syria
JOC  Joint Operations Center
JTAC  Joint Terrorism Analysis Center
LDS  Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
LEO  Law Enforcement Officer
LEPC  Local Emergency Planning Committee
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NaCTSO</td>
<td>National counter Terrorism Security Office</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Center</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>OCIAC</td>
<td>Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center</td>
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<td>OCSO</td>
<td>Orange County Sheriff’s Office</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Olympic Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>OJTTF</td>
<td>Olympic Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
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<td>QHSR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Homeland Security Review</td>
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<td>PSB</td>
<td>Public Safety Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>RICU</td>
<td>Research Information Communication Unit</td>
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<td>SIAC</td>
<td>Statewide Information and Analysis Center</td>
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<td>SLC</td>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
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<td>SLCFD</td>
<td>Salt Lake City Fire Department</td>
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<td>SLCFPB</td>
<td>Salt Lake City Fire Prevention Bureau</td>
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<td>SLCPD</td>
<td>Salt Lake City Police Department</td>
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<td>SLIC</td>
<td>Salt Lake Information Center</td>
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<td>SLTT</td>
<td>State, Local, Tribal and Territorial</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>TECC</td>
<td>Tactical Emergency Casualty Care</td>
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<td>UOPSC</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2014 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released its second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), refining its focus within the agency’s defined missions. One of the notable components of the 2014 review was the focus on community-level engagement and public-private partnerships. According to the DHS webpage, “This second quadrennial review reflects a more focused, collaborative Departmental strategy, planning and analytical capability.” The Review acknowledges shared responsibility in the national security effort and the value added by engaging in public-private partnerships while leveraging resources at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial levels of government, as well.

Contrary to that effort, however, are the growing concerns for the preservation of civil liberties within the realm of gathering intelligence in the name of national security. As the National Security Agency’s (NSA) tactics make the headlines and questions about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s scope of authority increase, citizens are left wondering if they can trust their government to operate within the confines of the law governing the country. The American Civil Liberties Union has also voiced considerable concern over the intelligence community’s tactics and secrecy in securing the country.

These opposing perspectives are at the core of the purpose of this thesis. Finding a methodology to bridge the gap between those who see value in fire intelligence program and those who do not, requires close attention to the necessary relationships and how they are fostered and maintained. The question that the research answers is, could trust be identified as a key consideration in the development of a fire department intelligence program and if so, how can the constructs of trust be applied to the implementation plan for the Salt Lake City Fire Department? Although this work is specific to the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s intelligence program development, the findings relating to trust have value for other fire departments and intelligence agencies looking to develop long-standing collaborative relationships.
Analysis of successful fire department intelligence programs, in addition to research and analysis of the constructs of successful collaboration, was the foundation of the research. Having realized success in the integrated security effort during the 2002 Winter Olympics, an analysis of how the Salt Lake City Fire Department integrated into the Olympic security effort and then subsequently removed itself from the continued post-Olympic effort was also a source of insight into how to reintegrate.

Salt Lake City Fire Department’s role within the national security effort is validated through supporting documentation from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the International Association of Fire Chiefs. The implementation will require partnerships with city and state administrators, city and state fusion centers, the Salt Lake City Police Department, citizens and civil liberties advocacy groups. Finding a way to garner support or, at a minimum, reduce the resistance to a fire service intelligence program, was accomplished through a multistep process.

According to the article, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi specifically address trust as a major factor in the maintenance and development of a fire intelligence program. To that point, getting to the root of trust in an effort to build the collaboration strategy necessary for Salt Lake City Fire Department’s intelligence mission to succeed, was required.

Research conducted by Center for Homeland Defense and Security graduate Chris Bertram identified key constructs of collaboration endurance specific to the 2002 Olympics security effort during and post event. These constructs were analyzed and compared with previous work presented by Hocevar et al. in their article, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: Addressing the Challenge.” Felt need, strategic planning and mandated systems were identified as enablers of successful collaboration within Bertram’s survey results and the findings within Hocevar et al’s publication.

Trust was also identified as a key construct in successful collaborations in both works. However, this research demonstrates that trust is intrinsic to all constructs identified as enablers of collaboration by Bertram and Hocevar. Mayer et al. Dyadic Organizational Trust Model was identified as the most applicable framework to address
the challenges the fire intelligence mission could face. The model breaks trust down into four components; the trustee, or the person wanting or needing to be trusted; the trustor, the person who will be doing the trusting; perceived risk; and the context in which that risk is being taken. Qualities of the trustee that would make him or her more or less trustworthy, according to the Mayer et al. model, are ability, benevolence and integrity. Focusing on the trustee and the impact he or she has on the success of collaborative relationships empowers program developers to use those constructs in an effort to fortify the collaborative relationships that will support the success of the program.

Based on the findings of this research, there are ten sequential steps recommended for the development and implementation of the Salt Lake City Fire Department intelligence program offered. The steps are seated in the understanding that building and maintaining trust must stay ever-present in the program development and implementation process. Inclusiveness in developing the program structure and the policies and procedures that will govern the program will be necessary to assure that consideration has been given to all perspectives.

**Ten Steps of Recommended Implementation:**

1. Initiate meetings with decision makers for each collaboration partner
2. Establish consensus on need and degree of involvement
3. Develop unified proposal options to secure funding
4. Develop strategic plan based on current and potential funding
5. Draft policies, procedures and MOUs between agencies
6. Establish specific channels of communication for collection and dissemination of information
7. Develop expectations and training program
8. Deliver training to fire personnel
9. Leverage existing assets
10. Continue planning, evaluating and adjusting as needed.
These recommendations are designed to provide ample opportunity for open dialogue throughout the development, implementation and sustainment phases of the program. Encouraging input from the stakeholders builds trust that the program will address the interests of all affected parties. Soliciting evaluation and feedback affords a higher probability of lasting collaboration and a successful, sustainable program, as changing needs are addressed and the program is allowed to stay agile.

According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Quadrennial Review, the nature of the threat to homeland security is changing. Centralized threats are shifting to the less predictable lone wolf attacks like the Boston bombings. Radicalization within the western countries has become a greater concern with the developments in Syria and Iraq and the advancement of the Islamist State in Syria. The Department of Homeland Security has identified community-level engagement as a key element in securing the country.

The fire service provides unique perspective and core capabilities to the effort. Having identified trust as the cornerstone to success in the development, implementation and sustainment of the Fire intelligence program model within Salt Lake City, it will be important to assure that all necessary steps are taken to promote inclusion, ownership and added value to all parties within the network.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. TRUST AND FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.

As the memory of 9/11 fades, the federal government and its agencies are being more thoroughly scrutinized on financial and ethical aspects of the homeland security effort. According to a recent New York Times article, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court has created dozens of classified rulings, creating laws that grant the National Security Agency (NSA) the power to collect a mass of data on Americans in the name of pursuing terrorism suspects and those potentially involved in cyber attacks, spying, and nuclear proliferation. The media coverage of this event translated to a key question in the public eye: can the government, in the broadest definition of the word, be trusted? President Obama is working to reform U.S. intelligence gathering measures at the national level; however, do these events have any bearing on local efforts to collect, share and disseminate intelligence in the name of public safety?

National interest in community level involvement in counterterrorism effort is increasing; including greater interest in the role of the fire service. As the reach of intelligence and national security programs expands, managing scrutiny of such programs continues to be an ongoing challenge. The primary goal of this thesis is to isolate trust as a key factor in creating a development and sustainment plan for the SLCFD intelligence gathering, use and dissemination program. This argument—that trust is a key factor—has been made before, as in an article by the Manhattan Institute that argues attention must be

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given to the maintenance and development of trust within the fire intelligence program.\textsuperscript{5} This thesis will build upon this earlier work, and discuss the importance of trust in the context of the Salt Lake City Fire Department.

B. DESIRED OUTCOME.

The Fire/Intelligence relationship is a developing component of the national effort to improve safety and security for the citizens and responders within their communities. This work will build the nexus between trust, effective information sharing and collaborative relationships specific to the Salt Lake City Fire Department (SLCFD). The objectives are: to identify where the SLCFD fits into the national network; to evaluate and compare the SLCFD’s previous involvement in the security efforts during the 2002 Olympics to current involvement; to assess the post-Olympic environment and its impact on SLCFD’s collaboration endurance; and to distill down the components of failed collaboration to the single element of trust. Creating a single point of failure may allow program developers to focus on specific methods to build and maintain trust within the SLCFD/IC model and advance the SLCFD’s efforts to support national information sharing efforts.

C. NATIONAL EFFORT TO IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING

1. Broadening the Value of Intelligence

Intelligence only has value when shared and utilized. Because of the sensitive nature of intelligence work in general, there is an intrinsic tendency for those who have access to sensitive information to want to keep it to themselves or within their agency. This is a questionable tactic, as large-scale, preventable events have been successfully executed due to a lack of communication in the past.

The willingness of the keepers of intelligence to share what they know is reliant on a multitude of factors. Not knowing what others need to know, not trusting that they’ll do the right thing once they have it and believing that sharing it may compromise the

value of the intelligence, are possible explanations. No matter the driver, the need to share information and engage more agencies, groups and individuals in the national security effort has been made clear by Homeland Security leadership.67

2. **Tiers of Improved Information Sharing**

The post 9/11 environment continues to evolve and provide the United States with unique security challenges. In the immediate wake of the 2001 attacks on the US, mismanagement of intelligence, critical to disrupting the attacks, was identified as a key component in failing to stop them. The 9/11 Commission Report defined the problem as an inability to “connect the dots.”8 A lack of information sharing was pivotal in the successful attacks. Three tiers within the effort to improve interdepartmental communication can be identified within our nation.

At a federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was developed. The idea being that putting several of the national security agencies under one department would provide an intrinsic continuity to the goal of protecting the homeland. The secretary of Homeland Security oversees eight child agencies, with a stated goal of preparing for, preventing and responding to domestic emergencies to be working toward the basic homeland security mission.9

The value and importance of state, local and tribal agencies was also made clear during post 9/11 analysis. Interagency collaboration at all levels continues to be the focus in addressing how domestic intelligence is gathered, disseminated and utilized. Bridging the gaps between federal, state, local and tribal entities has begun. Fusion centers, a network of information collection and analysis hubs, have provided a mechanism to more effectively connect the dots, as information is obtained, analyzed and disseminated to participating parties at all levels of government. The challenge comes in recognizing who

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8 Ibid.

needs to be involved and determining who may benefit from specific intelligence. The increase in fire service involvement within this tier of the effort on a national level will be discussed later in this work and be applied to the recommendations.

The final tier of improving information sharing is to engage citizens at the community level. The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review emphasized the importance of involving the citizen, communities, and private sector leadership in the homeland security effort. Law enforcement has traditionally led local intelligence efforts, however national interest is shifting to include fire and emergency medical personnel. The desired outcome of this research is to identify the optimum development and implementation model to best leverage the SLCFD as an intelligence asset.

The paradigm shift toward including the fire department in the national intelligence effort is the impetus for this research. Within each tier there is a clear need for collaboration between agencies, organizations and individuals. Creating a module, with a high probability for success, will depend on breaking down the key elements of successful collaboration and reconstructing them around the challenges SLCFD may face in the effort.

3. Trust as a Factor in Improved Information Sharing

Balancing trust with the necessity to obtain, analyze and use information or intelligence in the name of public safety can be a challenge. In order to achieve the desired outcome, this research will compare the current SLCFD intelligence program to that of 2002, reestablish the need for a robust Fire/Intelligence program, and develop a plan to reinvigorate an ailing program with sound policy development. Policy drives all aspect of government. Trust in policy development with an emphasis on the legal, civil and human elements of implementation should be explored because this type of program affects people.

This challenge has multiple fronts: Attention to civil liberties, privacy laws and ethics with regard to firefighter access into private property. The others are subtle, yet can play an equally important role in the success and sustainability of the program. The role of trust, across the necessary partnerships for the SLCFD/IC program to flourish, needs to
be understood. There are technical components of program development, such as policies and procedures, memorandums of understanding and the task of managing the classification of intelligence materials; and there are the relationships necessary to make the vision come to fruition. Understanding the intricacies and value of each node and link within the network is critical. Assessing the cost of breaking or weakening a link due to a lack of credibility is also relevant.

D. METHODS.

“The moment there is suspicion about a person’s motives, everything he does becomes tainted.”

–Mahatma Gandhi¹⁰

Utilizing the principles of appreciative inquiry,¹¹ an assessment of the current SLCFD/IC program, as compared to the 2002 Olympics time period, will identify the successful constructs of collaboration at work when involvement was high. This would include SLCFD’s participation in the preparation and management of the 2002 Olympics, in addition to an analysis of why the SLCFD has experienced a decrease in the overall participation in the security effort within its jurisdiction. The hypothesis is that trust plays a key role in collaboration endurance and that collaboration development and durability will be driven by program development recommendations made in the context of building trust.

Identifying a network structure necessary to successfully leverage firefighters within the intelligence community brings to light the relationships that underpin the program. Whether personal or professional, when human relationships are formed, the outcome of that interaction is dependent on many factors. This work will explore the potential impact and value of trust between stakeholders, the implementation and sustainment of a fire service intelligence program.


¹¹ Appreciative inquiry is an analysis perspective that focuses on further developing components of a system that are working favorably.
The hypothesis is that there is value in identifying all of the necessary relationships and focusing on developing trust between the working groups during the program development, implementation and sustainment phases in order to attain the desired outcome. This work will review reports and documentation evaluating the collaborative security efforts during the 2002 Winter Olympics, Chris Bertram’s analysis of the enablers of collaboration endurance during and post Olympics, identify a framework for developing trust, and use existing models for minimizing vulnerability in program development and implementation. The development of the alternative solutions and the criteria used to develop policy supporting the desired outcome, i.e. successful integration of the fire service into the IC, will be based on Bertram’s findings and the analysis of those findings against the constructs of trust. Potential hurdles will be identified and trust-building opportunities from successful models that could potentially be utilized to overcome those hurdles will be evaluated.

The research will rely on a combination of literature and data from like programs that will be identified as collaboration dependent and assessed for relevance to the Salt Lake City Fire/intelligence community program (SLCFD/IC). Using summative evaluation, the outcomes and the bearing of efforts to foster trust and transparency within the examples, in addition to comparing similarities and differences to the cases and policy development in the SLCFD/IC, will either validate or dismiss the evaluation’s relevance.

A case study of the SLCFD intelligence program, both past and present, will be utilized in two ways: First to determine if the Fire/Intelligence program in Salt Lake City would add value to the community; and second, to analyze Salt Lake City itself, and the rise and fall of the fire department’s involvement in the national security effort (and how the strength of this partnering arrangement might affect SLC). Study into the principles of social science and how they relate to successful collaboration within the Fire/Intelligence model will also be evaluated.

Questions that will need to be answered:

1. Is there national support for fire service involvement in the intelligence efforts?
2. What evidence is available to support that SLCFD was an integral part of the
security efforts during the 2002 Olympics?
3. What are the indicators that the SLCFD involvement has changed?
4. What are the factors that led to the successful Olympics security framework?
5. What agencies would be necessary for a successful SLCFD intelligence model today?
6. Does trust play a role in successful collaborative security efforts and if so, how?
7. What model can be used to measure the value of trust within a collaborative model’s development?
8. Are there specific strategies and/or tactics that can foster trust within the realm of the SLCFD intelligence program development?

This methodology supports the desired outcome of this research. The findings will direct the development and sustainment model for the integration of the Salt Lake City Fire Department into the IC. Trust, as a consideration for and solution to potential derailments in development and implementation of the SLCFD Intelligence program, will direct efforts toward relationships. By evaluating the successes and failures of other program and policy development models, policy makers for the SLCFD will have a more informed direction and understanding of the dynamics of entering into the IC. Potential hurdles will be identified and concepts in developing trust will be presented in the recommendations of this thesis.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Thesis Question

Can trust be identified as a significant factor in successful, collaborative working relationships and if so, how can focusing on developing trust add value and sustainment potential to the SLCFD intelligence gathering, use and dissemination program?

2. Purpose

The purpose of this literature review is to examine not only the published information on the specific subject matter of fire service (Fire) involvement in the
national security effort, but to examine the content of other literature which, although not specific to the mission, could be relevant to answering the thesis question. The desired outcome is to identify the value of trust-driven program development, implementation and sustainment and develop a strategy based on the findings. The goal of this thesis is to add a deeper understanding of the relationship between trust and successful policy development and implementation using the fire/intelligence apparatus partnership as a model.

3. Introduction

The concept of incorporating Fire and/or emergency medical services into the network of intelligence gathering, use and dissemination has been identified as an area previously overlooked, yet valuable in the counterterrorism, intelligence and all-hazards approach to homeland security. The model of integrating the emergency services with the fusion effort has been widely accepted and promoted at an administrative level since the events of September 11, 2001. While some have suggested it would be negligent to do anything short of integrating Fire into the intelligence network, the model has been met with some concern and opposition by civil liberty groups and within various tiers of the organizations involved.

The documents supporting fire service involvement in the fusion process include popular, scholarly and professional literature. The opinions for or against the relationship seem to be directly correlated with specific advocacy interests of the source of the materials. The most prolific source of opposing literature has come from civil liberties advocacy groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and its affiliated organizations. Interestingly, the disapproval of the ACLU is expressed across the board on the topic of fusion centers in general, and is not specific to fire department involvement.


14 Ibid.
Professional publications in favor of the partnership have been produced by government agencies like the DHS and fire service leadership organizations such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC).\textsuperscript{15} Examples of more scholarly contributions would be Dabruzzi and Garenstien’s work for the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research,\textsuperscript{16} FDNY Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer’s writings, including Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked World\textsuperscript{17} and several theses that have been submitted at the Naval Postgraduate School and the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program.

As organizations like the DHS galvanize support for the fire service/fusion center partnership by creating documents like the Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers, which defines not only why, but how the fire service could be leveraged in the field of homeland security,\textsuperscript{18} leadership organizations within the fire service have also embraced further development of the firefighter’s role in intelligence fusion. An example would be the International Association of Fire Chief’s publication, \textit{Homeland Security: Intelligence Guide for Fire Chiefs}. Both documents provide road map-style direction on building and leveraging the program. Several pioneering agencies have also led the way on integrating Fire into fusion operations and have provided written professional works to assist other agencies in the process in doing so. Salt Lake City, the Fire Department of New York City and Orange County Sheriff’s office in California are three examples.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{19} FDNY, \textit{FDNY Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy} (NY: FDNY, 2011).

As an emerging concept, assessing trust within the Fire intelligence model is still relatively new and specific literature on the topic is sparse. When considering how trust impacts the process and how to foster trust at all tiers of the network, writing specifically on that issue is lean. Up to now the focus has been procedurally driven. There are two exceptions; the first is a thesis written by CHDS student Chris Bertram. His work will be used to evaluate what role trust played specifically in the collaboration necessary to manage a successful and safe Olympics in 2002. He also discusses the maintenance aspect of the security community in Salt Lake City, post-Olympics. Although his focus is on law enforcement, his work reveals relevant information on how and why the SLCFD’s involvement in the IC diminished since 2002. The second exception, also law enforcement centric, is the Guidance for Building Communities of Trust report, written by Robert Wasserman. Wasserman’s work was funded by grant money from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs and the U.S. Department of Justice. His work provides relevant insights to the task of developing community trust within the scope of intelligence gathering, use and dissemination programs at the community level.20

Ample literature exists on the concept of collaboration and trust. Within the arena of homeland security, Caudle, Hocevar, Jansen and Thomas’s work on the topic of collaboration is often cited. Comparisons between these works and Bertram’s findings will be discussed later in this document.

4. Content

a. Making the Case for the Fire Intelligence Program

The fusion/Fire literature reveals three commonalities within the discussions of fire service integration into the fusion center functions: justification, concerns and mechanics. The variations within these common frameworks, focused on program development, are minimal among advocates of Fire involvement in intelligence gathering, use and dissemination. Advocates and critics alike agree that great care and

attention must be given to privacy, civil liberties and any other legal concerns associated with this type of a shift in job expectations for fire personnel.\textsuperscript{21}

Justifications for why fire service entities are well suited to participate in the IC consistently refer to the core competencies of fire departments in this country. An example would be work by Dabruzzi et al. Additionally, government publications such as the Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers,\textsuperscript{22} popular and scholarly works by Pfeifer\textsuperscript{23} and Rice\textsuperscript{24} that are cited in favor of a fire/intelligence program, present consistent arguments. There is clear understanding that the sheer number of firefighters either volunteering or working full-time within the three primary roles of the fire service – prevention, protection and response – could be leveraged to further the IC mission. How the firefighter’s warrantless access is viewed varies between negative and positive, again, depending on who’s making the assessment. Those who promote the idea of more fire involvement in the intelligence effort see the access as an opportunity; others with civil liberty and privacy concerns see it as a recipe for disaster and another means for the government to spy on average citizens.\textsuperscript{25}

Mike German, former FBI agent and senior policy counsel at the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office, stated in an article regarding the FBI’s efforts in gathering intelligence, “Rather than aiding its terrorism prevention efforts, the FBI’s expanded investigative and intelligence powers have overwhelmed agents with a flood of irrelevant information and false alarms.”\textsuperscript{26} He cites the recent NSA security leaks by Richard Snowden as a revelation into the secret interpretation of the laws governing

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\textsuperscript{22} Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, \textit{Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers} (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012).


\textsuperscript{24} Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” \textit{Harvard Kennedy School Magazine} (Summer 2010). Add link


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domestic surveillance. Firefighters would be walking a fine line when filling their role within the intelligence effort, which most of the supporting literature acknowledges. Admittedly, the leaks have changed the landscape for introducing new intelligence gathering programs and will require extra care in policy development, management and accountability for the program.

Firefighter reluctance in fusion center-related activities is widely discussed, but poorly documented, representing a gap in the research. Anecdotal accounts of firefighters’ unwillingness to participate in a role perceived as belonging to law enforcement has not been substantiated with statistics; however, to those in the service the idea is believable and needs consideration when an intelligence program is being developed and introduced. The concerns that typically arise from Fire relate specifically to the legal aspects of civil liberties adherence and the vulnerability of social capital, which is integral to successful execution of daily operations for emergency services. Ronald Burt, a professor at Chicago University, defines social capital as a metaphor about advantage.27 He cites Putnam’s definition: “Social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.”28

Law enforcement could resist the idea as well, due to an attitude, whether valid or not, that Fire is less competent when it comes to managing sensitive law enforcement information. According to Wasserman’s report on community policing, “Law enforcement agencies can be unwilling to share information with other agencies because they want to keep control of what enforcement actions are taken.”29 This pushback, although more subtle than the protests of the ACLU, will be critical when a strategy for developing trust and adding value to the program are considered.

Literature like the DHS and DOJ’s Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers\textsuperscript{30} and FDNY’s Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy\textsuperscript{31} discuss variations in the mechanics of creating an intelligence program involving the fire service and are in favor of the effort. The challenges facing the fire service today, such as the hazards of chemical, biological, explosive, radiological and nuclear threats in the response environment are compounded by the fierce competition for dwindling funds. Many options are provided throughout the literature to allow adaptation to municipal needs and variable budgets. Gaining political buy-in with the hopes of garnering financial support needs development. Included in the analysis will be documentation on how other programs add value to the community and the other nodes within the IC network. Documentation describing Great Britain’s Contest program is also relevant in increasing trust and public value in the Fire/intelligence model. A comparison of the Contest program with the current IC program in Salt Lake City in an effort to discover opportunities for implementation will also be analyzed.

b. \textit{Trust as it Relates to a Fire Service Intelligence Program}

The available literature on the topic of fire service involvement in the intelligence effort is primarily focused on why it is a good idea and how it can be accomplished logistically. Pfiefer touches on the idea of trust and the intrinsic value of leadership, relationships and accountability. Given the gravity of the task at hand, a greater emphasis on the leadership skills it takes to manage change and develop trust between all parties involved or impacted by the process is essential. This includes but is not limited to relationships between agencies, administrations and labor, the fusion centers and those protecting the rights and civil liberties of the U.S. citizens.

According to the Government Accountability Office, “The federal government faces a series of challenges in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century that will be difficult, if not impossible, for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{30} Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, \textit{Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers} (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012).
\item \textsuperscript{31} FDNY, \textit{FDNY Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy} (NY: FDNY, 2011).
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any single agency to address alone.™ Collaboration will be paramount. As finances become scarce, trust wanes in government policy and scrutiny of domestic intelligence efforts and programs continues, judicious planning for program development and policy implementation is critical.

Acknowledging the connection between policy and the impact it has on individuals, groups or society as a whole is at the core of trust-driven program development. Recognizing the nexus policy formation and operational implementation and the resulting impact on the people will allow us to examine the role of trust in the development of policy for fire department intelligence gathering, use and dissemination. Enablers of collaboration and trust can be leveraged in program development, implementation and sustainment effort.

Drivers of collaboration have been examined in works by Caudle on high performance partnerships, 33 Hocevar et al. on the specific factors that create successful collaboration, and Bertram and the specific relationship collaboration had to the Olympics security effort in 2002. 34 Chief J. Pfeifer from FDNY should also be recognized for his insight on responsibility, accountability and the need to acknowledge and strategize on combating competition among team members and channel energy and focus on the common purpose. 35

“Collaboration success factors” identified by the work of Hocevar et al. were the foundation of a study conducted by Bertram, which focused specifically on security efforts before, during and after the 2002 Olympics. 36 37 Interviewing twenty-two law

34 Christopher Bertram, Factors the Effect Interagency Collaborations: Lessons During and Following the 2002 Winter Olympics (master’s Thesis Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Add link
enforcement leaders who had been involved in the Olympics security effort, Bertram identified enablers or facilitators of collaboration development and endurance. There were significant similarities between Bertram’s finds and the constructs of successful collaboration identified in the work of Hocevar et al. Bertram’s key concepts; social capital, felt need, leadership and mandated systems, provided a platform for further research into how trust impacted each construct within his collaboration endurance model.

Research was required to address several different opportunities for trust to have a positive or negative impact on the success of the program. The concerns identified earlier, civil liberties and agency resistance, are relevant to the essential organizations or agencies identified within the Fire/Intelligence mission network. Finding tools to foster trust in the program, in an effort to ease the concerns, required looking into organizational tactics in trust development outside the Fire/Intelligence mission arena.

Linsky and Heifetz speak to the concept of “confronting the gaps between our values and behavior.” Linsky and Heifetz point out the challenge of confronting the gaps between values and behavior, which applies to both individuals and organizations. The struggle is a continuum and requires strong leadership to manage the mission and the multitude of personalities critical to success. The gaps that form between values and behaviors are key in defining integrity as individuals and organizations. What rests in those gaps are opportunities to tarnish and betray trust.

Mark H. Moore developed the idea of adding public value in policy development. The ideas he presents are helpful in building the foundation of public trust. He talks about “value as stakeholder and customer satisfaction,” which broadens the perspective of program development. Considering the “stakeholder” means a more inclusive mechanism of program development. Moore places a high level of importance

39 Ibid.
on the satisfaction of citizens, as “their goals are the only things that justify the expenditure of public resources.”

Moore’s assertions are reiterated in community intelligence-specific terms in Wasserman’s report. Wasserman addresses the overall concept of Building Communities of Trust (BCOT). The content of his report supports the development of added public value, in addition to supporting the concepts of Britain’s Contest program.

c. Leveraging Existing Models for Trust

The efficiency of trust is the primary assertion of Stephen Covey in *The Speed of Trust.* The concept is developed within the personal and professional context within Covey’s work. In an effort to minimize setbacks and optimize time and resources, the concepts within *The Speed of Trust* emphasize and reinforce the examples and frameworks specifically used to develop the recommendations within this thesis.

Arbinger Institute’s work on personal and organization relationships brings clarity to the destructive concepts of collusion and self-deception, which work to erode trust and influence. This group has successfully distilled centuries of philosophy, psychology and sociology into clear, straightforward and applicable concepts in collaboration. Arbinger’s model and framework lends practical support to the concept of developing trust and strengthening collaboration.

The dyadic model of organizational trust completed by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman provides a dynamic framework and a multifaceted perspective of the constructs of trust. What makes this model unique from earlier conceptualizations of trust is the differentiation between trust and trustworthiness, and the inclusion of

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42 Ibid. 301.
vulnerability and context in the formulation of trust. Three antecedents of trust within the construct of trustworthiness; ability, benevolence and integrity, are identified within the Mayer et al. model. This breakdown of trustworthiness defines a variable within the model, which is dependent on the character and competency of the trustee, the person seeking to be trusted.

Consideration for the personality traits of the trustor, the individual doing the trusting within a relationship, recognizes the variability of that individual’s propensity to trust. The Mayer et al. model creates a dynamic interdependence between the constructs they’ve identified. This dynamic equates to opportunity when seeking mechanisms to facilitate trust and consequently build stronger, more lasting collaboration.

The key commonality among these works is the understanding that human behavior conforms to norms, with little variation. People are prone to agency bias, have expectations of how they should be treated, and oftentimes fail to reciprocate the very treatment they’d like to experience at the hands of others. This thesis will explore the value and mechanics of developing a fire service intelligence model through the available literature, as well as key ways to minimize the resistance to the idea by utilizing principles, concepts and lessons learned in other policy development and implementation scenarios.

5. Conclusion

As the homeland security effort develops at the community level, the debate over how much is too much continues. While some literature supports the idea that fire and emergency services are untapped resources, others express reluctance to the idea of trusted first responders collecting intelligence on the customers they serve. Even within the service-level agencies, differing opinions exist on what, if any, role Fire should or could play in the IC effort.

Although how Fire fits into program implementation varies, documentation from organizations like the DHS, IAFC, and those already incorporating Fire into their community intelligence efforts, is unanimous in support. The arguments in favor of Fire’s greater involvement stem from citing the sheer number of firefighters as a resource to the
natural fit of the skill sets those in the emergency services embody with the homeland security effort.

Concerns are still prevalent within the civil liberties organizations, law enforcement and the fire service itself. The documentation questioning the practice focuses on trust and value. Bertram’s work on trust within the IC during the Olympics in 2002 will provide insight into the role of trust and interagency collaboration. The data he collected demonstrates the relevance of trust in the IC and will be factored into the recommendations of this work.
II. THE FIRE SERVICE ROLE WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY EFFORT

Examining the Department of Homeland Security’s 2014 Quadrennial Report, it is clear the nation is working hard to stay ahead of security threats. Local, state and tribal resources are being recruited to broaden the reach of protecting our country. As additional security assets are called upon to participate in the effort, it is important to clearly define roles and expectations.

A. MAKING THE CASE FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION

In order to promote a paradigm shift the magnitude of asking firefighters to engage in intelligence and security activities, the value added needs to be well substantiated. Revealing the threat posed, the vulnerability of the community served and the tools at the disposal of the fire service to mitigate potential harm will be significant aspects of promoting the fire department intelligence program. Building trust in the basis of the program will involve assuring all stakeholders see the need and want to be a party to its success.

1. Our Changing World

As our national security challenges change from a centralized threat like Al Qaida, to more of a decentralized, lone wolf model, like the Boston Marathon bombing, creativity in how we provide for the safety, security and resiliency of our nation must be encouraged.47 Concern is growing over the strength, funding and global recruitment efforts of the Islamist State in Syria (ISIS). Suspicions that western militants trained and fighting in Syria will return home to their western regions have been confirmed. According to an NBC report, as of June 2014, “In the past 18 months, British authorities

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have arrested 65 people returning from Syria...\textsuperscript{48} Michael Leiter, NBC News’ counter-terrorism and national security analyst, is quoted as saying, “For the United States and Western Europe, this is a very significant threat—probably as significant and complex a threat as we have faced since 9/11.”\textsuperscript{49} These trends validate increasing community-level security and resiliency efforts.

2. Community Need – Applicability in SLC

Determining if developing a Fire intelligence program within Salt Lake City or the State of Utah would be prudent and add public value to the citizens is a critical component in determining how to proceed. Salt Lake City has several unique homeland security challenges. There is significant infrastructure target potential with our joint civil-military international airport, a major railway hub for freight, Amtrak and local commuter lines, a nuclear reactor and more than 800 hazardous materials storage or use facilities within city boundaries.\textsuperscript{50}

According to the Utah Department of Natural Resources, The State of Utah is ranked 11\textsuperscript{th} in the country in crude oil production and 9th in natural gas gross production (Energy Information Administration; rankings based on 2011 oil production and 2011 natural gas production, not including Federal Offshore production areas). There are approximately 11,000 wells currently in production within the state.\textsuperscript{51} Facilities that support the extraction of oil and gas include five oil refineries and a complex rail and pipeline system could also be vulnerable to eco-terrorism. Although the eco-terrorism activity in the U.S. has decreased, the FBI continues to express significant concern with


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.


the potential resurgence. These types of attacks have also taken place repeatedly in Canada. In 1990 the pipelines were attacked in the Peace River region in Alberta and in October 2008, EnCana sour gas pipelines were sabotaged by anonymous individuals. Although the frequency of such attacks has diminished, consideration for protecting against them needs to remain, according to the FBI.

The predominant religious sect that is central to Utah, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), could create target potential, as well. In 2009, the Heritage Foundation reported that since the Mormon Church’s support for California Proposition 8 was made public in 2008, “Mormons were particularly and systematically targeted for supporting prop 8.” The centralized structure of the LDS headquarters, the Conference Center, Temple Square and the Church History Library in the heart of downtown Salt Lake City, also adds to the vulnerability of the LDS sites.

Since 1991 the Salt Lake Valley has experienced five active shooter incidents in public areas, four within Salt Lake City proper in the past 14 years. One of those incidents occurred inside the LDS Genealogy Library. Recent threats from the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have named Utah as a key target for mink farm attacks as

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Utah is familiar with ALF activity as the group was responsible for the 1995 fire at Tandy Leather store in Salt Lake City.

The area’s potential vulnerabilities measured against recent history provide a compelling argument for more robust law enforcement and fire department relationships. Two of the five HLS mission statements contained within the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Prevention and Strengthening National Preparedness and Resilience, are national goals that have local significance. The strategy of engaging communities throughout the country is recognized at the federal level as a plausible way to counter terrorism’s impact on our nation. First responders are being enlisted to identify warning signs of local terrorist involvement, radicalization or preparation for a domestic attack as they perform their regular duties. As this expanded role of fire departments becomes more widely accepted among the national security partners, it is time to identify the best course of action to reintegrate the SLCFD into local, state and federal intelligence networks.

3. An Expansion in the Fire Service Model

The fire service has traditionally served a specific role within its respective communities. Throughout the evolution of the fire service, particular skill sets have been developed, broadening the value of the departments to the community. An example would be when the fire service began providing emergency medical response in addition to fire suppression in the 1960s. This represented a significant service model change and was met with considerable resistance; however, today, on a national level, nearly 70

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percent of calls the fire service responds to are medical in nature. The forward-thinking paradigm shift enhanced the usefulness of the fire service to the communities it serves and further solidified the municipal fire service model.

Members of the fire service have a multitude of resources and abilities that could serve the nation’s security efforts well. The primary objective of this chapter is to explore the national trends, assess the applicability of the fire service within the national security effort and evaluate Salt Lake City’s previous involvement in security efforts during and after the 2002 Olympics.

a. Tools and Core Capabilities Supporting the Fire Intelligence Program

Emergency responders are an abundant resource, with access to people and places that others may not have through emergency response, arson investigation and business inspections. According to the National Fire Protection Association there were a total of 1,100,450 firefighters in the United States in 2012; 344,050 were career firefighters and 756,400 were volunteers. The role of the firefighter integrates well into the needs of the national intelligence network effort. The core competencies of firefighting provide several avenues of program implementation, diversifying the opportunities for using and collecting actionable intelligence. Through training and experience, firefighters develop a knowledge base in situational awareness, fire behavior and suppression, emergency medicine, fire code, rescue, hazardous materials, fire investigation, scene safety, fire protection systems and building construction. Fire service personnel have analytical skills and subject matter expertise (SME), ideal for contributing to intelligence analysis, production and use. According to a Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi article from the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, “There are three broad ways in which fire departments can contribute to counterterrorism efforts; as intelligence collectors, users

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and sharers; as developers of community networks; and as organizers of joint planning, preparedness, and response.”65 These are integral roles in Homeland Security that could be missed if a thoughtful plan is not developed, implemented and evaluated within Salt Lake City. Analyzing the current application of these functions more closely will demonstrate that Salt Lake City Fire is actively involved in the use of intelligence in a different but relevant application.

b. Fire Service Functions Well-Suited for Security Effort

Comparing Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi’s description of the firefighter’s counterterrorism role to current activities performed on the SLCFD, reveals several opportunities that could be leveraged into an IC model. Offered are a few examples of existing programs that, by nature, could be utilized to broaden the scope of the Fire Department’s involvement in the overall security measures within the community. Because these programs are already in place or skill sets have already been developed, the expansion into the IC would not require a great deal of effort.

(1) Intelligence Collectors, Users and Sharers

Every member of the SLCFD is trained to make observations in a broad array of applications. Fire and medical events, accident scenes and occupancies under inspection provide ample opportunity to assess an area for cause, event reconstruction and suspicious activity. Some examples are the cause and origin of a fire; the mechanism of injury for motor vehicle accidents; and evidence of illegal drugs present at the scene of an unconscious patient. Specific training relating to observed activities associated with criminal or terrorist activity may help prompt a different reaction to items once overlooked as nonconsequential. What must be clear is that the end objective of heightened awareness is a goal, not an enforceable mandate.66 The hope is to broaden the scope of knowledge so things that may not have seemed strange or out of place before can be perceived as potentially relevant. According to the Nationwide SAR Initiative

66 Ibid. 2.
training for firefighters, “suspicious activity reporting focuses on behaviours and incidents, not race, ethnicity, national origin or religious affiliations.” 67 Maintaining this focus will build credibility with the public as well as the firefighters engaged in the program.

(2) Developers of Community Networks

One example of how SLCFD builds networks within the city is through the work of Salt Lake City’s Fire Prevention Bureau (SLCFPB). The primary function of the SLCFPB is to connect with the general public, business owners and contractors in order to provide useful information on various safety procedures and practices. This division is in constant contact with the community through permit and business inspections, school programs, Fire Prevention Week activities, community council participation and partnering with private sector entities for community safety events. 68 Inspectors spend their days entering into every newly constructed building in the city and those that have been involved in moderate to significant renovation. Longstanding relationships are developed as each inspector works within a specific specialty.

An example would be the law enforcement officer (LEO) fire inspectors and the high life safety occupancy program. Entertainment venue operators work closely with the LEO inspectors to assure the safety of their patrons. Through this program, the LEO inspectors build strong working relationships with bar managers and owners. Developing networks among the nightclub management has led to information sharing about illegal or suspicious activity within their businesses and illegal parties and venue use. 69 LEO fire inspectors are also diligent in collecting intelligence and acting on leads, in addition to patrolling high life safety occupancies. Gathering intelligence through Internet advertisements to break up illegal rave parties is one example.

69 Ibid.
Within the department, the SLCFPB is key to providing valuable intelligence to the Operations Branch of the fire department. One example of this is through the hazardous materials permitting and inspection program. Inspectors perform over 800 hazardous materials inspections annually. Through the department records management system (RMS) chemical type, quantities and location are recorded and integrated into the computer aided dispatch system (CAD). Not only is the information at the fingertips of the operations crews when preplanning the district, dispatchers can feed pertinent information to the crews when en route to a reported incident.

An extension of the SLCFPB is the existing business license inspection program, which is conducted by the operations personnel. In 2013, the SLCFD operations section conducted over 3,000 business inspections. Combined with the over 4,000 permit and new business license inspections conducted by the SLCFPB, this represents a significant amount of access into business occupancies in SLC. The fire department network has been established. These factors make the SLCFPB the ideal division for the development of the SLCFD/IC program. The next step is to integrate it into a broader pool of shared intelligence.

(3) Organizers of Joint Planning, Preparedness and Training

Salt Lake City Fire plays a key role as organizer of joint training, preparedness and response throughout the valley. SLCFD works in tandem with other city departments and outside agencies, both private and public, in assuring a ready state in emergency preparedness and management. Three examples of this involvement are filling key roles in the city’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC), managing the Salt Lake City Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and developing training exercises with mutual aid communities and outside agencies like the Utah National Guard 85th Civil Support Team (CST).

(a) EOC

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70 Salt Lake City Fire Prevention Bureau, Accela Permit Records Management System, Data (Salt Lake City, UT: Salt Lake City, 2013).
The Fire Department has been key in developing new technology and training for all of the EOC roles. Other divisions serving in the EOC include police, public utilities, streets, communications, emergency management, finance and the executive and legislative branches of the SLC government. Working closely with other divisions within the city fosters a better understanding of each other’s roles and builds relationships that promote continuity in response and recovery.

On June 11, 2010, this theory was put to the test. Sometime around 2200 hours a crude oil pipeline broke, sending approximately 20,000 gallons of thick crude oil into Red Butte Creek. The EOC was activated and SLC resources including Fire, Police, Hazmat, Public Utilities and SLC environmental protection representatives, responded to the scene. Not only were the mitigation efforts developed in concert, but messaging to the media and the recovery plan were all developed with consideration for each department’s interests. Although the potential for a disastrous outcome was ever-present due to the nature of the chemical involved, the lengthy response ended without injury to civilians or first responders. City departments were able to work together with outside agencies as well, providing a united voice in the interest of Salt Lake City.71

Although the fire service has been working with the Incident Command System since its inception in the wildland setting, exercising these principles across multiple department boundaries is instrumental in creating a more seamless effort in exercise and actual events.72

(b) The SLC LEPC

Fire department leadership chairs the Salt Lake City LEPC. The LEPC is a key provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which was enacted in an effort to establish “a national framework for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other [other]...
citizens to plan ahead for possible chemical accidents in their communities." There are more than 3,000 designated local emergency planning districts throughout the country; most are established by county. Federal mandates require LEPC membership to include:

1. Elected state and local officials
2. Police, fire, civil defense and public health professionals
3. Environment, transportation and hospital officials
4. Facility representatives
5. Representatives from community groups and the media

Although SLC is not required by law to have an LEPC, leadership within the fire department recognized the importance of creating such a committee to address concerns specific to the community. The SLCFPB processes over 800 hazardous materials permits per year. Before a permit can be issued, a hazardous materials inspector inspects each site. The sheer volume of hazardous materials stored, used or dispensed within SLC warrants the SLC LEPC. Each permit holder is a member of the SLC LEPC, and although not all are able to attend the quarterly meetings, agendas, minutes and notifications are sent to all members through the LEPC web and information sharing system.

The LEPC is central to sharing information regarding the “storage, use, and transportation of hazardous materials in the City.” The SLC LEPC and the SLCFD are recipients of federally mandated Tier II reports, governed by the EPA. The EPA has established threshold quantities of specific chemicals and requires Tier II reports be

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75 Ibid.
77 www.SLCLEPC.com
submitted to the State Emergency Response Commission or Emergency Response Commission of the Tribe; The Local Emergency Planning Committee; and the fire department with jurisdiction over the reporting facility. Upon receipt of the Tier II reports, the Special Operations Specialist for the SLCFD enters the information into date sharing software, (CAMEO) enabling immediate access by response crews.

This shared information also allows members of governmental entities and private sector businesses to develop responses to emergency situations and mitigate their effects, which is a mandate of the EPCRA. The DHS continues to promote the added value of private-public partnerships, most recently in the 2014 Quadrennial Review. Recognizing that prevention, mitigation and recovery will take a collective effort, these partnerships should not be underestimated. Private sector representation in the co-chair positions of the SLC LEPC allows industry leaders and administrators in the fire department to work together to identify issues needing attention and design meetings that are fruitful, interesting and relevant.

\((c)\) \hspace{1em} Training

Salt Lake Valley is a conglomerate of 16 incorporated cities and 6 townships. Recognizing the need for integrated training, ten of the municipal fire departments joined forces to create the Salt Lake Valley Training Alliance in 2010. The key function of

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82 As the Chair of the SLCLEPC, the author has witnessed first hand improved relationships and shared information as the SLCLEPC develops. Partnering with leadership from the University of Utah and Tesoro has provided a mechanism to share ideas, concerns and strategies in emergency response, mitigation and recovery.


SLVTA is to create and implement training exercises that develop relationships, familiarity and continuity in service delivery, standard operating procedures and standard operating guidelines. The value of these relationships was demonstrated in a large 37-hour hazardous materials incident starting on June 30, 2013. Members of the SLCFD worked with agencies with whom they had drilled as recently as 10 days prior to the event, such as Murray City Fire Department, Unified Fire Authority and the 85th Civil Support Team.\footnote{Pat Reavy, \textit{Quarter-mile Radius Evacuated due to Chemical Leak}, June 30, 2013, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865582449/Quarter-mile-radius-evacuated-due-to-chemical-leak.html?pg=all (accessed July 15, 2014).}

\section*{B. \textbf{CASE STUDY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLCFD’S SECURITY INVOLVEMENT}}

\subsection*{1. SLCFD’s Role in the 2002 Olympics Preparation}

In June of 1995 Salt Lake City won the bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics. Planning for a secure Olympics began immediately.\footnote{Dale Watson, “Testimony,” \textit{FBI.Gov}, May 31, 2001, http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-2002-olympics-cooperation-between-federal-state-local-and-private-agencies-to-address-public-safety-concerns (accessed May 19, 2014).} Protecting more than 3,500 participants representing 80 nations and millions of anticipated spectators and visitors took a coordinated effort.\footnote{Ibid.} The venues, ten competitive and six noncompetitive, were geographically spread out between three different counties, adding to the challenge. A worldwide audience in excess of 3.5 billion television viewers and 9,000 media representatives broadcasting the events assured this was a world-class event. Collaboration was going to be necessary on every level of national, state and local security and emergency response.\footnote{Ibid.} To facilitate the security effort, the fusion center concept was introduced during the preparation for the 2002 Olympics.

The SLCFD was integral to the original operational plan. According to the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC) After Action Report (AAR). The UOPSC enabling legislation authorized two fire and EMS representatives to sit on the Command.
The Utah State Fire Chiefs Association appointed the representatives. They served the interests of “Fire & EMS 2002” (FEMS 2002), a committee formed to coordinate the disciplines’ Olympics planning.

Dan Andrus, the fire marshal for SLCFD at the time, also credits fire officials for pushing for greater involvement of the fire service in the safety and security effort. He stated,

Inclusion of fire service personnel in planning for venue security was instrumental in building working relationships. Credit is also due to those fire officials who recognized the significant public safety implication of hosting the Olympic Games and who were early and vocal advocates for joint planning.89

Solely responsible for the Fire & EMS Operations Branch of the UOPSC, SLCFD was a key component in the Olympics security effort from the beginning.90 The SLCFD participated in regular briefings, both before and during the Olympics and was integral to the Olympic Intelligence Center (OIC). Fire Investigator Cristal Vandongen, who represented the SLCFD in the OIC, described the fire department’s involvement as,

the collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of relevant, accurate and timely intelligence to meet the strategic and tactical intelligence requirements of the UOPSC, the Joint Operations Center (JOC), and the Olympic Joint Terrorism Task Force (OJTTF).91

Vandongen also functioned as a Team Leader in the Criminal Intelligence Collection and Dissemination Unit, further demonstrating the depth of the fire department’s involvement in the security effort.92

SLCFD was actively engaged in Terrorist Awareness Training, Disentanglement and Protest Deterrence Training, which consisted of didactic and tactical training programs and had built several working relationships with key security agencies such as

90 David Schwendiman, “2002 Winter Olympic Games, Utah Olympic Public Safety Command,” Olympic Intelligence Center Operational Plan (Salt Lake City, UT: David Schwediman, February 8, 2002).
91 Cristal Vandongen, interview by Martha Ellis, Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire and EMS Branch of UOPSC/Team Leader, Criminal Intelligence Collection and Dissemination Unit (August 24 2014).
92 Ibid.
the FBI, ATF and the CIA. Every member of the department received an exposure protection bag that contained a level B protection suit, a respirator, duct tape, protective eyewear and rubber gloves. The Fire Department was put on alert for any suspicious activity and was given specific directions on how to manage witnessing and reporting any observed activities that were inconsistent with the conditions or surroundings. Salt Lake City Police and Fire Departments had drilled extensively on a number of active shooter, bomb threat and activism scenarios. At the time of the 2002 Olympics, Salt Lake City’s counterterrorist and intelligence management strategies and tactics were the model that other jurisdictions would aspire to in the wake of the September 11 attacks.93

2. Hosting the Games

Five months after the 9/11 attacks, Salt Lake City welcomed the world to compete, celebrate and socialize in the spirit of the Winter Olympic Games. By all accounts the games were a success – not only from the standpoint of spirited competition, pageantry and camaraderie, but also in security and protecting patrons. Special consideration was given to the effort in Salt Lake City due to the close proximity in time to the 9/11 attacks.94 “The Utah Model” as it became known, was recognized and recommended as a best practice for future events by national leaders even before the Games were over.95 On the heels of our nation’s most devastating attacks on home soil and political controversy over the planning and organization of the Olympics in Salt Lake, the security team, including the fire department, prepared to receive the world.

According to Chris Bellavita, the Executive Director of Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, stated that, “eighteen months before the 2002 Olympic Games Opening Ceremony, the security group had 150 people in it.”96 The successes come down to the people, the plan and the ability to execute it. Bellavita goes on to explain that

96 Ibid.
when the Olympics came to a close, the exodus was swift and thorough. He stated, “At its peak, Salt Lake’s Olympic security operations involved more than 11,000 public safety people. A few weeks after the Games were over, the security organization—like a circus leaving town—vanished.”

3. **SLCFD Post-2002 Diminished Involvement in Security Effort**

Although the Salt Lake City Police Department has continued to advance within the realm of intelligence management through its fusion center, the Fire Department involvement has all but vanished. Today, many employees who were key to the Olympic security effort have left the fire department to work for private sector emergency preparedness companies like Booz Allen or federal agencies like the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the ATF. Fire Inspector Vandongen is the sole Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO) working for the fire department. The ILO has a cursory role within the Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC) and the role has no formal recognition within the Department’s organizational chart.

The state continued to recognize the value of fire department participation in the intelligence community in Utah, especially for the contributions the fire department could make in protecting critical infrastructure. SLCFD was offered vehicle and office space in the SIAC in an effort to maintain a presence in the process. The SLCFD demonstrated a complete lack of interest in furthering the FD security effort by declining the offer.

The SLCFD does not have policies or procedures in place that govern the collection, use or dissemination of potentially sensitive information. This has proven to be problematic, where as recently as April 2014, law enforcement sensitive information was released to the press by one of the SLCFD combat crews. Controlling the

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97 Ibid.

98 As the supervisor of this individual within her organization the author’s insights are offered as a participant observer.

99 Cristal Vandongen, interview by Martha Ellis, *Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire and EMS Branch of UOPSC/Team Leader, Criminal Intelligence Collection and Dissemination Unit* (August 24, 2014).

information and messaging to avoid breaches of this nature will be critical if the SLCFD expects to receive additional information from the police department and fusion centers in the future.

4. DHS Calls for Better Communication While SLCFD Security Effort Wanes

In 2003, the federal government published guidelines that initiated the development of the fusion center network. The goal: to form a robust and fully integrated national network of intelligence collecting and analyzing centers, operating in cooperation with state and local entities. According to DHS, “The National Network allows the federal government, SLTT (state, local, tribal and territorial), and private sector partners to participate as full contributors to, and beneficiaries of, the homeland security enterprise.”101 This effort was preemptive to the findings of the 9/11 Commission, which concluded that the biggest deterrent to information sharing and the likelihood of “connecting the dots” is the human or systemic tendency to avoid information sharing. As the rest of the country was ramping up their communication efforts, Salt Lake City Fire and the Utah fire service in general, began its gradual disengagement from terrorist awareness, intelligence management and law enforcement involvement as it pertains to Homeland Security. This is evident through the attrition of positions in the fire department previously filled in intelligence during 2002 as compared to today.102

Several factors contributed to the disengagement on the part of the SLCFD with the IC mission. When the Olympics were over, it wasn’t just the energy, funding and national attention that left the area. According to research completed by Lieutenant Christopher D. Bertram of the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office, “the major explanations


for the discontinuation of other Olympic collaborations were lack of motivation or need, lack of leadership, lack of strategic planning and no mandated system.”¹⁰³

Bertram’s work identified these collaboration construct deficiencies during his examination of the interagency efforts before and after the Olympics. Through his interview and analysis process he was able to identify the four main enablers to collaboration within the Salt Lake Valley during these time periods. They are motivation, leadership, trust and mandated systems. The research also investigated the undoing of well-developed interagency relationships when the Olympics came to a conclusion.

The vacuum effect of the closing of the Games would have challenged even the strongest leadership in maintaining established coalitions. After years of preparation the emotional letdown of successfully delivering a safe and secure Olympic Games, in conjunction with the vacating of federal resources, the welcome perspective of getting back to normal was pervasive.¹⁰⁴

Maintaining the Olympics security framework may not have been a realistic goal. As the majority of the federal resources left the area, so did many of the cornerstones of that framework. The rapid elimination of a focused outcome, funding and physical and human resources, in conjunction with the emotional letdown that came with the conclusion of the Games were strong forces to overcome.

The absence of vision and leadership within the SLCFD post-Olympics was demonstrated through diminished commitment of time and resources to intelligence community participation, in addition to letting valuable top secret security clearances held within the department lapse.¹⁰⁵


¹⁰⁴ Author is drawing on historical perspective since beginning employment with the SLCFD in 1995.

¹⁰⁵ Cristal Vandongen, interview by Martha Ellis, Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire and EMS Branch of UOPSC/Team Leader, Criminal Intelligence Collection and Dissemination Unit (2014 йыл August 24).
5. **Getting Back into the Security Circle of Trust.**

Twelve years later, given the national security concerns, the question is, what will it take to reinvigorate the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s participation in the national, state and local security effort?

By nature of the core responsibilities the Fire Department has to the community, several key foundational elements are in place within the SLCFD. There is growing national support for greater fire department involvement in the national security effort. DHS, DOJ and IAFC are just a few examples of how this movement is being supported at a federal level.\(^{106,107}\) The work being done by FDNY and the Orange County Sheriff’s Office are examples of the vigorous efforts taking place at the local level, which will be explored further in this research.\(^{108,109}\) It is equally important to note that support is not universal. Addressing the concerns of those who are not in agreement with including the fire service in national security efforts will drive the extent and nature of the effort.

This research will identify the stakeholders within the Fire intelligence mission model, assess the potential concerns and desires of those stakeholders and develop a plan for building trust and common purpose in the program.


\(^{109}\) Captain Nick Colonelli, interview by Martha Ellis, *TLO Coordinator, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center* (July 15, 2014).
III. IDENTIFYING THE RELATIONSHIPS, TRUST AND COLLABORATION LINCHPINS

A. THE SLCFD/SECURITY NETWORK

The relationships necessary for the SLCFD’s effort to integrate into the IC are diverse. They reach across professional and political boundaries, and all stakeholders need to understand how the program can positively affect their area of influence in order for the IC to succeed. As the fire department develops an intelligence program and fire department members broaden the scope of their understanding and role in the IC, all departments, agencies and individuals within the critical network will need a clear understanding of their roles within the program. It will be equally critical to program developers to understand the rules governing how the rulers rule within each node. According to *The Dictator’s Handbook*, how politicians spend money says a great deal about their loyalties; however, capital expenditures may not always involve currency. Allocation of time, human resources and other tangible assets can also reflect a leader’s priorities. A leader leads by the driver of his or her interests. If the interest is to stay in power, the allocation of capital will satisfy the needs of the essential coalition. That coalition can be the voters, who would advocate funding into projects creating the greatest good for the greatest numbers, or a small coalition of highly influential essentials, resulting in big gains for smaller numbers. Leadership looking to develop a fire department intelligence program would benefit from knowing the motivations, priorities and desired outcomes of all parties required for achieving success. It is also important to identify to whom the leaders of each node in the network has to answer. This will have a bearing on their motivation. The challenges surrounding the development of a fire department intelligence program are anchored in the ability of the individuals within the necessary network to develop and maintain trust; trust in the individuals working within the program and trust that their interests will be met. Understanding that

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111 Ibid. 19.
“partnership[s] should only be used when the partnership produces more in value than can be achieved by working alone,” defining those benefits and demonstrating how the policy supports them will be paramount.112

B. KEY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE SLCFD SECURITY PROGRAM

Focusing on the Salt Lake City program, the pairing list and diagram below are representative of the components of the network that will need to work together to advance the SLCFD intelligence program.

Phases of Program Development and the Interdependent Relationships:

1. Program Development

Fire – City Administrators and Representatives: Mayor & City Council
Fire – Fire: Admin, ILO, Firefighters and Emergency Managers
Fire – Fusion: State Information Analysis Center (SIAC)
Fire – SLCPD: Salt Lake Information Center (SLIC)

2. Program Implementation

Fire – City Administrators and Representatives: Mayor & City Council
Fire – Fire: Admin, ILO, Firefighters and Emergency Managers
Fire – Fusion: State Information Analysis Center (SIAC)
Fire – SLCPD: Salt Lake Information Center (SLIC)

3. Program Sustainability

Fire – City Administrators and Representatives: Mayor & City Council
Fire – Fire: Admin, ILO, Firefighters and Emergency Managers
Fire – Fusion: State Information Analysis Center (SIAC)
Fire – SLCPD: Salt Lake Information Center (SLIC)
Fire – Citizens: Within the community, visitors and the ACLU

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Each of these stakeholders will have varying degrees of interest in the Fire intelligence program depending on what they can gain, what it could cost them and how participation satisfies the overall mission of their own agencies, departments or initiatives.

C. THE FIRE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK MODEL

The network model of these relationships is demonstrated in Figure 1. The relationships are illustrated with links and essential nodes. Overlaid on those links are the exchanges between the nodes. These are defined as communication, formal agreements or directives and laws. Each exchange represents an opportunity to enhance or weaken the relationship between the respective nodes. The balance and functionality of the network and consequent exchange of information is dependent on strengthening the links by developing and sustaining collaboration between each node.

Figure 1. Fire Intelligence Mission Network
The primary stakeholders are Fire, City Administrators, State Administrators, the SIAC, SLIC and the citizens the FD is sworn to serve. A separate dynamic exists within the fire department itself, depicted in Figure 2. The exchanges necessary within the SLCFD organization will also be critical to the success of the greater network. If there is a lack of unity on the part of the Fire Department, the stability of the entire effort could be jeopardized. Administrators and field personnel will need to be aware of the role they will each play in the program.

Figure 2.  Fire Specific Intelligence Mission Relationship Network

1. Relationships within Salt Lake City

Both of the public safety departments in SLC, Fire and Police, have similar drivers, or motivations. The chiefs of those organizations serve at the pleasure of the Mayor. How well the chiefs address the Mayor’s initiatives drives the allocation of
money. An example would be air quality and carbon footprint. The mayor of SLC is environmentally focused. If either department fails to recognize this priority in their strategic plan, the city administration will manage those departments through budget and service model adjustments, or resource allocation. Reducing the number of light fleet vehicles and converting remaining vehicles to fuel-efficient models, are examples of SLC administrative actions taken to bring both public safety departments in line with the city initiative.

Another consideration in program development is appeasing the city council, which is an extension and representation of the citizens of Salt Lake City on a more refined level than the mayor. The city council representatives serve to protect the interest of the citizens within their district and the city as a whole. Fiscal responsibility is the primary way this is demonstrated. Re-election hinges on decisions that add value to the greatest numbers voters.

The relationship between fire and the police presents its own unique challenges. Agency bias will play a role as the program develops. The key will be in maintaining a clear distinction in roles and responsibilities and not trying to morph firefighters into police officers. Clearly defining, understanding and acting upon the respective roles each public safety official has within the joint security effort will be critical in managing mission creep. These steps will be developed in tandem with law enforcement, to assure that clear, appropriate parameters are set for SLCFD’s involvement.

The motivation of the public safety leadership is anchored in demonstrating value to the public and city leadership. Both the police chief and the fire chief are appointed positions, not elected. There is an intrinsic value to public safety, but as budgets become lean and other infrastructure and environmental needs arise within SLC, competition for funds becomes more fierce among city agencies, including police and fire. The delicate nature of building programs that closely knit the two departments together can be favorable if the efforts demonstrate synergy and add public value. A good example would be the active shooter program currently being developed. Having an orchestrated response and mitigation plan with police and fire produces a more efficient and effective
service model. SLCFD/PD Active Shooter classroom training, administered in July 2014, was designed to define roles, expectations and terminology. SLCFD and SLCPD officers taught the course in tandem. Concepts in tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) and rescue task force operations, developed by the Arlington Police and Fire Departments, are being introduced into the SLC response model. The mission, according to the Arlington County police and fire leadership, is to “get medical care to victims within minutes of being wounded,” in the active shooter environment. This includes providing immediate medical attention to wounded police officers, as well.

Specific training on utilizing the Incident Command system was also part of the classroom session, as leadership and command structure are integral to incident management. Classroom training was reinforced with a live drill involving both SLCFD and PD. The need for this training is not only demonstrated through Salt Lake City’s history with active shooter incidents. Just prior to an active shooter drill, scheduled to take place after-hours in a downtown mall in September of 2013, a man was arrested for making threats of violence, including plans to shoot guns and detonate a bomb, at that very mall. The drill was postponed.

2. Relationships with State of Utah Agencies

The final key relationship will be between the SLCFD and the SIAC. Predominately law enforcement driven, Fire has played a small but underutilized role within SIAC in the past. It is a state-run entity, under the Department of Public Safety (DPS). The governor of Utah appoints the commissioner of DPS. Although there isn’t a constituency component to the commissioner’s position, the Governor must consider valuable public safety policy if reelection is to be considered. He must also exercise fiscal responsibility and optimize his budget.


114 Ibid.

The impact of this program on the motivations within the agencies, departments and individuals it will touch, again, will vary. Within the scope of public safety, value can be added by building reliable lines of communication. The 9/11 Commission Report made it clear that our failure to “connect the dots” through effective interagency information sharing played a significant role in the successful execution of those attacks.\textsuperscript{116} Sharing information without the development of the relationships early in the process creates vulnerability; however, the belief that one agency is more competent than another drives information hoarding and hampers the imagination of the collective group.

3. **Essential, Interchangeable and Influential Network Nodes and Links**

Value can be assessed within the network by identifying the essential, interchangeable and the influential nodes and links. The essential nodes and links are those that the network cannot function without or their absence would have significant negative impact. They are essential to the mission of the network. Interchangeable nodes are those that can be swapped out or interchanged with other nodes. Typically this would represent a duplication of duties that one node could perform independent of one it is replacing. The influential nodes are those that carry power or influence in the wellbeing of the network or the advancement of the mission.\textsuperscript{117} Measuring the importance of each node in this network is accomplished by identifying the interchangeable, essential and influential aspects they have within the system. Doing so reflects a measure of each node’s political and fiscal clout. Additionally, important is how they work into this system that is being developed from the standpoint of collaboration and trust. Identifying the essential, interchangeable and influential components directs efforts to the optimum use of the network itself.\textsuperscript{118}


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. 5.
a. Essential and Interchangeable

All the nodes are essential because they fulfill different roles critical to the development and sustainability of the program. Interchanging the SLIC and the SIAC could be considered, however, sacrificing one for the other will jeopardize respective access. They both play similar roles within the network, however the SIAC has a greater state and federal involvement and consequent access. Although the SIAC is a state-run office, the Department of Homeland Security does have a representative working with the SIAC team. Substituting this agency with the SLIC would also minimize our ability to strengthen the relationships with the state DPS and subsequently the office of Emergency Management (EM).

Fusion centers were developed and situated within states and major urban areas throughout the country “to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of national intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their communities.”\textsuperscript{119} Having the SIAC within 10 miles of city boundaries, the focus for Salt Lake City will be more consistent with the Orange County Sherriff’s Department in California. This model will rely on existing law enforcement-centric resources, building in fire-related elements as the program evolves. According to the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center’s web page, “The purpose of this program is to ensure that fire department first responders throughout the urban area maintain a real-time awareness of terrorist trends, tactics, and procedures.”\textsuperscript{120}

Focusing on the SIAC and not the SLIC could also be done, but not without its shortcomings. The SLIC is in the Salt Lake City Public Safety Building (PSB). This building was built specifically to house Police, Fire and the 911 Center. The design of the building was aimed to reflect greater openness and communication—communication between the public safety officers and the public, as well as openness and communication between Fire and Police. Not working with the SLIC could have a negative impact on the

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120} Orange County Sheriff’s Department, \textit{Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center}, 2013, http://oesd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iac (accessed June 25, 2013).
relationship between Police and Fire. Opportunities to share information relevant to local efforts could be missed; information that could be useful in a joint response from both public safety agencies should be shared.

The administrative nodes are going to play a joint role in any of the proposed delivery models. Interchanging administrative nodes from the fiscal perspective may be a possibility as funding options for the program structure could arguably be placed within either administrative budget. A complete replacement of one node for another however, is not feasible. Both nodes would need to remain from an administrative, regulatory perspective.

The feasibility of interchanging any other nodes within this network would disrupt the balance needed between finance, information and trust. The nodes are intertwined to provide stability to the program design and removing one could jeopardize the stability of the entire network.

b. Influential

The influential components in this network are also in all tiers of the effort. Leadership will play a key role in the development and success of the program. Without the support from leadership in DPS, SIAC, SLIC, city and state administration and the SLCFD, the program will struggle if not fail. The support of the operations personnel will be equally as critical. They will need to see value in the program not just for themselves, but for the citizens, in order to garner buy-in.

Because the participation of the firefighters in training, sharing information and receiving and acting upon intelligence is the lynchpin to the program success, developing trust in the program among combat personnel will be crucial. Therefore, those promoting the program will need to be effective at influencing all parties in seeing the value of the program and more importantly, the criticality of their role and participation.

The citizens and civil liberty watchdog groups such as the ACLU are also influential. Citizens’ rights and the laws protecting them will need to be considered early and often as the program develops and strives for sustainability. The program must
demonstrate added value to the public in order to satisfy the drivers of all of the nodes, while adhering to all civil liberty laws and regulations. Paul Gordon describes “value-based ethics” as, “behaviors that serve the public good and maximize the values of life, health, and freedom, values that can be seen as being reflected in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution.” Components of Gordon’s ethics map will be considered in the development of the SLCFD model.

4. Value Added in the Network

The development of this program could be a win for all parties involved as long as full participation is fostered. The public safety entities, SLCFD, SLCPD, SLIC, and SIAC will experience greater access and exchange of information. This program also includes joint training, both didactic and tactile, taking this network development to a higher level by improving the mutual understanding of respective roles and response capabilities within the city.

Political gains may be subtle since protecting the public through prevention often goes unnoticed. However, developing more seamless responses to incidents such as active shooters, weapons of mass destruction or even natural disasters will result in added public value and demonstrate a worthwhile use of tax revenue.

The process of developing the SLCFD intelligence program will need to be thoughtful, methodical and inclusive. For the program to flourish, all agencies, administrators, and personnel will have to believe it adds value to their work, initiatives, and interests. Sharon Caudle states, “In simple terms, a partnership should only be used when the partnership produces more in value than can be achieved by working alone.”

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Assessing the value added within the partnerships will be a continuum and part of the ongoing evaluation process. The network and the threats and vulnerabilities it is designed to mitigate will be dynamic. Necessary adjustments to the components and the functions within the network will be driven by the desired outcomes. The value of the network and the overall effort will only be maintained if the network remains agile to changing needs. According to Caudle, “Managers of an enduring partnership will develop a process for evaluating benefits and periodically renegotiate the compact between partners.”

How those changes are managed can also have an impact on the value of the network. As Heifetz and Lindsky point out, managing the changes people are asked to embrace can oftentimes be more crucial to the success of the mission than the mechanics of the mission itself. As adjustments are made or players within the network change, it will be crucial to manage those changes openly with ample feedback and input from the stakeholders.

5. Potential for Negative Impacts within the Network

Any given location within the network can present an opportunity for failure. As stated early, no interchangeable nodes appear in the Fire intelligence mission network. By using the network models, the critical components of the nodes and links can be identified. The role trust plays in developing the resiliency of each relationship can be evaluated individually or on a network level. Figure 3 illustrates the potential negative impacts of breached trust within the various areas of the network. This illustration also demonstrates the impact on the network and consequently the program, if there are failures within any component of the network.

The negative consequences of the collaborative efforts failing are tightly intertwined. When any one of these impacts arise, the likelihood of others following is high. The lack of participation and a willingness to share information due to trust issues

124 Ibid. 5.
has been demonstrated in the past. Trust was compromised when fire department personnel shared sensitive information they had received from the SIAC. According to Major Jeff Carr, Utah State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, that incident in particular had a significant impact on the SIAC’s desire to work with the fire department.\textsuperscript{126}

Another example is within the SLCFD. After the 2002 Olympics, when leadership did not trust in the idea of continuing on with its security involvement, tangible withdrawal from the existing network was witnessed. Denied requests for time to participate in ongoing Joint Terrorism Task Force meetings, and resources necessary to or participate in the partnership offers from the State of Utah, are demonstrative of the negative impact of not having buy-in from all of the necessary stakeholders.

Figure 3. Fire Intelligence Mission Negative Feedback Loop

\textsuperscript{126} Major Jeff Carr, interview by Martha Ellis, \textit{State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor} (9-July, 2013).
These network models allow program developers to assess the stakeholders from a recognition and evaluation perspective. The diagrams presented in this chapter provide a road map for targeted and global consideration toward trust and the viability of the proposed program. This provides a solid platform for analysis in the application of concepts and models developed for organizational trust.

In the next chapter the constructs of collaboration will be assessed as they relate to the Fire intelligence mission model. Refining the constructs to the single element of trust will be the final phase before developing recommendations. The role trust plays within all aspects of the network models provided will be the cornerstone of those recommendations.

6. **Network Power Wheel, The Fire-Centric Model**

The Power Wheel concept comes from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Executive Leadership program. The general premise is to map out the necessary coalition for a specific program’s development, implementation and sustainment, using a centralized node as an anchor point. This model allows targeted attention to each individual stakeholder within the network. By isolating each node, specific concerns or interests can be addressed in the development, implementation and sustainment plan while maintaining consideration for the network as a whole.

Figure 4 demonstrates the fire-centric perspective, as the main drive for the program will come from within the Fire Department. Examples like the FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness derived the components of Figure 3. Chief Joseph Pfeifer describes how and why the FDNY intelligence network developed into its current structure:

> Through research, analysis and exercise design, the Center brings together Fire Service, EMS, Law Enforcement, City, State and Federal agencies, Fusion Centers, building managers, utility companies, National Guard and active military together to jointly develop protocols for challenging Homeland Security and disaster management incidents.\(^{127}\)

The Salt Lake City network model captures the key components directly and indirectly, as several of the specific elements Chief Pfeifer identifies are participants in the SLC LEPC.

![Fire Centric Power Wheel](image)

**Figure 4. Fire-Centric Fire Intelligence Mission Power Wheel Network**

### D. MODELING SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS

Agency bias will be one of the more challenging hurdles to overcome as this program is developed. Identifying a methodology, developing trustworthy relationships and supporting that framework with consistent procedures and policy have demonstrated effectiveness in other agencies’ programs. FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP), founded by Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer, and the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC), run by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office
(OCSO), are two examples of successful models in fire intelligence involvement.\textsuperscript{128}\textsuperscript{129}

What’s compelling about these two intelligence programs is that one lies in the law enforcement branch of public safety, (OCSO) and the other in Fire (CTDP). Leveraging these and other known successes to demonstrate value to all parties involved will be key in building trust and ownership in the program. As described earlier, the leadership within public safety has to meet the expectations of the elected officials. Their survival is based on sound policy and adding value to the overall effort of protecting the citizens.

\textsuperscript{128} Orange County Sheriff’s Department, \textit{Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center}, 2013, http://ocsd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iae (accessed 2013 йыл 25-June).

IV. COLLABORATION AND THE CONSTRUCT AND IMPACT OF TRUST

“Technique and technology are important, but adding trust is the issue of the decade.”

–Tom Peters, business author\textsuperscript{130}

Trust is the main focus of this section; it will identify trust as a key element in the past security efforts within SLC, define the construct of successful collaboration, identify the elements (or components) that constitute trust, and demonstrate how they come together to create the phenomenon (often experienced as a feeling) of trust.

A. HOW TRUST FACTORS INTO THE EQUATION

If the overall goal is to reestablish a role for the SLCFD in the homeland security effort, the logical place to start is to evaluate the factors that led to the diminished involvement after the 2002 Olympics. In 2008, Christopher Bertram’s research aimed to answer the question, “What are the factors that explain why some of the successful collaborations used during the 2002 Winter Olympics endured and some did not after the end of the Olympics?”\textsuperscript{131} Bertram’s work identifies key factors that explained weakening of collaborations that were established during the Olympics. Hocevar, Thomas and Jansen identify the success factors and sub-factors that impact collaboration, illustrated in Figure 5.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Stephen R Covey, \textit{The Speed of Trust, The One Thing That Changes Everything} (New York: Free Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{131} Christopher Bertram, \textit{Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following the 2002 Winter Olympics}, Thesis (Monterey: CHDS, 2008).

Figure 5. Success Factors for Collaboration Identified by Hocevar et al.\textsuperscript{133}

When comparing Hocevar et al.’s findings to Bertram’s, similarities can be found. Bertram’s research involved surveying twenty-two public safety leaders integral to the successful security efforts during the Olympics. Of these twenty-two public officials, fourteen were with local law enforcement agencies, five were with state and three were with federal agencies.\textsuperscript{134} The findings are illustrated in Figure 6.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Christopher Bertram, \textit{Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following the 2002 Winter Olympics}, Thesis (Monterey: CHDS, 2008). 23
Parallels between Bertram’s work and Hocevar et al. are sound drivers for establishing a framework in the rebuilding of the Fire intelligence effort and the necessary relationships. Having the nexus established between national and local enablers for collaboration, can the component of trust be established as the pervasive element that drives the constructs identified by Bertram?

B. THE CONSTRUCTS OF TRUST

This section will analyze trust from a large-scale, organizational level, as well as evaluate the subtlety of how individuals interact with each other, to either create or dismantle trust.

1. Defining Trust

Defining trust can be challenging due to its subjective nature, but most know it when they feel it. Oftentimes, it is defined by using synonyms in order to build the nexus

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135 Ibid.
between trust and a more finite definition; however, some argue that technique obfuscates the true nature of trust.\textsuperscript{136} Kee and Knox refer to trust in opposition to suspicion. They state, “Trust and suspicion appear to underlie many social interactions. Thus, it is not surprising that they occupy an important role in various efforts to account for the stability or instability of a wide variety of human relationships.”\textsuperscript{137} Viewing trust as a reflection of predictability, it can foster or undermine security and stability of relationships. Mayer, Davis and Schoorman point out, however, “The need for trust only arises in a risky situation.”\textsuperscript{138} Since risk can be subjective, it will be critical to recognize conditions within the program planning, implementation and sustainment phases that could be risky to the participants.

An early theorist, J.B. Rotter, defined trust as “an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon,”\textsuperscript{139} However, Mayer et al. point out that Rotter’s definition “focuses on a generalized trust of others.”

Mayer proposes that trust is more the synergistic sum of its parts; as the variables change so does the overall sense of trusting. The constructs of Mayer et al’s organizational trust model include the trustor, the trustee, risk and context.\textsuperscript{140} The trustor, being the one presumably doing the trusting; the trustee, being the one needing to be trusted; the risk is what’s at stake if things don’t go how the trustor envisions; and the context includes the variables or circumstances surrounding the situation. Variations between them will have an effect on the overall trust the trustor has in the trustee and the choices they’ll make.\textsuperscript{141}


\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
Mayer et al. looked further into the characteristics of the trustee, or that group or individual seeking or needing to be trusted in a given relationship, i.e. to be trustworthy. The three key components of trustworthiness are identified as ability, benevolence and integrity.142 (Figure 7) Demonstrating the ability to perform a task, the benevolence to care about the good of the task and the integrity to complete the task as promised are positive influencers of trust.

Figure 7. Mayer et al. Dyadic Organizational Trust Model.143

Mayer et al. define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.”144 This is consistent with Sharon Caudle’s assessment of cooperation. Caudle

142 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
identifies a study that demonstrates how successful collaborations occur when all parties recognize the vulnerability and interdependence necessary for the partnership to function. Additionally, these partnerships will succeed when clear roles, responsibilities and procedures are established. This also supports the idea that mission creep needs to be avoided with clear policies, procedures and memorandums of understanding (MOUs).

2. **The Trustee, Benevolence and Trade**

Trust can be fleeting depending on disruptive triggers. As the fire intelligence program is developed, the focus will be on the attributes the trustee contributes to developing trust. The goal will be to minimize vulnerability of all parties by fostering a high level of trust. Moyer states, “To overcome the anxiety created by putting ourselves in a vulnerable position, we cognitively, and affectively, evaluate the trustee on having certain qualities.” She goes on to cite the characteristics of trustworthiness as measured in previous research as, “benevolence, competence, honesty, integrity, reliability, predictability, good judgment, concern and openness.”

The role of benevolence in an individual and organization’s ability to build trust may be difficult to measure, but it could carry significant weight in the final outcome. Philosopher David Kelley’s defines benevolence as, “A commitment to achieving the values derivable from life with other people in society, by treating them as potential trading partners, recognizing their humanity, independence, and individuality, and the harmony between their interests and ours.”

The concept of trade extends past the boundaries of material goods. Non-material values can be traded, as well, demonstrated through friendships, exchange of knowledge, love and mutual protection. According to Ayn Rand, philosopher and novelist, “Love,

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148 Ibid.
friendship, respect, admiration, are the emotional response of one man to the virtues of
another, the spiritual payment given in exchange for the personal, selfish pleasure which
one man derives from the virtues of another man’s character.”149 The Trader Principle is
predicated on “attaining value from other people through mutually beneficial trade rather
than force, fraud, or parasitism.”150

This is consistent with Caudle’s assertion that highly functional partnerships are
driven by mutual benefit.151 People are willing to enter into a trade agreement based on
value added and the social capital carried by the other parties. In the case of the Fire
intelligence program, demonstrating those attributes will equate to the willingness to
genuinely participate and contribute value to the success of the effort.

3. Focusing on the How over the What

In the book, From Good to Great, Jim Collins wrote a chapter called, First Who…Then What.152 The significant finding of his research on the core of successful
companies revealed what distinguishes successful organizations. He states, “The
executives who ignited the transformations from good to great did not first figure out
where to drive the bus and then get people to take it there. No, they first got the right
people on the bus (and the wrong people off the bus) and then figured out where to drive
it.”153

Placing the focus on the players above the finite mission demonstrates
tremendous faith in all three constructs of trustworthiness within those individuals or
organizations. Organizational trustworthiness is a function of the individuals within the
organization.

150 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
Finding effective ways to assess trustworthiness as a measure of benevolence can be challenging. The Arbinger Institute (Arbinger), founded by C. Terry Warner, professor emeritus of philosophy at Brigham Young University, has developed tangible methods for individuals or groups to assess their effectiveness by focusing on the core of trust, specifically the basis for influence.

Considering that the recognition of the humanity of others is central to Kelly’s definition of benevolence, how do we know when we are recognizing the humanity of those with whom we wish to enter into trade? Consistent with Collin’s findings, Arbinger makes a clear distinction between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of doing business. The ‘what’ is usually the mechanics of a behavior or the method of accomplishing a task; much like the mechanics of setting up the framework for a fire department intelligence program. Yet the ‘how’ is what creates the distinction between programs that flourish verses those that limp toward failure.154


The basis of the ‘how’ is seated in how we see other people and the impact that has on how we interact with them.155 The principle is rooted in the philosopher Martin Buber’s observation that in all relationships, we either see the people in our lives as a person, like us, or as an object, not like us.156 When people are seen as objects, it can be in one of three ways; they are an obstruction, a vehicle, or are an irrelevance to us.157 Regardless, the results are the same. They are treated differently than we would expect to be treated ourselves. When individuals sense disparity in a relationship, and their sense of value is compromised, their willingness to engage in fruitful dialogue diminishes. Once this happens, the ability to influence decreases, social capital diminishes, and the willingness to trade becomes less likely.


156 Ibid.

C. BUILDING THE TRUST NEXUS

Within the context of the relationships that have been identified as essential to the Fire intelligence mission model, what can be drawn from Bertram’s findings and the trustee factors from the organizational trust model? The first step is to recognize that all components of Bertram’s enablers to collaboration development and endurance are related to trust. The second step is to identify specific hurdles in the program development, implementation and sustainment phases and measure solutions with the constructs of the trust model. Focusing on social capital, felt need, strategic planning and mandated systems, the common thread of trust can be identified. These constructs can be analyzed individually while anticipating greater significance with the sum of the whole.

Burt concludes from his review of several interpretations, social capital is widely viewed as a metaphor “in which social structure is a kind of capital that can create for certain individuals or groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends. Better connected people enjoy higher returns.”158 Identifying trust as a component of social capital combined with the value added to pursuing ends afforded with social capital, it is clear that trust will impact this construct of developing collaborative efforts.

1. Felt Need

In the context of security in the Salt Lake area, felt need has faded since the Olympics ended. The influx of millions of visitors to the Salt Lake area disappeared within weeks of the closing ceremonies of the Olympics. Mike Stever, Emergency Management Director for Salt Lake City in 2004, describes the homeland security effort in Salt Lake as “similar in comparison to the preparation for the Olympics; however, you obviously can’t put a fence around it.”159 Not being able to contain or define a threat in Utah as succinctly as during the Olympics presents a challenge to those wishing to advance prevention and preparation efforts. Scott Behunin, CHSD graduate, describes the Utah homeland security preparation effort in the post-Olympic environment: “It feels like

we’re preparing for the Olympics all over again, we just don’t know when they are coming.”160

Not having a clear-cut, definitive threat or vulnerability like the Olympics does pose a challenge to the felt need of the Fire intelligence program development. Creating the sense of relevance in developing an intelligence program within the SLCFD requires trust in the need. Salt Lake City has several unique Homeland Security challenges. Even with a cursory assessment, the greater Salt Lake area can be identified as a target-rich environment for domestic or international terrorist attacks. We have significant infrastructure target potential, hazardous materials storage and use facilities and a high profile, globally recognized religious organization’s headquarters within our response district.

Publications from the ALF have named Utah as a key target for mink farm attacks, as well.161 Utah is familiar with ALF activity as the group was responsible for the 1995 fire at Tandy Leather store in Salt Lake City.162 The area’s potential vulnerabilities measured against previous experience with extreme behavior within the community, supports the development of an intelligence program within the SLCFD.

Building a plausible case for developing the program is founded in the ability to present compelling evidence to support felt need. Bertram’s data showed that one-third of those interviewed reported “that trust cannot be developed in the middle of a crisis.”163 This point cannot be made too often.

2. Strategic Planning

When done collectively, strategic planning provides the opportunity for individual interests to be addressed within the scope of the larger project. Part of the

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160 Ibid.
strategic planning process is to make sure the “right people” are in the right positions. One state law enforcement leader quoted in Bertram’s work stated, “One of the biggest things about the strategic plan, without the players in the same room it just would have been a free-for-all.”\textsuperscript{164} This comment ties back to social capital. The working group has to have faith in the leadership and other participants in the program in order to trust the process. If the “players” are not part of strategic planning, the sense is that key decisions cannot be made and time would be wasted. These individuals had to be agencies leaders or trusted representatives for the given agencies involved in the effort. Those interviewed described how they selected their representatives. They focused on people with the ability to develop relationships and “build social capital and trust with their colleagues.”\textsuperscript{165}

*Strategic planning* builds trust in the system as a whole by bringing the right people together in the spirit of charting the course. It provides the fluidity that fosters perspective, innovation, and failure recognition and correction. Those involved can intervene early, avoiding commitment to poor decisions. Because *strategic planning* is a continuum, the process in itself allows for continual input and keeps the leadership group dynamic and adaptable.

3. **Mandated Systems**

*Mandated systems* demonstrate a commitment on the part of the administrators. Creating a mandate through administrative policy, procedures, ordinances or statutes creates a foundation of reliability. Without the support of all relevant administrators, programs can be stifled without financial support, human resources and other resources necessary for success. The integrity of the program is elevated with administrative support. Codifying the Fire intelligence program lends credibility to the effort and an anchor point to return to if efforts get off track. Bertram quotes one of his interviewees as saying, “I think at some point, of course, the system becomes more important than the relationships. We have to fall back to the system that we had in place when relationships

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. p 34  
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid. p 36
failed.”166 In worst-case scenarios, when relationships became inhibitors to the mission, 
the network could still rely on the mandated structure and trust the sustainability of the 
system.

All of the components of Bertram’s analysis are human-driven elements of the 
Olympics security system. As long as people are involved, necessary or impacted, trust 
will be a key factor. Bellavita describes trust as, “the glue that holds special events 
coalitions together.”167 Trust will be at the heart of the Fire intelligence program 
development, implementation and sustainment recommendations, forthcoming.

D. DRIVERS OF TRUST APPLIED TO POTENTIAL PROGRAM HURDLES

The previous analysis linked trust to all of the enabling or facilitating factors of 
development and endurance of collaboration, identified by Bertram. Focusing solely on 
trust as the predominant driver of collaboration, what is the applicability of ability, 
benevolence and integrity within the Fire intelligence mission network and the individual 
components? Can focusing on trust provide solutions to some of the anticipated hurdles 
to success of the Fire intelligence program?

When implementing a new program, obstacles must be anticipated. Three 
potential hurdles that will be analyzed against the trust model are financial constraints, 
concerns regarding public perception and civil liberties, and agency pushback and bias. 
Those marketing the program will need to leverage the components of the organizational 
trust model to garner support and counter the opposition to the proposed program. 
Remaining agile and willing to adapt as other unforeseen obstacles arise will also be 
critical to the success of the program development and sustainability.

166 Christopher Bertram, Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following 

August, 2014).
1. **Financial Constraints**

Financial hurdles will be central to the City and State administrative bodies. Funding a new program or an effort to make an existing program more robust will need sound justification and the ability to demonstrate increased value on a number of fronts. Available funds will also be a factor. Competition for whatever funding is available will be fierce. The onus will be on the program developer to build trust in the program by reducing the vulnerability of the trustor, or the administrative bodies, in this case.

In chapter 3, the administrative drivers were identified as fiscal responsibility and added public value in policy development. Reducing vulnerability to the administrative bodies will come with demonstrating added public value relative to the cost. The higher the value-cost ratio, the more appealing the program will be. Providing implementation options will increase the probability of success. Implementation models will include variations in the program design that will present different funding options. Components of the existing program can be leveraged as assets such as the SIAC and the SLIC. The strategy will be to compel administrators to further develop those components as opposed to presenting the Fire intelligence component as a stand-alone.

Examples of how similar models have added public value within their community will be helpful. The benefits have been realized in examples such as the thwarting of the Times Square car bombing, where alert, well-trained firefighters recognized the signs of a potential car bomb prior to it causing mass destruction. Intelligence provided to the fire department allows staff to focus resource and training on a particular area bolstering their ready state in an increase threat or hazard environment.

The exact configuration of the relationship the SLCFD will have with the fusion centers will depend on which models, if any, are most appealing to the funding bodies. For example, fire service personnel can serve as:

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• Fusion/Terrorism/Intelligence Liaison Officers (FLOs/TLOs/ILOs) to provide information directly to the fusion center and to facilitate vital information sharing between fire departments and fusion centers.

• Ad hoc fire, emergency medical service, rescue, hazardous materials, fire investigation, responder safety, and/or building/construction code SME to provide analytical support to fusion centers.

• Intelligence analysts embedded within fusion centers to provide a consistent emergency services analytical perspective to the fusion process.\(^{170}\)

Program developers must be prepared to support the viability and value of all proposed models. Citing the success within other municipalities, such as the Orange County Sheriff’s office or the FDNY’s preparedness center will provide reliable anchor points to the credibility of program development.

2. Public Perception

Building public trust will also be key. Failure to do so will not only impact the citizen node of the network, but could also lead to civil liberty violation lawsuits and decrease public trust in the administrative bodies. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, fusion centers “can employ officials from federal, state and local law enforcement and homeland security agencies, as well as other state and local government entities, the federal intelligence community, the military and even private companies, to spy on Americans in virtually complete secrecy.”\(^{171}\) Civil liberty concerns must be addressed in order to maintain the integrity of not only the fire department, but also the fusion network as a whole. Training in the sensitivity of the fire department’s involvement and access to information would be paramount. The potential legal pitfalls have been well vetted, as cited in Bryan Heirston’s paper, Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea? Heirston concludes,


legal and operational issues may be addressed by firefighters using standardized terrorist indicators while operating as sensors of opportunity during emergency and non-emergency operations, but fire personnel must not be specifically asked or assigned to gather information on suspected terrorists or terrorist activities.172

Along the same line, it is crucial to stress the importance of preventing abuse of privilege in the spirit of gathering intelligence. This can include purposely exceeding the scope of an inspection by looking specifically for evidence of possible terrorism activity, violating an individual’s civil liberties or taking sensitive information to the media when it is not appropriate.173

3. Agency Bias and Possible Resistance to Fire Service Security Program

Agency bias, as described by Chief Joseph Pfeifer, is when organizations “Create a positive in-group bias in favor of those who are part of the same group and a negative out-group bias against those who are part of an alternate group.”174 Because members of a given group identify more closely with others inside the group, the tendency is to share information within that closed system and withhold information from outsiders. The interests of the individuals within the group are typically driven by the similar interest of the organization. This closed circuitry of information sharing limits the imagination and fails to allow for other possibilities that would come from an outside perspective.175 As Thomas Schelling astutely pointed out, “One thing a person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his analysis, or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a list of things that would never occur to him.”176

172 Bryan Heirston, “Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?,” Homeland Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) VI, no. 2 (May 2010).
175 Ibid.
Agency bias can also present as a sense of superiority. As people’s confidence in their skills and that of their agency increase, it becomes easier to discredit an outside agency’s ability to perform within the same arena. The problem is exacerbated if the outside agency suffers a misstep. An example would be the mishandling of sensitive information at the hands of fire department personnel. Jeff Carr, State Deputy Director of Homeland Security, spoke to agency bias when sharing a story about sensitive documents that were leaked to the media by the Salt Lake County Fire Department. There could have been several explanations for the leak, but the reality is, those types of experiences create a history that complicates networking agencies together.

Counterterrorism efforts and intelligence gathering have traditionally been the role of law enforcement. As reported in the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, “a role in intelligence-gathering beyond identifying actual and potential hazards would represent an expansion of fire departments’ traditional mission.” Building trust in the program will be predicated on value added and assurances that we are not trying to turn firefighters into police officers and visa versa. Looking beyond firefighter competencies to the willingness of department members to participate will require value and assurances that are tangible. Firefighters and law enforcement personnel must see value in what they’re doing. Efforts to foster full buy-in will start by leveraging existing SLCFD/PD program development efforts, drawing on existing successes within the Fire intelligence model on a national level, and demonstrating value added to community, as well as to the individual firefighters and their peers.

It is critical that members from both agencies feel confident that the program is not trying to create a hybrid position of police and fire within the ranks. Sheriff Jim Winder stressed the importance of “identifying and maintaining the roles and responsibilities of each member within the model. The goal should not be to create the

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labradoodle of police and fire.”179 This can be accomplished by maintaining a clear distinction in responsibilities through policy and procedure development to solidify the distinction in roles. Identifying areas where responsibilities may dovetail will also be important.

As individuals are asked to change or accept responsibilities that are contrary to what they are accustomed to, recognition of that change acknowledges a perceived sacrifice. Heifetz and Linsky address this issue and state, “It’s not enough to point to a hopeful future. Make explicit your realization that the change you are asking them to make is difficult, and that what you are asking them to give up has real value.”180 Leadership will be critical to reassuring all sworn public safety personnel that the change in direction will be well thought out and thoughtfully implemented. Participants, from the highest level of administration to the line firefighter, should have a general understanding of the common vision and purpose of this program. Leadership, as the catalyst to change, must avoid becoming a lightening rod for conflict by continually making the vision tangible, valuable and attainable.181

Utilizing the SIAC will be key to the success of this effort. As explained by Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer of FDNY,

Network fusion is an information sharing system that fuses information and intelligence from multiple sources to allow decision makers to better adapt to a changing threat environment. It leverages technology to improve awareness and collaboration across different disciplines by connecting voice, video, and data communications at classified and unclassified levels.182

The true purpose of developing this plan is to show value in fully integrating the Utah fire service into a vast, national network of information sharing with the hope of mitigating potential hazards and increasing public safety for the citizens and the public

179 Jim Winder, interview by Martha Ellis, Sheriff, Salt Lake County (May 14, 2014).
181 Ibid. 120.
servant. Creating this strategy memo lays the foundation for securing the necessary funding to advance the effort.

Broadening the perception of involvement in a program of this nature can be looked at in the context of social capital. Burt states, “Society can be viewed as a market in which people exchange all variety of goods and ideas in pursuit of their interest.” As connections and ties improve or strengthen there is an increased probability of successful exchange. Being part of this system or network increases the value of the individual based on connectivity. Using information as a commodity, increasing the number of ties between individuals or groups will increase the chances of identifying new information. Diversifying the goods available for exchange can also increase the odds of sustainability and value. This concept is not new to the firefighters as viewed from the standpoint of “diversify or become extinct.” When the effectiveness of fire prevention efforts through enforcement of the building and fire code began to be realized, the need to diversify into emergency medical services became evident, and the fire service moved into a new realm of social capital. Today, 80% of the calls SLCFD respond to are for medical purposes.

The social capital metaphor also demonstrates the reciprocal nature of the intelligence network. The intent is not for information to move solely away from firefighters. Firefighters will fulfill the role of intelligence consumers, collaborators and contributors. Intelligence provided to the fire departments can allow them to focus resource and training on a particular area bolstering their ready state in an increased

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184 Ibid. 1,2.
186 Salt Lake City Fire Department, Salt Lake City Fire Department Annual Report 2012, Statistical (SLC: Salt Lake City Fire Department, 2012).
threat or hazard environment. The Times Square car bombing attempt is a good example of when firefighters mitigated a potential hazard before it could do further harm to the citizens and response crews.

Demonstrations of added value may be leveraged to alleviate the trepidation police and fire will initially feel toward the program. It may be equally as important to take advantage of previous and current collaboration success police and fire have experienced in the past. An example would be the active shooter protocol training and the fire department’s involvement with medic support for the SWAT team. Both of these programs have created productive ties between police and fire that could be further utilized to promote the intelligence program.

Collectively, the anticipated hurdles can be addressed by minimizing the vulnerability of the trustor. Tactics used by trustees to garner the trust and support needed to advance causes go back to the organizational trust model and Bertram’s findings. It will be critical to work from a place of integrity, with the focus on the greater good of the program. Systematically addressing concerns of the individual groups can only be accomplished if open and candid dialogue is allowed and encouraged. The need for greater fire department involvement in the national security effort is made clear regularly in current federal agency reports. Recent state level ILO training in Utah is also a good indicator that the environment is ready to accept a viable model for the development of a fire intelligence program.

In her NPS Masters Thesis, Terrorism Awareness and Education as a Prevention Strategy for First Responders, Alicia Welch cites Malcolm Nance, author of The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, as stating, “The single best method of defeating terrorism is educating our first responders, law enforcement personnel, military and


191 First annual Utah State sponsored ILO training. Park City, UT. May 14, 15, 2014
security professionals (as well as the public) how to recognize the roles and motivations of individual terrorists, their cell systems, and the street-level mechanics of terrorist operations.” Why? Because the more eyes you have trained to the awareness level, the better the odds of catching something pre-catastrophe. This concept has been embraced with the Department of Homeland Security’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign.

E. CONCLUSION

Weighing Bertram’s findings against the Organizational Trust Model developed by Mayer et al. identified trust as a key element to developing, implementing and sustaining the Fire intelligence program in Salt Lake City. Mayer et al. provide a clear framework for organizational trust that can help program developers recognize their role as the trustee within the model. The influence the trustee has on trust between participants can foster or destroy essential relationships necessary for the Fire intelligence program’s success. By utilizing models that exemplify the constructs of the trustee’s impact on trust, steps can be taken to develop the sense of integrity and ability in the program and its leadership, thereby minimizing perceived vulnerability on the part of the participants.

Participants must also understand the role they each play in developing the program and the relationships. Successful relationships are central to successful collaboration, and each participant is accountable. Personal responsibility for how we view others and how that impacts the effectiveness of our own efforts must remain in the forefront of program management.

Mayer et al’s organization model operates like a dynamic system. When a trustee is seeking to be trusted, all components must be considered. There will be times when significant effort will be needed to foster the trust of the trustor, depending on how vulnerable the trustor feels in the given circumstances.


V. LEVERAGING THE SUCCESS OF OTHER MODELS

Analyzing existing programs that have attained sustainment could be helpful in garnering support during the development, implementation and sustainment phases. There are several fire departments in the U.S. that are successfully participating in municipal or state fusion efforts, in addition to fire department involvement in the British program CONTEST. Two successful models in the U.S. were developed by the FDNY and the Orange County Sheriff’s office in California. The organizational structures differ between the two. FDNY is more fire-centric, being driven by fire department members, while Orange County is more law enforcement-centric, with the sheriff’s office inviting fire into the operation. Both are good working models to draw from regardless of the driving forces behind program development.

A. FDNY FIRE-CENTRIC MODEL

Convinced that the fire service could play an integral role in improving how first responders utilize and share information with other agencies, Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer of FDNY founded the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP). Recognizing the need for fire department collaboration with other agencies, Chief Pfeifer has led the country’s emergency response community to a service model paradigm shift. The CTDP efforts focus on research, training, relationships, and the weekly intelligence newsletter, Watchline, all of which have been acknowledged as adding value within the national security effort. According to Chief Pfeifer, “FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness engages public and private sector organizations in preparedness efforts by forming networks for information sharing, setting conditions for collaboration and partnering with others for coordination.”

195 Ibid.
197 Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, FDNY (August 27, 2014).
One of the primary areas of research has been on the use of fire as a weapon and the related tactics necessary to prevent and mitigate the subsequent emergency. FDNY has been the leader in this research and has driven the paradigm shift for first responders to rethink how they respond to fires. The term Mumbai-style attack describes the multi-front attacks executed in Mumbai. Using fire as distracter, enhancer or a mechanism to cover a crime is not new. When considering fire’s use within the context of terrorism, however, a layer of complexity is added to what are already considered large-scale events. Attention must be given to the chance a fire was intentionally set and related to another attack method, focusing to developing strategies and tactics to combat the potential hazards.  

The training that accompanies the research adds immediate and relevant value to the responding firefighters.

Heightening the awareness of the response crews to trends or intelligence on specific threats allows focused training, appropriate resource allocation, targeted safety protocols and standard operating procedures that play a role in risk management. The most well publicized example was the response and actions taken by FDNY and NYPD to the Times Square car-bombing attempt. Both teams were aware of the warning signs present at the scene, worked together to protect the proximal population and mitigated the hazard with nominal negative impact to the community because of specific training they had received on responding to car bombs.  

Leadership also plays a role in successfully mitigating hazards or large-scale incidents. Chief Pfeifer describes crisis leadership as “the art of generating trust so others can adapt to extreme events.”

Developing the relationships and response plans to successfully mitigate threats or disasters, is central to the Fire intelligence mission model. Chief Pfeifer and his CTPD team have developed relationships within the New York City municipal services, and reached beyond the boundaries of the City to state and federal agencies. Both are necessary to assure a coordinated response to potential Mumbai-style attacks.

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199 Ibid.

Pfeifer stated, “Building a sustainable platform for collaboration requires a level of trust among agencies.”\textsuperscript{201} He has accomplished this through inclusion, research, analysis and exercise design that adds value to those participating.\textsuperscript{202} An example was a partnership formed with the FBI’s NYC SWAT team. The goal was to develop a response plan specific to the multi-front attack. Dialogue led to tabletop exercises, which developed into full-scale exercises. In June 2012, the Interagency Tactical Response Model was released as a result of that collaborative effort.

CTPD also sends officers to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for one-year assignments. This is mutually beneficial as the officers receive current intelligence that can be shared with the CTPD and the NCTC gains perspective on information that can be analyzed from the fire point of view. These are a few examples of the value-driven partnerships that have strengthened the impact and influence of the FDNY counterterrorism effort.

Chief Pfeifer has also been pivotal in solidifying the relationship the FDNY has with the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), a DHS-sponsored graduate and executive leadership education center. In February of 2014, the CHDS published a report showcasing the relationship between the center and the FDNY. Referencing the FDNY intelligence newsletter, the report states,

\begin{quote}
In February 2008, [FDNY] issued first edition of FDNY Watchline, a weekly intelligence newsletter. Today, as the flagship intelligence product of the FDNY, it is sent via email and posted on several homeland portals, reaching an estimated 40,000 responders and homeland security partners representing more than 100 agencies.\textsuperscript{203}
\end{quote}

The publication addresses fire service-relevant information like the potential use of wildland fire as a terrorist tactic. The FDNY model has paved the way for more effective utilization of emergency responders in the arena of counterterrorism nationwide.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{201} Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, \textit{FDNY} (August 27, 2014).
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid
\end{flushright}
Chief Pfeifer’s focus on research, training, formal and informal relationships, and relevant and timely bulletins has led to the credibility of the CTPD.

Chief Pfeifer’s focus on trust and its importance to successful collaboration is clear when he spoke on developing trust between all participating agencies. From the beginning, fostering trust was a consideration, demonstrated by FDNY decision to “create a Center, instead of a Bureau for preparedness,” to demonstrate inclusiveness.204

B. ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF’S LAW ENFORCEMENT-CENTRIC MODEL

The Orange County Sheriff’s Office runs the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC). According to its web page, “The purpose of this program is to ensure that fire department first responders throughout the urban area maintain a real-time awareness of terrorist trends, tactics, and procedures.”205

Captain Nick Colonelli, Anaheim Fire & Rescue, OCIAC, is the coordinator for the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program. In trying to get the program started, he states, “Once it was explained to them [firefighters] the value of having them trained in observing suspicious behavior and the amount of work that went into the tips they submitted, the program gained speed.”206

This is a critical point. As the program develops and moves into implementation that the firefighters will need to feel the work they are doing is valuable and is serving a greater purpose. Seeing the information the Orange County firefighters gathered being well-managed and eventually converted into intelligence bulletins that benefitted the greater firefighting community added validity and momentum to the OCIAC program.

The momentum of the program is described further by Colonelli: “After a hundred or so firefighters had the training and were receiving Intelligence Bulletins and related products, word spread much faster and our growth has remained relatively

204 Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, FDNY (August 27, 2014).
206 Captain Nick Colonelli, interview by Martha Ellis, TLO Coordinator, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (July 16, 2013).
consistent, adding around 50 each quarter.”  

The leadership within this organization continues to develop social capital within the firefighter ranks. As the momentum grows, so does the credibility and confidence in the program.

Colonelli describes the current state of the program in a recent interview:

The continued training opportunities that we bring to the AOR [area of responsibility] are open to all first responders, and although the majority are Law Enforcement focused trainings, we allow our Fire Service TLOs to attend as well, which helps in building relationships across disciplines, and encourages Fire Service TLOs to maintain engagement with the Fusion Center. To date, since we stood up the fusion center in 2007, we have trained 832 Fire Service personnel as Terrorism Liaison Officers. Regarding bulletins, our center produces, on average, three products a month, which are distributed to our entire TLO network of over 3000 local first responders.

The OCIAC has developed a program that has demonstrated value to the community and the participating firefighters. The inertia demonstrated through the increased interest in the program is representative of the social capital program leadership it has earned and the collaboration endurance that follows. Leadership has been able to show added value through relevant information bulletins and training. This is a good example of a law enforcement-centric model that demonstrated key elements of development and sustainment of trust among the key stakeholders.

As the growth of the OCIAC’s social capital is demonstrated through increased interest and participation, the integrity, ability and commitment of the OCIAC leadership is validated. The synergy of increasing participation in conjunction with the increased quality of the intelligence product is also a model for a desired outcome.

C. GREAT BRITAIN’S CONTEST MODEL

CONTEST, the counterterrorism program in Great Britain, is another resource for program development that could demonstrate added value to the community and the IC network in the US. The UK’s national counterterrorism (CT) policy, CONTEST, is

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207 Ibid.

208 Captain Nick Colonelli, interview by Martha Ellis, *TLO Coordinator, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center* (July 15, 2014).
comprised of four key objectives: Prevent; Protect; Prepare and Pursue. Four specific work groups or organizations have been developed to support the mission, as well. The Research Information Communication Unit (RICU), The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). Applicable components of this program to the Fire intelligence program are within the Prevent, Protect and Prepare branches of the program.

1. Prevent

Inclusiveness is at the core of prevention in this model. The Prevent component of the UK CT policy emphasizes the importance of effective communication and inclusion to attempt to stave off opportunities for radicalization and homegrown terrorism or violence. The goals, as described in an online lecture dated January 28, 2014, Counter-terrorism in the UK Module II – Policy Response, are:

- Communicate with people not just their faith.
- Support common positions/purpose and denounce violence.
- Counter misperceptions of “Islamophobic” foreign policy.
- Utilize the RICU to promote the concepts of CONTEST.

By utilizing the RICU, which was designed to clearly communicate British foreign policy concepts across government agencies and the Muslim community, in addition to countering the assertions made by extremist groups and al-Qaida sympathizers from within and out of the UK, the relationships become mutually beneficial, inclusive and sustainable to all parties concerned. Getting the messages out quickly, accurately and in the spirit of exposing half-truths and misinterpretations, supports the goal of staying ahead of the radicalization effort of impressionable Muslims.

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209 Paul Smith, Presentation CHDS, Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning (January 2014).
210 Ibid.
One of the key lessons learned from the UK model of Prevent is the corrections they’ve made in their own approach to the prevent effort. The job of “prevent” initially fell onto the police. Because of the tremendous sense of urgency, the method was more aggressive than effective. The most critical aspect of Prevent is the intent at the core of the effort. The goal is to reach beyond solely benefiting law enforcement or fire. The relationship has to be mutually beneficial to all parties involved. Developing these relationships is universal and has great potential in the SLCFD.

Currently, the SLCFD does minimal community outreach. Most community interaction, beyond the emergency response, stems from public education efforts in CPR, Fire Prevention and public relations events. Salt Lake City has an Office of Diversity and Human Rights, yet there is no involvement with the Office at this time. The SLC Police Department (SLCPD) has the Homeless Outreach Service Team or HOST program, which is a community outreach program designed to support the organizations that provide opportunities and services to Salt Lake City’s homeless population. The SLCFD doesn’t have any involvement in this program, as well.

The four goals of the Prevent stand of the UK CONTEST policy can easily be applied to any population, in an effort of avoid oppression and exclusion and the negative consequences that can follow suit.

2. **Protect**

Protection encompasses protecting and fortifying everything from critical infrastructure, border security and mass gathering places of assembly.\(^{212}\) The history with the IRA and the risks that accompanied the peak of that era drove much of the critical infrastructure protection planning. CPNI has developed a network of Sector Information Exchanges, which include representation from private and public sectors.\(^{213}\) These relationships and communication pathways are vital in the dissemination and receipt of valuable information related to infrastructure protection.


\(^{213}\) Ibid.
Managing sensitive information, however, can be challenging. The CPNI system incorporates a ‘stoplight’ rating system to the sensitivity of the materials necessary to share with sector leaders.

- Red messages are those intended for the sector leaders only. They may not be shared with anyone and may only be used by the sector leaders in their decision-making processes.

- Yellow messages are those that can be shared on a need-to-know basis. If there are other decision-making members of the sector leader’s team who would benefit from the yellow messages, the sector leader can share the information, although judiciously.

- Green messages are those that can be widely shared among staff and employees. The stakes are high for those granted specific access to the various tiers of messaging. Those caught releasing messages outside of the scope of their authority will lose all access privileges to the stoplight information-sharing program.214

The NaCTSO, the police-run counter terrorism security office, operates within the CPNI. This office is responsible for the Counter Terrorism Security Advisory Networks. Some of the notable work the office does involves tabletop exercises with local business owners to help them identify their vulnerabilities and responsibilities in an emergency response. The NaCTSO has also produced several useful documents and tools for business owners and local agencies to use in protecting crowded places, hazardous sites and assisting the CPNI in the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.215

Additional Protect models include efforts like that of the Shropshire Fire Department. Utilizing online tools, they are able to enlist the participation of all members of the community in the fire prevention effort. The program, called ‘Operational Intelligence,’ solicits information from the community via an email portal on the brigade’s web page. Concerns, including undocumented construction, suspicious activity and other non-emergent issues are directly routed to the Shropshire Operational Intelligence Team. The fire department then has documentation of the event and can

214 Paul Smith, interview by Presentation CHDS, Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning (January 2014).

follow up on the complaints, potentially intercepting illegal activity that would have gone undetected without the assistance of the citizen.

The fire departments throughout the UK are also involved in the Sub Regional and Local Resilience Forums. These forums are designed to give emergency services, local authorities, government agencies, the health department, public utilities, voluntary organizations, businesses and the military an opportunity to share information and ideas. Forum participants are also encouraged to plan and organize local activities, including training and exercising, in support of the regional emergency plan.

The UK concepts are driven by the desire to develop trust and inclusion within all of the communities within the districts being served. As the trust, sense of belonging and community are strengthened, the end result is inset cultures and native residents of the community becoming more willing to work toward preserving the peace and prosperity of the community as a whole.

Information sharing is key to the success of the Protect strand of CONTEST. The integration of the agencies through continued reaffirmation of common purpose drives the multidirectional flow of information in the UK. There are several areas within the current SLCFD model where information sharing could be enhanced by integrating components of the UK model. Salt Lake City Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) was created under the guidelines of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA). The idea is to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other citizens to plan ahead for possible chemical accidents in their communities.  

216 The LEPC is central to sharing information regarding the storage, use, and transportation of hazardous materials in the City. Further enhancing the quality of information sharing by incorporating the ‘stop light’ method of rating the messages from the city to industry leaders could be very helpful in taking the LEPC platform to the next level.

SLCFD also needs to provide a better, technologically driven method for the citizens to submit information on non-emergent concerns or notifications. Moving to a more collective and organized methodology, such as that of the Shropshire Fire and Rescue service could provide a more succinct way of soliciting and managing input from the citizens.

3. Prepare

Key components of the Prepare strand of the CONTEST policy are developing relationships between key response agencies with counter terrorism roles and responsibilities, continuing training for response personnel and developing response policies and procedures. In doing so the UK will build its response capabilities, improve preparedness for assets identified as ‘high impact risks,’ improve collaborative emergency response, and realize improved communication and information sharing related to terrorist attacks. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Program trains frontline staff on preparing for large-scale, high impact events. Developing the continuity within operations and communications is critical to the successful outcome of a catastrophic emergency. The JTAC is the conduit for intelligence analysis, dissemination and the terrorism alert system and also a component of Prepare and Pursue. Collecting information, putting it into the right hands for analysis and assuring proper and effective dissemination are key components to connecting the dots and assuring all parties are prepared for the potential outcomes.

The UK has not only successfully bridged the gap between various intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the courts; it has also effectively invited the fire and emergency services into its model. Because Salt Lake City’s FD and PD respond to a number of calls in tandem, either fire supporting PD or visa versa, it makes sense to prepare in sync. As stated earlier, Salt Lake City has had four mass casualty active-shooter incidences in the past 14 years. Traffic accident, working fire, drug overdose and

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218 Ibid.
psychological disorder calls all receive a collective FD/PD response. Successful development of relationships between key response agencies with counter terrorism roles and responsibilities starts with the trust. In Salt Lake City, personnel on the street have a strong working relationship. It is up to leaderships to drive the development of training exercises and joint response policies and procedures to further forge the relationship and advance the level of preparation at the street level.
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VI. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

Creating a plan for developing, implementing and sustaining an intelligence program for the Salt Lake City Fire Department breaks down into three steps: establish or identify a need, define key relationships within the Fire intelligence mission network, and determine if trust-based program development can optimize collaboration within the network at all stages of program development.

1. Is There a Need?

The primary case study is the security success of the 2002 Olympics. Focusing on the Fire Department’s involvement and the achieved desired outcome of the international event, the case is made that the successful outcome was due to all components of the Olympic collaboration network.\(^{219}\) The research began with a review of operational plans for the Olympics to assess Fire’s role; government, scholarly and popular literature that discussed the mechanics of implementing a Fire intelligence program in general; and relevant literature that evaluated the basic concept and value added of fire service involvement in the intelligence effort, both from the support and the opposition. While DHS, the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the International Association of Fire Fighters support the concept, others dispute the validity and legality of fire service involvement in the intelligence effort.

The opposition comes from two primary positions; the firefighter’s themselves and the civil rights, or citizen advocacy groups representing them. Firefighters leveraging their access into homes and businesses of the citizens, in the spirit of collecting information concerns these groups, and rightfully so. The perception that firefighters are conducting surveillance or spying on the citizens jeopardizes citizen’s rights to privacy;\(^{220}\) and an extreme interpretation or a poorly implemented program could appear


that way. This revelation will be a strong driver to greater understanding in the laws and the scope and implementation of the program in an effort to build and sustain the trust of these citizens’ rights groups.

Firefighters tend to be more concerned with their safety and the preservation of their reputations. Firefighters are reluctant to engage in any activity that could be perceived as law enforcement because they do not want to be mistaken for the police\textsuperscript{221} – that could make them more vulnerable out on the streets. Firefighters are not typically armed, like law enforcement officers are. Illegal activity openly revealed by the fire department IC effort could have dire consequences if terrorists, gangs, or any other groups are involved in illegal behavior or engaged in retaliatory actions. This can manifest in several different ways, but primarily aggression toward the fire department or unwillingness to call if there is an emergency would be considered negative impacts of a poorly implemented program.

Those in favor of the concept identify the role, sheer number and existing relationships of the firefighters as prime reasons why they are tailor-made for this expanded role into the IC\textsuperscript{222}. As counterterrorism efforts move into the community, first responders take on more responsibility in protecting their communities. Prevention, protection and response all fall under the job description of firefighters. The core skill sets firefighters develop throughout their careers provide a unique perspective into preventing terrorist or illegal activity in their communities. Enhanced training is available, focusing specifically on indicators of activity that could be considered suspicious and potentially malicious, and what to do in the event firefighters come across such activities.

It is important to identify whether there’s a need for a Fire intelligence program within Salt Lake City, as well. Considering components of the City and the valley’s infrastructure, in addition to potential within private industry and the University of Utah, and the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints, vulnerabilities were identified

\textsuperscript{221} Dabruzzi, D. G. (2008 August). Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism. \textit{Manhattan Institute for Policy Research}.

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid.
that, if compromised could have catastrophic impact on the community. Some of those include major railways, hundreds of facilities housing hazardous materials and a nuclear reactor, housed at the University of Utah.

Salt Lake City also has had several fatal active shooter incidents, intentionally set church fires and ALF activity that resulted in a fire at a local Tandy Leather store. Recent bulletins distributed by the ALF discussed continued activity in the urban and rural areas within the State of Utah. This history supports the need within the community for a more comprehensive intelligence effort by all first responders.

The conflicting perspectives of the supporters and the opponents create a tension that provides an opportunity for analysis. Could these stresses be addressed through thoughtful, trusted process and relationships? The collaboration constructs and trust, essential to the process, were analyzed in order to identify solutions to potential conflict within the network.

2. Who are the Key Stakeholders?

When developing a Fire intelligence program, identifying the key stakeholders that will be necessary for success, is paramount. Advocate and adversary alike, must be identified early into the program development process. Part of that procedure happened when evaluating the need, as discussed in the pro and con literature.

Further assessment into all necessary components of the Salt Lake City Fire intelligence mission network revealed six key partnerships that would provide the framework of the program. The SLCFD would need to develop and maintain good working relationships with the police department, the SLIC, the SIAC, the City and State administrations and the ACLU during all stages of development and implementation. There are also specific dynamics within the Fire Department that will need attention and development. Each node contributes in its own way to the advancement of the program. Although the relationships will vary and represent different needs, all are equally important to the success of the plan. City and State administrators and representatives provide legislative and financial support, the fusion centers and the SLCPD provide the
mechanism to exchange and analyze information and the ACLU assures actions are within the scope of the laws protecting the citizens of the United States.

3. Optimizing Collaboration

Analyzing the network needs of the Fire intelligence program identified the stakeholders and their contributions to the effort. Also central to the analysis was the motivation behind each of the nodes in the stakeholder network. Knowing the interests helps program developers forecast the potential showstoppers before they come to fruition. If those showstoppers can be predicted through analysis, mechanisms to avoid them can be put in place early in the process.

Because collaboration is critical and the Fire Department will need to engage multiple network components, the constructs of successful collaboration were identified. Hocevar et al. developed a model for collaboration by identifying what they determined were key constructs of successful partnerships.223 The constructs central to collaboration success are: purpose and strategy, structure, lateral mechanisms such as social capital, incentives and the people themselves.

Bertram conducted a survey specific to the relationships developed during the 2002 Olympics. He analyzed feedback from law enforcement leadership, trying to identify factors specific to the success and failure of partnerships after the Olympics were over.224 Similarities can be identified between Bertram’s results and the model developed by Hocevar et al. Bertram’s findings identified four key enablers to collaboration development and endurance: trust or social capital, felt need, strategic planning and mandated systems.225 The consistency between Hocevar et al. and Bertram’s findings provided validation to the collaboration constructs and identified a starting point for analyzing their relationship to trust.

225 Ibid.
Each construct was evaluated against the need for trust. Work by Burt, Bertram, and Bellavita was utilized to effectively demonstrate the nexus between the collaboration constructs and trust.\textsuperscript{226}\textsuperscript{227}\textsuperscript{228} Distilling the constructs down to the single issue of trust simplifies the framework for program development.

Mayer et al’s organizational trust model was the framework central to the program development.\textsuperscript{229} This model was selected because its focus was trust between organizations. It provides a succinct set of components within the definition of trust that allows targeted attention to the areas program developers have influence. The components are the trustee, risk, context and the trustor. Program developers, as the trustee within the model, must exhibit ability, benevolence and integrity as core traits. It is also critical to minimize risk by providing a well thought out plan with input from all affected parties.

\section*{B. RECOMMENDATIONS}

There are ten steps identified in this recommendation, however, leadership and organizers must be willing to assess the process throughout the development, implementation and sustainment periods of the program. Agility will be required as varying perspectives and priorities are brought to light through the development process. Each of these steps has been created with the primary consideration of collaboration endurance and the development and sustainment of trust within the Fire intelligence mission Network.

Ten Steps of Recommended Implementation:

1. Initiate meetings with decision makers for each collaboration partner
2. Establish consensus on need and degree of involvement


3. Develop unified proposal options to secure funding
4. Develop strategic plan based on current and potential funding
5. Draft policies, procedures and MOU’s between agencies
6. Establish specific channels of communication for collection and dissemination of information
7. Develop expectations and training program
8. Deliver training to fire personnel
9. Leverage existing assets
10. Continue planning, evaluating and adjusting as needed

1. **Initiate Meetings with Decision Makers for Each Collaboration Partner**

The key agencies have been identified. The first step will be to reach out to each operational organization, namely the SLCPD, SLIC and SIAC and begin initial discussions on a more detailed vision of the desired outcome. Consistent with the findings on the role of trust during this process, the individuals selected to represent each organization will be critical. Making sure the right people are on the development and implementation team will be a function of the organization’s leadership and the team itself as it takes form. Effort should be made to reach out to influential contacts in the administrative offices, as well. Including the administration early in the process might afford insights into funding options that could drive initial program development. This is also an opportunity to develop the idea with administrators and invite feedback and involvement.

Questions that should be answered:

- What are your organization’s desired outcomes from this program?
- Is there anything the Salt Lake City Fire Department has done in the past that has been problematic in maintaining open trustworthy relations?
- What can we do to avoid that in the future?
• What can the Salt Lake City Fire Department do to best earn your trust throughout this process?
• Who are your key players?

Identifying the concerns of each component in the mission network early in the process will develop a sense of continuity in the process.

2. Establish Consensus on Need and Degree of Involvement

It is important that all of the key operational stakeholders are in agreement on the need and the basic development and implementation plan. Doing so will minimize the opportunity for scope creep, reassure those concerned with the mission strategy and tactics, and provide a mechanism to develop the necessary relationships. One of the first priorities of breaking into the intelligence field is recognition of the value of the partnerships and assuring that leadership of the organization understand the value of their efforts to the citizens, themselves and public safety as a whole. From that point all parties concerned have to acknowledge their vulnerabilities and reciprocal value to the partnership and build well-defined, cooperative directives.230 According to Chief Pfeifer, FDNY, the value of sharing information and “harnessing the knowledge of a team including fire, police, airport and Coast Guard officials under the pretense of counterterrorism was key in the successful outcome of the Hudson River crash of the U.S. Airways commercial jet.”231 Many of these key relationships in Salt Lake City will be forged through participation in the SIAC or independently, but it starts with the initial conversation.

3. Develop Unified Proposal Options to Secure Funding

DHS has identified three possible models for integrating Fire into the IC. In Salt Lake City, evaluating which option is the most viable will be a topic of discussion between the stakeholders. The DHS proposals are a good starting point and should be utilized when weighing out the options available in Salt Lake City.

Those options include:

- Develop the ILO position into specific roles and responsibilities in the SIAC and SLIC. This will include decreasing the current job responsibilities within the fire department to afford greater attention to the intelligence needs.

- Integrate a SLCFD employee more deeply into the program by creating a new full-time position in the SIAC for a person with fire department background.

- Create a hybrid of the two by splitting the expense of the employee.232

4. Develop Strategic Plan Based on Current and Potential Funding

Three key factors that have led to the growing success in integrating fire department involvement into the intelligence arena nationwide are value driven partnerships, relevant training and thoughtful implementation. Keeping those key factors in the forefront while developing the strategic plan will take utilizing all the assets at SLCFD’s disposal to best heighten awareness and contribute to a safer community.

Incorporating a SLCFD employee into the fusion center full-time is equivalent to the commitment the fire department has made to the Utah Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One. (USAR) That position is filled by a captain-level employee at a cost of approximately $100,000 per year including benefits. The City bills USAR annually for that position.233 That employee is dedicated fulltime to the USAR team and does not assume any other fire department responsibilities outside of the scope of that role. Funding for that position would require approval from the Fire Chief, the Mayor and at least four of seven votes from the Salt Lake City Council, even though the cost for the USAR position is ultimately passed on to USAR.234

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233 J. Vuyk (2013 8-July). Financial Manager, SLCFD. (M. Ellis, Interviewer)

234 Cindy Gust-Jensen, interview by Martha Ellis, *Executive Director, Salt Lake City Council* (July 10, 2013).
Roughly 80 percent of the funding for the SIAC in Utah comes from the state. The remaining 20 percent comes from DHS grants. Developing a position under the State DPS will require support from the governor. The position funding will go in as a line-item budget increase for his approval. Legislative support will also be necessary, as the final budget approval will rest with the legislative vote.

Either of these models will require a strong argument for the program and the necessary position(s). The national trend to increase fire department involvement in intelligence management as demonstrated through analysis by agencies like the DHS, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Department of Justice, and the fusion centers across the country will lend strong support to the effort.

5. Draft Policies, Procedures and MOUs between Agencies

By formalizing the policies and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities, the partnership will be less vulnerable to communication gaps and mission failure. Within these guiding documents and contracts expectations will be defined including a clear definition of the agency roles and responsibilities, specific procedures for collecting, disseminating and using information or intelligence, and strict adherence to federal laws protecting citizens’ rights.

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235 Major Jeff Carr, interview by Martha Ellis, State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (July 9, 2013).

236 Jennifer Seelig, interview by Martha Ellis, Utah State Representative, Democratic Minority Leader, Dist 23 (July 13, 2012).


240 Ibid.
6. **Establish Specific Channels of Communication for Collection and Dissemination of Information**

Operational roles and responsibilities within the network must be clearly defined. No task should be left open for interpretation. Specific names and back-up personnel should be identified to enhance accountability. Knowing whom to talk to on specific topics or information exchanges will provide an element of predictability, as well.

Within the Fire Department that would include creating support roles within Operations. Identifying platoon coordinators for collection and dissemination of information will create a clear focal point for crews looking for guidance and direction at all hours of the day. It would also add to the tiering concept of information distribution. Intelligence that may serve a purpose for the leadership of the Fire Department, but may not be suited or necessary for the private ranks, would be the responsibility of the Platoon Coordinators.

7. **Develop Expectations and Training Program**

Identifying terminal and enabling objectives for the training program will be critical. Leadership within Police, Fire and Fusion must develop the roadmap that will best serve the Salt Lake City community’s needs. Some of the curriculum may have to be developed specifically for the jurisdiction; however, DHS, DOJ and the IAFC have produced training materials designed for universal use. In her NPS Masters Thesis, *Terrorism Awareness and Education as a Prevention Strategy for First Responders*, Alicia Welch cites Malcolm Nance, author of *The Terrorist Recognition Handbook*, as stating, “The single best method of defeating terrorism is educating our first responders, law enforcement personnel, military and security professionals (as well as the public) how to recognize the roles and motivations of individual terrorists, their cell systems, and the street-level mechanics of terrorist operations.”

Why? Because the more eyes you have trained to the awareness level, the better the odds of catching something pre-

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catastrophe. This concept has been embraced with the Department of Homeland Security’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign.242

Integrating the fire service into the fusion center network requires educating personnel on “criminal/terrorism indicators and warnings and providing protocols on appropriate mechanisms for reporting suspicious activities to the fusion center, in accordance with appropriate privacy and civil rights/civil liberties protections.”243 Training will be necessary for the ILO position and the end user and observer. The end user and observer will include all fire department personnel.

The expectations for a messaging methodology will also be critical. In an effort to avoid sensitive information from being released to unintended readers, a color coding system, much like that of the CONTEST program in Britain, should be implemented. Providing a clear distinction between messages that should stay in the control of the recipient and those that can be shared will maintain the integrity of the messages and foster confidence in the FD’s ability manage the information.

8. Deliver Training to Fire Personnel

Training is the least cost-prohibitive aspect of implementing this program. The DHS has several options for training fire personnel to the operations and awareness level in anti-terrorism tactics that are free to the participants. Emergency Response to Terrorism Self Study can be downloaded directly off the Internet, and the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program (AIATP) is a course that can be delivered on site in Salt Lake City.244

Given the sensitivity of involving fire personnel in the structured effort of intelligence gathering, attention must be given to training in the legal implications of civil liberties. According to the SIAC web page,

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All intelligence activities carried out at the SIAC are to be performed within the boundaries established by the United States Constitution, and all Federal, State, Local, and SIAC policies and procedures; all information collected, researched, stored, analyzed, and shared must be done in such a way as to vigilantly uphold the privacy rights and civil liberties granted to United States citizens.245

Along the same line, it is crucial to stress the importance of preventing abuse of privilege in the spirit of gathering intelligence. This can include purposely exceeding the scope of an inspection by looking specifically for evidence of possible terrorism activity, violating an individual’s civil liberties or taking sensitive information to the media when it is not appropriate.246 Having the means to address these issues will be pivotal to the success of the relevant training and thoughtful implementation.

The training should also include promoting the understanding that “partnerhips should only be used when the partnership produces more in value than can be achieved by working alone.” This will help firefighters see that they are not simply doing police work in addition to their regular duties.247 Supporting documents and the successful collaborations demonstrated in Orange County, FDNY and Britain should be continually cited as sound justification that the program is mutually beneficial.

Training will also be necessary on the messaging procedures for the program. Firefighters will need a clear understanding of sensitivity classifications for incoming intelligence, as well as what to do with specific suspicious activity witnessed in the field. Points of contact must be established and shared with the operations personnel and their leadership. Continually updating contact lists to assure accuracy and specificity will also be part of the ongoing training.

9. **Leverage Existing assets**

Assets both within and outside the SLCFD should be leveraged to optimize success of the program. SLCFD has three key assets that should be included in the planning and implementation phases. The FD Office of Emergency Management (FDOEM), the Law Enforcement Inspector/Investigator Unit (LEOI/IU) and the LEPC, run from within the Fire Prevention Bureau. The FDOEM plays an integral role in the operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The emergency management position is relatively new to the SLCFD, however, current development of the position and the EOC will provide support to the mitigation component of the Fire intelligence program. The LEOI/IU is responsible for fire investigations and code enforcement and compliance. This unit has built strong relationships with the SLCPD through initial and recurring LEO training. These relationships can be leveraged to expand the depth of the Fire/PD training and response protocols into the active shooter and Mumbai-style response model development.

Utah is one of 47 states and U.S. territories that is a Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) state and Salt Lake City is home to one of 76 NSI Operational Sites.\(^{248}\) The SIAC is the critical link for the State of Utah to the national fusion center network. Having the SIAC within 10 miles of the core of the metropolitan center for Salt Lake is a significant benefit. With existing network infrastructure already in place, plausible arguments can be made in favor of expanding to include Fire. Integrating the Salt Lake City Fire Department into existing networks and enhancing the national intelligence network will assure accurate, timely and relevant dissemination of information.

The LEPC will provide a platform to collect, share and knit critical information related to hazardous materials into emergency planning and response. The committee of over 800 participants will be used to collect, share and analyze information related to hazardous materials sites.

10. Continued Training, Evaluating and Adjusting as Needed

The domestic and international threats are dynamic. To allow a program to remain static, while technology, vulnerabilities and the threat itself change, would likely result in missed opportunities and eroded trust in the program. Structured evaluations must be in place. Evaluating the program can be accomplished through surveying end-users, measuring specific tangible impacts and feedback from supporting agencies.

Evaluating the program is a continuum. Scheduled face-to-face meetings with network leadership provide opportunity for face-to-face dialogue and open discussion on all parties’ observations of the program’s efficacy. Formal and informal feedback mechanisms need to be encouraged from within all tiers of the information chain. Annual refresher training for operations personnel must be utilized to solicit feedback and maintain skills and engagement. All comments, concerns and suggestions should be thoroughly reviewed by program leadership.

The program must also be evaluated on a regular basis from a civil liberties perspective. Audits of information gathering tactics should be performed to assure that operations personnel maintain the highest standard in collecting information. Any procedures that deviate from the established policies and procedures must be addressed.

Only through unbiased and honest evaluation can the program be assessed. The constructs of trust must be at the forefront of any evaluation. The program must demonstrate the ability to produce useful intelligence and disseminate it to the appropriate end users. Through strict adherence to policies, procedures and MOUs, the integrity of the program will be established. The final component of evaluating the program is to continually assess intent. The core interest of the program is the greater good of the community. This cannot be established at the expense of civil liberties. Benevolence is defined as compassion or goodwill. It will take benevolence, strong leadership and continual dialogue to assure the core driver of trust within program development is maintained.
C. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND CONSIDERATIONS

This research has been focused on finding the most effective means to assure a successful and sustainable intelligence program for the Salt Lake City Fire Department. The mechanics of incorporating other fire departments from neighboring jurisdictions was not a primary consideration. The inevitability, however, of other fire departments engaging in and benefiting from Salt Lake City’s efforts needs to be considered. Keeping the task at hand manageable was a concern of this effort, but the firefighting community in the Salt Lake area is a close-knit group. Consideration for keeping interested parties apprised of the SLCFD efforts and sharing any information, either on the topic of developing a like program or resulting intelligence, would have widespread benefit to the entire community. Additional research in the specifics of each individual jurisdiction’s needs, resources and development strategy would need to take place. The concepts developed within this thesis would be a useful foundation in that effort.

D. CONCLUSION

The 2014 DHS Quadrennial Report focuses on the greater need for information sharing and community involvement. Resources must be engaged at all tiers of our government and communities to assure a safe and prosperous country. The support of national organizations like the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice are strong indicators that the fire service has a place in the national security effort.

As a developing concept, it is critical to identify pro and con positions for fire service participation in the national security effort. Addressing the concerns with a thoughtful inclusive implementation plan will have a positive impact on the sustainability of the program. Seeking out the opposition early in the process will allow an immediate effort to address the concerns.

It is also critical to address the causes leading to the decrease in the SLCFD involvement post-2002 Olympics. Although leadership in the SLCFD has changed, the

complete lack of trust previous administrations had in the program cannot be overlooked. Demonstrating added value to the Department, City and the citizens served will be a challenge overcome by leveraging nationally recognized agency support and case study documentation from both fire- and law enforcement-centric models.

Having identified trust as the cornerstone to success in the development, implementation and sustainment of the Fire intelligence program model within Salt Lake City, it will be important to assure that all necessary steps are taken to promote inclusion, ownership and added value to all parties within the network. Parties driving the effort must recognize their responsibility, as the trustees within the trust framework, to demonstrate ability, benevolence and integrity throughout the process. Presenting compelling evidence supporting the effort will be key to minimizing the perceived risk of the endeavor with other essential parties that may not necessarily be drivers of the development.

The true take-away of this research is the recognition of our humanity and those we interact with throughout our lives. Trust flourishes where equality, value and inclusiveness are primary considerations. An environment that fosters safety in dialogue invites the creativity this county is going to need to maintain security and peace.
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