INNOVATION
Under Austerity

European Missile Defense
Military Values
Report Documentation Page

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Front cover: Marine CH-53E Super Stallion crew chief makes way toward helicopter’s ramp edge while flying over Helmand Province (U.S. Marine Corps/Alejandro Pena). Table of contents shows (left to right) Airman takes oil sample from A-10 Thunderbolt II engine (Air National Guard/David Kujawa); Soldier watches firing lane for targets during U.S. Army 10th annual Best Warrior Competition (U.S. Army); Sailors work on engine of EA-6B Prowler (U.S. Navy/Carla Ocampo); and military working dog handler stationed in Okinawa, Japan, and his K-9 partner take part in night operations training (U.S. Marine Corps/Aaron Diamant).
Letters

To the Editor—In JFQ 65, Air Force historian Phillip S. Meilinger wrote a provocative and informative article (“Admirals Run Amok: The Danger of Inter-Service Rivalry,” 2nd Quarter 2012) about the Navy’s institutional response during the unification efforts of the Truman administration and airpower advocates after World War II. This hastened a trend that resulted in the bulk of the defense budget going to the new U.S. Air Force by the end of the Korean War. One is always tempted to ask, “Why this topic, why this time?”

Andrew Bacevich argues that honest study of the past should inform the imperatives of the present—Meilinger’s article fits the bill.1 But we are still left asking “why now?” On the face of it, as the last paragraph of the article makes clear, the occasion is the upcoming cutbacks in the Defense budget based on economic factors related to the Federal budget deficit. If the past is any guide, this dynamic tends to lead to a Service scramble over roles and missions to maintain capabilities that all honestly believe serve the national security and interest. However, a closer look reveals that the uniformed and civilian leadership of the Navy and Air Force seem institutionally and strategically aligned with a concept entitled Air-Sea Battle. If the Air Force and Navy (and maybe the Marine Corps) have found common cause, why introduce dissonance into the “alliance”?

The real issue here is the narrative over “unification.” This narrative has two primary versions, although it is the one being practiced—a curse (“Abolish the Office of Secretary of Defense?” 4th Quarter 2007). The unification story, however, is somewhat peripheral to the main point of the article—which presents a fairly objective account of the “Revolts of the Admirals” until about page 94. Meilinger’s language subtly and then not-so-subtly changes as he begins to make his real argument in the piece—that Navy resistance to unification reflected “insubordination” that fundamentally established an environment of inter-Service rivalry (“serious blot”) and “distrust” that is still with us today—despite a lengthy history of Defense reforms to fix it (p. 96). Certainly Meilinger is correct in claiming that some in the Navy completely bought into the unproven concept that the Service was practically irrelevant (a bad word in times of declining budgets) if it did not have a piece of the nuclear strategic bombing mission. He also does an objective and fair job of showing that there were those in the Navy who were dishonest about the problems of the B-36; they were misguided and even unethical—but their fundamental claims about the B-36, as General George Kenney admitted (p. 93), had some merit. However, in using less-than-honorable methods these Navy partisans poisoned the atmosphere for a reasonable debate on Navy roles and missions in the post–World War II security environment for the United States. But there were other issues at stake as well.

Nuclear strategic bombing did not allow for a range of responses across the spectrum of war, and Admirals Chester Nimitz and Louis Denfeld both knew this and trumpeted it in the period after World War II. In his testimony, Denfeld clearly made the case for spending on the Navy, not only based on a strategic bombing mission, but also for the following reasons:

As a result, there is a steady campaign to relegate the Navy to a convoy and antisubmarine service, on the grounds that any probable enemy possesses only negligible fleet strength. This campaign results from a misunderstanding of the functions and capabilities of navies and from the erroneous principle of the self-sufficiency of air power. . . . Fleets have never in history met opposing fleets for any other purpose than to gain control of the sea—not as an end in itself, but so that national power could be exerted against the enemy.2

Denfeld’s final sentence here makes a point many miss—the application of national power from the sea in all scenarios, to include conventional scenarios. Denfeld and many of the officers in the Navy were concerned that the very survival of capabilities essential to the Republic were at stake—capabilities unrelated to nuclear warfare. Moreover, Denfeld threw a strike directly at the new Service’s conception of its own identity in questioning the reputedly demonstrable efficacy of airpower when armed with the right weapons (nuclear weapons and long-range bombers). Truman bought into these ideas because they offered a savings on defense—he trusted the professionals to steer him correctly. Those professionals were the generals of the Army and the Air Force—for most part they were from the European theater of operations, where airpower had proved less than efficacious on a number of occasions.

Meilinger brings up the inconvenient truth of the Korean War and implies that it supports his case of poisoned Service relationships: “The Revolt of the Admirals caused a lingering ill will . . . the baleful maladies that unification of the armed forces was designed to correct. Worse still, less than a year later, the United States would be at war in Korea.” To the contrary, Korea proved an education and validation of what Denfeld and others had to say about the roles and missions of the Navy. At the outbreak of the Korean War, the Navy had only one active aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific and only two other large carriers available for the long deployment across the seas to the theater of operations.3 This theater comprised a peninsula jutting between the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan that lent itself particularly well to all the benefits that “control of the sea—not as an end in itself, but” as “national power [that] could be exerted against the enemy” could give.

So why the article? Perhaps Meilinger’s goal here is to avoid having the U.S. Army
become the “odd man out” much in the way that happened to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps after World War II. If so, he has a peculiar strategy using history as a case study for doing it. If not, then what is his purpose in conjuring up these “old ghosts”?

—John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

The author’s response to Dr. Kuehn—I thank Professor Kuehn for writing such a serious letter regarding my article on the Revolt of the Admirals. His main concern seems to be the timing of the piece and implies that there is some sort of agenda present on my part due to the recent rapprochement between the Navy and Air Force. He implies that I am trying to scuttle that cooperation. Not at all. The timing is simply coincidental. The Naval History Office sent me some material on the Revolt, and the idea had been rattling around in my head for some time before I finally was able to sit down and write. If there is an issue of timing involved, it concerns upcoming Defense budget cuts; as noted, that is when inter-Service rivalry most often rears its ugly head. I hope that does not occur and intended the piece as a warning against it.

Thankfully, Professor Kuehn does not try to defend the indefensible. The Navy hierarchy was outrageously out of bounds in 1949, and no attempt at “push back” or talk of fairness in the budget debates of the time can excuse their behavior. Some within the Navy deliberately and maliciously slandered the chief of another Service, and the Secretary of Defense. There is absolutely no excuse for that insubordination. None. It is irrelevant if later events would seem to support some of their contentions: there were other methods, less reprehensible, than spreading libelous rumors against senior civilian and military leaders to make their case. That is the main argument of my article.

Regarding the B-36: it was not a great airplane, but it was the best heavy bomber in the world at the time. Thankfully, it was never needed for a war against the Soviet Union, but those who flew it—and there are countless testimonials from them—believed that it would get through to its targets in enemy territory with acceptable losses and fulfill the dictates of the national war plans. Its combination of speed, altitude, and electronic countermeasures—the last being of tremendous importance—convinced those veterans that the B-36 would do the job. Because it never went to war, the contentions for and against the big bomber’s combat capabilities must remain conjecture.

Incidentally, small point, the Air Force did not receive the bulk of Defense Department funds in 1949 as Professor Kuehn argues. That situation did not occur until after the Korean War when President Dwight Eisenhower announced his strategic policy of massive retaliation. I would note that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time was Admiral Arthur Radford.

The claim that the Navy was later proved correct (the importance of seapower in Korea) is the true non sequitur here. No naval witnesses in the congressional hearings that I can recall ever pushed the concept of the Navy using its carriers to carry out tactical airstrikes in a conventional, peripheral war. The argument that Denfeld saw seapower as “national power exerted against the enemy” is far too vague to qualify as a prediction for naval/marine tactical airpower. The Sailors were no more prescien than Soldiers or Airmen when it came to predicting what the next war would look like. I would note here that the B-29s of the Strategic Air Command played a significant role in Korea—a role that neither General Curtis LeMay nor anyone else in the military hierarchy anticipated. Necessity is indeed the mother of invention—for all the Services.

Unification was designed to smooth relations between the Services and introduce nascent concepts of jointness—although that term was not then used. In an effort to save scarce funds, duplication and overlap were to be eliminated. Modern war—as proved abundantly in World War II—demanded joint command and cooperation. My comment (that is, the negative effect the Revolt would have on the Korean War, erupting less than a year after this unfortunate public brawl) was that the two Services were extremely distrustful and leery of each other. That is not the attitude one should have when going off to war when cooperation and jointness in both deed and spirit are so essential. Again, unification was intended to avoid such divisiveness, but the Revolt poisoned the waters. Even a cursory history of the Korean War will show that the Navy and Air Force had difficulty cooperating during the war, especially in air operations, and a large part of that difficulty was the hangover resulting from the congressional hearings.

Finally, regarding Professor Kuehn’s reference to the argument that minor redundancies can sometimes be beneficial is something that I have argued for quite some time. In my view, redundancy is the true American way of war, or, put more cynically, indecision is the key to flexibility. Since the 1950s, all administrations have been unable to make tough decisions regarding priorities in national defense, so we buy everything. Fortunately, the United States has been wealthy enough that it can afford to have the world’s best Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and special operations forces.

What a nightmare of capabilities that presents to a potential adversary! Saying that, however, is not the same thing as saying that such redundancy is a blessing. Given our astonishing deficit situation, spending $700 billion on defense each year might not be the best use of taxpayer dollars.

Again, thanks to Professor Kuehn for his excellent letter.

—Phillip S. Meilinger

NOTES

The United States is the world’s preeminent military power, and we have a responsibility to maintain this decisive advantage. It’s good for us, and, frankly, I believe it’s good for the world. But staying dominant doesn’t just happen. What we do today—and how we do it—may not be as successful in the context of tomorrow. To keep our edge, we must place more emphasis on adapting the force, investing in innovation, and getting the people right.

**Adapting the Force**

Adaptation is an institutional imperative for the joint force. Military power in the last century was defined largely by numbers—artillery pieces, tanks, carriers, and warheads. Materiel will remain important, but our ability to adapt smartly from the military we have to the military we need will determine our future success. That means focusing on agile organizational frameworks, people over platforms, and acquisition paced to the challenge. It means that we have to out-learn and out-think our adversaries.

To explore this context, I like British author Lewis Carroll’s 1871 classic *Through the Looking-Glass*. The Red Queen, a living chess piece, discusses with Alice what it takes to advance in the game. Alice runs alongside the Queen faster and faster until exhausted. Stopping to rest, Alice is startled to find that she is right where she started: “Why, I do believe we’ve been under this tree all the time! Everything’s just as it was!”

“Of course it is,” said the Queen, “What would you have it?”

The exchange between Alice and the Red Queen concludes: “Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else if you ran very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.”

“A slow sort of country!” said the Queen. “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”

Theorists have used this story to illustrate that a species, evolving alongside its competitors, must continually adapt just to maintain its relative fitness.

Today, in an increasingly connected and competitive global security environment, a nation—and its military—must do the same. That’s not to say that our force hasn’t been learning and adapting over the last decade—far from it. As members of the profession of arms, we’re adaptable by nature. We always find ways to accomplish the mission. In a broader sense, our military has been quite introspective about its performance through 10 years of conflict and has continuously applied its hard-won lessons. However, the pace of change around the globe is accelerating. Technology and capability are cascading to a wider set of middleweight actors. The operational environment is increasingly complex, competitive, and often unpredictable.

In response, we have to be agile enough to see ourselves within this new context, and adapt on a tighter cycle than ever before, in order to, as the Red Queen would say, “get somewhere else.”

This requires us to sharpen the discourse on our emerging concepts, doctrine, training, and leader development—under-scoring adaptation as an imperative across the board.

**Investing in Innovation**

“The real use of gunpowder,” essayist Thomas Carlyle wrote, “is it makes all men tall.” As far as innovations go, few in previous eras had as equalizing an effect. So I ask, what’s the next gunpowder?

Wherever the next advances occur, we know the effects won’t be clearly predictable. To account for this uncertainty, we need to expand our concept of what innovation means. Innovation is about new stuff and new
ideas. We must prioritize innovation not only in our material solutions, but also in our war-fighting concepts, organizational constructs, and relationships.

Historically, advances in these areas during interwar and drawdown eras were possible because we were obligated to identify clear needs, prioritize resources, and leverage emergent technologies. A period of transition and tighter resources doesn’t signal the end of innovation. Rather, it can and should promote creative and collaborative thinking.

America is built on innovation. We must reinforce a military culture that reflects and taps into this dynamic society—one that fosters and rewards innovation at all levels, and leverages private-sector networks in mutually reinforcing ways.

Along these lines, we must choose resource strategies that are not only innovative and collaborative but also affordable. In my view, strategy insensitive to resources is rhetoric. Global responsibilities, ongoing conflicts, and aging weapons systems—coupled with tighter budgets—only reinforce that reality.

This further underscores that we lean forward in how we invest in and cultivate relationships. The future of global security requires us to approach our challenges on a wider plane—that we think beyond and through traditional dividing lines. This means deeper relationships and collaboration among the Services, academia, the interagency community, industry, and partner nations around the world.

**Getting the People Right**

The Red Queen coached Alice by running alongside her and understood, instinctively perhaps, that people matter most. If there is a single dimension in which we must prevail to sustain our edge, it’s getting the people right. People are the strength of our military and our nation’s greatest strategic asset. Their leadership is what will enable us to adapt and innovate effectively.

We must continue to trust our men and women at the edge of our formations, to challenge them, and to leverage their talents and experiences. We must make sure they continue to be the best led, best trained, and best equipped in the world.

This means we need to make sure our leaders can effectively reconcile context, uncertainty, and surprise. It requires us to develop our Servicemembers with an unprecedented degree of versatility.

We need to promote and emphasize these characteristics in leader development and training across the force. As a learning institution, we also need to push to do it better, smarter, and faster in relevant and realistic ways. It’s particularly important that we get it right as our men and women spend longer times in the home station environment.

Getting the people right also means supporting those who support our force. Our military families and communities sustain the strength and readiness of the all-volunteer force. How we take care of them and how we honor our commitments say much about what we stand for as a profession and as a nation. We should remember that our future force is watching. They will have a big part to play in sustaining our edge, too.

Alice never finished her race. We have a responsibility to the American people, and to the world, to continue running ours—twice as fast. **JFQ**

MARTIN E. DEMPESEY
General, U.S. Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Bridging the Basics

By BRYAN B. BATTAGLIA

In the last issue of JFQ, I provided some thoughts and observations on the ebb and flow of the bands of readiness (individual and unit). It described some differences with soldiering in a predominantly garrison environment compared to a decade of military life in a back-and-forth deployed or combat/field setting—a lifestyle and environment that a large majority of our force has been shuddering since the winter of 2001. It is no secret that our enduring deployment cycle and focus on current conflicts have caused some degradation and receding of core competencies and skill sets, impacting traditional roles, missions, and even methods of operating. Said another way, the heavy emphasis on prepping for the next deployment has provided misalignment to some of the simple tenets of soldiering and survival in an otherwise extended garrison or unit setting.

These realities, along with our ongoing challenges of military life, equate to a buzz phrase that has recently resonated across the force. I suspect you have heard it already: back to the basics. Coined by someone, the phrase has taken on several meanings with regard to reintegration, readiness, military standards, and so forth. I will be the first to admit that it is certainly a catchy phrase. And since its beginning, it has indeed taken on momentum. However, I would like to inject through every beginning, it has indeed taken on momentum.

So no argument there—the basics do mean something, and while I do not concur that the older ways, methods, practices, and leadership were much more effective in that era than today. It implies, too, that the basics, methods of operating, and soldiering used by today’s generation of Servicemembers are falling short of the mark. It implies that we are returning a younger generation (the majority of our force) to a place that they have already been, but in reality they have not been and they cannot go. As a 33-year military professional, there are some basics that I grew up with that were in fact quite effective, but I certainly would not reintroduce them as applicable methods now. Indeed, we can return our troops to the basics, but it must be blended with their version, their style. Words do mean something, and while I do not completely disagree that there is value in going back to basics, the concept in general is linear and half-baked.

“Bridging the Basics” Makes More Sense

There are many methods, practices, and technologies used by today’s military professionals that we, an older generation, are still attempting to catch up to. Today’s basics can streamline efforts, stimulate innovative thought, produce savings, offer quicker access inside enemy decision cycles, save lives, create
rapid reach back, and in many cases generate better results. We cannot afford to replace today’s basics with yesterday’s more primitive ones. We would be consistently challenged in keeping pace with soldierly advancement and adversarial threats.

I think examples help to define the message, so what follows are administrative and operational examples that should explain where older methods still hold value and, when bridged with today, can be made better and more relevant. During the 1980s, our Leave and Earnings Statement (LES) was delivered in hardcopy through the chain of command down to the individual owner. Monthly and timed with the section/company training schedule, before anyone was given his LES, the sergeant or first sergeant, as a normal obligation in his duties and responsibilities, sat down with each member of the unit and went through the LES, line by line. This was common practice for everyone. It empowered the noncommissioned officer/section leader in leadership abilities, practical training, and gave him insights into the lives of those who worked for him. It gave us subordinates lessons in budget and finance. This basic practice provided an invaluable skill of deciphering arguably one of the most important pieces of paper I ever received as I grew through the ranks. Moreover, the practice happened systemically as it was built into the training schedule. The LES was merely the tool that provided the face-to-face engagement, but that piece of paper created active leadership engagement, which ended in financial education, knee-to-knee counseling, and leader confirmation that troops were tracking okay or needed assistance. There was no group setting or even communication through electrons for that meeting—it was face to face.

As you know, Servicemembers now receive an electronic LES, courtesy of technology that saves time and money, but this advancement has led to the degradation of leader to subordinate face-to-face interaction. In fact, since this basic leadership practice has been shelved, we find many of today’s Servicemembers disapproving in discussing their personal finances with their supervisors, considering it nothing short of an egregious invasion of privacy. The basic skill of reading one’s LES is no longer considered a priority, lost in the battle for free time and privacy during those “down times” or periods of platoon sergeants time. Of course, while we are back in the garrison at home station/port, any free time is precious, and to some it should not be wasted on items that can be accomplished with the touch of a button on the computer. We should remind ourselves, however, that leadership and the welfare of the force is more about problem preventing than it is about problem solving. Review of the LES allowed leaders to help shape and make decisions rather than just react to them, all in the best interest of the Servicemember and his or her family. Regardless of the environment, this is leader engagement; it worked back then and can work now—and it can work even better using today’s technology of the online LES. Therefore, you see this is not just back to the basics as much as it is bridging the basics.

An operational example is combat casualty care. Medical and field triage practices and casualty care used decades ago are still applicable and in use today. For instance, something as basic as the four lifesaving steps—start the breathing, stop the bleeding, protect the wound, treat for shock—remain unchanged. Yet today’s medical professionals—our corpsmen, doctors, and medics—have developed practices and policies leading to a higher probability of saving life, limb, and eyesight of our wounded Servicemembers. Moreover, with today’s medics and doctors, their innovative thinking, coupled with technology, has allowed us to advance the restoration of life from the first responder at the point of injury to the stateside medical treatment facility. Again, this is a prime example of bridging the basics.

I do agree that we should bring back some of the shelved garrison-shaped methods and basics of soldiering to bridge our force in this postconflict period. Warfare does remain fundamentally a human endeavor. Technology and its gravitational pull cannot be viewed as a panacea, so in deterring and defeating our adversaries, we must remain leader-centric, technology-enabled and -fostered through decentralization of command, control, and execution. So let’s focus our efforts more on bridging the basics of yesterday with today to make a better force of tomorrow—Joint Force 2020. Everyone, from the E-1 to O-10, in this profession of arms has ownership and responsibility in how our force sustains itself. This makes us all a part of the challenge, but, more importantly, it makes us all part of the solution. JFQ
As the often quoted Chinese proverb says, we do indeed live in interesting times. As this edition goes to press, the fiscal difficulties of the government remain unresolved, along with the question of how this situation will impact the Armed Forces. A number of senior military officer mistakes have grabbed the headlines. A brief but violent exchange of lethal fires between Israel and Hamas resulted in death and destruction on both sides. A ceasefire negotiated by the participants with involvement by the United States seems to be holding. The People’s Republic of China held its once-a-decade swap out of national leadership. These are indeed interesting times.

As editor of JFQ, I find myself well positioned to help readers sort through these events and other related issues. We receive a fairly large amount of submissions for review. Given that these authors have taken the time to discuss both well-known and not-so-well-known issues, selecting the best work both in terms of writing and content is often difficult but necessary. To make these hard choices, I am networked with a large number of experts in a wide range of fields who readily offer their opinions and advice on what issues to keep an eye on. From our faculty, students, and researchers here at the National Defense University to our Editorial Board members and experts from across academia and the U.S. Government, we receive world-class support identifying and delivering the best available writing on issues that matter to the joint force.

One solid indicator of the quality of our articles is that Google Scholar recently identified JFQ as the 13th most quoted national security journal in the last 5 years. At the heart of this journal is our team here at NDU Press. While we may be “resource challenged” in the months and years ahead, the dedication and professionalism of the folks you see on our masthead will not fail to produce the Chairman’s journal, JFQ.

This issue’s Forum offers four important topics at the strategic level. Returning contributor Stephen Cimbala goes beyond the seemingly emotionally charged discussion of missile defense in Europe where he explores Russian thinking and presents an important data analysis on this strategic issue. In a time when everything related to national security is being viewed through the lens of shrinking budgets, Ward Wilson next offers an alternative historical interpretation of the events at the end of the war in the Pacific: the decision to drop atomic weapons on Japan and the resulting logic that placed nuclear weapons at the center of the international security system. Mr. Wilson asks the reader to reconsider the value of nuclear weapons to our security. In a different time and circumstance in Japan, the United States was on scene to help our ally respond to a different kind of mass casualty event. Capturing significant lessons for future disaster relief efforts, Suzanne Basalla, William Berger, and C. Spencer Abbot provide a detailed look into how security assistance was used to respond to Japan’s needs following the 2010 “triple disaster” of an earthquake, tsunami, and catastrophic failure of...
a nuclear facility. Responding to the Chairman’s White Paper on Mission Command, Kathleen Conley lastly suggests how the military can effectively shape this theory into actual capability focusing on command and control issues.

Our Special Feature presents a group of articles that highlights potential options to deal with defense reform in light of ongoing budgetary challenges and suggests how best to adapt to emerging innovative capabilities in cyber and human terrain intelligence. Placing second in the 2012 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay competition, Ryan Allen identifies the need to reduce the Department of Defense (DOD) to balance national elements of power and to prevent strategic overreach. Continuing the theme of how to address austerity going forward (echoing 2011 Defense Business Board recommendations), Jon Sunderland discusses the need to reform military pensions. With reduced resources, military staffs—which John Price next suggests have seen little change from Napoleon’s time—will have to seek improvements in how they are organized to deal with future challenges effectively. Adding to our continuing discussion on cyber, Jan Kallberg and Bhavani Thuraisingham then provide an interesting suggestion on how our universities can better support the national security challenge of cyber defense.

In Commentary, John Mattox offers a means to critically evaluate DOD and Service value statements and their continuing importance. Reed Bonadonna then takes us back to one of the seminal military professional handbooks for the post–World War II era, the 1950 version of The Armed Forces Officer. He wrote his review far in advance of several high-profile senior officer ethical falls from grace, but now provides a useful discussion of the basic “rules of the road” for military professionals. Next, placing second in the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Article competition, Houston Cantwell draws a line from reduced risks of traditional lethal force that drone strikes offer through the negative impact that the strikes have on U.S. foreign policy. Looking back on the conflict in Libya that ousted Muammar Qadhafi, W.A. Brown and Brent Coryell detail important aspects of the logistics support from both U.S. and international allies and partners that made the operation successful.

Three ongoing challenges in the strategic environment are examined in Features. As the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan approaches, John O’Connell outlines the issues that need to be analyzed in order to achieve a regional solution to the conflict after more than a decade of U.S. operations. Helping us widen our global scan of security issues, Chang Kwoun Park and Victor Utgoff re-affirm the value and outline steps to enhance U.S. extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea. Taking second place in the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Research Paper competition, Marc Koehler provides an in-depth review of the impact of the events and aftermath of 9/11 on the People’s Republic of China.

In examining a particular episode in what is probably the largest conflict in terms of loss of life and displaced populations since 1945, this issue’s Recall takes us to 1998 Africa. Detailing military operations some 4 years after the horrendous events we all remember in Rwanda, James Stejskal recounts the initial successes and eventual failure of a bold operation led by the Rwandan army aimed at regime change in neighboring Congo.

To close out this issue, we have an interesting article on joint planning. Dale Eikmeier revisits operational design and the problematic concept of center of gravity as presented in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Along with this doctrine discussion, we offer three valuable book reviews that should help enhance your professional reading and education.

One of the enduring lessons I have from my early military career is the fact that every issue or challenge, whether new or enduring, presents an opportunity to overcome and move ahead. Each new or enduring challenge will be interesting until it is overcome. JFQ will do its best to continue to identify both challenges and potential solutions as long as we live in interesting times. JFQ

—William T. Eliason, Editor
Russia and European Missile Defenses

Reflexive Reset?

By STEPHEN J. CIMBALA

The U.S.-Russian “reset” appeared to be in free fall in December 2011 as a result of both foreign and domestic policy issues that had dampened enthusiasm for further momentum. Among the forces resisting progress on nuclear arms control was the issue of missile defenses. The following discussion examines European (and other) missile defenses from the Russian perspective, with obvious implications for current and future U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policies. The article first considers whether the outlook of the Russian government and military leadership on missile defenses and nuclear arms control is driven by realistic fears and/or resistant forces in Russian domestic politics. It then discusses the possibility that aspects of Russian public diplomacy on missile defenses consist of a “reflexive control” or other influence operation, directed at both foreign and domestic audiences. The article then performs data analysis to determine the viability of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear deterrents, including scenarios that assume antimissile defenses are available.

Russian Rethinking

Medvedev Stokes Fears. On November 23, 2011, then–Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev issued a somber address in which he declared that Russia had been unable to reach agreement with the United States and NATO over the future of missile defenses in Europe. Accusing the United States and the Alliance of undermining Russia’s security, Medvedev censured Washington for its unwillingness to provide a legal guarantee that the Obama administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to European missile defenses would not be directed against Russia. The outgoing Russian president presumably spoke with the approval of the current prime minister and probable future president Vladimir Putin.

Facing an imminent election in Russia that might have prompted his tougher line with respect to national security issues, Medvedev outlined a number of responsive measures that Russia would take if the United States and NATO continued to stiff Russia
on missile defense talks. First, Russia would develop capabilities for “the destruction of information and control means of the missile defense system” deployed in Europe, meaning, in plain English, cyberwar. Second, the protection of Russian facilities for strategic nuclear weapons and launchers would be increased. Third, nuclear strategic ballistic missiles would be equipped with new countermeasures to overcome U.S. and NATO ballistic missile defenses. Fourth, Russia might deploy advanced attack systems in its western and southern districts capable of striking elements of the U.S. and NATO missile defense system, including Iskander ground-to-ground missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave. Fifth, Russia might suspend further cooperation on arms control and disarmament, and, according to Medvedev, “There might be grounds for our country to withdraw from the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty].” As Medvedev spoke, doubtless the Russian General Staff was loading his PowerPoint file with even more talking points for future briefings.

Although it was apparent that some of Medvedev’s rhetoric was intended for domestic political consumption, it would be mistaken to infer that his démarche was mainly or entirely campaign fodder. Russia’s political and military leaders have, from their perspective, genuine security needs and concerns that are evoked by the U.S. and NATO missile defense plans. For example, although the Duma had previously cautioned against jettisoning the entire reset process over missile defenses, the first deputy chairman of the Duma’s foreign affairs committee, Leonid Slutsky, warned of inevitable connections:

*The biggest success of this new chapter in Russian-U.S. relations was the signing of the New START treaty. But this treaty links strategic offensive weapons to missile defense. But the American administration, acting in circumvention of all agreements, is now trying to deploy systems near Russian borders that threaten our strategic nuclear deterrence forces.*

**Additional Challenges for Russia.** In addition to the relationship between nuclear offensive retaliatory forces and antimissile strategic defenses, there is the fact that strategic nuclear deterrence per se is but one element in the Russian geopolitical security calculus. Russia faces the need to modernize its conventional military forces in order to meet exigent and prospective threats to its security from conflicts near or within its borders, including terrorist attacks. Besides growing a more professional military for low- and mid-intensity wars, Russia must prepare for a world in which major powers and others can exploit the information highway for military purposes. As Jacob W. Kipp has noted:

If the strategic nuclear arsenals have been the backbone of deterrence and strategic stability for the last half century, it appears that they are no longer sufficient to set the general line of relations in part because of the reduced threat perceptions of each side, but also because other military capabilities have taken on greater importance.

These other military capabilities include, according to Dr. Kipp, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, missile defenses, conventional systems for prompt, long-range offensive strikes, and military transformation in conventional armed forces driven by developments in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). The United States, having mastered the information technology revolution and applied it to military affairs in the most comprehensive manner, has arguably provided its commanders the military-strategic equivalent of a trump card in information-based warfare. The Russian military leadership has also sought to exploit the electronic spectrum and cyberspace for military advantage, as Russia’s war against Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated. In that conflict, attacks on Georgian government and other Web sites appeared to have been well coordinated with Russian kinetic force operations, including suspiciously coincidental timing of starts and stops in activity.

In addition, Russian military thinking about information operations (IO) and information warfare is quite sophisticated and has roots in Soviet-era discussions of topics such as electronic warfare, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and camouflage and concealment, among other subjects. Russian military writers distinguish between the information-technical and the information-psychological aspects of warfare and military operations. Information-technical aspects have to do with equipping the force with digital products and neutralizing the enemy’s information systems by means of electronic, cybernetic, or kinetic attacks. Information-psychological aspects include use of the media and other sources to influence public and leadership opinion in other countries and in one’s own state. In addition to these two major categories of information operations, one might argue for a separate and specifically “cyber” aspect including “the use of military and surrogate computers to disrupt command and control” in countries in conflict with Russia. Timothy L. Thomas, U.S. expert on Russian information warfare, explains:

If an information warfare element under consideration is a machine-driven, data-processor component (computers, sensors, satellites, reconnaissance-strike systems, etc.) then the category under consideration is information-technical. Electronic warfare would also be an element in this field. If the IO element is a human-based, data processor component (the brain, which can be influenced or manipulated by propaganda, psychotronics, nonlethal weapons, or special pharmaceuticals according to the Russian paradigm), then the issue under consideration is information-psychological. Thus, psychological operations (PSYOPS) are an element of this field.

Of course, the actual conduct of military operations or the prewar management of crises can involve both aspects of information operations as defined above. The point is to understand why and how Russia might be using what the United States would call “influence operations” or the Russians information-psychological operations to compensate for military-technical deficiencies in hardware, software, and command-control communications “connectivity.”

If Russia is sincerely concerned about the possibility of U.S. full-spectrum dominance by means of offensive and defensive force modernization, network-centric warfare, and enhanced C4ISR, then it follows that Russia’s better strategic moves include both diplomatic forestalling and manipulation, as well as substantial investment in military modernization. However, Russia needs to nest these forestalling-manipulation and modernization initiatives within a broader geostrategic and diplomatic strategy that fits into present, and arguably future, reality.  

**Reflexive Control?** An undiplomatic finger-pointing by Putin against Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over demonstrations in Russia in December 2011 was an obvious effort at distraction and buck-passing. But it
also contained elements of disinformation and misdirection familiar to students of Cold War Soviet military and intelligence practice. The concept of reflexive control appeared in Soviet military literature decades ago, referring to a means of conveying to another actor specially prepared information that would induce him “to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.”

According to Thomas, reflexive control can be used against either human-mental or computer-based decisionmaking processors. Reflexive control is similar to the U.S. concept of “perceptions management” although it emphasizes control more than management of the target audience.

Putin’s placement of blame on Secretary Clinton for demonstrations in Russia, unusually personal by normal diplomatic standards, had a reflexive control aspect for not only domestic but also foreign audiences, including Americans. The Russian prime minister was raising the cacophony bar, but in support of a familiar theme for his administration: Russian sovereignty imperiled by foreign sources, including nongovernmental organizations working in Russia and international media stories unsympathetic to Russia or to Putin. The sensitivity of Russian leaders on this point has been especially pronounced since the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, and, more recently, Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008. Putin’s managed democracy or authoritarian capitalism, however one prefers to define it, is threatened by the very existence of grass-roots dissidence on a large scale, especially if it escalates into an Arab Spring in Russia per the 2011 uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. Thus, Putin’s point at Secretary Clinton was also a warning to domestic opponents not to push too far against the regime, despite its oligarchic and authoritarian tendencies. The Russian prime minister reiterated the same theme during his televised call-in show marathon of December 15, 2011, during which he noted that color revolutions “are special schemes to destabilize society” and added that Russian opposition activists were trained under Viktor Yushchenko, former president of Ukraine.

In the same fashion, Russian political leaders’ fulminations against U.S. missile defense plans for Europe have a reflexive control quality for domestic and international audiences, including the United States and NATO. Despite the U.S.-Russian reset and the conclusion of the New START treaty on strategic nuclear arms reductions signed by Medvedev and President Barack Obama, European missile defenses have remained a serious bone of contention since 2007. This is so regardless of the uncertain technological capabilities of the proposed European missile defenses as first proposed by George W. Bush and then revised by President Obama.

The reflexive control aspects of Medvedev’s and others’ opposition to U.S. and NATO European missile defenses include efforts to influence their government leaderships and public opinions in favor of either delaying or reconsidering the European missile defenses. A form of this message directed at Europeans partakes of intimidation. Russia threatens to move nuclear-capable missile strike forces closer to the locations of proposed missile defense installations. In addition, Russia might withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and be free to deploy longer-range missiles pointed at NATO Europe for the first time since the 1980s. Russia’s threat of possible withdrawal from New START and follow-on negotiations spikes the blood pressure of not only U.S. advocates for nuclear arms reductions but also Europeans who might feel unprotected in the midst of a revived U.S.-Russia nuclear arms race. These and other messages about nuclear arms control and missile defenses are intended to separate ranks within NATO as to the desirability or feasibility of missile defenses and further nuclear arms reductions, including proposals for reducing the numbers of Russian and NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

In addition to sticks with respect to Russian messages on missile defenses, the Kremlin has offered carrots. The most obvious carrot was Russia’s expressed interest in joining NATO in the construction and operation of an all-European missile defense system, a principle endorsed by NATO at its Lisbon summit in 2010. However, Russia’s concept of shared operations and control over European missile defenses differs markedly from the NATO version. Russia wants an integrated ballistic missile defense (BMD) system with overlapping Russian and NATO components and shared control over missile launch detection, threat assessment, and choice of response. NATO has demurred at this proposal, preferring to have separately operated and maintained U.S.-NATO and Russian BMD systems that cooperate in selected areas, including a joint data center and shared information about missile warning. Russia has responded that, unless satisfied on this issue of joint participation in BMD, and unless reassured that planned NATO BMD interceptors are no prospective threat to its nuclear deterrent, Russia will take responsive measures unfriendly to the United States and NATO (as enumerated previously).

Russia’s demand for a legal guarantee that the European PAA missile defenses system is not aimed at Russia seems to contradict its expressed desire to share in the management and operation of a European-wide BMD system. The apparent contradiction is reduced if we assume that both the demand for legal guarantees and the demand for shared operation of the European BMD system together constitute an example of “nested” reflexive control—one pointed at the diplomatic level and the other at the military-technical level of U.S. and NATO decision-making. As to the first, at the diplomatic level, the Obama administration has already indicated its willingness to provide reassuring political statements to Russian leaders, indicating that the European missile defense system is intended to deflect attacks from so-called rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, not from Russia. More than this, the United States has also invited Russia to send observers to missile test launches to verify that SM-3 interceptor missiles lack the performance envelopes to threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Reportedly, U.S. officials have indicated a willingness to share some of the technical specifications of the SM-3 with Russia, although Republicans in Congress have threatened to oppose this idea.

Despite these apparent overtures of U.S. cooperation, Russia has insisted on legal guarantees against the European missile shield being pointed at Russia, although:

Russia’s concept of shared operations and control over European missile defenses differs markedly from the NATO version
developments in missile defenses, including the possible improvement in interceptor velocities, sensors, and battle management and command and control

Russia would be shooting itself in the foot if it withdrew from the New START agreement over disagreements about missile defenses, since New START enables Russia to preserve an image of nuclear-strategic parity with the United States without the expense of an open-ended offensive nuclear arms race.

Departing New START and declaring arms control dead because of BMD would deprive Russia of important diplomatic and military-technical windows into U.S. policy planning and defense modernization, including performance enhancements in missile defense and offensive nuclear force modernization.

The other aspect of Russian participation with NATO in a European-wide missile defense system is the suspicion on the part of Russia that the European PAA system is merely a part of the eventual, and perhaps inevitable, U.S. global missile defense system that would be capable of nullifying Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Therefore, Russia wants to monitor the technical characteristics of the NATO European missile shield in order to devise countermeasures, when and if the system evolves into something approaching a global Leviathan that would give the United States a preclusive first-strike capability against Russia or any other nuclear weapons state.

This fear of evolving U.S. offensive and defensive force modernization combining to establish an American departure from U.S.-Russian nuclear-strategic parity, or the impression of nuclear-strategic parity, is as much a political as a military-technical preoccupation for Russia. The same concern motivates Russia’s objections to U.S. conventional prompt global strike systems: Russia fears that conventional prompt global strike systems could be used as first strike weapons against other states’ nuclear or conventional forces.

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder indicated in December 2011 that U.S. and NATO plans for European missile defenses would go forward with or without Russia. According to Ambassador Daalder, Russian concerns were not as important as the accelerating Iranian missile threat: “We’re deploying all four phases [of the EPAA] in order to deal with that threat.”

He added that, if the United States should decide to field missile defense systems against Russian nuclear weapons, those defenses would be deployed in the United States, not in Europe, on account of the physical principles of missile interception that make it “easier and better to approach an incoming missile from the opposite side than it is to try to chase it down.”

However, the command-control and political decisionmaking aspects of PAA are more complicated than that. EPAA capabilities will support U.S. obligations to the defense of NATO as required under Article 5. But these capabilities will also be used to support U.S. forces deployed overseas and, with respect to the fourth phase of EPAA evolution, U.S. homeland defense. As Daniel Goure has explained:

This means that in some instances the EPAA will operate under NATO’s direction and rules of engagement but in others will be under direct U.S. command and control. When—or if—phase four capabilities are deployed to Europe, for the first time since ballistic missile defenses were deployed in the 1960s, the defense of the homeland against ballistic missile attack will rely, at least in part, on interceptors fired from outside the United States.

Russia’s need for reassurances against U.S. and NATO missile defenses is based on worst-case analysis relative to the ability of Russia to maintain its image as a great power. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has acknowledged many technical challenges standing in the way of completing all four phases of the EPAA plan, including the possibility that the MDA will have to design an entirely new missile for the SM-3 IIB variant, together with a new launch system. And each phase of EPAA will require improvements in space-based and airborne sensors as well as in battle management and command and control systems.

Progress in technology development also assumes consistent funding from Congress, an uncertainty within the political decisionmaking aspects of PAA are concerning others.

Notwithstanding these toxic political waters, analysis can contribute to the modification of excesses in political prognostication and in military forecasting.

Analysis

In the analysis that follows, we generate hypothetical, but not unreasonable, strategic nuclear forces for the United States and for Russia that are within New START guidelines and counting rules for deployed weapons and launchers, circa 2018–2020.

In the figures that follow, we summarize the results of nuclear force exchanges between the United States and Russia under four operational conditions for New START compliant forces with a peacetime deployment limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads on intercontinental launchers and for a smaller force with a maximum limit of 1,000 warheads.

The four operational conditions for second strike retaliation are:

- Forces are on generated alert and launched on warning (Gen/LOW)
- Forces are on generated alert and riding out the attack (Gen/RO)
- Forces are on day-to-day alert and launched on warning (Day/LOW)
- Forces are on day-to-day alert and riding out the attack (Day/RO).
Figure 1. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads New START Deployments

![Bar chart showing comparisons between Russian and U.S. warheads under new START deployments.](image1)

Figure 2. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads 1,000 Deployment Limit

![Bar chart showing comparisons between Russian and U.S. warheads under 1,000 deployment limit.](image2)
## Figure 3. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses New START Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>U.S. Defenses</th>
<th>Russian Defenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>81.05</td>
<td>122.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>162.10</td>
<td>244.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>243.15</td>
<td>366.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>324.20</td>
<td>489.17</td>
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</table>

**Russian Balance Triad 1,550**

## Figure 4. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses 1,000 Deployment Limit

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>U.S. Defenses</th>
<th>Russian Defenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>73.12</td>
<td>73.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>146.24</td>
<td>147.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>219.37</td>
<td>221.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>292.49</td>
<td>294.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Russian Balance Triad 1,000**
Figure 1 summarizes the outcomes for the 1,550 weapon deployment limit. Figure 2 provides similar information for the 1,000 warhead limit. For the sake of completeness in analysis, the results for U.S. and Russian balanced triad force structures are compared with the outcomes for alternative force structures for each state.

The results summarized in figures 1 and 2 show that the United States and Russia can fulfill the requirements for stable deterrence based on assured retaliation at, or even below, New START deployment ceilings. In either case, sufficient numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads exist to destroy unacceptable numbers of the first striker’s major cities and/or national infrastructure. The 1,000 deployment ceiling limits the options for attacking nuclear counterforce targets in retaliation more than does the 1,550 deployment limit, but especially in the most likely retaliatory postures during a crisis (generated alert and launch on warning, or generated alert and riding out the attack). Surviving and retaliating land- and sea-based forces and bomber delivered weapons provide some leverage against that target class. In addition, since the model is following New START counting rules that count each heavy bomber as only one weapon, it understates the number of surviving and retaliating weapons for each state, but especially for the better equipped U.S. bomber force.

Would missile defenses deployed by either or both sides change the outcomes depicted in figures 1 and 2? In figures 3 and 4, we examine the impact of antimissile defenses on retaliating U.S. and Russian second strike forces assuming an overall penetration capability for each side against opposed defenses of 40 percent (60 percent of the retaliators are intercepted or otherwise deflected away from their intended targets). This is a generous assumption for the effectiveness of missile defenses given present and foreseeable technologies. Figure 3 summarizes these results for the larger peacetime deployment limit of 1,550 warheads and figure 4 for the smaller peacetime deployment limit of 1,000 weapons.

The results summarized in figures 3 and 4 show that even the smaller (1,000 limit) of the two forces for each state can provide for numerous retaliating and arriving second strike warheads against opposed defenses of high competency by today’s standards. Russian forces on day-to-day alert and riding out the attack are limited to several tens of surviving and retaliating weapons, but Russian forces in a crisis will be alerted so this finding is an improbable worst case for them. On the other hand, if either the United States or Russia deployed advanced missile defenses in sufficient numbers to shift this equation, stable deterrence could be placed at risk—or, at least, the political perception of it.

Conclusions

There is nothing necessary or inevitable about the backsliding in the reset in U.S.-Russia relations, including the potential for additional strategic nuclear arms reductions. The United States and Russia could maintain stable deterrence based on assured retaliation at New START or lower levels, even in the face of highly competent defenses deployed by either state or by both states. Another reason for restarting the reset in U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control is to create additional momentum for NATO-Russia negotiations on reducing or eliminating nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons talks need to get moving before Russia is tempted to abrogate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and redeploy intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and in Asia. A third reason for post-New START reductions is to establish the United States and Russia as reliable leaders for multilateral nuclear arms reductions among the remaining nuclear weapons states. Drop-
NOTES


3 “Missile shield remarks forced measure, not political rhetoric—Medvedev,” RIA-Novosti, December 1, 2011.


6 “Duma wants reset between Russia and the US to be linked to MD talks,” Itar-Tass, November 28, 2011.


9 Russian military thinking and relevant traditions on this subject are explored in Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology through Toughness (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011).


11 Ibid.


13 For an especially ambitious example, see V.V. Druzhininn and D.S. Kontorov, Concept, algorithm, decision: Decision making and automation (a Soviet view) (Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1972), trans. and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. See also Thomas, Recasting the Red Star, 69–81.


15 Thomas, Recasting the Red Star, 247.

16 Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes, 166–167.


18 Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes, 244.


24 Ibid.


26 Ibid., 11, passim. See also Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Missile Defense Programs, Washington, DC, April 15, 2010.


28 The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. James Scouras for use of his AWSM® nuclear force exchange model in this study. Dr. Scouras is not responsible for its use here or for any arguments in this paper.

29 For Russia, the alternative force structures are a dyad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with no bombers, a dyad of ICBMs and bombers with no SLBMs, and a force composed entirely of ICBMs. For the United States, the alternative force structures are a dyad of SLBMs and bombers without ICBMs, a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs without bombers, and a force composed entirely of SLBMs.

30 These results are consistent with analyses completed by other researchers using different analytical models. See, for example, Bruce Blair et al., “Smaller and Safer: A New Plan for Nuclear Postures,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2010), 9–16.

31 For example, a three-tiered system might establish maximum numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons among nuclear weapons states as follows: 1,000 deployed weapons each for Russia and for the United States; 500 each for China, France, and the United Kingdom; and 300 each for India, Israel, and Pakistan.
The original mindset developed for thinking about nuclear weapons was theoretical. Herman Kahn, one of a group of civilians who eventually came to be called “nuclear strategists” and played an important role in shaping ideas about nuclear weapons, described the justification for this theoretical approach in 1965:

Despite the fact that nuclear weapons have already been used twice, and the nuclear sword has been rattled many times, one can argue that for all practical purposes nuclear war is still (and hopefully will remain) so far from our experience that it is difficult to reason from, or illustrate arguments by, analogies from history. Thus, many of our concepts and doctrines must be based on abstract and analytical considerations.¹

Military wisdom grows out of pragmatism, which is, in some ways, the opposite of the theoretical and abstract approach advocated by Kahn. Pragmatism is founded on experience. It takes the facts of history seriously and is tied to events rather than high concepts. In the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, a thorough review of the facts has thrown a new, more critical light on nuclear weapons. It seems that Cold War fear and tension led a number of nuclear weapons thinkers to overlook what should have been obvious. Military officers were always somewhat skeptical of nuclear weapons. It now appears that much of that skepticism was justified.

Ward Wilson is a Senior Fellow in the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies.

¹Military officers were always somewhat skeptical of nuclear weapons. It now appears that much of that skepticism was justified.
Hiroshima

In the run-up to Hiroshima, there were varying opinions inside the U.S. Government about what impact nuclear weapons would have. President Harry Truman's friend and colleague from the Senate, James "Jimmy" Byrnes (D-SC), soon to replace Edward Stettinius as Secretary of State, had high hopes. The Bomb, he told Truman, “might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war.” Byrnes and Truman both expressed the hope that the Bomb would be able to force Japan to surrender before the Russians came into the war.

Professional military men were less enthusiastic. Planners in the Bomb project itself called for the speedy completion of up to 10 more bombs by November 1, 1945. They clearly were not counting on two nuclear weapons alone to end the war. This judgment was ratified by Secretary of the Army George Marshall’s G2 (Intelligence), whose written report on August 8—2 days after the bombing of Hiroshima—flatly stated that the “atomic bomb will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days.” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal clearly agreed.

On the same day that Marshall’s G2 turned in his estimate to Marshall, Forrestal sent a letter to President Truman calling for the removal of Army General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the forthcoming invasion of Japan. Forrestal suggested that Admiral Chester Nimitz replace MacArthur. Such a request was sure to ignite inter-Service rivalry and cause tremendous controversy. An experienced Washington insider such as Forrestal would not have risked such a showdown if he believed that the second atomic bombing would cause Japan’s leaders to sue for peace 2 days later. Finally, even Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who guided the Bomb project from its inception and knew the most about it, was taken off guard by the sudden Japanese offer to surrender. Stimson was on his way out of town for a long weekend at his vacation home in Maryland when the Japanese offer arrived. He would not have been leaving Washington if he had thought that just two bombs would bring an offer to surrender. So the top military men in Washington were skeptical that nuclear weapons could coerce Japan to capitulate after only two attacks on cities.

It now seems that the military appraisals were right and Byrnes was wrong. New evidence from archives in Japan, the United States, and Russia, as well as reevaluations of old evidence, shows that Japan surrendered because of the Soviet Union’s decision to renounce its neutrality and join the war. The atomic bombings apparently had little to do with the decision.

Four sets of evidence are crucial in overturning the long-held view that nuclear weapons delivered a decisive shock to Japan’s leadership. First, the timing of events does not support the assertion that Hiroshima coerced surrender. Hiroshima was bombed at 0815 on August 6, 1945. Word of the attack began to reach Tokyo from various sources within half an hour, and by the afternoon, the governor of Hiroshima reported that one-third of the population had been killed and about two-thirds of the city destroyed. Early in the morning hours of August 7—because of the international dateline and delays associated with translation—Truman’s press statement, declaring that the attack was carried out with an atomic bomb and threatening a “rain of ruin” if Japan did not surrender, arrived in Tokyo. On the morning of August 8, Togo Shigenori, the foreign minister and advocate of a diplomatic solution to end the war, urged Premier Suzuki Kantaro to call a meeting of Japan’s Supreme Council—the effective ruling body of Japan at that point in the war. Suzuki checked with members of the Supreme Council (which was dominated by military men) and determined that there was insufficient interest to have a meeting to discuss the implications of Hiroshima. At midnight on August 8, the Soviet Union, which had signed a neutrality pact with Japan in 1941, renounced the pact and declared war. Soviet forces began attacking Japanese holdings in Manchuria, Sakhalin Island, and elsewhere. By 0430, word of the nature and scope of the attacks had begun to reach Tokyo. Within 6 hours—by 1030—the Supreme Council was meeting to discuss unconditional surrender.

When historians of the Bomb describe the events of this crucial week, they naturally put the dramatic focus on August 6 and the bombing of Hiroshima. It is, for them, a story about the Bomb. But from the Japanese perspective, the most important day of that week was not August 6, but August 9. That was the first day of the entire war—the first time in 14 years of conflict—that the Japanese government sat down to discuss surrender. What motivated them to finally take such a drastic step? It was not Nagasaki, which was bombed later in the day. It probably was not Hiroshima. That had been 3 full days earlier, and they had already considered whether to have a meeting to discuss its implications and rejected the notion. There is, however, an event that was both proximate and portentous that might have motivated them to think about surrender: the decision by the Soviet Union to join the war at midnight on August 8. Based on timing alone, the traditional interpretation of Hiroshima seems doubtful.

The second problem is one of scale. One would imagine, based on the way Hiroshima is described in the literature, that such a devastating attack must have made a strong impact. It is difficult to detect a single drop of rain, however, in the midst of a rainstorm. In the summer of 1945, the U.S. Army Air Force carried out one of the most intense and devastating bombing campaigns in the history of warfare against the cities of Japan. Sixty-eight cities were bombed and on average 50 percent destroyed; 300,000 civilians were killed and over 1 million made homeless. For 5 months from March until August, a Japanese city was turned into a smoking ruin every other day on average. We might imagine that Hiroshima would be the worst of these attacks by a wide margin. But that is not the case. If we graph the number of civilians killed in all 68 cities, according to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Hiroshima was second. Tokyo, in a conventional attack, lost more people. If we graph the square miles destroyed, Hiroshima was sixth. If we graph the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima was seventeenth.

Although the attack on Hiroshima is often presented as horrifying and shocking, the actual scale of the attack was not outside the scope of what Japan had been experiencing all summer. In fact, Minister of War
Anami Korechika, by this point probably the most powerful man in the government (including the Emperor), stated that the atomic bombings were no more menacing than the fire bombings that Japan had endured for months. If Japan’s leaders were shocked by Hiroshima, why did they not surrender after any of the other city attacks?

The third set of evidence is the reactions of Japan’s leaders to the two events. A close examination of meeting minutes, actions, and diary entries at the time shows that while Hiroshima was recognized as a problem, it did not seem to change the equation of the war.3 The Soviet declaration of war and invasion, however, touched off a crisis. When Army Deputy Chief of Staff Kawabe Toroshiro realized that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, he wrote in his diary that it gave him a “serious jolt.” But, he opined philosophically, “we must fight on.” When Cabinet Secretary Sakamizu Hisatsune was woken in the early morning hours of August 9 and told that Russia had declared war, he was so angry he “felt as if all the blood in [his] body ran backwards.” The actions that Japan’s leaders took are more telling. On the morning the Soviets entered the war, army officers met to discuss their strategy for the upcoming Supreme Council meeting. General Kawabe suggested that martial law be imposed, the Emperor captured, and military rule imposed. No such emergency meetings were held, and no such extreme measures were considered on the morning Hiroshima was bombed. Examine the reactions to the two sets of events and the contrast is plain: Hiroshima was a serious problem, one of a number of problems, but the Soviet entry into the war was a crisis.

Finally, the most important evidence has to do with the strategic importance of the two events. With more than a million men still under arms on the Japanese Home Islands, military leaders could reasonably have imagined that they could make an invasion costly enough that the United States would offer better surrender terms. They had been steadily and laboriously shifting men into position in the south for this very purpose. Now more than a million and a half new adversaries had joined the fight, and they were poised to attack from the north, where Japan’s defenses were weakest. Fighting one superpower attacking from one direction might just have been possible, but fighting two invading from opposite directions was clearly beyond Japan’s limited military capability at that stage of the war.

The Soviet invasion also drastically changed the timescale of decisionmaking. Japan’s leaders correctly assessed that the U.S. invasion would not occur for some months. The Soviet 16th army, however, had orders to quickly conquer the southern half of Sakhalin Island and then be ready to invade Hokkaido—the northernmost of Japan’s Home Islands—within 10 to 14 days. Suddenly the timescale for invasion had gone from months to days. And Japan’s leaders had already recognized the strategic significance of the Soviet Union’s role. In a Supreme Council meeting in June discussing long-term prospects, they had agreed that Soviet entry into the war would “determine the fate of the Empire.” In that same meeting, General Kawabe asserted, “The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations

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USS Essex–based TBM’s and SB2Cs bomb Hakodate, Japan, July 1945

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with the Soviet Union is one of the fundamental conditions for continuing the war.”

The declaration of war by the Soviet Union was strategically decisive. The bombing of Hiroshima was not. Claiming that Japan surrendered because of the bombing of Hiroshima is, in part, a claim that the military men who were leading Japan did not know their business. Their job was to evaluate which factors impacted the overall strategic calculation and which did not. Hiroshima clearly did not. How could Japan’s military have agreed to surrender as a result of an event that was strategically unimportant?

In the years after the war, believing that the bombing of Hiroshima coerced Japan was natural because Japan’s Emperor had declared that the bombing was the cause of the surrender. But two facts throw doubt on the Emperor’s claim. First, the announcement that prominently mentioned the atomic bomb was in a radio broadcast to civilians. Tellingly, the announcement that was sent out 2 days later to the members of the military made no mention of the Bomb but focused on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. It seems as if the Emperor was using the arguments that each audience would find persuasive. With civilians, who cared about city bombing, he talked about bombing. With military men, who cared about the military situation, he talked about Russia.

Secondly, the Bomb made the perfect explanation for losing the war. Instead of having to admit grievous errors of judgment that led to enormous loss of life and destruction, Japan’s leaders could blame defeat on a sudden scientific breakthrough by the enemy that no one could have predicted. At a single stroke, they were no longer responsible for having lost the war.

The story of why Hiroshima was identified as the cause of surrender rather than the Soviet declaration of war has yet to be written. Obviously, complex motives of national pride and influence played central roles. The important point is not, however, as some historians would have it, whether the United States was wrong to drop the Bomb on Hiroshima. Attacking cities was, at that point, an established part of the war. The important question is whether bombing a city with a nuclear weapon works—whether it will reliably coerce an adversary into surrendering. Much of the claim that nuclear weapons have a special psychological ability to coerce and deter is based on the experience of Hiroshima. The new evidence about the end of the war now throws doubt on this assertion. The new interpretation of Hiroshima is surprising because we are used to the old one. But it would not have surprised the senior military leaders in the U.S. Government at the time: they were all already skeptical of the bomb’s ability to influence events.

Nuclear War

One of the most important constructs in the field of nuclear weapons is our image of what a nuclear war would be like. Much of our national political debate has been shaped by perceptions of nuclear war, and nuclear deterrence depends, in part, on conceptions of nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence is supposed to work this way: a leader takes an aggressive action, his adversary warns him of the risk of nuclear war, the leader sees an image of a nuclear war in his mind’s eye, and he then thinks better of his aggression. The image of nuclear war is critical. It is discouraging, therefore, to consider that most civilians and political leaders think about nuclear war based on cultural myths and religious prophecies that are thousands of years old.

Military conceptions of nuclear war tend to be quite realistic. Declassified war plans from the late 1940s and early 1950s show a clear and pragmatic vision of what such a war would be like. Fleetwood, the original war plan drawn up in 1948, called for the use of the full U.S. nuclear arsenal at the outset of the war. A total of 133 bombs would be used against some 70 Soviet cities, resulting in several million casualties and the destruction of 30 to 40 percent of Soviet industrial capacity. The plan’s authors, however, did not confuse this enormous devastation with victory. They estimated that Soviet forces would then launch an invasion of Europe and that the United States would have to prepare itself for a traditional conventional land war in Europe. The men who drew up this plan had just finished fighting a global war against Germany and Japan. They were some of the most experienced military leaders in the United States at that time. Their judgments are worth taking seriously.

As nuclear forces evolved and Soviet nuclear forces became more capable, estimates of the likely first round of any war with the Soviet Union changed. But the presumption that the initial nuclear phase of a war would not be decisive remained the same. Here
is Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, describing what such a war might be like to an audience in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1955: “Presumably massive blows would continue as long as either side retained the capability. . . . With the passing of the initial phase, and if the issue is still unresolved, tough people would carry on across the radioactive ashes and water, with what weapons are left.” Similarly, a British white paper from 1954 described a war with initial devastation that did not resolve the dispute.

much of our national political debate has been shaped by perceptions of nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, in part, on conceptions of nuclear war

In what one strategist called a “broken-backed war,” it was presumed that both sides would unleash significant salvos on each other but that neither would surrender as a result. These are serious attempts to estimate what would happen in a novel situation. It is true that when the bombers of these early scenarios were replaced with missiles, the nature of the war changed. But these early plans and predictions are useful reminders that a nuclear attack might not be immediately decisive. Nuclear war could play out in a number of different ways.¹

Compare these military appreciations with the typical civilian vision of nuclear war. Politicians and civilians could draw on declassified studies such as these to shape a picture of what nuclear war might be like. They could take military thinking as a starting point and try to reason from these estimates to a likely outcome. But civilian thinking about nuclear war ignores military judgment and experience.

In the popular imagination, nuclear war is most often thought about as an apocalypse. When people talk about nuclear war being “the end of everything” or “the destruction of all life on earth,” they clearly have in mind an image based on apocalypse. Apocalypse occurs so often in the public debate about nuclear war that it almost passes unnoticed. But apocalypse is a very specific phenomenon. It is the story of a world mired in sin, in which a small sect remains true to a set of values (usually by living according to a very strict code), a gigantic cataclysmic event or war wipes out much of the Earth, and the small sect survives because of its faith. Apocalyptic writing occurs across cultures and eras. There is, of course, the apocalyptic book of Revelation in the Christian Bible. The book of Daniel in the Hebrew Bible is also apocalyptic. There are apocalyptic suras in the Koran. Scores of other religious traditions—from ancient Persian Zoroastrianism to the Norse sagas of Scandinavia—have apocalyptic stories. Apocalypse figures in writing in Europe from the third through fifth centuries in the Sibylline Oracles. The apocalyptic Shangqing scripture of Taoism was produced in China in the fourth century. Nostradamus wrote in the 1500s. Apocalyptic writings led to political uprisings in Germany and England in the 16th and 17th centuries. At the turn of the 19th century, millenialists predicted the end of time and the coming of the Lord at midnight December 31. Many eras and cultures prophesy apocalypse.

When we stop to consider it, the biblical elements in the language used about nuclear weapons is striking. Not only did the original observers of the first test reach for biblical language (“A great blinding light lit up the sky and earth as if God himself had appeared among us. . . . there came the report of an explosion, sudden and sharp as if the skies had cracked . . . a vision from the Book of Revelations”), but even the alternate name for nuclear war evokes the Bible. We could refer to nuclear war as “super science war,” since it involves remarkable and advanced science. We could call it “megadeath war,” since it would likely lead to millions of people killed. We could even call it “wargasm,” the flippant coinage of Herman Kahn. But we do not call it any of these names. When we do not call nuclear war apocalypse, we refer to it by the name of a hill in Israel that is the site, in the Bible, of the Last Battle at the End of Days— we call it Armageddon.

All of these biblical allusions and apocalyptic descriptions raise the question of why we talk about a 21st-century military phenomenon in terms of 2,000 years of religious prophecies. If we are going to try to develop pragmatic and sober policies for handling nuclear weapons, how can it make sense to think about them using religious ideas rather than basing our thinking on the facts on the ground? One of the most disturbing aspects of the nuclear weapons debate is that given the choice between trying to think realistically and factually about nuclear war or thinking in terms of familiar religious prophesy and cultural myth, most people grabbed apocalypse with both hands. If serious and sensible policies are to be formulated, it is necessary to at least begin our analysis with a pragmatic military frame of mind rather than religious thinking.

Nuclear Deterrence

The standard claim for nuclear weapons is that they are not really intended to be used on the battlefield; their chief value is as psychological tools. One way to define nuclear deterrence is “manipulating the fear of nuclear war for political ends.” Nuclear deterrence, it is sometimes claimed, is a special form of deterrence that operates largely outside the rules of other forms of deterrence (deterrence with conventional weapons, for example, or deterring lawbreakers, and so on). One important proof of this special status was the unbroken string of successes that nuclear deterrence enjoyed during the Cold War crises in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and intermittently thereafter until the fall of the Soviet Union. Even the first Gulf War was supposed to illustrate the power of nuclear deterrence. Because of its unique status and the fact that it apparently operated under a special set of rules, the standard lessons and wisdom of military experience were often set aside when dealing with nuclear deterrence in favor of specialized theories of nuclear threat. The problem is that the unbroken string of successes seems largely illusory.

The first crisis of the Cold War period occurred when Soviet forces cut off access to the western sectors of Berlin in 1948. Each of the four Allies had been allocated a sector of Germany to administer and the capital city, Berlin, located deep in the eastern, Soviet sector of Germany, had also been divided into four sectors. Unhappy over plans for reintegrating Germany based on a Western model, Josef Stalin ordered Russian troops to close all roadways and rail lines to supplies from the West. Without supplies the people of West Berlin would starve.

President Harry Truman ordered B-29 bombers redeployed to England. The B-29 was the bomber that had dropped nuclear weapons on Japan, and although these
bombers had not been modified to allow them to drop nuclear weapons, when word of the redeployment was leaked to the press, it was widely assumed that the United States had clear and available capacity to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Although some historians have been skeptical that the redeployment had much impact on the crisis, in Washington in the years that followed, it was widely believed that Truman’s “nuclear threat” was important in resolving the crisis.6

What is rarely asked about this crisis is what Stalin was thinking. He ordered the blockade at a time when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. One of the options considered in Washington for relieving the blockade was forcing an armored column up the autobahn to Berlin. Stalin initiated a crisis that could have led to war despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly.

Although this episode is not entirely persuasive regarding the failure of nuclear deterrence (there was, for example, no explicit threat made), what is troubling is that so little investigation has gone into the facts of the case. When planes crash, the Federal Aviation Administration takes extraordinary steps to understand exactly what went wrong. Given the stakes involved, should not the same standard apply to potential failures of nuclear deterrence? Should not each potential failure be pored over carefully until the exact details are completely understood?

A far more disturbing failure of nuclear deterrence occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet attempt to sneak ballistic missiles into Cuba in 1962 is often cited as clear proof that nuclear deterrence works. After all, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, when confronted with the danger of nuclear war, withdrew the missiles. But this overlooks the failure of the danger of nuclear war to deter President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy’s actions could have caused the crisis to spiral out of control to nuclear war. After the crisis President Kennedy’s brother Robert wrote that although the President had initiated the course of events, “he no longer had control over them,” and Kennedy himself told aide Theodore Sorensen that the odds of war had been “somewhere between one and three and even.” During the discussions that led to the choice of a blockade of Cuba, the danger of nuclear war was mentioned 60 times. Kennedy clearly knew that blockading Cuba carried with it the risk of nuclear war.

The President’s handling of the crisis was, in retrospect, masterful, and there is little doubt that he chose the least aggressive of the action options presented to him. But he could also have chosen to do nothing. The reputation and standing of the Soviet Union had not collapsed after the U.S. introduction of nuclear missiles into Italy and Turkey in 1961. There is good reason to suspect that Kennedy might have lost the election of 1964 had he not taken action on the missiles in Cuba. But should a President place the lives of 100 million U.S. civilians at risk (the estimated number who might have died in an all-out nuclear war in 1962) to prevent personal and political humiliation? In any case, the question is not whether Kennedy was an admirable President, or whether his actions were justified. The question is whether nuclear deterrence works reliably. And here the facts are indisputable: a leader was faced with the prospect of an uncontrollable crisis where the risks of nuclear war were high and he was not deterred from escalating the crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides clear evidence that nuclear deterrence can fail in alarming ways.

It is often asserted that the Gulf War provides further confirmation that nuclear deterrence works. Secretary of State James Baker sent a letter to the Iraqi government prior to the outbreak of hostilities warning that if chemical or biological weapons were used, the United States would respond with the “full measure of force” against Iraq. The threat was widely viewed as a nuclear threat. Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons, and, therefore, it is often asserted, the power of nuclear deterrence was once again demonstrated. But the facts in full are not so reassuring. Secretary Baker actually drew three red lines in the sand: Iraq had to forgo using chemical or biological weapons, setting the Kuwaiti oil wells on fire, and making terrorist attacks against U.S. allies. As is well known, the Iraqis crossed two of those three lines: they set the oil wells alight and launched Scud missile attacks against Israeli civilians. How is it possible to call a threat that was only one-third successful real support for the theory of nuclear deterrence? Admittedly, a batter who gets a hit one out of every three trips to the plate is judged a successful baseball player, but nuclear deterrence is not baseball. Because of the catastrophic consequences that could result from an all-out nuclear war, nuclear deterrence has to be perfect or at least vanishingly close to perfect. As these three examples illustrate, however,
there are a number of cases that appear to be nuclear deterrence failures.

And the list of other crises in which nuclear deterrence could be plausibly argued to have failed is longer. Why, for example, did the redeployment of bombers to bases in the Pacific not deter the Chinese from entering the Korean War in 1951? Why was Israel’s quite public possession of nuclear weapons (it was reported in the New York Times) not sufficient to prevent a full-scale conventional attack in the Middle East in 1973? Why, in other words, were Anwar Sadat and Hafiz al-Assad not deterred by the risk of a one-sided nuclear war? In 1982, the Argentines occupied the British Falkland Islands, instigating war and again risking one-sided nuclear attack. Why did the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal not deter Argentina’s leaders?

There are arguments that can be offered in each of these cases explaining these potential failures. What is troubling is that these failures have not been explored in depth. In almost every case, the “successes” of nuclear deterrence are touted while the possible failures are swept under the rug. Most of the literature about the Middle East War of 1973, for example, focuses on the “successful” use of a nuclear forces alert ordered by Henry Kissinger to deter the Soviet Union from sending paratroopers to reinforce Egypt in the waning days of the fighting. The initial failure is hardly ever discussed.

It appears that claims for the special nature of nuclear deterrence and its unblemished record of perfection may well be based on a selective reading of the evidence, rather than a careful, thorough, and fair-minded review of the facts. The history of warfare demonstrates that there are extreme hazards associated with embracing novel military theories that are not founded on actual experience.

Conclusion

Today there are increasing doubts about nuclear weapons. President Barack Obama has set a goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and there is currently discussion of deep reductions in the requirements for the U.S. arsenal. Former Secretaries of State, Defense, and many others have expressed both doubts about the current reliability of nuclear deterrence and support for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Even the first commander of U.S. Strategic Command famously expressed doubts (after his retirement) about the serviceability of nuclear weapons over the long run. The words of General Lee Butler in 1998 now seem remarkably prescient: “I see with painful clarity that from the very beginnings of the nuclear era, the objective scrutiny and searching debate essential to adequate comprehension and responsible oversight of its vast enterprises were foreshortened or foregone.”

There is no question that there is a limited set of cases in which nuclear weapons are the best tools for accomplishing certain missions. Whether those limited uses are sufficient to offset the known dangers that the weapons inevitably bring is a political judgment. It seems likely that there will be an extended political debate on the issue. The judgment of the military on the practical question of the usefulness of nuclear weapons deserves to be heard clearly in that debate. Too often in the past, when these weapons have been discussed, unrealistic—even fantastic—opinions about their impact on world affairs have been voiced without the restraining influence of experience and practical knowledge. On the topic of nuclear weapons, military wisdom is essential.

NOTES

1 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 134.


3 See, in particular, the diaries of Kawabe Toroshiro quoted in Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 200; Takagi Sokichi’s diary entry for Wednesday August 8, 1945, in Burr, doc. 55; and the diary entry for Ugaki Matone in Kort, 319.

4 Admiral Robert Carney and the British white paper are quoted in Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 160–162. There were a number of studies of limited nuclear war in the 1950s and again in the 1970s. See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957); Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). Regional nuclear wars, which are perhaps the most likely, would probably be limited and rely on tactical or theater weapons much more than a war between the United States and Russia.

5 Exaggerated fears are also found in the debate about nuclear terrorism. For a useful antidote, see Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008).

Managing Foreign Assistance in a CBRN Emergency
The U.S. Government Response to Japan’s “Triple Disaster”

By SUZANNE BASALLA, WILLIAM BERGER, and C. SPENCER ABBOT

Responding to a major disaster is invariably time-critical, complex, and difficult. Supporting a foreign government engaged in a disaster response adds an additional layer of logistical, linguistic, cultural, and organizational challenges. The tsunami caused by the March 11, 2011, earthquake in Japan killed more than 19,000 people and destroyed coastal settlements along a massive swath of Japan’s eastern coast. Responding to a natural disaster of such magnitude would prove a monumental task for any country. Japan, through its extensive community level training and significant investment in disaster preparedness, is as experienced and capable as any nation in coping with nature’s hazards. However, as the grave situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant unfolded in the days following the tsunami, the Japanese government confronted a crisis of unprecedented and daunting complexity.

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Commanding generals of III Marine Expeditionary Force and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force discuss progress of disaster relief mission at Uranohama Port.
To understand the threats to Japan posed by the cascading sequence of breakdowns at the plant, and to undertake the actions required to halt the disaster’s progression, the Japanese government had to knit together information, assessments, and capabilities from a wide array of government and private sector actors, many of whom do not normally work together. To support Japan in its efforts to respond to the complex and rapidly unfolding crisis, the U.S. Government similarly required disparate agencies that do not often interact to quickly establish a close, collaborative working relationship in the midst of an emergency.

This first large-scale U.S. response to a complex disaster including a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) element required a number of organizational adaptations over the course of the crisis. The U.S. Government has established detailed procedures for responding to such incidents under the rubric of Foreign Consequence Management (FCM). Yet in managing the situation, U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that existing guidance was vague and undefined with respect to interagency organizational processes and structures needed to absorb additional personnel sent forward and to execute the foreign assistance aspect of the FCM function. The government of the affected state has primary responsibility for responding to CBRN events within its territory. Some indeterminacy exists, however, within the U.S. Government as to the lead agency role during a foreign assistance effort in response to a CBRN emergency.1 Within the affected country, responsibility falls to the Chief of Mission, in this case U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, to coordinate the activities of the various agencies involved in the disaster response. Over time, both the Japanese and the U.S. governments’ organizational mechanisms evolved in response to the complex demands of supporting the Japanese government through its management of the nuclear emergency. The lessons of the crisis response warrant review and consideration, as future responses to a natural or manmade disaster abroad that include a CBRN aspect—whether an epidemic, an attack with a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb”; or a terrorist attack with a biological agent—would also necessitate rapid integration of disparate but vital capabilities from both inside and outside government.

The U.S. Government Approach to Disaster Assistance

The U.S. Government possesses a well-developed and proven system for responding to natural disasters abroad, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) playing the lead role. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created USAID and delegated disaster assistance authority to the USAID administrator. Yet OFDA’s predecessor office was not created until 1964–1965 after clear failures in interagency coordination during a disaster response in Macedonia drove congressional pressure for a more robust coordinative structure. Consideration was given within Congress at the time to assigning the lead role to the Department of Defense (DOD); however, by assigning the role of lead Federal agency in an international disaster response to USAID and OFDA, the United States has maintained a primarily civilian face for its disaster assistance efforts and has provided a mechanism for coordination of DOD and other governmental and nongovernmental actors involved in disaster relief.2 Given the wide array of actors involved in a disaster response—a number that only continues to grow in present day emergencies—effective disaster relief coordination poses a constant challenge for OFDA and for the humanitarian relief community, especially when significant numbers of military or other Federal Government personnel are involved.

OFDA drew on the very successful “incident management system” concept developed by the U.S. Forest Service to create its Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) model, through which OFDA organizes responses to the most serious disasters abroad. Domestically, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a well-understood organizational structure that readily incorporates contributions from external actors, is tailored in size to the situation at hand, and can be replicated at the local, state, or national level.3 A key mechanism within NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides a standardized approach to managing on-scene activities, with staffing support concentrated in five central areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.4 The ICS organizational structure is not unlike the staffing model used by the U.S. military and is designed to be put in place rapidly when required, as well as to integrate a broad spectrum of outside agencies and organizations. The Department of Homeland Security has incorporated the ICS construct under NIMS as the foundational structure used in its National Response Framework (NRF), the primary document guiding U.S. domestic disaster response planning and execution. The NRF seeks to provide “scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures” for use in responses ranging from

U.S. officials engaged in the response within Japan found that existing guidance was vague and undefined with respect to interagency organizational processes and structures
system, noted that "One of the singular advantages of deploying a DART is that it automatically clarifies who is in charge, which avoids the usual problem of leadership and reporting confusion when multiple [U.S.] agencies go into the field. This clarity even extends to the U.S. military when [it is] involved in a response."7

Substantial progress has been made over the past decade in clarifying and systematizing coordination between USAID and DOD in particular. USAID development advisors and OFDA humanitarian assistance advisors have been stationed in each of the DOD geographic combatant commands, and an Office of Military Affairs (now the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation) was created within USAID in 2005. While occurring in very different contexts, both the 2010 U.S. disaster response in Haiti and the 2011 response in Japan involved substantial numbers of military personnel, placing a premium on both interagency and multinational coordination.

The Initial Response to Japan’s Humanitarian Crisis

The collaborative effort between Japan and the United States in the wake of the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake represents the largest cooperative military undertaking in the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance. To confront the crisis, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) mobilized more than 100,000 personnel, establishing the first joint task force in its history and calling up reserve forces to active duty for the first time. More than 24,000 U.S. troops supported Japan’s disaster response through Operation Tomodachi, working closely with USAID, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and a host of other U.S. Government agencies. Indeed, the response to the March 11 “triple disaster” represented an unprecedented whole-of-government effort by both Japan and the United States.

Immediately after receiving reports of the massive damage and loss of life caused by the tsunami, USAID mobilized and deployed a DART to coordinate U.S. assistance to the Japanese government. USAID Administrator Shah, after assessing reports from the region in consultation with senior officials from across the U.S. Government, made a timely decision, within 24 hours of the earthquake, to include representatives from the NRC in the original composition of the DART. This decision ensured that U.S. nuclear power expertise, and reachback to U.S.-based colleagues, was available from the early days of the unfolding crisis. The ability to rapidly fund and support interagency colleagues from relevant agencies is one of the key advantages of the DART construct, and the short-notice deployment of these experts reflects the value of close interagency consultation and information-sharing in the immediate wake of a major disaster.

OFDA maintains agreements with Fairfax County (Virginia) and Los Angeles County (California) to provide rapidly deployable Urban Search-and-Rescue (USAR) teams. On March 13, USAR teams arrived in Japan aboard a commercial aircraft chartered by OFDA, and the equipment cache arrived via U.S. Air Force C-17s, pursuant to a formal USAID request for DOD support. With Misawa Air Base providing invaluable logistics, mapping, and other support, these USAR teams focused their efforts on the areas of Ofunato and Kamaishi on the heavily damaged Iwate coast. The DART quickly
assigned a humanitarian assistance advisor to the military at the headquarters of U.S. Forces–Japan (USFJ) at Yokota Air Base to assist with civil-military coordination and the vetting of requests for U.S. military assistance received from the Japanese government.

OFDA uses a system called the Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) to receive, assess, validate, and prioritize requests for military assistance during a disaster. This system has been successfully used to facilitate civil-military coordination in numerous disaster response efforts, and the MITAM system is

thoroughly briefed to U.S. military participants in the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course taught by OFDA personnel. During the Operation Tomodachi relief effort, USFJ successfully used a related process named the Joint Requirements Review Board to assess requests brought forward by the MITAM system and to determine whether those requests could be supported based on the joint task force commander’s priorities and the resources available. USFJ also positioned Bilateral Crisis Action Teams with the Japanese government at the Japanese joint task force headquarters in Sendai and at the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Ichigaya, where the USFJ deputy was stationed. USFJ also hosted a JSDF general officer and numerous other JSDF officers at USFJ headquarters at Yokota Air Base.

Because the Japanese government organizes its disaster relief efforts at the prefectural level—roughly analogous to that of a U.S. state—it does not maintain a national civilian agency specifically focused on disaster relief, as FEMA does in the United States. The JSDF thus plays an especially important role in large-scale disaster relief within Japan. As such, the close working relationship and long history of combined exercises between the U.S. and Japanese militaries proved extremely valuable throughout the course of Operation Tomodachi and in the disaster response more broadly. Through Operation Tomodachi, the U.S. military delivered approximately 189 tons of food, 87 tons of relief materials, and 2 million gallons of potable water to support Japan’s relief efforts.

After consultations with the Japanese government, U.S. forces cleared the debris-covered runway at Sendai Airport sufficiently to allow a C-130 aircraft to land on March 16, only 5 days after the tsunami. The opening of the airport allowed the Japanese government and relief agencies to fly massive quantities of supplies into the area. The rapid opening of the airport was accomplished by hard-working men and women of the U.S. military and made possible by close communication and cooperation between U.S. commanders and the JSDF. Communication is of paramount importance in a post-disaster environment. Military officers on both sides who could work in both Japanese and English were especially valuable to the disaster response effort and in high demand to facilitate communication and coordination at all levels, from boots-on-the-ground roles to policy-level coordination in Tokyo. These included foreign area officers in various U.S. commands within Japan, officers with language training stationed at the Embassy, as well as others, such as officers enrolled in foreign war college and exchange billets with the JSDF.

A large number of outside augmentees from a variety of organizations joined permanently stationed USFJ personnel. Augmenta-
tion of existing U.S. military capacity in Japan included the deployment of a joint task force led by Admiral Patrick Walsh, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Admiral Walsh served during his forward deployment to Japan as overall joint task force commander at the augmented headquarters and led what was designated the Joint Support Force (JSF). Command of the JSF was then passed to Lieutenant General Burton Field, USAF, the USFJ commander. The military’s joint task force construct is a key mechanism through which a staff can be built or augmented in response to the needs of a particular situation and represents a well-understood and frequently exercised process that can quickly absorb and channel the activities of supplementary personnel arriving during a contingency or crisis. This process was key to enhancing USFJ’s capacity to cope with the massive demands of executing Operation Tomodachi, coordinating with other U.S. agencies, and supporting the JSDF in their crisis response efforts.

Confronting the Nuclear Emergency

U.S. Embassy Tokyo and civilian U.S. Government agencies involved in the disaster response faced similar challenges and the need for additional staff and resources as the severity of the crisis became clear. As DART personnel were arriving to carry out the U.S. humanitarian response in the days following the earthquake and tsunami, the situation at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant became a prime focus of U.S. officials as they sought to support the Japanese government and safeguard the well-being of the large community of American citizens living and working in Japan.

The NRC personnel who initially deployed with the DART team were soon
augmented by senior NRC management and additional NRC staff. The NRC team set its base of operations within the Embassy and worked closely with senior Embassy staff, USFJ, and officials from other agencies who arrived to assist the response effort. The DOE augmented the Energy Attaché’s office in the Embassy with officials from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration and other DOE personnel to advise on the response to radiological contamination, the status of the accident as it progressed, and subsequent stabilization and cleanup activities. DOE soon partnered with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and USFJ to undertake airborne measurements of ground deposition of radioactive elements and shared the results of those assessments with the Japanese government. This capacity was later transferred to the Japanese government, and the measuring equipment was then flown on aircraft operated by the JSDF.

One of the most critical challenges faced by Ambassador Roos and Embassy staff was communicating with the substantial community of U.S. citizens in Japan regarding the rapidly evolving emergency at the nuclear plant. Ultimately, social media proved an especially useful tool for engaging with the community of U.S. citizens in Japan, and the Embassy Public Affairs staff used Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to provide updates on the situation and to distribute information on response measures, such as recommendations on protective measures including evacuation zones around the plant.

One of the core challenges in managing a CBRN emergency is to understand and acknowledge the uncertainty and fear that arises among potentially affected citizens and to address public concerns through timely and transparent communication. A risk communication expert from the Centers for Disease Control, along with subject matter experts from multiple agencies, engaged directly with the community of U.S. citizens in several forums to answer questions and help explain the practical effects of some of the complex technical issues associated with the crisis. Visiting experts from the Food and Drug Administration helped assess the effects of the radiological release on the food chain, a radiation oncologist from the National Cancer Institute provided expert views on potential health effects on the population, and officials from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration drew lessons learned from fisheries management during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill crisis to help inform officials engaged in managing the crisis in Japan. The U.S. Civilian Response Corps deployed personnel to Embassy Tokyo via the USAID Office of Civilian Response to augment civilian capacity in support of the response effort.

Ultimately, some 145 additional personnel arrived at U.S. Embassy Tokyo to augment the 270 direct-hire personnel normally stationed there. This number does not include the many U.S. military augmentees who were assigned to USFJ headquarters in Yokota and other locations throughout Japan and the Japanese government inquiries regarding potential U.S. assistance. A government in the throes of managing such a complex crisis has limited capacity for addressing requests for information and other inquiries amid the many other activities involved in managing the crisis. Recognizing the large number of information channels between the U.S. and Japanese governments, the Japanese government, in consultation with U.S. officials, established an effective mechanism for centralizing intergovernmental dialogue under the oversight of Goshi Hosono, then special advisor to Prime Minister Naoto Kan, and later designated the minister in charge of managing the nuclear crisis. This mechanism, formally known as the Joint Crisis Management Coordination Group, but generally referred to by U.S. officials as the “Hosono Process,” structured and enhanced communication between the two governments on issues related to the crisis, particularly regarding U.S. support to the Japanese government. Furthermore, the focused dialogue at the Hosono Process meetings spurred interagency coordination on both sides. On the U.S. side, a need became increasingly apparent as the crisis continued into April for an interagency organization internal to the Embassy, specifically focused on supporting U.S. engagement in the Hosono Process, and capable of absorbing and integrating the efforts of additional personnel sent to the Embassy from various agencies in response to the crisis.

The DART served this role in part through the end of April, as the NRC representatives were themselves members of the DART, and the DART coordinated closely with the Embassy’s Emergency Action Committee, the Joint Support Force, and other organizations involved in supporting the Japanese government. The DART concept is a well-honed method for deploying civilian capacity to a foreign country to assist local crisis-affected citizens, typically basing operations in the U.S. Embassy, and coordinating U.S. Government relief efforts with the host country government under the authority of the U.S. Chief of Mission. Yet while the military joint task force construct serves to organize and manage personnel and resources in

social media proved an especially useful tool for engaging with the community of U.S. citizens in Japan
support of a military contingency operation, no analogous coordination mechanism exists to absorb and structure civilian personnel sent to a U.S. Embassy to support crisis management in the case of a CBRN emergency that affects Americans abroad and/or has domestic impacts.9

**Organizing for Interagency Collaboration**

As the humanitarian needs in the region affected by the tsunami became less acute toward the latter part of April, the DART assessed that an appropriate time had been reached to stand down its humanitarian response function. Yet because of the ongoing need for support and bilateral dialogue on matters relating to the nuclear emergency, a follow-on body was needed to help bring together the various stakeholders involved in providing support to the Japanese government in the consequence management sphere. In cooperation with DART leadership, and in consultation with involved offices in Washington, DC, Ambassador Roos convened an organizational mechanism entitled the Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell (BACC) to support U.S. engagement in the Hosono Process. The BACC included representatives from OFDA and all of the relevant Embassy offices, as well as other stakeholder organizations such as the NRC, DOE, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, USPACOM, and USFJ. The BACC reached back to parent agencies in Washington as well as to the private sector through the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service. NRC also facilitated technical dialogue with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators on behalf of the BACC.

The BACC received requests for assistance from the Japanese government via the Hosono Process at multiple venues: in higher level meetings, at action officer–level working groups chaired by the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, and in a radiological monitoring subworking group hosted by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. Each of these meetings involved representatives from numerous Japanese and U.S. organizations involved in supporting the crisis response. Assistance requests were added to a tracking matrix that was developed by the DART and managed bilaterally between the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat and U.S. Embassy. The BACC tasking matrix essentially applied to bilateral coordination of nuclear-related foreign assistance the proven MITAM system used by the DART for civil-military coordination, providing a single tool for listing all requests for U.S. assistance, tracking progress toward their accomplishment, and recording the U.S. and Japanese personnel responsible for vetting and responding to the requests.

Using the shared matrix, members of the BACC team were able to interact effectively with Japanese counterparts in a working-level support group that was established to inform and implement decisions reached through the Hosono Process. Formal requests for material assistance were categorized as to their priority, and requests for information and technical assistance were included in a separate section. As requests were either completed or withdrawn, they were moved to the end of the BACC matrix. The matrix was exchanged between the U.S. and the Japanese prior to Hosono Process meetings, with additions and modifications made collaboratively in advance. This collaborative system proved extremely useful in enabling timely and
efficient responses to requests for assistance by the Japanese government, created a single, streamlined vehicle for communication between the two governments, and represented a successful adaptation of the proven DART MITAM system for use in a bilateral context to support a host nation in managing a CBRN emergency abroad.

**Lessons from the Response**

Numerous lessons arose during this complex disaster response that could help shape the U.S. and Japanese governments’ approaches to future emergencies, especially any that might involve a CBRN element. Over the course of the crisis, it became apparent that across both governments, agencies focused primarily on domestic disaster response possess limited familiarity and experience working with agencies focused on international disaster response, and vice versa. In the United States, the National Response Framework, shaped in part by lessons learned through the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, enables all response partners to collaboratively plan, train, and respond to domestic disasters and emergencies with a unified national response. One of the important lessons identified after the U.S. response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti was that an analogous International Response Framework (IRF) might help domestic and internationally focused U.S. Government agencies better understand each other’s organizations, capabilities, and procedures. Vexing issues such as donor coordination and staffing augmentation, along with agency roles in responses to complex disasters involving a CBRN element such as radiological events, biological threats, or epidemics—scenarios that are covered in disasters and emergencies with a unified CBRN emergency might find that a similar Embassy-based structure could help absorb and channel arriving personnel capacity, augmenting staff support for the U.S. Chief of Mission and enhancing U.S. Government assistance to the affected state.

**NOTES**

1. See Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Foreign Consequence Mangement Legal Deskbook (Washington, DC: DTRA, January 2007), available at <www.dtra.mil/documents/business/ current/FCMLegalDeskbook.pdf>. This document states that “unless the President directs otherwise, the Department of State has been designated as the Lead U.S. Federal Agency (LFA) in responding to requests for [foreign consequence management] assistance from a foreign government” (1-6). Also see Department of State, Guidance for Responding to Radiological and Nuclear Incidents, fact sheet, available at <http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1184.html>. This document states, “the Department of State is not the lead government agency on radiological or nuclear incidents . . . At present, there is no one government agency that has taken the lead responding to nuclear or radiological incidents.”


4. Ibid.
As the U.S. military emerges from more than a decade of combat experience, two factors hold particular promise for meeting future military needs. First, the joint force has developed a cadre of strong leaders who have successfully adapted in the face of a bewilderingly complex array of challenges.1 Second, it has compiled a record of enhanced mission achievement associated with dramatic increases in networking and information processing capability.2 These factors provide the basis for shaping a better integrated and more effective joint force, one that draws inspiration not only from existing doctrine, field experience, and academic research, but especially from key leaders who advocate fundamental change.

Significantly, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently published a Mission Command White Paper.3 The paper asserts that, although Mission Command is found in current doctrine, more must be done to cope with an “increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment” and that the “conduct of Mission Command requires adaptable leaders at all levels.”4 In addition to presenting his Mission Command leadership philosophy, General Dempsey seems to be calling for a paradigm shift in the manner in which military leaders relate to their organizations and to the operating environment.

In today’s military, leaders typically do not adapt their preferences and style to the organization—rather, the organization adapts to the leader. Leader preferences stem from a collective set of personal experiences, and they reflect informed judgments as to what methods work best. The result has normally been a hierarchical command and control (C2) system. General Dempsey’s paradigm shift is that in the future, leaders must focus on adapting their preferences and style not only to the mission but also to the situation. In other words, the situation itself—not leader preferences—may become the overriding factor in determining an organization’s C2 approach.

This expansion of an approach with an honorable history in U.S. military lore—particularly as applied by irregular forces—is broadly consistent with the findings of a body of research known as C2 Agility. In general, a military unit is deemed to be “agile” if it can successfully respond to changed circumstances; Mission Command supports C2 Agility by encouraging decentralized decisionmaking fully informed by commander’s intent. Furthermore, as General Dempsey specifically states, “Mission Command is not a mechanical process.”5 This statement implies that Mission Command is not a process that commanders can simply inspect and expect to achieve based upon a checklist of do’s and don’ts. Rather, Mission Command, we suggest, is more dynamic, first requiring feedback on the effectiveness of the organization’s current C2 approach. Based on this feedback, organizations and their leaders should be able to recognize the need for adjustments to the C2 approach. By making these needed changes, U.S. forces would be empowered to retain, regain, or improve effectiveness due to actual, perceived, or anticipated changes to the situation. Viewed in this manner, Mission Command becomes less a static state of being, and more the adoption of a dynamic process.
for managing change as necessary, a key tool for adaptive leaders.

In fact, in calling for widespread adoption of the attributes of Mission Command, General Dempsey is doing something the joint force is familiar with in a leader: he is setting forth a new agenda, and he is providing insights on why his agenda is important. What may be less clear to many is that General Dempsey is asking the entire force—both commanders and those they command—to continue adapting, not directly to him and his preferences as a commander, but to a diverse, uncertain future operational environment.

Mission Command cannot be embraced and applied blindly. Operationalizing the new Mission Command vision requires that leaders across the force—and the organizations they command—be able to do three things both dynamically and routinely:

- understand their organization’s current C2 approach
- detect significant changes in the environment or mission that indicate a new approach is needed
- adapt the C2 approach appropriately and in a timely manner.

Developing and employing these capabilities will drive changes in doctrine, education, training, and operations throughout the joint force. However, there is currently no roadmap for making such sweeping changes across the board. This article aims to facilitate this important force-wide transition by sketching out the contours of such a map.

What Is a Command and Control Approach?

The concept of an “approach” to C2 is foreign to many, largely because a single approach is prevalent throughout the U.S. military. Students of C2 describe this familiar approach as hierarchical—one characterized by centralized decisionmaking authority, limited ability to share information, and limited ability to interact laterally and across organizational boundaries. Developed across a series of multinational research forums, figure 1 depicts these attributes graphically, with each component of the C2 approach falling on a separate axis.

The traditional hierarchical C2 approach falls near the origin of all three axes; C2 Agility theory postulates that this approach has important advantages in some situations. Its attractiveness largely stems from the fact that authority and information travel along predictable pathways. These pathways are straightforward and direct. Both command relationships and accountability are simplified: among commanders and staffs, the critical relationships are between superior and subordinate; among units, the connections are between supported and supporting organizations.

Beyond this typical approach, however, the history of warfare as well as recent operations are replete with examples of alternate, often ad hoc, command and control approaches that diverge from this single standard. A vivid example of a C2 approach that occupies the box labeled “Edge” in figure 1 comes from the battle of Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, in 2001. Special Forces Operational Detachment A (SFODA) 595 shared certain decision rights with entities not under U.S. command, notably the Northern Alliance Force, led by Afghan General Abdul Rashid Dostum. In addition, highly variable patterns of interaction enabled SFODA 595’s C2 element to communicate directly with the Combined Air Operations Center and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Lastly, creative distribution of information between these nonstandard formations and their supporting logistics elements enabled a 21st-century logistics system to deliver needed saddles, horse feed, and blankets to special operations forces and to provide AK-47s and 7.62mm ammunition to Northern Alliance fighters.

As this illustrates, and as General Dempsey points out, the security environment is becoming increasingly dynamic and complex. This will stress the hierarchical approach along all three dimensions of the C2 approach space or “cube.” Mission Command responds by advocating decentralized execution based upon mission type orders, increased sharing of information both horizontally and laterally, and networked interaction with a greater number and variety of all types of organizations—any of which can support or be supported by any other.

General Dempsey describes three key attributes of this approach—understanding,

![Figure 1.](source: David S. Alberts, Reiner K. Huber, and James Moffat, NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model (Washington, DC: CCRP, 2010), 66, available at <www.dodccrp.org/files/N2C2M2_web_optimized.pdf>.)
intent, and trust. He also stresses the importance of gaining the proper situational context and of commander’s intent. General Dempsey notes:

Importantly, in Joint Force 2020, leaders at every level must contribute to the common operating assessment of context, “co-creating it” as operations progress and situations change. Created knowledge at the point of action is critical to operational and tactical agility. Understanding in mission command must flow from both bottom-up and top-down. Shared context is a critical enabler of . . . intent.

Far from being a minor subset of a more general, hierarchical C2 approach, Mission Command is seen by General Dempsey as becoming a “common attribute” of the military profession. This implies that Mission Command can be taught and learned—but how? How do leaders—each of whom General Dempsey has challenged to become a “living example of Mission Command”—know that their current approach is no longer effective? As the environment morphs from day to day, how do leaders and staffs know they have decentralized enough (but not too much), that they have shared enough information while still maintaining necessary operational security, and that their organizations are interacting appropriately with other organizations without creating mission-threatening vulnerabilities?

Students of C2 describe this continual reassessment and timely, effective, and prudent adjustment of one’s C2 approach as C2 Agility. Rather than a single approach, Mission Command thus can be seen as a continuum of approaches, with the choice of approach dependent upon a given environment and mission, as shown in figure 2.

Viewed in this way, the cognitive task becomes pivotal, requiring constant reassessment of the complexity of “self” or organization and of the complexity and uncertainty of the operational environment. In terms of the C2 approach space, this cognitive task can be restated as follows: “How do I know where my organization is in the C2 approach space, whether (and where) it should move, and how to get there?”

The dilemma for operators then becomes how to adjust the C2 approach as conditions change—in order to bring about what General Dempsey describes as the highest state possible (under existing conditions), wherein “shared context and understanding is implicit and intuitive between hierarchical and lateral echelons of command, enabling decentralized and distributed formations to perform as if they were centrally coordinated.” In terms of the C2 Agility theory, the question becomes: “What specifically must change if I am to move from one C2 approach to another?”

**What Lies Ahead?**

We are only beginning to formulate these questions—the answers will take time. But as this discussion demonstrates, senior U.S. military leaders recognize a need to address C2 as an urgent, critical issue. General Dempsey’s Mission Command White Paper sets the direction, while C2 Agility theory complements Mission Command by providing a helpful framework that can be used to guide its implementation. Here, both operators and researchers have a clear opportunity for collaboration. Working in tandem, they can accelerate the joint force’s implementation of true information-age C2 by leveraging the research accomplished over the past two decades.

Much work lies ahead for C2 researchers—for example, instrumented environments should be developed to give commanders and staffs experience with operating in different regions of the “Mission Command space.” In addition, tools can be developed to enable visualization of information sharing and collaborative behaviors—and to demonstrate the “so what?” of Mission Command. It should also be possible to recognize the existing level of trust within an organization, and to identify and teach methods for enhancing trust.

For operators and commanders, this discussion reveals an opportunity to seize the initiative. By embracing the C2 Agility concept as the basis for implementing Mission Command, operators will gain a framework through which it can be discussed, evaluated, taught, exercised, measured, and improved. Through the lens of Agile Mission Command, they can learn to see Mission Command as a way to “task organize C2”—just as they routinely think of task organizing forces and resources to achieve mission effectiveness. Mission Command thus ceases being a static concept (that is, defined as decentralized execution based on mission type orders) and takes on a dynamic

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**Figure 2.**

Patterns of interaction among entities and allocation of decision rights to the collective.
fluidity (developing ever greater adaptability, critical thinking, and independent, rapid decisionmaking).

Many leaders and organizations are using the principles of Mission Command in current combat and other activities. Unfortunately, such applications are unique to units and have not been institutionalized in joint doctrine and training. General Dempsey and others clearly see the need to refine these successful principles into Mission Command and have them pervade leader development and organizational design. By visualizing the C2 approach space, Agile C2 theory, when operationalized, would enable joint forces to systematically characterize their current C2 approach within the range of approaches covered by Mission Command; issue enabling directions for the selected approach; and, if necessary, choose which dimension(s) along which to alter the current approach. In addition, the theory highlights that changes in the environment or mission could indicate the need for a new C2 approach. Agile joint forces should understand and be able to exploit this theory, using it to develop procedures for migration to a new approach at the appropriate moment. These procedures could be validated in operational experiments that would serve to translate C2 Agility theory into Mission Command practice. Lessons learned from these experiments would enable the tenets of Mission Command to be inculcated into doctrine, education, and training, including exercises at all levels. Only then will General Dempsey’s ambitious vision become a reality. JFQ

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4 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), defines Mission Command as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders.”
5 Dempsey, 4.
7 Dempsey, 4.
8 Ibid.
The 600-pound Gorilla
Why We Need a Smaller Defense Department

By RYAN P. ALLEN

Where does an 800-pound gorilla sit? Wherever it wants.

The largest gorillas found in the wild weigh around 500 pounds, and gorillas living in captivity can weigh over 600 pounds. The 800-pound gorilla of the classic riddle gets whatever it wants by virtue of its exaggerated size. There are no smaller creatures or other large gorillas that could stop it, so it dominates without competition. While the 800-pound gorilla’s size is beneficial to him, it is unnecessarily large. The gorilla does not need that much mass when 700 or even 600 pounds would be enough weight and power to have its way in any situation and sit where it wants. One can say the same for the Department of Defense (DOD). The Department is too large, and a smaller DOD is in the best interest of the United States.

The current DOD is a liability in some respects, which runs counter to the security and stability that U.S. citizens expect. Of course, it provides the necessary national security during Operation Southern Strike II, Afghanistan.
defense, but at its current size, it also comes with unintended effects. Overreliance on military force instead of utilization of other forms of national power is an unintended but natural result of an overly large and extremely capable organization. The DOD budget is too large to remain at its current level, and the amount that the U.S. Government spends on defense is unsustainable if the Nation wishes to regain economic viability. Finally, the excessive size of DOD results in strategic overreach, does not match realistic threat projections, and, ironically, weakens the United States over time.

The United States can reverse these unintended consequences with a sound plan for reduction of DOD manpower and budget. Of course, any reduction must be in harmony with national security, defense, and military strategies to be effective. Military strategy nests in the President’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy. Reduction measures that do not account for elements of these strategies are ill-advised and reckless. Therefore, sound military strategy that addresses current and future threats must be the starting point. With a National Military Strategy that addresses these threats, and a realistic approach toward what it will take to safeguard the Nation in light of these threats, the United States can maintain a military that allows for the use of other forms of power, is economically sustainable, and does not encourage overreach.

**Overemphasis on Military**

There are many ways to organize and distinguish forms of national power. One common organization is its division into four categories: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Naturally, nations most often use those elements of national power best suited to their strengths and their cultural and traditional norms. The way different forms of national power are used forms an identity for each nation in the international community. This combination shifts over time as national interests evolve, the nation’s strengths and weaknesses change, and the social and political climates in a nation or region transform.

DOD carries out the mission of national defense today but does not necessarily exercise military power consistent with the idea of national defense as held by many citizens. Samuel Huntington wrote about the gap between American ideals and the institutional practice of those ideals by government. Huntington suggested that throughout the political and governmental processes, American institutions are inconsistent in practice with the people’s ideas. In the defense environment, one can see this in the form of defense commitments that are not essential to the defense of the Nation. Rather than using military force to defend vital security interests, the U.S. Government often uses it electively in support of lesser interests. Washington conducted military operations in Bosnia, Iraq, and Libya with tenuous connections to actual defense of the United States. The use of military power in areas that may be better suited to other forms of power unnecessarily raises the stakes in the international community.

The use of U.S. military power often comes with media and popular discussions, domestically and abroad, of national sovereignty and legitimacy. The use of diplomatic, economic, and informational forms of power rarely triggers such discussions. Sovereignty is a term without a concrete, globally accepted definition, but for most it generally means the right and responsibility of a nation’s government to govern within its borders without external infringement. While many people around the world share this concept, historically a realistic if somewhat Hobbesian view is that a nation is only as sovereign as stronger nations or groups of nations allow. Sovereignty of weaker nations may or may not be important to stronger nations based on current events and circumstances, and has not been a fixed principle throughout American history. This cynical but realistic view of sovereignty does not mean, however, that it is in the interest of stronger nations to violate the sovereignty of weaker nations.

The idea of legitimacy naturally arises during discussions of national sovereignty. Although legitimacy in the eyes of the world is something most governments desire, it has not proven to be a roadblock to military action. Although not required, internationally perceived legitimacy does have its place in planning for military action. Embarking only upon “just” military actions that are perceived as legitimate by the world at large helps provide balance and stability to international relations. Nations that upset this international balance through unaccepted military use degrade that international system, no matter how powerful the acting nation may be. Political scientist Andrew Hurrell writes that legitimacy in this context is “the existence of an international order reflecting unequal power and involving the use of coercive force that creates the need for legitimation in the first place,” and it is “as much a part of the messy world of politics as of the idealized world of legal or moral debate.” An overreliance on the military aspect of national power tends to erode this international system, which is a stabilizing force in most cases. Military force is only one instrument of power and its overuse comes at the expense of the nation as a whole, weakening the potential impact of the other forms of power.

Diplomatic relations guarantee little, as they rely on relationships in which both nations tend to vie for their own interests. The result of the bargaining is likely a combination of the two interests, a compromise that is not what either nation desires in total but is more palatable than the alternatives. Members of powerful governments, or the citizens of those nations, often take exception to this uncertainty. Militarily powerful nations may be tempted to use force to get exactly what they want rather than having to accept the compromise of diplomacy. This assumes, however, that force gives a more predictable and intended outcome, which history shows to be untrue. The cumulative result of the use of force wears on a nation’s credibility in the international scene, and ultimately weakens future attempts at applying diplomatic power.

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In U.S. history, we can see the ebb and flow in favor of diplomatic versus military forms of national power. Individual personalities, external threats, and other factors have combined, resulting in administrations and leaders who have tended toward either diplomacy or military force. Diplomacy in the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was unique, at times nonexistent, and usually combined heavily with military posturing. Indeed, the very appointment of some personalities, such as John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower administration, ensured that diplomacy with the Soviets was not an option. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the United States cut the State Department budget by 20 percent, resulting in the closure of over 30 Embassies and consulates and elimination of 22 percent of the department’s employees. The cuts in the State Department resulted in increased operations for the Defense Department, and the missions were not always a good match.

The Defense Department chafed as the Clinton administration grew accustomed to using it to cover the types of missions that could have been better addressed through diplomacy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was seen as “obstructive” by the Clinton administration officials who wished to resolve the situation in Bosnia with military force. The situation resulted in the famous statement from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: “What are you saving this superb military for... if we can’t use it?” This civilian tendency to use military force either without clear political goals or as a substitute for other implements of national power, which was embraced by both political parties, demonstrates the danger of maintaining an oversized military force. As long as there is a force large and capable enough at the disposal of the Government, there will be a temptation to use that force without the perceived uncertainty or compromise of diplomacy.

Economic Impact of an Oversized DOD

The U.S. economy is staggering in scale and complexity. In 2011, total Federal revenue was $2.2 trillion, and Federal spending was $3.8 trillion. It does not take an economist to see that in 2011 the United States ran a deficit; it spent (outlays) more money than it took in (receipts), and it has done that every year since 2001. Annual deficits, which in turn add to the total national debt, have been the norm since World War II. In the past 5 years, the United States amassed about one-third ($4.6 trillion) of the current total national deficit ($16 trillion). Economists expect that after 2015, national debt will outpace gross domestic product (GDP) growth, resulting in the reduced possibility of being able to “grow out of debt.” There is no doubt that these trends over the past decade are hazardous and unsustainable, and we cannot attribute the source of the deficits to one area alone. While defense spending is not the only large budget category for the United States, it is one of the consistently largest areas of spending.

Defense amounts to 17 percent of Federal spending in the President’s 2013 budget proposal. The size of annual defense expenditures, to which the U.S. people have grown accustomed for the most part, are typically presented in such a way as to underemphasize the actual dollars being spent. For example, citing defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP is misleading in its simplicity. In 2011, total Federal revenue was $3.8 trillion. It does not take an economist to see that in 2011 the United States ran a deficit; it spent outlays more money than it took in (receipts), and it has done that every year since 2001. Annual deficits, which in turn add to the total national debt, have been the norm since World War II. In the past 5 years, the United States amassed about one-third ($4.6 trillion) of the current total national deficit ($16 trillion). Economists expect that after 2015, national debt will outpace gross domestic product (GDP) growth, resulting in the reduced possibility of being able to “grow out of debt.” There is no doubt that these trends over the past decade are hazardous and unsustainable, and we cannot attribute the source of the deficits to one area alone. While defense spending is not the only large budget category for the United States, it is one of the consistently largest areas of spending.

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Americans must realize that too much defense, more specifically the money it costs to provide that much capability, is nearly as hazardous to a nation in the long term as having too small a defense capability. Historically, the United States pays for its wars through a combination of tax increases, cuts in domestic program spending, and borrowing. The past decade has seen quite a different approach to paying for defense and war. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan mark the first time in U.S. history that the government cut taxes and did not cut nondefense spending while engaged in major wars. Seemingly, the United States and its citizens are having their cake and eating it, too. It should come as no surprise that fighting wars costs money, a dilemma that typically triggers the so-called guns-versus-butter debate. The U.S. Government seemingly avoided this controversy in America’s most recent wars, but the short-term avoidance comes with a long-term cost.

Political scientist Alex Mintz correctly concludes that there has not been a “defense-welfare tradeoff” in post–World War II America. Increased defense spending does not result in reduced domestic programs—it results in debt. Until recently, the government offset this increase in defense spending with revenue increases (bonds and/or taxes). A dangerous reality now faces Americans who are willing to look at the numbers: guns and butter and reduced revenue equal mountains of debt. How did the United States arrive at this point? A large part of the answer is that there is simply too much money involved in defense and too much influence over a Congress that naturally seeks constituent approval. The power of the purse held by Congress necessitates close ties with the defense industry where the appropriated money is spent. President Dwight Eisenhower publicly warned of the dangers of what has become widely known as the military-industrial complex. Privately though, and with more accuracy, Eisenhower included the Congress and labeled the relationship the “delta of power.”

The delta of power more accurately describes a tripartite relationship where one party allocates the money, one party spends the money, and one party receives the money. Congress does not always allot money based on a threat, as many Members of Congress see military programs for the benefit they provide to their constituents in the form of jobs and state revenue. The defense those programs provide is nearly an afterthought. Every year, the DOD budget contains unrequested funds for programs that mean jobs and happy constituents for Congress and industry, but not necessarily military utility. For example, the 1996 Defense Authorization Bill contained $8
billion in unrequested spending, 80 percent of which went to states with lawmakers sitting on the Armed Services and National Security committees or the Appropriations Defense subcommittees. The purpose of spending this unrequested money is not for defense; it is to bring money and jobs to home districts and constituents. Money spent on defense should be for just that, defense, not for a stimulus for congressional district economies. America is paying an unnecessarily large sum for defense, due in part to Congress’s incentive to funnel defense dollars and jobs home to their districts—but what is the solution? The American military is the most effective and capable in the world, but it is not worth the increasing amount it costs. Manpower expenses alone are growing at a rapid rate. The annual cost for pay and training of an Active-duty Soldier rose from $75,000 in 2001 to $120,000 in 2006, excluding indirect costs such as family housing. The United States pays too much for too much defense capability and could spend significantly less and defend itself nearly as well. Politicians propose defense spending reductions with great trepidation if they are bold enough to propose them at all. A recent speech by President Barack Obama, for example, calls on Americans to understand that “we can keep our military strong and our nation secure with a defense budget that continues to be larger than roughly the next ten countries combined.” This is a clear demonstration of an inferiority complex thrust on the American people by Congress, DOD, and the defense industry: a call for ever-increasing defense spending based more on economic and political desires than on real-world threats to national security.

The Resulting Weakening of the United States

On the surface, it is counterintuitive to propose that a strong and large DOD will weaken the United States over time. To militarists, hegemonists, and the defense industry, the military cannot be strong enough. In their view, there will always be critical threats to national security that are on the verge of destroying the United States. The Nation does indeed face threats and that will continue, but this does not mean that it structures its defense apparatus appropriately to counter those threats. The current size and structure of the U.S. military is ill-suited to address challenges the United States has faced in the past 10 years and may face in the near future. Today’s DOD structure remains based on Cold War requirements and threats. That basic structure drives policy and political strategy, causing overreach and eventually resulting in a weaker United States. We must examine realistic current and future threats to arrive at a proper match of defense capabilities and resources.

We can organize current and near-term threats to the United States into two general categories: threats from nonstate groups and those from competitor nation-states. The former became a very real issue for the United States on 9/11. Since those attacks, the United States has been fighting nonstate groups around the globe, but from a military standpoint primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. The latter threat, of competitor nation-states, has always been a factor in national security and always will be. The complex and important questions relating to nation-state threats remain: how much of a threat do certain countries pose, and how will that threat manifest itself? These threat groups must be the starting point in determining defense posture and organization.

Nonstate groups such as al Qaeda have used terrorism and irregular tactics against larger and more powerful entities such as the United States. Understandably frustrating to many Americans, it is the natural tactical choice for nonstate groups, who wisely do not wish to fight U.S. strengths. Competitor nation-states pose a different challenge. Nation-states may engage in acts as benign as economic competition and as malicious as full-scale conventional war or any point in between. Historically, Americans worry most about this conventional threat when thinking about national defense. The U.S. defense industry has long been postured to battle rival conventional forces, and parting from that mindset proves difficult. Rather than deriving defense strategy and structure based on threats to U.S. national security, strategy is in danger of being constructed based on current organization and capabilities.

It is likely that nonstate groups will attack the United States again. To address this threat, we must ask what role DOD is expected to play against that threat. Indeed, that task falls not only on DOD but also on the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies. The Defense Department may have a role in reaction to a terrorist attack depending on the attack’s scale and origin, and would certainly have a role in preventing some types of actions originating outside of U.S. borders. However, current DOD organization and structure would be of little use in directly preventing another 9/11-type attack. If we accept this logic, the only choices are to change the Department to provide this defense or to expect that defense to come from other departments and agencies. If DOD should not be organized and tasked to prevent such an attack, we must then look at what reaction the Department could have to such an attack as part of the defense strategy.

The U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks was primarily military. Examining this reaction is important in determining if the military is a good choice for terrorist attack response. Whether the U.S. Government expected it or not, the response to the 9/11 attacks continues to this day. Depending on whether we include Operation Iraqi Freedom in that response, the 9/11 attacks resulted in 19 years (nearly 9 in Iraq and over 10 in Afghanistan) of military action for DOD. The United States does not have the money or national will for that type of response to become the norm. If adversaries see that scale of response as a prediction of future U.S. strategy, nonstate and state actors alike will choose that tactic and watch the United States fall on the sword of overreach. In this respect, the war on terror serves as an opportunity for rival states such as China and Iran.

Many envision conflict with competitor nation-states in terms of head-to-head conventional military action and speculate that China is a potential foe. The U.S. Government must shape defense strategy; therefore, it must organize and size its forces around this type of threat. In doing so, it must avoid the conventional approach in favor of a realistic look at how such a conflict would
occur. Economic competition and occasional disputes between Beijing and Washington are much more likely than conventional war. A strategy of proxy war and enticement will probably remain more appropriate in dealing with competitor nations such as China. Thus, the United States must carefully measure potential military involvement in such conflicts and decide whether it is necessary to maintain a 1.4 million-strong standing force to address such threats.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has used its military might in conflicts that are arguably not strictly national defense missions. Militarists advocate the use of force to influence and shape the world in terms of U.S. interests, which is starkly different than use of force for national defense. The appropriate starting point must be a top-down review of the U.S. strategic framework. P.H. Liotta and Richmond Lloyd recommend beginning the strategic framework review with a series of questions: What do we want to do? How do we plan to do it? What are we up against? What is available to do it? What are the mismatches? Most importantly we must ask, “Why do we want to do this?” The answer to that question matters. Aggressively promoting American ideals and democratic systems of government, even without military force, can create animosity and spark the kinds of conflict the United States seeks to avoid in the first place. This dynamic is exacerbated by the type of constant military activity seen following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that the first questions Liotta and Lloyd ask are not the ones asked in practice, which often start with, “What are we up against?”

We can find myriad answers concerning what the United States is up against. Officially, according to the 2011 National Military Strategy, we face an “evolution to a ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized by more shifting, interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power, than by a rigid competition between opposing blocs.” The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes the current and near-future defense environment by stating, “not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by... the rise of new powers, the growing influence of nonstate actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other destructive enabling technologies.” The same document details the force required to meet these “far-reaching and consequential shifts” but does not recommend significant change to current force structure. The congressionally mandated independent QDR review panel reports that QDR reports have “become a mirror of the current budget process rather than a strategic guide to the future that drives the budget process.”

Finding a solution to the economic aspect of decreasing the size of DOD is challenging but achievable. It is rational for Members of Congress to seek and pass legislation bringing defense dollars to their districts. The reward is reelection, and there is no penalty for that at present. Detailed congressional reform is beyond the scope of this article, but a simple solution exists. Eliminating unrequested money in the defense budget is a start, but overall budget cutting is required as well. Congress could model future defense budget reduction on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program. BRAC legislation was designed to “give top cover and distance to politicians... who might otherwise want to do the right thing” but seek to avoid the blame and political fallout. Eliminating the political disincentive associated with defense cuts makes room for real change. One must recognize the fact that more money involved in defense spending means more incentive to take advantage of the system. Extra defense dollars result in extra corruption.

To be sure, a reduction in the size of DOD in terms of manpower is a contentious issue. Many analysts use the size of a nation’s military synonymously with its capability. Political scientist Peter Feaver warns, “It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed,
an inadequate military institution may be worse than none at all.50 Feaver is correct, but many analysts today incorrectly surmise that defense reduction equals “vitiation.” Arbitrary, across-the-board cuts in DOD are unwise; what they may give in “fairness” to all branches and programs they may cost in real capability and result in a truly hollow force.49 The threat of a hollow force is usually one of the first terms encountered in the examination of manpower reduction, but this need not be true.

DOD can retain capability while reducing personnel if the Department approaches the task correctly. To avoid the hollow force phenomenon, DOD must eliminate redundant capabilities such as multiple units that perform the same mission, while retaining effectiveness within that capability. For example, a nation may require multiple armored divisions to engage in multiple, simultaneous conventional wars. While the capability requirement is legitimate, the amount of that capability is in question, and the nation could reduce the amount of capability without eliminating the capability as a whole. We can also see the benefit to this approach in manpower versus procurement costs. A smaller manpower force saves money. That savings is vital to research and development as well as maintenance of capability.50 With capability safely maintained, the Services can add manpower if the defense situation requires it. History indicates, and future circumstances will reinforce, that the need for rapidly deployable ground forces is a phenomenon, DOD must eliminate redundancy if the Department approaches the task correctly. To avoid the hollow force, it must do so with caution, and it must conduct an honest assessment of the results of the maintenance and use of that strength. U.S. policy currently relies too much on the military instrument of national power at the expense of the other instruments, and that appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This overreliance is a direct and natural result of an inflated DOD, and it weakens the U.S. position in the international community. Defense spending levels of the past decade are unsustainable, and they unnecessarily create vulnerabilities.

Finally, the colossal size of DOD results in the use of military power without great hardship on the American people, thereby resulting in overuse and strategic overreach. These aspects of today’s DOD indicate a need to reduce its size in budget and manpower in the interest of maintaining the U.S. position in the 21st century.

The United States should continue to maintain the strongest and most capable military in the world. This article is not a call for world peace, and it does not aim to weaken security to pander to world community activists. Furthermore, the United States cannot reduce DOD to a weakened point and rely on the good will and humanity of its competitors to act peacefully. The strongest approach for the future of DOD is to trim its size, creating a force that while smaller than the Cold War force remains the most capable in the world and one able to respond to realistic threats to national security. JFQ

Conclusion

Historian and strategist Eliot Cohen notes that “inertia overwhelms the impulse to change at the Pentagon,” and “the military will resist transformation.” But the current situation calls for change nonetheless.54 The United States relies on military force, or the threat of force, because that is its strength. It is natural for a nation to play to its strengths in international relations, but it must do so with caution, and it must conduct an honest assessment of the results of the maintenance and use of that strength. U.S. policy currently relies too much on the military instrument of national power at the expense of the other instruments, and that appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This overreliance is a direct and natural result of an inflated DOD, and it weakens the U.S. position in the international community. Defense spending levels of the past decade are unsustainable, and they unnecessarily create vulnerabilities. Finally, the colossal size of DOD results in the use of military power without great hardship on the American people, thereby resulting in overuse and strategic overreach. These aspects of today’s DOD indicate a need to reduce its size in budget and manpower in the interest of maintaining the U.S. position in the 21st century.

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15 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 182.


18 All figures in this paragraph are from U.S. Office of Management and Budget.

19 U.S. Office of Management and Budget. This figure includes Department of Energy spending specifically outlined for defense purposes.


23 Ibid., 61.


26 MacGregor, 186.


31 Earl H. Fry, Lament for America: Decline of the Superpower, Plan for Renewal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 71.


35 Glain, 409.

36 Ibid.


38 Preble, 87.


40 Ibid., 122.


45 Ibid., 46–47.


The Case for Military Pension Reform

By JON P. SUNDERLAND

If the Department of Defense (DOD) fails to reform its military retirement system, it will find itself in the same place as General Motors (GM) during the last decade. With GM management focused on maintaining the status quo, staggering legacy costs provided health care and pensions to millions of retirees totaling nearly $2,000 per vehicle.¹ A cumbersome and unresponsive bureaucracy suggests a management failure in organization that lasted over decades as market share consistently declined. As a result, morale in the workforce declined and a sense of corporate responsibility was never asserted by leadership. In effect, GM was unable to keep up because it was unwilling to change. Rather than act on the financial inequities clearly present in early analysis, leadership chose to pass the buck to consumers, contributing to a declaration of bankruptcy in 2009 and one of the greatest downfalls in corporate American history.

Military advocates have long argued that the current military retirement system needs no alteration. For service in the line of duty, it recognizes individuals who have given 20 or more years of honorable service and recognizes their personal sacrifice in holding up their end of their contract with the Federal Government. The current system is supported in strong conviction by retired and Active-duty Servicemembers alike. However, the financial numbers tell a different story and hint that the current model will be unsustainable in the future. Left untouched, it could endanger the military’s ability to reward the performance of our future career force. The central question in the debate on military retirement is therefore how an individual who spends a career in a profession where the risk is the ultimate sacrifice should be compensated in retirement.

Survivors attend commemoration of 70th anniversary of Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor

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It is legitimate for citizens to consider the value of military service as sacred. The value of military service itself and the contributions of members are priceless, but the question of retirement compensation is different. Any valuation must be based on criteria that must be reasonable in context. The current benefits offered in the U.S. military are based on historical assumptions of a century ago. Therefore, military retirement reform should not impact current retirees, Active, or Reserve personnel, but should be enacted for the future force. The preservation of benefits to recruit and retain the most qualified personnel and to incentivize honorable and dedicated service within the characteristics of the current generation should be implemented now. Both the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy should consider alternatives to preserve retirement options for future career military members.

The Past

Military retirement holds a longstanding value for Servicemembers. Service in arms was a respected profession because of the extraordinary sacrifices of both warriors and their families even before the Nation was founded. In 1636, the first law granting benefits was passed during the conflict between the Plymouth Pilgrims and Pequot Indians where “any man set forth as a soldier and returned maimed should be maintained by the colony for life.” The system has evolved since then, but giving consideration to military retirees has remained. The current retirement plan took shape in the early 1900s, where after 20 years of honorable service a member was granted a percentage of basic pay, medical care, and indirect benefits such as commissary and exchange privileges for life. Lawmakers approved these benefits as a fair deal based on longevity, generational values, and fiscal approach. In 1910, life expectancy in the United States was 51 years, and significant events such as World War I, World War II, and the Great Depression shaped traditionalist values centered on discipline, conformity, and delaying rewards to oneself or one’s family.

The focus was on service to country because the country had given so much to its citizens. When these values were translated into work requirements, it showed that dedication, diligent effort, and respect for authority were the driving factors in employment, especially in the government because citizens believed it had taken care of them in the greatest time of need.

Periodic reassessments of the military retirement package have caused considerable tension. Since 1976, seven different panels have been charged with evaluating changes to the retirement system. The focus has always remained the same: how should Congress and the Services continue to offer a fair benefits package at a reasonable cost? This is the central problem in military retirement reform. The difficulty is not in acknowledging the value of Servicemember contributions, but in converting it to a valuation. Both Active-duty and retired military react emotionally to suggestions of changing the system, and the magnitude of the reaction has been significant enough to deter any significant reform. As a result, proposals in these commissions have never been wholly received and have resulted in small-scale changes only. The strong military sentiment suggests tremendous value in the object to those who serve, yet the relatively small compromises over the years have allowed financial expenditures to increase more rapidly. Pensions for over 2.2 million retired military personnel are a $1.3 trillion liability (of which $385 billion is funded) and are projected to grow to $2.8 trillion by 2034. These are unsustainable costs even in the present time and remain projected to grow.

The Present

The criteria that collectively make up the military retirement system are based on a different time and place. Longevity, generational values, emphasis on work-life balance, and technology are all markedly different compared to societal attributes over a century ago. In 2011, life expectancy in the United States was 78 years, with millennium generational values centered on confidence, achievement, diversity, and competition. According to Thomas Friedman, this is a population that lives in the age of a flattening world where traditional structures are being transformed by globalization in ways that state-centric organizations are ill-equipped to deal with. This is the age of information and networking where greater control is placed in the hands of the individual. Military requirements are changing, too. The operational tempo is increasing, mission sets are diversifying, and recruiting remains keenly competitive. Coming out of multiple wars, America is also tending to have more
wounded warriors than ever. Many roles are fundamentally changing for both the officer and enlisted ranks, which will demand an even more highly competent force.

The financial environment is dramatically different. DOD is the focal point of the current budget reductions as wars conclude in Iraq and Afghanistan and looming foreign debts come due. Billions have already been slashed from budgets in recent years. With the failure of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (the “Supercommittee”), an additional $1.2 trillion in cuts will be spread among various government programs with Defense expected to assume $600 billion of the total. The size of the DOD budget should not be targeted simply for its size, but in this era it is important to realize greater efficiencies for the sake of future force planning.

What is valued in the current retirement model? It offers an exceptionally generous defined contribution benefit, medical care for members and their families, and exchange and commissary privileges for life. It is often not considered an incentive until a member passes 10 years of service due to its cliff vesting nature, but it is heavily prioritized afterward. Numerically, base pay is a significant financial incentive alone. For example, in 2012 an O5 retiring at 20 years of service can expect to earn $3.028 million in retirement income over a 4-year timeframe. An E7 would earn $1.615 million over the same period. Retiring over a 40-year timeframe. An E7 would earn $3.028 million in retirement income as compared to a $1.615 million over the same period. Retiring at 20 years of service can expect to earn $3.028 million in retirement income over a 40-year timeframe. An E7 would earn $1.615 million over the same period. Retiring at 20 years of service can expect to earn $3.028 million in retirement income over a 40-year timeframe. An E7 would earn $1.615 million over the same period. Retiring at 20 years of service can expect to earn $3.028 million in retirement income over a 40-year timeframe. An E7 would earn $1.615 million over the same period.

The proposed alternative is meant not only to preserve the value of a military retirement but also to promote performance and active ownership of retirement savings. It is based on two central tenets: earn your keep and pay yourself first. The current generation has demonstrated incredible skill in accessing and applying information but seems to lack the discipline to plan for the long term. This core incentive capitalizes on the high degree of individuality but stems the “earn to spend” mentality by regularly contributing to future savings.

Recognizing a graying workforce that will work longer, retirement eligibility should be a factor of age and years of service. The “Rule of 80” (see table 2) has been used by various groups such as local governments, Federal judges, and school districts. By making the sum of age and service equal 80, it is possible to maintain an Active-duty force predominantly between the ages of 18 and 60. With the physical nature of military work, a greater majority will likely continue to enter at younger ages, but this system would allow multiple on- and off-ramps and keep personnel in service until their late 40s to early 50s on average. The current retirement system does not facilitate force management or encourage longer careers, a key opportunity since the retirement age usually allows personnel to move on to second careers. This alternative would retain more senior personnel who provide critical leadership, corporate knowledge, and mentorship to younger generations, a key factor bridging the gap.

The direct benefit should be a base salary that recognizes a combination of two

### Table 1. Current and Proposed Retirement

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Proposed alternative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>Age + Years of service (YOS) = 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct benefit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incentivized by YOS</td>
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<td>Incentivized by performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of base pay</td>
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<td>Minimum pension (lesser percentage of base pay) +</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>performance base (competency weighted by individual</td>
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<td>Contribution benefit plan</td>
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<td>Noncontributory</td>
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<td>Mandatory</td>
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<td>Government matching (above minimum contribution levels)</td>
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<td>Transferrable</td>
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<td>Indirect benefits</td>
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<td>Medical (100%)</td>
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<td>Medical (to be determined)</td>
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<td>Commissary</td>
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<td>Vesting</td>
<td>20 years</td>
<td>10 years</td>
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remains under the control of the citizen. It is unrealistic to wait 20 years to receive any benefit. The “all or nothing” system results in a mix of personnel who are dedicated performers or are waiting out their time. Reducing the time required to gain a transferrable benefit acknowledges Sailors’ contributions and gives them the flexibility to pursue another career path, providing a force that is committed to the military profession.

Finally, the payout date should remain unchanged from the date of retirement. If we assumed the majority of retirements would be occurring between 49 and 53 years of age, payouts would last 25 to 30 years on average, thereby reducing the current obligation, which pays for 40 years of retirement. This would effectively reduce retirement incomes by 25 to 38 percent. Immediate payout is deserved and recognizes the unique value in military service and sacrifice.

**Conclusion**

There is no comparative retirement compensation system in the private sector that can match the military’s benefit. In this time of change, it is crucial to preserve an honorable recognition of service but within fair economic reason. In our present time, the current system is unfair, unaffordable, and inflexible. This issue is not about emotion, defending a longstanding benefit, or dishonoring a group of well-qualified individuals. It is an issue of financial responsibility and planning to effectively recruit, retain, and offer a retirement benefit to a future career soldier.

There are numerous proposals currently available on how to accomplish military retirement reform, but few focus on generational values and demographic information. Revising a program based on characteristics from the current population (not from the 1900s) can be accomplished while preserving the benefit of honest and faithful service. In other words, this should not be an exercise in older policymakers telling younger Servicemembers what they should be doing. A mandatory contribution benefit plan would complement the direct benefit and reward Servicemembers for saving. The government of Chile, for instance, instituted a government-run social security system that was bankrolled into a privately managed account that remains under the control of the citizen. Everyone earning a paycheck contributes a mandatory 10 percent that is bankrolled into a privately managed account that remains under the control of the citizen.

**Table 2. Retirement Eligibility Under the “Rule of 80”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting age</th>
<th>Years of service</th>
<th>Retirement age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If DOD does not reform military retirement now, the alternative case is precisely what GM experienced.
want or what they are entitled to. Neither knows what the other wants, but collectively it is critical for both to have the dialogue to discern those items of value. Findings from other reports have confirmed that there are opportunities to make retirement compensation more efficient at delivering value to the Servicemembers. Reform needs to be accomplished within the resource constraints in existence today.

Additionally, it is best if proposed recommendations come from the military itself. Although current Servicemembers and retirees would not be subject to a new system, a military-originated solution shows that the current generation is taking careful consideration of the next with a new policy that assumes ownership of the issue, which has become a top concern of military members since discussion of reform intensified in 2011. The Secretary of Defense has stated that this issue is not off the table and that it must be considered for modification.12 The Services would be wise to understand their respective populations (especially junior officer and enlisted personnel) to create their own solutions for the future career force. These could be collectively debated at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with final recommendations altered only in size (not scope). There is little likelihood that a solution will be wholly adopted by an outside group and even less chance of it happening during an election year.

If DOD does not reform military retirement now, the alternative case is precisely what GM experienced. The rigidity of management, rejection of change, and failure to adhere to financial indicators over many years placed GM in a position that was unsustainable and affected current employees and retirees alike. Management failed to understand not only the company’s situation, but also how their decisions would have ripple effects for years to come. Righting the ship (especially one as large as GM) was not a simple task, but it had to start somewhere. By restructuring the organization, obtaining government assistance, focusing on a central vision, and openly communicating with company employees, new leadership was able to create more sustainable practices. This alternative system provides one way to correct the course for the military retirement issue, combining a government benefit with an individual retirement plan that involves members playing an active role in managing their nest eggs. This preserves the value of military retirement but adjusts the benefits package in line with the current generation and plans for the warriors of our future force.

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NOTES

5 West Midland Family Center, Generational Differences chart, available at <www.wmfc.org/GenerationalDifferencesChart.pdf>.
16 Piñera.
17 Defense Business Board, slide 8.
18 Ibid., slide 15.
Napoleon’s Shadow

Facing Organizational Design Challenges in the U.S. Military

By John F. Price, Jr.

In the world of competitive triathlons, there is a saying: “You might not win the race in the swim, but you can certainly lose it there.” The maxim emphasizes how initial actions lay the foundation for success or failure. For leaders, decisions on organizational structure are similar to the triathlon swim; it may not be the key to organizational success, but failure to recognize the importance of structure selection and maintenance—and the impact it has on employee performance—could easily be the source of downfall.

Next to choosing the organization’s strategy, the selection of organizational structure is arguably the next most important decision leaders make. In Designing Organizations, Jay Galbraith points out, “By choosing who decides and by designing processes influencing how things are decided, the executive shapes every decision made in the unit.” In today’s fast-paced, competitive environment, organizations can ill afford to neglect the advantages that come from organizational design. Despite this reality, large traditional organizations such as the Department of Defense (DOD) continue to maintain stifling, rigid bureaucracies that hamstring talent and place the organization at a disadvantage.

Defensive Structures

While still the premier fighting force in the world, the U.S. military stubbornly retains organizational structures that impede flexibility, adaptability, and creativity and undermine the execution of its operations in an increasingly challenging environment. In 2001, Major Eric Mellinger, USMC, wrote, “The modern military staff embodies the industrial age precepts of hierarchical, vertical flows of work and supervision.” This critique echoed the indictment leveled by General Anthony Zinni, USMC, the former commander of U.S. Central Command. He stated, “Napoleon could reappear today and recognize my Central Command staff organization: J-1, administrative stovepipe; J-2, intelligence stovepipe—you get the idea. The antiquated organization is at odds with what everyone else in the world is doing; flattening organization structure, decentralizing operations, and creating more direct communications. Our staff organization must be fixed.”

Despite this acknowledgment of the problems generated by outdated structure, the military has continued to resist change in most sectors. This resistance is grounded in the daunting size of DOD, the natural inertia of the organization, and its accustomed use of the “vertical flow of control, facilitating dissemination of orders from top to bottom and ensuring compliance from bottom to top in a rapid efficient manner.” Since this emphasis is unlikely to change, the key to getting leaders to adopt a new structure depends on showing the adverse impacts of the current structure on organizational performance and employee behavior and how both will improve through structural change. As a

Colonel John F. Price, Jr., USAF, is Vice Wing Commander for 375th Air Mobility Wing and recently completed a tour on the Joint Staff.

Army lieutenant colonel briefs commanding general Joint Task Force–Haiti on internally displaced persons camps in Port-au-Prince during Operation Unified Response
RAND study pointed out, “The challenge for the U.S. military is to develop new organizational structures that achieve the efficiencies and creativity businesses have gained in the virtual and reengineered environments, while at the same time retaining the elements of the traditional, hierarchical, command and control system (for example, discipline, morale, tradition) essential for operations in the combat arena.”

Beyond the Org Chart

To appreciate the impact of structural decisions, we must comprehend the multiple components of the structural dimension. According to recent research by Joseph Krasman, a comprehensive look at structure requires consideration of routinization, standardization, span of control, formalization, and centralization. Taken together, these components provide a significantly expanded concept of organizational structure, and it becomes easier to see how structural decisions have so much influence on employee behavior.

Leaders must also contend with the fact that organizational design is a continual process. As Galbraith points out, “Leaders must learn to think of organize as a verb, an active verb. Organizing is a continuous management task, like budgeting, scheduling or communicating.” Unfortunately, some organizations, especially large ones, continue to view organizational structure as a one-time, foundational decision that they are reluctant to revisit because of the extensive repercussions of organizational structure changes. However, the dangers of failing to adapt are much more significant than the inconveniences of structural change, even in a large hierarchical bureaucracy.

Impact of Inaction

While effective in the dissemination of top-down direction, the current military structure has numerous adverse impacts on the military members currently serving. At the individual level, the military’s hierarchical bureaucratic structure undermines creativity, hinders empowerment and sense of ownership, and fosters cynicism. The same organization that rapidly responds around the globe to the directions of senior officers provides almost no voice to the hundreds of thousands in the lower ranks. As a result, the organization’s adaptability and flexibility are significantly impaired because navigational choices are addressed only by the most entrenched in the organization. Furthermore, the functional stovepipes that comprise the central columns of the organizational structure only serve to fracture teamwork, collaboration, and knowledge distribution. It is no surprise that then-Brigadier General Zinni and others argued, “In a crisis, the dusty wire diagram sitting atop most of our desks does not spring into action as one amorphous mass.”

The current structure undermines the amazing talents of officer and enlisted Service members by burying them under excess layers of supervision and constructing barriers to information exchange. Instead of creating opportunities, the oppressive structure stifles initiative and slowly drains talent from the organization. As Arno Penzia, Bell Laboratory’s chief scientist, states, “The problem with hierarchies is that people at every level have the power to say no.” The unfortunate reality in the military is that most of those people telling you “no” do not have the authority to tell you “yes,” but are still able to clog the arteries of the organization.

In a terrible irony, the effort by senior military leaders to smooth decisionmaking and improve control only results in slowing down the organization and stifling its ability to react to opportunities and threats. Instead of helping the organization, the structure fosters dependence and a greater need for direction from senior leadership. As Martin van Creveld states, “An organization with a high decision threshold—that is, one in which only senior officials are authorized to make decisions of any importance—will require a larger and more continuous information flow than one in which the threshold is low.” It is time for senior defense leaders to recognize the impediment that the organizational structure has become and consider the consequences of failing to change in the face of difficult economic pressures and myriad military threats.

Leaving Napoleon Behind

Over the last decade, the military has made a few feeble attempts to step out of Napoleon’s shadow and improve organizational design. However, in most cases, the structural adjustments were temporary fixtures stood up to address a specific contingency operation, acquisition program, or other “hot topic.” Interestingly, in many cases, these ad hoc organizations are cross-functional or matrixed structures specifically designed to cut through the day-to-day bureaucracy. Somehow, we have realized these reliable structures are preferred for crisis scenarios when speed, accuracy, and creative thinking are at a premium, but when the crisis ends, we return to the sluggish, stovepiped hierarchy.

One aspect that makes this more difficult is the challenge of transitioning the entire military structure. Instead of reforming one or even a set of organizational charts, adaptation for DOD would require the near simultaneous transition of thousands of organizational charts. The reality despite the problems generated by outdated structure, the military has continued to resist change in most sectors
William Fulmer in his *Shaping the Adaptive Organization*:

- decentralization
- high spans of control
- extensive use of temporary structures
- powerful information systems
- constantly evolving structure.12

Decentralization removes the barriers to creativity and freedom of action, while wide spans of control reduce the layers of bureaucracy and keep senior officials more in touch with operations.11 Increasing the use of temporary structures enables adaptation and flexibility and indirectly provides a forum for structural experimentation within the organization. Information systems enable networking and collaboration in virtual structures and allow members to escape geographical or functional barriers. Finally, the establishment of structure as a variable instead of a fixed entity fosters a learning organization culture, which is vital in today’s environment.

**Act Now**

While some would have us wait for the elusive “time of peace” to implement change, now is the perfect time to execute needed structural change in DOD. Budgetary contractions and impending personnel drawdowns demand increased efficiency and place a great deal of stress on the existing structure. Congressional pressure to reduce the bloat of the general/flag officer corps creates opportunities to eliminate excess structural layers. It is time to stop renting extra office space in Northern Virginia because the Pentagon staffs long ago outgrew one of the world’s largest office buildings and start organizing for 21st-century operations.

While a comprehensive reform effort will involve all of DOD, the proper starting point for the process must be with the Joint Staff. As an extension of the Chairman, this staff serves as the interface with both the Service staffs collocated in Washington and the combatant command staffs distributed around the world. The Joint Staff helps to facilitate the interchange between the Services’ organize, train, and equip missions; the combatant command’s regional engagement operations; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s guidance and policy. Organizational change efforts at this critical juncture will cascade into the partnering organizations and promote a DOD-wide shift driven by the natural tendency of military organizations to seek alignment.

If we know it is time to restructure—and it appears the logical starting point is the Joint Staff—the question remains: what should the new structure look like? By following Louis Sullivan’s maxim “form ever follows function,” we find our structural answer by looking at the core purpose of our military enterprise.14 If we filter through all of the creative language in the national strategy documents and observe how the organization is resourced, it is apparent that DOD is focused on two desired outcomes: win the current fight (in whatever form that may be), and prevent/prepare to win the next conflict—in order to secure America’s global position. This description of the military’s core purpose can be condensed down to two foundational concepts that form the basis for a new military structure: execution and preparation.

These two pillars are the major operating lanes on every staff and in every functional area. They represent the temporal separation we see between operational planning and execution, between procuring capabilities and employing them, and between recruiting and training personnel and deploying and employing personnel. If we look at DOD on a grand scale, it becomes clear that this preparation/execution divide is the primary separation between the Services and combatant commands. For the most part, the combatant commands occupy the execution role as they employ today’s force, while the Services are charged with the preparation role of generating tomorrow’s force while sustaining today’s. However, when we look at each organization’s staff arrangement, we typically see execution centered on the J3 but also distributed across the staff, while preparation roles are scattered across the functional stovepipes.

The temporal dividing line must be the driving force in the staff reorganization effort instead of attempting to organize around the competing demands of geography and functional capabilities. The current system disperses parts of execution and preparation throughout the organization and desynchronizes the efforts. Even worse, because the system has aspects of execution laced across the organization, it results in every functional area gravitating to current operations, which causes the entire organization to dive to the tactical level. To avoid this reality, temporal separation, instead of functional “cylinders of excellence,” must be the basis for staff design. This simple bifurcation would significantly compress the staff structure to reflect priority of effort—again, execution and preparation. It would also reduce the problems of duplication of effort and information fratricide by eliminating the artificial barriers formed by the functional arrangement.

The implementation of this construct would result in the elimination of functional hierarchies on the military staffs. Instead

### Decentralized, Cross-functional Staff Concept

**Directors of Execution and Preparation integrate all aspects of current and future operations**

#### Operational Processes
(Plans, Programs, Budgets, Posture, Risk/Readiness)

#### Operational Enablers
(Intelligence, Logistics, C4ISR, Personnel, Legal, Medical)

#### Operational Areas
(Africa, Europe, Asia, Americas, Pacific, Space)

#### Operational Domains / Capabilities
(Land, Naval, Air, Space, Cyber, Nuclear, SOF)

#### Cross-functional Teams
(Crisis Action, Operational Planning, Working Groups, etc.)

**Director of Staff Synchronization manages work flow and spans current-future transition**

**Director of Staff Synchronization**

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or collectively in crisis. While this structure may seem foreign on initial review, there are numerous examples of it already residing in our staffs. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell is a perfect example of a highly effective cross-functional team that existed independently on the staff before recently being absorbed by the J5. Another example common to many staffs is the commander’s action group. These multifunctional miniature think tanks, designed to tackle issues for senior commanders, are perfect examples of how a standing, matrixed team concept could be employed. Senior functional area experts would still be resident in the staff to assist with developmental and assignment issues, but the elimination of the functional directorates would remove barriers to collaboration and improve staff integration.

Transitioning the Joint Staff and combatant command staffs to this model would not be easy because it would remove numerous layers of the hierarchy and deal a serious blow to the functional stovepipes. However, the improvements in agility, collaboration, and end-to-end process management would be significant. Shifting our major staffs to focus on operational execution and preparation helps ensure unity of effort and continuity in plans, programs, and budgets.

While significant detail would need to be added to make this concept a reality, it is clear that this approach could provide several key benefits. First, it ensures the entire staff is focused on the core DOD mission and not divided by functional allegiances. Secondly, it ensures the return of a strategically focused staff by devoting a large portion of the staff to focus on future strategic development. The intentional temporal separation would be complemented by the consolidation of the staff, which would ensure sufficient connections to current operations to enable continuity of thought in concepts, planning, and lessons learned. Third, the consolidation of the staff into a single current and future operations group would enable the elimination of numerous general/flag officer positions that were previously required to lead the numerous directorates. Instead of serving as stovepipe chieftains, the remaining senior officers would be true generalists charged with facilitating the efforts of the cross-functional teams. Fourth, the removal of bureaucratic layers and duplication of effort combined with improved coordination would provide increased staff efficiency in the face of having directorates focused on personnel, intelligence, logistics, and so forth, the revised staff would matrix each of these functions into the core areas of execution and preparation depending on its role. While functional leadership would still exist, the overall coordination of effort across the staff would be greatly simplified. The combatant commander or Chairman would be able to focus attention on two primary channels: current operations and future operations. The dividing line between current and future operations in this construct would differ significantly from present models. While some fluctuation would be needed to balance workloads, the baseline for current operations would be the present out to 6 months, where future operations would take the lead. The word operations in this construct has a greatly expanded meaning to include all aspects of military operations from budgetary planning and platform procurement to kinetic operations in a combat zone.

This staff is not intended to operate in functional areas. Instead, it is designed to operate like a joint task force or a cross-functional team that pulls together the desired expertise to address specific issues as they arise. Instead of continuing the current process of creating ad hoc groups every time an issue arises, team members are aligned in cells capable of working independently...
of impending personnel cuts. Finally, and most importantly, the “practice like you play” maxim would finally be realized in the headquarters staffs as the agility, creativity, and expertise of the cross-functional teams seen during crisis response become the normal mode of operations.

Closing Thoughts

As this article is being written, the most substantial cuts in military spending in the last several decades are being considered, and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review stated that one of its two goals was “to further reform the Department’s institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the warfighter.” The need for structural reform combined with the fiscal demand for efficiencies, taken together, should provide sufficient motivation for leadership to consider resuming their responsibilities with regard to organizational design and revolutionize the antiquated structures in the Services. If we are truly serious about improving efficiency, saving taxpayer dollars, and taking care of our people, what could be better than doing all three by improving the organizational structure?

Think about the increased accessibility to leadership, the increased span of control, and the decentralization that would occur from this action. While the concept presented is only one of many options that could be pursued, it should be clear that there is great value in pursuing design ideas that break the mold of the past in order to make the organization more competitive and sustainable in the future. Do we have the courage to put structure back in the leadership discussion, or are we doomed to follow Napoleon through another century?

**NOTES**

The United States is preparing for cyber conflicts and ushering in a new era for national security. The concept of cyber operations is rapidly developing, and the time has come to transpose the conceptual heights to a broad ability to fight a strategic cyber conflict and defend the Nation in a cohesive way. Richard M. George, a former National Security Agency official, commented on recent developments: “Other countries are preparing for a cyberwar. If we’re not pushing the envelope in cyber, somebody else will.” Therefore, increased budgets are allocated to cyber operations research and education. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Plan X (for which a formal solicitation has not yet been issued at the point of authorship) will, according to media outlets, give an additional infusion of $110 million to research in pursuit of cyber operational capacities. Herbert S. Lin of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences commented, “They’re talking about being able to dominate the digital battlefield just like they do the traditional battlefield.” Plan X adds to the DARPA budget of $1.54 billion for cyber research in the period 2013–2017. Additional funds are allocated for a variety of Federal agencies. The most desirable goal is to acquire cyber supremacy—global U.S. dominance in cyberspace that permits the secure, reliable conduct of operations by U.S. forces and related land, sea, air, and space forces at a given time and sphere of operations without prohibitive interference by an adversary.

Universities are instrumental in bridging from concept to methodology, tools, and implementation. They are the force multiplier of the cyber defense doctrine as research hubs, educating thousands in the civilian and military-contractor workforces, and as a provider of technical solutions to ensure mission success. It is pivotal for cyber superiority that institutions of higher learning are aligned with the strategic goals of our national cyber defense strategy and clearly understand its doctrinal underpinnings. Put differently, if cyber security research is driving in a different direction than the national cyber strategy, we are getting in trouble by creating a gap and a weakness that can be exploited by hostile parties. Not only do we lose the opportunity to acquire cyber superiority, but we also become the prey in cyberwar.

This article challenges the universities’ abilities to provide support for the doctrinal change to cyber operations, mainly because of the overemphasis on information assurance and the lack of intra-university collaboration. Another issue considered is that in case we fail to transpose the theory to broad implementation, adversaries may be watching and learning what we should be implementing. The support for this scenario is drawn from the development of armored warfare.

The Business of Information Security

Traditionally, information security research and education have been founded on the key concept of information assurance—actions that protect and defend information systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepubdication. Information assurance is often expressed in underlying subfields such as forensics, network security, and penetration.
The Lure of Traditional Thinking

The cyber warfare concepts and abilities of the early years will continue to evolve over the decades to come. Developments tend to take longer than first anticipated not only because of technological hindrances, but also due to a path-dependent culture favoring earlier methods and a natural instinct to prefer what is known. There is a valid analogy between the dawn of cyber warfare and the dawn of armored warfare. It took 25 years for Western armies to figure out a proper use for the armored tank. Once that was understood, the way wars were fought was fundamentally changed. That has continued for 70 years and still counting.

For the first 25 years, the French and British saw the battle tank as a moveable machinegun pillbox from trench warfare. The tank was not a fighting platform; it was a mobile fortification that supported infantry. This perception changed when those countries suffered a horrifying defeat to the Germans in May 1940; the Germans had studied, developed, and understood armored warfare. For the Allied forces, it was too late; the damage was done. The irony is not only that the French developed many of the ideas the Germans utilized, such as Charles de Gaulle’s proposed armored warfare tactics and the French airman’s innovation of advanced dive-bombing, but also that the Allies publically and vocally debated the opportunities these tactical innovations offered. The Germans were listening, but not the Allied high command. Due to groupthink and intellectual path dependency, the French military never accepted it or even considered it seriously.

The French preferred structured positional warfare. An integral part of positional warfare was fighting for fixed hardened positions—a war of holding positions and attrition. In 1940, France had the largest land army and also the largest number of battle tanks in Western Europe. In addition, there were Allied forces such as the British Expeditionary Force.

The difference between the combatants was the tactics of how to use battle tanks. The German strategy—which was old and known to the French—was an attempt to encircle the French after a breakthrough, but the tactics and operational performance were revolutionary. The German tanks were in the hands of Heinz Guderian, who carefully studied how to utilize tanks in an unconventional manner. He invented and refined armored warfare, ensuring that he could exploit the adversary’s weaknesses. The number of French tanks and massive French army did not matter. The reason was simple: the French were not able in their minds to fight modern warfare and therefore were doomed to destruction or submission.

The opportunity in cyber operations in the next decade is not a revolutionary technology, but instead derives from how we utilize and militarize existing technologies in a way that is unburdened by tradition, to use Guderian’s words.

The French in 1940 were still thinking of warfare as a solid front between two adversaries, consisting of three lines of units: infantry, artillery, and bakery. The traditional way of fighting war was that infantry faced and fought the enemy, artillery supported the infantry with indirect fire, and the rear echelon, here called bakery, provided logistical support. Guderian broke the rules and fought the war in reverse order. He concentrated his units and overran the French lines at a weak point, and, in a deep stroke attacked the bakery, ignored the infantry, and let the artillery panic. The attack was identical to the sketches of deep-penetrating armored assaults that Liddell Hart and de Gaulle envisioned before the war.

The lure in applying traditional military thinking on cyber warfare is that we can
Traditional military theories could be less relevant in cyberspace than we are ready to admit. Traditional thinking appeals to us, but it could be spurious.

If we assume that we have control of the situation and knowledge of our enemy’s positions and the full extent of the map, with our defense focused on hardened strongpoints, then we are fighting the digital cyberwar with the tools of analogue positional warfare. Edward N. Luttwak noted that strategy only matters if we have the resources to execute the strategy, and embedded in Luttwak’s statement is the general condition that if we are unable to identify, understand, and utilize our resources, strategy does not matter.

Cyber supremacy will be achieved if we can understand the unique tenets of cyber, create a doctrine that exploits opportunity and technical ability, achieve broad societal alignment to cyber strategy, and assemble the workforce to execute it. Universities play a vital part in the last three components. Even if the military develops the brightest and most thought-through doctrine ever conceived, it will still be only a doctrine and nothing more. Doctrines are instruments of war, but they tell only how to play the cards; the actual deck of cards in cyberwar is mainly produced by private enterprises and academia.

Inability to Transpose Theory to Practice

The United States is having an extensive public debate about the future of cyber warfare and how it should be conducted. We debate openly as a free and democratic society. We are not the first open society that has been able to generate magnificent ideas and theories about future warfare. In the 1930s, B.H. Liddell Hart, Giffard Le Quesne Martel, and John F.C. Fuller wrote extensively about the future of mobile warfare. Martel was considered one of the world’s leading tank experts of the 1930s. He went so far to prove his case that he built a light tank in his own garden, at his own expense, which became the platform for the British Bren gun-carrier. Liddell Hart was a prolific writer and developed theories of exploits after an armored breakthrough of enemy lines, the deep strike that would force the enemy to react and lead to the collapse of the defense. In France, then—Colonel Charles de Gaulle advocated for armored divisions, freeing the tank corps from the infantry and utilizing armored warfare’s full potential. France and Britain in the 1930s saw the potential in armored warfare, but for institutional reasons and internal biasness, they refused to capitalize on these modern ideas.

In the 1930s, both France and Britain failed to transpose theory to methods, tools, and implementation. In military terms, theory transposes to tactics, weapons, and training. Theory was created in France and Britain but transposed by Germany through generals such as Erich von Manstein and Guderian to tactics, weapons, and training. Guderian wrote after the war: “The proposals of de Gaulle, Daladier and others along these lines had been ignored. From this it must be concluded that the highest French leadership either would not or could not grasp the significance of the tank in mobile warfare.”

The United States faces the same risk as Britain and France in the 1930s, except our military leadership clearly understands the changing paradigm; there are other obstacles to transposing theory. We are the creators of cyber ideas and concepts, but we fail to move beyond the present and implement them. Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community are world leaders in developing cyber operation concepts and innovative strategies to ensure future American cyber supremacy. Instead of the military being the blockage for intellectual proliferation as it was in France 75 years ago, the hindrance for cyber warfare’s development today is in the civil society and the academic realm.

We can assume that our adversaries or covert adversaries in the digital age carefully study our new strategies and ideas and develop plans to utilize these publically discussed innovative concepts. The most loyal online readers of the offensive cyber operation discourse in American journals are likely our adversaries. All of them are ready to capitalize on our ideas if they can.

The University Role in Cyberwar

A nation’s cyber warfighting ability will be determined by its ability to mobilize resources and knowledge and coordinate the effort. These resources are not as easily identified. At the entrance to the contested cyber-space as a warfighting domain, academia and university research centers have to find their new roles. University cyber researchers have continued to deliver mainly information assurance. Even the information assurance context has been following the Zeitgeist by focusing on Cold War spies, terrorists, drug cartels, white-collar crime, and economic espionage. The bottom line is that it is still information security with a theoretical foundation from the 1980s. Information security has had a decade of high levels of funding as a response to 9/11 and society’s increased reliance on the Internet and computerized systems. This posture has

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even if the military develops the most thought-through doctrine ever conceived, it will still be only a doctrine
that have been considered Centers of Academic Excellence—Research (CAE-R). NSA’s latest addition is CAE Cyber Operations. According to the NSA, key abilities are collection, exploitation, and response. The majority of the CAE-R institutions are likely to pursue the CAE Cyber Operations.

A Quick Survey

As an experiment, we conducted a survey to get a snapshot of where CAE-R research centers stand today in relation to the broader systematic full-spectrum view on cyber warfare pursuing cyber superiority. The question was whether the academic institutions are embracing the cyber operations paradigm shift or are institutionally path-dependent and continuing with the information assurance track that has been prevailing since the Cold War. The purpose of the survey was to determine how many research universities have broken down their internal walls between departments in professional and engineering schools and successfully pursued a broader approach to match the complexity of cyber operations. We acknowledge that this paradigm shift is a work in progress, and we have credited schools that are moving toward cyber operations even if the actual approach as of today is ad hoc and less defined.

Cyber operations research requires linkages outside of the engineering schools and benefits from collaboration with other university-wide schools and departments. The research can then be transferred through research-based education to the workforce that is needed to achieve national cyber defense objectives. A broader knowledge base enables the research center to do work that can support, prepare, and conduct defensive countercyber operations, offensive cyber operations, and cyber operational preparation of the environment aligned with the national interest.

A set of variables was created and then each academic CAE-R research center’s Web presence was visited, along with their leading researchers’ Web presence, and the materials presented on the Web site were evaluated against the variables. Some of the observations were reviewed and validated by an external reviewer to ensure that the evaluation did not contain systematic errors. There were 48 academic cyber research centers in nonmilitary higher education in the United States in February 2012. All schools that met the CAE-R criteria had information assurance programs in place as the foundation for the designation. The variables used were:

- whether there is research on offensive and responding cyber defense and if the research conducted steers toward offensive countercyber, cyber operational preparation of the environment, and pursuing cyber superiority in cyber warfare, or is predominantly based on information assurance only
- if there is a legal component supporting utilization of weapons control status, especially international law, ethics, and privacy, and a future need for assessments of military ethics, cyber rules of engagement, and the legal foundation for collateral effects, first and second tier
- whether the research has involved political scientists or other social scientists, especially in theories about national institutional stability and international relations, creating understanding of foreign societies or institutions that are the targeted adversaries, aligned with the concept of cyber operational preparation of the environment and information operations, leading to increased effect on adversarial society
if the university has a designed policy school or similar entity to determine the extent of resources available on campus to optimize cyber operations research to take advantage of intelligence-gathering opportunities, human terrain, political instability, and fragile institutional design of target countries or institutions

whether there is a clear linkage between the cyber research program and policy school of the same university, if one exists

if security studies scholars are involved in the cyber security research, creating an understanding of security fundamentals and military science that would support a better understanding of the final goal with the cyber operation mission and doctrinal goals

whether there is an international relations component in the research to determine the degree the opportunity to exploit human terrain, political instability, and fragile institutional design of target countries or institutions is understood

if the cyber research covers the space domain since the importance of the defense of the global information grid is clearly identified by the term cyber operations, defined as the “employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid.”

Cyber attacking U.S. space assets can give high returns for an adversary. The global information grid is pivotal to U.S. military might and information supremacy.

Results and Reflections

We do not consider this survey as delivering a perfect picture of the state of national cyber research, but it will reveal a fundamental understanding of what research universities are able to deliver and where the majority of the U.S. cyber security research centers are on the learning curve. All 48 CAE-Rs are researching information assurance. Only five are actively researching offensive and defensive cyber operations to a broader extent. This includes research supporting information operations and psychological operations aligned with future military operations. If a military commander wants to have cyber weapons made, these universities are able to make military grade cyber weapons.

The high number of CAE-Rs that have legal components in their research reflects privacy research, which is also an integral part of information assurance. Only 10 CAE-Rs involve social scientists in their research. A significant number of schools do not involve social scientists in projects that are focused on human behavior and institutional arrangements. A few universities go as far as to design complex research projects that are partly based on behavior, sociopolitical institutions, and societal factors with only computer scientists and engineers on the team. Of the 48 CAE-Rs, 10 have a full-size policy school on campus, with numerous specialized scholars running research over a spectrum of policy related inquiries and with understanding of core tenets of societal cyber operation components. Only 5 CAE-Rs out of these 10 collaborate to a visible degree with their own policy school and utilize the joint knowledge. In other terms, half of the tier-one universities with cyber security research centers underutilize their own policy schools’ pool of competence. Even if we are in a globalized world with cyber as not only a warfighting domain, but also an arena for international cybercrime and transnational illicit activities, only 6 CAE-Rs involved international relations scholars in their projects. Cyber issues in space only draw interest from 5 CAE-Rs.

The largest portion of the CAE-R cyber research centers is doing information assurance research independently and separated from other scholarly activity on their

Survey Results of 48 Centers of Academic Excellence-Research (Defense Department Institutions Not Counted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive cyber research, such as offensive counter cyber and cyber operational preparation of the environment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal considerations and privacy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involving social scientists and/or behavioral scientists</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy school on campus</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilizing the assets of a policy school</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of security studies scholars or activity in research</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International relations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber in outer space, considering outer space as a part of cyber defense</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concerns and Opportunity

Cohesive cyber defense research requires universities to optimize their campus-wide resources to fuse knowledge, intellectual capacity, and practical skills in an unprecedented way. This is a major challenge for universities that have historically separated departments and schools and driven specialization so far that intra-university collaboration seldom occurs. In an era of austerity, it is justifiable for DOD to steer toward applied research that can strengthen the understanding of the need to collaborate, and they can even seek to collaborate, but the internal culture often prevails.

There could be several reasons why the academic turf war mentality exists. One is funding; cyber defense is seen as one of the few areas where funding could increase significantly in the future. Academic departments are trying to set out on their own journeys to seek sponsored research instead of jointly seeking grants with other disciplines, which would lead to fewer resources once they are shared.

For researchers, it is always more pleasant to be granted more money in the field we have already submerged ourselves in and fully understand. For researchers in general, it is also hard to admit that our little niche of science may not matter that much in the future. The academic community in many ways is driven to seeking more funding for what has interested researchers in the past rather than adapting to the new cyber paradigm, thus digging deeper trenches in the turf war.

A second reason the turf war exists is academic gridlock, which is a matter of institutional culture, intellectual path dependency, and the fact that many institutions became used to access to funding during what then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called an era of endless money. Once universities figured out the magic algorithm to get funding, the universities were less responsive to signals of change. If that predicted stream of funding disappears, action will be taken. The fastest way to correct the gridlock and increase the transformation of research and education to better mirror the interest of DOD is to steer funding. One of America’s advantages in research is its universities’ ability to quickly adapt when facing the risk of losing funding.

The conducted survey presents a misalignment between what is researched and educated in the Nation’s cyber security research centers and DOD’s overarching goals and doctrine. It has to be made clear that the stakes are so high that a correct balance has to trump any internal academic politics. The misalignment creates a gap that can be closed by steering funding and increasing interaction among the actors in the national cyber defense. Unless corrected, the misalignment will continue to create a national security risk. These innovative ideas can be put to use by our adversaries while we as a nation fail to achieve cyber superiority.

The problem is that theoretical concepts do not become transposed into research and education to create methodologies, tools, and implementation abilities of the Armed Forces and Intelligence Community and provide policymakers and Federal executives with more options.

The future will require cyber defense research teams that can address not only computer science, electrical engineering, and software and hardware security, but also political theory, institutional theory, behavioral psychology, deterrence theory, military ethics, international law, international relations, and additional social sciences. Researchers working alongside DOD to develop tool sets for information operations as a subset of cyber operations, utilizing social media and exploiting collective behavior, would require a broad mix of social science and behavioral psychology competencies.

The problem, and our disadvantage, is that theoretical concepts do not become transposed into research and education to create methodologies, tools, and implementation. A vast number of our academic institutions are unable, as of today, to look at and conduct research beyond information security. Cyber operations require a different academic culture where collaboration in the national interest prevails over departmental turf wars. To quote Sayre’s Law, “In any dispute the intensity of feeling is inversely proportional to the value of the stakes at issue”—and its corollary—“that is why academic politics are so bitter.” A sense of what is ultimately at stake needs to be infused. Cyber research centers and dedicated researchers within different departments can be brought to an understanding of the need to collaborate, and they can even seek to collaborate, but the internal culture often prevails.

3 Nakashima, “With Plan X.”
5 Jan Kallberg and Bhavani Thuraisingham, “Towards cyber operations—The new role of academic cyber security research and education,” IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics 2012, Washington, DC.
9 Guderian.
12 Cartwright.
13 Jan Kallberg, “Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012).
Over the past decade and a half, the Department of Defense (DOD) and each of the uniformed Services has issued core values statements:

DOD: Duty, Integrity, Ethics, Honor, Courage, and Loyalty.
U.S. Air Force: Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do.
U.S. Coast Guard: Honor, Respect, and Devotion to duty.
U.S. Department of the Navy: Honor, Courage, and Commitment.

Each of these statements purports to constitute a succinct summary of the owning organization’s most fundamental commitments—the moral reference points that underwrite, circumscribe, and guide the organization’s goals and work. As such, each merits both special attention and careful reflection. However, each additionally deserves critical examination—especially since each is intended to communicate to the profession’s members, particularly its newest members, its core ethical commitments. A critical examination includes questions such as:

- How well do these statements capture the essence of how each organization’s members ought to conduct their personal and professional lives?
- How successfully and comprehensively do they communicate the ethical standards of the organization?
- How well do they imbue the members of the organization with a sense of what it means to belong to the profession of arms in a democratic society?

Core Value Statements Compared

Upon undertaking a critical examination, the first thing we notice about these statements is that each is different, even though the uniformed members of the respective organizations are members of the same profession of arms and, with one exception, the same executive department. In their 2009 review of these core values statements, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission offered the following apologetic explanation for this lack of uniformity:

Although the DoD core-values statement indicates that uniformed military members share a common set of core values, each Service’s identity is reflected in its own uniquely defined core values, which serve as common ground for all its members. For example, the Marine Corps’ core values “form the bedrock of [a Marine’s] character” (Sturkey, 2001), the Air Force’s “tell us the price of admission to the Air Force itself” (United States Air Force, 1997), and the Army’s are “what being a soldier is all about” (United States Army, n.d.).

This descriptive statement, coming from a commission with a mandate to promote diversity, comes as no particular surprise, and, in all fairness, there is nothing overtly objectionable about it. On further reflection, however, it raises some questions that properly claim our attention:

- Since DOD has a common set of core values, and DOD is the organization that encompasses the profession of arms in the United States, why should its subordinate organizations find it necessary to espouse different sets of core values?

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COMMENTARY | Values Statements and the Profession of Arms

Core Values Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>duty</th>
<th>integrity</th>
<th>ethics</th>
<th>honor</th>
<th>courage</th>
<th>loyalty</th>
<th>service</th>
<th>excellence in all we do</th>
<th>respect</th>
<th>selfless service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>integrity first</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>service</td>
<td>excellence in all we do</td>
<td>respect</td>
<td>selfless service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>duty</td>
<td>integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td>honor</td>
<td>personal courage</td>
<td>loyalty</td>
<td></td>
<td>respect</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>devotion to duty</td>
<td></td>
<td>honor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>respect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>honor</td>
<td></td>
<td>courage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>commitment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td>honor</td>
<td></td>
<td>courage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>commitment</td>
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- Is there something fundamentally different between DOD and the uniformed Services or among the uniformed Services themselves that makes distinctions in their core values a matter of logical necessity?
- Do the Services’ values actually differ, or do the differences in wording and composition exist merely for cosmetic reasons?
- If their values actually differ, why is this so?
- If their distinctions are merely cosmetic, might not such artificialities actually have the effect of detracting from the seriousness that should attach to core values statements?
- Are the individual tenets themselves logically necessary or are they essentially arbitrary?
- If they are logically necessary, on what grounds is this so?
- If they are arbitrary, does that mean that any list of virtues would suffice as a military core values statement?
- Are the Service core values qualities that members of that Service have a unique requirement to possess, or are they merely desirable qualities that any virtuous citizen in a democratic society should have?

Members of a profession have an obligation to be self-critical—to look for ways in which to better themselves and more effectively discharge the special public trust that distinguishes them as members of a profession. That means they must, from time to time, scrutinize cherished notions, ideas that they have grown to hold dear, or things that because of the passage of time have come to be regarded as part of their identity. If in the process of self-examination, they encounter discomfiting flaws in their assumptions or methods, they must resist the temptation to dismiss those encounters out of hand, but instead take as their touchstone the question, “What is best for America?” and relegate other considerations to a secondary status.

DOD Core Values

On the basis of the comparison in the table, we observe that all five uniformed Services contain one or more elements found in the DOD core values. This should come as no surprise since, after all, DOD is the parent organization. However, what should be startling to anyone familiar with standard five-paragraph operation orders is that there is so little overlap between DOD’s core values statement and those of the individual Services. Let us liken the DOD core values statement to a superior command’s operation order and the core values statements of the individual Services to the operations orders of subordinate units, derived from the order received from the superior headquarters. If the DOD core values statement were to appear in what we might call an “ethics operation” order, where would it appear? Is seems clear enough that it would appear either as paragraph two (the mission statement) or in paragraph three in the “concept of the operation” subparagraph, which addresses the commander’s intent. One might argue that the individual Service core values statements are simply instances of the “restated mission statement” found in subordinate unit operation orders. Perhaps, but the problem with this interpretation is that there is no obvious connection between the superior unit mission and the subordinate restated missions.

The next thing of note is that none of the Services includes “ethics” in their respective core values statements. At first blush, this may seem nothing less than incredible. Indeed, one might ask, “How can it possibly be that none of the subordinate commanders finds ‘ethics’ to be important enough to include from the superior commander’s ethics operation order into their own?” However, the likely answer is that the subordinate commanders omitted ethics precisely because its inclusion serves no clear purpose in a statement that, by its nature, is understood to enshrine the institution’s ethics. With respect to this particular tenet, the superior commander’s core values statement does not serve its subordinate commanders very well.

Now we turn to the individual Service core values statements (in alphabetical order) as shown in the table.

Air Force Core Values

It is immediately clear that the Air Force statement is the least aligned of all the Services with the DOD core values statement. That in no way implies that the Air Force does not cherish ethical values; it simply means that the DOD and Air Force statements do not, prima facie, appear to reflect a reliance on each other as might be expected between superior and subordinate organizations. In particular, we are struck by the Air Force core value not found in any other core values statement, namely “excellence in all we do.” In practical terms, this is not a particularly helpful tenet. It does not require a great deal of reflection on general life experience.
to conclude that if everything truly is excellent then nothing is excellent. Human beings simply do not do everything excellently; and when they try to lead their lives in a way that insists on excellence in every single aspect, they often end up frustrated and excellent in nothing. Certainly members of the profession of arms are better served by being imbued with the understanding that they must learn to look at tactical situations, quickly and accurately assess them to separate that which is important from that which is not, and relegate that which is not important to the possibility of less-than-excellent outcomes.

The next most prominent feature in the Air Force core values statement is its reference to “service before self.” This statement is not precisely the same thing as the value of “selfless service” articulated in the Army statement. “Service before self” suffers from the same theoretical malady that attends many such moral-philosophical statements: If we always serve others before attending to ourselves, our ability to serve others ultimately diminishes because we fail to “sharpen the saw,” as it were. On the other hand, “selfless service” suggests that when one does serve—with the assumption that the idea of “service” in the profession of arms represents the norm and not the exception—one should do so selflessly. This characterization of service probably more closely reflects what is actually intended in the Air Force core values statement.

**Army Core Values**

The Army’s statement is the most closely aligned of all the Services with the DOD values statement. At the same time, however, it is also the longest—raising the question of whether Occam’s razor might be advantageously applied.

But why exactly is it the longest? The unfortunate answer appears to be that a corporate decision was made to express the Army’s core values as an acronym, no matter what contortions needed to be applied to make it so. The acronym L-D-R-S-H-I-P is what has come to be Soldier-speak for “leadership.” Now, acronyms certainly have their place. After all, what drill sergeant would object to having the aid of an abbreviation to help new recruits remember a long list of values, alongside the many other lists that trainees are expected to digest? However, insistence on this particular acronym appears to have imposed certain artificialities upon the values statement. For example, the Army core values statement refers not to “courage,” but to “personal courage.” This is, of course, a rather odd and counterintuitive construction since courage, by its very nature, is personal. Indeed, what would it mean if one were to refer to “corporate” courage? There is no such thing as a courageous squad, a courageous platoon, or a courageous company. Only the members of that squad, platoon, or company can be courageous. Courage, like all moral values, can be meaningfully experienced only at the individual level. Even if every member of a collective is courageous, the collective does not thereby become courageous; only its individual members can do that.

The other apparent artificiality in the LDRSHIP acronym is “honor.” On the face of it, this does not appear to be a problem, especially since every DOD and Service core values statement, except for the Air Force, includes it. However, its artificiality in the context of the acronym is betrayed by the Army’s own official definition of what it means by “honor,” to wit: “Live up to all the Army values.” The notion thus becomes self-referential and to that extent, vacuous; for what good is a “value” that merely tells one to “live the values”?

The idea of making a core values list fit an acronym is something that probably merits discussion among Army professionals. However well intended the gesture, might it not be the case that forcing a fit with an acronym results in a case of misplaced emphasis? Indeed, the acronym LDRSHIP is itself a choice that invites some questioning. Is the intent of the acronym to suggest that core values are the province of leaders only? Is it to suggest that everyone in a civilian-led military (in which all uniformed personnel are, to that extent, followers) are actually leaders—and if so, in what sense? Indeed, moral values are not about leaders per se; they are about persons. To confuse the two is to misunderstand something fundamental about our humanity. Values apply to leaders because they are persons; values do not apply, in the present context, to persons based on whether or not they are leaders.

**Coast Guard Core Values**

While it is understood that the Coast Guard is aligned bureaucratically with the Department of Homeland Security and not DOD, the nature of its work as a uniformed Service charged with the Nation’s defense aligns it, for purposes of the present discussion, both conceptually and philosophically with the Services under the Department of Defense.

The Coast Guard core values statement is not particularly distinctive, except for its reference to “respect”—a reference shared with the Army’s core values statement.

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Prima facie, it is not entirely clear what role “respect” should play as an essential characteristic of the profession of arms. This is not to say that “respect” is not an honorable or desirable trait; but how does its inclusion in a core values statement illuminate the essential character of the profession of arms any more than, say, “cheerfulness,” “friendliness,” or “courtesy”?
a member of the uniformed Services has any greater responsibility to demonstrate respect for others than every other member of American society does. The law holds—or should hold—every American citizen accountable for the abuse of other persons. If that is what “respect” refers to here, it simply is not the case, legally or philosophically, that a distinctive standard need exist on this point for members of the uniformed Services. In contrast, there is both a legal and philosophical basis for expecting a member of the uniformed Services to demonstrate “courage” in a way that cannot necessarily be expected of members of American society at large. “Courage” must be understood as not only fundamental to the performance of military duty—as a defining hallmark of the profession—but also distinctively so, in a way that “respect” must not necessarily be understood.

**Department of the Navy Core Values**

The Department of the Navy core values statement, as manifested in both the Navy and Marine Corps core value statements, features a singular elegance that is worthy of special attention: The Navy and Marine Corps core values are presented as having been derived from the Constitution of the United States. This is a remarkably powerful and sophisticated approach because it provides a grounding and derivation for the core values and a rationale for their selection. Hence, the Department of the Navy statement does not suffer from the apparent arbitrariness in selection of core values that plagues the other statements. The Navy statement ties each core value to key phrases from one of the oaths administered upon entry into naval service, to wit:

**Honor:** “I will bear true faith and allegiance . . .”
**Courage:** “I will support and defend . . .”
**Commitment:** “I will obey the orders . . .”

Even if the connection of the Navy and Marine Corps core values to these key phrases is not obvious, the Navy’s official explanation of the connection is compelling and makes an excellent basis for elucidating the import of these core values—and for explaining precisely why they are core values—in instructional settings with naval personnel. On the downside, the fact that the key phrases come from a mixture of the Navy’s oath of enlistment and from its commissioned officer oath of office constitutes a curious juxtaposition that may detract from the philosophical elegance of the arrangement.

This goes to a point that some might consider esoteric, but which in fact deserves consideration, namely, the question of what exactly constitutes the “professional” part of the military profession. By their very nature, codes of ethics pertain most directly to the professional segments of society. For example, while medical doctors are bound by the Hippocratic oath, it does not follow that the hospital medical records clerk or the radiology clinic receptionist are professionals in the same, relevant sense. They may be skilled technicians or tradespersons, but it is hard to make the case that they are classifiable as professionals in the traditional sense of the word. American society has grown so accustomed, in the last quarter or third of a century, to referring to anyone who is gainfully employed as a “professional” that the concept has become quite diluted. Hence, one routinely hears references to “professional” golfers, “professional” air conditioner repair persons, “professional” sales clerks in department
perhaps the time has come for DOD and each of the uniformed Services to consider what values distinctively define the profession of arms in a democratic society

knowledge not easily obtained by and not readily available to lay persons. That is why the medical doctor is a professional in the relevant sense and the medical office receptionist is not. In a similar vein, it is not entirely clear that every member of the uniformed Services is a “professional” in the relevant sense. At least the question should be asked as to whether there is a relevant difference in terms of professional status between, say, the young enlistee who drives a truck and the company commander who has far-reaching responsibilities concerning everything his or her company accomplishes or fails to accomplish and everything his or her subordinates do or fail to do. Of course, that does not mean that the truck driver is not important in his or her own circumscribed sphere; it just means that the label “professional” may not apply to that person in the same way that it does to a company commander.

In any case, the issue invites the question of whether the profession of arms should have a core values statement for those in bona fide professional positions, as is the case with medical doctors vis-à-vis the medical profession, or for all members of the team, as it were. The answer is probably the latter, and that is probably the best answer, given the enormous ethical decisionmaking responsibilities presently reposed even in junior enlisted personnel—the so-called strategic corporal—and given the context of America’s egalitarian social priorities.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion is not a critique of the proposition that the profession of arms in the United States ought to champion core values, and it does not seek to question whether the profession should have core values statements. Rather, it is a reevaluation of the efficacy of the current core values statements in terms of their ability to communicate to the members of the profession the serious nature of the ethical enterprise. Some might feel inclined to counter by saying, in effect, “Aren’t we making much too big a deal about this? Is it not far more important that we have arms should be able to articulate a defense of why this is so.

Some members of the profession might find these claims to be unduly theoretical. Some might regard them as bordering on irreverence. They might place such questioning in the same class with, for example, tinkering with the words of “America the Beautiful” or of the Pledge of Allegiance. However, the current core values statements deserve to be scrutinized. If after a decade of experience with the various core values statements their words are found to withstand scrutiny, they will become stronger and more enduring. If they are not able to withstand scrutiny borne of careful reflection, they need to be changed. In either case, it may well be that the time has come to conduct that reevaluation. JFQ

NOTES

1 As will be argued hereafter, the Coast Guard’s mission clearly makes it a part of the profession of arms, even if it is not aligned bureaucratically with the Department of Defense.
3 The oaths are as follows: For enlisted personnel: “I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God. I swear (or affirm) that I am fully aware and fully understand the conditions under which I am enlisting.” For commissioned officer personnel: “I, [state your name], having been appointed a (rank) in the United States (branch of service), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.”
6 1 Corinthians 13:1.
Reconsidering *The Armed Forces Officer* of 1950

Democracy, Dialogue, the Humanities, and the Military Profession

By REED R. BONADONNA

The 1950 edition of *The Armed Forces Officer* is the best book by the prolific military writer S.L.A. Marshall, and it is probably the best book on military leadership ever written by an American.1 In this article, I briefly describe how the timing and circumstances of the composition of *The Armed Forces Officer* helped Marshall to write his masterpiece, and then go on to illuminate the book’s innate, enduring, and timely strengths. This book represents a significant and perhaps still-unmatched achievement in uniting the form and content of the values and outlook required of an officer serving in the armed forces of a democracy. *The Armed Forces Officer* emphasizes both the accessibility and complexity of military leadership. In *The Armed Forces Officer*, the profession of arms itself becomes an interdisciplinary subset of the humanities, connected to both...
a canon of writing on military leadership and officer education, and most importantly to the larger culture, past and present.

Marshall’s approach to the paradoxes of the citizen-soldier and the commissioned elite in the service of a democracy is dialogic and inclusive. The book merits widespread reading and reconsideration at a time when the American military profession is beset by great challenges and confronted with formidable adversaries.

Marshall and the Army of a Democracy

How did it come about that this book, apparently written at speed in 30 days after Marshall (at least by his own later account) had assumed responsibility for a languishing Department of Defense (DOD) project, come to be his tour de force? One important element might be that Marshall was an anonymous author in the earlier Government Printing Office editions of the book. Writing without his own name dampened Marshall’s strong inclination for self-promotion, allowing his undoubted abilities, which included a prolific, although not infallible, memory to dominate. The Marshall of The Armed Forces Officer was just nearing 50. His lively mind was full of his readings and of the scenes and voices of his recent war experience, and he was not yet as curmudgeonly or reactionary as he sometimes seems in some later writings. The tone of this book is decidedly democratic and egalitarian.

Perhaps partly due to the instructive experience of World War II, The Armed Forces Officer is very non-Prussian, rejecting militarism, dogmatism, and other forms of professional insularity in favor of one more suited to America’s Army. The book eschews the German model that sometimes seems to be the dominant historical example of military professionalism. On the one hand, Marshall rejects the narrow, technocratic approach to professionalism that had overtaken the German officer corps and General Staff in the later 19th century, in effect reaching back to an older, more humanist, and ethical model (represented by Gerhard von Scharnhorst and the other Prussian reformers of the Napoleonic period). Moreover, he takes into account American culture and conditions. Marshall may also have been aided by the fact that he was writing before the field of “leadership studies” and military professionalism had come to be dominated by sociologists, psychologists, and others in academe, so that there was still room for eclecticism, even eccentricity. As opposed to the prevailing social science model of the officer as a “manager of violence,” Marshall’s officer is much more a leader, an in-person figure and not a faceless member of a bureaucracy. The book reflects the era of the common man in which it was written. With liberal 20th-century ideas of education in the air, such as those of John Dewey, Marshall writes of the Armed Forces as a school in liberal democracy whose subjects include citizenship, virtue, self-knowledge, and even creativity and self-invention.

It is no coincidence that The Armed Forces Officer was written just a few years after World War II. World War II was a life-changing event for Marshall, as it was for the U.S. Army (in which he served intermittently for three decades), for the Armed Forces, and for the Nation. Marshall had created and developed on World War II battlefields the method of small-unit combat analysis that would make him famous. He would go on to write about the next war. His postwar works Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War and The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation were explicitly intended to prepare the country for wars to come.

If these works prepared the Nation for future wars by addressing tactical and logistical challenges, The Armed Forces Officer can be seen as having a similar purpose concerning officer leadership and military professionalism. In World War II, the United States had created an enormous officer corps almost from scratch. Prewar regular and reserve officers provided the cadre, but the great majority of junior officers had no military experience or training before the war. These were the products of the various officer candidate schools, the
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90-day wonders—“gentlemen by act of Congress”—who attracted considerable derision for their growing pains and inexperience. The United States and its allies won most of the battles and the war, but it was obvious that some of the leaders could have been better prepared for their responsibilities. In *The Armed Forces Officer*, Marshall focuses on certain challenges to the performance and perception of officer candidate school-trained junior officers in particular, but also of American officers in general.

One of the main difficulties addressed in *The Armed Forces Officer* is an American discomfort with hierarchy and elitism. The rigidly stratified structure of an army, and in particular the elevated, even privileged status of junior officers over men sometimes older and more accomplished, had struck earlier generations of Americans as paradoxical and even untenable in a democracy. This perception had been sharpened in the citizen army of World War II, which drew on an American society grown more egalitarian. If the military community seemed to World War II British novelist-turned-officer Evelyn Waugh as a “happy civilization” in which “differences in rank were exactly defined and frankly accepted,” the military insistence on hierarchy struck some Americans as anachronistic and artificial. Part of Marshall’s task was to establish a hierarchical basis for officer status and authority that was acceptable in a democracy while maintaining professional standards. In common with the works on civil conduct and self-improvement of which it may be said to be a close relative, Marshall’s book is about locating and promoting oneself on a hierarchy. As in many other accounts of social existence, this is not merely a matter of ambition, but of legitimacy and authenticity. Marshall provides the bases for an officer’s authority, right to lead, and even entitlement to certain privileges and deference. The reader is given to understand, in a manner urbane and commanding, that the commissioned person must constantly and restlessly acquire and reacquire the justifications for officership in order to be worthy of the title of officer. Marshall emphasizes that the officer’s position is actually dependent on a willingness to acquire knowledge, to assume responsibility, to adopt an ethos of duty and service, and to communicate freely on these matters within the military and with the civil community. He introduces the idea in the very first words of chapter 1, “The Meaning of Your Commission”:

> **Upon being commissioned in the Armed Services of the United States, a man incurs a lasting obligation to cherish and protect his country and to develop within himself that capacity and reserve strength which will enable him to serve its arms and the welfare of his fellow Americans with increasing wisdom, diligence, and patriotic conviction.**

**Humanities and the Profession of Arms**

Marshall’s approach to officership builds on a venerable canon of works on military leadership. Earlier works on this subject had taken pains to establish the terms of an officer’s right to command, wage war, enjoy privilege, and compel obedience. In writing his work, Marshall is adding to a distinguished tradition of works on military leadership, sometimes inspired by defeat, but sometimes by the cost, consequences, or imperatives of victory. This body of work can be traced at least as far back as Xenophon, through many other Greek and Roman writers to include Vegetius, author of the enduring *De Re Militari*. The catalogue of writers on military leadership should not exclude medieval works such as Christine de Pizan’s *Book of Acts of Arms and Chivalry or Honorable Bonet’s Tree of Battles*. The genre experienced its own renaissance following Niccolò Machiavelli’s *Art of War* (1521), a rebirth that gained momentum during the early modern “military revolution” of 1550–1650. During the 18th century, written works centered in France where a reexamination of military practices would follow French defeats by the British and Prussians. One of the best 19th-century books on military leadership, a work that anticipates Marshall in its emphasis on cohesion and morale (and which he cites more than once), is French army Colonel Ardant du Picq’s *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle*.

As a genre, works on military leadership may be linked to works on civil behavior since Cicero, through medieval manuals on chivalry and kingship, to Balderas Castiglione’s *The Book of the Courtier* (1528) and the “self-help” genre named if not started by 19th-century Englishman Samuel Smiles. The best of the works on military leadership draw on larger intellectual currents and traditions. They contain explicit and implied reminders of the officer’s civic role and responsibilities, and of his obligation to acknowledge ties with the culture, government, and populace of his society. As works of literature concerned with the education and betterment of the individual and of society, they form a link to the classical conception of the humanities as not only a set of academic disciplines, but also an education for public life and leadership.

In *The Armed Forces Officer*, officer education, and the military profession itself, is a branch of the humanities. The book is open-ended, creative, and inquisitorial more than it is prescriptive. By reaching outside itself to a broad culture, in the form of frequent quotations and allusions, it stresses the human, humanistic, literary, and artistic aspects of leadership and officership. The allusiveness of *The Armed Forces Officer* is one indication that it is not meant to complete even a junior officer’s education, but to inspire a beginning, a journey of experience, reflection, and discovery that ideally will last a lifetime. The narrative voice is well-read and even cultivated, but it is also unmistakably the voice of an officer and of an American. From early in his book, Marshall in effect makes an instructive example of his own broad, selective reading.

Chapter 1 contains quotations or citations from Voltaire, Bertrand Russell, the British politician Lionel Curtis, Confucius, Thomas Jefferson, William James, Theodore Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and an anonymous admiral. Tellingly, only two of those cited are professional officers. Unlike most more recent writers on military leadership, Marshall makes it clear that an officer’s education consists of much more than military knowledge, and that an officer’s values are not a thing apart from those of the civilization that he or she serves. The officer is a human being and a citizen serving in the armed forces.

In a refreshing relief from uncritical and repeated references to Servicemembers as “warriors” among current writers, Marshall notes that the American military does not produce “warriors per se,” but instills in its members a sense of “the right thing to do” in
Marshall explains the need for the armed forces to instill values, saying they have a greater need to do so than “gentler institutions” because of the unregimented character of American citizens and the demands and pressures of war and combat. In these settings, “all barriers are down” and only a strong internal sense of right and wrong will prevent atrocity and disorder. Not only are officers accountable to their society for their own moral conduct, but they are also in a position to articulate and exemplify moral standards. Officers are not a group apart, not a “guardian class,” but “a strong right arm.” Finally, officers require broad educations because the demands of their calling are often novel and unexpected. An officer must anticipate encountering the enemy’s opposing and unpredictable will, the ways and manners of unfamiliar cultures, technological change, the inherent chaos of the battlefield, and human nature at its most beleaguered. Marshall presents this as a fascinating challenge. He writes:

_If he has the ambition to excel as a commander of men, rather than as a technician, then the study of human nature and of individual characteristics within the military crowd becomes a major part of his training. That is the prime reason why the life of any tactical leader becomes so very interesting, provided he possesses some imagination. Everything is grist for his mill._

As the list of quoted writers from chapter 1 indicates, Marshall only lightly draws on the writings of officers and other military writers. What connects his diverse citations is that they all underscore the value and character of the civilized works, practices, and attitudes that the military officer must sometimes paradoxically use force to protect. For Marshall, that an officer understand and exemplify these civilized values hardly takes second place to an understanding of the use of force itself, since only a civilized person will appreciate the depth of the officer’s commitment to use force only as consistent with the mission, proportionately, and even with reluctance—certainly with a desire to see peace restored as soon as possible. Only in this way will the officer keep faith with his or her constitutional oath, and only in this way is the officer distinguished as an educated professional from a mere technician or “manager of violence.” The military profession is a branch of the humanities because war is such a human activity, calling on all of one’s capabilities, knowledge, and emotional and intellectual depths.

**The Dialogic Form**

In *The Armed Forces Officer*, the education of officers, and their roles as educators, is largely a matter of dialogue. Officers should talk with subordinates, superiors, peers, and the people. Perhaps the most important reason for open speech by officers is the fact that American officers are servants of a democracy. Officers must not be “intellectual eunuchs” who remain aloof from debate out of either an exaggerated sense of infallibility, a habit of obedience, or because they do not believe they have a right to express an opinion on the policies it may be their professional duty to enforce. Even in their areas of expertise, officers should be prepared to have their views questioned. Marshall offers arguments supporting officers engaging the open market of ideas, and he gives many examples of how to talk in various settings and to a variety of audiences and interlocutors.

Marshall provides both precept and example on the art of conversation. He cautions against the temptation to score off seniors as shortsighted and unwise. He encourages officers to talk to their subordinates about their families and interests and to scrupulously avoid patronizing them or addressing them as other than his “intellectual and political peers from any walk of life.” Characteristically, Marshall quotes both soldiers and civilians on dialogue. He cites William Hazlitt on developing one’s own strength by testing it against others: “A Man who shrinks from a collision with his equals or superiors will shrink below himself.” This observation is echoed by Marshall Saxe, who asks that the assurance with which he expresses his opinions not be taken amiss by “experts”: “They should correct them; that is the fruit I expect of my work.” Eisenhower is quoted (in fact, slightly misquoted) on the importance of enlisted men talking naturally to officers so that the “product of their resourcefulness becomes available to all.” For the officer uninterested in or unconvinced of the value of dialogue, Marshall offers two observations. One is that “fully half of boredom comes from lack of the habit of careful listening.” The other is an anecdote about a newspaper editor who greeted enthusiastically the dubious ideas of his juniors, encouraging them to develop a completed plan, and allowing them in effect to discover the flaws in their ideas for themselves. The need for an exchange of words and ideas is upheld by Marshall’s insistence—in
The Armed Forces Officer, Then and Now

Despite its occasional anachronisms, Marshall’s book is probably needed now more than when it was first published. In 1950, Marshall’s emphasis on humanistic dialogue and democracy were underwritten by America’s World War II experience of a citizen army. George C. Marshall, the only American career Soldier to win the Nobel Prize for Peace, signed as Secretary of Defense the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer. In 1952, the voters elected another career Soldier to the Presidency. The machinery of war, to include the fearful, war-ending atomic bomb, had been built by an unprecedented alliance of industry, academe, government, and military. The 1950s would see a series of best-selling books on the lives of Soldiers and Sailors by veterans such as James Jones, Leon Uris, Norman Mailer, James Gould Cozzens, Herman Wouk, and Thomas Heggan. Many of these became popular and critically well-received feature films. South Pacific was both on Broadway (1949–1954) and on the screen (1958). The Nation was crisscrossed by interconnecting networks of soldier-civilians and civilian-soldiers engaged in a dialogue based on shared experience. Soon after Korea, the military would desegregate, reluctantly at first but with growing progress, and nearly always in advance of the rest of American society, playing a leading role in an important social issue.

How different is the situation today? As then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen noted at a conference on the future of the military profession in January 2011, the American people respect their armed forces but scarcely know it. Although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced their share of literary and media attention, the scale is much smaller, the interest more limited. The need for democratic and humanistic dialogue is greater because it is too rare—and because we are in an era in which the links between civil and military will be tested and forced to grow or give way like unexercised muscles. As in the 1940s and for most of the 1950s, the military is shrinking, heavily deployed overseas, and demographically isolated in its own country. Unlike the post–World War II period, the military has neither a “nation of veterans,” nor numbers of former officers in prominent nonmilitary positions, nor a recent example of large scale and highly public civil-military cooperation on which to form a foundation of understanding and trust.

Admiral Mullen’s concern with the lack of communication between the American military and its nonmilitary citizenry struck a chord with his distinguished audience of military educators. Indeed, except for maintaining the relevance of its warfighting capability, communication with the rest of America may be the great challenge facing the military profession in the coming decades of the 21st century. While it is not possible to recapture a lost age, a consideration of Marshall’s work points a way to alleviate the estrangement of civil and military. Marshall’s view of the profession of arms is in essence a branch of the humanities. His emphasis on the need for dialogic communication and on a daily recognition of the American officer as a servant and exemplar of democracy address the challenges of our time as I have depicted them above, and in other ways I discuss in the rest of this article.

The 21st-century Armed Forces Officer

The prevailing attitude to military professionalism may be inadequate to deal with the contemporary challenge of the need for a wider, discursive approach. In this context, the social science model for military professionalism could be described as necessary but insufficient. An example may be found in the most recent edition of The Armed Forces Officer (2007). Compared to the 1950 edition, the range of reference and allusion in the newer work is relatively narrow, drawing mostly on American military history. Although the book discusses the officer’s role as a member of a larger society, it sets an unsatisfying example in this area, suggesting by inference that the military profession should look mostly inward for example, inspiration, and instruction.

The 21st century requires American military officers to engage in continuous dialogue both within and outside the ranks of their profession. Officers have already recognized that the “communicate” branch of the “move, shoot, communicate” trivium is assuming greater importance in our times. Counterinsurgency, humanitarian, security, and peace operations, contact with U.S. Government
officers must be equipped to engage in common speech, but some must also be prepared to communicate with intellectual and political elites as equals.

The ruminative nature of Middle Eastern discourse. They have had to acquire knowledge of customs, manners, social codes, habits of mind, and religious beliefs, but it is even more important that these diplomats in uniform be able to serve as fit representatives of their own culture, its history, its literature, its values and aspirations. The role of talker may have struck some officers as incongruous or unwelcome. It requires innovation, new skills, and personal change, but it is in a sense a reconnection with a traditional role for the profession of arms as bearer of order and civilization.

Military officers need skill in dialogue and narrative to do their jobs, to tell their stories, and to participate in the civic discourse of a democracy. Officers must be equipped to engage in common speech, but some must also be prepared to communicate with intellectual and political elites as equals.23 The post–World War II alliance of civilian and military elite cultures was largely a casualty of the Vietnam War. It might seem that the differences are insurmountable, but the post–“Don’t ask, don’t tell” military offers the opportunity for a rapprochement with elite universities, the media, and big cities such as Washington, DC, for a role in social change equivalent to the desegregation of the 1950s and 1960s.

A Call to Arms and Letters: Knight and Scribe

A reading of Marshall's magnum opus can serve as a necessary and timely correction to the narrowness and insularity that may afflict all professions or institutions in the course of their development, but which is particularly insidious and undesirable in the case of America's profession of arms. Committed autodidact Marshall is also a corrective to the creeping anti-intellectualism that sometimes seems to infect the American military profession. Officers must be trained as well as educated, but they must be educated, and even learned, men and women comfortable and capable with words as well as deeds. The officer may be a "manager of violence," but he or she is more than that: part artist, part storyteller, part scholar, and part teacher. The military profession is correctly conceived as a branch of the humanities broad in both scope and purpose, which are the study and the betterment of humankind. For S.L.A. Marshall in The Armed Forces Officer, the profession of arms and the people who make up the armed forces are a tremendous repository of knowledge and belief, a great book to be read in crowded and in quiet moments: fight, endure, reflect, grow wise. JFQ

NOTES

1 The Armed Forces Officer was first published by the Government Printing Office in 1950. (This original version is hereafter referred to in endnotes as AFO.) Since then, it has gone through a number of reprints and revisions. Marshall wrote an expanded version published as The Officer as a Leader (Stackpole Books, 1966). The American Forces Information Service published a revised edition in 1975 and a greatly altered version in 1988. The 1975 edition is especially good, leaving the original mostly untouched but adding sections based on Korea and Vietnam. A completely new edition was co-published by NDU Press and Potomac Books in 2007, although this copy contained chapter one of the original: "The Meaning of Your Commission" in its entirety as an appendix.

2 The Officer as a Leader, 12–13.

3 This is noted by David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman in About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), although Hackworth is often S.L.A. Marshall’s unsparing and even unfair and untruthful critic.


8 AFO, 1.


10 Since the term military revolution was first coined by Michael Roberts in his inaugural address at Belfast University in 1955, many works have been written on this idea. For a compendium of works on the subject, see Clifford Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on Military Transformation in Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).


12 Ardant du Picq was killed in action during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. His book was posthumously compiled from his writings (organized as he had outlined) and published in France in 1880. The 1921 American translation of the eighth French edition by John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton can still be found in reprints today.

13 AFO, 17.

14 Ibid., 14–15.

15 Ibid., 3.

16 Ibid., 169.

17 Ibid., 8.

18 Ibid., 77, 190.

19 Ibid., 174.

20 Ibid., 113.

21 Ibid. Marshall quotes Eisenhower as stating, “There is among the mass of individuals who carry rifles in war a great amount of ingenuity and efficiency” Eisenhower's words in Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1949) are “ingenious and initiative” (314).

22 AFO, 120.

23 See Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). This book is a compelling argument for the importance of the humanities tradition in developing sophisticated strategic thought. Although aimed mostly at the civilian diplomat or statesman, the work has value for the military strategist as well. Hill teaches a highly selective, yearlong seminar on this subject at Yale.
A six unsuspecting young men drove their nondescript van across the vast Yemeni desert on November 3, 2002, a small piston-driven aircraft covertly monitored their activities from roughly 3 miles overhead. Following a great deal of intense data collaboration and synthesis, intelligence confirmed that one of the vehicle occupants was involved in the 2002 bombing of the USS Cole. The aircraft set up for an attack. Minutes later, an AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missile carrying an 18-pound warhead scored a direct hit on the vehicle, killing all occupants.1

Located in an air-conditioned Predator ground control station over 100 miles away sat the individual responsible for this violence. From this comfortable vantage point, during the time leading up to the engagement, the operators of the lethal MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ensured minimal collateral damage, precise weapons effects, and positive target identification.2 The strike was a politician’s dream—objective neutralized at low risk with no visible collateral damage.

Though this was not the first time a UAV employed lethal force, the 2002 Yemen strike showcased the unique strengths of armed UAVs—a persistent surveillance platform capable of precise and lethal engagement at a moment’s notice. This successful strike helped pave the way for increased reliance on unmanned strike capabilities by the U.S. Government. This article questions the increasing reliance on armed UAVs by the United States as a foreign policy tool. Though the use of armed UAVs continues to expand, this unabated trend could prove detrimental to U.S. national interests.

Questioning the UAV Trend

Today, the voracious appetite for UAV capabilities remains strong. The recently released fiscal year 2013 Department of Defense (DOD) budget proposal cut a sig-
significant number of programs, yet increased UAV investment, directing the Air Force to expand from a current level of 61 Predator/Reaper orbits to 65 with a surge capability of 85. But as the United States continues to send unmanned machines to execute national security policy, some have begun to question this trend—most notably the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIAs) regular use of lethal force through unmanned aircraft. Nowhere have unmanned airstrikes become more prolific than in Pakistan. In a 2011 Foreign Affairs article, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann report that:

from June 2004, when the strikes in Pakistan began, to January 2009, the Bush administration authorized 44 strikes in the rugged northwestern region of Pakistan. Since assuming office, Barack Obama has greatly accelerated the program. . . . In just two years, the Obama administration authorized nearly four times as many drone strikes as did the Bush administration throughout its entire time in office—or an average of one strike every four days, compared with one every 40 days under Bush.4

Though these strikes have employed solely precision-guided munitions, they have still resulted in tremendous destruction, killing an estimated 300 to 500 people in 2009 alone.3 Congress passed an important piece of legislation on September 18, 2001, that indirectly supported this increased use of UAVs. The Authorized Use of Military Force permits the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.” After years of projecting lethal force under this authority, the dependence on armed UAVs has grown. In terms of government efforts at targeting al Qaeda and Taliban leaders in their tribal areas, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta went as far as to say UAVs are “the only game in town.”7

Given that politicians continually strive to minimize the number of casualties in our Armed Forces, the increased use of unmanned aircraft should not be surprising. While serving as Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney was asked if he felt there were any disadvantages to using precision standoff weapons. He responded:

“We’d be damned fools if we didn’t take advantage of our capabilities and use our technology to the maximum extent possible. Why would you want to get somebody killed if you don’t have to? . . . If we can prevail in a conflict by imposing maximum damage on the enemy at a minimal cost to ourselves, I can’t think of a better way to pursue.”

But public concern has risen given the emerging trend of using machines to fight our enemies while safely distanced from the battlespace.

Peter Singer, renowned author of Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, recently published an article entitled “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?” His concerns focus on the growing disconnect between the U.S. public and government regarding decisions to employ deadly force in defense of national interests due to the increased use of unmanned aircraft. According to Singer, countries we need to work with to contain and defuse terrorism, and in the lives of the many innocent people we’ve killed through either sloppiness or ignorance.” According to Foust, “In Yemen the insistence on drone strikes in the absence of any broader political engagement with the opposition political movements has created the mass perception that the U.S. is intimately tied to the oppression of the Yemeni people.” Estimates of civilian casualties, though extremely difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy, also cast a troubling light: “According to [a] survey of reliable press accounts, about 30 percent of all those killed by drones since 2004 [through 2010] were nonmilitants.”

In making an interesting science fiction analogy, Noah Shachtman points out that sending machines abroad to kill on our behalf “makes us look like the Evil Empire [from the Star Wars movies] and the other guys like the Rebel Alliance, defending themselves versus robot invaders.”

Arguably the most troubling effect of the proliferation of unmanned systems relates to the frequency of and decisionmaking calculus toward future war. UAVs may lessen the terrible costs of going to war, and in doing so, make it easier for leaders to go to war. The danger, as Christopher Coker argues, is that leaders can:

“become so intoxicated by the idea of precise, risk-free warfare that we believe what we want to believe. Unfortunately, we may slip down the slope and find ourselves using violence with impunity, having lost our capacity for critical judgments. We may no longer be inclined to pay attention to the details of the ethical questions which all wars (even the most ethical ones) raise.”

The trends emphasizing the increased use of unmanned aircraft are unmistakable. As one of the last military growth industries, companies work feverishly to design the military’s newest unmanned systems. Though unmanned systems reduce the personal risk shouldered by American Servicemembers on the battlefield and reduce the political risk to politicians, as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, the employment of unmanned
combat aircraft must be carefully evaluated to ensure that their continued use remains congruent with overall national security objectives. Their proliferation around the world affects foreign perceptions of America and reflects our societal values. No group is better positioned to ensure continued close scrutiny than our elected officials. James Madison envisioned a chosen body of elected officials “whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.” Continued development and use of these technologies will further test their wisdom. Unmanned systems reduce the costs of war, making war significantly less horrible for the side employing the technology. America must not lose the capability to discuss the difficult ethical questions that come with any type of war, or, as General Lee observed, we risk becoming fond of it.

**NOTES**

2 The official U.S. Air Force designation for an aircraft flown via datalink is remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). The author chose to use the term UAV due to its acceptability by wider audiences. The term drone has also gained recent popularity.
10 Mayer.
12 Foust, “Unaccountable Killing Machines.”
13 Bergen and Tiedemann, “The Drone Wars.”
15 Ibid., 319.
16 Ibid., 324.
Logistics Support “Seams” During Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector

By W. A. BROWN and BRENT CORYEILL

Here’s the complexity of this operation—you have kinetic effects in one Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), generated out of another GCC, partnered with a coalition, with resources from a third GCC, then NATO reinforced by international partners [that are] not a part of NATO.

—USEUCOM Chief of Staff, April 12, 2011

Rear Admiral W.A. Brown, SC, USN, served as the Director of the Logistics Directorate (J4), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), during U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Libya operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Brent Coryell, LG, USA, served as the Executive Officer of the Logistics Directorate (J4), USEUCOM, during U.S. and NATO Libya operations.
T he collective and collaborative efforts of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to support Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector from March to October 2011 represented a remarkable and challenging logistics undertaking for all of these organizations. Consequently, the experience offers a number of insights that can enhance our ability to prepare for, plan, and manage future joint endeavors. Odyssey Dawn took off so fast that the operation started as a “come as you are event,” without major force deployments from the continental United States and rapidly evolving staff structures and alignments. Most of the operational forces “belonged” to USEUCOM but were employed in support of, and by, USAFRICOM. This is not unusual in terms of how U.S. forces are assigned globally, but in this case, the forces also operated from USEUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). This ad hoc construct, compound by the

and USAFRICOM operation centers carefully monitored events as international pressure mounted for action in support of the Libyan insurgency. The decision to engage kinetically took a relatively short time in political terms, particularly considering the complex political equities involved as well as the daunting operational considerations. Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector introduced USAFRICOM for the first time as a geographic combatant command that faced committing armed assets to a United Nations–sanctioned operation. Odyssey Dawn transitioned to Unified Protector on March 31, 2011, and thus became a NATO–vice USAFRICOM-led operation.

Initial American forces included global strike assets from U.S. bases and forces forward positioned in Europe, both ashore and afloat. The commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, quickly amassed surface and subsurface capabilities that operated primarily in the USEUCOM AOR and within the boundaries set by the Odyssey Dawn joint operating area, which covered Libya and extended north into the

in international waters, the Navy was not encumbered by restrictions on flying U.S. combat operations

shift to a NATO-led operation, added to the complexity and created a number of logistics issues that required close coordination, flexibility, and a pervasive cooperative spirit.

This article is intended to share logistics observations, insights, and lessons learned while supporting these operations. While many of the support concepts and creative “solutions” from Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector were tailored specifically for those efforts, this is likely how almost all future logistics operations will be conducted. The major observations in this article revolve around three major themes: the no-notice nature of the initial efforts, complexity of the logistics enterprise, and issues associated with USEUCOM–USAFRICOM–NATO coordination. Many of the logistics techniques and procedures developed and used by USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and NATO can offer insights for future logistics planning, doctrine, and execution.

Background

As events unfolded across Northern Africa in 2010 and early 2011, USEUCOM地中海 Sea. The U.S. Navy immediately held an advantage over the Air Force for initial strike options during the planning phase. While in international waters, the Navy was not encumbered by restrictions on flying U.S. combat operations. U.S. Air Forces Europe, through 3rd Air Force (Air Forces Europe), supported 17th Air Force (Air Forces Africa) by flying missions with forward positioned aircraft. Within short order, additional nations joined the operation and forward basing was required. Libya’s distance from Central Europe dictated moving strike aircraft operations to locations further south and in the Mediterranean littorals.

Setting the Theater and Transfer to NATO

Initial Phase. During the initial startup of the operations, USEUCOM and USAFRICOM were able to employ existing logistics management capabilities at their command headquarters. The close coordination between the commands and the well-integrated staff processes enabled leaders to monitor operations and assess logistics requirements and implications, leverage information-sharing technology with a broad array of organizations, and facilitate collaboration and full situational awareness of the activities of logistics planners. One simple but key tool for efficient coordination among support organizations was the use of Defense Connect Online (DCO), a virtual conferencing capability. Daily online collaboration sessions synchronized lines of effort and information sharing not only between the two involved combatant commands but also among the U.S. Transportation Command, USEUCOM, and USAFRICOM Service components; Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and a multitude of other high-level agencies. The DCOs fostered constructive multidirectional discussions that minimized redundancy of effort, clarified roles and responsibilities, and resolved mission challenges.

One critical issue associated with crisis response or short “lead time” operations is the coordination of air routes including diplomatic clearances, logistical deconfliction with international partners, and other matters. One valuable enabler was use of Standard Theater Airlift Routes (STAR) during initial resupply operations. Similar in concept to a local bus circuit, the STAR consists of several preplanned air routes established for Europe-based C-130 aircraft to fly cargo to designated locations. A load is placed on a previously scheduled mission along the STAR and then removed at the required destination. A major advantage is the time saved by not having to apply for diplomatic clearances because routes are preapproved through each country of transit. Over time, the frequency of intratheater, Unified Protector–related movements declined, resulting in more capacity than requirements, and USEUCOM swiftly reverted to requirement-based missions.

Setting the Theater. Access, basing, and bed down, and reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSO&I) are a few of the many key aspects of “setting the theater.” Our nation’s ability to respond to global crises and sustain operations depends on access agreements, overseas basing, and global en route infrastructure. The United States must work closely with its European Allies to support operations from European facilities. The ports and bases where U.S. forces are assigned in European nations (except Germany) are not sovereign U.S. territory, and thus all U.S. access, basing, and operations are
subject to host nation approval. There are generally bilateral agreements that stipulate limitations on operations and other restrictions to how host nation territory may be used.

As preparation to enforce the no-fly zone gathered momentum, USEUCOM became a lead for bed down and base support. This was no small task as there were 18 bases in eight European countries involved in Unified Protector. The simultaneous enhancement of 11 air bases for the large and quick influx of units and materiel required tremendous coordination across U.S. and allied forces throughout Europe. Of note was the extraordinary work done at Moron, Aviano, Souda Bay, and Sigonella to prepare for the arrival of forces to include increasing billeting, aircraft parking, and ammunition storage space. One primary example for the United States was Naval Air Station Sigonella, on the Italian island of Sicily. With its ample runway, parking space, and logistics support, Sigonella became prime real estate supporting Unified Protector. With seven nations operating from Sigonella, it truly became a multinational base.

Logistics and operational planners often fail to fully assess the impact of military operations on the environment around them. For example, one significant hurdle that surfaced in Sicily was the summer tourist season. The Sicilian economy relies heavily on tourism, but all the hotels were filled with Unified Protector personnel. The hotel owners saw the operation as a one-time event, and tour operators represent repeat business. With hoteliers hesitant about evicting the military but concerned about their economy, joint logistics planners made a move to find additional billeting—and fast. Navy Seabees and Air Force civil engineers built a 500-person tent city literally from the ground up. The availability of prepositioned tents and the construction support (manpower and equipment) to build a tent city ended up being a critical factor in sustaining the campaign.

Transfer to NATO. NATO operations are normally supported by a multinational logistics organization known as a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG). These are generally tailored to support specific operations from a pool of voluntary on-call units from NATO member nations. In the case of Unified Protector, a JLSG was not deployed primarily due to the expected short duration of the mission. In the absence of the JLSG, the United States stood up a coalition support cell (CSC) in Naples, Italy; however, it was clear to most senior leaders that more representation was required from coalition partners. The cell had members from three combatant commands, the Joint Staff, Department of State, and other nations on periodic conference calls, but it lacked staff officers with specific functional expertise, such as fuel coordination specialists, to properly forecast, compile, coordinate, and up-channel requirements to a central fuels coordinator. Most of the support coordination efforts simply consisted of the development of logistics agreements and arrangements, with the United States routinely serving as the lead agent for most commodities and capabilities. Establishment of routine logistics status reports required a significant amount of staff coordination.

Beans, Bullets, Oil—Keep It Coming

Food. The rapid buildup of naval units in the Mediterranean was unprecedented in recent history. Due to the Sixth Fleet being primarily a transient theater for the past 10 years with only a minimal afloat presence, the deployment of several ships to this theater created an immediate need to build up subsistence inventories to a level that could support the resulting increase of up to 700 percent of their normal demand. DLA Troop Support coordinated the procurement and receipt of an additional 80,000 food shipments to keep ship provisions on hand, including 13 emergency airlifts from the United States to Italy to supplement the extraordinary spike in demands. The
response by DLA Troop Support demonstrated its ability to assist quickly and effectively in challenging operations.

**Ammunition.** USEUCOM headquarters directed the staff to support USAFRICOM in *Odyssey Dawn* “to the maximum amount possible,” and the Joint Munitions Office (JMO) began by providing theater asset postures for combat air and naval forces, advice on munitions infrastructure to support the many basing decisions needed, and additional staff assistance to USAFRICOM and NATO nations.

Early in *Unified Protector*, it was apparent that precision-guided missile (PGM) expenditure rates would exceed the capacity of several participating nations. As support requirements were identified for our allied partners, the USEUCOM J4 JMO built the necessary coordinating mechanisms with USEUCOM J5, the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and U.S. Service Headquarters to facilitate expedited Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deliveries. As it became evident that *Unified Protector* would be a longer operation than anticipated, it was clear that a more robust ammunition management and forecasting capability would be needed. USEUCOM was directed to manage PGM forecasting and resupply operations for all operation partners, with commitments from individual participating nations to provide forecasts of their requirements.

To manage the liaison and expediting work, USEUCOM J4 established a Munitions Coordination Cell to ensure all nations had the weapons required to fulfill their NATO taskings. Such close oversight helped ensure that no missions were cancelled due to lack of on-hand munitions. During the course of the operation, PGMs valued at over $100 million were sold in over 50 FMS transactions to seven participating nations. Expediting the FMS purchases, the sourcing of specific variants from stocks in USEUCOM when possible and expediting their transportation to the applicable bases was essential to warfighters executing the air tasking orders.

USEUCOM’s experience with *Unified Protector* made it clear that future European air-to-ground combat operations would be heavily reliant on PGMs. In almost any combat support scenario, it is apparent that on-hand stocks for most nations and for forward deployed U.S. units will quickly become depleted. USEUCOM immediately issued command guidance to establish minimum stockage levels of PGMs to support NATO operations, engaged with the Joint Staff on various means by which to preposition PGMs in-theater in anticipation of possible contingency FMS requirements similar to the expedited sales needed, and requested that DSCA include PGMs in its newly restarted Special Defense Acquisition Fund to reduce the lead time for normal FMS deliveries needed for NATO nation resupply.

**Fuel.** From the onset of *Unified Protector*, it became immediately clear that sustaining the coalition with fuel would be one of the top logistics priorities and challenges. To accomplish this, the USEUCOM/USAFRICOM combined Joint Petroleum Office synchronized all fuel requirements throughout the Combined Joint Operating Area. A number of issues and challenges emerged during the course of operations including limited visibility of coalition requirements and resources, equipment maintenance problems, and specialized fuel requirements. For example, the fuel required by the MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles was not readily available. USEUCOM had to arrange spot purchases of the fuel through DLA-Energy and reposition fuel handling equipment packages from other locations at a significant cost to cover this shortfall.

The bottom line to the above discussion is that all of the support required by the U.S. military and its NATO partners was provided on time and as needed to accomplish the mission. Many of the most challenging issues resulted from the unusual structure of the combined force that executed the operations and the short planning and coordination timeframes that will likely be the hallmark of future operations. Hard work, close coordination, and robust lines of communication will enable logisticians to support future operations effectively and efficiently despite
challenging environments and rapidly changing requirements.

Future Implications for Cross Logistics Operations

Communication. One of our biggest seams was communication between USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and our coalition partners. Despite NATO being our longest-lived alliance, U.S. capabilities to share information are often limited, many times in ways that directly affect operations. The U.S. SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network) system worked well with USEUCOM and the Joint Staff, but it was challenging for our NATO partners to work with. During Unified Protector, the combined headquarters set up a classified email system using laptop computers in the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM Joint Operations Centers to communicate with NATO counterparts. Unfortunately, obtaining approval for transferring classified/sensitive information to our allies kept our Foreign Disclosure Officer extremely busy. This is an area where the logistics community in particular must develop information-sharing protocols and practice them both in exercises and in day-to-day operations to ensure that required information sharing is second nature to all concerned.

Coordination and Synchronization of Logistics. One of the most consistent lessons to emerge from every recent multinational military operation is the crucial role of a capability to synchronize and harmonize logistics efforts among all the participants. This includes other nations, coalitions, interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations, and in essence almost anyone involved in support operations. In Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, coordinating support across geographic combatant commands certainly posed challenges but also offered opportunities to think about how we will undertake such efforts in the future. Operations of this nature are much more likely in the years ahead. Coordination with NATO for integrated and synchronized support across national lines is another area where we must increase our collective proficiency. In terms of a NATO support organization, whether it is called a CSC or a JLSG, a “scalable” overarching logistics organization is critical at the outset of any NATO operation to help plan, coordinate, and synchronize coalition logistics efforts. Member nations are always going to provide a significant proportion of their own logistical support, but such an organization will clearly facilitate improved ability to support the combined joint task force commander’s priorities—and offer better visibility of logistics challenges.

Planning. Short notice, “come as you are” events, and the increasing number of simultaneous small to medium actions, have dramatic logistics planning implications. Typically, under normal operating conditions, military logisticians receive well-defined materiel requirements and are often given adequate lead time to fill those requirements. The United States and NATO did not know how long Unified Protector would last, and due to this uncertainty the longer range logistics planning required to sustain the operation was challenging. In building sustainment plans, especially for PGM munitions, U.S. logistics planners attempt to work with expenditure projections for up to 90 days out. It greatly assisted the logistics planners when NATO authorized operations for up to 90 days and approved extensions in 90-day increments. This took the logistics planning requirement from a risky 4 to 5 days out to 3 months.

Conclusion

From a logistics perspective, Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector were remarkably successful, and at no time were the operations constrained by logistics shortfalls. At its conclusion, Unified Protector had 15 nations contributing air and naval forces operating from 18 locations throughout Europe. At the same time, the complexity of the operations and required coordination for sustainment presented significant challenges. Given the certainty that we will operate in organizations that will form in response to requirements, it is essential that we plan for and practice so that organizing and working as a cohesive team on short notice becomes second nature for all participants. The professionalism and can-do attitude of all the players produced the highly successful outcomes we experienced, but we must do better. The ability to sustain “come as you are” military operations with nontraditional command relationships and continuously shifting members of the coalition is critical. While the team of USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and NATO was collectively able to plan, source, and deliver, we must continue to reinforce the fact that “synchronization of logistics” is not just a catch phrase but an operational imperative.

Prepositioning and Access Agreements.

In the case of Unified Protector, the use of preexisting bases provided fast ramp-up of facilities and personnel during RSO&E. Robust airports and seaports with sufficient operational capacity, adequate fuel storage and distribution systems, and maintenance capability will always be critical enablers for military operations. During the operation, a number of European facilities were revalidated as having enduring strategic importance, including Sigonella, Souda Bay, and Moron. These installations and others will likely be needed again, yet there will be continued pressure in a reduced funding environment to not maintain them. Operations in support of Libya also made use of prepositioned assets in Europe, and the U.S. Government should carefully consider anticipated requirements across a variety of scenarios before reducing stocks based on resourcing constraints. Just as important as preexisting facilities and real estate are prearranged access agreements, fuel exchange agreements, expedited FMS procedures, diplomatic clearances, and acquisition cross-service agreements to facilitate the rapid exchange of goods and services among coalition partners. One of our major efforts in future years should be to ensure that we do as much coordination and planning in advance as possible for operations involving multiple combatant commands, nations, coalitions, alliances, and non–Department of Defense entities—which is to say almost all future operations.

the U.S. Government should carefully consider anticipated requirements across a variety of scenarios before reducing stocks based on resourcing constraints
Since taking office in January of 2009, President Barack Obama and his national security team have insisted that a regional approach to Afghanistan is critical for success. Indeed, as early as the waning days of the Presidency of George W. Bush, it appeared that achieving success in Afghanistan would require the support of regional state actors as well as others in the international community. On paper, it seems so simple: Afghanistan’s neighbors will derive significant benefit from a secure and stable Afghanistan. But as the old adage implies, the devil is in the details. This article broadly discusses the benefits of a regional approach to Afghanistan and its neighbors and the inherent obstacles that may never be overcome.

Why Care about Afghanistan?

Afghanistan is a landlocked country geostrategically located at the crossroads of South, Central, and Western Asia. It is bordered by nuclear neighbors Pakistan to the south and east and China in the far northeast, as well as a potential nuclear state in Iran to the west. (Add Russia and India to the mix, and we have a region with four nuclear states.) The Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan round out the north. Historically, Afghanistan was at the center of the southern route of the old Silk Road. Afghanistan is often referred to as a Rubik’s Cube, which could not be more appropriate. The Rubik’s Cube is an agonizingly complex three-dimensional puzzle with an alleged 43 quintillion (18 zeros) permutations, but only one correct alignment. Not unlike the cube, Afghanistan is a conundrum that frustrates the United States and its allies as they attempt to solve the structural...
problem of moving the parts independently without the entire mechanism falling apart.

Admittedly, Afghanistan is not completely analogous to the Rubik’s Cube, which has only one correct solution. Perhaps it is more of a high stakes card game, requiring the patience of regional players as they maneuver to build the best hand possible. But, like a card game of this nature, regional players must decide if they are “all-in” in hopes of realizing the enormous potential economic benefit in reestablishing the long dormant continental land routes across Eurasia.

Aside from the U.S. proxy war with the then-Soviet Union following that country’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Afghanistan had wallowed in this neglected corner of the world, nearly ignored by the United States until that bright, blue-skied Tuesday morning of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, which were orchestrated by Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched as teams of U.S. and British special operations forces joined with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government and capture or kill bin Laden. As Taliban and al Qaeda forces fled across the porous border into Pakistan’s western frontier to regroup, a new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai was formed in December 2001. Reconstruction of a war-weary Afghanistan began in early 2002, and there was renewed hope for the Afghan population, but by March of 2003 the focus of the United States and its allies shifted to a new war in Iraq. What little optimism there was for Afghans began to fade as the Taliban crept back into their lives, forming a shadow government in many parts of the country.

Near the end of his second term, President George W. Bush moved toward a regional approach to the Afghanistan problem set. As Jessica Matthews noted in her introduction to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report on the viability of a regional strategy for Afghanistan, “the Washington Post reported as early as November 11, 2008 that ‘At [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael] Mullen’s direction, the map of the Afghanistan battlespace is being redrawn to include the tribal regions of western Pakistan.’” With the incoming administration of Barack Obama, the concept of “AfPak” was introduced, and with the Obama administration’s second strategic review of the Afghan war, it became clear that not only Pakistan’s cooperation was so inextricably linked to achieving success in Afghanistan, but also Pakistan itself had to have equal priority. But what about Afghanistan’s other neighbors?

A Regional Solution: From Their Perspective

The need for a regional approach to the war in Afghanistan was clearly articulated by then-U.S. Central Command Commander General David H. Petraeus during remarks to a conference hosted by the United States Institute of Peace only 12 days before Barack Obama was sworn in as the 42nd President. General Petraeus stated:

“It’s not possible to resolve the challenges internal to Afghanistan without addressing the challenges especially in terms of security to Afghanistan’s neighbors. . . . [The Coalition] will have to develop and execute a regional strategy that includes Pakistan, India, the Central Asian States and even China and Russia along with perhaps at some point Iran.”

On the surface, it seems so obvious that a regional solution is the answer the United States and the coalition have been searching for that one wonders why it has not happened already. Surely a stable and secure Afghanistan, with open and safe trade and transit routes, must be in the interest of regional actors and the international community at large. Perhaps a review of the interests or objectives of each state actor and what obstacles need to be overcome will shed some light on the illusive “regional approach.”

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a poor, landlocked country, and as such is dependent on its neighbors and other regional countries for the bulk of its legal trade. Afghanistan’s national interests, therefore, include achieving internal security and stability, maintaining friendly relations, and establishing itself as the “trade and transit hub linking South and Central Asia as well as China with Iran and the rest of the Middle East.”

While most of the neighboring countries would benefit from Afghanistan realizing its objectives, there are several impediments to Afghan-istan doing so, some of which include the relationship between India and Pakistan, particularly concerning Kashmir; Russia and the Central Asian Republics’ disagreement over the former’s preferred sphere of influence in the region; and border disputes and water-sharing disagreements with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Many of the impediments date back to the British and Russian colonial era, are interwoven throughout the region, and would require complex multilateral agreements to resolve if the parties could even reach agreement. But as Haroun Mir notes in his essay on Afghanistan, “the more practical approach should focus on exploring opportunities rather than trying to fix what countries of the region have not been able to achieve for themselves.”

As Afghanistan and its neighbors begin to realize the untapped potential, regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Economic Cooperation Organization, which have been timid in their actions thus far, should be encouraged to take the lead in fostering economic cooperation and free trade and transit through a revival of the old Silk Road. The continued development of regional energy projects to transport electricity from Central Asia to Pakistan and India, and the construction of rail and highway links between South and Central Asia as well as China and Iran, will set in place the critical infrastructure needed for development of the region as a whole. Again, the approach seems so simple—why has it not happened yet? Lack of political will among the regional leadership, as well as an inability to look beyond historical conflicts, are the culprits.

Relevant Players and Impediments

Pakistan. As discussed earlier, it is generally acknowledged that Afghanistan’s success—however loosely defined that is—is dependent on the cooperation of Pakistan. However, take a contentious border dispute between the two countries, mix in a strategic
partnership agreement between Afghanistan and India, and combine those with an unhealthy dose of Pakistani paranoia and we have the underpinning for Pakistan’s destabilization of Afghanistan. Despite the great economic benefits that it could derive from a stable Afghanistan, Pakistan has instead chosen to undermine the Karzai government through its tacit support of the Taliban. Blind paranoia toward India drives Pakistan’s need to control Afghanistan and disrupt economic and security relationships with India.

To the delight of China, the paranoia also dictates that the Pakistani military position troops on the eastern border with India instead of the western border (assuming that they would even want to engage with Taliban or al Qaeda fighters), thus forcing India’s hand to focus on the Pakistani border and not direct its attention to China and the Sino-Indian border dispute, most recently the result of the century-old McMahon Line. Almost every decision that Pakistan makes is Indo-centric, whether it is denying Indian influence in Afghanistan or gaining any international support against India. Even other regional states such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are looked at through an Indo-centric lens and viewed as a threat because an alternative supply route through those countries would lessen the U.S. reliance on Pakistan, thereby diminishing its importance and benefiting India. The bottom line is that in Pakistan, anything and everything India does is aimed at weakening Pakistan. Pakistan must take positive steps to eliminate state support for Taliban terror. However, as Frédéric Grare noted:

"Pakistan is a revisionist power and, in the eyes of India, an aggressor. It will continue to feed its own paranoia. For this reason, concessions to a Pakistan that will not renounce terrorism as a means of pursuing its foreign policy objectives are likely to lead to a resurgence of the very organizations the coalition has been trying to eliminate for the past eight years. In a regional context where the political balance might have been altered in favor of Pakistan, such concessions would constitute regression and would make little sense from a security perspective."

India. No doubt there is an intense strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan for influence in Afghanistan. While Pakistan’s actions are Indo-centric, India’s interests in Afghanistan extend well beyond its rivalry with Pakistan. India’s objective is for increased trade and new economic ties with Central and Western Asia through traditional land routes. India has well-founded concerns for security in Afghanistan. Given the abrupt departure of India from a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 1996, India clearly has a strong interest in developing a long-term strategic partnership that includes stronger economic ties as well as security training as a means of containing or reversing the wave of militant Islamic fundamentalism.

India, however, is fearful of a rushed U.S./coalition exit from Afghanistan before the Taliban is weakened to the point of ineffectiveness. Gautam Mukhopadhaya notes that such an outcome could conceivably be worse than the Taliban rule of 1996–2001 because of “the extent to which jihadi groups have now gained ground in Pakistan, strengthened ties with the Taliban..."
and al-Qaeda, and assimilated the ambitions and methodology of al-Qaeda (for example Lashkar-e-Taiba). While historically India’s stance on the Taliban has been absolute, it has opened a small window of compromise by indicating support for the Afghan government’s effort to reconcile and reintegrate former fighters, though a fair amount of skepticism remains.

India supports the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan and believes that the development and buildup of the Afghan National Security Forces is the best course of action to set the conditions for a transition to Afghan takeover of security responsibility. India also supports the coalition counterinsurgency campaign, but would like to see a more robust political, economic, and diplomatic strategy interwoven into the effort and endorses the inclusion of other regional players that may not be overcome. India enjoys good relations with Iran and supports a more inclusive regional approach, to include Iran. However, Iran’s deep animosity toward the United States not only prevents Iran from pursuing shared interests in Afghanistan, but also leads it to take actions that undermine U.S. efforts there and are detrimental to Iran’s own national interests—actions such as narcotics trafficking and a return to power of the anti-Shia Taliban (against whom Iran almost went to war). That said, both India and Iran have a shared interest in not seeing Afghanistan dominated by Pakistan, and have issued joint statements pledging to cooperate in stabilizing Afghanistan. Interestingly, as Karim Sadjadpour reports, Iranian officials have privately admitted that a U.S. presence in Afghanistan helps Iran by keeping “the Taliban at bay and serves as a source of leverage for Tehran.”

Iran. While it would seem that India’s national interests and objectives broadly converge with most other regional players—Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics, and China—it should come as no surprise that Pakistan plays the spoiler yet again. While all benefit from a stable and secure Afghanistan, there are differences between India and the other regional players that may not be overcome. India enjoys good relations with Iran and supports a more inclusive regional approach, to include Iran. However, Iran’s deep animosity toward the United States not only prevents Iran from pursuing shared interests in Afghanistan, but also leads it to take actions that undermine U.S. efforts there and are detrimental to Iran’s own national interests—actions such as narcotics trafficking and a return to power of the anti-Shia Taliban (against whom Iran almost went to war). That said, both India and Iran have a shared interest in not seeing Afghanistan dominated by Pakistan, and have issued joint statements pledging to cooperate in stabilizing Afghanistan. Interestingly, as Karim Sadjadpour reports, Iranian officials have privately admitted that a U.S. presence in Afghanistan helps Iran by keeping “the Taliban at bay and serves as a source of leverage for Tehran.”

Saudi Arabia. Iran also has a strained relationship with Saudi Arabia, a regional power and rival that views the current government in Tehran as a threat to security in the region and the Muslim world. Though the United States is Saudi Arabia’s most important foreign partner—a relationship the House of Saud would like to preserve—the interests of Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan are often in conflict with those of the United States; Saudi Arabia was one of just three countries to recognize the Taliban government when it took power in Afghanistan, so it is no surprise that the Saudis would like to see in Afghanistan an Islamist state focused on the “domestic propagation of religion and enforcing moral strictures within the country,” much like their own Wahhabist (Salafist) state. Saudi Arabia has already provided a sizable amount of financial support to Afghanistan, mostly in the form of reconstruction and direct foreign aid, and also supports reconciliation efforts with moderate elements of the Taliban. While the United States and Saudi Arabia have different views of success in
Afghanistan, the United States should leverage the close alliances of both Afghanistan and Pakistan with Saudi Arabia to reach an agreeable outcome.

Central Asian Republics. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have a national interest in seeing the coalition prevail, as they believe that it is tied directly to their own national security. However, each of the Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as well, must include their relationship with Russia in any calculus regarding support to the coalition. As Martha Brill Olcott notes in the Carnegie report, Russia’s willingness to invest in the completion of Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarak Dam led to Kyrgyzstan pressing the United States in negotiations for withdrawal from Manas Air Base.6 To persuade the Central Asian Republics to take on more of a participatory role, they must be convinced that U.S. interest in the region is enduring and that its support for Afghanistan and its neighbors is unwavering.

China and Russia. China’s approach to policy in Afghanistan is simple—what does Pakistan think? China’s primary concern when formulating Afghan policy is to do no harm to its relationship with Pakistan since it needs Pakistan to counter India’s perceived bid for domination in South Asia. As previously mentioned, China is more than content to have Pakistan amass troops on its border with India. Pakistan is also a significant trading partner with China. That said, China does not want to see the coalition fail in Afghanistan, as it could threaten China’s billions in investments there in the Aynak copper mine as well as other natural resource and mineral reserve projects—projects that can provide Afghans with thousands of jobs and help stabilize the Afghan economy.

Both China and Russia would like to see a stable and secure Afghanistan. Similarly, both are wary of a large and/or permanent presence of the United States in the region. By contrast, Moscow and Beijing differ regarding the Taliban: because of the support the Taliban provided to Chechen rebels, Moscow would like to see the Taliban dismantled, while Beijing is indifferent and would likely defer to Pakistan. But suppose for a moment that China could leverage its relationship with Pakistan and persuade the Pakistani military to reposition troops from the Indian border west to the Afghan border. Such a move would have great benefit to Afghanistan and the region as a whole, but would Pakistan take such action against the Taliban?

From the Russian perspective, China’s rise to power in Central Asia has been at Russian expense. Now add on the status and influence that the United States has garnered in Central Asia, also at Russian expense, and it is easy to see why Russia must balance its interest in Afghanistan with an eye toward U.S. influence in the region. It must be noted, however, that Afghanistan considers Russia not only a close neighbor, but also an important political and economic partner.7 While Russia has not contributed much monetarily to Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction, it has delivered both military and humanitarian aid, as well as forgiven nearly 90 percent (USD 10 billion) of Afghanistan’s debt.8 Russia has also expressed a willingness to help train Afghan security forces, and in 2010 Russia donated 20,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and arranged a sale of up to 80 Russian Mi-17 helicopters. Moreover, with over 30,000 Russian citizens dying each year because of heroin, the flow of Afghan heroin into Russia is of grave concern, causing former Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev to call heroin addiction a matter of national security.9

As stated earlier, on paper, a regional approach to resolving the conundrum of Afghanistan seems straightforward and logical. It is an almost universal interest of the regional players to see the stabilization of Afghanistan. It is not until we start to peel the onion back and examine the complex relationships between the relevant players that it becomes apparent why a regional solution has not been reached in the nearly 11 years since the Afghan War commenced. It is critical for all stakeholders to review the consequences of failure in Afghanistan and to contemplate what could be achieved with regional cooperation. It must be made clear to Russia and China that our strategy is not aimed against them, but complements their own national interests in both the security and economic lanes. In combination with a secure and stabilized Afghanistan (and Pakistan), a revival of Central Asia’s historic trade and transit routes will benefit all stakeholders.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is well on its way to establishing nuclear forces that can strike targets throughout the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, and beyond. It has deployed medium-range ballistic missiles. It tested nuclear weapons in 2006 and 2009. It is likely to be developing nuclear warheads deliverable by ballistic missiles. While international efforts might get North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, this seems most unlikely. Thus, the ROK-U.S. alliance must respond to this evolving threat.

The alliance has been strengthening its extended deterrence arrangements. In the many high-level meetings of alliance leaders since the first North Korean nuclear test, a variety of steps have been taken. In June of 2009, the presidents of the two allies signed the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance, pledging to build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global
This article summarizes the more important arguments for why and how the extended deterrence arrangements for the alliance might be strengthened. It considers both the technical steps already identified in SCM communiqués and further steps that might be needed. The purpose is to illustrate how the more important interests of the two allies might be expected to shape further strengthening of the alliance’s extended nuclear deterrence. The article then describes how a small nuclear force might enable North Korea to challenge the alliance with intense crises or perhaps even by initiating the use of nuclear weapons. Next, the article argues that there is already a strong basis for confidence in the alliance’s extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, but nonetheless that further strengthening would be needed as North Korean nuclear capabilities evolve. The article then discusses the more desirable features that the allies should want to see in strengthened arrangements for extended deterrence. After presenting an example plan for how alliance arrangements for extended nuclear deterrence might be prepared to adapt over the next decade and beyond, the final section provides some conclusions. The article thus presents a picture of how extended nuclear deterrence arrangements for the alliance would have to evolve given the continued evolution of the North Korean nuclear threat.

Potential Scenarios for DPRK Nuclear Challenges

How might North Korea make use of nuclear forces? We see three plausible scenarios for nuclear-backed aggression that North Korea might think it could profit from. First, North Korea might gamble that nuclear strikes that destroyed the most important alliance command and control centers would enable quick victory. Such attacks would presumably leave the ROK armed forces without high-level leadership and essential intelligence. DPRK military forces might then break through weakened alliance defenses and paralyze South Korea by capturing Seoul and by making deep penetrations to neutralize key military targets.

Success in decapitating alliance leadership with nuclear strikes would require better nuclear and missile technology than North Korea apparently has. But we can expect further improvements. North Korea would require sufficient nuclear forces to survive potential attacks by alliance precision strike capabilities and then penetrate its missile defenses as well. Alliance efforts to strengthen these capabilities should help guard against and thus deter this potential scenario. The alliance should also ensure the survivability and connectivity of its high-level command and control capabilities despite nuclear attacks.

In the second scenario, North Korea would optimistically presume that its willingness and capacity to endure the pain of a few nuclear strikes and keep fighting is greater than that of the alliance. It would further assume that (a) the alliance cannot destroy a substantial portion of its nuclear forces or defend effectively against those it succeeds in launching, (b) fear of further nuclear strikes would greatly limit the alliance’s retaliation, and (c) the alliance would quickly offer a settlement of the conflict that would be a major improvement over DPRK prewar circumstances, even taking into account the damage it had suffered.

In this scenario, too, strong precision strike capabilities and defenses for the alliance would make a big difference as they would negate presumption (a) above. Furthermore, to the extent that the alliance could make clear that it would not concede anything that North Korea could possibly value enough to outweigh the damage it would suffer, this scenario might be deterred. The United States has a fundamental interest in demonstrating to all its allies and potential adversaries worldwide that it will—at a minimum—not allow a state to profit by attacking it or its allies with nuclear weapons.

In the third type of scenario, North Korea would not commit to nuclear war but would instead test the alliance with intense crises, conventional military provocations, and frightening nuclear threats to see if such brinkmanship can shatter alliance resolve. Single initiatives of this kind might be aimed at winning some specific concession. Alternatively, a series of such initiatives might aim at gradually weakening the allies’ resolve and loosening the ties between them.

In confronting any highly stressful DPRK nuclear-backed provocation, the allies...
would need to agree on and implement effective and timely steps to convince the North that its provocation will at best not do it any good and could lead to disaster. The confrontation will have to be carefully managed by the alliance and teach the right lesson: that such brinksmanship is not worth its costs and risks. For at least three reasons, this kind of scenario seems much more likely than the first two, though they could evolve from it.

First, North Korea would expect to control the pressure it puts on the alliance, escalating only so long as the alliance has not found an effective counterstrategy, does not appear likely to escalate excessively, and shows signs it might make substantial concessions. Second, North Korea has a long history of initiating provocations against the allies stretching back to its invasion of South Korea in 1950. Its more serious provocations since then include several attempts to assassinate presidents of South Korea; the capture of a number of ships including the USS Pueblo; the hijacking, attacks on, and bombings of several ROK and U.S. aircraft; and the abduction of South Korean citizens. These provocations took place mostly in the decades immediately following the Korean War. In recent years, most of them have been associated with DPRK nuclear proliferation, especially its nuclear weapon and missile tests. North Korea has on occasion threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.”

More troubling at this point are two severe DPRK provocations in 2010. The first was the sinking by North Korea in April 2010 of the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean naval ship. This attack caused greater loss of life than North Korea had inflicted on the South in more than 20 years. The second was a DPRK artillery attack in November 2010 on Yeonpyeong Island, which is near the Northern Limit Line of the Yellow Sea (West Sea). This attack was seen as particularly significant because two of the four people killed on the island were civilians, and because this was an attack on South Korea’s sovereign territory. The ROK government has since promised strong retaliation for any future military attacks by the North. These especially intense provocations may foretell even more intense tests of alliance resolve as the DPRK nuclear threat continues to emerge.

Our third reason for believing that nuclear-backed provocations are the most likely of nuclear scenarios is that intense provocations serve the interests of the Kim dynasty that has ruled North Korea. Military provocations allow the dynasty to portray itself as once again bravely defending the nation against aggression by the United States and its ROK “puppet” government—thus suggesting that the Kim dynasty’s leadership is essential to its citizens’ security. Military provocations can also cause reactions from the alliance that can unify the North while the new leadership is consolidating its control. Provoking the alliance can impress the military by demonstrating its new leader’s willingness to act boldly against powerful adversaries, as well as demonstrating the military’s willingness to follow his leadership.

Finally, these various motivations for North Korea to continue to mount military provocations against the alliance seem unlikely to recede any time soon. We might hope that the extra dangers that North Korea would face as a result of its having become a nuclear-armed adversary would induce new caution, but the alliance should not count on that.

It seems clear that the extended deterrence capability of the alliance—including strategic strike capabilities, missile defenses, and nuclear deterrence arrangements—would help to deter and, if need be, defend against the first two types of scenarios. It could also help the alliance to deter the third type of scenario. Strong extended deterrence arrangements of these kinds should make it easier for the allies to discount the nuclear threats that North Korea makes. We note that while the allies surely do not look forward to the intense provocations that seem likely to come, the experience of successfully weathering them should draw the allies closer together. In general, better anticipation and advance preparations to respond firmly to DPRK provocations should help to deter provocations.

Note that any of the three scenarios would be more plausible to the extent that North Korea finds itself in desperate circumstances from which the scenario seems to offer escape. Thus, the alliance and other regional powers must keep an eye on conditions in North Korea and consider providing humanitarian aid if dire circumstances threaten, so long as it is not provided in response to threats.

**Alliance Confidence in Extended Deterrence**

The current basis for the allies’ confidence in extended deterrence is sound. History counts for a great deal in both cultures. The ROK-U.S. alliance was established during a war where some 30,000 U.S. military personnel died, and the allies have been reliable partners in facing security challenges on and off the Korean Peninsula ever since. While relations between the allies have their ups and downs, ties of such consistent strength and duration can be expected to survive whatever challenges North Korea might attempt.

The credibility of the alliance’s extended deterrence is backed up by continuing U.S. contributions to ROK defense, by the U.S.-ROK defense treaty, and by the U.S.-ROK combined defense system. The United States is committed to maintaining more than 28,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea and providing much larger forces in the event of war. As expected of a strong alliance, its military forces carry out a regular schedule of exercises with each other.

The nuclear component of the alliance’s extended deterrent is vastly superior to any nuclear forces North Korea could ever hope to have. Alert U.S. nuclear forces are always within range and more than sufficient to derive the maximum deterrence of North Korea that can be had from such forces. U.S. nuclear forces could be deployed in South Korea within a few days whenever the alliance’s concerns might dictate.

Finally, the ROK-U.S. alliance is a key component of the global system of alliances maintained by the United States for its own security. Failure by the United States to meet its most important security obligations would risk the collapse of the entire system.

While the basis for confidence in the alliance’s extended deterrence seems sufficient now, as the DPRK nuclear threat continues to evolve, the alliance’s extended deterrence will have to evolve, too. Improved defenses and conventional strike forces will need to become a reality. The nuclear deterrence arrangements...
will need to be strengthened on a timely basis. To do otherwise would risk a crisis of confidence in the ROK-U.S. alliance—and among other U.S. allies as well. It could encourage North Korea to believe that it could establish a meaningful advantage in coercive power. DPRK efforts to pose an increased threat to the alliance should be answered with increased costs and concerns for them.

Desirable Features for the Extended Deterrent

The following six observations are interpretations of points made in the four defense policy papers released by the United States in 2010, especially the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), or were drawn from two papers written separately by the authors, or in several cases from our discussions.

Broaden Extended Deterrence to Include Missile Defenses and Conventional Strategic Strike. These two steps were agreed to and reaffirmed in the last three SCM communiqués. The 2010 NPR calls for “work[ing] with allies and partners to respond to regional threats by deploying effective missile defenses, including in Europe, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia.”

The United States is also pursuing enhanced long-range strike forces that can help protect U.S. forward forces and allies. They would be able to strike a limited number of targets from intercontinental distances in tens of minutes. Of course, conventional forces within the theater may be similarly capable and quicker. We discuss this possibility later.

Some observers are concerned that this broadening of the alliance’s extended deterrence implies a weakening of its nuclear component. Their concerns may be based on President Obama’s commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The 2010 NPR connected this commitment to changes in extended deterrence arrangements by stating that “Strengthening the non-nuclear elements of regional security architectures is vital to moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons.”

At the same time, the President and high-level U.S. officials have continued to state, “so long as [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

Missile defenses and strategic strike forces should give the alliance substantial advantages in the event of war with North Korea. It is at least conceivable that as defense and strike technologies improve, these forces could greatly limit the number of targets North Korea could expect to destroy. If the alliance were able to suppress DPRK nuclear forces to this degree, its dependence on nuclear weapons to deter North Korea would be much reduced. Of course, such effective protection may not be possible. And even if it is, the alliance may be substantially uncertain of how effective it is. North Korea might succeed in building effective countermeasures, perhaps with help from outside. It might also plan other means for transporting nuclear weapons to alliance targets.

Despite the uncertainties and the substantial costs, even considerably less than perfect protection against North Korean nuclear attack could be valuable. Every DPRK nuclear-armed missile that does not reach its target would reduce the potential damage to the alliance and could justify limiting the damage the alliance imposes in retaliation. Finally, missile defenses and strategic strike capabilities could help allied citizens maintain their confidence when North Korea threatens to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” Nonetheless, given the high likelihood that the missile defenses and strike capabilities deployed by the alliance would prove substantially less than perfect, the Alliance must continue to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent.

Enable the ROK to Share Alliance Nuclear Responsibilities More Fully. There are at least two strong arguments in favor of ensuring that the two allies share the responsibility for any nuclear use. First, both presidents would be held responsible by their citizens for whatever strategic actions are taken and the outcomes. Thus, both their views must be taken into account if nuclear weapons are to be used, or not used, in circumstances where they seemed warranted. Second, whatever happens when nuclear weapons are used to defend the alliance, it should be clear that both allies are fully responsible.

Enabling the ROK to share fully in the responsibilities for any alliance nuclear use could be done in many ways. Institutional arrangements could be established—perhaps similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Nuclear Planning Group—to enable both allies to work out nuclear strategies—and to plan specific nuclear options for possible choice by the two presidents.

Consultation by the two presidents would be needed to decide on the nature and timing of any nuclear use, and even threats of use. Both would want to remain within their homelands. Their consultations with each other and essential subordinates would have to be supported by reliable, secure, high-bandwidth communications.

Finally, both allies’ military forces should participate in carrying out the necessary nuclear missions.

Establish Jointly Controlled Conventional Strategic Strike Capabilities. Former ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young stated in his confirmation hearing that the locations of DPRK nuclear facilities are known and that if there is a concern that North Korea is going to make a nuclear attack, the United States and South Korea would then make the final decision on whether or not to strike these facilities.

While nuclear attacks on these facilities might offer the best chance to destroy them, unless low-yield precision delivery weapons can be made available, nuclear preemption despite uncertainties and substantial costs, even considerably less than perfect protection against North Korean nuclear attack could be valuable

could cause great collateral damage on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Thus, if practical conventional weapons could be essentially as effective in carrying out attacks against these facilities, they would be preferable.

The ability to attack quickly once the decision has been made is important. Minimizing the time to reach these targets can increase the time available to the presidents to decide whether to attack. Anticipating quick attacks, North Korea can be expected to minimize the time from the first detectable signs it is preparing to attack until its forces are launched. Thus, the alliance should want conventional strike capabilities that can reach DPRK nuclear targets as quickly as possible. This suggests that conventional ballistic missile strike forces should be deployed on or near the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea has been interested in creating a ballistic missile strike force that can attack North Korean nuclear facilities, but until early October 2012 had been restricted by the New Missile Guidelines—agreed to with its U.S. ally in 2001—to ballistic missiles that can carry no more than a 500-kilogram payload, at a range no more than 300 kilometers. As some DPRK nuclear facilities and longer range missile bases are more than 500 kilometers from plausible missile launch locations in South Korea, the alliance would have to agree to increase these limits.18

In addition, the United States is bound by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty not to have ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. While South Korea is not a party to the treaty, the United States could be seen as subverting the treaty if it were to support ROK deployment of such missiles. Deploying air-to-surface missiles or sea-based missiles could be one way around this problem, but either of these options would be a wholly new program for South Korea while deploying longer range surface-to-surface missiles would not.

Instead, after long negotiations, and two direct discussions between Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak, the allies reached an agreement to revise the Missile Guidelines: "Under the revised guidelines South Korea can deploy ballistic missiles with a range of up to 800 kilometers . . . enough to reach any target in North Korea but not enough to be considered a threat to China or Japan, as long as the payload does not exceed 500 kilograms, about half a ton."19

The ROK’s prospective deployment of such forces is not without risk. North Korea might have alerted its missiles to pose a heightened threat to the alliance but with no intent to launch. A conventional preemptive attack could be substantially less than perfect, and even though collateral damage would be low, it could leave the North Korean leadership sufficiently angry or panicked to launch the surviving missiles—which might not all be intercepted by allied missile defenses.

In sum, the deployment of a conventional ballistic missile force by the ROK should make the DPRK more cautious about readying its own missiles as a ploy to frighten South Korea and its U.S. ally. In other words, it should help to deter this kind of provocative action. At the same time, given the risks to the alliance of striking at the DPRK, both allies should agree to any such use of the ROK ballistic missile force.

Deploy U.S. Nuclear Weapons on or Near South Korea as Needed. Deployment of nuclear weapons on or near South Korea could have both military and political advantages. While we would not expect the alliance to need to make quick strikes with nuclear weapons, air-to-surface ballistic missiles or sea-based missiles located over or near the peninsula could strike within minutes—significantly less than the few tens of minutes required for ballistic missiles to fly intercontinental distances.

The political values of having U.S. nuclear weapons on or near South Korea reside in the extra measures of assurance and deterrence they would provide. The ROK and its citizens are likely to be more confident that they are protected by nuclear weapons deployed forward for that purpose. Similarly, North Korea should have little trouble understanding that deterrence of attacks on South Korea would be the primary purpose of nuclear weapons located there. It should see U.S. willingness to forward deploy nuclear weapons as a particularly credible indication of alliance intent to use them should that prove necessary.

On the other hand, stationing nuclear weapons on or near South Korea would seem a serious setback for nuclear nonproliferation. Some would call this nuclear proliferation. Many would see it as inconsistent with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed by North and South Korea, or with U.S. and allied efforts to reduce their dependence on nuclear weapons. Some would see this step difficult to reverse. Some would lament the precedent that might be set for other states wanting the strongest possible nuclear assurances from the United States.

Nonetheless, the continuing statements and decisions made by U.S. leaders and senior officials that South Korea is protected by U.S. extended deterrence including nuclear weapons have not been qualified in any way.
They imply that the U.S. leadership sees its obligation to defend the alliance as a higher priority than even nuclear nonproliferation. The United States also expects that by meeting the assurance and deterrence needs of its allies, it will maintain their confidence that they need not establish nuclear deterrent forces of their own.

A decision by the two presidents to deploy nuclear weapons in Korea—even temporarily—would be momentous. Given the current embryonic state of DPRK nuclear forces, there is little reason to make this decision anytime soon. To do so would provide North Korea with an argument that it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself.

Nonetheless, the continued emergence of the North Korean nuclear threat will provide strong arguments for nuclear weapons to be deployed in or near South Korea—especially when any serious security crisis arises.

Structure Extended Deterrence to Minimize North Korean Peacetime Threats and Provocations. North Korea’s periodic peacetime threats and provocations have been a substantial political, psychological, and material burden for the alliance. As noted, the most likely way for North Korea to attempt to capitalize on operational nuclear forces when it gets them is to engage in intensely hostile conventional provocations and nuclear brinksmanship, and count on its nuclear forces to deter military escalation by the alliance.

Strengthened extended deterrence may help to reduce hostile peacetime acts by North Korea. If the alliance deploys effective conventional strategic strike forces (as the ROK may now do) and missile defenses, it could become capable of destroying much of North Korea’s nuclear forces and defending against many of those that survive. If North Korea were to credit the alliance with such a capability, it should be especially leery of making realistic threats of nuclear war, as it would then have to worry more about the possibility of preemptive attack by the alliance. Strengthening extended deterrence in this way should also help allied civilians discount DPRK nuclear threats.

Develop an Adaptive Plan for Strengthening Extended Deterrence. The alliance should have a flexible plan for well-coordinated and timely adaptation to the evolving North Korean nuclear threat as it reaches specific milestones. Such a plan can bolster the alliance’s will to make necessary changes in a timely manner. Knowledge of its existence and general features could help convey to North Korea that its efforts to increase its nuclear threat will be countered, which might slow—or less likely halt—its pursuit of nuclear forces.

The plan should facilitate steps to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence arrangements when needed and scale them back if the nuclear threat were reduced. Desirable changes either way are more prudent if they can be reversed in a timely manner. To the extent possible, changes should be designed and managed to avoid providing excuses for increases in the North Korean nuclear threat, or for resisting steps toward elimination of that threat.

The following example adaptive plan specifies three groups of steps to strengthen the alliance’s extended nuclear deterrent, each keyed to a different phase of North Korea’s efforts to establish substantial operational nuclear forces.

**Group 1.** On a schedule suitably synchronized with North Korean development of an initial technical capability to deliver nuclear weapons with ballistic missiles, the alliance would organize, equip, and task three combined organizations. The first would be a combined, political-strategic advisory group that would examine and recommend high-level policies for deterring DPRK use and threats to use its nuclear forces. It would develop strategies and operational approaches for alliance employment of nuclear weapons. It would also look for strategies for bringing nuclear use to a halt quickly while achieving a reasonable political outcome to the war. The second organization would be a combined intelligence and target-planning group. Combined intelligence would provide the best basis for planning strikes in support of approved strategies and operational approaches, or otherwise of interest to the two presidents. This group would also plan conventional strategic strikes on key North Korean targets, especially nuclear-related targets. The third organization would be responsible for activating and sustaining survivable, reliable, and secure command, control, and high-bandwidth communications support to enable the two presidents to consult and implement their decisions.

**Group 2.** On a schedule suitably synchronized with DPRK efforts to deploy its first operational nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the alliance would take the following specific steps. The U.S. Air Force would provide, or the ROK would build, long-range precision conventional air-to-ground missiles that could be quickly launched from ROK aircraft patrolling in suitable launch areas during crisis and conflict. The ROK air force would plan, purchase, deploy, train pilots for, and exercise a small force of stealthy dual-capable aircraft such as the F-35. These ROK pilots would periodically train at air exercise ranges in the western United States. Training would include delivery of nuclear missiles and bombs. Weapons delivery would be practiced against mockups of planned targets. The Air Force and ROK air force would arrange for timely covert forward delivery and safe storage of nuclear bombs and/or nuclear warheads for the ROK air-to-ground missiles. These weapons would be equipped with use-control systems requiring separate codes from the two presidents. Regular peacetime exercises of the delivery, storage, and arming of the dual-capable aircraft would be carried out with mockup nuclear bombs and warheads.

**Group 3.** On a schedule suitably synchronized with the deployment by North Korea of enough nuclear capability to attack the majority of the bases across which the ROK dual-capable strategic strike force might be deployed, one or both of the following steps might be taken. The ROK air force would develop and exercise the capability to disperse its strategic strike aircraft on sections of hard roads. Ground crews would practice minor maintenance and refueling at dispersal sites. Air Force personnel would practice transporting mockup nuclear weapons to exercise sites and arming ROK dual-capable aircraft.
Many variants of this example adaptive plan are conceivable. Perhaps arrangements could be made to disperse the ROK strategic strike force to airbases outside South Korea. This could make them less vulnerable to DPRK special forces expected to attempt to penetrate deep into South Korea in crisis or war. Alternatively, the alliance might choose to deploy sea-based ballistic missile forces capable of striking targets throughout North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons.

We believe that adaptive plans of this kind could have all the desirable features discussed in the previous section. Though our descriptions focus only on strike forces, stronger missile defenses would presumably also be deployed.

**Conclusion**

The possible need to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence arrangements has been a frequent topic of discussion among U.S. and allied experts and officials for at least the last 6 years. In the discussions we have been part of, it is commonly argued that nothing need be done just yet. This is not surprising. Many experts and officials hope that somehow nuclear proliferation can be halted and that nuclear weapons can eventually be safely eliminated. We hope so, too.

In view of these hopes, the notion that the United States and South Korea might have to make nuclear weapons a more salient part of their defense is not easy to accept. To say “not yet” is appealing. Despite the hopeful appeal, we see a need to commit soon to establishing an adaptive plan for implementing concrete measures to strengthen the alliance’s extended nuclear deterrence—measures that are tied to defined thresholds in the evolution of North Korea’s nuclear forces.

A failure to adopt suitable measures as North Korea continues to develop its nuclear forces risks encouraging it to think it could gain a meaningful advantage over the alliance. It risks shaking the confidence of South Korea that the alliance remains adequate to its security needs. Other states will be watching how the United States reacts to the continued evolution of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and to the increased concerns of the U.S. South Korean ally.

South Koreans should continue to have no basis for doubt that the United States is committed and prepared to defend them by all means that might prove necessary. JFQ

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**NOTES**

4. In the opinions of the authors, these three scenarios provide a suitable basis for assessing the potential uses North Korea might make of its emerging nuclear forces. The first and third are described and commented on in Chang Kwoun Park, “U.S.-ROK Cooperation in Preparation for Hostile Actions by a North Korea in Possession of Nuclear Weapons,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 22, no. 4 (December 2010), 499–513. The second scenario is a subject of continuing study at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) by Victor A. Utgoff and his colleague Andrew Coe, an adjunct staff member at IDA.
5. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report makes a parallel but different statement: “The United States will continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response.” *Nuclear Posture Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010), xi.
10. Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig of IDA sees military provocations by North Korea as particularly important for the leader’s efforts to maintain control over the citizens and the military officer corps, especially the most senior officers. See also “North Korean leader may use dispute to rally support,” *Denver Post*, May 26, 2010, available at <www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ct_15161588?sourcelpkg>; and Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, “Putting Together the North Korea Puzzle,” E-Note, Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 2009, available at <www.fpri.org/enotes/200906.ohhassig.northkoreapuzzle.html>.
16. White House, “Remarks by President Obama.”
Some Chinese grand strategists are said to have breathed sighs of relief on September 12, 2001. Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had been heading downhill in the months and years leading up to that day, with increasing prospects for a significant clash. But even before the fires at the World Trade Center and Pentagon were completely out, it was immediately clear—to Chinese experts and to most of the world—that Washington’s strategic focus would be shifting 3,000 miles to the west, away from East Asia and the Taiwan Strait and onto the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. U.S. strategists who had been increasingly concerned about China’s rising power would now be engaged around the clock on what would become known as the war on terror.

China, therefore, would lie within a strategic penumbra for a number of years, offering it a chance to develop quietly a variety of coercive military capabilities intended to expand its power in East Asia. This, in turn, would allow it to pressure pro-independence forces on Taiwan and raise substantially the projected cost to U.S. forces that might be called on to react to PRC military provocations in the region. Such, at least, was the initial thinking among many PRC experts and international observers.

But after a year or two, strategists across the globe started to have second thoughts. By the end of 2001, after a handful of U.S. special operations forces ousted the Taliban regime in a matter of weeks, global assessments of U.S. power started shifting. Governments throughout the region scrambled to accommodate the aggressive and determined entry of U.S. forces into Central Asia, and the exploding U.S. military footprint suggested plans for a more enduring American presence in China’s rear areas. It appeared to be too soon, therefore, for leaders across Eurasia to resign themselves to the Chinese hegemony that had seemed inevitable before 9/11.

As the second decade of the 21st century begins, the global landscape is changing once more. China is rapidly expanding a wide variety of military capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which in turn is bringing about a new level of assertiveness in PRC foreign policy. Despite the multiyear efforts of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers and civilians, success in Afghanistan remains in question.
U.S. influence in the Middle East is diminished after the Iraq invasion. The measurable costs to the United States from the war on terror include at least $1 trillion and more than 6,000 U.S. dead; less quantifiable are the global costs to the U.S. reputation and soft power. But at the same time, U.S. alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Australia are robust and expanding, a nascent U.S.-India friendship is deepening, and the U.S. military footprint in Central Asia remains significant. There are several drivers of these relationships, the most important of which is strategic mistrust over China’s intentions. In short, the PLA military buildup, coupled with Beijing’s recent foreign policy aggressiveness, seems to be driving Eurasian nations closer to the United States.

How, then, should one assess the impact of 9/11 on China’s strategic environment? Ten years after the terror attacks against New York City and Washington, DC, is China better off strategically? Or do the gains and losses balance out? This article examines these questions, first by outlining the history of Sino-American relations to illustrate the downward spiral that marked the period up to 9/11. Next it discusses the strategic gains that PRC scholars and others thought would accrue to China in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and the PLA military buildup that ensued. The strategic costs to China that became evident in the years that followed had identified with Clausewitzian precision as the center of gravity of Taiwan’s defense. Later that year, Deng Xiaoping became the first communist Chinese leader to visit the United States. His pragmatism and apparent moderation impressed U.S. audiences, sparking popular support for enhanced bilateral ties. China’s soft power was growing.

But Sino-American ties ruptured severely on June 4, 1989, when PLA troops in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square opened fire on unarmed students and other civilians protesting against corruption and in favor of democracy. Western media coverage of China switched overnight, portraying the Chinese leadership as barbaric and backward. Parliamentarians and nongovernmental organizations expressed revulsion at the massacre and demanded their governments cease business as usual with “the butchers of Beijing.” Western governments responded with all instruments of national power including canceling existing arms deals, ceasing military-to-military exchanges, imposing sanctions on the regime and travel bans on high-level PRC officials, suspending loans and export credits, and tightening controls on exports of military hardware and advanced technology to China. U.S. public opinion of the PRC government declined sharply, to this day never returning to the positive levels that prevailed before 1989.

During the Clinton years, Sino-American ties continued to be a target of critics in both countries. Beijing’s coercive population control policies were attacked by Christian groups while organized labor raised concerns over goods produced by PRC prisoners for sale in U.S. markets. Tibet became a cause célèbre in Congress and on college campuses across the country. But in addition to concerns about human rights, U.S. worries about security issues now became much more pronounced. For example, despite intensive diplomacy, the Clinton administration failed to prevent Chinese proliferation of missile and nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan. Washington imposed sanctions on PRC entities for violations of international regimes.

PRC strategists assessed that U.S. and Western attacks on Moscow’s human rights practices had been instrumental in weakening the foundation of Soviet control, so they worried about the same with regard to China. They viewed the imposition of sanctions as part of an effort to “contain” China. Starting in 1985, PRC leaders ordered the PLA to downgrade preparations for a major war with the Soviet Union and begin planning for fighting local, limited wars on China’s periphery, such as a conflict over Taiwan. After the 1991 Gulf War, PLA planners also began to concentrate on the possibility of war with the United States; war games against “the American ‘enemy’” became standard. The Taiwan Strait Crises in 1995 and 1996 and the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 exacerbated an increasingly antagonistic relationship.

Debate about “the China threat” heated up globally. Congress reacted by directing the Secretary of Defense to begin submitting annual reports on “the current and future military strategy” of the PRC. Congress also established in 2000 the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to “monitor, investigate and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications” of Sino-American trade, and to focus as well on Chinese proliferation practices and restrictions on free speech. Congress also set up the Congressional-Executive Commission on Human Rights to “monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China” and to report annually on these topics.

Against this backdrop, George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001 promising
to treat China not as the “strategic partner” that his predecessor had talked about, but as a “strategic competitor.” Bush was determined to raise the profile of U.S. allies in Asia while downgrading the role of China. Senior administration officials also departed from historical practice by intimating greater willingness to consider significant arms sales and diplomatic support for Taiwan.

But these early events in the Bush administration paled in comparison to what happened on April 1, 2001, when a PLA fighter jet attempting to buzz a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane inadvertently crashed into the EP-3. The PLA pilot was killed. The EP-3 made an emergency landing on a PLA airfield. China released the American aircrew after 11 days, but kept the aircraft longer to examine fully the sensitive electronics on board. Administration officials were furious, which no doubt helped inform the decision 3 weeks later to announce the offer of a significant U.S. arms package to Taiwan. Asked 2 days later what he would do to defend Taiwan, President Bush responded, “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” Beijing was stunned.

Thus, three decades after Nixon’s strategic breakthrough, Sino-American relations were quickly spiraling downhill. On the eve of 9/11, there was little reason for optimism that bilateral relations would recover anytime soon.

9/11 and Strategic Gains for China

In the days and weeks after September 11, 2001, observers in China and around the world saw the possibility of at least three strategic gains accruing to China.

Easing of Tensions. First, Sino-American tensions quickly relaxed as the Bush administration began working to build an international coalition against terrorism and PRC officials began stressing a common interest in fighting terrorism. That China was a veto-wielding member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council was also a consideration to the extent the administration was planning to gain global support for its military response through UN resolutions.

For Beijing, 9/11 was quickly seen as an opportunity to put Sino-U.S. relations “back on the healthy development track” and to halt the steady deterioration in relations that had accelerated during 2001. Among the benefits that Beijing hoped for were diminished U.S. support for Taiwan, U.S. backing for Chinese efforts to control its own “terrorists”—ethnic Uighurs living in Muslim-majority regions of western China—with the additional benefit of U.S. attacks against extremists in Afghanistan who were believed to be aiding Uighur separatist groups, and a generally more stable relationship with the United States, which by 2001 was both the largest market for Chinese exports and the largest source of foreign direct investment to China.

Perhaps sensing an opportunity to shift the bilateral relationship into a more positive direction, President Jiang Zemin was among the first world leaders to contact the White House, sending a telegram on September 11 and calling President Bush on September 12. Jiang’s message termed terrorism “a common scourge” and offered sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims. President Bush wrote in his memoirs that Jiang had pledged during his phone call “to help in any way he could.”

Chinese support took several forms. Before the year was out, China had voted in favor of four UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) dealing with Afghanistan and global counterterrorism efforts, including UNSCR 1368, which justified a vigorous international response to those who carried out the 9/11 attacks. As Beijing had only 2 years earlier strongly protested U.S. “interventionism” in the 1999 Kosovo campaign, its first-ever endorsement of U.S. military action against another state was seen in Washington as a significant, and welcome, departure from past practice.

For its moral support and lack of obstructionism, Beijing was quickly upgraded in status within the Bush administration. The President traveled there within a month of 9/11 and again in February 2002; he would travel twice more before the end of his second term, including to the 2008 Olympics. In contrast, no other President had visited China more than once. Moreover, by the end of 2003, Washington acted on several PRC priorities. For example, it declared a dormant Uighur entity, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a terrorist group in August 2002; despite opposition from Congress, Bush pledged in 2003 not to repeat the annual exercise of submitting an anti-China resolution at the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee, and on China’s top concern, Taiwan, the administration began to apply diplomatic pressure on Taipei not to take symbolic steps toward independence, such as by holding a referendum on the question.

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to come it will not regard China as its main security threat.36

Although it is hard to quantify, the fact is that the 9/11 attacks effectively shifted the focus of U.S. strategists and decisionmakers away from China.37 For example, in their recently published memoirs, top Bush administration officials mentioned China much less often than their predecessors.38 The frequency of congressional action on China also dropped significantly. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 11 hearings on China during 106th Congress (1999–2000), including on its military buildup,

Significantly, it appears that Beijing drastically increased its already high rate of defense expenditure immediately after 9/11. By some estimates, China’s defense spending more than tripled between 2001 and 2011.46 Why PRC leaders decided to ramp up spending after 9/11 is a matter of debate, although it would appear to be a rational response to an assessment that other global actors would not be paying attention.

In any event, China’s expanding military capability and booming economy seem to have emboldened many of its national security decisionmakers. PRC diplomats were sent across Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America in what multiple scholars termed a “charm offensive,” seeking to assure counterparts of China’s “peaceful rise.”47 By 2007, public opinion surveys in Asia showed Beijing was more trusted to wield global power than Washington.48

**Strategic Setbacks**

Despite the gains they perceived in the weeks and months after 9/11, by 2002 PRC observers also started to focus on strategic setbacks—that are evident when examining the reaction of key nations on China’s periphery.

**Central Asia.** Checked to the north by Russia, to the south by India, and to the east by U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, Beijing since the early 1990s had viewed Central Asia as an opening to expand its influence, trade, and access to energy resources.49 It also saw potential threats in the region from growing Islamic extremism.46 In 1996, China organized what became known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which included Russia and the Central Asian states and was formed primarily to promote security cooperation against “extremists and separatists,” and secondarily to expand trade.50 Hope and fear motivated Central Asian states to join the SCO—hope for an active PRC role in a region historically dominated by Russia, and fear of Islamic extremism.51

But the speed with which U.S. forces crushed the Taliban in the fall of 2001 served as a vivid illustration that the SCO was ineffective in comparison, and that China still had a long way to go before it could compete toe-to-toe with the United States.52 All Central Asian states quickly offered U.S. forces overflight rights, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also opened their bases to U.S. troops and aircraft. These states had multiple interests in a robust U.S. presence, but they generally shared a desire to see a third global power present in what had largely been contested ground between China and Russia, something that allowed Central Asian governments more latitude in balancing against Moscow and Beijing.53

**South Asia.** U.S. ties to China’s key South Asian ally, Pakistan, deepened right after 9/11. U.S. forces quickly deployed to air and naval bases in the country, albeit on a small scale to avoid creating political problems for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.54 By September 22, Washington had lifted all sanctions imposed since 1990; a month later, it was starting to provide nearly $700 million in budgetary support and security assistance.55 On the diplomatic front, President Bush invited Musharraf to the White House in 2002 and to the more prestigious destination of Camp David in 2003, during which he declared Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally” and offered a $3 billion aid package.56

Despite the initial post-9/11 warmth, U.S.-Pakistani ties cooled as the decade wore on. In the last 60 years, the two countries have seen their strategic interests overlap only when the shared perception of the Soviet threat was high. At other times, threat perceptions diverged. Islamabad fears India’s superior military power, and its security services have supported Islamic extremist networks whose perceived value lies in their ability to launch attacks in Kashmir, tying up large numbers of Indian troops in locations away from the Pakistani border. Islamabad also wants a Pakistan-friendly regime to its rear in Afghanistan and supports at least some extremist groups there. But in the post-9/11 era, state support for extremism ensures a clash of vital interests with Washington.

Pakistan’s support for terrorism affects China, too. Islamic extremists are angry over Beijing’s repression of Chinese Muslims,57 and there are indications that some terrorist networks in Pakistan are supporting Uighur separatists.58 But while concerned, PRC strategists remain focused on their larger interest in South Asia: keeping potential human rights practices, trade disputes, and security of Taiwan. But no subsequent session of Congress has held even half that number.39

And what did China do with its time in the strategic shadows? It quickly accelerated and broadened its military buildup, most aggressively in pursuit of “the world’s most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program”—the military instrument of power most effective at altering the strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait and at putting U.S. forces in the region at risk.40 In 2002, China was assessed to have 350 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) deployed opposite Taiwan,41 and by 2011, it had 1,000–1,200 SRBMs opposite Taiwan, along with hundreds of other new longer range missiles targeting U.S. and allied bases throughout Asia.42 In other areas, it rushed forward production and purchase of fourth-generation fighter jets, modern air defenses, conventional and nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines, a range of space-denial capabilities, and the ability to attack U.S. computer networks.43

Since at least 2005, China’s political-military goal has been described as the development of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities to restrict the U.S. freedom of action in the western Pacific and threaten U.S. bases in the region with missiles capable of overwhelming missile defenses.44 China’s broader political-military strategy, experts argue, includes “reducing the salience of U.S. power to support allies in the region, and undercutting the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent” so that allies and other regional actors may feel compelled, over time, to accommodate Chinese interests.45

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rival India tied down on the subcontinent. Beijing must perform a delicate balancing act. If it gets too close to Islamabad, it drives New Delhi into a tighter relationship with Washington; too much distance from Islamabad, however, creates an opening for better U.S.-Pakistani ties.

As for India, U.S. relations with New Delhi continued to improve during the last decade, even as Sino-Indian ties deteriorated. After 9/11, New Delhi immediately offered assistance to Washington, including the use of its bases for staging operations in Afghanistan and intelligence on regional terrorist organizations. President Bush aggressively sought to deepen ties in pursuit of a “strategic partnership” based on shared values and converging geopolitical interests. His administration signed deals with India on civilian nuclear cooperation and on a defense framework agreement, leading to major U.S. arms sales and combined military exercises. Moreover, 2012 strategic guidance for the Department of Defense released by the Obama administration asserts that “the United States is . . . investing in a long term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”

All of this only added to Sino-Indian tensions. Experts on Asian affairs note that the “Chinese are increasingly wary over the growing strategic relationship between the United States and India, and Beijing has expressed concern over potential alignments in Asia that could result in the ‘encirclement’ of China.” At the same time, writes former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the China-India relationship itself “is inherently competitive and antagonistic.” The result is that both China and India are rushing to rearm their frontier regions, while India is now conducting more military exercises with the United States than with any other country. Washington’s ties to India—the world’s largest democracy, second most populous state, third largest army, and fourth largest economy—are deepening.

East Asia. U.S. ties to its principal Asian ally, Japan, expanded rapidly after 9/11. On September 19, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced that his nation would provide military support to U.S. forces in Afghanistan by deploying naval vessels to the Indian Ocean—the first time since the end of World War II that Japan had sent troops overseas. As the decade wore on, Washington and Tokyo worked productively to resolve alliance issues involving U.S. bases in Japan, ultimately taking steps to increase interoperability and cooperation between Japanese forces and the 40,000-plus U.S. troops stationed there. Sino-Japanese ties worsened over the same period. Since the 1950s, Beijing has been consistently wary about the resurgence of Japanese power and expanded U.S.-Japan military cooperation. Flexing its new muscles, the PLA navy has increasingly harassed Japanese fishing and oil exploration vessels in contested waters over oil and gas fields in the East China Sea. Japanese views of China have dropped steadily since 1989, displaying a growing concern over China’s rise; a 2009 survey of Japanese elites saw 51 percent identify China as posing a threat to Japan. In contrast, surveys showed strong and growing inclination to retain the security alliance with the United States.
As for the Republic of Korea, its reliance on the United States to deter conflict with nuclear-armed North Korea means that bilateral security ties will remain close, anchored by a 1953 mutual defense treaty and the presence of 28,500 U.S. troops. Beijing, in contrast, saw its ties to Seoul weaken after a series of impolitic moves related to ancient Chinese territorial claims. After a North Korean submarine torpedoed an ROK naval vessel in 2010, killing 46 sailors, China was the only regional player that refused to condemn the North. South Korean favorable views on China dropped to 38 percent in 2010, an 8-year low. Among elites surveyed in 2009, 56 percent identified China as the ROK’s principal threat; only 24 percent identified North Korea. As with Japan, South Koreans strongly favor maintaining a security alliance with the United States. In contrast, China is allied to North Korea, a broken, backward regime whose reckless behavior could pull the region (and its patron) into an unwanted war. Washington’s ally is a strategic asset; Beijing’s is a strategic liability.

Southeast Asia. Finally, Beijing’s recent resumption of assertive diplomacy over its disputed claims to the entire South China Sea—and its harassment of U.S. Navy reconnaissance ships, Vietnamese trawlers, and Philippine vessels—have “managed to sour relations with virtually every Asian country and every advanced industrial nation.” In the last 2 years, widespread regional concern over China’s “spiral of domination” has led to expanded U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation, the reestablishment of full U.S.–New Zealand military ties, and the first-ever joint U.S.-Vietnamese naval exercises.

U.S. alliances in the region are strong and growing. The U.S.-Thailand mutual defense treaty is six decades old, and the two sides engage in an average of 40 joint exercises annually. The U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty is older, and both sides have agreed to increases in military exercises and joint efforts to combat extremist groups. U.S.-Singapore security ties deepened steadily since the 1990s, and the latter recently expanded its naval base to accommodate U.S. Navy vessels. U.S.-Australia ties are deepest of all. The two nations have fought together in every war since 1900, and Australia has the largest non-NATO contingent in Afghanistan. President Obama announced in November 2011 that U.S. Marines will begin deploying to Australia for 6-month rotations, with total size of the deployment reaching 2,500 by 2018.

Conclusion

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, China’s security environment is not what Beijing hoped for in 2001. A number of tactical benefits did accrue immediately after the 9/11 attacks—including a lessening of tensions with the United States—but they were of limited duration. Most significantly, PRC decisionmakers may have assessed, correctly, that other global actors would not be paying close attention to the PLA military buildup while war was raging elsewhere. They quickly ratcheted up defense spending, leading to significant increases in the quantity and quality of a wide range of PLA armaments. Concomitantly, China became more aggressive in its diplomacy. These actions created the dreaded security dilemma in which an increasingly powerful nation finds it is not more secure because of growing strategic mistrust among its neighbors, which respond by working to enhance their own security. The common response of states on China’s periphery has been to take steps to balance China’s growing power. Existing U.S. allies (Philippines, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Thailand) and long-term friends (Singapore, New Zealand) have doubled down on their security ties to Washington by looking for ways to build up the U.S. presence inside their borders and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces. Emerging partners (India, Vietnam) have increased the tempo of joint exercises, strategic dialogues, and purchases of U.S. defense articles. Fence sitters (Central Asian states) are not necessarily looking for deeper security relations with the United States, but neither are they anxious to see the U.S. presence in their region diminish anytime soon. Few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-U.S. alliance,” rues Chinese scholar Wang Jisi.

Beijing likely would have acted differently over the last decade if 9/11 had not occurred. It would have wanted to build its military power in any case, but might have tried to do so more slowly in order to gain real capability before encountering the possible need to use it. However, the apparent jump in defense spending right after 9/11 suggests that PRC leaders thought they saw an opportunity—and acted on it. If true, then they lurched forward too soon. Everyone is now watching, and the PLA is not yet prepared to go toe-to-toe with any but the smallest of its neighbors.

In sum, Beijing’s actions over the past decade led to widespread fear of China’s rise, the emergence of balancing coalitions by its neighbors, and a more complicated security environment than it enjoyed before 9/11. China’s crowning as the “clear victor” of the global war on terror is certainly premature.

NOTES

1 Anatol Lieven, “China the Quiet Winner in War on Terror,” The Australian, August 29, 2011.
Time magazine named Deng “Man of the Year” in 1979.

Harvard University’s Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction.” See Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 16.

Robert G. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 95. All but the latter were soon lifted; so-called Tiananmen sanctions on arms exports remain in place in both the United States and Europe.

Sutter, 96.


Sutter, 105–107, 187.


See <www.uscc.gov/about/facts.php>.

See <www.cecc.gov>. Congress also passed in 2002 the Tibet Policy Act, requiring the U.S. Government to treat Tibet separately from China in annual reports and appoint a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues to “promote substantive dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama.”


Ruan Zongze, “Sino-U.S. Ties Back on Healthy Track,” Chung kuo jih pao [China Daily], February 11, 2002. 4. Dr. Ruan served as Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the PRC Embassy in Washington 2007–2011. He is now Vice President of the China Institute for International Studies, a think tank associated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


Malik, 7, 15. Princeton scholar Aaron Friedberg points out that because Beijing did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, U.S. attacks against the group might not have been seen as constituting a violation of national sovereignty. See Aaron Friedberg, “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,” Survival 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002).


Rothkopf, 417–418; Zakaria, 140–141.

Malik, 12–13.


Qtd. in Aaron Friedberg, “Going Out: China’s Pursuit of Natural Resources and Implications for the PRC’s Grand Strategy,” National Bureau of Asian Research 17, no. 3 (September 2006).

Sutter, 97, 123.

President Bush discussed China on 9 pages of his 477-page memoirs (less than 2 percent of the book); Vice President Cheney hit China on 18 of 527 pages, but 12 of those pages related to discussions of China’s role in North Korea (3.5 percent of his book, unless the China-on-North Korea discussion is cut, in which case 1 percent). In contrast, despite their busy days managing the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft mentioned China on 74 of 567 pages (13 percent, 6 times more than his son), while President Bill Clinton mentioned China on 58 of nearly 1,000 pages (6 percent). See Bush, Decision Points; Dick Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011); George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998); and William Jefferson Clinton, My Life (New York: Vintage Books, 2005).

In the 107th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) held one hearing before 9/11, and none afterward. The SFRC held four hearings on China during both the 108th and 109th, three in the 110th, and four in the 111th. In other words, a decade after 9/11, Congress’s foreign policy focus remains fixed on a multiplicity of issues related to the war on terror—and not on China or East Asia.


“clear,” according to Dr. Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: “China has the means to threaten the forward bases from which most U.S. strike aircraft operate.”

47 The Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), “China’s Strategic Modernization,” 2009. ISAB provides the Secretary of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of arms control, international security, and related aspects of public diplomacy. The board has up to 30 members, all national security experts with scientific, military, diplomatic, or political backgrounds.


51 Ibid., 132–133.

52 Nathan and Ross, 50–51.


54 Jing Dong-yuan, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),” Journal of Contemporary China, November 2010.


67 Kronstad et al.


77 Ibid.

78 Department of State, “Background Note: South Korea,” available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm#relations>.


81 Ibid.


86 Department of State, “Background Note: Singapore,” December 2, 2011.


89 PRC scholar Wang Jisi wrote recently, “Although the vast majority of people in China support a stronger Chinese military… they should also recognize the dilemma that poses. As China builds its defense capabilities… it will have to convince others, including the United States and China’s neighbors in Asia, that it is taking their concerns into consideration.” See Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011.
The Kitona Operation

Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers during 1998 Congo war and insurgency

Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers guard refugees streaming toward collection point near Rwerere during Rwanda insurgency, 1998

One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into alliances with them.

—Sun Tzu

By James Stejskal

James Stejskal is a Consultant on International Political and Security Affairs and a Military Historian. He was present at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, from 1997 to 2000, and witnessed the events of the Second Congo War. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer (Political Officer) and retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Warrant Officer in 1996. He is currently working as a Consulting Historian for the Namib Battlefield Heritage Project.
In early August 1998, a white Boeing 727 commercial airliner touched down unannounced and without warning at the Kitona military airbase in the southwestern Bas Congo region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As the civilian-marked airplane rolled to a stop, the doors opened, and a force of heavily armed Rwandan soldiers poured out. Within 30 minutes, the main facilities were secured, and the airfield was in the hands of the invaders. Once the airfield was secured, additional aircraft began to land and offload troops and equipment to reinforce the initial landing force. So began one of the most brazen operations in African military history—all the more remarkable because the small African country that launched the raid did so without outside assistance or support. It was the Rwandan army, a small but extremely competent force with a reputation for brilliant leadership, discipline, and tactical excellence.1

In a classic maneuver made up of equal parts speed, surprise, and audacity, a small force of Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) troops under the command of RPA Colonel James Kabarebe commandeered a civilian airliner and flew over 1,000 miles from Goma in the far east of DRC across the Congo River basin to seize Kitona Airfield near the Atlantic coast and then threaten the capital of Kinshasa.

The “Kitona Operation” was an extremely risky but potentially strategically decisive special operation that had as its objective nothing less than the capture of the DRC’s capital, Kinshasa, and the overthrow of President Laurent Desiré Kabila. Within days, however, the raid began to unravel as opposition came from an unexpected opponent: Angola. The assault at Kitona is an example of a brilliant military operation that ultimately failed because of erroneous political assumptions. In this case, a singular misunderstanding of the strategic political interests of Angola, the one regional power that Rwanda and Uganda needed on their side more than any other country. It was a fault that could have been avoided through a better understanding of both the decisionmaking process in Angola and regional power politics.

Misconceptions about how decisions are made in many African countries remain hurdles that must be confronted by U.S. planners and decisionmakers when considering military operations in today’s Africa. Rwanda’s foray into DRC in 1998 also illustrates the consequences of a failure to understand that the generals’ view was not always the same as the civilian leaders’ view. This strategic failure has relevance for the U.S. military as it deals with allies as well as opponents. Anyone—including the United States—could easily repeat Rwanda’s mistake.

Prologue
Laurent Desiré Kabila, a former youth-wing member of the Balubakat, a party aligned with Patrice Lumumba, and the “Simba” rebels who opposed Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seku in the 1960s, was used by Rwanda and Uganda as a surrogate to lend credibility to the rebellion and ousting of Mobutu during the first Congo war in 1996.2 In planning a second coup, the Rwandans and Ugandans counted on the tacit acceptance of their plans and intentions by Angola, their former ally, which had supported the overthrow of Mobutu in 1996.

Rwanda’s president in 1998 was Pasteur Bizimungu, although most political and all military decisions were made by then-Vice President Major General Paul Kagame. Uganda’s president was (and still is) Yoweri Museveni. In 1996, both viewed themselves as representing a “new generation” of African leaders who were prepared to chart their own destinies with or without the approval of others—whether traditional Western powers or other African leaders. By contrast, Angola’s José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, could be considered the quintessential “old style” African strongman. It is not known to what extent the generational difference was a factor in the misunderstanding among Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, but it may have strongly influenced the respective leaders’ assumptions about decisionmaking.

The strategic factors that drove Rwanda and Uganda to turn against Kabila, their former protégé, and their decision to remove him from power lay in the civil war that began in Rwanda in 1990 and ultimately led to the 1994 genocide. For Rwanda and Uganda, DRC in 1998 remained a safe haven for rebels who represented a threat to their respective nations. Angola had shared this concern in 1996, and its dominant security imperative remained an ongoing civil war with the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or, UNITA) force. In supporting the 1996 invasion, dos Santos and his party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Labor Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola–Partido do Trabalho or, MPLA), saw supporting Kabila as a chance to overthrow their nemesis, Mobutu, for his Cold War support (at the behest of the United States) of Holden Roberto’s National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. Pro-Mobutu UNITA forces operating in Zaire (DRC) resisted the Rwanda/Ugandan invasion. By supporting the invasion and Kabila, Angola was able to disrupt UNITA’s bases and logistical lifeline and was thus better able control its northern and eastern regions. Angola was also convinced that Kabila would never support UNITA precisely because they had supported Mobutu. Thus by 1998, dos Santos no longer saw DRC as a safe haven for his enemies. His interests lay with Kabila, not with Rwanda or Uganda.

misconceptions about how decisions are made in many African countries remain hurdles that must be confronted by U.S. decisionmakers

Rwanda’s leaders faced a problem they thought they understood and based their calculations on a situation in which their primary Angolan interlocutors, senior military and security officials, misrepresented their country’s position as well as their decisionmaking mandates. The summer of 1998 was another turning point for the small country, one of many in its 8-year civil war that had led to a genocide in which nearly 800,000 people were murdered, the Hutu-led government in Kigali was toppled, and the stability of the new government remained in question.

Earlier, in 1994, following the victory of the Tutsi–exile dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) military wing over the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armées Rwandaise, or FAR) and its Interahamwe militias, several million Hutus fled west
Operation Kitona

Rwandan, Ugandan, Rebel Movements
DRC Government Forces
Angolan and Zimbabwean Forces
into neighboring Zaire. Among the refugees was a large, organized, and armed remnant of the FAR and Interahamwe who, once settled among the other refugees in United Nations refugee camps, began preparations for a guerrilla campaign into Rwanda's northwestern territory as a prelude to an offensive to reconquer Rwanda. The new RPF government in Kigali had intelligence sources in the camps and discovered the plans. Of additional concern to Kigali was the information that Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko was condoning, if not directly supporting, the activities of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. Despite warnings provided to the United Nations by the new Rwandan government, nothing was done to stop these preparations and the RPF decided it had to act alone.

The 1996 offensive that followed was launched by Rwanda into Zaire initially only to eliminate the threat from the camps in the extreme eastern border area of Zaire and it, was hoped, to enable the refugees to return home to Rwanda. The RPF believed the ex-FAR/Interahamwe militias were effectively holding many of them hostage. (The RPF leadership's supposition was in fact correct as many Hutus returned to Rwanda after the camps were liberated.) Quickly overrunning the camps, the RPA began to pursue the armed militias westward into the Congo River basin. As this happened, Mobutu ordered Zairian military forces to oppose the intruders and the dynamics of the mission changed; the Rwandans found themselves actively opposing another country's armed forces. Rather than backing away, the Rwandans took their coalition of forces, which by now included Ugandans, Zairian Banyamulenge (an ethnic group closely related to Rwandan Tutsis), Burundians, and rebel Congolese army and militiamen—including one Laurent Desiré Kabila—and moved farther west toward Kinshasa. At that time, Kabila was pushed forward to nominally head the coalition known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre or, AFDL) by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. The leaders of the so-called Front-line States, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Angola's dos Santos, South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, and Namibia's Sam Nujoma, along with Nyerere, saw the "rebellion" as akin to their own liberation struggles, for they had always viewed Mobutu as a puppet of the imperialist West. His departure would rid southern Africa of "foreign" interference once and for all.7

The AFDL, with Rwandan officers and noncommissioned officers leading the way, quickly overwhelmed Mobutu's forces and forced him to flee into exile. Kabila declared himself president and thereafter began pursuing his own erratic agenda, which included promoting his Lubakat tribe to the exclusion of other tribal groups.8 This eventually led to a falling out between the Rwandans and their protege.

By early summer 1998, Kabila was facing Congolese popular discontent over Rwanda's heavy-handed tactics in the eastern DRC and a perception that he was a puppet of two foreign powers. This led him to send home the Rwandan forces that installed him and had been protecting him in Kinshasa, including Colonel Kabarebe, whom Kabila had named his defense minister after assuming power. Additionally, he began to consolidate his control of the country by allying with some wanted Kabila's continued presence as a docile and compliant neighbor to the north to ensure the eventual victory over UNITA.9

Prior to the invasion, the director of Rwanda's external intelligence service, Colonel Patrick Karegeya, conducted a number of meetings with senior officials in Angola. Karegeya received assurances from two powerful Angolan rivals, General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias, also known as "Kopelipa," minister of state and head of military house in the Office of the President, and General Fernando Garcia Miali, director of Angola's External Security Services and Military Intelligence, that their country would remain on the sidelines. Thereafter, Karegeya briefed Kagame that the invasion plan could proceed without fear of outside intervention. But, unknown to the Rwandans and Ugandans, the discussions were not briefed to dos Santos, who repudiated the agreement once the invasion commenced as he perceived a danger to his own interests.10 Dos Santos had befriended Kabila and gained an influence over him that the Angolan leader was not eager to lose, especially when no one knew who the next Congolese leader would be. This factor would prove decisive in the end game.

The Military Operation: The Successful Aspect of the Plan

Colonel James Kabarebe knew the terrain and the enemy best, having marched the ground with his troops and led both the Zairian/Congolese rebels, as well as the RPA in 1996 and through 1997. He would lead the most dangerous and audacious part of the invasion, the air assault deep into enemy territory to seize the key province of Bas Congo and then to capture the capital of Kinshasa. On August 2, 1998, breakaway elements of Kabila's newly created Congolese Army Forces (Forces Armées Congolaises, or FAC) in Goma led by Major Sylvain Mbuki declared their opposition to Kabila and launched a ground assault westward, supported by Rwandan and Ugandan army forces. Simultaneously, Kabarebe seized a civilian Boeing 727 airliner that was on the tarmac of Goma Airfield and loaded it with his assault force. The plan was simple and elegant, but it was built on a faulty premise:
that Rwanda’s and Uganda’s allies from the first Congo War that deposed Mobutu, namely Angola and Zimbabwe, would remain neutral. Despite indications that these countries would stay on the sidelines, that would not be the case.

On August 4, Kabarebe’s force landed in Kitona and quickly dispersed across the installation and secured key points. Kabarebe then met with the former Zairian Army Forces (Forces Armées Zaïroises or, FAZ) army officers who were being “re-educated” at Kitona. Kabarebe was in a good position to understand both their plight and their motivations. He had been the FAC chief of staff when Kabila ordered approximately 2,000 ex-FAZ soldiers and officers to be interned there because he did not trust them. After about 30 minutes of negotiations, an agreement was reached and Kabarebe had his “army.”

With the airfield secured, several additional aircraft brought more troops from Goma until the Kitona raiders totaled two battalions (800 men), including a 31-man, self-contained UPDF light artillery unit. The raiders set up blocking positions to the east of the airfield and then headed west with a small element to seize the port cities of Banana and Moanda about 6 kilometers away, which they did on August 5.

When Kabarebe’s force took control of Kitona Airbase and the coastal ports, his small force effectively closed DRC’s connection to the outside world. Under Mobutu, the capitol city of Kinshasa had been effectively reduced to one means of resupply: the Atlantic Ocean port of Banana, which lies at the mouth of the Congo River. The Rwandans knew that if they could control the port and the mercantile traffic that supplied Kinshasa, they could strangle the government. Moreover, if the huge hydroelectric plant at the Inga Dam complex on the Congo River could be captured, the invaders would control all the electrical power for the western part of the country. A third component of Kabarebe’s plan was even more ingenious: the several thousand soldiers suspected of being loyal to Mobutu who were interned at the Kitona Airbase rallied to Kabarebe and augmented his own small force to complete the mission.

The incursion forced Kabila to face not one but two fronts, as a joint force made up of Rwandan and Ugandan army forces along with the rebellious FAC launched an attack from the east that quickly captured the eastern third of DRC.

After capturing the seaports, Kabarebe’s force then turned east, reinforced by the ex-FAZ soldiers. By August 10, his force had moved 40 kilometers up river and seized the river port city of Boma, followed by the railhead/pipeline terminal at Matadi. They took Inga Dam on August 13 and turned off the power on August 14, plunging most of the DRC into darkness. The force had quickly moved 110 kilometers in 6 days meeting little resistance. Kabila’s FAC had no will to fight Kabarebe and ran back to Kinshasa or melted into the jungle, although they outnumbered the invaders three to one. Leadership, discipline, and a fearsome reputation made the difference for the Rwandans.

By August 17, 1998, Kabarebe and his forces were located 30 kilometers west of Kinshasa and President Kabila was under pressure. Alarmed by the success of Rwanda’s incursion, on August 22, after intense lobbying and deal making, the presidents of three countries—Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, and dos Santos of Angola—agreed to help Kabila to repulse the invaders. But these leaders were also seeking influence and a share of DRC’s immense mineral reserves, especially in the case of Zimbabwe. A Zimbabwean businessman, Billy Rautenbach, was given the position of director of Gécamines, DRC’s parastatal cobalt and copper mining company, which permitted Zimbabwe to siphon off large sums of money as well as raw resources from the mine’s lucrative operations.14

The Reversal

Dos Santos’s Angola had the most powerful forces of all the allies available and began immediately to undo what Kabarebe had wrought with an assault south across the Congo River from its Cabinda enclave that quickly recaptured Moanda. With a large, armor-heavy column, the Angolans cut off Kabarebe’s comparatively lightly armed rear guard from the main force, placing the entire plan in jeopardy. Left with few options, Kabarebe attacked Kinshasa, forcing his way into the city to the perimeter of the Ndjili International Airport. At the same time, Rwandan Tutsis and ethnically related Congolese Banyamulenge civilians were being hunted down and killed in Kinshasa as Congolese government-controlled radio began to broadcast messages warning of Tutsi spies and saboteurs in the capital city that were reminiscent of hate messages broadcast by Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. That, and the arrival of Zimbabwean helicopter gunships and an Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas or, FAA) armored column that threatened his rear, forced Kabarebe to break off the engagement at the end of August. He knew that his continued advance could well mean large-scale ethnic killings.

Although outgunned and outnumbered and with little maneuver room, Kabarebe chose to conduct a tactical withdrawal rather than surrender. To preserve his force and link up with the main invasion force in the east, he and his officers decided to move 360 kilometers south into Angola to get to a suitable airfield for exfiltration. Moving swiftly, Kabarebe’s force brushed off their pursuers and punched through another Angolan force of around 400 defenders to seize the airfield at Manuela do Zombo in mid-September 1998.
For several weeks, the beleaguered force held off the FAA and worked to extend the airfield to 1,400 meters to enable large transport aircraft to use it. At one point an RPA unit at a defensive post positioned 100 kilometers from the airfield stopped an FAA armored convoy. The final analysis that was en route to recapture the field. Finally, once the runway was prepared, aircraft began to land and extract the Rwandan, Ugandan, and eastern Congolese forces. Most of the ex-FAZ had already made the choice to return to their homes or to remain in Angola with antigovernment UNITA rebel forces. Some 30 flights were made over the next several days, and as the defensive perimeter was collapsed inward, successive numbers of Kabarebe’s forces were flown out. The last flight was literally loaded with troops running from their positions to the airplane, with the commanders being the last to leave. It is not clear how many casualties the Rwandans took in the operation—the secretive RPA will not discuss the operation openly—but it is believed that the majority of the force was repatriated. The Ugandans stated that their small part of the force returned home without any losses.

The Final Analysis

When the decision is made to go to war, a successful plan for victory rarely involves timidity or restraint. Risks must be taken, especially when one chooses to engage a country far greater in size, with forbidding distances to conquer, and to fight an army that has more soldiers and equipment at its disposal. The tactical aspect of the Kitona Operation is a testament to the great skill of its planner and commander, as well as the fighting capabilities of a small African nation’s army.

The Kitona Operation was an audacious strategic gamble by the Rwandans to avoid a protracted struggle in their bid to oust Laurent Kabila. As long as neighboring countries stayed out of the conflict, the chances of its success were very high. However, once Angola, and to a lesser degree Zimbabwe, entered the fray, the odds changed dramatically. The Kitona military plan was not faulty; rather, it was well planned for strategic effect and could have achieved its desired aim. As it was, the so-called Second Congo War turned into a protracted affair that ended only after long negotiations. The singular fault in the planning was political. Rwanda and Uganda misjudged Angolan President dos Santos’s readiness to accept the overthrow of Kabila. Their understanding of Angola’s position was based on representations of senior Angolan officers that did not reflect political reality. The only way this mistake could have been avoided would have been through direct negotiations between Kagame and dos Santos. Amazing as it may seem today, the two leaders never discussed Rwanda’s plans because the Rwandans did not fully appreciate the power structure or political interests of the Angolan government.

Kitona could have had a place in the annals of great victories. Instead it is a little-known example of brilliance unhinged by fate.

Epilogue

Following the Second Congo War, Kabarebe served as chief of Rwanda’s Defense Forces before he became minister of defense in 2010, a capacity in which he still serves. Paul Kagame became President of Rwanda in 2000, a position he still holds. Angolan General Miala was imprisoned for coup plotting in 2007, while “Kopelipa” remains a principal advisor to dos Santos. Also in 2007, Colonel Karegeya was cashiered from the RPA for insubordination and conduct unbecoming. He is currently in exile in South Africa and is a vociferous critic of the Kagame government. Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguards in 2001.

NOTES

3 A Kinyarwanda word meaning “those who fight together.”
5 Author’s conversation with a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees officer, Kigali, Rwanda, 1998.
10 Author’s discussion with a senior Rwandan military officer, Kigali, September 1998.
11 Prunier, 182.
14 Author’s conversation with a Congolese official in Goma, September 1998. Rautenbach’s Ridgepointe Overseas Developments, Ltd., took control of Gécamines shortly after Zimbabwe’s entry into the war.
15 Ouzani.
16 Onyango-Obbo.
17 Ibid.
Moreover, a number of military monographs have explored the role and purpose of IO. But still today, the Barnes & Noble bookshelf does not feature many text or reference books on the actual practice of strategic communication, information operations, or public diplomacy. Yes, you can find Leigh Armistead’s edited work (Brassey’s Inc., 2004), and there have been books about soft power and public diplomacy at the national strategy level by Craig Hayden, Phil Seib, Barry Sanders, and others.

This book is unique. Where else do you find current public diplomacy practitioners pulling back the curtain on their craft, explaining the judgments, and analyzing the factors that led them to take one path or another to accomplish something in a foreign context? Take, for example, the excellent description of the effort to “recapture the narrative” in Turkey, a vital U.S. ally, member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, regional power, and example of a secular Muslim majority nation with democratic values. Yet the Embassy faced one of the world’s most hostile and erratic media environments, exceeded perhaps only by that of Pakistan. As the Embassy public diplomacy chief Elizabeth McKay writes, they “recognized that if we addressed the problem from the sole perspective of what we wanted, our efforts would be less successful than if we approached things from the perspective of what our audiences wanted from us.” McKay goes on to describe in detail what the Embassy did with Turkish youth, from entrepreneurship training to innovative film production, but if there is a lesson for communicators, it is that we need to learn “to approach the design of programs with the audience’s needs in mind—rather than merely our own.”

Another lesson comes through in many of the accounts: consistency over time. Public diplomacy, like information operations, takes time. In multiple chapters, this book makes it clear that success depends on four or five rotations of officers continuing with the same vision, the same commitment, and the same program activities. Newly arrived Ambassadors eschew the impulse to invent a new program with their name on it and instead put their full enthusiasm to making a success of something started by predecessors once or twice removed.

With the current enthusiasm for digital diplomacy, many will want to examine closely the case study of @America, the innovative, high-tech approach to Indonesian youth chronicled in this book. In a logical but unprecedented step for the stodgy State Department, Embassy Jakarta moved its youth outreach efforts to a shopping mall. As Hillary Clinton told Time, “we are going to take America’s message to where people actually live and work!” Why not a shopping mall? That’s where people are today, isn’t it?

Beyond the adventuresome leap to the mall, the diplomats struck deals with American companies such as Apple and Google to provide an American experience to Indonesian visitors. Indeed, from the moment newcomers walk into @America and are greeted by young, English-speaking Indonesian “e-guides,” they engage with an array of technology, videos and photos, interactive games, and myriad U.S. information sources. An educational advising service answers questions—for free. Sounds vaguely like an Apple store, doesn’t it?

To be honest, not every chapter is as energizing and creative as the one from Indonesia. But every one opens a door on what really goes on in public diplomacy. The country case studies and political challenges—as well as the responses—are as varied as a United Nations session.

And one can see the gaps. One could wish, for example, that public diplomacy officers spent more time measuring the impact of their programs in objective terms or at least measuring effect and adjusting as they go. There are not a lot of OODA loops in public diplomacy.

Nevertheless, for the military information support operations team leader or the senior combatant command officer engaging Embassy counterparts on a theater strategic cooperation plan, this book should be required reading. Out of these pages, the military IO warrior will begin to appreciate the operational mindset, as well as the challenges, that confront the “diplomatic IO” folks—you know: the ones who talk about “public diplomacy.”

The fact is, we need to learn from each other’s experience. JFQ

Ambassador Brian E. Carlson served the State Department as Senior Liaison with the Department of Defense for strategic communication. Today, he advises InterMedia Research Institute on defense and diplomacy and serves on the board of the Public Diplomacy Council.

The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in Public Diplomacy
Edited by William P. Kiehl
The Public Diplomacy Council/ PDWorldwide, 2012
196 pp. $14.99 (paperback)

Reviewed by
BRIAN E. CARLSON

How hard can it be to do information operations (IO) and strategic communication in foreign countries? This is America—the land that invented marketing, public relations, and survey research, right?

After all, what most of us know from watching car advertising and political campaigns is that there are just a few rules. You develop a message, keep it simple, and say it often. If you are in a foreign environment, you do not have to translate from English. Just turn up the volume and say it again. Negative advertising always wins in politics. Right?

Too often and inadvertently, we slip into the language, if not the theory, of artillery—using terms such as OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, concentrating fires, target audiences, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Those who work in this field know that messages are not cannon shots, civilian audiences are not targets, and what matters is not what we say but what they hear. That is why the arrival of The Last Three Feet: Case Studies in Public Diplomacy is a welcome addition to the IO library.

To be fair, the U.S. military has made tremendous strides in recent years and has become, about this subject especially, a much smarter organization. From Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, to FM 3-0, Operations, to Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, progressive military thinking is evident.
Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba

By Stephen Tankel
Columbia University Press, 2011
288 pp. $35

Reviewed by
BENJAMIN FERNANDES

Pakistan simultaneously acts as one of America’s most important allies and one of its most implacable foes. It is an ally when it provides critical support to U.S. efforts against al Qaeda and becomes an adversary when it provides safe haven to violent extremists such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In Storming the World Stage, Stephen Tankel—a highly regarded academic expert on Pakistan with substantial experience in-country—details LeT’s evolution into a “powerful and protected” Pakistan-based organization with international reach. The book uses a variety of academic sources and original field research in Pakistan and elsewhere to produce the best account of LeT’s evolution along with important insights into Pakistan’s relationship with Islamic militants in general. Tankel argues LeT’s growth and international reach result from its ability to reconcile two dualities: “identity as militant outfit and as a missionary organization” along with being both a tool of Pakistan and a pan-Islamist militant organization. Storming the World Stage is a must read for anyone attempting to understand the complex and opaque Pakistani logic that permits Islamic militants to survive and thrive in that country.

The book first explains how Pakistan views militants, perceptions that caused Pakistan’s government to protect LeT after 9/11, and LeT’s spectacular 2008 attack in Mumbai. Pakistani actions against LeT have almost universally been a facade to appease the international community with minimal lasting impact because Pakistan perceives LeT as “good” Islamic militants. One of Tankel’s most important concepts is that Pakistan protects or counters militants depending on their status as “good” or “bad” jihadis. This distinction is neither static nor exact as militant actions cause Pakistan’s perception of loyalty and utility to shift. Though other Pakistan experts such as Christine Fair and Ashley Tellis implicitly use similar concepts, Tankel’s construct is more concise and equally valid. Tankel clearly articulates how perceptions of good and bad jihadis affect Pakistani decisions and uses events after 9/11 as a poignant example. His sources describe militants as a “gas stove” that Pakistan believes it can use with precision against India to increase or decrease the “temperature” as policy requirements dictate. However, Pakistan cannot turn off the flame because it cannot restart the “pilot light.”

As Pakistan increased restraint on militant activity to further its policy priorities, specifically in Kashmir, many militants turned their attention to foreigners in Afghanistan and in some cases Pakistan’s government. Organizations perceived to be too restrained by Pakistan lost prestige. In LeT’s case, this decline in prestige likely encouraged it to launch the attack in Mumbai, vaulting it into the international spotlight and increasing its status among extremists.

While Tankel makes no attempt to develop policy recommendations to reduce the potential threat from LeT, he arms readers with the context necessary to avoid major policy blunders. He explains how Pakistan relies on LeT and other militant groups to serve a series of domestic and foreign policy objectives. Tankel also describes the conundrum for policy options dealing with LeT and other militant groups that Pakistan supports. Efforts to substantially degrade a group’s capabilities would likely negate Pakistani restraints and encourage vigorous self-defense. Neither American nor Pakistani leaders want LeT to shift its operational activities from Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan to Pakistan, Europe, or the United States.

Storming the World Stage is the best analytical history of LeT’s development and cogently explains how it balances competing secular and religious aspects to form one of the most capable terrorist networks in the world. Ultimately, it is LeT’s practical nature that allows balance, which subsequently prevents it from becoming the next al Qaeda, at least for now. As a result, the greatest threat from LeT is its long-term potential to erode moderate values in a Pakistan already plagued by weak governance and violent Islamists. While the book’s focus is LeT, readers will gain a better understanding of Pakistan and its relationship with militants in general. While Pakistan is too complex to understand from one book, Storming the World Stage provides a strong foundation to readers unfamiliar with Pakistan, and its extensive field research offers new insights for Pakistan experts. JFQ

Major Benjamin Fernandes is an Army Strategist assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command. He has served in Afghanistan and spent several years studying and working South Asia issues.
A key challenge for academics the world over is conducting research that advances understanding of their chosen fields of study. In some fields, the process of selecting a new topic might be compared to staring at a plate of spaghetti and untangling a single strand. In other fields, it is more akin to splitting a light beam with a prism and then selecting a sliver of the resultant rainbow as your academic focus area. In *Withdrawing Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Insurgencies*, Joshua Gleis uses his academic prism to dissect the study of armed conflict and, in turn, focus on the area of war termination theory. He then further refines his study to the subject of "when and how a state should withdraw from . . . [an Islamic] insurgency" (p. xiv).

Since Gleis’s book is derived from the dissertation he wrote while completing his doctorate at The Fletcher School, it follows a cogent and easy-to-follow structure. Chapters are divided into titled subsections that help readers trace the logical construction that Gleis has devised. Overall, the book first traces the evolution of irregular warfare and then provides a number of case studies. The first four depict how Islamic insurgencies were resolved by Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. A fifth case study, Israel, is examined over two chapters to reflect on how Tel Aviv has dealt with two types of insurgencies. Finally, a lengthy conclusion chapter summarizes both the author’s lessons learned and recommendations on what conditions will most likely deliver a firmly resolved insurgency. The book concludes with robust endnotes and a thorough bibliography and index.

In his first chapter, Gleis offers a rapid review of the evolution of insurgency and how, over the past century, we have witnessed an increase in state repression that has served to mobilize the “grass roots” level of society to participate in insurgencies. He then provides a detailed explanation that seeks to define the characteristics of an Islamic insurgency and why they are noteworthy enough to merit a unique label as a fourth-generation mode of warfare. This uniqueness, we learn, is rooted in the use of suicide or martyrdom attacks, use of social welfare networks, and presence of outside state sponsorship. Seemingly simple and somewhat innocuous, these basic elements combine and leverage the fervor of religious conviction and the solidarity of shared ideology to develop a whole that is greater than the sum of its pieces. The first chapter concludes by discussing the “democratic dilemma” and the challenges confronted in a counterinsurgency environment where the state is faced with determining how it will conduct an effective counterinsurgency strategy designed to deter aggression while “maintaining the civil liberties of its domestic population,” and to do that while the insurgents are not similarly constrained (p. 11).

Chapters two through five are subsequently devoted to individual case studies. Listed sequentially, the case studies cover the British withdrawal from Iraq in the 1920s, the French withdrawal from Algeria in 1962, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. Organized through the consistent use of subheadings, each chapter provides the relevant background followed by a focus on the tactics employed by the insurgency and the counterinsurgency forces, the factors leading to withdrawal, the consequences and subsequent policies, and finally an analysis of the campaign and its aftermath.

Chapters six and seven focus on Israel and its handling of the Hizballah insurgency in Lebanon in 2000 as well as the Hamas insurgency in Gaza in 2005. As a result of the nuanced history behind these case studies and the fact that the unsatisfactory resolution of the Lebanese withdrawal directly contributed to the Gaza uprising, these chapters, while retaining the same general categories as the previous case studies, are much more robustly developed in detailing all aspects of the campaign.

As generations of political and military leaders will attest, and as many academics will agree, the formulation of national strategic policy is an inexact process that relies heavily on experience and study to develop an awareness of what has both worked and failed in the past. Ultimately, the goal of our leaders should be to plan and to resolve conflicts, regardless of the specific type, allowing us to withdraw with honor and to not be faced with “repercussions [which] . . . may last for generations” (p. 149).

With such goals in mind, and with the current war in Afghanistan at a critical point, the final chapter is the most important. Focused on the lessons that Gleis has derived from his case studies, his recommendations are particularly relevant in Afghanistan since the civil-military leadership of many countries is concerned with “getting [the strategy] right” as they seek to balance the elements of strategy and art that will ultimately guide the coalition’s withdrawal.

While not a primer in the classic sense, these recommendations are a wide-ranging list that reflects the myriad considerations that commanders at all levels must deal with in developing and executing a transition and withdrawal strategy. In particular, Gleis notes the importance of clearly defining phases, controlling borders, declaring “red lines,” executing an effective strategic communication plan, establishing realistic goals, holding insurgents accountable to the rules of war, and supporting and protecting the public. This last element is, in fact, a truism clearly understood by counterinsurgency experts who have long advocated the “will of the people” as any insurgency’s “center of gravity.”

In the final analysis, *Withdrawing Under Fire* does not seek to provide a prescriptive solution for resolving any insurgency—Islamic or otherwise. It does, however, present a well-organized study of those issues that have, over the past century, most affected the ability of a nation to resolve and to withdraw from Islamic insurgencies. It is a study that casual readers can easily comprehend and that seasoned professionals would do well to review as a refresher on what they should be thinking about as they develop and enact strategy. JFQ

**Lieutenant Colonel Todd M. Manyx, USMC, is an Intelligence Officer deployed to the International Security Assistance Force.**
Operational Design and the Center of Gravity
TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK

By DALE C. EIKMEIER

Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, contains a significant editing error that, if not corrected, will further confuse the integration of the already difficult concepts of “design” and the “center of gravity.” Figure III-4 incorrectly places identification of friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COGs) in operational design’s “understanding the operational environment” step.1 This placement is also challenged by the J7’s Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design and the 2006 version of JP 5-0.2 A better placement would put identification of the enemy center of gravity in the “defining the problem” step and the friendly center of gravity’s identification in “developing the operational approach” step. The good news is the error is repairable.

This article argues three main points. First, commanders and staff cannot properly identify enemy COGs until after they have defined the problem. The logic is that until we identify the problem, we cannot be sure who or what the real adversary is. Second, as the commander develops an operational approach, or solution to the problem, he identifies his friendly COG; different approaches to solving a problem may require different capabilities and therefore different friendly COGs. Lastly, identifying the enemy and friendly COGs during the “understanding the environment” step is premature, illogical, and counter to the intent of operational design thinking.3 The conclusion then recommends changes to current doctrine that would make operational design and the center of gravity concept more compatible and complementary.

When doctrine writers introduce a new concept such as operational design, they try to integrate it with existing concepts in a complementary way. Unfortunately, this is not always easy; doctrine is not “plug and play.” Making sure the new concept is ready is only half of the integration process. Integration of new and older concepts and how they will function together requires thorough consideration. Existing concepts need to be reexamined in light of the new concepts and, if necessary, adapted to fit the new. Unfortunately, even with thorough consideration, doctrinal or editing errors are still possible. These errors may occur because a new concept has not fully matured or the implications on existing doctrine are not fully realized at the time of publication. The latter appears to be the case with JP 5-0’s discussion of operational design and the center of gravity.

In JP 5-0, figure III-4 clearly shows that the identification of friendly and enemy COGs is an output of operational design’s “understanding the operational environment” step.4 The placement of the COG identification in this step is likely based on a poor understanding of JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), which discusses COG identification in detail.5 JP 2-01.3 emphasizes using a holistic view of the operational environment to identify centers of gravity in a system.

JP 5-0, Figure III-4. Understanding the Operational Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Inputs</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic guidance</td>
<td>Description of the current operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the conflict</td>
<td>• Systems perspective of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant history</td>
<td>• Impacts of physical and information factors on the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical and information factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment</td>
<td>• Friendly/enemy COGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII Analysis</td>
<td>Description of the desired operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opposing</td>
<td>• Military endstate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Neutral</td>
<td>• Termination criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Friendly</td>
<td>Description of the opposing endstates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

COG center of gravity
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

NOTE: All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance.

Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
COGs occurs in the third step, “evaluate the adversary,” which in some ways is similar to design’s “define the problem” step. It is assumed that a misplaced focus on the word environment led someone to mistakenly place the COG identification step in operational design’s “understanding the operational environment” step. It is an easy mistake, and even easier to overlook, but it represents a lack of understanding of the purpose and origins of operational design, specifically the problem identification and operational approach steps.

The purpose of design thinking is “to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.” The origins of design thinking in military doctrine resulted from a recognition that commanders were having difficulty understanding increasingly complex environments that in turn hindered their ability to distinguish between the symptoms and the actual root causes of problems. This inability to identify root causes of problems led to solutions that often attacked symptoms rather than the root problem, with disappointing results. What commanders needed was a better identification process suited to ill-structured problems to complement existing problem-solving processes such as the joint operation planning process. Operational design was the solution to this challenge and is essentially a methodology for understanding complex environments and identifying ill-structured problems and potential solutions.

Operational design, as described in JP 5-0, “is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” Operational design consists of three steps: “understanding the strategic direction,” “understanding the operational environment,” and “defining the problem.” The answers or understanding obtained from these three steps enable the development of an “operational approach.” (A claim could be made that developing the operational approach is actually a fourth step that completes the operational design process, but doctrine does not label it as a step.)

**Understanding the Strategic Direction**

This step helps the commander understand the strategic endstate and objectives as the starting point to formulate a vision of what the desired environment should look like. It simply asks, “What are the strategic goals to be achieved and the military objectives that support their attainment?” More simply, this step defines the goalposts and where they are, but not how to get to them. That occurs later in the process. This step provides a framework that defines the desired environment, but it does not describe the current environment. That framework and description are filled in during the second step.

**Understanding the Operational Environment**

The purpose of this step is to “help the [joint force commander] . . . better identify the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these actions affect achieving the military end state.” It asks, “What is the larger context that will help me determine our problem?”

This step can be thought of as a prerequisite, not an end. This is a key point. In the 2011 version of JP 5-0, “understanding the operational environment” is one step in a larger design process. In this step, the commander and staff create “pictures” of the current and desired environments. It is akin to collecting and assembling the pieces of two puzzles. The goal is to arrive at understanding by assembling the pieces and knowing why and how the pieces fit and function together. At the end of this step, the commander and staff should be able to look at each puzzle (current and desired environments) and understand what is going on in the current environment and why, and what the desired environment should look like. The only things that have been identified are the desired and current conditions, actors, relationships, functions, and tensions in the environment that establish the operational context.

Any discussions of centers of gravity at this point are premature. A detailed understanding of 2006’s JP 5-0, JP 2-01.3, and the discussion in 2011’s JP 5-0 support this conclusion. For example, the 2006 pre–operational design JP 5-0 states, “The primary purpose of mission analysis is to understand the problem and purpose of the operation.” This clearly suggests that identifying the problem is paramount and other planning elements derive from it. Even the Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design acknowledges that COG identification in the environmental step, and prior to problem identification, is premature when it states that “Given sufficient time, planners should defer COG analysis until they have at least an initial problem frame, because identifying the factors that comprise the problem should facilitate COG analysis.”

Identification of problems or adversaries and solutions that would provide insights to COG identification occurs in the following steps.

**Defining the Problem**

Defining the problem’s purpose “is defining what needs to be acted upon to reconcile the differences between the existing and desired conditions.” In this step, the commander looks at the environment “puzzles” and asks what the problem, obstacle, or condition is that prevents the current environment from becoming the desired environment. The answer to this question defines the problem and what needs to be “fixed.”

The problem is not the enemy COG. The problem merely defines the adversary or enemy system. (Note, in this context, the terms adversary or enemy do not imply hostility, only that they are obstacles to obtaining the goals. They are “the problem.”) This adversary system contains a center of gravity that must be identified by studying the system. This is where some argue that design’s problem statement actually replaces the COG. This is an incorrect understanding. The defined problem is not the center of gravity. Rather, it determines what the adversary system is and sets up a systems analysis based on the adversary’s goals, capabilities, and requirements that contribute to the COG identification and analysis process of that system. Planners using a systems perspective analyze the adversary system that is causing the problem to determine the enemy center of gravity. More simply, design’s problem identification defines for commanders and planners the system in which to look for an enemy center of gravity. Once the adversary or enemy center of gravity is identified, the next logical step is determining how to solve the problem.

JP 5-0’s figure III-4 would have the commander identify the enemy center of gravity prior to determining the adversary or enemy system causing the problem facing the joint force. This makes no sense and is contrary to the intent of operational design as expressed in the J7 handbook on operational design, which states:

*The requirement to frame the problem and write a problem statement early in design raises a question concerning how the problem relates*
to one or more centers of gravity. Both [COG and problem] are important to developing the operational approach, but the caution to planners is that jumping to COG analysis too early in design [specifically understanding the environmental step] can constrain creative thinking about the problem.19

This statement clearly indicates that identifying the COG should not precede problem analysis.

**Developing an Operational Approach**

Just as the identification of the problem provided an enemy system for COG analysis, development of an operational approach guides the selection of a friendly center of gravity: “The operational approach reflects understanding of the strategic direction [step one], the operational environment [step two], and the problem [step three] while describing the commander’s visualization of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state.”20 Simply speaking, the operational approach is a description of the solution to the problem. It outlines the objectives, actions, tasks, missions, and desired conditions that are intended to solve the problem. These actions then help identify critical capabilities required to address the problem and achieve the objective. These critical capabilities in turn will suggest a friendly center of gravity that can perform the actions and achieve the objective.

**JP 5-0**—as currently illustrated, but contradicted by the J7 design handbook—has the commander identifying the friendly center of gravity before defining the problem and determining the broad operational approach to solving the problem. This is selecting “the tool” before we know what needs to be fixed or how to fix it. This type of logic is exactly what design thinking means to prevent.

Here is one way to think about an operational approach and its relationship to the friendly center of gravity. Since most problem sets can be described as blocking, lacking capacity, or faulty behavior, a technique for developing an operational approach is the *remove, provide, and change* (RPC) framework. For example, if the problem is blocking the transition to the desired state and it is not needed in the desired state, then removal is an approach. If the problem is the absence of a requirement or capability, then an approach is to provide. If the problem is a behavior or a condition of a requirement, or something that cannot be removed, then change is an approach. Again, these are broad categories of approaches, and actual approaches will be more specific and the lists of approaches are only limited by the ability to think creatively, but RPC provides a starting point. Additionally, these categories can be used in combination for a multifaceted approach to addressing the problem set.

Once an RPC approach or combination is selected, commanders and staffs can identify the friendly center of gravity by asking who or what has the critical capability to execute the RPC action and achieve the objective or endstate. The answer to that question is the friendly center of gravity.

**The Illogic of Identifying the COG in Step Two**

JP 5-0 figures III-4 and III-6 clearly show that friendly and enemy COGs are an output of “understanding the operational environment” and an input to “defining the problem.”21 Interestingly, in the textual discussion, there is no mention of COGs in either step. The error appears only in the figures. This, along with the J7 design handbook, suggests that doctrine never intended COG identification to be part of “understanding the operational environment” because of weak logic. It also suggests that the figures may simply contain an editing error. On the other hand, COGs, in the context of operational design, are first discussed in JP 5-0 in the narrative on developing the operational approach. The discussion does not specifically address when COG identification takes place, only that COGs, along with other elements of operational design, are useful in developing an operational approach.22 This suggests that COG identification should occur prior to the completion of an operational approach, but it is ambiguous. As shown in JP 5-0, it occurs during understanding the environment. But is this logical?

Here is an example using the current logic of JP 5-0’s figure III-4. The operating environment is an old house. The strategic direction (step one) is to have a solid floor. The current environment has a floor with loose boards and nails sticking up. The commander, knowing the goal is solid floors and seeing that the boards are loose and nails are sticking up, identifies the nails as the enemy center of gravity and a hammer as the friendly center of gravity. The commander is tempted to skip “defining the problem” and go directly to developing an operational approach—that is, hammering in the nails. After all, why define the problem if we already have identified the friendly and enemy COGs? It is a superfluous step. But is it?
The commander resists and continues to use operational design. To define the problem, he looks at the current and desired environment and asks probing questions to get at the root problem and not be misled by symptoms. Are the boards loose because the nails are sticking up? What caused the nails to stick up? Could the boards be warped, causing the nails to pull out? What is the condition of the wood? By attempting to identify the problem, he refines his understanding of the environment and realizes that the nails are not the problem or the enemy COG but rather a symptom of a larger problem that he needs to identify. He now realizes his hammer COG—and hammering nails—might not be the solution. By defining the problem, he may realize that the enemy COG is warped and rotten wood, which he needs to replace—that is, his operational approach. So now his COG is no longer a hammer, but new floorboards.

Without operational design thinking, the commander may have chosen to hammer nails, and when that did not work satisfactorily, try another approach and so on until the problem was ultimately solved or the effort abandoned, both at additional cost. Operational design was specifically introduced into doctrine to address this problem of misidentifying symptoms as root causes. Therefore, it is critical that the error be corrected because in the best case it will be ignored or explained away, which undermines doctrine’s credibility. In the worst case, it subverts operational design and takes doctrine backward to where symptoms, not root causes, are addressed.

**Summary**

Operational design’s discrete steps can enhance understanding and enemy and friendly COG identification by correctly placing them into separate cognitive bins in a logical sequence. By asking what the root problem is before determining an enemy COG, operational design can point commanders and staffs toward an adversary system in order to identify the enemy center of gravity. This center of gravity, if attacked directly or indirectly, can significantly contribute to solving the problem. By asking in the “developing the operational approach” step, how the problem can be solved or center of gravity attacked and what has the capability to do so, commanders have an insight as to what their friendly center of gravity is or should be. Any discussion of enemy and
friendly centers of gravity prior to defining the problem and the start of developing an operational approach is illogical and negates the utility of operational design.

**Recommendations**

This issue can be resolved by adopting two recommendations. The first is to delete references to friendly and enemy centers of gravity in figures III-4 and III-6. This recommendation corrects the error, but alone is insufficient to increase understanding of how operational design and the center of gravity concept complement each other. To improve understanding and clarity, a discussion of enemy COG identification should be added to the narrative on defining the problem along with a similar discussion on the friendly COG in developing the operational approach.

The discussion should include the following points: The problem defined in step three identifies the adversary and its system and sets up a systems analysis for identification of the enemy center of gravity in accordance with JP 2-01.3. More simply, design’s problem identification defines for commanders and planners the system in which to look for an enemy center of gravity. In step four, developing an operational approach, the enemy’s center of gravity and critical factors analysis will identify requirements and vulnerabilities that suggest where to act and offer possible solutions or actions to take. These actions require capabilities, and the possessor of these capabilities is the friendly center of gravity.

Adopting these recommendations and clarifying the relationship between operational design and center of gravity will strengthen synergy and contribute stronger, more useful doctrine.

**NOTES**

5. Ibid., III-7.
6. Ibid., III-8.
7. Ibid., III-7.
8. Ibid., III-12.
13. Ibid., VI-4.
15. Ibid., III-8, III-12.
16. Ibid., III-14.
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