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The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.

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From the Editors ................................................................. 3

President’s Forum ............................................................ 7

National Policy and the Post-systemic Navy. .......................... 11
Robert C. Rubel
If what happens overseas affects what happens here in North America, then the United States needs to have a voice and influence in overseas affairs. The Navy and the Marine Corps have served as the sources of that instrumentality on a day-to-day basis. How? How will they do so in the already-emerging future?

Strategy and Policy

Thucydides
Theorist of War. .............................................................. 31
Williamson Murray
Thucydides did not set out to be a theorist in his account of the Peloponnesian War. Rather, his analysis of the great war between Athens and Sparta helps to clarify not only the events of that war but also fundamental, theoretical truths about the nature and consequences of human conflict.

Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination .................. 47
Karl Walling
The ancient historian and political theorist Thucydides supplies a microcosm of warfare, addressing the fundamental and recurring problems of strategy at all times and places—origins, objectives, and other strategic issues that those who wage war ignore at their peril. But we will never understand his work unless we try to understand him on his own terms.

Maritime Deception and Concealment
Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks ......................................................... 87
Jonathan F. Solomon
Deception and concealment can help mitigate the risks that an adversary might cripple U.S. forward maritime forces in a massive, war-opening strike, achieve in the first days or weeks some fait accompli, or inflict severe losses on maritime forces as they maneuver within a contested zone to retake the initiative.
An Amphibious Capability in Japan’s Self-Defense Force

Operationalizing Dynamic Defense ........................................ 117
Justin Goldman

An amphibious capability would offer Japanese leaders new flexibility, especially in the increasingly volatile offshore islands zone—given improvements in equipment, doctrine, and especially interservice integration.

Review Essay

An Unpersuasive Argument for Overcoming China’s A2AD Capability ........... 135

A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, by Aaron L. Friedberg
reviewed by Marshall Hoyler

Book Reviews

Fundamentals of War Gaming, by Francis J. McHugh
reviewed by Jeff Shaw .......................................................... 139

The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor
reviewed by Jon Scott Logel .................................................. 140

Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine
reviewed by Peter M. Swartz .................................................. 142

reviewed by Sean Sullivan ...................................................... 143

Churchill and Seapower, by Christopher M. Bell
reviewed by Geoffrey Till ...................................................... 144

The War Below: The Story of Three Submarines That Battled Japan, by James Scott
reviewed by Beth F. Coye ....................................................... 145

In My View ........................................................................... 147

Of Special Interest ................................................................. 149

Reflections on Reading .......................................................... 151
The nation’s persisting fiscal crisis continues to pose severe challenges to the military services of the United States, while at the same time inviting a rethinking of fundamental assumptions about our defense requirements—to repeat a point we made in this place in our last issue. The lead article of that issue addressed possible responses by the Marine Corps to what it called a “period of austerity.” In this issue, Robert C. Rubel turns to the Navy. His broad-ranging, historically focused article, “National Policy and the Post-systemic Navy,” begins from the premise that times of austerity are always times of danger, because they intensify pressures from political elites and the public to articulate persuasively overarching strategic concepts that serve to justify the immense costs associated with sustaining particular services. Today, as in 1954, 1979, and 1992, altered circumstances confront the Navy with just this challenge, Rubel argues. Over the last decade the Navy has adjusted to the changes in the strategic environment brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union, the war on terror, and globalization by formulating and implementing a new naval strategic concept centered on maritime security cooperation in defense of the global “system.” However, as we look at the rapidly changing international picture, it is far from clear that the current “systemic era” can be sustained indefinitely; accordingly, the Navy needs to be prepared to re-examine and refine—or redefine—its fundamental strategic concept. Robert C. Rubel is dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.

One of the surprises awaiting incoming students at the Naval War College is the attention given in its flagship course (on “strategy and policy”) to a historian who wrote as long ago as the fifth century BC. Thucydides’s account of the epic, decades-long struggle between Athens and Sparta for primacy in the world of classical Greece is widely recognized as one of the great masterpieces of historical literature of all time. But what is its real relevance for the education of military officers today? In “Thucydides: Theorist of War,” military historian Williamson Murray makes the case why this author should be placed in the first rank of that (small) number of thinkers who have meditated deeply on war as a political and human phenomenon. Karl Walling provides additional insight into Thucydides’s enduring value, through an extended analysis of a neglected aspect of his history, the problem of war termination. In the process, he offers a compelling challenge to conventional interpretations of Thucydides as an exemplar of the so-called
realist school of contemporary international relations theory. In particular, he argues that scholars have frequently misunderstood Thucydides’s view of Athenian grand strategy in the Peloponnesian War—and especially the role in it of Athens’ leading statesman, Pericles. Williamson Murray and Karl Walling both currently teach the Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy course.

Two additional offerings bring us back to the present and to the operational and tactical levels of naval warfare. In “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks,” Jonathan F. Solomon provides a detailed analysis of the range of naval deception and concealment techniques available to the United States and allied navies today or that have been utilized in past conflicts, in the context of the growing challenge posed by the antiaccess/area-denial capabilities of potential adversaries. Finally, Justin Goldman, in “An Amphibious Capability in Japan’s Self-Defense Force: Operationalizing Dynamic Defense,” makes the case for a significant strengthening of Japanese amphibious capabilities with respect to the defense of the southwestern Japanese islands against growing Chinese encroachment, as well as for increased cooperation between the JSDF and the U.S. Marine Corps.

NEW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
The twenty-first in our Historical Monograph series, Blue versus Orange: The U.S. Naval War College, Japan, and the Old Enemy in the Pacific, 1945–1946, by Hal M. Friedman, will soon be available for online sale by the Government Printing Office. The new book (a companion to the author’s 2010 Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare, 1945–1947) closely analyzes war gaming at the Naval War College in the academic year 1945–46, as both a reflection and source of the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal and strategic responses to the experience of World War II—responses that would help the Navy shape its approach to the Cold War. Blue versus Orange also describes in fascinating detail the practice of war gaming at the Naval War College in that era.

WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL REVIEW PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing in the Naval War College Review.

The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the previous publishing year. Cash awards are provided by the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation.
The winner is Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., for “Naval Operations: A Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea,” which appeared in the Summer 2012 issue ($1,000).

The second-place winners are Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., for “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,” in our Autumn 2012 issue ($650, shared between coauthors).

The third-place winner is Iskander Rehman, for “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean,” in our Autumn 2012 issue ($350).

The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for the author of the best historical article appearing in the Naval War College Review in the same period. The winner is Donald Chisholm, for “A Remarkable Military Feat: The Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950,” which appeared in the Spring 2012 issue ($500).

IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
Rear Admiral Walter E. "Ted" Carter, Jr., became the fifty-fourth President of the U.S. Naval War College on 2 July 2013. A native of Burrillville, Rhode Island, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981, was designated a Naval Flight Officer in 1982, and graduated from Top Gun in 1985.

His career as an aviator includes sea assignments in Fighter Squadron (VF) 161, on board USS Midway (CV 41); in VF-21, the "Freelancers," on board USS Independence (CV 62); in Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW 5); in command of the VF-14 "Tophatters"; and as executive officer of USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), culminating in command of USS Camden (AOE 2) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Subsequent fleet command assignment includes service as Commander, Enterprise Carrier Strike Group (CSG 12).

Carter has served in numerous shore assignments, including VF-124, the "Gunslingers"; in Fighter Wing Pacific; as executive assistant to the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command; as chief of staff of the Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command; as Commander, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command; and as Director, 21st Century Sailor Office (N17).

He has led strategic projects, including the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and most recently, was charged with leading Task Force RESILIENT.

He is the recipient of various personal awards, including the Defense Superior Service Medal (two awards), Legion of Merit (three awards), Distinguished Flying Cross with Combat V, Bronze Star, Air Medal (two with Combat V and five strike/flight), and Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (two with Combat V). He was also awarded the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Leadership Award and the U.S. Navy League’s John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership and was appointed an Honorary Master Chief by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.

He has accumulated 6,150 flight hours in F-4, F-14, and F-18 aircraft and has made 2,016 carrier-arrested landings, the record among all active and retired U.S. naval aviation designators. He has also flown 125 combat missions in support of joint operations.
IN EARLY JULY OF THIS YEAR I became the fifty-fourth President of the U.S. Naval War College. Out of respect for the tremendous legacy of the naval officers who have preceded me in this position for nearly 130 years, I made a pilgrimage to the nearby grave site of the College’s founding President, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, on the ninety-sixth anniversary of his death. Luce was one of the greatest maritime minds of his generation, and in the 1880s he envisioned a Naval War College that would be “a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.” Nearly thirteen decades later I believe that Luce’s vision has largely been achieved, but I fear that the College’s full potential has yet to be realized by many current and future naval leaders. In the coming months, I plan to use this forum to address some of the factors that have historically limited our Navy from taking full advantage of the capabilities that exist here in Newport while not fully welcoming all designators of our brightest and best officers from achieving the strategic outcomes this College is capable of facilitating. My commitment as President of this venerable institution is to ensure that this College maintain a laser-like focus on educating and developing the enlightened leaders that America, and our allies, must produce if we are to succeed in the face of the formidable and unforeseeable challenges that lie ahead. I am further committed to ensuring that our Navy and our nation receive a full return on the investment they make in the education and research provided here.

I have worn the cloth of the nation, as either a midshipman or a commissioned officer, for more than thirty-five years. Over this period I have frequently heard the Naval War College referred to in almost reverential terms, and when I arrived I thought I knew what the institution was all about. It didn’t take me very long
during my turnover briefings, however, to recognize that so much of what the College accomplishes has changed since 9/11. From a national security perspective, a new age, and the new century, began not on New Year’s Day of 2000 but instead on that terrible morning in September 2001. From that day onward, the Naval War College has refined and adapted its programs to meet the challenges of what is often called the “post-9/11 world.” Today’s College is a multifaceted educational and research institution that enhances and enriches the analytical skills, leadership abilities, and strategic and operational expertise of our maritime and joint warriors. Our academic programs are

- **Tightly focused:** Answering fleet demand signals, our faculty has restructured the content of our curricula to meet the differing needs of the midgrade officers enrolled in our Intermediate Service College and the needs of the senior officers attending the Senior Service College program. The three core courses that a student encounters in the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) are now significantly different in content and focus from what students engage in when enrolled in the more senior College of Naval Warfare (CNW). At the macro level, the CNCS curriculum focuses on developing leaders with an operational/theater perspective, while the CNW program addresses issues from a national, strategic, and combatant-commander perspective. For example, the CNCS Joint Maritime Operations course covers all aspects of joint-force operations, with a strong emphasis on maritime operations and joint operations in the maritime environment. The more senior CNW course covers maritime campaigns (past, present, and future) and joint-force operations, emphasizing decision-making and critical analytical skills that equip students for leadership positions on major fleet and joint staffs, as well as for future command positions. Similar focus differentials are found in courses offered by the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department and the Strategy and Policy (S&P) Department. In this manner, the relative seniority of students determines the nature of the curricula they will pursue, creating a better match between their studies and their future needs. The S&P Department at the senior level provides an in-depth examination of sea power and maritime strategy that is not duplicated anywhere else in higher education. At the heart of both curricula is the fundamental goal of helping students learn to think critically about strategic problems, understand the joint world, comprehend the emerging security environment, and deal effectively with surprise.

- **Flexible and agile:** Our world-class faculty, who take understandable pride in their intellectual ownership of the courses they develop and teach, spend a significant portion of their time analyzing the constant changes that occur in the national security environment. In many cases they actively participate
in the strategic dialogues that occur on the national scene. They continually reshape the core curricula and the various elective courses and research programs to reflect the changing domains in which our graduates will operate. Today’s NSA course brings a new set of sessions with accomplished practitioners, a renewed focus on force planning, and practical exercises on such subjects as the Combatant Commander’s Integrated Priority Lists. In S&P, the traditional case studies of past wars have been joined by detailed case studies on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, keeping the course as current as tomorrow’s headlines. In S&P they continue to look back to look forward.

• Relevant to the needs of future leaders: In response to the guidance provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his white paper “America’s Military: A Profession of Arms” and the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations in his “Navy Education Strategy” and “Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy,” Naval War College courses now include increased coverage of cyber issues, the interagency process, nuclear strategy, deterrence, economic theory, unmanned systems, civil-military relations, and the ethics of leadership. Our response to the nation’s widely reported “rebalancing toward Asia” is evident in exercise scenarios, elective course offerings, and the work of research groups such as the Asia-Pacific Study Group. In reality, however, the College’s Asia-Pacific expertise has been steadily growing since 2006, when appropriate hires were made to staff the College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and to meet other objectives.

Today’s Naval War College is often called the “Navy’s Home of Thought,” and we strive tirelessly to accomplish our mission of helping to create the strategically minded critical thinkers that our country and our allies will need in the years ahead. While much of what I have said in this column has focused on what we do “inside the schoolhouse,” in future issues I will talk about some of the many ways in which the College reaches directly to the fleet through our Distance Education programs; our efforts to assist the Chief of Naval Operations in creating the Navy Leader Development Strategy (which defines the ways, means, and ends of a career-long Leader Development Continuum); and our robust and relevant research and gaming activities. This is an exciting place, and these are challenging times. I look forward to sharing with you—decision makers, opinion leaders, and proven operators—what your Naval War College is doing for you and for America.

TED “SLAPSHOT” CARTER

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
Professor Rubel is Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. Before retiring from the U.S. Navy in the grade of captain, he was an aviator, participating in operations connected with the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the TWA Flight 847 crisis, and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 and served as the inspector general of U.S. Southern Command. He attended the Spanish Naval War College and the U.S. Naval War College, where he served on the faculty and as chairman of the War Gaming Department, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, before his present appointment. He has a BS degree from the University of Illinois; an MS in management from Salve Regina University, in Newport, Rhode Island; and an MA in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College (1986).
In 1954, the noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published a seminal article entitled “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.” In it he sought to articulate the connection between the geopolitical conditions of the time and the need for and functions of the U.S. Navy. His concern was as follows: “If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.”

Huntington felt impelled to write because the Navy of 1954 was facing a quandary arising from its own success in World War II. The service faced similar quandaries in 1979, in the post-Vietnam national “malaise” of the late 1970s; in 1992, in the wake of the Cold War; and again in 2004–2006, as major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq devolved into extended insurgencies. In each case the Navy had to reassess its purpose and missions and articulate a “strategic concept.” In 2013 another quandary is forming, this time in an era of economic downturn, emerging peer competition, massive government debt, ballooning cost of all things needed to maintain a navy, and a world of bewildering complexity and change. The Navy’s existing strategic concept, codified in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” is barely six years old, but the issues just mentioned have arisen or intensified since that concept was crafted. The Navy faces, as it has in the past, an era of austerity following a period of extensive use and generous budgets, and once again a fundamental reassessment of its purpose is in order, as well as the articulation of a new strategic concept. This process is made all the harder by the ambiguous vector of geopolitical conditions. This article will
attempt to establish a basis for such a reassessment and provide a vocabulary that could be useful in crafting a new strategic concept.

Huntington’s notion of the Navy’s strategic concept at the time he wrote reflected a new and unprecedented focus on projecting power ashore, in “that decisive strip of littoral encircling the Eurasian continent.” The reason the Navy would do this, Huntington argued, was simply that the United States—a maritime power—was engaged in a global struggle with a continental power. Since American command of the seas was a given, it stood to reason that the Navy’s mission would be to project U.S. power inland. This explanation was limited; the brute fact of the threat from the Soviet Union sufficed to justify the instrumentality of power projection ashore. The fall of the Soviet Union removed this justification, and the Navy then found itself in a quandary a bit like the one after World War II that had prompted Huntington’s article. However, national prosperity, the high prestige of the armed forces generated by the successful Gulf War in 1991, and a series of peripheral crises served to maintain public support for a relatively large navy.

Today, however, a financial crisis combines with political gridlock and spiraling costs to produce a situation in which the Navy will have to dig deeper to explain why the American public should invest scarce resources in it. A viable strategic concept will have to be constructed on a more profound understanding of the connection between U.S. policy and naval instrumentalities.

The Constitution of the United States directs Congress to “provide and maintain a navy,” whereas its language regarding an army is “raise and support.” The obvious inference is that land forces are to be created as needed to meet emergencies but a navy is to be maintained in peacetime as well as war. This logic with respect to land forces has long been eclipsed by geopolitical and technological circumstances, the structural requirements for an army dictating that a robust cadre be maintained in continuous readiness. However, its essence may reassert itself as budgets tighten. The naval logic, however, is as germane now as it was in 1789. The Constitution’s wording implies that the Navy is needed to perform some essential function for the Republic in both war and peace, thus justifying its expense in peacetime.

That essential function and its underlying logic can be expressed by a simple syllogism: if what happens overseas affects what happens here in North America, then the United States needs to have a voice and influence in overseas affairs. “Voice” here means the nation’s ability to make itself heard in international forums of various kinds, as well as credibility, based on the perceived legitimacy of significant recapitalization, but it is not clear what the justification should be, what direction it should take, and what the deployment posture ought to become.
of the country, of the pronouncements and policies of national leaders. “Influence” is the effect of power—that others must take the United States into account whether they wish to or not. A corollary to this syllogism (perhaps reflecting a realist tilt) is that voice and influence both require some form of power and instrumentality to back them up if they are to have effect. The Navy (along with the Marine Corps) is envisioned by the Constitution as the source of that power and instrumentality on a day-to-day basis.

Three major caveats to this argument must be stated up front. First, it is admitted that the fundamental nature of a navy is to fight and win, by defeating adversary navies, protecting friendly shipping, interdicting enemy shipping, directly bombarding the enemy targets ashore, delivering Marines and the Army to where they need to be used, and supporting them while they are there. This point should not require explicit expression, but there are those who need such reassurance. Even so, however, this fundamental purpose must be seen in the context of the wider strategic landscape; war winning is a lens that can block out critical factors that better peripheral vision might detect. Admiral Michael Mullen, calling (as Chief of Naval Operations) for the development of a new maritime strategy, said, “So I am here to challenge you. First, to rid yourselves of the old notion—held by so many for so long—that maritime strategy exists solely to fight and win wars at sea, and the rest will take care of itself.”

For much of its history, the Navy was not in fact built to win wars; it was built to fight and win certain engagements that might prove crucial in an overall strategy, such as in the War of 1812, or to have a chance of prevailing in certain defined circumstances, as from the 1890s through the start of World War II. Since 1944, however, American naval officers have been so conditioned by U.S. Navy dominance that it is almost impossible for them to think in any terms other than war winning.

The second caveat is that voice and influence are not precision instruments. Rare indeed is the national leadership that can craft elegant maneuvers to convey closely nuanced messages that will be correctly interpreted by their intended recipients. Military force is mostly a blunt weapon, with collateral effects almost impossible to predict. As one example, the 1996 dispatch of two American aircraft carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan in response to missile firings by the People’s Republic of China had the unintended side effect of stimulating a Chinese military buildup. Building a navy and creating a deployment pattern for it create a context in which statesmanship can be exercised, for good or for ill. However, without a navy it is clear that strategic options are far more limited.

The third caveat involves the totality of the American military establishment. Obviously, given the global reach and presence of all the U.S. military services, the Navy and Marine Corps are collectively but one piece in a much larger pattern. However, the use of the seas and the projection of power from the seas are
strategic issues predominantly associated with those two services—especially in peacetime—and the implications for the creation and conveyance of American voice and influence overseas are sufficiently compelling to warrant an (almost) exclusive focus on them in this article.

An assertion that the Navy’s fundamental purpose is to provide the basis for American voice and influence overseas, though it would be a logical foundation for thought, is not sufficiently specific to offer utility in particular geopolitical circumstances. Huntington attempts to add context via a historical analysis of the geopolitical phases of American history, based on successive geographic foci of U.S. grand strategy. Starting with what he terms the “continental phase,” Huntington traces the expanding locus of U.S. security interests into the “oceanic phase” and finally, after World War II, to the “transoceanic phase.” While his categorization is accurate and useful for his own purposes, for this discussion a different perspective is needed. On the basis of the syllogism above, the criterion for categorization for our purposes is how the Navy has provided for American voice and influence overseas.

THE HAMILTONIAN ERA
Alexander Hamilton was an early proponent of a navy. Writing from the perspective of the commercial interests in New England, Hamilton laid out in one of his Federalist Papers the instrumentality the navy would afford: “A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us . . . would arise from the establishment of a navy.” A navy of sufficient size and power would, if committed on the side of one external power or another in a war in the West Indies, constitute the margin of victory: “It will be readily perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.”

Here is a clear articulation of a navy’s instrumental logic. Hamilton’s scenario did not actually transpire in that century, but it reflects a clear understanding that the imperial competition among European powers would affect American commercial prospects and American naval deployments even in the Western Hemisphere could generate influence in Europe.

In the event, American naval instrumentality was manifested in operations against the Barbary pirates and in commerce raiding against the British in the War of 1812. American naval power in the early part of the Hamiltonian Era was elemental, represented principally by highly capable frigates, several of whose victories against Royal Navy adversaries discomfited British public opinion. Later on, the effectiveness—at least a creditable attempt at effectiveness—of the
Union blockade of the Confederacy was a factor in keeping Britain, and thus the other European powers, from recognizing or directly aiding the South. Moreover, Admiral David Farragut’s amphibious capture of New Orleans stemmed the Confederate export of cotton, thus scuttling a Southern scheme to finance the war via cotton-secured bonds in Europe. Some regard this seizure, rather than the battle of Gettysburg or the capture of Vicksburg, as the turning point of the Civil War, as it kept the powerful Rothschild banking conglomerate on the sidelines, not financing the Confederacy as it had Great Britain in the Napoleonic Wars.

The general strategic concept, explicit or not, of the Hamiltonian Era, which extended up to the Spanish-American War, involved deployment of the nation’s limited naval power, principally within the Western Hemisphere, to influence events in Europe, as well as a series of discrete naval expeditions to protect and support, in various ways, American commercial interests.

THE MAHANIAN ERA

A combination of ingredients served to change the American formula for the application of seapower to influence events overseas. The seeds were sown by the publication in 1890 of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783* by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Becoming an international best seller, this book provided the intellectual underpinning for the establishment of a powerful blue-water fleet. The Spanish-American War yielded possessions in Asia that would create direct vested interests for the United States overseas. Now the nation needed significant naval power to protect its possessions and to deter great-power threats to its expanding geopolitical interests. The residual concept of the Hamiltonian Era, neutrality, was eradicated by the sinking of *Lusitania*. In 1917–18 the United States directly used its naval power, sending it forward to help redress the balance of power in Europe. After World War I the nation found itself possessing a navy “second to none” and sought to take advantage of this naval power to back up its voice and influence in international forums. According to a prominent naval historian, “Still it was naval capacity, the force of the fleet, that [President Woodrow] Wilson intended to put in his service. On that strength Wilson wanted to establish an international order that would lead to the limitation of arms.” Further, “the Navy was part of Wilson's semicoercive diplomacy, its ships stakes on the negotiating table.”

In the Mahanian Era, command of the sea became an element of American naval instrumentality, reaching its apotheosis in World War II. Command of the sea was the precursor of America’s ability to bring its industrial might to bear against the Axis powers. The United States, via command of the sea, became the arbiter of Europe—and, to a degree, of other regions—not by constituting the potential margin of superiority for a European power but directly through its own military
might. In this context, the United States, seeking to avert another world war, brok-ered the Bretton Woods accords, which set the conditions for globalization. The oceans of the world were now a vast maneuver space for the U.S. Navy. As with the transition between the Hamiltonian and Mahanian Eras, naval success in one era created the conditions for an altered application of U.S. voice and influence, and with those new conditions, a new era.

THE HUNTINGTON ERA
An extensive analysis in 1988 of the connection between command of the sea and overall national power from the dawn of the age of European empire to the last years of the Soviet Union found that such command allowed the ascendant nation to enforce the rules of an international order it found congenial to its interests. Using naval power either directly or to move its army, the principal power could deter conflict, support allies against local threats, or keep major external powers at bay. This was the role of the United States during the Cold War. Competition and threat from the Soviet Union, a continental power, led to a new formulation of the Navy’s overseas instrumentality. It was now to ring the Eurasian littoral with naval power that could extend its reach inland to prevent Soviet domination of what Nicholas Spykman had in 1944 called the “rimlands”—areas on the edges of the “World Island” marked by both political instability and strategic significance. American naval forces were kept busy conducting naval diplomacy to suppress or limit regional conflict and supporting wars in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere to contain Soviet strategic probes.

American naval forces were also used to help glue together anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese alliances, as well as to enforce the new Free World order. American aircraft carriers, especially, were used as geopolitical chess pieces to deliver messages of both threat and reassurance. The motivator of this approach to overseas voice and influence was bipolarity—the maritime United States and its allies and clients were facing a hostile continental Soviet Union and its clients. The site of decision in this struggle would be the rimlands of Eurasia, so power projection, both in its threat and in its application, was the naval instrumentality. In 1954 the outcome of this struggle was not foreseeable, except perhaps to George Kennan; nonetheless, the very success of this naval instrumentality, manifested perhaps most compellingly in the 1980s Maritime Strategy, led to its eclipse when the Soviet Union collapsed.

THE SYSTEMIC ERA
In the aftermath of the Cold War, American naval posture operated on momentum. Naval patrols on the Eurasian periphery continued, and there certainly were
enough residual conflicts and potential hot spots, such as Korea and Iran, to draw naval forces forward, not to mention a series of crises and minor operations, such as Somalia and Kosovo. However, the logic of the Huntington Era’s naval instrumentality had evaporated and with it the justification for a “six-hundred-ship navy.” The United States was even more ascendant than after World War II, and the basic logic of enforcing the rules of the international order remained. However, with the threat level so low, it was natural that the instantiation of American voice and influence would evolve.

In laying out his concept of the “culminating point of victory,” the Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz admonishes us that any victorious campaign, however decisive, must sooner or later go over to some kind of defense; in fact, the concept of “victory” itself must be defended. In the post–Cold War era naval forces switched to performing what might be termed “constabulary” duties, essentially providing general security so that the victory of democracy could be defended, all the while basing their planning and programming on a set of potential contingencies with “rogue” states, principally North Korea and Iran. In this era the focus of U.S. influence shifted even more landward, to the extent that the Navy itself regarded its own function as being the support of land forces. This orientation was manifest in the course of three land wars in the Middle East: Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Even the orientation of the American Unified Command Plan shifted to accommodate better this continental focus; Army-style area-of-responsibility boundaries increasingly sectioned off the oceans until they became essentially communications zones between the United States and forward, Eurasia-facing combatant commanders.

As this era wore on, the Navy became increasingly concerned that it had lost its way, in terms of a strategic concept that would provide not only a utility argument but also a guide to the service’s functioning. This sense became especially compelling after the 9/11 attacks as the Navy and Coast Guard struggled to conceptualize and establish a strategy for securing the homeland against future terrorist attacks that might be mounted from the sea. There were nowhere near enough ships in both services combined to establish effective patrols of the American coastline. Moreover, the Navy instinct, born of over two hundred years of focusing on influencing events overseas, did not want to tie its forces to the North American littoral. The answer to this quandary emerged in stages. First came the recognition that the United States did not have the wherewithal to secure its sea approaches unilaterally. Effective defense had to start overseas, with intelligence and cueing. These in turn would require the cooperation of as many foreign navies, coast guards, and other agencies as possible. That consideration led to the notion of a global maritime partnership, but political conditions obviated an extension of
existing alliances or the creation of new ones. The answer was found in the crafting of a new maritime strategy document that articulated a universal maritime mission—defense of the global system of commerce and security.¹⁹

Such a codification, while new in itself, actually described a state of affairs that had existed since the fall of the Soviet Union. With no major geopolitical competition to fragment the world, the Western liberal trading system had gone global, progressively intensifying economic interdependencies. Any economic system requires security to function, and the United States became the key provider of that systemic security. The Navy became a kind of global public-safety organization, a role reflected in its recruiting advertisement slogan “A Global Force for Good.”²⁰ The strategic judgment now reached was that the nation benefited substantially from the proper operation of the global system of trade and so should act to protect that system insofar as it is able.

In this post–Cold War, globalized world, U.S. voice and influence are so pervasive and transmitted through so many channels that it is difficult to distinguish which elements are dependent on naval power or presence and which are not. Moreover, in a stable, globalized world, what does not happen is as important as what does, and, of course, it is not possible in most cases to link positive instrumentalities with potentialities that do not occur. Such imponderables made the development of the current maritime strategy in significant measure a faith-based exercise; the Navy’s being forward was judged, as an article of faith among the admirals, in the absence of any concrete evidence, to be critical to national interests, and thus the option of bringing the fleet home was rejected out of hand.²¹

From a purely physical standpoint, the ready availability of U.S. naval forces overseas during this era has been repeatedly useful, in episodes ranging from the initial response by two aircraft carriers to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait to the rapidly staged relief efforts during the aftermaths of tsunamis in Indonesia and Japan. Responsiveness as an underpinning to voice and influence has a certain inherent value, not least in that it coheres nicely with the contingent nature of statesmanship. James Cable captured this notion in his concept of “catalytic force”:

However, a force is often deployed for vaguer purposes. A situation arises pregnant with a formless menace or offering obscure opportunities. Something, it is felt, is going to happen, something that somehow might have been prevented if force were available at the critical point. Advantages, their nature and the manner of their achievement still undetermined, might be reaped by those able to put immediate and appropriate power behind their sickle.²²

If we regard the United States as a status quo power—that is, as satisfied with its status in the international system and as seeking to maintain the structure of
the system and day-to-day stability—then in an inherently unstable world, it is precisely for the reasons articulated by Cable that naval force is now continuously deployed forward, even though he was talking about the episodic use of limited naval force in peacetime. Influence, as defined here, is thus both continuous and contingent.

Voice, in the present sense, is, if not the flip side of influence, at least a corollary of it, with a somewhat different dynamic. Edward Luttwak, in his discussion of “suasion,” notes that suasion has a supportive side, as when U.S. naval forces are deployed to reassure allies that might be under threat by other powers.23 There is, however, another facet of suasion that Luttwak, from his vantage point in the Cold War, could not clearly discern—what we today call “engagement.” Beyond disaster relief or humanitarian assistance rendered by hospital ships, routine engagement involves conducting exercises to enhance the training of other navies, building the capacity of embryonic navies by providing equipment and training, and generally getting other nations and their navies comfortable, via routine interactions, with collaborating with the United States. The theory is that such interactions improve the chances that critical information will be exchanged at critical moments and that support, both political and military, will be forthcoming in the event of a crisis. Unlike deployment for influence, which is contingent in nature, deployment for voice is a structured investment in the future. As such, it involves both costs and risks, as would any investment in the business world. Naval deployment strategy would be better conceived on that basis.

Superimposed on the Systemic Era was what some termed the “global war on terror.” The Navy’s attempt to execute its 2007 Cooperative Strategy was essentially overlaid by Navy–Marine Corps support for major land operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The nation’s apparent success in its fight against Al Qaeda and the strategic and financial overextension brought about by those two extended land wars in the Middle East have produced another quandary for the Navy. This latest quandary is exacerbated by the spiraling cost of anything required to maintain a navy. Having used up a good portion of the service lives of many of its ships and aircraft, the Navy is in need of significant recapitalization, but it is not clear what the justification should be, what direction the reconstitution should take, and what the Navy’s deployment posture ought to become. The answers to these questions depend in significant degree on whether the world is transitioning to a post-systemic era or not.

A POST-SYSTEMIC NAVY?
Globalization—the increasing economic interdependency of nations and regions—has been both a boon and a curse, depending on whom one asks. Over
the course of the Systemic Era the global gross domestic product has risen, and millions of people have been lifted out of poverty. On the other hand, shifting economic geography has taken jobs away from many, disrupted traditional cultures, and created new vulnerabilities. Either way, globalization has been regarded as an “objective tendency” that nations cannot avoid. In that context, U.S. voice and influence, based on the nation’s status as the world’s leading economy and a key proponent of the Bretton Woods–based world order and aided and abetted by its seapower, would seek to be inclusive. Thus it is no accident that the current national maritime strategy document focuses on cooperation. However, indications are emerging that globalization may have run its course and that a backlash is forming. If the world steps back from globalization, how does the requirement for American voice and influence overseas change, and how would that affect the size, structure, and deployment patterns of the U.S. Navy?

Before considering how the United States would adapt to a post-globalized world, we should recognize that since the country has generally benefited from the global system that is in place, it will no doubt do what it can to maintain that international political and economic order. Fully recognizing the “rise of the rest” in terms of economic and political power, the United States is attempting to socialize rising powers and convince them that their interests are served by playing by the rules. How does the maritime element of national power serve this purpose? The answer currently on the books is to engage as extensively and intensively and with as many nations as possible, not only to enlarge and perpetuate a global maritime partnership aimed at securing the seas against terrorists and criminals but also to form a political consensus based on habitual cooperation. Under the rubric of what is termed “forward partnering,” the purpose of forward deployment would be to “enable” partners to help the United States maintain global stability.

Such a strategy suggests frequent and repeated interactions with as many navies as possible. This approach would appear to be a very stressing one for the Navy, but relief is to be found in several ways. First, this kind of interaction can be effectively carried out in most cases with small vessels or even via direct personnel interchanges, such as workshops, war games, instruction, command-post exercises, and the like. Second, like-minded navies might be recruited for the purpose, lessening the burden on the U.S. Navy.

On the forcible side, it would not be in the U.S. interest to give certain nations the impression that they can rewrite the rules, either globally or regionally.

The Constitution . . . implies that the Navy is needed to perform some essential function for the Republic in both war and peace, thus justifying its expense in peacetime.
Deterrence is always a problematic concept, but there is a term in the current maritime strategy that might offer some assistance—“credible combat power.”

The term itself is vague, but some parsing can help. Credibility consists of two parts. The first is the “usability” of the power—that is, whether the political costs and risks of actually using it are sufficiently low to make an American president likely, in a given set of circumstances, to say go. The second aspect of credibility is effectiveness: If used, would the combat power actually disrupt the plans and objectives of the aggressor? The first element of credibility is certainly on the side of naval and airpower; the United States has a strong track record of applying liberal doses of each, even in rather minor crises. Perhaps the apotheosis of usability is the drone aircraft, whose presence in the skies above suspected terrorist hangouts is now almost taken for granted. Precision weapons that reduce collateral damage also factor into the usability equation. In addition, barring some future mission failure, the use of special forces seems to be on the rise. At the high end of deterrence, nuclear weapons, by virtue of their very unusability, contribute to the overall environment of deterrence; at the low end, the opposite is the case.

If air- and seapower are highly usable, what about their effectiveness? Effectiveness breaks down again into two sub-elements: ability to penetrate defenses and the ability, having penetrated them, to do something strategically useful. To be clear—we are talking about bombardment, but not just striking targets ashore via aircraft and missiles. We must also consider the destruction of naval forces and naval infrastructure. The requirement in the first instance is to prevent an aggressor from attaining some military fait accompli that would be hard to reverse. This, of course, is the basic military task that U.S. forces have used as a basis for major contingency planning since the 1950s. The difference in this new age of austere budgets is that the task must be accomplished without the use of major overseas infrastructure or even massive industrial backup at home. Precision (along with its vital handmaiden, targeting) can make up some of this deficit, but the rest must be derived from the ability to reduce losses to enemy defenses. With a limited stockpile of weapons, what is fired must get through and must have effect. Given the increasing sophistication of defenses and the growing expensiveness (and thus smaller numbers) of traditional strike platforms, such as tactical aircraft, the answer to this problem will increasingly involve new kinds of missiles and other unmanned systems. If the Navy, along with the other services, can evolve to a predominantly missile-based, aggression-disruption posture, U.S. influence may be manifested in the inability or unwillingness of dissatisfied powers to try to overturn the international order, either regionally or globally, via military means.

The alternative to bombardment is represented by boots on the ground. The Marine Corps is currently attempting to “get back to its amphibious roots” by
reembarking more units on amphibious ships. In past eras the Marines have been eminently usable and effective when committed, but certain events, such as the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing, have heralded a new, more constricted operating environment for amphibious operations. The ability to hide powerful, precision weapons will make it ever more difficult to declare given littoral areas safe for amphibious operations. Opponents will adopt a “sniping” approach, attempting, as in 1983, to inflict sufficient casualties to unhinge U.S. policy. It is not at all clear at this point what role the Marine Corps will play in providing credible combat power to underpin U.S. voice and influence, but there are strong national incentives to have an alternative to bombardment in order to back up policy. An ability to insert, support, and extract Marines from greater distances and an operational doctrine that emphasizes raiding constitute two potentially useful directions.

Of course, the current system may deteriorate, and power shifts may occur without military action. The most recent National Intelligence Council report on global trends suggests four illustrative future scenarios, three of which illustrate such shifts in one way or another. If China, for example, were somehow able to persuade its maritime neighbors to become tributary clients, or the Shanghai Cooperative Organization were to become more effective, Beijing might be able to establish a mercantilist economic regime in Eurasia. Perhaps the Arab Spring will translate into a pan-nationalist Islamic “caliphate” that is able to adopt some kind of exclusive trade zone, and an increasingly xenophobic Europe might follow. The United States, for its part, might attempt to establish its own exclusionary trade consortium among nations excluded from other blocs. The “BRICS”—the emerging national economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—may establish some kind of noncontiguous, alternative system. In a world where any such development had occurred, power would talk. Major conventional warfare in Eurasia might be off the table (nuclear proliferation would likely be a feature of such a world), but trade-bloc competition in resource zones could lead to peripheral or surrogate wars.

The security of shipping and maritime infrastructure would become an issue. American voice and influence would be critical in providing assurances for the nation’s constituents and for limiting the depredations of hostile or competitive trade blocs, the objective being to limit systemic deterioration by keeping as many nations as possible within the U.S. sphere of influence. The ability to secure or disrupt oceanic movements becomes critical in such a world, and the Navy would have to “follow the trade,” much as it did in the early nineteenth century. The fleet would have to disperse widely to secure friendly shipping and protect maritime infrastructure, such as oil platforms, undersea cables, fisheries, etc.
Moreover, power-projection missions would likely be in places where, like Africa, trade-bloc influence could produce surrogate conflict. The system could also deteriorate in a more atomistic manner, with formerly democratic governments yielding to more authoritarian regimes, be they religious or secular. Corruption in and among such regimes could produce more in the way of transnational crime. Here again, the “system,” as the United States conceives it, might contract to a group of countries that are able to maintain the democratic form and are willing to play by the established rule set. In this world, U.S. voice and influence would be a necessary “glue” to hold the residual system together. The Navy’s role would be more similar (in comparison to the bloc-competition world) to the one it currently plays in the Systemic Era—that of a global public-safety force that limits the damage transnational crime and terrorism can do, performs deterrence at certain key points, and conducts wide engagement with friendly nations, providing some form of security umbrella if they have disruptive, authoritarian neighbors. Unlike in the Huntington era, the locus of naval deployment would not be necessarily on the rim of Eurasia. One can easily imagine the need in such a world for at least episodic naval force in the Caribbean, the coasts of Africa, and perhaps the Mediterranean.

**VOICE, INFLUENCE, CONCENTRATION, AND DISPERsal**

A nation’s seapower can be thought of as the net vector of its policies, its overall economic and military strength relative to other nations, its geographic position and conformation, and the character of its naval forces. The size, composition, deployment pattern, and reputation of a nation’s navy constitute collectively a geopolitical terrain feature that other nations must take into account as they develop their policies. This is one way in which the nation’s voice and influence can be made manifest, one reflected in the reasoning of Alexander Hamilton—a form of strategic body language. In addition, voice and influence are made more explicit in patterns of deployment and responses to specific situations. The vernacular of this latter mode of strategic communication is contained in the modality of fleet concentration and dispersal. In all naval eras we have examined except for the Mahanian Era, wide strategic dispersal of the American navy has been the norm. This consistent pattern reflects America’s sense of itself as a nation with a mission and thus a duty to fight tyranny and to promote freedom and free trade, in the contexts of the various geopolitical circumstances that have emerged over the past two and a quarter centuries. Dispersal—presence in many places at once—carries with it several implicit messages. First, it reinforces the notion that the U.S. Navy fears no opponent. Dispersal implies command of the sea, which, rightly considered, is a strength relationship among navies.
Command allows the dominant navy to disperse to exercise control in specific situations and to conduct naval diplomacy as it sees fit.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, wide and persistent forward presence conditions the world to American involvement in regional affairs and confers a degree of legitimacy on claims of leadership. These messages are only reinforced and intensified when U.S. naval forces are called on to render disaster relief or other peacetime assistance.

In all three of the future scenarios we have examined—a continued systemic world, a trade-bloc world, and a world of creeping authoritarianism and chaos—U.S. voice and influence are transmitted in key ways by the forward and dispersed operations of its sea services. The specifics of deployment patterns may change, but the American navy must be forward at numerous places to provide the voice and influence the nation requires to carry out policies that are consistent with the nature of its society and economy. Dispersed operations at the strategic level involve increasing risk as potential competitors develop their own navies; an adversary might be able to achieve relative concentration at a particular point and defeat our force. This situation was encountered in the eastern Mediterranean during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The Soviet 5th Eskadra swelled to ninety-six ships and, armed with antiship missiles, outgunned in a significant way the sixty-three ships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.\textsuperscript{34} The episode occurring as it did in the context of a larger nuclear standoff, actual combat did not take place, so the potential results can only be guessed at. But it is conceivable that the U.S. Navy would have suffered significant losses if not outright defeat, with incalculable strategic effects, not the least of which would have been loss of American voice and influence.

The lesson is that strategic naval dispersal in a post-systemic era requires that individual forces have the ability to fight successfully for local sea control in modern technological conditions and that widely dispersed groups be able to aggregate quickly enough to create local superiority. The perceived ability to prevail in local fights for sea control will be a keystone of the U.S. Navy’s ability to transmit American voice and influence overseas in both a systemic and post-systemic world, and it may constitute a significant factor in avoiding a global slide from the former to the latter.

**CAPITAL SHIPS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

From the galleasses that turned the tide at the battle of Lepanto to the modern-day Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, capital ships have possessed characteristics that have imbued them with potent geopolitical meaning: they pack a lot of power into one hull; they are big and expensive, and thus nations can afford relatively few of them. They thus represent both commitment and risk. When a nation commits its capital ships to battle it is rolling the strategic dice—risking all to
win all. When capital ships are dispatched on missions of gunboat diplomacy, the nation is signaling intense interest. The American aircraft carrier as a type has been referred to as iconic, signifying its size and power and its history of victory in battle. Presidents have moved carrier strike groups around the oceans like queens on a chessboard, seeking to checkmate potential aggressors before they have a chance to make their moves. How much of the effect of carriers is based on a rational calculation of their actual combat power and how much on their reputation is largely imponderable, but it stands to reason that if one were put out of action by a mine, torpedo, or missile, not only would its actual combat power be neutralized in the specific situation, but the reputation of the class would be diminished. People who were supposed to fear them would be less afraid.

Navies of the world have faced a David-and-Goliath dilemma at least since the invention of the self-propelled torpedo in the late nineteenth century. The torpedo, an undersea cruise missile capable of being launched today from either submarines or small surface craft, can bring down the most powerful capital ship. In fact, in World War II a number of U.S. aircraft carriers were put out of action by Japanese torpedoes. In the current era, nuclear-powered submarines and advanced torpedoes exacerbate the problem significantly. The antiship cruise missile, as an airborne analogue to the torpedo, has the same operational implications—it makes small ships capable of challenging and even defeating large ones. Evolving technologies permit these weapons to be stowed in shipping containers or otherwise hidden, creating the problem that any vessel could be an existential threat to a capital ship. The danger is that if the U.S. Navy ties up its credible strategic-communication capability in a small number of nuclear aircraft carriers, that capability will catastrophically evaporate if one is defeated by a salvo of cruise missiles or torpedoes. In a similar vein, newly developed land-launched, long-range antiship ballistic missiles and their cousins, coastal-defense cruise missiles, could create wide oceanic zones where capital ships cannot be operated at an acceptable degree of risk. The stakes would be, if anything, higher in a post-systemic world.

The key question is thus whether American voice and influence can be transmitted in ways other than through the movements of its capital ships, the large aircraft carriers. On the face of it, there is no available answer, not only because of the many imponderables associated with deterrence and coercion but also because historical evidence is scant. While it is true that over the ages relatively small naval units have been effective at conducting gunboat diplomacy, in most cases they were the most powerful military forces on the scene. Nevertheless, as symbols of national interest, smaller units can deliver meaning if the recipients of the message are convinced that more military power will emerge over the horizon, sent by ironclad national will.
This brings us back to the discussion of credible combat power. Assuming the dispatch of a missile-armed surface ship (or a force of several) instead of an aircraft carrier, its offensive punch must be seen as roughly equivalent to what a carrier might deliver. This equivalence is problematic on a number of counts. The “warheads” of a carrier are bombs, smart though they may be, with the tactical aircraft constituting a reusable first stage. The carrier is thought—correctly—to carry many of these. Thus it can persist in dropping bombs over time, perhaps indefinitely. Missiles, on the other hand, are always in limited supply, so once any are fired, a certain useful indeterminacy of threat is lost: “If we can survive the first salvo, perhaps they will run out of ammo.” However, balancing that shortcoming is the advantage missiles have in overall usability—defenses are less likely to stop them or to score a lucky hit that yields an American prisoner of war.

The issue boils down to risk: Are the potential consequences of being put out of action balanced by the importance of the mission and the presumed effect of the capital ship? In the Systemic Era the answer to that question would be easy; there is no appreciable threat. In a postulated post-systemic era, however, serious consideration must be given to the trade-off. Beyond the immediate operational circumstances, American voice and influence, as transmitted via the Navy, will be at stake.

The image of an eleven-hundred-foot-long, hundred-thousand-ton aircraft carrier is laden with meaning for potential adversaries, allies, and the American public. In this huge, impressive package, the reputation of the U.S. Navy and the political will and economic power of the United States are embodied and communicated to the world. But in an age of austerity, the issue of whether these ships are appropriate investments becomes increasingly compelling. There are a number of reasons for the U.S. Navy to shift away from these capital ships to a more dispersed, resilient, and affordable array of missile-carrying vessels. However, no such move can be made on the basis of tactical efficacy alone; there must be a viable logic that illustrates how the movements and positioning of such forces adequately convey American voice and influence overseas. It must be noted, however, that a positive logic of influence by missile might be less compelling in motivating institutional change than a negative logic of carrier vulnerability.

BEING ALMOST EVERYWHERE
Despite its continental extent, the United States is functionally an island and has quite naturally adopted a maritime-oriented grand strategy throughout most of its history. That is, the Republic has never been truly isolated in the manner of Eurasian continental powers. Even from the beginning, it was inextricably connected to the goings-on in Europe and Asia. As a relatively weak trading power, it sought such leverage as it could through deployments of its navy in the Western
Hemisphere and in small, episodic expeditions to secure its trade. As its power and interests grew, it used the instrumentality of an increasingly strong navy to gain a voice in the international forums of the day. In Huntington’s “transoceanic” era, the U.S. Navy helped glue together the various alliances that kept the Soviet Union at bay. In the post–Cold War Systemic Era the United States consolidated its legitimacy and defended the victory of democracy by making its navy available to do various kinds of good works, ranging from helping stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo to assisting victims of tsunamis in Indonesia and Japan, not to mention supporting two ground wars in the Middle East.

2013 . . . an era of economic downturn, emerging peer competition, massive government debt, ballooning cost of all things needed to maintain a navy, and . . . bewildering complexity and change.

The United States is also unique among nations in that it feels a sense of mission in the world, and that mission requires broadly recognized legitimacy as a role model and as a leader. Such legitimacy must be underpinned by the capability to take action when and where needed to confront tyranny and aggression and to assist those in need. The sea services deliver that capability on a global scale. Over its history, the United States has utilized naval forces to create legitimacy in a number of ways: in the Hamiltonian Era, via leverage exercised by relatively weak naval forces; in the Mahanian Era, via the power to vie for command of the sea; in the Huntington Era, via power-projection capability; and in the Systemic Era, by the ability to be almost everywhere, helping. Assuming the national sense of mission endures, the sea services’ strategic concepts, as well as their patterns of deployment, will be so conditioned.

However, in a postulated post-systemic era of austerity and potential retrenchment coincident with the rise of new powers, the role of the Navy in helping maintain American influence could change significantly. In a sense, and depending on the vector of global affairs, its role may revert to one described by Huntington—that of a force operating forward to hold together alliances oriented toward counteracting threats from authoritarian competitors. The locus of deployment might change, and the relative importance of positive actions to maintain overall command of the sea and the ability to exercise local sea control will likely be higher than in the Cold War. In any case, there seems to be no suitable strategic deployment option that involves keeping the nation’s sea services in home waters; the nation’s character and its role in the world require that its naval forces be forward to the extent feasible, though their exact disposition and composition will be a function of technology, threat, and cost. A post-systemic navy will have to be ready to fight its way into strategically significant waters and then fight to stay there. It will have to go where a shifting array of threats dictate,
and unlike the deployment structure of the current maritime strategy, there may be no stable set of areas that serve as focal points.

Huntington wrote his article several years into the transoceanic phase he codified, so the parameters of that era’s naval mission set were more or less clear. At this writing, while there are indicators of a slide toward a post-systemic world, no such clarity is available in terms of where the Navy should deploy, for what purpose, and with what capabilities. However, simply defining the problem in terms of bringing American voice and influence to bear overseas helps establish a set of criteria and a vocabulary for evaluating events as they unfold, thereby helping planners and decision makers anticipate, and even influence, the turn of events.

NOTES


21. The author directed the Naval War College research and gaming project that developed options and concepts for what became “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” and personally witnessed the rejection of a “surge option” by a panel of three-star flag officers.


25. The 2008 financial collapse, along with emerging factors like 3D printing and North American shale oil and gas finds, point to an altered economic geography that may feature increased economic insularity. A number of commentators have observed such trends. See, for example, David Francis, “Is This the End of Globalization?,” *Fiscal Times*, 28 February 2013; Pankaj Mishra, “The Dead End of Globalisation Looms before Our Youth,” *Guardian*, 25 August 2011; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Which Globalisation Will Survive?,” *World Finance*, 4 January 2012.


27. For a typical current analysis of Navy deployment stresses, see Kristina Wong, “Navy to Stretch Deployments; Aircraft Carrier Fleet Down to 9,” *Washington Times*, 10 January 2013.


31. A more extensive—perhaps the archetypal—discussion of the elements of seapower is found in Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), chap. 1.

32. Even in the Mahanian era, the Great White Fleet was dispatched on an extended world tour, and various smaller squadrons were kept forward—for example, the Asiatic Fleet.


35. “Gunboat diplomacy” is used here not pejoratively but to denote the limited use of naval force in peacetime, per Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 1.


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I have been teaching and reading Thucydides since the fall of 1975, and over that nearly forty-year period I have increasingly come to appreciate his enormous skills as a historian, as well as his sophisticated theoretical understanding of war. It is not that Thucydides set out to be a theorist in his account of the Peloponnesian War. Rather, the subtext of his depiction of the great war between Athens and Sparta presents a theory of conflict that in the power of its analysis helps to clarify not only the events of the war but also fundamental, theoretical truths about the nature and consequences of human conflict, truths as relevant today as they were late in the fifth century BC.¹ This combination of history with a sophisticated theoretical basis more than justifies Thucydides’s claim at the beginning of his account: “And it may be that my history may seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if my words are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.”²

Thucydides amply delivers on his hope that his account will prove useful to those who think about the issues surrounding war and strategy in the future.³ In fact, in the Strategy and Policy course at the Naval War College, the week devoted to an examination of the Peloponnesian War is far and away the most popular among the students.⁴ Why? My guess is that the students catch the interconnection in Thucydides’s discussion between its account of the course of that particular war and its theoretical understanding of war’s fundamental nature—a connection made in a way that is not true of that other great theorist of war, the Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.⁵
In fact, there is a noteworthy and important difference between Thucydides and Clausewitz: the latter focuses almost exclusively on the conduct of human conflict and military operations, as he makes clear from the beginning of *On War*. Thus Clausewitz limits himself to a narrower field than Thucydides, although his discussion of human conflict is no less brilliant in its examination of war, the relationship of human conflict to politics, the conduct of military operations, and of course, war’s fundamental nature. However, the larger issues involved—grand strategy, policy itself, morality, and the impact of war on the values of civilized states—he leaves to others to examine. Unfortunately there have been few other theorists or historians who have addressed those issues with anything like the sophistication of Thucydides.

Thucydides has taken as his subject the whole tapestry of the Peloponnesian War: the origins of the conflict; the impact of war on the human condition; the inherent tension among expediency, morality, and humane behavior under the unremitting pressures of conflict; and the fundamental nature of war, including the psychological aspects of battle, where soldiers are engaged in the bloody business of killing. Significantly, John Keegan, in his brilliant, groundbreaking book *The Face of Battle*, identifies Thucydides as one of the few historians who have realistically described the “sharp end” of fighting.

It is the purpose of this article, then, to draw out some of the more significant theoretical observations that *The History of the Peloponnesian War* offers in its dark portrayal of that terrible war, which destroyed the economic and political basis of the greatest cultural and literary flowering in human history. We will begin with a general discussion of Thucydides’s basic depiction of the fundamental nature of war and then move on to areas where I believe he presents his most pertinent and thorough observations on conflict and the human condition: his examination of the factors that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (factors that have contributed to the outbreak of other great wars as well); the impact of war on human society and civilized standards, including the tensions between morality and humane behavior; and finally, the reasons why civil wars represent the most terrible of all human conflicts.

The great classicist Bernard Knox laid out the intellectual accomplishments of fifth-century Athens in a lecture to the Naval War College in 1972: “The Athens in which [Thucydides] lived was one of the most intellectually and artistically creative cities the world has ever seen. . . . Yet of all this there is not one word in Thucydides except some extremely faint allusions in Pericles’ funeral speech.”

The reason for this lay in Thucydides’s single-minded focus on the complexities, difficulties, and consequences involved in the waging of war. That said, it is worth noting that this Greek historian’s interests ranged from the highest levels of grand strategy to that of the battlefield, where men engage in the merciless processes
of killing each other. By means of this focus Thucydides is able to examine with honesty and ruthlessness the reality of war—not glory, not colorful parades, little but desolation and tragedy, yet a fundamental and everlasting part of the human tableau.

The universe Thucydides describes is a remarkably grim one. The gods, if they exist, could not care less about human affairs. In this dark world, as Athenian negotiators warn the inhabitants of Melos in demanding their surrender,

the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and . . . in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. So far as the favor of the Gods is concerned, we think we have as much right to that as you have. Our aims and our actions are perfectly consistent with the beliefs men hold about the Gods and with the principles that govern their own conduct. Our opinion of the Gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it in existence and we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.

Much as has been the case for the modern world, war was a principal, if not the principal, preoccupation of the Greeks. In fact, one modern author has gone so far as to title his book on the period The Warring States of Greece. Thucydides’s view of war resembles closely that of Clausewitz. In On War, the Prussian military thinker comments that “no other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance.” Thus, “from the very start, there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry.” He notes later in his account, “War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.”

Tychē (chance) makes constant appearances throughout Thucydides’s account. One might even suggest that Thucydides, like Clausewitz, possessed a modern sense that nonlinear factors determine the course of events. His universe is one where uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction, as well as incompetence, dominate the actions of men. Moreover, the impact of tychē renders nearly all great events and decisions contingent: on personalities, on the relations and interrelationship between and among statesmen and military leaders, on the impact of the unforeseen or the unpredictable, and on the ability, among a host of other factors, of a single individual, even at the lowest level, to retard or thwart the best-laid plans. In particular, the competence, or more often the incompetence, of individuals plays an unpredictable role in the unfolding of history’s
course. Moreover, unexpected second- and third-order effects add to the difficulty of executing any strategy, whether political or military. Finally, as U.S. forces rediscovered in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy always “gets a vote.” Again, it is not that Thucydides spells out this atmosphere of chance, ambiguity, friction, and uncertainty but that they suffuse his account of everything from diplomacy to combat.

Thucydides’s discussion of the events surrounding the Theban attack on Plataea in _The History of the Peloponnesian War_ underlines brilliantly the role that friction and _tychē_ can and do play in thwarting the best-laid plans. At the time the incident occurs, in 431 BC, Greece is teetering on the brink of a long-awaited war between Athens and Sparta. The Thebans decide to capitalize on that fact to seize their longtime hostile neighbor, the smaller _polis_ of Plataea. They have set the stage for a coup with meticulous planning; they have reached out to traitors within the city who have agreed to disarm its guards and keep the gates open. The Thebans sneak a commando force across the Boeotian hills separating the two cities. The advance party reaches its target and catches the Plataeans by surprise. The traitors open the gates, panic breaks out, and the Theban raiders announce that they have seized control of the _polis_. At the same time, in the early evening, a larger occupying force leaves Thebes to secure the victory. Thus far everything has worked perfectly.

But then friction and _tychē_ intercede. As the main force makes its way across the hilly terrain in the gathering gloom, it begins to rain. The torches sputter, the Asopus River swells with runoff, and the trail, increasingly muddy, slows all movement. At times the guides lose their way in the darkness, and the force halts in confusion. Meanwhile, in Plataea, the locals, at first terrorized by the sudden eruption of Theban soldiers, recover their courage as they perceive there is only a small body of the enemy in their midst. The Plataeans regain control of the gates.

At that point the morale of the Theban commandos, who had been emboldened by their initial success, collapses. They realize that their reinforcements have been delayed, and the strangeness of their surroundings adds to their dismay. The Plataeans seize the initiative. Burrowing between their buildings, through the walls from building to building, and moving over the roofs, they harry their enemies and then eventually force them to surrender. In the early hours of the morning the main party of Thebans arrives, only to find the gates of Plataea barred and their commando force either dead or prisoner. With that flawed military operation, caught up in the entanglements of friction and chance, the great war between Athens and Sparta begins.

But this is not the only place where chance, friction, and their handmaiden, incompetence, appear. As with the modern world, individuals at every level make an immense contribution to the tangled course of events. All too often they gum
up the works with their incompetence or (on all too few occasions) redirect the flow of events by virtue of the competence they exhibit on the battlefield or in debate. Nothing underlines that pattern more clearly than the sorry tale of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BC. As Clausewitz suggests, “The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them.”

In 415 BC, an angry debate took place before the Athenian assembly. Alcibiades, one of Socrates’s leading students, argued for a raid on the Sicilian city of Syracuse. His opponent was the conservative politician Nicias. The assembly then voted in favor of the proposal. On the next day Nicias, determined to undermine the proposed raid, spoke again, this time urging—in the belief the assembly would see thereby the foolishness of such an expedition—that the raiding force be vastly increased. But as was to occur again, Nicias was being too clever by half. The Athenians voted in favor of Nicias’s proposal, and if that were not enough, they appointed Nicias himself, along with Alcibiades and one other, to lead what was now to be a great expedition.

To make matters even worse, shortly before the expedition departed some drunks knocked the erect phalli off the statues of Hermes that stood before many households. Alcibiades’s enemies accused him of the sacrilege and managed to have the young politician-general recalled from the expedition, which had by this time departed. Instead of returning to the city, he deserted to the Spartans, knowing that with most of his supporters away on the expedition, his enemies now dominated in Athens, and the assembly would undoubtedly condemn him to death. The naval and ground force, now dominated by Nicias, continued on, ultimately meeting a disastrous end at Syracuse, even after the Athenians sent out major reinforcements at his urging. Nicias’s extraordinarily incompetent performance led the Athenians to chisel his name from the various decrees and treaties that he had participated in signing.

Alcibiades’s fate further underlines the unique role that exceptional individuals play in history. Furious at his recall and fearing for his life, he had deserted to Sparta, where he provided his one-time enemies with a war-winning strategy against Athens. His time in Sparta was relatively short, however, as he managed to get the Spartan queen pregnant. He then fled to Persia, where he provided the former mortal enemy of the Greek city-states with a strategy to keep the Spartans and Athenians busy killing each other rather than interfering in the affairs of Greek city-states under Persian control. Alcibiades’s career reached its end when he returned to help the Athenians in putting down a revolt of Athens’s allies and in removing from power an oligarchy that had attempted to replace the democracy. This was indeed an astonishing political career, almost unmatched in history.
From the beginning of his account, Thucydides places enormous emphasis on the wild cards of history, those entirely unpredictable individuals of genius who appear and by their statesmanship or military leadership channel the course of events into entirely new and unexpected directions. It was that ability that marks the extraordinary career of the Spartan general Brasidas, who led a Helot army—which by itself is an extraordinary comment on his leadership abilities, given the treatment the Spartans inflicted on their Helot serfs—from the Peloponnesus in a campaign against the Athenians. His efforts came close to undermining Athens’s strategic position in the northern Aegean. Only his death at the battle of Amphipolis prevented a most dangerous situation from developing that might well have ended Thucydides’s account at that point.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR
One of the most fundamental questions that those who study war, strategy, and diplomacy must address is why great wars occur, as well as the particular circumstances that lead to the outbreak of conflicts between great states. Not surprisingly, Thucydides is at his best in describing the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. He addresses the problem in a twofold manner. The overarching cause he places in a simple, straightforward sentence: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” Thus, he establishes the precondition not only for the war he is about to discuss but for most other major wars that have occurred. One might equally posit that the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War was the result of the growth in the power of the Northern states and the fear that it occasioned among Southerners. Equally plausible would be an explanation of the First World War that ran along the following lines: the growth of German power and the fear that it occasioned among the Entente powers.

But the larger explanation is sufficient only for explaining why a war occurred during a specific period in history. It fails to unravel the tangled web of confusion, uncertainty, and miscalculation that are the bedfellows of all those who shape and form grand strategy. The strategic situation in the late 430s BC was similar to a fuel-air mixture waiting to explode. The second question, then, that the historian must address is why the war broke out in 431 BC and not 433 or 429. Similarly, the historian of the First World War must ask, Why war in 1914 and not 1911, or for that matter in 1916? That is precisely what Thucydides sets out to explain: “As for the reasons for breaking the truce and declaring war, . . . they are as follows.”

Winston Churchill aptly characterized the situation confronting the powers before the outbreak of the First World War: “It has been well said, ‘there is always more error than design in human affairs.’ The limited minds of even the ablest of men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their
transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspect.\textsuperscript{28} Ironically, and as was to be the case with the First World War, the spark that exploded the growing tension between Athens and Sparta into a great war came in a peripheral area of the Greek world, along the coast of the Balkans.

There the city of Corcyra (modern-day Corfu) found itself involved in an increasingly nasty confrontation with its mother city (that is, having originally established it as a colony), Corinth. The quarrel spiraled into open conflict in which the Corcyrean forces crushed those of the Corinthians. Refusing to accept defeat at the hands of its colony, the Corinthians attempted to mobilize their economic and military power as well as that of their allies to crush their upstart colony. Fearful of the Corinthians, the Corcyreans went to the Athenians with a clear warning that they put in simple terms. Everyone in Greece knows, they argued, that war between you and the Spartans is coming. Ally with us and add our considerable naval power to that you already possess, which will ensure your naval dominance of the Greek world, when war comes, or stand aside and allow the Corinthians and their Peloponnesian allies—that is, the Spartans—to acquire our naval power and thus be in a position to challenge your control of the seas.

Interestingly, ambassadors from Corinth addressed the Athenian assembly as well, and at the same time, but their arguments, that war was not on the horizon between Athens and Sparta, proved less persuasive than those of their adversaries. By a close vote the Athenian assembly agreed to a defensive alliance with Corcyra and sent a small squadron of ten triremes to Corcyra to warn the Corinthians off.\textsuperscript{29} The Athenians then reconsidered and sent a larger naval force, which arrived in the nick of time to save their new allies from defeat.

That action infuriated the Corinthians and lit the fuse for the great war that soon overwhelmed the Greek world. As a defensive measure, the Athenians attacked their own ally Potidaea, which they believed was too closely connected to Corinth, which was its mother city as well, an action that only further enraged the Corinthians. Thucydides lays out, in a series of brilliant speeches, how the Spartans found themselves drawn into the conflagration. In these debates statesmen with opposing views lay out the pros and cons of going to war. Here one must underline the crucial importance of such speeches to Thucydides's account of the factors that led inevitably to war, as well as what the participants believed to be the proper strategic courses for their poleis to follow.

In our world, drenched as it is with the overblown rhetoric of campaign speeches, which are innumerable, are eminently forgettable, and reveal little of policy making, it is all too easy to skip over the speeches that Thucydides records. But in the Greek world, where literacy was a relatively new phenomenon and there was nothing resembling the modern media, speeches were the means
through which the major decisions of strategy were made. Moreover, they represent a brilliant dissection of the making and shaping of grand strategy and operational strategy.

The most brilliant of these speeches is the oration given by the Spartan king Archidamus in the debate that took place before the Spartan assembly of warriors as to whether Sparta should go to war with Athens:

Spartans, in the course of my life I have taken part in many wars, and I see among you people of the same age as I am. They and I have had experience and so are not likely to share in what may be the general enthusiasm for war, nor to think that war is a good thing or a safe thing. And you will find, if you look closely into the matter, that this present war which you are now discussing is not likely to be on a small scale. When we are engaged with Peloponnesians . . . , the forces on both sides are of the same type, and we can strike rapidly where we wish to strike. With Athens it is different. Here we shall be engaged with people who live far off, people who have the widest experience with the sea and who are extremely well equipped in all other directions, very wealthy both as individuals and as a state, with ships and cavalry and hoplites and a population bigger than that in any other place in Hellas, and then too, with numbers of allies who pay tribute to them.

Archidamus then proceeds to lay out the extraordinary difficulties that the Spartans would confront should they embark on such a war. He asks his listeners, “What sort of war, then, are we going to fight?” But his speech is not an antiwar speech, protesting the possibility of war between Athens and Sparta. Rather, it a speech against war now in favor of war later, for solid strategic reasons. He warns that Sparta needs to make careful and thorough preparations before embarking on such a war with the other “superpower” of the Greek world. In every respect Archidamus’s speech represented a brilliant analysis of grand strategy, resting on what we would today call a thorough “net assessment” of the opposing sides. However, his arguments failed to resonate with the Spartan assembly of warriors, undoubtedly because it offered no easy, simple, direct path to victory. The other speaker whom Thucydides presents, the ephor (i.e., one of five elected leaders who served with the two kings) Sthenelaidas, dismisses Archidamus’s arguments with the clear notion that marching directly into Attica will end the war in short order. Ironically, Archidamus’s strategy will prove to be the path the Spartans will eventually follow to victory, but it will be that much more difficult because the Spartans will not have addressed the strategic issues that Archidamus has raised.

The Spartans instead vote for a simple and direct approach: march into Attica; burn the crops, temples, and houses that lie outside Athens’s walls; and then defeat the Athenian hoplites, who, furious at the destruction occurring before their eyes, would inevitably come out to fight. It seems simpleminded and obtuse, in
view of what we know will happen. Yet it is well to remember, as Thucydides indicates in Book 2, it would only be by the most desperate measures that Pericles, the Athenian leader, was to prevent the Athenian assembly from meeting when Attica outside the city walls was in flames—a meeting that would surely have voted to send the hoplites out to confront the invaders directly. It would have been a battle the Athenians would have lost. But as it is, the Athenian hoplites decline to take up the challenge, nor in subsequent Spartan invasions are they willing to meet the enemy directly in phalanx battle.

In the end, strategic decision making is a matter of choosing between different and difficult paths; sometimes both will be right, sometimes one will be right and one wrong, sometimes both will be wrong, but the future will always be opaque and difficult to estimate. In the end, as James Wolfe commented before Quebec in 1759, “War is an option of difficulties.”

At some point in the articulation of military forces against an opponent, things will go wrong, and more often than not they will go very wrong. Thus, whatever the perceptiveness and intelligence of the thinking and strategic preparation for war, the sophistication of the military preparations, or the brilliance of those in command, one must count on friction, chance, and unexpected enemy reaction to interfere with, delay, or even entirely thwart the efforts of military forces, whether one is dealing with strategy, operations, or tactics. Thucydides has made a sophisticated point in the contrast between Archidamus’s speech and that of the ephor, but he has not spelled it out for the reader. Rather, he has left readers to draw out its significance for themselves.

WAR AND THE COLLAPSE OF HUMAN VALUES

Perhaps the gravest warning that Thucydides left for those who came after lay in his description of the slow but steady decline in the behavior of the opposing sides displayed as the conflict continued. Immediately before the war’s outbreak, the Athenians justify the possession of their empire on the basis not only of expediency but of the assertion that they have behaved better toward their subjects and allies than might be expected under the circumstances. That is certainly not a statement they would have dared, or even wished, to make later in the war. Again it is the subtle fashion in which Thucydides recounts the history of the war that allows him to underline the tragic collapse of humane values under the pressure and deadly atmosphere of war. There is in his view a clear connection between what the plague of 430 BC does to Athenian values and what the war itself does to them—except perhaps that war will do so in a more murderous fashion.

The issues surrounding events on Mytilene and then on Melos highlight the collapse of values, and even common sense, in Athens over the course of the war.
In the first case a revolt had broken out on the strategically well placed island of Mytilene, but the Spartans had dithered in reinforcing the rebels, while the Athenians had reacted with dispatch and crushed the rebellion with the help of Mytileneans who remained loyal. The question came before the Athenian assembly as to what should be done with the captured islanders. Initially the assembly decreed that all the men should be put to death and the women and children sold into slavery. But the next day the Athenians, many appalled by the decision, reconsidered.

Thucydides condenses the debate to two speakers. On one side, the demagogue Cleon urges that the initial decision should stand as a warning to the rest of the Athenian empire. His approach rests to an extent on basic morality: they have done evil to you (and to their own oaths) and should be punished. On the other hand, Diodotus argues that the Athenians should punish only those guilty of instigating and participating in the rebellion. His argument centers on the belief that such an approach would encourage others of Athens’s allies and subject people who confront brewing rebellions to remain loyal. Cleon’s approach, he warns, would only encourage those who have revolted to fight to the bitter end.

Twelve years later, shortly before the Athenian expedition to Sicily embarked on its disastrous course, the Athenians determined to remove the neutral island of Melos from the strategic table. Most of the scholarly focus has remained on the brilliant dialogue between the Melian representatives and those of the Athenians, but Thucydides makes a fundamental point about the fate of the Melians that is too often missed. In one sentence, he records the fate of the Melians: “Siege operations were now carried on vigorously and, as there was treachery from the inside, the Melians surrendered unconditionally to the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and children as slaves.”

What is noteworthy about this account is that it underlines that Diodotus was right—someone in Melos did betray the city. However, Thucydides gives no indication that there was a serious debate in Athens about what the fate of the Melians should be after their resistance had collapsed. In other words, the Athenians were now willing to slaughter the Melians without even considering the potential negative consequences to their own future strategic interests.

As the war continued its terrible course, the Athenians seem to have lost not only their sense of humanity but their common sense as well. An episode in 406 BC offers a vivid example. Despite the disaster at Sicily and the revolt of some of their allies, the Athenians, with considerable help from Alcibiades, recovered. In 406 they were even able to win a devastating victory over the Peloponnesian fleet at the battle of Arginusae. They lost only twenty-five ships, while the Spartans and their allies lost seventy. Arginusae seemingly heralded the complete
restoration of Athenian fortunes. But at the end of the battle a storm had come up; the Athenian fleet had not been able to save many of the Athenians still alive in the water or bodies of the dead. Despite the victory, the assembly, urged on by a madness that had clearly gripped the city and its politicians, condemned six of the admirals to death for impious behavior in failing to attend to the living and dead in the water.

Unfortunately, Thucydides died before he could complete his historical account, so the dismal years that led to the final Athenian catastrophe were left to be covered by Xenophon—and Xenophon, though a student of Socrates, brought to his account none of the great historian’s sophistication.  

CIVIL WAR
Thucydides is equally clear in his warning about the consequences of “civil war.” It has become fashionable in the modern age, at least since the French Revolution, to believe that revolutions bring general benefits for the human race. In his account of the events on Corcyra in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, however, Thucydides presents us with the course and consequence of a real case—civil war. The murderous conflict among the contending classes and factions on Corcyra, in which families found themselves torn apart, has found its echo all too often in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. At one point, according to Thucydides, the Corcyreans

seized upon all their enemies whom they could find and put them to death. . . .

[T]hey went to the temple of Hera and persuaded about fifty of the suppliants there to submit to trial. They then condemned every one of them to death. Seeing what was happening, most of the other suppliants, who had refused to be tried, killed each other there in the temple; some hanged themselves on the trees, and others found various other means of committing suicide. . . . During the [next] seven days the Corcyreans continued to massacre those of their own citizens whom they considered to be their enemies. Their victims were accused of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but in fact men were often killed on grounds of personal hatred or else by their debtors. . . . There was death in every shape and form. And, as usually happens in such situations, people went to every extreme and beyond it.

In his depiction of the atmosphere that surrounded the civil war on Corcyra Thucydides is at his most brilliant. He points out that on Corcyra, in the midst of the civil war, “to fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their meanings. What used to be called a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would now expect to find in a party member; . . . any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character.”

George Orwell would underline the same phenomenon in both his great novels, _Animal Farm_ and _1984_. In a depiction that eerily evokes the contest between
Stalin and Leon Trotsky for political control of the Soviet Union after Lenin's death, Thucydides remarks:

As a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers of survival. Such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intelligence of their opponents; fearing that they might lose by debate or find themselves out-maneuvered in intrigue by their quick-witted enemies, they boldly launched straight into action; while their opponents, overconfident that they would see what was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they could secure by policy, were the more easily destroyed because they were off their guard.48

HUMAN NATURE IN ITS TRUE COLORS

Thucydides’s sharpest comment on the direct and indirect results of war is contained at the end of his discussion of the civil war on Corcyra. These dark words should be remembered by all who embark on war. It is not a warning aimed at preventing war, which, as Thucydides suggests, is a fundamental part of human nature. Rather it is a warning against embarking on war without thinking through the terrible consequences, direct and indirect, that will inevitably occur: “Then, with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed itself proudly in its true colours, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy to anything superior to itself; for if it had not been for the pernicious power of envy, men would not so have exalted vengeance above innocence and profit above justice.”49

Thucydides did indeed write a work of history “done to last forever.”50 It is deeply imbued with a theoretical understanding of war, its conduct, and the terrible consequences that it produces. The sad record of the 2,400-some-odd years since its completion is an endless repetition of the same pattern. Yet while *The History of the Peloponnesian War* is of great importance in the twenty-first century, the modern age is perhaps even less prepared than its original audience for its deep and abiding insights. Thucydides has provided us with an understanding of war and strategy from the highest to the lowest level. But to grasp that understanding, readers today must grapple with a number of issues. First is the fact that they have in most cases little knowledge of the geography of ancient Greece, much less the players.51 But that is the least of the problems that beset the first-time reader of Thucydides.

In the largest sense, the real difficulty lies in the fact that *The History of the Peloponnesian War* is an enormously sophisticated and complex work, one that requires, like Clausewitz’s *On War*, careful and deep readings. For a society that demands instant gratification, such sustained, focused effort represents a major
challenge. Simply put, Thucydides’s history is not an easy or simple read. Rather, it demands concentrated thought and a willingness to grapple with the text—and also with the author, because as sophisticated and perceptive as he is, Thucydides sometimes, like all historians, loads the dice in favor of his perception of what occurred.\footnote{But in the end readers willing to make the effort will find themselves richly rewarded by the understanding that they will be able to bring to the present. That great American soldier and statesman George C. Marshall, in an address at Princeton at the beginning of the Cold War, doubted “whether a man can think with full wisdom and with conviction regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War.”\footnote{Marshall could not have been more right about his own time—or ours.}}

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<td>1. Above all let me emphasize that Thucydides is not a theorist of international relations but rather a historian and theorist of human conflict.</td>
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<td>3. The problem, unfortunately, is that most statesmen and military leaders throughout history have not been interested in studying history—or, for that matter, Thucydides—in their preparations to lead.</td>
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<td>4. The author has participated in the teaching of the Strategy and Policy course at the Naval War College on three separate occasions: during the 1985–86 academic year, as a regular faculty member; during the 1991–92 academic year, as a Secretary of the Navy fellow; and at present, beginning in 2012, as a Minerva fellow. The Naval War College is the only American war college that has consistently used Thucydides as a basic building block of its curriculum. The Air War College did for a brief period in the 1990s but then relapsed, when the golf-playing fighter pilots regained control of its curriculum. The National War College has used Thucydides occasionally over the past several years, while the Army War College has never placed Thucydides in its basic curriculum.</td>
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<td>5. Clausewitz, of course, relies heavily on history but at least in his great theoretical examination of war scatters his historical examples throughout the text, and unless one is a student of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, it can be difficult to understand his allusions fully.</td>
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<td>6. Bernard M. W. Knox, “Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War: Politics and Power,” <em>Naval War College Review</em> 25, no. 3 (January–February 1973), pp. 3–15. Knox continues, “In his lifetime the great tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides, as well as the comedies of Aristophanes, were staged in Athens; the Parthenon was built, and its great frieze cut in marble; Athenian potters and painters produced masterpieces which are the jewels of our museums; the philosophers worked out an atomic theory of the constitution of matter; the sophists revolutionized political, moral, and social theory.” Perhaps because his lecture was on Thucydides, Knox failed to mention Herodotus and Thucydides in the depiction of the brilliance of Athenian culture.</td>
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<td>7. For the nature of the sharp end in Greek hoplite warfare, see Victor David Hanson, <em>The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece</em> (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1989).</td>
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<td>8. The fates of Germany, Japan, and Poland after the Second World War underline the accuracy of the harsh comments of the Athenian negotiators at Melos. In the cases of both</td>
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Germany and Japan—two nations that had spread such devastation in unleashing the war—their strategic importance led to their rapid rehabilitations. Poland, however—an innocent victim of Nazi and Soviet aggression at the beginning of the war that had suffered terrible devastation during the next six years—found itself under the merciless heel of Soviet occupation for the next fifty years.

9. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 404–405. Some historians, most of them undoubtedly living in the comfortable, gated communities that our universities have become, have discounted these dark words as simply an effort by Thucydides to underline Athenian arrogance or the enormous strategic mistake of invading Sicily immediately after the destruction of Melos. The problem with such a line of argument is that there was nothing in the behavior of the Greeks in Thucydides’s world—or for that matter in human behavior generally in the 2,400 years of subsequent history—to suggest that he was less than accurate in his depiction of the international arena.


13. In this regard, Otto von Bismarck, the great Prusso-German statesman who unified Germany under Prussian leadership in the 1860s and 1870s, noted: “Politics is a thankless job because everything depends on chance and conjecture. One has to reck with a series of probabilities and improbabilities and base one’s plans upon this reckoning.” Quoted in Jonathan Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life (Oxford, U.K., and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), p. 130.

14. For a brilliant depiction of the impact of nonlinear factors on Clausewitz’s thinking, see the outstanding article by Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93). I am indebted to Professor Donald Kagan of Yale for pointing out to me the importance that tychē has for Thucydides.

15. As Clausewitz notes in regard to the last point, “A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong”; On War, p. 119. That, of course, is the American military’s “Murphy factor.”


17. In this regard see Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, Policy, Diplomacy, and War (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011), particularly chap. 1. In this regard Edmund Burke was particularly perceptive in his understanding of the baleful influence that second- and third-order effects could exercise on events: “The real effects of moral causes are not always immediate; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation; and its excellence may arise even from the moral effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens, and very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions.” The Works of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, ed. Henry Rogers (London: S. Holdsworth, 1837), p. 404.

18. The whole incident is all described wonderfully by Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 124–27.

19. Clausewitz, On War, p. 94.

20. To have two individuals diametrically opposed in their views as to the possibilities open to the expedition was a guarantee of failure.

21. In the Greek world of the polis there was no differentiation between citizen and soldier, nor was there between general and politician.

22. In fact he had made that proposal in the hope that the assembly would recall him and the expedition, thus allowing him to argue that it was the responsibility of others that the attack on Syracuse had failed. After the reinforcements failed to turn the tide, Nicias delayed the retreat until too late, and the entire expedition went down to disastrous defeat.
23. It is significant that in his chapter discussing genius in war, Clausewitz does not use the most brilliant general in modern history—namely, Napoleon Bonaparte—as an example.

24. Brasidas’s success did end, however, Thucydides’s career as an Athenian military leader. The capture of Amphipolis was attributed to Thucydides, and he was promptly exiled from Athens. That removal at least provided him the time and perspective to write his great history.


26. Thucydides’s explanation works in the case of most major wars. There are other wars, however—such as the conquests of Alexander the Great, most Roman wars after the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War, Napoleon’s wars, and the Second World War—where the ruler, like Adolf Hitler, of one great state deliberately unleashed, with malice aforethought, war on his neighbors and eventually the world. In the case of the Pacific War, which began with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the explanation is more in line with that of Thucydides: the massive building program that Franklin Roosevelt’s administration had embarked on beginning in 1938 confronted the Japanese with the choice of either fighting now or waiting and surrendering in 1943 to the overwhelming power the United States would possess. In the end they chose to fight in 1941, and they got to surrender in 1945.


29. The first vote of the assembly had been to reject the Corcyrean appeal for an alliance, but the Athenians had then reconsidered.

30. For the speeches, Thucydides indicates that “in this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered just before and others during the war. I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.” *History of the Peloponnesian War*, p. 47.

31. One of the most bizarre trends in the academic world dealing with the history of the ancient world is the argument that Greek and Roman statesmen and generals had no understanding of grand strategy, because they lacked a word for such a concept. Archidamus’s speech alone puts paid to such nonsense.

32. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, p. 82. One might also note that Pericles’s speech before the Athenian assembly on why war with Sparta was necessary is equally compelling, but it proved more flawed in its long-range analysis of the future.

33. Ibid., p. 83.

34. As Michael Howard has suggested, military organizations will always get the next war wrong, which is why the crucial enabler in military effectiveness is the ability to adapt more quickly than one’s opponents. For a discussion of these issues, see Williamson Murray, *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).


37. As the Athenians tell the Spartans, “Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by their situation.” Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, p. 80.

38. “In other respects also Athens owed to the Plague the beginnings of a state of unprecedented lawlessness. Seeing how quick and abrupt were the changes of fortune which came to the rich who suddenly died and to those who had previously been penniless but now inherited their wealth, people now began to venture into acts of self-indulgence which before they used to keep in the dark.” Ibid., p. 155.
39. Interestingly, Diodotus makes no mention of humane values in his speech; rather, he rests his case entirely on the basis of expediency. One of the basic problems of modern thinking is the belief that humane behavior and morality are congruent. That is something that Thucydides makes clear is not the case in the real world.

40. Melos lay on the direct route from the Peloponnesus to the Persian empire. Moreover, it was a colony of Sparta and could hardly be expected to remain neutral if the war were to go against the Athenians. There is among those who read the debate for the first time a sense that the Melians were the “good guys” and the Athenians the “bad guys,” the latter because they were a dominant power. What is missed in such an understanding is that the Melians were oligarchs. When the Athenians requested an opportunity to talk to the citizens of Melos, the oligarchs refused, undoubtedly because of the distinct possibility the demos would agree to surrender to the Athenians, who would then replace the oligarchy with a democracy.

41. The debate among scholars has revolved around, on the liberal side, the belief that Thucydides provides the dialogue over the nature of power only to underline the arrogance of the Athenians, who were about to set off for Sicily. On the other side, there are those, more in consonance with the real world, who argue (like the author) that the dialogue in fact reflects Thucydides’s fundamental belief as to the nature of the real world of power politics and war. The history of the past 2,400 years would seem to suggest that the Melian dialogue is all too accurate a depiction of the world of states and men.

42. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, p. 408 [my italics]. Not all Athenians were happy with the outcome. The following year the great dramatist Euripides wrote and had produced his ferociously antiwar play The Trojan Women.

43. Nothing better underlines the collapse of the values of humane behavior than British bombing policy in the Second World War. In fall 1939 British bombers were forbidden from dropping bombs on German warships tied up to quays, for fear of killing civilian dockworkers. Three years later the Royal Air Force’s bombers were dropping four-thousand-pound bombs, nicknamed “cookies,” with the explicit intention of “dehousing” the German population, and while its members were in their houses. However important such bombing was to the winning of the war—and it was very important—the collapse of humane values is graphic.

44. Xenophon’s history is not a bad record of events, but it possesses none of the sophistication that Thucydides would have provided had he been able to write the history of the last years of the war. Thucydides himself appears to have died in the midst of writing Book 8, which contains none of the speeches laying out the nature of political and strategic debates among the Greeks that are so central to the account of the war, speeches that he provides in the other seven books.

45. That was certainly the message that Karl Marx trumpeted in the nineteenth century and that contributed to the ruthless and murderous civil wars characterizing so much of the blood-drenched history of the twentieth century.

46. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, p. 241.

47. Ibid., p. 242.

48. Ibid., p. 244.

49. Ibid., p. 245.

50. Ibid., p. 48.

51. The problem of dealing with the geography of the Peloponnesian War has been substantially addressed by Robert Strassler’s edition, which, while it is not as satisfactory a translation as the one I have been quoting in this article, provides extraordinarily good maps that indicate the geographic position of virtually every place identified in the text. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996).

52. The brilliant work of Donald Kagan, the greatest living commentator on Thucydides over the years, has underlined this reality.

THUCYDIDIDES ON POLICY, STRATEGY, AND WAR TERMINATION

Karl Walling

Even the ultimate outcome is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at a later date.

CLAUSEWITZ

War is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are themselves consumed by them.

LI CHUAN

For decades, Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian War has been a staple of professional military education at American war colleges, the Naval War College especially.¹ And with good reason—he self-consciously supplies his readers a microcosm of all war. With extraordinary drama and scrupulous attention to detail he addresses the fundamental and recurring problems of strategy at all times and places. These include the origins of war, the clashing political objectives of belligerents, the strategies they choose to achieve them, and the likely character of their conflicts. As the war escalates, Thucydides expands his readers’ field of vision. He compels them to consider the unintended consequences of decisions of statesmen and commanders and the asymmetric struggle between Athenian sea and Spartan land power. He shows the ways in which each side reassessed and adapted to the other; the problems of coalition warfare; indirect strategies through proxy wars, insurgencies, and other forms of rebellion; the influence of domestic politics on strategy, and vice
versa; and myriad other enduring strategic problems that those who wage war at any time ignore at their peril. As a student of war and politics, whatever his faults, he was a giant with few peers, if any at all. Yet Thucydides says relatively little about peace, peacemakers, and peacemaking. Not surprisingly, then, what he has to say on this subject often receives little attention at the war colleges, especially when there are so many other rich questions to explore in his account.

One thing Thucydides does say, however, needs to be pondered carefully to understand the problem of terminating the Peloponnesian War or any other. The Peace of Nicias—at the end of the so-called Archidamean War, a full decade into the twenty-seven-year war between the Athenian-led Delian League and the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League—cannot, he argues, “rationally be considered a state of peace,” despite the efforts of peacemakers like Nicias to turn it into one. Instead, it was a “treacherous armistice” or an unstable truce (5.26). Although Thucydides never defines “peace,” his distinction between peace and a truce indicates that he had some idea of what peace might mean in theory, even if it was difficult, indeed impossible, to establish it between the Athenians and their rivals in the Peloponnesian League. Peace for him appears to be something very Clausewitzian: the acceptance by the belligerents that the result of their last war is final, not something to be revised through violent means when conditions change or opportunity is ripe.

The Peace of Nicias was not the only occasion when Thucydides treated a peace treaty as a mere truce (spondē). He also used the word “truce” to describe the Thirty Year Peace, the treaty that officially, at least, put an end to the First Peloponnesian War of 462/1–445 BCE (1.115). Some modern scholars, skeptical that the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE, popularly referred to as simply “the Peloponnesian War”) was inevitable, have argued that this agreement was a genuine peace. According to this view, Athens accepted the result of the first war as final and became a “sated power,” no longer aiming to expand its empire by force. Thucydides emphatically did not think this was the case, however. Because Thucydides’s account of the war is not the same as the war itself, it is possible that Thucydides was wrong, but we will never understand his work unless we try to understand him on his own terms, which is the objective of this article. Indeed, without a serious effort to understand Thucydides’s own view of the relation among policy, strategy, and war termination, efforts to analyze his account critically are likely to produce more heat than light. They may even so distort understanding of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War that they rob both the author and his chosen case study of the enduring strategic value they deserve.

To understand why Thucydides did not think either the Thirty Year Peace or the Peace of Nicias brought the Peloponnesian War to an end, one must pay careful attention to his presentation of the objectives and strategies of the
belligerents. The war waxed and waned, and waxed and waned, like a fever (or a plague, Thucydides might say) because of a clash of policies that made it impossible for either Athens or Sparta to accept the result of their most recent conflict as final. Their political objectives were fundamentally incompatible. Athens was determined to expand; Sparta was no less determined to contain Athens, if necessary, by overthrowing its empire and its democratic regime. If so, the Second Peloponnesian War was inevitable, and not because it was predetermined but because the First Peloponnesian War never really ended—that is, neither side was willing to change its revisionist objectives. Each side’s objectives clashed inherently with the other’s sense of the requirements of its own safety. Each sought to exploit opportunities to revise the settlements of their previous conflicts as soon as opportunity arose. Each placed such high value on its objectives that it would risk war rather than give them up. So the First Peloponnesian War dragged on and on, and then the Second Peloponnesian War, on and on through the Peace of Nicias and beyond, until one side was able to overthrow the other’s regime and replace it with something fundamentally less threatening.

The repeated failures to terminate the war, in Thucydides’s account, cast the motives, policies, and strategies of the belligerents in a fundamentally different light than typically seen among strategists today. It is common to suggest that Athens under Pericles chose a Delbrueckian strategy of exhausting Sparta and that Sparta, under Archidamus, chose an equally Delbrueckian strategy of annihilating the Athenian army in a major land battle early in the war. If one assumes Athens was a sated power, then there is some sense in describing its strategy as an effort to win, by not losing, a war of exhaustion with Sparta that would maintain the status quo ante. If one follows Thucydides and assumes that Athens was an expansionist power, however, a more ambitious diplomatic and military strategy was going to be necessary, and such a strategy is readily apparent for those willing and able to connect the dots.

Under Pericles especially, that strategy was to break up the Peloponnesian League as a prelude to further expansion in the west, toward Italy and Sicily in particular. Spartan authorities—presuming they understood that the Athenians were attempting to destroy the Peloponnesian League—had little choice but to counter by supporting Sparta’s own allies. When Sparta’s annual invasions of Attica are seen as part of a larger coalition strategy, they do not look like utopian efforts to achieve a knockout blow, though the Spartans would have been grateful had the Athenians been foolish enough to cooperate by risking a decisive engagement outside their walls. Because Athens’ long walls (that is, those reaching about six miles, with a road between, to the port of Piraeus) had rendered it invulnerable to direct assault by the Spartan army, there is good reason to think that Archidamus, especially, understood that Sparta could not win a war of
annihilation, that its best option was a war of exhaustion. The Spartans needed to coordinate with actual and potential allies, especially Persia and rebels from the Delian League, to tie down Athens in a multitheater war. So even if the Spartans’ annual invasions failed to induce the Athenians to commit strategic suicide by fighting outside the walls or to inflict so much damage on the countryside that the Athenians sued for peace, they contributed mightily to a multitheater strategy of attrition that would force the Athenians to fight everywhere, leaving them strong nowhere. Ultimately that is how Sparta won the war, despite much Spartan incompetence and with much unintended help from the Athenians, who would have achieved a much better outcome if they had been willing to make a genuine peace earlier in the twenty-seven-year war.

So long as the mutually exclusive political objectives of Athens and Sparta remained unchanged, the Second Peloponnesian War was inevitable and unlikely to end. But war as such is not inevitable. One significant inference from Thucydides’s account of the failure of the belligerents to terminate this war effectively is that the art of peace is to prevent the violent clash of policies that produce and protract warfare. Although Thucydides makes clear that he does not think Athens was ever a sated power, it should have been. To whatever extent our own world resembles that of Thucydides, he helps us ponder, among many other things, one of the fundamental global strategic problems of the twenty-first century: that both old and new powers will need to find the self-restraint to prevent dissatisfaction with previous peace settlements, which are often mere truces, from escalating into general war.

I

Thucydides had a thesis—that the events and debates immediately before the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War were not as important to its origins as something more fundamental, the growth of Athenian power and the fear it inspired in Sparta. Athenian growth and Spartan fear of it constituted the “truest cause” of the war (1.23, 1.88).6 His Pentecontaetia, or history of the fifty years between the end of the Persian Wars and the crises over Corcyra and Potidaea at the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War, was designed to prove that thesis. One can summarize his complex argument the following way.

First, despite strategic cooperation during the Persian Wars, Sparta and Athens were deeply suspicious of each other almost from the moment they forced the Persians to retreat from the Greek mainland after the battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale in 480–79 BCE. When Athens began to rebuild its walls in 479, Sparta and its allies, seeing the enormous growth of Athenian naval power during the Persian Wars, began to be afraid. So they made one of the first calls for universal and unilateral arms control, even partial disarmament, in recorded
history. They asked the Athenians not to rebuild their walls but instead to join them in tearing down the walls of all the cities in Greece. They argued, disingenuously, that walled cities would merely give the Persians strong points for defense if they invaded again and that anyway all Greeks could retreat to Spartan protection in the Peloponnesus if the Persians returned (1.90). Distrust breeds distrust. The Athenians could not help finding something one-sided and deceitful in the Spartan arms-control proposal, which would leave them vulnerable to Sparta’s famously disciplined army of hoplites (that is, armored foot soldiers fighting in disciplined phalanxes) reinforced by forces from its allies. So under the advice of Themistocles, the fox who had outsmarted the Persians at Salamis, they continued to rebuild their walls covertly. Themistocles, still highly regarded in Sparta as a hero of the Persian Wars, went to Sparta, where he deceived the Spartans deliberately by delaying arms-control talks until the walls were rebuilt. Once they were completed Themistocles declared Athenian independence from Spartan hegemony, announcing that Athens knew its best interests and was now strong enough to pursue them without asking permission from Sparta or anyone else (1.91–92). Says Sun Tzu, the best strategy is to attack the opponent’s strategy. The long walls, the Athenian “Strategic Defense Initiative,” were a breakout strategy that rendered obsolete Sparta’s traditional strategy of dominating Greece in decisive land battles.

Second, it was not Pericles, then, but Themistocles who was the father of Athenian grand strategy, which had two components. One was defense by land behind long walls down to Piraeus, the port of Athens, walls that made Athens a de facto island, able to feed itself by sea and invulnerable to attack by land. The other was offense by sea, which the Athenians undertook with the utmost vigor from 479 to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War in 462/1. Their objective was to clear the Persians from the Aegean and to build and expand their maritime alliance, the Delian League, to keep the Persians out. It was Themistocles who told the Athenians to become a naval power and thereby “lay the foundations of the empire.” Allies-cum-subjects gradually saw their dues for defense transformed, under Pericles especially, into tribute to Athens, thus financing the growing and powerful navy by which Athens ruled its allies, who came to see the city as a tyrant exploiting them for its benefit (1.93, 1.96–99).

Third, seeing all this unfold, Sparta was not idle, though it proceeded cautiously and covertly. When rebels from the Athenian empire on the island of Thasos asked for Sparta’s aid in 466/62 (?), the Spartan authorities promised secretly to go to war with Athens, thus establishing a fundamental principle of Spartan strategy (1.101). The best time for Sparta to go to war with Athens was when Athens was already committed to fighting in some other theater. The Athenian walls made it possible for Athens to withstand a siege indefinitely, yet that did not
mean Sparta had no counter. If the Athenians were compelled to fight not merely in Attica but also throughout their empire, they might lose the will to carry on or even the empire that enabled them to carry on. In the former case, there could be a negotiated settlement; in the latter, the Spartans just might be able to overthrow not merely the empire but even the democratic regime (arguably the source of all their troubles) in Athens itself.

Timing is often everything, however. Before the Spartans were able to go to war to support Thasos and potentially many other rebel cities against Athens, there was an earthquake in Sparta in 462/1 (?). It enabled the Helots, the enslaved descendants of the Messenians whom the Spartans had conquered previously, and who constituted the overwhelming majority of Sparta’s population, to rebel. Rather than fight a two-front war against Athens and the Helots, the Spartans canceled or postponed their plan to attack Athens and instead called on that city, their formal ally, known for expertise in siege warfare, to help them put down the Helots in their last redoubts at Mount Ithome. Traditional Spartan xenophobia, combined with suspicion of the “revolutionary and enterprising” character of the Athenians, led to a change of heart, however (1.102). The Spartans dismissed the Athenians, saying they no longer needed their aid. It must have been about this time that the Athenians learned the Spartans had planned to attack them to support the revolt at Thasos—an important reason for the Spartans to wish them to depart, lest the Athenians betray them first by an alliance with the Helots. Not surprisingly, in light of both Sparta’s betrayal and its rejection of their aid against the Helots, the Athenians left Sparta in a huff, broke off their alliance with Sparta, and allied instead with Argos, Sparta’s traditional competitor for hegemony in the Peloponnesus, as well as with the Thessalians in the north (1.102).

Fourth, the Athenians allied with Megara, on the Isthmus of Corinth, and actually helped it build its long walls down to the sea, so that it could be resupplied in case of assault (1.103). In effect, in doing so the Athenians extended their own long walls from Attica to the isthmus, with extraordinarily important strategic consequences. Attica would be safe from invasion by land from the Peloponnesus. Sparta would be cut off from its major ally on land—Thebes, in Boeotia. Also, through Megara’s port on the Crisaean Gulf, Pegae, Athens had now established a base for expansion in the west. Through the alliance with Megara, which was at war with Corinth, the traditional hegemon in the Crisaean Gulf, Athens engendered bitter hatred on the part of Corinth, a maritime power in its own right and fabled for wealth derived from trade over its isthmus.

Fifth, the Athenians were expanding in all directions in the First Peloponnesian War. In the west, they had control of both of Megara’s ports, Nisaea and Pegae. They had already established a base for Helot refugees from Sparta at Naupactus, which could serve as a base for the Athenian fleet in the Crisaean
Gulf (1.103). They gained control of Achaea on the opposite side of the gulf, thus potentially acquiring the ability to bottle up Corinth in the gulf. Toward the south, they acquired Troezen in the Peloponnesus as an ally, presumably as a base for linking up with Argos, if and when Athenians and Argos intended to unite to fight the Spartans in the Peloponnesus. To the north, they sought to extend their hegemony into Boeotia (1.108). Most amazing of all, to the south they gave up on an expedition to Cyprus and decided instead to send two hundred ships to aid a rebellion in Egypt against the Persian empire, presumably to gain access to the grain and the seemingly infinite wealth of Egypt (1.104).

Sixth, the Athenians failed to achieve their objectives in the First Peloponnesian War in large part because they were overextended and fighting in too many theaters. The Egyptians drained the canals of the Nile, thus trapping and annihilating the Athenian naval expedition. In an ironic anticipation of later Athenian failure in Sicily, the Egyptians also destroyed another Athenian fleet sent to reinforce the first (1.109–10). The Boeotians were able to defeat Athens on land at Coronea and so to recover their independence (1.113). The cities of Euboea, from which Athens received much of its food, revolted, thus forcing Athens to divert forces to subdue them (1.114). Most importantly, Megara defected to the Peloponnesian League, meaning the gate to Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was open (1.114).

Seventh, with the entire empire at risk and the Athenians fighting on multiple fronts, Athens had little choice but to agree to the Thirty Year Peace treaty with Sparta and its allies, who demanded a heavy price. The Athenians had to give up Nisaea and Pegae, as well as Achaea and Troezen (1.115). Three of these sacrifices served primarily the interests of Corinth, which could not have wished to confront Athens in the Crisaean Gulf. (Not coincidentally, they were to loom large in Athenian demands during peace talks with Sparta after the Athenians’ stunning victories at Pylos and Sphacteria in the Second Peloponnesian War [4.21].) Most importantly, the Thirty Year Peace required Sparta and Athens not to encroach on each other’s allies and to settle future quarrels through arbitration.

Largely because Athens had overextended itself, a blunder Pericles refused to let the Athenians forget (1.144), the Spartans and their allies had contained, even rolled back, Athenian expansion, with future controversies to be solved through arbitration, not war. But for how long? The treaty, like most others in Thucydides’s account, had an expiration date, thirty years—that is, long enough for both sides to recover from the war, if they were patient. That most such treaties in Thucydides’s account come with expiration dates is important. It reveals that most of the treaties not only were but were assumed by the belligerents themselves to be nothing but truces, meaning that the belligerents did not expect final results to their wars. As Herodotus observes, in peace sons bury their fathers, in
war fathers bury their sons. Sons cannot replace their fathers, but fathers can have more sons. If they or their children or both do not accept the result of a previous conflict as final, they need only wait until their respective sons reach the age to fight alongside their fathers, brothers, and other kin in the next round of conflict. Hence, in the sentence immediately after describing the terms of the Thirty Year Peace, Thucydides calls it a “truce” (1.115).

Like the Peace of Nicias, it merely bought time for each side to renew the conflict under more auspicious circumstances. Indeed, within six years of signing the treaty a key ally of Athens, Samos, rebelled, compelling Athens, led by Pericles, to engage in a long, costly, and brutal siege to recover it. Significantly, the Peloponnesian League was divided over whether to use this opportunity to force Athens into a two-front war, with Sparta probably supporting going to war at that time but Corinth dissenting. As the Corinthians later reminded the Athenians, were it not for their dissent the Second Peloponnesian War might well have started over Samos in 441 rather than over Corcyra, Potidaea, and Megara in 431 (1.41). So the Athenians knew there was a high probability that any time a significant ally rebelled or was instigated to rebel by the Peloponnesians, Athens would have another multitheater war on its hands.

In other words, “It ain’t over ’til it’s over,” and in ancient Greece, war was never over. One might well debate whether Thucydides’s greatest translator, Thomas Hobbes, was right to say that the natural state of mankind is a state of war. One might even debate whether he was right to conclude that international relations, there being no opportunity to exit the state of nature, are by definition a state of war too. But he was certainly right about the ancient Greeks: their natural and normal state was war, not peace,

for Warre, consisteth not in Battel only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend in Battell is sufficiently known: and the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a shower or two of rain; but an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.11

The final component of Thucydides’s argument that the truest cause of the war was Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens is rooted in efforts by Athens, Corinth, and ultimately Sparta itself to continue the First Peloponnesian War by indirect means and proxies. One proxy was Corcyra, an island off the northwestern coast of Greece in the Ionian Sea, the other Potidaea, a city on the Chalcidic Peninsula, in the Aegean Sea in northeastern Greece. Corinth was at the center of both controversies. Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra on the Adriatic, underwent
one of the revolutions common in ancient Greece, with the popular party exiling the oligarchic one. The oligarchs sought aid from local barbarian tribes and began to wage an insurgency to get their city back. Finding itself in need of foreign aid, the popular party asked for help from the mother country, but Corcyra refused. The popular party then sought aid from Corinth, which had established Corcyra originally as its own colony and now deeply resented it for taking an independent, isolationist foreign policy—that is, for rejecting Corinth’s traditional hegemony in northwestern Greece (1.25). Probably as a way to restore that hegemony, Corinth was all too happy to help the popular party in Epidamnus, but its efforts to do so alarmed the Corcyreans. With the third-largest fleet in Greece, the Corcyreans were able to defeat Corinth, which had the second-largest fleet, and Corinth’s allies at the battle of Leukimme (1.26). Humiliated, the Corinthians sought revenge and began to build a bigger navy and called on all their allies for aid, with those allies forming inside the Peloponnesian League a coalition perhaps more likely to follow the lead of Corinth than of Sparta (1.27). Seeing the naval balance turn against them, the Corcyreans appealed to Athens, the largest naval power, with an offer of an alliance.

What made their appeal an offer the Athenians could not refuse? Ideally, in their view, Corcyra and Corinth might wear out each other’s navies, thus leaving Athens in a stronger position relative to both (1.49). But what if Corcyra lost? In ancient Greece, naval battles did not depend so much on sinking ships as on disabling them, often by stripping their oars. The victor often gained control of the defeated belligerent’s ships, towed them to port, and repaired them for combat again. If Corinth defeated Corcyra, it might gain control of all or most of the latter’s navy, thus tipping the naval balance against Athens, which needed control of the sea to feed itself in wartime and raise tribute within its empire. Otherwise, with an undefeated Corcyra as an ally Athens would substantially increase its naval power, but for what purpose? Containing Corinth was surely part of the story, but so too, Thucydides made clear, were Italy and Sicily, not as projects of immediate expansion but as somewhat vague yet highly passionate and deeply held aspirations to be achieved when opportunity knocked (1.33–36, 1.44). During the First Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had set up at Nisaea, Pegae, Achaea, and Naupactus bases that would have enabled them to expand toward the west. Fear of westward Athenian expansion was surely part of Corinth’s hostility to Athens; denying Corinth the use of Corcyra as a base was also essential if Athens meant to compete with Corinth for influence in Italy and Sicily.

As the Corcyreans pointed out, an alliance with them would not violate the letter of the Thirty Year Peace. That treaty prohibited Athens and Sparta from poaching members of each other’s alliance, but since Corcyra had been neutral and isolationist, genuinely impartial arbitration would not prove Athens had
violated the treaty. So an alliance with Corcyra gave Athens the chance of gaining the fruits of a major military victory without giving the Peloponnesians a legitimate cause of war (1.35). Athenian diplomacy under Pericles thus appears to have been following a Sun Tzuian strategy to “subdue the enemy without fighting,” an approach that the Eastern sage called the “acme of skill,” more so even than winning “a hundred battles.” Although the Athenians initially rejected the offer of an alliance, in a subsequent assembly meeting they accepted a merely defensive arrangement, supplying strict rules of engagement to their commanders not to interfere in Corcyra’s war with Corinth unless Corcyra itself was endangered. In theory, the defensive alliance would deter Corinth, thus giving Athens the fruits of military victory without war. This was a diplomatic gamble with high rewards but no less high risks. If Corinth was in fact deterred by the Athenian alliance with Corcyra, escalation would stop and Athens’ position in western Greece would improve enormously. Athens would have taken a huge step toward revising the Thirty Year Peace without having to fight a war. Unfortunately for Athens, Corinth was not deterred and began to succeed against its former colony. Corinth began to win a naval battle at Sybota, thus drawing the Athenian navy into combat to save Corcyra’s navy, in turn making possible escalation to a great-power war with Corinth’s ally, Sparta (1.44–54).

Still, there was no declared war yet. In part because Corinth relied on “volunteers,” this conflict was still seen as a private one between Corcyra and Corinth, not between the rival alliances (1.26). Yet it would be wrong to say the Second Peloponnesian War had not yet begun. The Corinthians warned the Athenians that an alliance with Corcyra would mean war with them and eventually their allies (1.42). Thinking such war was inevitable, many Athenians thought it best for war to begin with Corcyra as an ally rather than a neutral vulnerable to Corinth (1.40–42, 1.44). True to their word, the Corinthians began to sponsor a rebellion in Athens’ tribute-paying ally Potidaea. Once again, in an exercise of “plausible deniability,” Corinth sent volunteers, so no one could say it was directing the affair and dragging the Peloponnesian League into a major war. Significantly, representatives from Potidaea convinced the Spartan authorities to promise to invade Attica once their rebellion began (1.58). The Spartans’ promise put their credibility at stake, with huge implications for the viability of the Peloponnesian League.

From this perspective, the famous debate in Sparta that in Thucydides’s narrative followed immediately on these events looks like a controversy less about whether to go to war than whether to escalate an ongoing war. After all, the Spartans were planning on invading Attica even before the debate began, thus helping us understand why Thucydides believed the stated grievances in the debates were not as important as the underlying causes of the war. Corinthian representatives present egged on the Spartans, arguing that the entire balance
of power, understood in social as well as geopolitical terms, was tipping against them: Spartans had to act soon, before it was too late to check the Athenians, whose diplomatic gamble all sides’ leaders understood completely (1.70–71). Just in case the Spartans did not get the point, however, the Corinthians concluded their speech with a demand that Sparta “assist your allies and Potidaea, in particular, as you promised, by a speedy invasion of Attica” and “not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance” (1.71). This threat to leave the Peloponnesian League may have been hollow, but apparently the Spartans did not think they could afford to call the Corinthians’ bluff, perhaps especially since the Corinthians suggested they would take other allies with them.

Ironically, the unnamed Athenian envoys whose speech followed the Corinthians’ probably only fanned the flames of war in Sparta, though that was not their intent. They meant to show the power of Athens and thus to deter the Spartans; instead, their speech proved highly provocative. They declared that the Athenians were compelled by the three strongest passions in human nature (fear, honor, and interest) to acquire their empire, sustain it, and expand it. Anyone else, they claimed, would have done the same thing, for “it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger” (1.76). If Corinth was right to argue that Athens’ power was growing rapidly—through the alliance with Corcyra, for example—the envoys’ defense of the Athenian empire merely proved the danger it posed to the weak, whom it would subject when opportunity was ripe. Not for the last time, the Athenians, by frank presentation of Machtpolitik, undermined their diplomatic objectives. Quite unintentionally, they confirmed the worst nightmares of everyone present. Because they thought it was natural and inevitable for the strong to rule the weak, the Athenians would expand until they met equal or superior strength, thus also confirming the Corinthian envoys’ portrait of the Athenians as a people “who were born into the world to take no rest themselves and give none to others” (1.70). Not surprisingly, then, the majority of Spartans at the assembly voted that the “Athenians were open aggressors, and that war must be declared at once” (1.79).

Still, the Spartan king Archidamus, who was “reputed to be wise and moderate,” tried to prevent further escalation, if only because the moment was not auspicious, not least from the diplomatic and legal points of view. The Athenians had concluded their speech by warning the Spartans not to break the treaty or violate their oaths but to go to arbitration first, thus suggesting the Spartans would otherwise assume responsibility for violating the peace (1.78). Archidamus did not want that responsibility without sufficient moral and legal justification, however. It might prove difficult to sustain support for the war within Sparta and among its allies, and to whatever extent he may have been pious, he might have wondered
about the reaction of the gods. Indeed, Thucydides reports much later, doubts that Sparta had a just cause for the war or that it had begun in a just manner (in a surprise attack on Plataea by Thebes, a Spartan ally) had a detrimental impact on Spartan morale for much of the war. The Spartans actually believed they deserved their misfortunes, that the gods were punishing them for their injustice (1.85, 6.105, 7.18).

So Archidamus now tried to delay offensive action until the Spartans had a better pretext for war, meanwhile gathering allies among both Greeks and barbarians, raising money, and developing some form of naval power—to buy time for a long war in multiple theaters that he did not think Sparta could win with the resources and justification at hand (1.80–82). That he feared the Spartans might leave the war as a “legacy to our children” should give the lie to all claims that he at least expected to win quickly through a battle of annihilation on land (1.81). Invading Attica could aid allies like Corinth and Potidaea but was unlikely to win the war. He had to order early invasions of Attica, yet he doubted they would prove decisive. He “hoped” the Athenians would commit the blunder of fighting the invaders outside their walls (2.20), though his first speech explained that such a hope was entirely unrealistic: “Never let us be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by a devastation of their lands” (1.81).

In light of Corinth’s threat to defect from the Peloponnesian League unless Sparta took “speedy” action (1.71), however, the king’s reputation for wisdom in this particular case appears to exceed his actual merits. Archidamus had a clear grasp of the likely stalemate the war would produce, Sparta’s need for foreign aid (from Persia especially), and Sparta’s need to acquire naval power to inspire revolts among Athenian allies so as to break the likely stalemate—all of which would take time (1.82–83). Yet it was the Spartan ephor (elected leader) Sthenelaidas, who comes off as an angry demagogue, who got the Corinthian message completely. It was “put up or shut up” time. The Spartans could “neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin,” because the surest way by which Athens could expand was by picking off Sparta’s allies one by one (1.86).

If Athenian strategy was to destroy the Peloponnesian League, the best strategy for Sparta was to defend the league by keeping its promises to its allies, before it lost them, even if that meant going to war before Sparta was fully prepared. Such, at least, was Thucydides’s view: “The growth of Athenian power could no longer be ignored” by the Spartans, because “their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments” (1.118). The problem was that Sparta’s fear was not a sufficient legal or moral rationale for war, which helps to explain the fumbling and hilarious way in which the Spartans sought to make the struggle a holy war, so to speak. They demanded that the Athenians “cast out the curse” of a goddess
the Athenians were said to have offended (1.126). Deftly, the Athenians under Pericles, who was implicated by ancestry in the curse and was unwilling to give up the leverage of arbitration, refused to give the Spartans a religious pretext for war and told them to cast out their own curse (1.128).

Thucydides did not say all we would like to know about the origins of the Second Peloponnesian War. In particular, he said little or nothing about the character and strength of parties in both Athens and Sparta for and against revising the Thirty Year Peace, though there is evidence they existed. The problem is that estimating their influence can be only a matter of speculation, especially in Sparta, for which written records are few. Nonetheless, Thucydides succeeded in demonstrating that there was more than ample reason for Sparta to fear the growth of Athenian power enough to be willing to go to war, which was his primary purpose. Not only was Athens a de facto island, invulnerable to Spartan land power. Not only did every day of peace favor Athens, as it became stronger through wealth and tribute. Not only did each passing day give the Athenians time to build ever more ships and train crews to project their power wherever their ships could go. Not only had the Athenians announced publicly that they considered it natural and inevitable for the strong to rule the weak, with the implication that they would rule wherever they were strong. Not only had the Athenians crushed rebels, like Thasos and Samos, time and time again, thus demonstrating what would happen to the victims of their power. Not only had the Athenians used the letter of the arbitration clause in the Thirty Year Peace to undermine the spirit of the treaty and to expand to Corcyra and potentially far beyond in the west, where no one in the Peloponnesian League had ever intended they should go. They had also crossed a red line, by putting such pressure on Spartan allies, Corinth and its followers, that Sparta had to go to war to aid them or risk having fewer allies or even none at all. At that point even its marvelous hoplite army might prove vulnerable to an expanded Athenian alliance, including perhaps some of Sparta’s most important traditional allies.

II
Thucydides’s stress on Sparta’s fear of losing allies is essential to understanding each side’s war aims, the strategies each developed pursuant to them, and why it would be extraordinarily difficult for either side to make a peace it regarded as final. Sparta had both minimum and maximum goals, which correspond loosely to what Clausewitzians call “limited” and “unlimited” war objectives. Sparta’s immediate and minimum objective was to save its alliance by aiding its allies, who might be appeased if Sparta persuaded Athens to leave them alone and return to something like the Thirty Year Peace. This explains why lifting the siege of Potidaea and repealing the Megarian decree, which denied the Megarians the
ability to trade with the Delian League, were part of the Spartan ultimatums and pretexts for war (1.139). If Athens complied, Sparta could satisfy its allies without fighting Athens. If possible, however, Sparta aimed also to “break” the power of Athens, which would require Athens to “let the Hellenes be independent” (1.118, 1.139). This final ultimatum escalated from the more moderate ones regarding Megara, Potidaea, and Aegina and from earlier religious pretexts for war. Compliance would require the Athenians to disband the Delian League, which would reverse the previous peace settlement to the status quo before the Persian Wars, when Sparta had been the clear hegemon in Greece—an ambitious objective for which Sparta and its allies clearly and simply lacked the means. As a pretext for war, demanding that Athens free the Greeks was nonetheless useful strategically for Sparta. Freeing the Greeks was most certainly as much public diplomacy, or what we today call “strategic communication,” as an objective for Sparta. All Greeks, except the Athenians, could be united behind freeing other Greeks from Athens. Like the Atlantic Charter in World War II, this slogan expressed principles enormously helpful for building an extended coalition in a protracted multitheater war and bought Sparta much sympathy as the liberator of Greece throughout the Hellenic world (2.8).

At a minimum, Sparta had to stop Athens from poaching on its allies. In the best case, however, it would seek to overthrow the Athenian empire—but how? As the king of Siam says in the Broadway musical The King and I, that “is a puzzle.” For all the reasons explained by Archidamus previously, Sparta had no direct way of challenging Athenian power. Secure behind the walls, able to feed themselves by sea, and with a navy to ensure the allies did their bidding and paid their dues, the Athenians could wage a protracted war, even indefinitely. They could wait the Spartans out. All Sparta would be able to do would be to invade Attica, which the Athenians, since the time of Themistocles, had been willing to give up until the invader went home. As Archidamus understood, Spartan victory would depend on things and events Spartans could not control and over which they had little influence: ships and money from allies, including cities in Sicily and Italy and the Persians (who were unlikely to intervene as long as Athens was dominant at sea); rebellions within the Delian League; and above all else, Athenian mistakes, which Pericles was determined to prevent (1.82–83). All of Sparta’s prospects were based on hope, though hope is not a strategy. Obliged to save their alliance, the Spartans were trapped in the most unenviable position—they would have to prosecute a war without a clear strategy for victory, pouncing when opportunity arose, which, given the slow and ponderous character of Spartans, was almost as unlikely as Athenian errors that would give the Spartans the opportunity to win (1.70, 2.65).
As for the Athenians, their immediate and minimum aims were cautious, their ultimate and maximum ones grandiose, indeed simply utopian. Their aims reflect the character of the Athenian statesman Pericles, who sought great things through calibrated measures (though the tension between his ambition and his caution has led to a great deal of confusion about his strategy, especially among those who study strategy professionally). As Platias and Koliopoulos observe, there is a difference between strategy proper, primarily dealing with military activity, which is the principal subject of Clausewitz, and grand strategy, including the usual diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities by which states seek to achieve their objectives before, during, and after actual hostilities, a subject Sun Tzu investigated somewhat more.  

Most accounts of Pericles as a strategist focus on his minimum objective to hold on to the Athenian empire, but offer a merely military conception of his strategy. They stress how he employed the Athenian army and navy once hostilities broke out and conclude that he meant to wage a strategy of exhaustion. From this point of view, he meant to win by not losing, holding out behind the walls of Athens, maintaining control of the sea, avoiding direct battle with Peloponnesian ground forces of equal or greater strength, keeping the Peloponnesians off balance and lifting morale at home with raids on the Peloponnesus, and avoiding new wars of conquest while still at war with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League.  

What is left out of this approach is the diplomacy by which especially Pericles meant not merely to preserve but also to grow the Athenian empire. Without that component, accounts of Pericles’s strategy are one-sided, cartoon-like caricatures of the real thing. Without attention to Pericles’s prewar diplomacy, his military strategy is disconnected from his grand strategy in such a way as to obscure his ultimate objectives and how he meant to achieve them. The lesson that Pericles took from the First Peloponnesian War was, not to refrain from further expansion when circumstances permitted, but to avoid the blunders Athens had made in the first round by ensuring above all else that Athens did not get overextended. In other words, it was not policy but strategy that he meant to change.  

Among other things, this change included the use of diplomacy, often seen as an alternative to war, as a continuation of war by other means. This applied especially to the requirement in the Thirty Year Peace treaty that quarrels between the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues be settled by arbitration, with a “legalistic interpretation of the arbitration clause to disguise an Athenian bid for domination.” Thucydides’s distinction between the stated and truest causes of the war is, among other things, an admonition to beware statesmen who, often because their motives are not publicly defensible, conceal them. Ironically, just as Sparta disguised a defensive war to preserve its alliance as an offensive war to free the Greeks, so too did Athens under Pericles disguise an offensive diplomatic
initiative to expand the empire as a defensive effort to preserve the Thirty Year Peace. Academic realists have often admired Thucydides for stressing Sparta’s fear of Athens’ growth, but a genuine realist, paying attention to what Clausewitz called the “moral factors” (which he claimed constituted more than half of real strength), must take his hat off to Thucydides for showing how and why both sides considered it necessary at least to appear to hold the moral high ground.

Precisely because Athens had not violated the letter of the Thirty Year Peace in allying with Corcyra, Pericles knew Athens was unlikely to lose in any impartial effort to settle the disputes through arbitration. Because the alliance was not compatible with the spirit of the treaty, however, it was also entirely predictable that Corinth would seek Spartan aid in response. Whether Sparta went to war or not, Athens had a good chance to break out of the containment against westward expansion established under the Thirty Year Peace. Since Pericles was no fool, he must have assumed Corinth would threaten to defect unless Sparta went to war. If Corinth left the Peloponnesian League, Athenian power relative to the Peloponnesian League (Pericles’s primary adversary) would grow diplomatically, not merely through the alliance with Corcyra but also by dividing Sparta from Corinth, its chief and wealthiest ally and the only one with a significant navy, and, not least important, by reducing its access to northern Greece. If Sparta and the other Peloponnesian cities did go to war against Athens, however, but proved incapable of aiding Corinth effectively against Corcyra and Sparta so found itself compelled to make peace at some later date, Athens might still succeed at dividing the Peloponnesians. There was a good chance that not merely Corinth but also other important Spartan allies, like Thebes and Megara, would find Sparta useless for their own purposes. They might even feel betrayed by Sparta, as in fact they would immediately after the Peace of Nicias, and begin to form their own alliance, possibly including Argos, leaving Sparta so distracted by the shifting balance of power inside the Peloponnesus that it would be unable to act outside of it (5.22, 5.27).

So whether the conflict was settled through arbitration, which was preferable, or through war, which was acceptable, Athens could retain Corcyra, build a chain of bases in and outside the Crisaean Gulf to get to Corcyra, and have secure communications to and from Italy and Sicily. All Athens had to do to break up the Peloponnesian League and escape from its containment was outlast Spartan will to wage war, though it might shorten the length of time it could take Sparta to sue for peace with a judicious mix of defensive and offensive operations.

The problem is that Pericles did not explain his grand strategy publicly, though he did state publicly that there was more to what he was doing than he was willing to say in the Athenian assembly. He had many reasons to “hope for a favorable outcome,” provided Athens did not make the same mistakes as in the First
Peloponnesian War, but, he said, he would explain his reasons later in “another speech,” meaning one has to look at all of his speeches to grasp the totality of his strategy. So we do not have to suspect that Pericles was keeping some cards close to his vest—he actually said so (1.144). When a statesman of his caliber deliberately informs his audience he is being discreet, one needs to treat him seriously. To grasp his strategic vision one must look as much at what he does in power as at what he says. Indeed, even Pericles’s public remarks about his merely military strategy do not explain all he had in mind, perhaps because he did not wish to broadcast his intentions to enemies abroad and rivals at home on the very eve of the war. In his first speech, he still sought to win without fighting by demanding that the Peloponnesians settle through arbitration the totality of matters in dispute (1.140, 1.144). That totality (from the Athenian viewpoint, expanding via Corcyra, securing the empire against revolt at Potidaea, pressuring Megara to defect to the Delian League through economic sanctions, etc.), however, was so important that, he argued, the Athenians should accept the risk that the Peloponnesians would go to war rather than submit to their ultimatums. As a result, he stressed Athenian strengths more than weaknesses in his first speech. For all the reasons seen by Archidamus, he understood that Sparta and its allies had no direct way to overthrow Athens. The strategy of defense by land and offense by sea, which Pericles had inherited from Themistocles, meant that Athens could repel repeated invasions by land, control its allies, and launch attacks all around the Peloponnesus at targets of opportunity (1.93, 1.142).

Although these early Athenian offensive operations are often dismissed as mere raids, there has been, in the language of the 9/11 Commission Report, a substantial failure of strategic imagination, a huge failure to “connect the dots” to construct a strategic pattern underlying these operations. Consistent with Pericles’s caution, if Athenian invaders got into trouble on land they could withdraw by sea, so they could always limit their losses, as Wellington did in Iberia during the Napoleonic Wars. Also, if only because they were inexperienced in operations in the Peloponnesus and hesitated to go too far inland, the Athenians were none too daring and often lost opportunities, like capturing Methone early in the war, as a result. Sooner or later, however, they might find a Spartan nerve and gain leverage for negotiations. So to understand the offensive component of Pericles’s strategy of unremitting pressure on a fragile alliance, one must look at where the Athenians operated while he was still the first man in Athens and its leading strategist.

The first order of strategic business was to get Megara to flip back to the Delian League. The Athenians certainly did not fail to do so for lack of offensive spirit or action. Pericles led the largest land force in Athenian history to capture Megara in 431, the first year of the war. Sometimes Thucydides leaves out details
important for understanding the strategic purpose of operations early in the war but mentions them much later. One example is that the Athenians attacked Megara twice per year, sometimes with most of their hoplite army, sometimes only with cavalry (2.31, 4.66), meaning that this was a do-or-die objective for Athens, which had only itself to blame for the long walls that enabled Megara to resist repeated assaults. In the eighth year of the war, partly with the aid of a fifth column, the Athenians took Megara’s port at Nisaea and came within days, hours, or even minutes of taking the city too (4.69). Had they succeeded, they would have reversed much of the result of the First Peloponnesian War (and prevented Brasidas from leading his daring Spartan expedition to Chalcidice). Attica would have been safe from invasion, Sparta divided from Thebes, Athens enabled to expand through the Crisaean Gulf, and Corinth howling mad, perhaps even angry enough to carry out its threat to defect from the Spartan alliance.

Under Pericles the Athenians experimented, tentatively, with several other options as well. In the second year of the war Pericles led a hundred Athenian ships, fifty allied ships, four thousand hoplites, and three hundred cavalry to Epidaurus. They ravaged the territory, as usual, but also had “hopes of taking the city by assault” (2.56). This operation failed; the Epidaurians closed their gates and the Athenians left in a hurry, perhaps for fear of the arrival of Spartan ground forces. Still, the failed operation points toward a more imaginative strategy than commonly ascribed to Pericles. Once again, Thucydides does not make clear the strategic purpose of this operation when it happened. One has to connect the dots. In the thirteenth year of the war, Argos sought to capture Epidaurus for the explicit purpose of ensuring the neutrality of Corinth and giving the Athenians “shorter passage for their reinforcements” (5.55) to Argos, meaning Argos and Athens understood that Epidaurus was vital for joining their forces against Sparta and neutralizing Corinth. Had Athens taken Epidaurus, the Athenian-Argive alliance that almost defeated Sparta in 418 might well have begun in the second, not the fourteenth, year of the war, with Pericles rather than Alcibiades in command and no Nicias to obstruct going for the Spartan jugular or forcing Corinth out of the war.

As Pericles had suggested before the war, the Athenians could also fortify a base, whether at Methone (while he was still alive), at Pylos (after his death), or elsewhere in Sparta, to support a revolt of the Helots, with essential aid from the Messenian exiles at Naupactus (1.142, 2.25, 4.3–15). This would force Sparta into a two-front war, which, given its relative poverty, it could afford much less than Athens. Under Pericles, the Athenians also sought to bottle up Corinth and secure their lines of communications to Corcyra and beyond by gaining control of low-hanging fruit—islands off the coast of the Peloponnesus like Zacynthus and Cephallenia (2.7), thus adding pressure on Corinth to go its own way and
leave Sparta in the lurch. Certainly to secure their rear, but perhaps also to obtain much-needed new ground forces, the Athenians under Pericles also allied with both the Macedonians and the Thracians (2.29), though they turned out to be unreliable to say the least.

It is not at all surprising that these early efforts to seize the strategic initiative were operational failures, or conversely, that the Spartans were slow to compete with the Athenians at sea, where the Athenians had the upper hand. Each side was experimenting, cautiously, with fighting in its opponent’s element. The Athenians were learning on the fly how to operate in hostile Peloponnesian territory at a time when the prestige of Sparta’s hoplite army was near its peak. Had some or all of these operations panned out while Pericles was still alive, however, the Spartans might well have had to negotiate peace, and the Athenians could have asked for some or all of the gains they had lost under the Thirty Year Peace—Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea—as Cleon would later do when the fortunes of war turned more in Athenian favor (4.21). The Second Peloponnesian War would have overturned the settlement of the first. If it had, the route to expansion in the west would have been clear. Operational failure, in other words, is no proof of a failure of strategic imagination on the part of Pericles. As is true also of the failure of the Spartans to use their fledgling navy effectively to support revolts against Athens on the island of Lesbos (3.25–35), operational failure was simply the most likely beginning in the asymmetric struggle between Athenian sea and Spartan land power, when neither side had either the confidence, the experience, or the commanders to gain decisive results.

Pericles’s ultimate objectives were substantially more ambitious than most students of strategy today are wont to admit. Virtually unlimited expansion was not on the minds only of the Athenians under Pericles when they made the alliance with Corcyra, with Italy and Sicily the ultimate prize. It was emphatically part of Pericles’s ambition too. This war escalates not merely militarily but also rhetorically. Pericles’s first speech is cautious; his second proud, defiant, and hubristic; his last over the top in a manner that explains why his ward Alcibiades, despite his recklessness, was Pericle’s natural heir, the one who best understood that Pericles along with many others had been thinking about Italy and Sicily from the beginning, just not ready to go west until he had broken up the Peloponnesian League.

In Pericles’s final speech to the Athenians he put on the table some of the cards he had refused to show in his first speech. With the Athenians suffering from plague and clamoring for peace, he sought to bolster their spirits. He chose to “reveal an advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think has never suggested itself to you”—or apparently many students of this war either—“and which I never mentioned in my previous speeches.” The “visible field of action” in the war had “two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these, you
are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval resources are such that your naval vessels may go anywhere they please, without the King” of Persia “or any other nation being able to stop them” (2.62). That was how Pericles sought to prevent the Athenians from making a premature peace in a moment of weakness, by dangling the opportunity of unlimited maritime empire before them. It was because of this seemingly unlimited ability to go anywhere in the Mediterranean world by sea that the Athenians “held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state.” Not merely to hold such rule but to gain more of it, and with it “the greatest name in the world,” a name that would live forever, was the ultimate goal of Periclean policy and strategy (2.64).

Such a goal might seem preposterous to modern Americans, whose democratic ethos makes them uncomfortable with and suspicious of those who wear their desire for glory on their sleeves. Since the age of George Washington, Americans have preferred that their statesmen and generals cloak their ambition, however great, with humility. Worse still, Clausewitz’s effort to understand war as it ought to be, as a potentially rational human endeavor, sometimes inclines strategists who have learned from him to ignore war as it often is, the product of deeply irrational forces in human nature, including the ancient desire to prove superiority to everyone else and thereby gain a kind of immortality through fame. In that way, both the modern democratic ethos and the Clausewitzian approach to politics and war can combine to blind us to the true objectives of belligerents, for any account of war in the ancient Greek world from the age of Homer to Alexander the Great that leaves out honor, fame, and glory as motives of both leaders and citizens is inconsistent with what it meant to be Greek.

In that way our ethos and our analytical tools can lead us to fail to understand the true character of the conflict, though Clausewitz himself claimed that gaining such understanding is the first, the supreme, the farthest-reaching act of judgment for any war, the one essential to understanding everything else. So an idealized version of Clausewitz applied as a template to Thucydides can wind up distorting the latter’s account, turning it into what we think it ought to be, not what it was in fact. The problem is not in Clausewitz but in his readers’ failure to understand Thucydides on his own terms. To avoid distorting the war to suit our times and our ways of studying strategy, we have to get beyond how we today respond to the call to glory. We have to understand the deadly seriousness of Pericles in expressing, quintessentially, the ruling passion for power and glory among the Greeks.

Thucydides concluded his eulogy of Pericles by stressing the “easy triumph” Pericles foresaw over the “unaided forces of the Peloponnesians,” meaning that Pericles’s strategy was to deal with the Peloponnesians first, others later (2.65).
His confidence was not unfounded. So long as he could prevent third-party intervention, he had grounds to think the Peloponnesian League would crumble over time. Under no circumstances did he want a war with the Peloponnesians and with other powers—like Egypt, Persia, or Sicily—at the same time, which would have been to repeat the great blunder of the First Peloponnesian War. Pericles towers above his successors not because Thucydides had unlimited regard for him or failed to recognize something deeply flawed and highly unstable in his unique blend of caution and ambition. The only statesman or general who receives anything like unlimited praise from Thucydides is Themistocles, the founder of the strategy of defense by land and offense by sea (1.138); Pericles was not in the same league. But Pericles was unlikely, had he not died in 429, to have tried to expand the empire until his strategy to break up the Peloponnesian League was fully accomplished—that is, until it would have been possible to expand in relative safety from the threat of a multifront war.

Nonetheless, Pericles’s grand vision of a Mediterranean empire was utopian, for the simple reason that tiny Athens could never generate the resources required to preserve maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea even if it gained it. The more Athens expanded, the weaker it would become and the more vulnerable it would be to efforts by Sparta or some other power to tie it down in a multitheater war. Indeed, even the cautious side of Pericles’s strategy, based on outlasting Sparta, was almost equally utopian, because the Athenians, who could neither rest nor give rest to others, were the wrong people to execute it, if any people could have. Retreating behind walls called for qualities of character inconsistent with Athenian society and culture, perhaps even with human nature itself. The Athenians, a people of seemingly limitless enterprise and energy, could not be patient. Pericles had enormous difficulty preventing them from fighting in open battle outside the city’s walls, where they were almost certain to be defeated by the superior Spartans and their allies (2.21). He had even greater difficulty convincing them not to make a premature peace during the plague, which may have killed almost a third of the Athenian people. When Pericles himself died of the plague, his successors—each quarreling over different pieces of the strategy, with some, like Nicias, embracing his caution and others, like Cleon and Alcibiades, seeking to fulfill his grandiose ambition—proved incapable of putting Humpty-Dumpty back together again (2.65).

III

In light of these policies and strategies within Sparta and Athens, it was going to be very difficult to bring the Second Peloponnesian War to an end, and not for want of trying. To see why, consider three different Thucydidean accounts of war termination between Athens and the Peloponnesians in the Second
Peloponnesian War. The first attempt occurred during the plague, when Athens was down but not out; the second after Athenian victories at Pylos and Sphacteria, when Sparta in its turn was down but, again, not out. The last occurred after the Spartan victories in Chalcidice, at Amphipolis especially, and Athenian defeat on land in Boeotia at the battle of Delium. In the last instance both sides were down, but each had some leverage over the other and so could bargain and negotiate.

In contrast to his ample detail about the symptoms of the plague in Athens, Thucydides is surprisingly reticent about the peace talks for which the plague was the major contributing cause. Thucydides introduces his account of the plague immediately after Pericles’s Funeral Oration, itself noteworthy for present purposes for its discussion of the accomplishments and ambitions of different Athenian generations and for its demands on Athenian women, mothers especially. Pericles called attention to the grandparents in his audience, the ones who had fought at Marathon and Salamis, thus saving Greece—perhaps all of Europe—from Persian rule. He also called attention to the parents in his audience, the ones who had established the Athenian empire throughout the Aegean (2.36).

His central theme, however, was the current generation of Athenians and the beauty, nobility, power, and greatness of their city, including (but by no means limited to) their free way of life. What could the younger generation do to equal or surpass its ancestors? Since the subject of the Funeral Oration was not democracy as such but the fame of being an Athenian, and thus the immortality of name that might compensate for mortality in combat, that question needed to be addressed. Great things do not come from puny efforts. As Pericles had said earlier (1.143), the Athenians could not pine over the loss of their homes and farms and ancestral gods as the Spartans ravaged Attica. Merely to equal the heroes of Salamis they would have to be willing to abandon all these things, as Themistocles had advised them to do when he developed the strategy of the long walls (1.93). They would have to understand that when Athenians died in battle they gained immortality. Hence, the few (so far) who had fallen in combat “received the renown which never grows old, and for a tomb, not so much that in which their bodies have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or story shall be commemorated” (2.43). Since they had purchased immortality with their lives, their sacrifices were not losses at all but gains for themselves as individuals and for Athenians collectively.

Significantly, if any Athenian desired glory beyond that of his grandparents and his parents, it would not be enough to preserve what had already been acquired. As Abraham Lincoln explained at the Springfield Young Men’s Lyceum in 1838, the young may earn respect but not glory by perpetuating the accomplishments...
of their forebears. The most ambitious, the ones who belong to “the family of the lion” and “the tribe of the eagle”—like Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, and, one must add, Alcibiades—aspire to much more than perpetuating other people’s glory. “Towering genius disdains a beaten path. It seeks regions hitherto unexplored. It sees no distinction in adding story to story, upon the monuments of fame, erected in the memory of others. . . . It scorns to tread in the footsteps of any predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts and burns for distinction; and if possible, it will have it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves [Lincoln’s eventual role] or enslaving freemen [the role the Athenians chose].” Greeks were agonistic (that is, competitive), especially with each other, and especially for that highest term of praise in Homer, “godlike.” If the members of the current generation were to engage in a competition with each other, and with their ancestors, to be like the gods, they would have to go and do something significant where no Athenian had gone or done anything remarkable before, which would not be easy. Pericles boasted that they had already “forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for good [to friends] or evil [to enemies], have left imperishable monuments behind us” (2.41).

Their parents had already built the empire in the east. So the best chance of earning immortal fame for the current generation was in gaining an empire in the west—that is, in revising the Thirty Year Peace on terms that in time might more than double the size of the Athenian empire. Such an accomplishment would more than compensate for the casualties; indeed, even if Athens failed, it might earn glory merely for having braved so much. “Comfort, therefore, not condolence,” is what Pericles had to offer the parents of the dead, for “fortunate indeed are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which caused [their parents’] mourning” (2.44). In light of that good fortune, the best that could be done, by those capable of it, for the dead, for themselves, and for Athens, whose interests were presumably all in harmony, was to have more children, who could grow up to fight for Athens and continue the cycle of aspiring for glory, to be like the gods, by risking all in combat—that is, through endless war (2.44). Perhaps unintentionally, and quite tragically, Pericles, whose strategy depended on calibrated steps toward a larger goal, in the Funeral Oration found it necessary to boost morale by getting the Athenians drunk on ambition. The elder statesman could hold his liquor, but not his younger successors.

The plague did not show up in Athens an hour, a day, or a week after Pericles gave this challenge to Athenians to gain immortal fame in endless competition; it came half a year later. But Thucydides deliberately inserted his account of the plague immediately after the speech. Perhaps the main reason Thucydides’s account of the plague occurs where it does in his narrative is to remind us that there is a limit to our ability to be heroes and sacrifice for a presumably common good.
As Clausewitz observed, the sacrifices demanded in time of war can pass the culminating point of social tolerance. One reason wars never or rarely become absolutely “total” is that “in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would cause.” The contrast between what Pericles asked of Athenians when facing death and what they actually did when they all thought they had been sentenced to an agonizing death by disease is striking, and intentional. Among other things, Athenians ceased to care about funeral rites, sometimes having “recourse to the most shameless modes of burial,” such as throwing bodies on top of funeral pyres meant for others and then running away. Perseverance “in what men call honor was popular with none, it was so uncertain they would be spared to obtain the object.” The Athenians lost all “fear of gods or law of man. . . . As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offenses[,] . . . and before they fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little” (2.52–53). In times like those—apparently the “end days,” as fundamentalists might say today—it was only natural for the people to swing to extremes, from irreligion and hedonism to superstition. So some consulted oracles and blamed the plague on the war and on those, like Pericles, who had convinced them, walled and crammed inside the city with little shelter (like refugees from Hurricane Katrina in the New Orleans Superdome in 2005), to accept the war rather than submit to Sparta’s ultimatums.

Hawks like Pericles became increasingly unpopular as a result, but amazingly, after losing as many citizens to the plague as they were likely to have lost in a protracted war, the Athenians kept up the fight, trying to take Epidaurus, attacking Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, and reinforcing the besiegers at Potidaea (who had also caught the plague) (2.56–57). At the same time, however, having endured perhaps more than human nature can bear, they “became eager to come to terms with Sparta, and actually sent ambassadors thither who however did not succeed in their mission” (2.59).

Thucydides does not explain the failure of this peace mission. We can make only intelligent inferences. The plague had put the Athenians in a world of pain, and the Spartans knew it. If all the Spartans had asked for was a return to the status quo ante, the fighting might have stopped, but the war would not have ended. The result would not have been final, because once the pressure of the annual invasions of Attica was off, the Athenians would have returned to their homes in the suburbs, escaped the crowding of the city, recovered their health, and (following Pericles’s advice) had more children—that is, baby soldiers and sailors for the next round. Also, Sparta could not act as a free agent. Having escalated the conflict at the behest of its allies, it could not make a separate peace without risking their loss.
In any case, if the result was to be final, the Spartans had to keep the pressure on, but the nature of their maximal political demand—that Athens liberate the Hellenes by dissolving its empire—was such that the Athenians could not accept it without committing strategic suicide. As Pericles said in his third speech, when he tried to dissuade Athenians from making a premature peace, the empire might have been unjust to acquire but was imprudent to let go. “For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong; but to let it go is unsafe” (2.63). The Persians might make a comeback. Athenian allies (subjects) might seek revenge. Without allies, Athens would have had no tribute to fund its navy and no trade to feed itself if the Peloponnesians renewed the war, with bitter Corinth egging on the Spartans to seek a “final solution,” such as killing all the men in Athens and selling the women and children into slavery, as indeed Corinth would propose at the very end of the war.29 With their backs against the wall, literally on what Sun Tzu called “death ground,” with no choice but to keep fighting or die, the Athenians had good reason to refuse Sparta’s maximal terms.30 Conversely, the Spartans, presumably thinking Athens was down for the count, would have had good reason to refuse possible concessions from Athens, like lifting the embargo against Megara. So long as the maximal objectives of one side were incompatible with the minimal objectives of the other, a negotiated peace was impossible. So the war went on and on and on.

Almost the inverse occurred after the great Athenian victory at Pylos. After years of trying, the Athenians struck not one but two vital nerves among the Spartans. At Pylos the Athenians had established a fortified base to support a rebellion of the Helots, thus forcing Sparta into a two-front war, with the insurgency at home inclining the Spartans to shut down the other front in Attica. At Sphacteria, an island off the coast of Pylos, the Athenians had also managed to cut off 420 Spartan hoplites, who could be supplied only by Helots swimming from the shore to the island. With these forces in danger, the Spartans made an armistice and sent an embassy to Athens offering not merely peace but an alliance (4.16–21).

Certainly, the Athenians could have had peace at this time, and a far better one than the status quo ante, but there were two fundamental obstacles. First, Cleon, the “most violent man” in Athens (3.36), did his best to sabotage the negotiations, and second, the Athenians, under the influence of Cleon, kept demanding more than Sparta could accept. The Athenians were determined to reverse the Thirty Year Peace treaty. They wanted back all that they had lost at the end of the First Peloponnesian War: Nisaea and Pegae, after the recovery of which it would probably have been only a matter of time before Megara fell and returned to the Athenian empire; Troezen, giving them a foothold on the eastern Peloponnesus near Argos, if they chose to ally with that Spartan rival in the future; and Achaea,
at the western end of the Gulf of Corinth, a foothold that (along with Naupactus) would have enabled them to control all communications, military and commercial, to and from Corcyra, Italy, Sicily, and the Crisaean Gulf (4.21). Had the Spartans accepted these demands Cleon would have earned his share of immortal fame as the greatest Athenian statesman since Themistocles, even greater than Pericles, so he had important personal motives (of the sort encouraged, ironically, by Pericles in the Funeral Oration) to make such demands and continue the war until they were accepted.

Cleon’s objectives were consistent with the most ambitious goals of Pericles, though he was not as cautious or nearly as diplomatic. By refusing to negotiate with the Spartans in secret, demanding rather that negotiations be conducted before the Athenian assembly, Cleon was using a Wilsonian approach, based on “open covenants openly arrived at,” for anything but Wilsonian ends. Cleon put the ambassadors in an impossible situation, which may well have been his object. A public discussion of the terms meant that the Spartans, whose envoys were willing to betray their allies by an alliance with Athens, would lose face with those allies and perhaps their leadership of the Peloponnesian League. If breaking up the Peloponnesian League was still the primary Athenian objective, however, Cleon ought to have accepted the Spartan offer of an alliance, which would have pushed Corinth and its coalition inside the Peloponnesian League away from Sparta. Since a Spartan king had been suspected of taking bribes from the Athenians at the end of the First Peloponnesian War and had been exiled temporarily as a result, the Spartan negotiators knew that accepting humiliating terms from the Athenians might risk exile for themselves, or worse, when they returned home.

More lenient terms from Athens might have made a difference. Perhaps the Athenians might have negotiated for something more than just an alliance (which was unlikely to last anyway). So perhaps they needed to ask for not much more than the Spartan envoys had already offered. Had the Athenians limited their demands to Nisaea and Pegae, for example, and done this in private, perhaps the Spartan negotiators would have taken the risk of political embarrassment at home for the sake of rescuing the garrison on Sphacteria, securing the return of Pylos, and preventing future aid from Athens to rebels among the Helots. With such a concession it was highly probable that Megara would have been compelled to return to the Delian League, thus walling off all of Attica from the Peloponnesians while opening access for Athenian expansion through the Crisaean Gulf. The envoys’ position had been made impossible by the nature and form of the Athenian demands, however, and they returned to Sparta. So the negotiations failed, and the war went on and on and on.
No one can know for sure whether different terms and a different way of offering them might have resulted in a treaty ending the hostilities, at least temporarily. Shortly after the botched negotiations, however, the Athenian general Demosthenes and, surprisingly, Cleon managed to defeat and capture the Spartan garrison at Sphacteria, including 120 full Spartiates, sons of the leading men in Sparta. The surrender was a severe blow to Spartan prestige. Because of the famous refusal of the three hundred Spartans to surrender to the Persians at Thermopylae, nothing in the war shocked the Greeks more than the surrender of the garrison at Sphacteria (4.38–40). The Greeks discovered that Spartans were mortal too. Moreover, the Spartans began to doubt themselves. Fearful that Helot incursions from the sanctuary at Pylos would lead to revolution at home, they ceased offensive operations outside the Peloponnesus and sent more envoys to Athens. Yet the Athenians “kept grasping for more” than the envoys could negotiate and dismissed one embassy after another (4.42). Meanwhile, the Athenians, holding hostage the prisoners taken from Sphacteria, believed they could attack almost anywhere (Corinth, the Peloponnesian coast, Anactorium, Cythera, Megara, or elsewhere) with impunity, for if they had a setback, they believed, they could always negotiate at that time from a position of strength (4.41–55).

When the tides of war shifted once again in Sparta’s favor, however, the Athenians came to regret demanding more than Sparta could accept (5.14). This confirms that genuine peace, like war, must involve at least two sides. Not only must the defeated party renounce efforts to revise the terms in the future, but also the victor must refrain from demanding terms that can only make the defeated party desire to renew or escalate the conflict when opportunity permits. The victor needs to avoid reinforcing the defeated belligerent’s will to resist; the defeated belligerent needs to calculate whether it can live with the victor’s terms in the long run or must accept those terms only so long as they are absolutely necessary to serve some larger end.31

Of course, the most famous effort to terminate the war is the Peace of Nicias, appropriately named in Athens after Nicias, the Athenian statesman and general who most wanted peace, one who shared Pericles’s caution but lacked his ambition for Mediterranean hegemony. He too sought personal fame, that of a peacemaker, at a time when the Athenians were willing to give peace a chance. His opportunity came from a startling upset victory by the Spartans. Leading a ragtag force of elite Spartan soldiers and Helots who had been promised freedom for their service, Brasidas, the most daring and innovative Spartan general of the war, managed to make his way from the Peloponnesus through barbarian-controlled Thessaly and Macedonia to Chalcidice, where Athens had many important tribute-paying allies, silver mines, and lumber yards to supply wood for ships. A
“good speaker for a Spartan,” Brasidas, somewhat like T. E. Lawrence of Arabia among the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, managed to convince Athenian allies that Sparta actually meant to liberate them from the Athenian empire. By promising lenient terms to those who joined Sparta against Athens, he convinced several cities to rebel, the most important being Amphipolis, a colony founded by Athens and a nerve center for the Athenians, who were in need of supplies and a secure sea line of communications to the Hellespont (4.81, 4.84, 4.106). Perhaps most important, Amphipolis was a symbol of effective resistance to the Athenian empire, which both Pericles and Cleon had called a tyranny (2.63, 3.37). So long as Amphipolis and other cities in Chalcidice remained independent, they would give hope to others that resistance to Athenian tyranny was not impossible. In other words, the independence of these cities meant a risk that the Athenian empire would fall apart.

Having set this sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the Athenians, the Spartans opened negotiations with them and achieved a one-year armistice (4.117). However, Brasidas—the glory of liberating these cities having perhaps gone to his head—disregarded and disobeyed orders not to prosecute further hostilities (4.135), putting his operations increasingly in conflict with the Spartans’ current political objective of a negotiated peace. So it was probably a stroke of good fortune for Sparta’s peace party that he, the best Spartan general of the war, and Cleon, the most bloodthirsty Athenian general (who, Thucydides said, needed the war to continue to distract attention from his crimes and slanders against his political opponents in Athens), were both killed in combat at Amphipolis (5.10). The most prominent proponents of the war on both sides were dead, thus enabling a change of leadership and a change of political objectives, at least temporarily, with both Athens and Sparta willing to settle for minimum objectives (5.16).

Both sides had powerful but unequal motives to end hostilities. The Athenians needed Amphipolis back to stem the tide of revolt among their allies, and, having suffered a punishing defeat at Delium, especially, they had lost the confidence that had once led them to take the offensive almost everywhere. The Spartans had come to understand that their original strategy of devastating Athenian territory and supporting allies in a multitheater war could neither bait the Athenians to fight them outside the walls of Athens nor overthrow the maritime empire that enabled Athens to continue the fight. The surrender of the soldiers at Sphacteria was a disaster “hitherto unknown” in Sparta; Spartan lands were being plundered from Pylos and Cythera; and the Helots were deserting their farms for the insurgents, whose attacks tied down much of the Spartan army. Sparta feared that free Helots from outside Sparta would join forces with those inside. Perhaps most
importantly, Sparta’s treaty with Argos, another treaty with an expiration date, was about to end, meaning it might soon have to fight Athens, Argos, the Helots, and any others who might wish to join the fray, all at the same time (5.14).

With new leaders in Sparta and Athens, a compromise was possible. In Athens, Nicias, who counted himself lucky to be successful so far, wished “while still happy and honored, . . . to secure his good fortune, to obtain a present release from trouble for himself and his countrymen,” and to earn his own immortality. He meant to “hand down to posterity a name as an ever successful statesman” who had made a lasting peace, arguably an accomplishment greater than that of Pericles. Since he had been successful so far, and war is an affair of chances, the best way for him to win the ancient Greek equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize was to make the peace that bears his famous name (5.15–16). For his part, the Spartan king Pleistonax, who had been accused of accepting bribes to end the First Peloponnesian War, saw an opportunity to redeem his reputation from this and other scandalous accusations. Thinking that “in peace no disaster would occur” for which he was likely to be held responsible “and that when Sparta recovered her men there would be nothing for his enemies [in Sparta] to seize upon,” he too was willing to lend his name to ending active hostilities (5.17). To strengthen his negotiating position, he openly made plans not merely to invade and ravage but also to occupy Attica and garrison fortifications within it, meaning the Athenians would not be able to return to their homes and farms if he carried out his plan. So conditions were ripe to make a trade.

Under the treaty, the Athenians would get Amphipolis and other Chalcidean cities back as tribute-paying allies, provided the Athenians did not molest the citizens of those cities and allowed them to be independent. (It was unclear how Sparta could give back to Athens cities liberated by Brasidas if they objected, as they certainly would, knowing the ruthless treatment that defeated rebels, like Mytilene and Scione, usually received from Athens [3.50, 5.17–18, 5.32].) In return, the Athenians were supposed to surrender cities and places captured during the war, including Pylos, and to release any Spartan prisoners they held. Like most other treaties in Thucydides’s narrative, this one came with an expiration date. It was supposed to last for fifty years, thus suggesting the irony that in Thucydides’s account the further away the expiration date of peace treaties, the less likely the peace is to endure. To ensure fidelity to the terms, each side was to swear an oath to the gods, who presumably punished oath breakers. Here is another irony of Thucydides’s chronicle—it consists of the moral, intellectual, religious, and legal somersaults that would-be and actual belligerents were willing to perform to convince themselves and others that they had not violated a treaty or other convention, that the gods were not against them but actually on their side.
In other words, they were extraordinarily skillful at finding pretexts to violate their treaties, so the oaths were next to meaningless as guarantees of the peace.32

If Pericles’s primary objective at the start of the war was to break up the Peloponnesian League, then Athens clearly won the Peace of Nicias. Sparta’s principal allies—the Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the Eleans—refused to go along with the treaty (5.17 and 5.21), partly because it allowed Sparta and Athens to revise its terms without consulting them. These allies began to make separate arrangements with each other, thus giving Athens a god-sent diplomatic opportunity to isolate Sparta in the Peloponnesus. Rightly, however, Thucydides calls the Peace of Nicias a “treacherous armistice,” not a peace (5.26). Sparta simply could not deliver on its promised terms, which were unenforceable. The Amphipolitans refused to return to the Delian League, and nothing Sparta could say would make them do so. Indeed, Sparta’s own general Clearidas, seeing the treaty as an act of treachery against those whom Sparta had promised freedom, refused even to try to turn the liberated cities back to Athens (5.21). Sparta, its traditional allies having repudiated the treaty, was obliged, for fear of war with Argos, to seek a new alliance in Athens. The erstwhile enemies duly formed a fifty-year alliance pledging to wage war and make peace together and committing Athens to help Sparta put down Helot rebellions if they occurred. After signing the alliance, the Athenians gave Sparta its prisoners back, though they held on to Pylos just in case they needed it as security for the hoped-for return of Amphipolis (5.23–24).

IV

Although many in Greece believed the conflict was over, Thucydides, in retrospect, demurs. The full-scale war that followed six years later was not a separate war but a continuation of the Second Peloponnesian War, which had been a continuation of the First Peloponnesian War. In the six years of the Peace of Nicias, byzantine diplomacy carried on the unending war by other means. The (nominally) fifty-year treaty and alliance could not “be rationally considered a state of peace, as neither party either gave or got back all that they had agreed” (5.26). Added to this, numerous violations of its terms occurred, most notably the battle of Mantinea, the largest land battle of the war, pitting Athens and Argos, Athens’ new ally, against Sparta. Perhaps if the Athenians had supported their new ally more effectively and instigated a Helot revolt at the same time, this could have been a decisive victory on land for the Athenians. As it was, because the Athenians were half-hearted, some wanting to finish off Sparta and others wanting to save the so-called peace, the Spartans were able to defeat the coalition and restore much of their own martial prestige (5.75). All the protection Athens now had from its enemies to the north in Boeotia was an armistice renewable every ten days (5.26).
Most importantly, the treaty did not resolve the original cause of the war—the fears in Sparta and among its allies of the growth of Athenian power. The Athenians needed a break, but they had not ceased to be ambitious to expand. If anything, the war had only fortified this hunger, a dream deferred so long that delay could no longer be tolerated. The series of treacherous diplomatic realignments during the period of official peace was as confusing as the “Who’s on first?” logic of Abbott and Costello, but Sparta’s original allies eventually got over Sparta’s original betrayal. Fear of Athens drove them back into alliance with Sparta. The war had settled nothing, and every day without active hostilities meant that Athens was growing stronger, filling its treasury with tribute, building more ships, and training new crews for the next round—in Sicily.

The Athenians had coveted Sicily since before the Second Peloponnesian War and (contrary to Pericles’s advice to avoid overextending themselves) had visited several times, even while the war back home was hot, to “test the possibility of bringing Sicily into subjection” (3.86, 3.115, 4.2, 4.24–25, 5.4). The Athenians had even fined one of the naval commanders on these missions and banished two others for allegedly taking bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. So thoroughly had their present prosperity [after victory at Pylos] persuaded the Athenians that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The reason for this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. (4.65)

For Thucydides, neither Pericles nor his successors, save Nicias, ever intended to renounce or even compromise their objective of establishing for Athens the greatest name, based on the greatest rule over the Greeks, an objective that pushed them toward dominating the larger Mediterranean world, and ultimately to Sicily. That ill-fated adventure did not arise from a change of policy but from a change of strategy, based on both worst-case assessments (of what might happen if Sicily united under Syracuse and aided the Peloponnesians) and best-case assessments (of Athenian prospects of success in a faraway theater on an island larger than Attica itself, with cities whose total population was larger than that of Athens) (6.1, 6.6–8). Each of these assessments was preposterous: first, Syracuse was no threat to Athens until the Athenians went to Sicily and stirred up the hornet’s nest; second, the Sicilian city of Egesta, which wanted their aid against its perennial enemy Selinus, had deceived the Athenians into thinking it would pay for the expedition (6.46).

These are classic examples of how to manipulate allies or enemies into doing one’s bidding, based on appealing to their worst fears and fondest hopes, though here the Athenians deceived themselves at least as much as they were deceived
by others. Athenians believed that even if they failed in Sicily (in spite of the enormous power of the force they sent) Athens would suffer no harm, because of the disarray in the Peloponnesus and the so-called peace treaty with Sparta and its allies (6.24). In this they were at least partly right. It was unlikely Athens could have held whatever it conquered in Sicily, especially if Carthage intervened, but the expedition need not have led to disaster. That was the result of judgments of the ground commanders, Nicias especially, and their dysfunctional relations with the people of Athens (7.42, 7.48). Among other things, Nicias’s procrastination in Sicily gave the Spartans opportunity to catch the Athenians in the grand-strategic trap they had always dreamed of—a protracted, multitheater war, with fronts both in Attica (where this time the Spartans fortified Deceleia and cut off the Athenians from their farms and mines) and in Sicily. The effort drained the Athenian treasury and compelled Athens to demand higher tribute from its allies, which encouraged those allies to rebel as soon as they got the chance (7.28). All this and more was handed the Spartans when the Athenians lost the best of their army and navy at Syracuse, thus removing much of Persia’s reluctance to intervene. It was anything but inevitable that Athens would lose the war even at this late date, but it now simply could not afford to lose a decisive battle at sea and desperately needed peace to reconstitute for another round.

It is tempting to see Athens’ comeuppance, not merely in Sicily but also in the war itself, as a form of divine punishment; however, Thucydides, who barely hides his skepticism about the Greek gods, gives us no reason to reach such a conclusion. Thucydides’s world is ruled not by the gods or by karma; instead, it is conditioned by a natural economy of power and violence that endures today. *Hu-bris* and *nemesis*, whatever their religious connotations, are natural phenomena for Thucydides; they are seen time and again not only in this war but in war in general.33 Had Athens not self-destructed in Sicily, it would have done so eventually somewhere else—in Italy or Carthage, for example—because it was drunk on the passion for power and glory. That passion, requiring continual expansion, was inculcated but not invented by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, and it found its most virulent expression in Alcibiades’s speech before the Sicilian expedition (6.16–18, 6.24).34 True, Athens did sober up in the immediate aftermath of disaster in Sicily (8.1), but again, the Athenians were born to take no rest nor to give any to others.

Although Thucydides lived through the end of the war, he did not finish his account of it. Perhaps he died, perhaps something else took priority, but other sources confirm Thucydides’s characterization of the Athenians as a people incapable of making a durable peace because they could not be sated with power. After surprising comeback victories in the last years of the war, at Arginusae
especially, the Athenians, thinking they were rising again, refused Spartan offers of peace on the basis of the status quo, an offer they would have accepted gladly immediately after the failed Sicilian expedition. During the fierce and confused battle at Arginusae, perhaps the largest naval battle of the war, many Athenians fell into the sea, leaving their commanders torn between saving them and pursuing the retreating Peloponnesian fleet; in the event they left ships behind to rescue the survivors, but a storm made that impossible. When the commanders returned to Athens, the Athenians did not congratulate them on their victory or take a deep breath because of the chance of peace it offered. Instead, they put on trial all eight for failing to save the drowning sailors. All were convicted, six were executed, and two fled before they were killed by the very people whose empire they had saved. Not long thereafter Athens lost its fleet, control of the sea, and ultimately the war, along with its democratic regime, at Aegospotami, through the tactical incompetence of a commander who allowed his fleet to be surprised on the beach. Surely one reason for that was that the Athenians themselves had killed or driven into exile their best admirals. If they had made peace after Arginusae, they would not have lost the war, at least not for good.35 Yet war, says Thucydides in his account of the revolution in Corcyra, is a “rough master” (3.82). It produces what we today call PTSD, post–traumatic stress disorder, which distorts, even deranges, judgment, not merely among soldiers and sailors but among the people too. However rational the Athenians under Pericles may have appeared at the beginning of the war, they were irrational, if not truly mad, at the end—they could not make peace. Tragically, Thucydides’s account from the plague to the Sicilian expedition and beyond to the revolution in Athens shows the gradual breakdown of strategic rationality in the world’s most famous democracy.

For Thucydides, expansionist powers who refuse to make peace (when necessity demands and opportunity allows) create and perpetuate the sort of fear seen in Sparta and its allies, a fear that leads others to check them, if necessary, by overthrowing their regimes and establishing something fundamentally less threatening. Sparta did that to Athens after its surrender, and the grand alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union of World War II did it to the Axis powers. At no place in Thucydides’s account was Athens ever a sated power, but it ought to have been one, a lesson that perhaps no Greek city, least of all Athens, could ever learn. This suggests that preventing great-power war in our own time will depend on the willingness of former belligerents—like China, the United States, and their respective allies, for example—to accept the results of their previous conflicts in Korea (where there is still only an armistice) and over islands, including Taiwan, off the coast of China as final enough not to need revising by violent means.36 They need to act like sated powers—what Athens
should have been in this conflict, not what it was. Preventing great-power war in the twenty-first century will therefore depend at least as much on self-restraint as on deterrence. That is a lesson that great powers especially often fail to take away from Thucydides’s “possession for all time”—his account not merely of the origins and conduct of the heartbreaking war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians but also of their tragic failure to make a genuine peace while there was time, opportunity, and overwhelmingly good reason to do so.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Ian, Alex, and Lisa Walling; his Naval War College colleagues in Newport and Monterey; and the Gentrain Society of Monterey Peninsula College, for their criticism and support for this article.


4. That Athens was a sated power is one of Donald Kagan’s major theses in *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1969), esp. pp. 190–92, 345–47. Though many disagree with Kagan’s thesis, designed to show the war was not inevitable, all must salute his remarkable accomplishment, a new critical, and deeply revisionist, four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War that took perhaps almost as long to complete as it took Thucydides to write his own uncompleted book, and without the advantage of many of Thucydides’s immediate sources. Moreover, Kagan’s project needs to be seen in light of the First World War and the Cold War, especially. Thinking a war is inevitable not only risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy but might tempt belligerents into preventive war, as some say was the case for Germany in August 1914, with the near suicide of European civilization and collapse of four great empires (those of Germany, Austria, Russia, and the Ottomans) as the consequence. In the age of massive nuclear arsenals, “inevitablist” thinking and preventive-war mind-sets of the sort made famous in the 1964 film *Dr. Strangelove* could only have made an already bad situation much, much worse. Statesmen needed to find a place for freedom of action whereby strategy could spell the difference between catastrophe and the survival of all that makes human life worth living. So Kagan’s staunch defense of the possibility of statesmanship and strategy to prevent escalation to great-power war deserves enormous respect. That does not mean he was correct about Athens being a sated power, however. For other critiques of Kagan’s claim, see Athanasios G. Platias and Konstantinos Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2010), pp. 32–34; Lawrence A. Tritle, *A New History of the Peloponnesian War* (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 35–39; and, with some ambivalence, Victor Davis Hanson, *A War like No Other: How the Athenians and the Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 12–14.

5. That is, rooted in the view of the German historian Hans Delbrueck (1848–1929), who distinguished between wars to annihilate enemy forces in decisive battles leading directly to a peace settlement and wars of attrition in
which an exhausted opponent, often fearing revolution or third-party intervention, makes peace because it believes itself unable to continue the struggle at an acceptable cost or level of risk. See, for example, Platias and Koliopoulos, *Thucydides on Strategy*, pp. 35–80.

6. In this case, the Loeb translation of this famous passage seems more useful than Richard Crawley’s in the Strassler edition. Crawley and most others translate the Greek adjective Thucydides used to describe the cause of the war as “real,” but it is the superlative of the Greek word *aletheia* and means “truest.” What was said and done immediately before the war, especially regarding matters of law and justice, was not irrelevant to its origins—it served as a catalyst, or Aristotelian “efficient” cause. But great wars do not occur over small stakes. More fundamental and important was Sparta’s fear of the growth of Athens, which put Spartan security, prestige, interests, and traditional hegemony in Greece all at risk. Significantly, Thucydides did not say the war between Athens and Sparta was “inevitable” (as Crawley and many others translate this passage), though he came close. Instead, as the Loeb translation reveals, he said the growth of Athenian power and the fear it produced in Sparta “forced,” or compelled, Sparta to go to war.


8. Scholars are uncertain of the date of the Thasian rebellion, as well as of the dates of the earthquake and Messenian rebellion in Sparta that in Thucydides’s account follow on the revolt in Thasos. See Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides*, p. 55.


12. It is easy to imagine from the image on the cover of this issue the damage that might be done to a trireme’s oars and oarsmen by an adversary (its own oars momentarily “shipped,” drawn into the hull as far as possible) passing close aboard and driving through the three banks.


14. Following Plutarch (*Pericles*, 29.3), Donald Kagan suggests that the clash of the Athenian and Corinthian navies was a case of failed “minimum deterrence.” The battle might have been avoided had the Athenians sent a much larger fleet to intimidate the Corinthians; Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), pp. 45–48. Maybe so. Maybe Athens could have avoided war at that time had Pericles communicated his intentions with a bigger show of force, but in many ways Kagan’s approach puts the cart before the horse. It stresses the mechanics of how the war started at the expense of the motives
of the belligerents. It focuses on strategic miscalculation, which is important, but not as important for Thucydides as the incompatible objectives of the belligerents. Without the clashing objectives, there would have been no war—which is why Thucydides treats them as the truest causes.

15. Of the speeches in his account Thucydides said, “Some I heard myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one’s memory, so my practice has been to make the speakers say what was demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they actually said” (1.22). No doubt, there is a possible tension between what Thucydides thought the occasion demanded and what was actually said, though he indicates he followed what was actually said as much as possible. Proof that he adhered to this principle is that sometimes the speakers say things that contradict their persuasive purposes—that is, were not what Thucydides believed their situations demanded. At other times, they say much more than is required by their rhetorical objectives, raising the question whether they are actually saying something that helps us understand them better or Thucydides used the occasion of their speeches to promote reflection on more universal, even philosophical, subjects, or both. Surely one reason for the work being a possession for all time is that it was meant to present, and generally succeeds in presenting, a microcosm of all war. The forensic character of the debates often supplies something like a dialectical approach, giving readers opportunities to see multiple sides of a question. Like citizens in Athens and Sparta, readers get to decide for themselves. See Kagan, *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, p. ix; and F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and His History* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 27–42.


20. An exception to the rule is Paul Rahe, who shows the extent to which Athenian diplomacy under Pericles was directed at detaching Corinth from the Peloponnesian League, with the dismemberment of the Peloponnesian League a prelude to Athenian expansion after Sparta had been defeated. Rahe, “Peace of Nicias,” pp. 50, 58, 61.


22. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 77, 97, 137, 184–88. For Clausewitz, these moral factors are not limited to belief in the justice of one’s cause or the legitimacy of the means by which one fights, though these are vital. The moral factors include all the intangibles (leadership, training, discipline, will, patriotism, enthusiasm, strategy, etc.) that make a difference, especially for morale, but that cannot be counted when belligerents go to war.


25. For an insightful discussion of the passion for honor and contests for rank in this war, see J. E. Lendon, *Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), but beware leaping from the frying pan of one form of reductionism (modern realism) into another (understanding everything in the Peloponnesian War in terms of honor and revenge). Said the Athenian envoys in Sparta,
they were driven to acquire, sustain, and expand their empire by three of the strongest passions in human nature—fear, honor, and interest (the desire for gain) (1.75–76). Modern realists, lacking Lendon’s understanding of Greek culture and society, often underrate the role of honor in the origins, conduct, and termination of this war, but Thucydidean realism embraces the whole of human nature, not just one part, like the love of honor. If one focuses on honor exclusively, the result will still be a caricature, just a different one than common today. And while it is valuable to understand that the belligerents were not always, or even often, the “rational actors” of modern realist theory, it is misleading to make them simply irrational actors in a protracted Homeric saga of rank and revenge, as if they had no strategic vision beyond paying back their adversaries. Like humanity itself, they were a mixture of both reason and unreason, and thus capable of both serious strategic thinking and monumental strategic errors. Like Clausewitz, Thucydides deliberately eschewed moncausal explanations. His “trinity” of fear, honor, and interest is fundamentally more balanced than the templates commonly applied to his work, and it helps us evaluate the strategic rationality of the belligerents, especially when they get carried away with some great passion. That trinity serves as the launching pad, not the conclusion, of his investigation of human nature, which was perhaps his fundamental purpose. That investigation was the ultimate ground of his primary thesis—that all wars will be like the Peloponnesian War, so long as human nature remains the same (1.22), though different wars will express and reveal different aspects of human nature according to their particular circumstances.

26. Machiavelli perhaps best explained why it was utopian for any Greek city to seek the universal dominion later acquired by Rome. For the Greeks, citizenship was a prize and therefore restricted to a few; conquered peoples were usually not allowed to become citizens. So the more a Greek city expanded the weaker it would become, as it ran out of citizens for occupation and colonization and its subjects began to rebel. In contrast, Rome extended citizenship to those it found useful among conquered peoples, thus enabling it to expand territorially and grow stronger militarily. As Edward Gibbon, Machiavelli’s student in this regard, observed, however, this more inclusive way of running an empire, which allowed assimilation of foreign cults and religions, including Christianity, may have undermined some of the spirit required to maintain the empire. See Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 22; and Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Penguin, 1994), vol. 1, chap. 15, pp. 446–512.


28. Clausewitz, On War, p. 585; see also Sun Tzu, Art of War, p. 74.


30. Sun Tzu, Art of War, p. 131.


32. See, for example, Thucydides’s discussion of the first Spartan religious pretext for going to war and the Athenians’ no less twisted religious counterdemand, at 1.126–138.

33. For a discussion of hubris and nemesis in Thucydides, see, of course, F. M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (London: Routledge, 1907), and Christopher Coker, Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg (London: Hurst, 2010), pp. 63–76. Cornford suggests Thucydides imposed the tragic art form on his history, but the history of states balancing against those seeking hegemony suggests something more like a natural law, an action/reaction phenomenon rooted in anarchic systems more analogous in this case to the theory developed by Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 102–28. For an insightful realist critique of Athenian imperialism for failing, among other things, to respect this natural system of checks and balances, see


36. For insightful discussions of Korea as a cradle of conflict analogous to the Peloponnesian War, see David R. McCann and Barry S. Strauss, eds., *War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).
The post–Cold War interlude during which U.S. maritime access to and within overseas regions of grand-strategic importance faced few challenges was a historical anomaly. Accordingly, in January 2012 the Department of Defense (DoD) formally recognized in its Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) document that this pause is ending and that joint capability requirements must be revisited. The JOAC establishes benchmarks for developing the doctrine, training priorities, warfare systems and matériel, organizational structures, and other measures necessary to overcome advanced maritime-denial capabilities across all warfare domains.¹ Woven throughout the JOAC is the need to disrupt or neutralize the theater-wide surveillance and reconnaissance networks that strategic competitors are developing to provide their maritime-denial forces with tactically actionable targeting cues. Indeed, China’s and (to a much lesser extent) Iran’s deployments of dense, layered, and networked capabilities over the past decade represent continuity with the millennia-old struggles between offense and defense, as well as between localized area control and denial.

The JOAC specifically states that efforts to disable such networks in war require not only kinetic means but also deception and concealment. This is partly because the survivability and deterrence effect of forces deployed forward in a crisis depend in large part on their ability to avoid being targeted.² It follows that because standing peacetime rules of engagement constrain prehostilities antinetwork measures,
force-level deception and concealment where practicable will be crucial to joint countersurveillance and countargeting.\textsuperscript{3}

Should deterrence fail, physical neutralization of maritime surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, communications pathways, and data-fusion centers would likely consume considerable resources and time.\textsuperscript{4} In the meantime, political objectives would likely assign forward maritime forces other tasks that necessarily expose them to the still-capable network.\textsuperscript{5} Some network elements are likely to be shielded through hardening, mobility, or positioning beyond strike range. Antinetwork operations may also face self-imposed political constraints stemming from escalation concerns. The network may additionally maintain a “war reserve” to replace neutralized assets and compromised pathways, though returns may diminish as a conflict’s duration increases. Nevertheless, the 1991 Gulf War campaign against Iraq’s integrated air-defense system suggests that the risks an adversary’s network poses would not decrease quickly and could never be completely eliminated via neutralization of nodes and pathways alone.\textsuperscript{6}

Deception and concealment can help mitigate these risks—namely, that a network-empowered adversary might cripple U.S. forward maritime forces in a massive, war-opening strike; achieve in the first days or weeks some fait accompli that maritime forces are striving to prevent; or inflict severe losses on maritime forces as they maneuver within the contested zone to retake the initiative. Deception and concealment are hardly new to electronic-age maritime warfare, and although the tactics and historical examples that follow are hardly comprehensive, they help outline potential countersurveillance and countargeting tools.

Deception and concealment alone cannot guarantee success; they are complements to, rather than substitutes for, robust kinetic weapon systems that physically attrite sensors, weapons, platforms, and network infrastructures. All the same, their absence would likely handicap U.S. forward maritime operations within emerging threat environments, which in turn would impact contemporary conventional deterrence credibility.

**MARITIME CONCEALMENT DOCTRINE AND BASIC TACTICS**

U.S. joint doctrine defines “concealment” as “protection from observation or surveillance.” Concealment is primarily a tactical-level effort that supports deception by “manipulating the appearance or obscuring the deceiver’s actual activities.”\textsuperscript{7} Although some concealment tactics can be used effectively in the absence of deception (defined below), most attain peak effectiveness in tandem with it. In the JOAC framework, concealment falls under the term “stealth.”\textsuperscript{8}

The most commonly practiced maritime concealment tactic is *emission control* (EMCON). Maritime forces typically restrict their radio-frequency (RF)
emissions and configure shipboard systems to limit acoustic emissions when operating in contested areas; platforms tasked with active sensor searches in support of forces in EMCON are positioned so that the former’s emissions do not reveal the latter’s general location. As repeatedly demonstrated by the U.S. Navy against the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) during the Cold War, EMCON measures can severely constrain if not eliminate the usefulness of wide-area passive sonar and RF direction-finding or electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors for surveillance and reconnaissance. EMCON does not necessarily imply complete silence; highly directional line-of-sight communications systems and difficult-to-intercept “middleman” relays (satellites or aircraft) can provide critical command and coordination links. Even so, it does represent a deep cut to the force’s normally available bandwidth. Effective EMCON therefore requires decentralized doctrine that embraces unit-level initiative in executing the force commander’s intentions, as well as preplanned and frequently practiced responses to foreseeable situations.

Force-level maneuver enables concealment as well. If the adversary’s maritime reconnaissance patterns and tactics, surveillance-satellite orbits, fixed-location sensor emplacements, and effective sensor coverages are known with reasonable confidence, ocean transit plans can be designed to reduce the probability of detection or sustained tracking. For example, a force can maneuver to reduce electromagnetic and acoustic exposure. Force-level maneuvers might also be ordered in response to long-range detection of adversary reconnaissance assets or seemingly neutral shipping or aircraft, changes in the adversary’s satellite dispositions, or emergent tactical intelligence.

Additionally, a force’s operations can be adjusted to exploit meteorological phenomena. Sufficiently dense haze and cloud cover reduces vulnerability to infrared (IR) and visual-band electro-optical (EO) sensors. Precipitation similarly reduces EO/IR sensor effectiveness and, depending on wavelength and clutter-rejection capabilities, sometimes radar as well. Atmospheric layering can cause radar emissions to be so refracted as to render nearby surface units and aircraft undetectable. Highly variable diurnal ionospheric conditions can likewise degrade shore-based over-the-horizon-backscatter (OTH-B) radars. Heavy seas, however uncomfortable for crews, increase the background clutter OTH-B radars must sift through, as well as the ambient noise that complicates passive sonar search.

In the absence of exploitable meteorological phenomena, surface units can lay obscurant “clouds” against EO/IR sensors and millimeter-band radars, as well as chaff clouds against centimeter- and decimeter-band radars. Throughout naval history, ships have employed similar methods to shield themselves from
detection, classification, identification, or precision tracking. Obscurants and chaff are detectable, however; an adversary might reasonably assume that a unit of interest lies somewhere behind or beneath such a cloud and that closer reconnaissance is warranted. The adversary may even directly target the cloud in hopes of temporarily incapacitating the concealed unit. Obscurants and chaff are consequently best employed when supported by tactical deception.

Dispersion is another concealment tactic that works best within an overall deception plan. Naval formations, for instance, are often thought of as like a bull’s-eye, with rings of defensive aircraft and escorts surrounding high-campaign-value surface units at the center. This is not always the case. Wide-area sea- and land-based sensors, long-range sea- and land-based weapons, and joint tactical data links allow a dispersed force to extend its sensor and weapons coverage over broad areas and its units to support each other even when not in physical proximity. A dispersed force, therefore, may not be as conspicuous as a traditional formation to wide-area sensors. Combined with selective EMCON and deceptive tactics, dispersion can allow a force to blend into background shipping. The tyrannies of time, distance, speed, fuel, and electromagnetic/acoustic-wave propagation represent, however, an important caveat. As the Imperial Japanese Navy demonstrated at the battle of Midway, a force’s dispersion must never be so great that its units cannot quickly and effectively mass their capabilities or provide mutual support should deception fail.

Disciplined operational security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) can be considered forms of concealment, as they deny information that could negate a deception plan. By restricting the personnel with knowledge of a planned action and minimizing related communications—encrypted where appropriate and sent only over the most secure and trusted pathways—a force can complicate an adversary’s intelligence collection. Although COMSEC measures and cyberdefenses support pathway integrity and confidentiality, a force commander may use human couriers or other “out of band” methods to protect critical messages, despite impacts to throughput and timeliness. Generally speaking, robust OPSEC and COMSEC measures mean a force cannot use finely choreographed plans relying on “just-in-time” updates or direct control. Like EMCON, they compel reliance on “command by negation,” a doctrine that empowers unit commanders to exercise initiative to carry out the force commander’s promulgated intentions.

Electronic warfare (EW) concealment comprises two main tactics. First, RF and acoustic systems can employ low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) hardware and waveforms that make them very difficult to detect, analyze, or exploit. An adversary may eventually extract LPI emissions from the ambient environment, though. LPI capability employment must hinge on risk analysis; certain critical
capabilities should be withheld as war reserve and even in combat used only when absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{21}

Electromagnetic jamming is the other major EW concealment tactic. RF noise can effectively saturate older or less sophisticated radar receivers, tax modern radar processing enough to make searching less efficient, and disrupt the communication of a remote sensor or data-relay node with a network.\textsuperscript{22} Low-power, solid-state IR and visible-band lasers can be used to blind EO/IR sensors, but because solid-state lasing mediums can excite photons only in narrow wavelength blocks, multiple lasers may be necessary to blind a single multispectral or hyperspectral EO/IR system.\textsuperscript{23} The greatest limitation of noise jamming is that an adversary can cross-fix the source of the jamming and cue scouts to search nearby for the supported force. This risk can be mitigated somewhat by positioning airborne jammers so as not to compromise the force’s location, or by employing deception.

Lastly, “distributed denial of service” (DDOS) and penetrative “disruption/blinding” cyberattacks against nodes of a surveillance-reconnaissance-strike network potentially contribute to maritime concealment. A DDOS attack saturates a targeted web server with data requests in order to disrupt its hosted services and connectivity. However, an adversary can harden a network against DDOS by using pathways with bandwidths well beyond that needed for most services; redundant war-reserve mirrored servers into which those under DDOS bombardment can “fail over”; war-reserve or “out-of-band” network pathways for rerouting; or agile Internet protocol (IP) address/domain blocking. It is also not clear how a sizable sustained DDOS attack can be practically directed against military networks that are not connected to the public Internet.

Whereas DDOS attacks are “brute force,” penetrative cyberattacks that blind networked sensors, disrupt or corrupt network data-relay pathways, or shut down data-fusion infrastructures require a substantial level of tradecraft. Some might involve “logic bombs” covertly inserted prior to a conflict and triggered by remote signal or insider action. Others may involve real-time penetrations, again dependent on prior intelligence collection against, and exploration of, the adversary’s network. Much as with DDOS, though, war-reserve network infrastructures and sensors, as well as out-of-band communications pathways, may be able to limit the duration and impact of a penetrative “disruption and blinding” cyberattack.

This is not to say that these cyberattack types are unlikely to be useful in any scenario but to suggest that they may not be the most effective or viable means for nonkinetically handicapping an adversary’s networked systems—unless, at least, one knows with some confidence how severely and for how long they could degrade the adversary.
MARITIME DECEPTION DOCTRINE AND BASIC TACTICS

Joint doctrine defines “military deception” as those “actions executed to deliberately mislead” adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, “thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.” An adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance networks are the channels for conveying a deceptive “story” and are not themselves the deception targets. Rather, deception is aimed at specific military or political leaders, with the objective of inducing them to make suboptimal decisions by exploiting their known or apparent preconceptions. It follows that operational deception is aimed at campaign/operational-level planners and decision makers, while tactical deception focuses on the engagement and battle levels. The boundaries separating operational and tactical deception are increasingly blurry in practice, though, since an adversary’s theater-range maritime strike assets may be controlled by a commander who bridges the two levels. Operational deception may therefore be necessary to induce surveillance-reconnaissance-strike asset retasking or repositioning within a theater that makes such assets less usable against a supported force.

Maritime deception tactics are generally most effective when several are simultaneously employed so as to address all adversary sensing methods, as well as to establish and legitimize the deception story. Deception is also generally coordinated with concealment tactics, as well as selective physical neutralization of surveillance and scouting assets. Such coordination denies the adversary information that might reveal the charade while allowing the defender to collect disinformation reinforcing the story.

Visual deception tactics include painting schemes and lighting configurations that make a ship appear from a distance to be of a different type or size. Prefabricated structures and deceptive lighting can simulate austere forward operating bases or airstrips. Less common is deceptive alteration of a ship’s structure; for example, in World War II, false stacks installed on Allied tankers in Murmansk-bound convoys prevented their easy identification by Luftwaffe bomber crews, and the Royal Navy reconfigured an obsolescent battleship to look like a newer one in order to lure bombers away from a 1942 Malta convoy. Other visual deceptions merely imply the presence of a unit or group, such as the World War II-era “water snowflake” float, which launched an illumination rocket on a preset time delay at night to convince U-boats that a convoy lay just over the horizon. Visual deceptive tactics are likely to be most effective when used against scouts who for safety limit the time they spend near a force, how close they will approach it, or what active-sensor usage they will risk in its proximity; austere scouts, such as those on civilian or commercial platforms, who lack advanced sensors; or
surveillance-reconnaissance systems that are prevented by natural or artificial phenomena from optimally using their sensors.

*Deceptive maneuver* tactics include use of misleading routes to manipulate a force’s “attractiveness” for investigation or attack, or to mislead as to its actual objectives. As the U.S. Navy periodically demonstrated against the SOSS during the Cold War, decoy groups can draw reconnaissance-strike resources away from a main force in EMCON. Units can additionally exploit an opponent’s tactical complacency to conceal their movements by taking advantage of the latter’s known transit routes and procedures.

*Deceptive communications tactics* involve the transmission of messages falsifying identities, compositions, locations, intentions, activities, or states of readiness. Since an adversary probably cannot be expected to intercept, identify as significant, decrypt, and analyze a given message in a timely manner, deception tactics often attack the ability to perform traffic-pattern analysis. For example, the Imperial Japanese Navy employed several anti-pattern analysis tactics to conceal the Pearl Harbor Striking Force’s November–December 1941 transit toward Pearl Harbor. Alternatively, an adversary’s communications-intelligence apparatus can be saturated with “junk” transmissions or contradictory messages. A decoy unit can also simulate another unit’s communications while the latter is in EMCON. Forces can even attempt to penetrate an adversary’s communications channels and generate false messages that distract, confuse, or redirect his surveillance and reconnaissance.

*Deceptive EW and acoustics* often involve equipping platforms, expendable decoys, or unmanned vehicles with systems that simulate another unit’s RF or acoustic signatures. The aim is to prevent the actual units from being detected, classified, identified, or tracked. During World War II, the Allies periodically used chaff, radar-reflecting balloons and wire cages attached to floats, corner reflectors on small ships, and even false-target generators to convince enemy radars that a major naval force was operating in a given area, so as to attract attack at the wrong place or allow an actual force to break contact. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) “spoofing” and deceptive jamming of targeting and weapons-guidance sensors are other deceptive EW tactics that debuted in that conflict. Post-1945 technology developments added electronic “blip” enhancement, integrated simulation of RF and acoustic emissions, and expendable offboard decoy technologies. Today, with sufficient intelligence regarding adversary radars’ designs and signal-processing techniques, deceptive EW systems can use such emerging technologies as “digital radiofrequency memory” for precision replication, rapid analysis, subtle modulation, and carefully timed directional retransmission of waveforms to trick adversary radars into “detecting” highly realistic contacts in empty space.
Lastly, cyberspace operations are a relatively recent addition to the deception portfolio. A commonly hypothesized “crown jewel” tactic uses intelligence collected about the gateways and computing infrastructure of an adversary surveillance-reconnaissance network to execute cyberattacks that manipulate the situational picture it provides decision makers. The technical challenges and uncertainties of sustaining manipulative cyberattacks throughout a war are severe. For that reason, the most frequently used deceptive cyberspace operation may be the “computer network charade” (CNC), which indirectly supports countersurveillance by hijacking the adversary’s intelligence-collection activities.\(^{38}\)

CNC takes advantage of the fact that timely fusion of intelligence into a situational picture is exceptionally difficult, even when aided by data mining and other analytical technologies, since a human generally has to assess each piece of “interesting” information. Once counterintelligence reveals an adversary’s intelligence exploitation activities within friendly forces’ networks, CNC can feed manipulative information tied to a deception story or worthless information meant to saturate. This can be done using the existing exploited network elements, or alternatively by introducing “honeypots.”\(^{39}\) Massive amounts of such faked material as documents, message traffic, e-mails, chat, or database interactions can be auto-generated and populated with unit identities, locations, times, and even human-looking errors. The material can be either randomized to augment concealment or pattern-formed to reinforce a deception story, as appropriate. A unit can similarly manipulate its network behavior to defeat traffic analysis, or augment the effectiveness of a decoy group by simulating other units or echelons. All this leaves the adversary the task of discriminating false content from any real items he might have collected.\(^{40}\)

Regardless of CNC method, it can be determined whether or not planted disinformation has been captured by the adversary. The commonalities of CNC with many communication-deception tactics are not coincidental. In fact, civilian mass media, social networks, and e-mail pathways can also be used as disinformation channels in support of forward forces.\(^{41}\)

**THE ADVERSARY’S FIRING DECISION**

To understand how maritime deception and concealment tactics can be optimally combined, it is important to understand how an adversary decides how many weapons to launch and how that number impacts an adversary’s campaign requirements. The salvo-sizing calculus is based on the probability that the firing platform will be destroyed or break down prior to weapons release; the probability the weapon itself will fail after launch; the size of the area the weapon’s guidance sensors must search for the designated target, as compared to their fields of view; the probability that the weapon will detect and lock onto the target;
the probability that it will be able to penetrate anticipated defenses; and the estimated number of weapons that must hit to inflict a desired amount of damage. The lower the cumulative probability of a single weapon’s success and the more of them needed to strike the target to inflict the desired damage, the higher the number of weapons that must be fired per salvo.

A firing decision can therefore represent a hefty opportunity cost to the attacker, as the weapons inventory must be managed against requirements needed for the duration of the campaign and as coercive “bargaining chips” for the political-diplomatic endgame. It follows that the more complex a weapon or the more limited the resources the attacker can allocate to its production, the longer its users must wait for replacements. In a prolonged conflict, the effect is magnified if the defender can restore damaged units’ most operationally important capabilities faster than the attacker can replenish weapons. All of this means that it may not matter whether cost differentials allow the attacker to procure several times as many offensive weapons as the defender has ships, aircraft, or land-based sites. It also may not matter that the number of offensive weapons available significantly exceeds the number of targets in track. As with all decisions involving a scarcity, the central metric would seem to be the prospective attacker’s self-estimated campaign-level opportunity cost of striking at a given point in time.

A prospective attacker might deal with this problem by devoting the majority of the most capable weapons to a conflict’s earliest phases, perhaps including a first strike. It is then that an attacker holds the maximum advantage, as its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are not yet heavily degraded by countermeasures and counterattacks. The prospective attacker who believes a conflict will be short might be tempted to expend the inventory quickly, given that chances for using it most effectively will decrease rapidly. The campaign-level opportunity cost of classifying targets “by debris” might well be low under these circumstances.

A defender can exploit this situation by sacrificing lower-campaign-value assets to a first strike and its immediate aftermath, and can also attempt to deceive the attacker into wasting inventory against decoys while the defender conceals higher-campaign-value assets. This approach has the bonus of enabling early data collection and analysis against the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-strike architecture under combat conditions to identify quickly exploitable vulnerabilities that were not discoverable during peacetime.

However, if the attacker requires that a given weapon be employable throughout a prolonged conflict and that a certain number be preserved for the endgame, the inventory must be either relatively large, quickly replenishable, or used economically. Under these circumstances, an attacker might hesitate to expend a significant portion of the inventory in a given raid if uncertain which—if
any—targets are valid, especially in the aftermath of a successful deception. It is instructive that throughout the Cold War the vaunted Soviet maritime “reconnaissance-strike complex,” notwithstanding its wide-area land, sea, air, and space sensors for over-the-horizon missile targeting, was forced by U.S. Navy deception and concealment to depend consistently on visual-range scouts for positive target identification. The physics of contemporary sensor capabilities and limitations does not suggest that the near future will be any different.

As a result, the more a defender can confuse an inventory-husbanding prospective attacker’s situational picture by making it impossible to tell from a distance whether a given contact is what it appears to be or whether high-confidence targets in track are actually the most important ones to attack, the more likely that the attacker will hesitate to strike. In fact, the more the defender can tax the adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance resources through physical attrition, deception, and concealment, the better the chances that high-campaign-value forces will escape attention, unless and until their missions compel them to drop cover.

With this appreciation, we can now outline how deception and concealment can help a force survive a first strike with minimal degradation and then quickly rally to slow down, if not defeat, the follow-on offensive. Though these two tasks contain significant tactical similarities, the vast difference in their strategic circumstances means that the first task is far more challenging than the second. The application of doctrine and tactics to form practicable deception and concealment concepts becomes somewhat different for the two tasks.

**BLUNTING FIRST STRIKES AND SALVOS**

The defender’s tactical deception and concealment prior to a first strike, or naval domain “first salvo,” aim to prevent or delay effective targeting of forward forces and high-campaign-value units. Should an attack be delivered, the role of deception and concealment is to draw inbound weapons away from actual units.

The success of a first strike generally hinges on an attacker’s own use of deception and concealment to enhance surprise. A defender therefore cannot be certain of detecting and recognizing strategic warnings of imminent war, let alone tactical warnings of imminent attack, with enough confidence and rapidity to implement optimal countersurveillance and countertargeting measures. In any case, indication and warning (I&W) is rarely unambiguous. Even should I&W be accepted and hedging actions directed by the leadership, political and psychological factors are likely so to handicap the response that forward forces will not be able to employ fully their deception and concealment options.

The defender’s political objectives during a crisis may further complicate the problem, as exemplified by U.S. Sixth Fleet’s operations during the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. By presidential direction, the Sixth Fleet was to maintain forward presence at the war zone's immediate periphery; support the transoceanic, airborne, logistical replenishment of Israel; and deter Soviet naval intervention. These tasks meant that the Sixth Fleet could not use space and maneuver to complicate Soviet targeting, and the confined geography of the eastern Mediterranean only worsened the dilemma. “Tattletale” scouts provided the Soviet 5th Eskadra with high-confidence over-the-horizon missile-targeting data by taking station within close visual range of the highest-campaign-value U.S. combatants. With his concealment and deception options foreclosed, the commander of the Sixth Fleet would have faced an unenviable choice had he received possible I&W of a Soviet first salvo: either exercise his authority under American rules of engagement to unleash his own first salvo against the 5th Eskadra and thereby initiate a superpower conflict, with all its associated escalation hazards, or risk his warships by holding back in hope that a risk-averse Kremlin did not want to chance a Soviet-American war.

The Yom Kippur case illustrates the tactical difficulties of prolonged operations within a confined maritime space during a crisis. When geography so greatly simplifies the search problem, a force might be able to avoid localization and identification for hours at best, even if it maximally employs such basic concealment tactics as EMCON. It follows that the proximity of scouts to a force makes the use of jamming or decoys for countersurveillance and countertargeting unsustainable; it might compromise “tricks” prematurely and with little benefit. Jamming might even be unnecessarily provocative, depending on the situation. Postlaunch concealment, however, may still be highly effective against inbound weapons at low relative cost in resources and mission impact. With adequate intelligence, or at least correct assumptions about weapon guidance, postlaunch EW or acoustic deception may likewise help limit the number of successful hits to a campaign-tolerable level. As will be discussed later, a potential adversary’s uncertainties regarding a defender’s deception and concealment capabilities against an inbound first strike may reinforce deterrence.

The less confined a crisis’s maritime space, however, the more deception and concealment can be tactically effective as well as useful for deterrence. This is especially so if the most vulnerable campaign-valuable elements of a conventional deterrent are positioned outside optimal first-strike range, yet close enough to rapidly blunt the adversary’s offensive actions and prevent a fait accompli. For example, when at least two aircraft carriers are present in a theater, one should almost always be under way and able to become quickly unlocatable, even in peacetime. If both carriers must be simultaneously in port during a period of tension, one of those ports should either be outside the optimal first-strike range or in a country that the potential adversary would be reluctant to drag into conflict.
These posture adjustments must be made in consultation between the defender and his forward allies, and they ought to be made in peacetime vice during a crisis to mitigate the risk of misperceptions.\textsuperscript{54}

Shifting high-campaign-value units beyond a potential adversary’s optimal first-strike range is operationally plausible, because initial forward denial operations against a maritime offensive can be waged by submarines; relatively numerous lower-campaign-value warships with offensive armaments disproportionate to their size; land-based air and missile defenses, as well as antiship missiles on friendly-held forward territories and choke points; sea-based missile defenses protecting forward bases and positions; preinserted forward, territorial-defense ground forces; and widespread offensive and defensive mining.\textsuperscript{55} These forces can be supported by maritime-denial and logistical aircraft operating from dispersed forward land bases, distant land bases, or over-the-horizon aircraft carriers.

In contrast, the main operational roles of carrier and expeditionary groups following a first strike would arguably be to temporarily secure highly localized areas—that is, achieve “moving bubble” sea control—to support mass movement of reinforcements and matériel into and perhaps within the theater, protect primary economic lines of communication, and maintain sea bases for projecting maritime denial into areas the adversary seeks to control. In many scenarios, these missions would require carrier and expeditionary groups to operate at least initially from the contested zone’s periphery.\textsuperscript{56} Raids by these groups within the contested zone may also be desirable.\textsuperscript{57}

Given these assumptions, carrier and expeditionary groups could mitigate their first-strike vulnerability as a crisis escalates by taking advantage of wide maneuver space to employ such concealment tactics as EMCON, dispersal, weather masking, artificial obscuration, or evasion. These groups could similarly use deceptive visual, maneuver, communications, and CNC tactics to create countersurveillance and countertargeting ruses—decoy units or groups, for example.\textsuperscript{58} They might also be able to employ certain EW or cyberattack tactics, as allowed within the rules of engagement and as balanced against the likelihood of revealing exploitation methods and perceived exploitable vulnerabilities, and given relative spatial separation from the potential adversary’s sensors and firing platforms.

Even if not in geographically confined waters, though, forward surface forces “locked” to a geographic position or required to operate overtly during a crisis would almost certainly not be able to take advantage of pre–first salvo concealment and deception tactics. It follows that combatants executing such missions as sea-based air and missile defense in support of forward forces would be highly exposed.\textsuperscript{59} Forward land-based sensors and weapons, however, might be able to compensate for their constrained tactical mobility through rotational dispersion.
among austere basing sites, minimized or deceptive communications and emissions, CNC, and countertargeting displays (signature-simulating decoy aircraft and equipment).60

A defender might support frontline forces by trying to saturate the adversary’s maritime targeting picture from the start of a crisis. It is not clear, though, that such an effort would be practicable, let alone sustainable. This degree of deception might require revealing crown-jewel EW and cyberattack tactics along with vulnerability exploits, which would be worthwhile only if the potential crisis-stabilizing benefits outweighed the probable tactical costs.

Nevertheless, forward forces have some cause for optimism. Although pre–first strike rules of engagement would likely bar direct neutralization of potential adversary manned reconnaissance assets, the same might not be true regarding unmanned ones. There are recent historical precedents of one state neutralizing another’s unescorted, unmanned scouts during times of elevated tension without inciting much more than diplomatic protests.61 Far less stigma attaches to killing robots than manned platforms. A defender might declare exclusion areas during a crisis within which any detected unmanned system would be neutralized; enforcement of these areas might well not precipitate drastic escalation by the other side.62 This possibility should be examined further through war gaming, as well as by historical case studies of the use of assertive peacetime Cold War and post–Cold War-era antiscouting tactics, such as shouldering, communications jamming, and physical attack.63 If the findings are favorable in terms of escalatory risks and the resulting legitimization of the same against American unmanned systems during crises is tolerable, it may be worthwhile for the United States to advance unmanned scout neutralization diplomatically as a norm.

POST–FIRST STRIKE/SALVO OPERATIONS

A defender’s most immediate uses of deception and concealment after absorbing a first strike are to prevent, or reduce the effectiveness of, follow-on strikes against forward forces as they reconstitute and then begin their direct resistance. The tactics used are much the same as before the first strike, but their potential effectiveness is amplified by the fact that the defender can now physically neutralize manned scouts and aggressively deceive, if not selectively neutralize, elements of the adversary’s maritime surveillance-reconnaissance network.

However, a defender’s political objectives will often deny the luxury of waiting for decisive neutralization of the adversary network’s capabilities before committing higher-campaign-value forces within the contested zone. Indeed, political direction may compel extremely risky operations, in which forward forces will have to rely heavily on tactical concealment and deception for self-protection.
For example, during the Yom Kippur War the Israeli navy was tasked with removing the Syrian and Egyptian fast-attack-craft threat to coastal commerce, even though the Israelis’ Gabriel Mark 1 antiship missile could reach only half as far as their opponents’ Soviet-supplied SS-N-2 Styx. Worse, Israeli fast attack craft lacked robust active antiship-missile-defense capabilities. The Israeli navy’s main defenses at the time were chaff and shipboard EW jammers whose specifications reportedly owed more to educated guesses than the limited technical intelligence available. Israeli EW systems were therefore designed to employ multiple tricks, in hopes that at least one would prove effective. The design assumptions were vindicated during the Yom Kippur naval battles of Latakia and Baltim, where the Israeli EW lured the Syrian and Egyptian craft into depleting their Styx inventories, which in turn allowed the Israeli craft to close within Gabriel range and devastate their opponents.\textsuperscript{64}

A defender may not always be this fortunate in countermeasure-design assumptions and yet be no less pressed to operate deep within an adversary’s optimal attack range. The fact that there was little confidence the U.S. Navy’s first-generation noise jammers could counter German radio-guided antiship bombs, after all, was not allowed to hold up the September 1943 Salerno landings.\textsuperscript{65} This possibility highlights the importance of planning “branching” (alternative) actions, and perhaps also of using, as politically and operationally possible, assets for which losses could be tolerated, to mitigate the impact of failed deception or concealment.

The relaxation of the rules of engagement after a first strike also opens the door to using deception and concealment to distract an adversary from the defender’s subsequent actions, mislead the adversary as to the defender’s intentions, or seduce him into wasting scarce resources investigating or attacking decoys. This is especially promising if the adversary’s decision makers are doctrinally dogmatic; overconfident in their surveillance-reconnaissance-strike capabilities, tactics, and plans; or driven to attack by ideology or fear. Signature-simulating decoy aircraft, vehicles, and equipment can be dispersed to forward land bases, which, when supported by deceptive communications and CNC, may be able to attract attention or attack. Likewise, as demonstrated by the U.S. SCATHE MEAN mission during the 1991 Gulf War, unmanned aerial vehicles or gliding expendable decoys can simulate aircraft in action.\textsuperscript{66} Unmanned subsurface vehicles could similarly be used to simulate submarines in order to confuse antisubmarine forces, if not lure them out of position or into wasteful prosecutions.

On the ocean surface, as previously discussed U.S. Navy Cold War–era examples show, it is entirely feasible to surround a ship that is visually and electronically simulating a high-campaign-value unit with actual escorts or aircraft to create a decoy group. A defender may also use signature-emulation technologies
installed in low-campaign-value warships, aircraft, or unmanned systems to form a decoy group. Decoy groups can be positioned in a distant part of a theater to divert attention or attract attack, or they can steam ahead of actual groups to confuse the situational picture, induce the adversary to commit forces prematurely, or lure those forces into an ambush.

Decoy groups are more likely to succeed early in a conflict if the defender has convinced the opponent in peacetime that a certain operational sequence would be followed during hostilities. For instance, although the conditioning effort was not preplanned, decades of operational observations led U.S. Navy commanders, planners, and intelligence analysts to expect the Imperial Japanese Navy to wait in home waters for the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s sortie toward East Asia in event of war. By placing decoy units near Japanese homeports to cover the Striking Force’s transit, the Imperial Japanese Navy exploited American expectations to great effect. Similarly, if during peacetime exercises a defender has routinely moved a particular unit type or group forward—perhaps even to specific areas—shortly after the “outbreak of hostilities” to perform missions consistent with publicly articulated strategy or doctrine, the attacker might well expect the defender to do the same in an actual conflict. Decoy forces fitting that pattern, supported by efforts to blind or roll back surveillance and reconnaissance coverage, may be very effective—especially if they play directly to the adversary’s own preconceptions and doctrinal preferences.

Other forms of deception and concealment that might be used early in a conflict rely on misleading the adversary’s decision makers as to operational or tactical intentions and priorities. In a feint, deliberate contact with an adversary’s forces is made to deceive their commanders as to the timing, location, or importance of the separate, actual main offensive action. For example, during Operation HUSKY, the Allied invasion of Sicily, in July 1943, U.S. Navy “Beach Jumpers” used fast boats armed with barrage rockets and equipped with noisemakers that acoustically simulated landing craft and infantry firefights, smoke-laying gear, and EW systems to conduct feint landing attempts in the western part of the island. These feints resulted in German reserves being withheld from the actual beachhead in southern Sicily. Two months later, the Beach Jumpers seized islands in the Gulf of Naples to confuse the Germans as to the planned landing beach site for Operation AVALANCHE, once again producing German hesitation to commit reserves—this time at Salerno. In contrast, an attempt to entice an opponent, by a “show of force” but without direct contact, into actions favorable to oneself is a demonstration. During the first Gulf War, the presence of a U.S. Navy amphibious task force in the northern Arabian Gulf, for instance, served as a demonstration that induced Iraqi misallocation of major forces to guarding Kuwait’s coast rather than its land border.
None of these deceptions was in itself of decisive importance to the success of the operations they supported, but all reduced the opposition with which friendly forces had to cope at critical stages. Indeed, well-conceived feints and demonstrations before a main action can induce an adversary to divert surveillance, reconnaissance, or strike resources from positions where they could have been employed against the main force. Afterward, feints and demonstrations may be used to distract attention from follow-on maneuvers as well as to cause confusion as to the friendly force’s actual objectives.

Feints and demonstrations generally require the use of actual combatant forces, as opposed to artificial decoys, though the former have historically often been augmented by the latter to achieve desired effects. A deception story might require that certain actions be actually performed rather than simulated, and stand-alone artificial decoys may be unable to keep the adversary deceived for the length of time desired. The visible use of actual forces may also provide a hesitant adversary a “certainty” that will lead to the distraction of attention and misallocation of resources.

Maritime feints and demonstrations might involve actual strikes or localized control/denial operations by submarines or aircraft, threatening movements by naval surface forces, amphibious raids, or simulated amphibious or airborne force insertions, all with the intention of distracting the adversary or drawing combat resources away from a main action. “Cyberfeints” against elements of an adversary’s maritime surveillance-reconnaissance-strike network—or perhaps some other network—could even be performed to divert attention and defense resources from cyberspace operations elsewhere, or distract attention from real-world tactical actions.

Feints and demonstrations must not reduce one’s own available combat power below what is necessary for high-confidence execution of a main action. Feint and demonstration groups will generally employ concealment, ruses, or displays to attract attention at particular times and places but otherwise to cloak their movements and dispositions. Communications deception and CNC may be used to make the feint or demonstration appear to be the main action. Specially constructed feints and demonstrations may also play to the JOAC’s emphasis on seizing the initiative by deploying and operating along multiple, independent lines. Some feints or demonstrations could even conceivably be designed to achieve campaign-level objectives, such as disrupting and wearing down expeditionary or maritime denial forces, reducing confidence in the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance tactics and network, or seizing peripheral territories useful for forward bases. However, feints and demonstrations using sizable forces or units of medium or high campaign value might not be viable at acceptable risk until
the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance capabilities are sufficiently degraded or long-range maritime strike arsenals depleted.

Notwithstanding all this, a maritime force must eventually break cover to execute its missions—land-attack strikes, amphibious operations, air and missile defense in support of bases and allied territories, or sea control or denial. Continued deception and concealment for countersurveillance become difficult at this stage. Nonetheless, some forms of countertargeting deception—such as use of decoy units and groups, artificial decoys, or obscurants—might retain effectiveness, depending on the mission and the threat environment. Once the time comes for maritime forces to break contact with the adversary and relocate or withdraw, joint and combined forces’ support in the form of feints, demonstrations, or ruses, as well as nonkinetic disruption and physical neutralization of the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance network assets, would likely prove invaluable.

**INTELLIGENCE, TRAINING, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND PLANNING PREREQUISITES**

None of the deception and concealment tactics discussed thus far will work absent groundwork begun many years in advance, of which intelligence and counterintelligence preparation is perhaps the most painstaking part. Deception planners must identify the intelligence-collection points of potential adversaries and learn what stimuli are necessary to elicit desired reactions. They also need to understand potential adversaries’ surveillance and reconnaissance doctrine and tactics, sensor designs and capabilities, sensor network architecture (including data transmission and fusion), and counterdeception measures. Perhaps most critically, deception planners need to identify maritime operational and tactical leaders of likely opponents and learn as much as possible about their decision-making processes and tendencies.

While some of this information can be collected via clandestine means, much of it depends on repeated, systematically orchestrated operational exposure to the surveillance-reconnaissance networks of potential adversaries. Routine maritime exercises can be tailored to elicit surveillance, reconnaissance, and force-posturing responses. These exercises can also be designed to shape perceptions of friendly forces’ doctrine, capabilities, likely wartime campaign priorities, and decision making. Perception shaping is especially important because, as we have seen, the credibility of deception stories in combat increases if an adversary’s decision makers have been conditioned in peacetime to anticipate certain behaviors by the defender.

Potential adversaries might restrain their responses to exercises to withhold useful information, or could conceivably tailor responses as deceptions of their
own. Their observed behavior during exercises—as well as their own exercises—can be correlated with other sources to find the probable “ground truth.” Military decision makers are often quite frank in their professional journals and military-academic studies about their forces’ shortcomings and needed doctrinal, tactical, or technological changes. Open-source writings also provide a window into the thought processes and mentalities of their authors, which is especially useful should those authors be, or eventually become, key decision makers. Counterintelligence on the potential adversary’s own collection priorities provides additional data points. Systematic human-in-the-loop war gaming based on what is confidently known about possible opponents’ objectives, doctrine, and weapons inventories may also be useful in building or checking potentially actionable assumptions about their “shoot/no-shoot” criteria in prewar and wartime circumstances. Over time, all these sources and methods help in formulating, testing, and evaluating hypotheses regarding adversary capabilities and behaviors relative to various stimuli.

Intelligence and counterintelligence additionally provide feedback regarding the effectiveness of a deception in progress. Since doctrine and operational plans cannot depend on deep and reliable intelligence penetration of the adversary, wartime intelligence feedback may come mostly from the actions of the target of a deception. For instance, a key indicator of success might be that the adversary is focusing surveillance and reconnaissance resources or massing strike assets in ways that appear driven by the deception story. A decrease in adversary data exfiltration efforts from a given network following friendly-force CNC operations might suggest that the adversary is losing confidence in the network’s usefulness for intelligence exploitation. Feints and minor operations can also be conducted during a conflict to observe and analyze responses, as a precursor of major initiatives.

Another method for assessing the effectiveness of deception and concealment is the “red team.” Intelligence cells not privy to a friendly force’s plans can be tasked with deducing that force’s location, composition, and intentions using only tools, tactics, and techniques either possessed by or within the capabilities of adversary intelligence. If the red team is able to penetrate the friendly force’s deception and concealment, the planned action can be postponed and redesigned or otherwise replaced by a branching action. Indeed, planned branches are particularly critical against contingencies in which the adversary overcomes the friendly force’s deception and concealment or successfully employs counterdeception.

Friendly forces must therefore be trained, equipped, and supported to minimize their losses if they must fight their way out should deception or concealment fail. Operational and tactical decision makers must weigh the risk of failure
against the immediate need to accomplish a given mission. If the mission’s operational-strategic need is great enough, the risk of major losses if deception and concealment are ineffective might be accepted. If not, the mission might be deferred until the probability of success at tolerable risk, with or without effective deception and concealment, increases.

In any case, deception planning in a theater should be centrally coordinated to ensure that localized deception in support of a given operation or tactical action does not conflict with or compromise others. Deception must be firmly integrated within and subordinated to the force-level commander’s overall plan of action. Commanders must ensure that all units or groups under their control understand their roles in a deception so that inadvertent or independent actions do not gradually undermine it. This is difficult enough to accomplish within a single-service organization, such as a carrier group; the addition of other services or allied forces compounds the challenge. Regular peacetime exercises are the best venues for working out these issues; it may not be possible to do so effectively in the heat of crisis. The deception plan itself must be flexible enough that necessary measures or inadvertent incidents that break the cover can be made to appear consistent with the story. Above all, the story must be plausible with respect to the existing situation, consistent with the prior shaping of expectations and perceptions, and tailored to exploit the opponent’s apparent processes and inclinations.

Deception and concealment concepts must be aggressively tested in the context of force-level doctrine and tactics. For instance, subtle differences in decoy positioning relative to main forces and defended units might mean failure. Modeling and simulation, with and without humans in the loop, should be used for preliminary concept testing. Thereafter, however, battle experiments conducted during training exercises are critical for validation.

It follows that forces must be thoroughly trained for performing deception and concealment while executing operations and tactical actions. Deception and concealment plans may require consumption of fuel and stores at a higher rate than would otherwise be the case, and the logistical challenges that may arise must be appreciated. In addition, friendly forces must be capable of executing deception and concealment safely despite the constraints they place on communications and active sensors. Personnel safety, not to mention that of ships and aircraft, depends on crew familiarity with operating in restrictive EMCON and intense cyber-electronic-warfare environments. Increasing unit-level initiative in keeping with a commander’s promulgated intentions will be a particularly critical training objective. This emphasis may require the focused advocacy of senior leadership, given the ways it runs contrary to certain network-centric warfare practices of the past two decades.
Some doctrinal elements or tactics that are considered war-critical, as well as tactical situations too complex to generate in forward theaters, can be practiced in home operating areas. In-port synthetic training can also be used for these purposes; it has the added benefits of enabling more frequent and intensive training than may be possible at sea, given how budgetary constraints are increasingly curtailing exercises of nondeployed forces. That said, aggressive peacetime training at sea remains necessary to provide the environmental variability and operational risks necessary for building proficiency in deception and concealment. High-confidence intelligence, advanced technologies, and a clever deception plan may be all for naught if a force’s personnel lack the conditioning to execute the plan safely and reliably.

“Training like you’d fight” and efforts to condition a potential adversary’s perceptions during peacetime are not necessarily incompatible. An exercise’s primary purpose is to increase proficiency in executing doctrine and tactics. As noted earlier, however, this does not mean that exercise scenarios must closely mirror actual campaign plans. It bears repeating that if forward exercises and authoritative public expressions of strategy and doctrine create an impression that the United States and its allies would follow a certain operational sequence in a given contingency, a potential adversary might be conditioned to believe that it reflects the actual contingency plan. None of this would degrade the ability of exercise forces to train to their doctrinal and tactical objectives.

CONCEALMENT, DECEPTION, AND DETERRENCE

Exercises designed to shape perceptions can serve an additional purpose—reinforcing deterrence. If risk-averse prospective aggressors can be convinced by peacetime demonstrations of selected deception and concealment capabilities that their chances of detecting and identifying forces are low or extremely uncertain, and their opportunity costs of wasting advanced weapons are high, they may estimate that their prospects for a decisive first strike are insufficiently promising. Even if these prospective aggressors believe an opening attack might land strategically exploitable tactical blows, they may still be deterred if brought to conclude that the surviving defenders, now freed of prior restrictions on physical and cyber-electronic responses, would retain a fair chance of preventing the offensive from achieving its political objectives.

There is precedent in modern American military history for maritime demonstrations along these lines. As we have seen, the U.S. Navy selectively demonstrated deception and concealment capabilities throughout the Cold War as a means of lessening the confidence of Soviet leaders in the SOSS while simultaneously eliciting observable political and military reactions. During the first half of the 1980s in particular, the Navy wove these demonstrations into exercises
along the periphery of the Soviet Union as part of a joint psychological campaign supporting specific grand-strategic objectives, along with military intelligence collection. These exercises were also likely designed to “normalize” U.S. use of deception and concealment, as to reduce the risk that their employment during heightened tensions might be misperceived as signaling hostile intent, as well as to shape Soviet expectations regarding U.S. maritime doctrine, campaign priorities, and strategy for a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict. The exercises were certainly successful from the American perspective in terms of the intelligence collected, and eventual declassification of archival materials will reveal how they were viewed by both sides in terms of deterrence and conditioning.

A deterrence-reinforcing psychological campaign of that scope and scale is neither necessary nor desirable against China today, though an appropriately scaled campaign aimed at deterring Iranian conventional aggression might be, as the impasse over Tehran’s nuclear program continues to fester. Nevertheless, routine exercises in the western Pacific, conducted within view of China’s nascent ocean-surveillance system, should periodically include psychological conditioning elements configured to shape expectations, as well as concealment and deception tactics selected to buttress the conventional deterrence credibility of U.S. maritime forces. Visible commitment to training the joint force in the practice of maritime concealment and deception, selectively publicized acquisition of related technologies, and judicious demonstration of those tactics and technologies may, in coordination with grand-strategic initiatives featuring other elements of U.S. and allied power, go a long way toward enhancing conventional deterrence. Should deterrence fail, though, these same measures would likely prove invaluable in having shaped an operational theater during peacetime in a way that promoted access in war—perhaps the most important precept of the Joint Operational Access Concept.

NOTES

1. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: 17 January 2012) [hereafter Joint Operational Access Concept], pp. 3–4. As a terminology note, this article defines “maritime control” and “maritime denial” by expanding on Julian Corbett’s definitions of “sea control” and “sea denial.” Corbett asserts that navies can never control the entirety of a sea at all times. Instead, he argues, navies strive to obtain and exercise temporary localized sea control for given purposes or otherwise strive to prevent opponents from obtaining and exercising temporary localized sea control. The same is arguably true about military activities in the air and on land. Since a force can use any one of these domains to support localized control in any of the other domains and can likewise use any of these domains to prevent or contest an adversary’s localized control in any of the other domains, new Corbettian terminology is needed that accounts for these interactions. Given that a maritime area combines the sea with the airspace and “landspace” that
can affect or be affected by an actor’s use of the sea, “maritime control” means that a force (whether single-service, joint, or combined) has obtained and is exercising control of a localized maritime area for a certain duration and purpose; “maritime denial” means that a force is challenging an opposing force’s efforts to obtain and exercise control of a localized maritime area.


3. The term “force level” describes the doctrine, tactics, capabilities, operating concepts, and other considerations applicable to operating a maritime single-service, joint, or combined task force or group as an integrated whole.

4. Wide-area surveillance sensors and mobile, highly sensitive reconnaissance sensors are arguably the most lucrative targets in an anti-network campaign, as they cannot be repaired or replaced quickly or cheaply. Conversely, it is neither expensive nor time consuming in relative terms to replace damaged network computing infrastructure or shift to backup command sites. The only tactically meaningful cost imposed by physical attacks against computing infrastructure may be the adversary network’s temporary (albeit graceful, if the network is well designed) degradation, which friendly forces can certainly exploit operationally or tactically while it lasts.

5. For examples of these tasks in the context of notional conflicts with China or Iran, see Mark Gunzinger, with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-access and Area-Denial Threats (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2012), pp. 53–73; Jan Van Tol [Capt., USN (Ret.)] et al., AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 2010), pp. 56, 60, 74, 76, 117; and Jonathan F. Solomon, “Defending the Fleet from China’s Anti-ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense” (master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2011), pp. 114–15, 130–31, available at http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/.

6. Although it is unclear whether the Iraqi Kari integrated air-defense system had been designed with war-reserve capabilities including redundant communications pathways, it was able to retain limited yet effective combat functionality in certain areas of Iraq despite debilitating strikes against its command-and-control nodes. The United States was never able to sever Kari’s communications pathways fully, and the Iraqis were apparently even able to “regenerate” some nodes in spite of the punishment they absorbed. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor [Lt. Gen., USMC (Ret.)], The General’s War (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1995), pp. 256–57.


12. An example of this is the U.S. Navy’s Cold War–era exploitation of the poor sensitivity of Soviet radar ocean-reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs). RORSATs were continuously tracked and reported to U.S. naval forces so that large warships, such as aircraft carriers, could maneuver to present their smallest radar cross sections as satellites passed overhead; see Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 195. Similarly, stricter EMCON periods were scheduled for when Soviet ELINT ocean-reconnaissance satellites were expected to be overhead; see Friedman, Network-centric Warfare, pp. 237–38.

13. For example, a combined U.S. and NATO battle force transiting from Norfolk, Virginia, to the Norwegian Sea for exercises OCEAN SAFARI and MAGIC SWORD NORTH in August–September 1981 reportedly used a passing North Atlantic hurricane for cover from

14. An example of how the U.S. Navy has exploited this kind of vulnerability in the past involves RORSAT’s poor clutter-rejection capabilities. See Friedman, *Seapower and Space*, p. 195.

15. For more on obscurants for countering, see Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants: History and the Future,” *Naval War College Review* 63, no. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 73–84, and Scott Tait [Cdr., USN], “Make Smoke!,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 137, no. 6 (June 2011), pp. 58–63.

16. The traditional term “high-value unit” is shorthand for tactically important or very expensive assets that a force must strive to protect: aircraft carriers, amphibious and maritime prepositioned matériel–carrying ships, replenishment ships, strategic aircraft, wide-area-surveillance aircraft, transport aircraft, and airborne-refueling aircraft. At the spectrum’s other end, “low-value unit” applies to relatively expendable small surface combatants and tactical aircraft. This terminology is imprecise, however, in that it incorrectly implies that an asset’s tactical value always carries over into campaign-level value. Although “high-value units” generally have high campaign value, the relationship is not automatic. For example, while an aircraft carrier’s tactical value is difficult to dispute, in a given campaign a combatant capable of ballistic-missile defense or a submarine carrying conventional land-attack missiles—either of which might otherwise be considered medium-value units—may be of greater importance and correspondingly require the support of the rest of the force. The key to interpreting a specific asset’s campaign value is to judge how a campaign would be impacted by its temporary incapacitation or outright loss. Campaign value is thus a more nuanced framework for doctrinal development and operational planning.


18. Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto’s operational plan for Midway is a case study in how not to structure maritime dispersal for deception and concealment. By threatening to seize Midway, Yamamoto sought to lure the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s carriers into decisive battle. However, rather than intentionally use his 1st Air Fleet carriers as his primary spear, the lethal blow was to come from his battleships, in a night action. His concept of operations therefore positioned the battleship main body, for its own concealment, hundreds of miles from the 1st Air Fleet. That made it impossible to add battleships to the 1st Air Fleet’s air defenses in the event his assumption of operational surprise proved incorrect. Yamamoto also inexplicably chose not to augment the 1st Air Fleet’s screening and scouting resources with the fast destroyers and floatplane-equipped cruisers meant eventually to provide fire support to the Midway landing force. By rendering the majority of his fleet incapable of supporting his highest-campaign-value warships, Yamamoto ensured that the resulting exchange would be isolated to the opposing and fairly closely matched carrier forces. See Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), pp. 50, 53–56.


20. The U.S. Navy experimented during the Cold War era with human couriers to enhance
OPSEC and COMSEC. See Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight,” p. 89, and Vistica, Fall from Glory, p. 108.

21. For an outstanding technical overview of RF LPI, including theoretical LPI countermeasure technologies and techniques, see Aytug Denk [Capt., Turkish air force], “Detection and Jamming Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Radars” (master’s thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, September 2006). It seems doubtful that LPI systems can avoid resort to restrictive EMCON within a contested area for the duration of a conflict. While a highly directional line-of-sight RF communications system might employ LPI capabilities actively with acceptable risk, as that beam is very difficult to intercept, the same would not be true of a search radar. LPI seems to hold more promise as a means for expanding transmissions under certain risk-defined circumstances during EMCON than as a complete substitute for EMCON.

22. RF noise jamming is an especially attractive option for cutting off an adversary’s scouts and space-based surveillance sensors from networks, decreasing the timeliness and throughput of their communications, or forcing them to maneuver evasively in ways that benefit a defended force. In fact, co-orbital minisatellite jammers represent a potential option for nonkinetically attacking data-relay satellites, which are critical nodes in wide-area maritime surveillance-reconnaissance networks. Communications jamming against a potential adversary’s satellites might be unduly escalatory in a crisis, so its use would almost certainly be a political decision; should hostilities erupt, though, it would be far less escalatory and damaging to the orbital environment than a kinetic kill. See Stephen Latchford [Lt. Col., USAF], Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems, Occasional Paper 39 (Maxwell Air Force Base [hereafter AFB], Ala.: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air Univ., December 2005), pp. 22–23.


25. For example, although Allied bombers neutralized most major surveillance-radar sites in southern France prior to the August 1944 DRAGOON landings, one major site was spared to support a deception involving simulation of an assault force approaching a different area. See Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (New York: Skyhorse, 2007), p. 619.

26. See Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, Strategic Deception (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), p. 224, and Holt, Deceivers, pp. 83–84. Holt also notes that in World War II the U.S. Navy developed tactics for disguising low-campaign-value warships as units of higher value but does not seem to have employed them widely.

27. Examples include the use by the Algiers landing force during Operation TORCH in November 1942 of a route that implied until the last moment it was a Malta supply convoy, and by the DRAGOON landing force of a track that reinforced German expectations that the Genoa region would be the next Allied objective. See Francis Harry Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, abridged version (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), p. 259, and Holt, Deceivers, p. 619.

28. See Friedman, Network-centric Warfare, pp. 233–35.

29. For example, this tactic was used by kamikaze raiders during World War II, as well as by the Iraqi air force in a nearly successful strike against critical Saudi oil infrastructure during the first Gulf War. See John Monsarrat, Angel on the Yardarm: The Beginnings of Fleet Radar Defense and the Kamikaze Threat (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1985), pp. 130–34; Robert Stern, Fire from the Sky: Surviving the Kamikaze Threat (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 321; and Gordon and Trainor, General’s War, pp. 263–66.

30. Anti-pattern analysis tactics can include deceptively positioned transmitting stations and simulation of transmitter or operator signature characteristics to misrepresent a unit’s identity or mission. Other tactics include manipulating the volume, priority, or classification of message traffic to generate false “peaks” and “troughs” so as to conceal the actual pattern. “Offensive manipulation” uses these tactics to mislead the adversary as to the units, locations, activities, and timing associated with an operation or action. “Defensive manipulation” increases the traffic
on channels typically associated with forces or locations not involved in a planned event while suppressing activity associated with units, etc., that are. In preparation for anti-pattern analysis measures, deception teams collect traffic-pattern data of a unit or force, as well as representative samples of message content over a long period, including both routine (in port or in garrison) and elevated (preparation for, or execution of, missions) levels of activity. The unit’s or force’s communications can then be modeled and simulated with appropriate fidelity; for these tactics as applied during World War II, see Holt, Deceivers, pp. 85–92. Though originally conceived for use against data and voice radio, anti-pattern analysis tactics are also extensible to cyberdeception.

31. Military communications facilities in Japan supported the Striking Force with daily information broadcasts on the same schedule and frequencies used during late-1941 exercises in home waters. Intricate deceptive transmissions were also made from Japanese home ports to simulate Striking Force units. These measures, combined with the actual force’s high-frequency radio EMCON, had the effect of convincing U.S. radio-traffic analysts that the force was still near Japan. Their analysis was further degraded by Japanese units’ use of multiple call signs—or none at all—to defeat correlation. Lastly, observable Japanese communications patterns immediately prior to Pearl Harbor were significantly different from those seen during previous periods of intensive activity, denying U.S. intelligence a key indicator. See Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 338, 353–54, 362, 424–25, 427, 440–42, and Hanyok, “Catching the Fox Unaware,” pp. 104–12.


33. Imitative deception is very difficult, as it requires at a minimum detailed knowledge of the adversary’s communications procedures, authentication measures, and equipment and operator characteristics. It is generally not a primary deception tactic. See Holt, Deceivers, p. 93.

34. See ibid., pp. 89, 578, 619; Dwyer, Seaborne Deception, pp. 25–33, 35–48, 79; and Monsarrat, Angel on the Yardarm, pp. 126–27.

35. For IFF spoofing by Japanese kamikazes, see Stern, Fire from the Sky, p. 155. For a thorough technical overview of the EW waged between developers of German radio-guided antiship bombs and Allied defensive countermeasures, see Martin J. Bollinger, Warriors and Wizards: The Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010).

36. For the U.S. Navy’s 1960s-era AN/ULQ-5 and -6 blip enhancers, see Dwyer, Seaborne Deception, p. 102. For the 1970s- and ’80s-era AN/SSQ-74 Integrated Cover and Deception System (ICADS), see Friedman, Network-centric Warfare, pp. 247, 343. Per Friedman, ICADS was housed in a trailer temporarily installed on a warship’s flight deck. ICADS Phase 1 allowed its host to simulate an aircraft carrier’s telltale radios and radars. ICADS Phase 2 added a false-target generator that could deceive Soviet airborne and RORSAT radars, as well as an acoustic element that simulated a carrier’s machinery noise to deceive Soviet submarines. For an overview of mid-to-late-twentieth-century deceptive EW techniques and expendable offboard decoy technologies, see Solomon, “Defending the Fleet from China’s Anti-ship Ballistic Missile,” pp. 81–87.


38. “Computer network charade,” or CNC, is a term suggested by an anonymous reviewer of this article, to whom I am grateful for the idea.

39. For outstanding summaries of the potential uses of disinformation planting and honeypots for CNC, as well as the theoretical impact of CNC on an adversary’s intelligence collection efforts, see Fred Cohen, “The Use of Deception Techniques: Honeypots and Decoys,” n.d., available at all.net/journal/deception/Deception_Techniques_.pdf, and Neil C. Rowe, Deception in Defense of Computer Systems from Cyber-Attack (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, n.d.), available at faculty.nps.edu/. Rowe’s paper
also summarizes high-fidelity deceptive simulation of an actual node's or network's behavior. As with preparation for communications deception, if a CNC deception team has access to node or network behavioral data and representative content over the range of operating tempos, it ought to be able to model and then simulate them in another node/network or in a honeypot or net. This is an important area for unit- and force-level experimentation.

40. This hypothetical CNC tactic is envisioned for the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and perhaps also the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). It is not envisioned for operational or tactical data-link or distributed fire-control networks.

41. CNC's relative immaturity means that its viability must be proved in war games, battle experiments, and developmental tests before it can be incorporated in doctrine and operational plans. CNC may well prove more useful for concealment (saturating adversary collection systems and overwhelming decision makers with sheer volume and ambiguity) than for outright deception. A potentially useful way to estimate its combat efficacy would be to study historical cases of equivalent communications deception. For example, in spring 1942, U.S. naval intelligence used a false, unencrypted radio message about Midway Island's water-purification system to elicit enemy communications activity that helped verify that Midway was indeed the Imperial Japanese Navy's next target; see Patrick D. Weadon, “The Battle of Midway,” National Security Agency / Central Security Service, 15 January 2009, www.nsa.gov/. There is little conceptual difference between this episode and how CNC might be used in the future.

42. The challenges of rapidly obtaining and reacting to I&W may make it extremely difficult to use decoy forces to successfully induce an adversary into wasting precious first-strike resources. It also brings the danger of premature employment of “crown jewel” deception tactics. Nevertheless, defending leaders who are confident that they understand their counterparts’ mind-sets and perceptions well enough, have sufficient maneuver space, and judge the probability of war to be high may decide that even a failed decoy attempt is better than waiting passively for their counterparts’ first move.

43. As an example, a Royal Navy sloop that was attacked during the Luftwaffe’s 27 August 1943 radio-guided antiship bombing raid—the second successful one of the war—had on board a Royal Air Force ELINT collection team. This embarkation was not typical, which suggests British intelligence had anticipated the combat debut of the weapon and sought to use a relatively low-campaign-value task group to collect data that would be useful for defending more important forces later. In fact, there is circumstantial evidence the sloop’s group was deliberately exposed to attract radio-guided antiship bomb attacks; see Bollinger, Warriors and Wizards, pp. 6–8, 49. A sensor’s emissions or a weapon’s kinematics may very well give away design vulnerabilities that, not easily or rapidly correctable, can be readily exploited by countermeasures. The same may be true of surveillance-reconnaissance-strike tactics and decision making, in which case early data collection may be as important to the defender as inducing the adversary to waste weapons.

44. This point is exemplified by the April–July 1945 Okinawa kamikaze campaign. The raids were initially high in strength and frequency but gradually—though they remained lethal—decreased to relative nuisance levels as it became apparent to Japanese commanders that they were not inflicting significant operational or strategic handicaps on the U.S. Navy and that new production could barely compensate for the aircraft expended. The Japanese decided to husband their remaining inventory for intense raids against U.S. forces during the anticipated invasion of the home islands; see Robin L. Rielly, Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships: Okinawa 1945 (Havertown, Pa.: Casemate, 2008), pp. 312–13, 320–22. Luftwaffe patterns in employing radio-guided antiship bombs between July 1943 and August 1944 also represent an example. Severe attrition of the specially configured bombers and corresponding losses of highly trained crews in exchange for no operational gain led to the redeployment of several bomber units from the Mediterranean to
northern Germany for a planned (though never executed) future offensive. Mediterranean radio-guided bombing operations were heavily reduced until the Anzio landings in late January 1944, where heavy attrition led to the withdrawal of most of the surviving bombers in anticipation of the Allied invasion of France. By that time, though, sustained radio-guided bombing operations were all but impossible owing to inadequate bomber and bomb production. See Bollinger, *Warriors and Wizards*, pp. 73–74, 88, 118, 145–49.

45. For experimentally obtained evidence regarding the lingering psychological effects of a successful deception on an adversary’s decision making and tactics, albeit in the cyber realm, see Cohen, “Use of Deception Techniques,” pp. 17, 19–20.


47. This is the exact principle around which U.S. Navy deception and concealment against the SOSS was structured throughout the Cold War. See Friedman, *Network-centric Warfare*, p. 224.

48. Though adversaries often use deception and concealment to cover first-strike/salvo forces as they increase combat readiness and move into position, they may also employ deception within the first strikes/salvos themselves. The attacker could launch an initial salvo of obsolescent weapons or decoys to entice a defending force into revealing its location or expending ordnance (or revealing defensive EW “tricks”), thereby paving the way for the actual strike. Defenders might be able to defeat such deception by positioning networked multi-phenomenology sensors in their outer defense-in-depth layers to enable early classification of inbound threats, with sensor data relayed by highly directional line-of-sight pathways to mitigate interception risk. Better still is to have a very deep defensive-ordnance inventory that can support many engagements before reloading is needed. This may not be practical with respect to missile interceptors, which suggests the importance of EW countermeasures and future directed-energy defenses. The ideal option, though, is a counterdeception that lures the attacker into wasting salvos. This would be very difficult to orchestrate in peacetime’s waning moments but would seem to offer the greatest reward at the least relative cost.

The attacker can, alternatively, use sacrificial scouts or raiders to elicit defensive responses and thereby reveal a force’s positions. This gambit could be countered by positioning the outer defensive layers far enough from the main force so that the former’s actions do not directly reveal the latter’s location. Following the first strike/salvo, offensive counterair sweeps well forward of a main force can also be used to locate and neutralize adversary scouts. The U.S. Navy’s “Outer Air Battle” doctrine and tactics of the late Cold War are examples of these approaches. See Friedman, *Seapower and Space*, pp. 234–39.


53. Optimal first-strike range is not necessarily the same as the maximum physical reach of the longest-ranged weapon system effective against a given target type (i.e., the combined range of the firing platform and the weapon it carries). Rather, it is defined by trade-offs in surveillance and reconnaissance effectiveness and in the number of weapons employable in a short time as the target’s distance from the firing platform’s starting position increases. This means that a potential adversary with a weapon system that can reach distance $D$ from the homeland’s border but can achieve timely and high-confidence peacetime cueing
or targeting only within a radius of $0.75D$ has an optimal first-strike range of $0.75D$. It follows that if, for technical, operational, or logistical reasons, the adversary can fire only a few $D$-range weapons within a defined short period of time, and if his doctrine therefore calls for using $D$-range weapons in coordination with far more plentiful weapons of range $0.5D$, the optimal first-strike range decreases to $0.5D$. This does not reduce the dangers faced by the defender at distance $D$ but does offer more flexibility in using force-level doctrine, posture, plans, and capabilities to manage risks.


55. These frontline forces have great capacity to blunt an adversary’s offensive, and many are either relatively invulnerable to countermeasures (e.g., submarines, mines) or expendable from the campaign-level standpoint (e.g., small warships, land-based antiship missiles). The types, numbers, capabilities, and positions of these frontline units are driven by the threat as well as geography. Defense in a choke point, archipelago, or small physically enclosed sea can be very different from defense in a large marginal sea. Environmental and endurance factors in the former might weight the structure of low-campaign-value forces toward missile-armed patrol boats and short-range, rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft, while those factors in the latter might favor corvette or frigate-type warships and medium-range, fixed-wing aircraft. Additionally, ground-force preinsertion assumes that a remote, isolated territory is strategically worth holding. Depending on geography, operational needs, and the adversary’s combat and logistics capabilities, it may be strategically beneficial, in both political and military terms, to induce the adversary’s seizure of a given friendly territory. The defender can then wage maritime-denial operations that gradually shift the overall theater correlation of forces in his favor—an important element not only for eventually retaking the territory but also for follow-on operations, maintaining popular support for the war effort, and the eventual political settlement. All this may not be possible, though, if the territory must be held as a barrier against the adversary’s open-ocean access.

56. The high-campaign-value-unit positioning argument is convincingly made in Robert C. Rubel, “Talking about Sea Control,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 38–47. Aspects of the aircraft-carrier-doctrinal-roles argument are advanced in the same author’s “The Future of Aircraft Carriers,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2011), pp. 13–27. Rubel asserts that a carrier’s chief future roles in intensely contested oceanic waters should be (using its air wing) maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, support of wide-area communications, and undersea warfare. Rubel downplays the carrier’s role in other maritime-control/denial operations, in light of potential adversaries’ rapidly improving long-range antisub and air-defense capabilities. However, much as the (modular) air wing represents the carrier’s combat power, (modular) ordnance in turn represents the air wing’s combat power. In other words, the air wing allows a task group to launch ordnance farther from the main body than if weapons are directly launched by its ships (or submarines); also, the air wing can be quickly reloaded aboard the carrier for follow-on missions, whereas shipboard and submarine launch tubes presently cannot be reloaded at sea. This means that not only does an air wing equipped with standoff antisub and ground-attack ordnance provide a naval force with its most rapidly reloadable spears but that in a prolonged maritime battle consisting of numerous sequential engagements, the same air wing, equipped with standoff antiair and antisubmarine ordnance, provides maritime forces with their most agile and longest-reaching shield.


58. Ruses are defined as actions intended to deliberately expose false or ambiguous information to the adversary. They do not necessarily require use of actual combatant forces. See JP 3-13.4, p. I-9.

59. Data collected during a first salvo against them, though, might prove invaluable for deception and concealment during subsequent operations and tactical actions.

60. A “display” is defined as the static “simulation, disguising, or portrayal of friendly objects, units, or capabilities” meant to support...


62. A potential adversary could overcome this threat by placing unmanned systems under close manned escort, but that would undercut the rationale for using unmanned, vice manned, reconnaissance systems to increase search volume and on-station time per sortie. Also, it is not clear how a potential adversary could respond without disproportionate escalation if a defender neutralized the unmanned system by close-in jamming or other nonkinetic means. The point is worth study through war gaming.

63. Interestingly, during an early 1970s U.S. Navy war game it was suggested that since Soviet first-salvo doctrine relied heavily on scouting, the president could warn his Soviet counterpart over the hotline that the approach of any Soviet aircraft within fifty nautical miles of a U.S. aircraft carrier would be interpreted as an act of war. This was deemed unrealistic by the game’s participants, though, as it would place on the United States responsibility for the “last clear chance” to avoid a shooting war; see Friedman, Seapower and Space, p. 174. With unmanned systems taking on this reconnaissance role, though, it seems less clear that the same escalatory risk now arises.


66. In Scathe Mean, on the opening night of the first Gulf War, 17 January 1991, a U.S. Air Force unit launched BQM-74 target drones and Navy A-6 bombers released tactical air-launched decoys in support of second-wave F-117 strikes against Baghdad. The Scathe Mean decoys enticed Iraqi air-defense sites to switch on their targeting radars, which were then subjected to withering antiradiation-missile attacks. The decoys also lured the Iraqis into wasting surface-to-air missiles against false targets. Lastly, the decoys distracted the Iraqis from any intermittent contact their very-high-frequency search radars may have gained against the F-117s. Gordon and Trainor, General’s War, pp. 112–14, 217, 219–20.

67. For examples, see Solomon, “Defending the Fleet from China’s Anti-ship Ballistic Missile,” pp. 115–18.


70. Dwyer, Seaborne Deception, pp. 25–33, 35–48. The British conducted similar maritime feints in support of the June 1944 OVERLORD landings. See Holt, Deceivers, p. 578.


72. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps originally planned an actual, major amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti coast as part of the ground offensive in Operation DESERT STORM. When U.S. Central Command refused to authorize the assault, the amphibious force’s presence became a demonstration “by default.” See Gordon and Trainor, General’s War, pp. 293–94.

73. Joint Operational Access Concept, pp. 20–21.

74. As an example, Allied bombing missions against western France immediately prior to the OVERLORD landings hit many targets north of the Seine River to lend credence to the FORTITUDE SOUTH story that the primary invasion target was the Pas de Calais. These feint raids, though, secondarily supported OVERLORD by disrupting German movements across the Seine. See Holt, Deceivers, p. 94.

75. Joint Operational Access Concept, p. 31.

76. For example, early in World War II the Royal Navy attempted to lure Luftwaffe raiders into attacking decoy ships at Rosyth instead of the main fleet at Scapa Flow. The deception ultimately failed; Luftwaffe scouts may never have come across the decoys, and in any case British intelligence had not yet identified whether other information channels were more effective in drawing the attention of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) or backing up a deception story. In contrast,
the Royal Navy ploy discussed earlier to lure Luftwaffe attacks against a decoy battle-
ship in a 1942 Malta convoy was effective in part because British agents had fed relevant
information to the Abwehr in advance. See Howard, Strategic Deception, p. 224.

centralized decision-making architecture may be more vulnerable to exploitation. See
Solomon, “Defending the Fleet from China’s Anti-ship Ballistic Missile,” p. 20.

78. Monte Carlo modeling and simulation might be able to inform such war gaming,
but human players representing adversaries are needed to make decisions on the basis of
scarcities, campaign priorities, and psychological intangibles, to have confidence in the
findings.


80. Holt, Deceivers, p. 94.

81. For example, Allied radio deception during World War II was centrally controlled by the-
ater commanders and overseen by strategic deception-planning staffs in Washington and
London. See ibid.


83. For an example of this kind of analysis, see Kenneth S. Blanks [Capt., USA], “An Effec-
tiveness Analysis of the Tactical Employment of Decoys” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Com-
mand and General Staff College, 1994), pp. 59–73. The modeling and simulation Blanks
describes focus on tank decoys, but the basic issues are extensible to warships and aircraft.

84. For examples of U.S. Navy Cold War–era exercises used for this purpose, see Dwyer, Sea-

College Review 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 84–105.

86. Though network-centric warfare is often de-
scribed as inherently enabling decentralized operations, in the author’s experience this has
not uniformly been the case. Force com-
mmanders have often been tempted to control
over-the-horizon subordinate units tactically
and in real time using solely a displayed
common situational picture. Aside from the
fact that this picture has sometimes not been
“common,” let alone current, owing to tech-
ical limitations, the future cyber-electronic
operating environment suggests that this
degree of control will be increasingly difficult,
if not impossible, to achieve.

87. See Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan
Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened
the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), pp. 6–8, and
David Alan Rosenberg, “Process: The Reali-
ties of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy,”
in Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a
Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett
and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, ed. James
Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport,
161–62.

88. For instance, exercises OCEAN SAFARI and
MAGIC SWORD NORTH ’81 “elicited probably
the most extensive reaction from Soviet naval
forces in almost a decade” and provided “an
ideal opportunity to . . . assess the Soviet
capability to conduct surveillance and target
allied maritime forces;” Commander Second
Fleet Calendar Year 1981 Command History,
box 234, Operational Archives Branch, Naval
History and Heritage Command, Washing-
ton, D.C.

89. Joint Operational Access Concept, pp. 18–19.
Operationalizing Dynamic Defense

Justin Goldman

Today the Japanese face an increasingly complex regional-security environment, particularly along the southwestern islands, where incursions by Chinese government vessels are increasingly occurring in what Japan claims as its territorial waters. The security of offshore islands has developed as an area of focus within Japanese defense planning, and Japan has begun building up modest island-defense capabilities.\(^1\) Although the nature and range of threats faced have evolved, a core focus of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) remains the same—the requirement to protect the nation from an amphibious invasion.\(^2\) While the JSDF has developed some robust platforms, its current state also reflects the constraints placed on its development under the 1947 constitution, enacted during the occupation following World War II.

Response to this increased regional tension and the current challenge of island defense make it important for Japan to develop a unified amphibious capability. The reasons begin in the current defense thinking in Japan. Shortly after a Chinese trawler collided with a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessel in October 2010, the government released the current National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). A robust amphibious force would help meet that document’s requirement that the future defense force possess “readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility.”

Japan has confronted challenging conditions in recent years during times of domestic political uncertainty, ranging from the 11 March 2011 triple disaster.
disaster—a magnitude 9 earthquake generating 40.5-meter tsunami waves and causing reactor meltdowns at the Fukushima nuclear power plant—to the government’s decision in September 2012 to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands from their private owner. The Senkaku Islands are a group of five islands at the southernmost tip of the archipelago, referred to as Japan’s “southwestern islands,” that extends downward from Kyushu and effectively divides the East China Sea from the Pacific. While the Japanese hold that there is no territorial sovereignty issue, the Chinese, who refer to the group as the Diaoyu Islands, also lay claim to them.

The 2011 white paper Defense of Japan states explicitly that “in the case of crises enveloping one or more of Japan’s offshore islands, it is vital that Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Force units carry out joint operations rapidly and flexibly.” Following his December 2012 election, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ordered the existing NDGP—that of 2010—frozen and directed Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera to review and revise the guidelines. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has expressed its desire to increase defense spending and to strengthen the nation’s defense posture in response to growing Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea, making an amphibious capability increasingly relevant.

Japanese defense thinking naturally leads to the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the development of a Japanese amphibious capability presents an excellent opportunity for both partners. The U.S. Marine Corps, in partnership with the U.S. Navy, has the doctrine and experience to support the JSDF in developing this capability. As the United States “rebalances” toward Asia, enhanced cooperation will bolster the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in defending Japan and ensuring regional stability. This article concludes by considering the impact of such a capability for Japanese decision makers. Amphibious forces will enhance Japan’s ability to contend with China’s active maritime presence, especially to defend the Senkaku Islands. Today’s crises and future complex contingencies will allow less advance warning than in the past to those responsible for policy decisions. With Chinese and Japanese forces operating in proximity within these waters, the risk of escalation arises, and Japan must ensure it maintains the readiness to respond. Ultimately, an amphibious capability comprising elements of all three services within the JSDF would ensure that the necessary air assets and sealift are available to bring a combined-arms force to bear in an unfolding crisis.

DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD A DYNAMIC DEFENSE FORCE
The 2010 NDGP reflected Japan’s recognition of the need to enhance its defense posture in the East China Sea and along the southern Ryukyu island chain to contend with China’s assertive military modernization. The following sections
will look at the increasing Ministry of Defense (MOD) attention placed on joint operations in the SDF; the enhancement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance highlighted in Japanese defense thinking; and the need for greater deterrence. The heart of a recent initiative known as “the Dynamic Defense Force”—calling for active use of the SDF during normal conditions to provide deterrence and stabilization, particularly along the southwestern islands—is operational readiness for crisis response. In the case of amphibious forces, this is a joint pursuit, integrating efforts of all three services. This concept builds on actions taken in recent years by Japanese decision makers to move “from an SDF that simply exists to an SDF that actually works,” as former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba stated in the foreword of the 2004 defense white paper.

The relatively limited strategic lift and the short range of key capabilities central to amphibious operations, such as ship-to-shore connectors, reflect the constraints of Japan’s postwar constitution. The 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense established the priorities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) as waging antisubmarine warfare, protecting sea lines of communication, and defending against an invasion from the sea. The MSDF was allowed to employ limited numbers of tank landing ships (LSTs) to transport reinforcements to Hokkaido to meet an anticipated Soviet invasion, but a 1960 proposal for a helicopter carrier for antisubmarine warfare, initially planned at six thousand tons and revised up to eleven thousand, was ultimately rejected, owing to the continuing aversion to military matters in Japan. While the strategy Japan has built taking these constraints into account has held for decades, the intensifying security situation around the southwestern islands brings it into question. The security environment Japan now faces was exacerbated by the January 2013 incident where a Chinese frigate reportedly locked fire-control radar on an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea, 180 kilometers north of the Senkaku Islands. In late April 2013 Prime Minister Abe told the Diet that the country would act decisively against attempts to enter its territorial waters and make a landing on the islands.

JOINT MOBILITY
The operational utility of the SDF in responding to a crisis depends on its capacity for rapid maneuver of forces to the scene, particularly in the southwestern islands. “The 2004 NDPG directed the SDF toward a multirole, flexible force. Current efforts build on this recognizing the need to have a more active force, rather than our static past,” according to Dr. Tomohiko Satake, of the National Institute for Defense Studies. Amphibious operations are expeditionary in nature, and in the defense of the nation the forces involved must be capable of immediate deployment in an integrated manner. Rapid maneuver along the littoral of
the southwestern islands is essential to an ability to dictate the tempo in a crisis. “Our President,” says Satake, referring to the head of his institute, “has argued that the Dynamic Defense Force concept should be characterized by being swift, seamless, and sustainable. I think this concept is quite relevant to today’s Japanese situation, especially in terms of the defense of offshore islands.”

The effectiveness of forces deployed to the southwestern islands, in turn, will depend on adequate early warning. The Mid-term Defense Program (FY 2011–2015) captures this point in its guidance to the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). It directs the GSDF to stand up in the southwestern islands a new coastal surveillance unit that will monitor developments and gather intelligence. Ideally, such assets, permanently stationed there, will build an accurate picture of the operational environment, detect threats, grasp adversary intentions, and report, all in a timely enough way that amphibious task forces, for instance, can respond rapidly to contingencies.

The three services within the SDF do not have a long history of training and operating together, a situation that critically needs to be addressed. “The Dynamic Defense Force concept is important and relevant, but all three services and MOD officials have different ideas about it and there is little effort at coordination going on; each of the services are analyzing and training to the concept independently,” observes a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. A 1998 joint exercise on Iwo Jima marked the first time the SDF had conducted a triservice training evolution under a single command. An amphibious capability for rapid island defense is inherently joint. The 2006 establishment of the Joint Staff Office created an entity focused on operations, while the staff offices of the three services concentrated on maintenance and training; such a mechanism was critical to the dispatching of a joint task force in response to the 11 March triple disaster. “Under Dynamic Defense Force we are now considering cross-domain capabilities including sea-air, sea-land, and air-land. Cross-domain is very important and challenging for us. The biggest issue we face is mobility,” explains a senior MOD strategic planner.

In the 2010 NDPG’s section on priorities in SDF organization, equipment, and force disposition, the first area of emphasis is the “strengthening of joint operations,” followed by the “response to attacks on off-shore islands.” For both, transport capacity is described as key. Although some associate the Dynamic Defense Force strictly with mobility—the point has caused confusion—in fact the concept goes beyond lift to the issue of response to unclear contingencies. The GSDF is becoming lighter and more mobile, phasing out armor designed for Cold War scenarios and incorporating the new, lighter, Type 10 tanks, which can be fitted with modular armor for a variety of threat levels. During the Cold War the GSDF had 1,200 tanks; that number is now down to around 760, and
Further planned reductions will produce an armored force of four hundred tanks by 2020.\textsuperscript{24}

Along with more effective fire support from armor, the movement of ground combat forces continues to receive vital attention. Since their introduction in 2001, over 1,500 four-by-four light armored vehicles (LAVs) have been brought into service in the GSDF to increase mobility.\textsuperscript{25} Development of an eight-by-eight Mobile Combat Vehicle is under way, an effort to combine high road mobility with air transportability and so to shorten response time; fiscal year 2016 is the target for this vehicle’s introduction.\textsuperscript{26} In addition to transporting troops, mobile combat vehicles can perform in command-and-control and reconnaissance roles. The MSDF currently possesses other essential platforms that an amphibious capability would require and is developing more. The two Hyuga-class helicopter destroyers—Hyuga, which entered service in March 2009, and Ise, which did so in March 2011—lack a well deck, but offer the potential for ship-to-objective maneuver from the air. At 197 meters in length, the eighteen-thousand-ton vessels have four spots on the flight deck to accommodate three SH-60 Seahawks and an MH-53E Sea Stallion.\textsuperscript{27}

The SDF does possess a limited capability to move landing forces ashore over the water, but key upgrades are needed. Each of the three Osumi LSTs possesses a well deck that can embark either two Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCACs, which in turn can carry multiple LAVs) or one of the GSDF’s heavy tanks. The LCAC and the utility landing craft currently in the MSDF inventory offer a range of uses; at the low end of the spectrum, two of the latter perform port-service tasks.\textsuperscript{28} According to a recent Marine Forces Pacific liaison officer to the GSDF, neither platform is well suited for forcible entry, a limitation that also impacts their utility for humanitarian assistance; the GSDF will need, for ship-to-objective maneuver in a contested landing, a vehicle that can carry out operations once ashore.\textsuperscript{29} In the fiscal year beginning in April 2013, the GSDF initially planned to acquire four amphibious assault vehicles (AAV-7s), the craft currently in service with the U.S. Marine Corps, but there are indications this number may be reduced to three.\textsuperscript{30} The MSDF is developing two helicopter destroyers of a new class that will be known as “22DDH,” with greater length and displacement that will allow nine helicopters to be embarked.\textsuperscript{31}

Through disaster-relief operations, many SDF personnel have gained critical experience with respect to embarking personnel and essential equipment. In response to the 11 March triple disaster, the dock landing ship USS Tortuga (LSD 46) got under way from Sasebo, embarked over ninety SDF vehicles and around three hundred SDF personnel, and carried them to northern Honshu, where Tortuga served as a forward service base afloat for helicopter operations.\textsuperscript{32}
PERSISTENT AWARENESS AND PRESENCE

The 2010 NDPG also identified the need to enhance situational awareness. The 2011 white paper explains, “It is extremely important to carry out activities on a daily basis in order to ascertain the movements of other countries’ forces and detect any warning signs of potential contingency.” Domain awareness in the southwestern islands must be enhanced by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Establishing a presence to conduct surveillance is important operationally, but it also sends a political signal of Japanese intent to defend the territory. According to one Japanese academic and analyst, the process is on track: “Dynamic Defense Force is embedded into the Self-Defense Force development plans. The importance of Southwestern Islands defense is understood.”

The 2013 defense budget provides funding for a surveillance station on Yonaguni Island, at the southern end of the island chain, well over a thousand kilometers from Japan’s home islands; the 15th Brigade will base between one and two hundred personnel there. Increasing situational awareness is a positive development, but it must be complemented by a capability that can rapidly respond if Japanese territory is threatened.

The argument for a military presence of personnel and equipment south of Japan’s four main islands is not a new one, and it is important to keep in mind that an absence of presence might be interpreted as unwillingness to defend expressed territorial interests. “Sea control and control of the airspace in the Southwest Islands are vital in peacetime,” says a scholar at the National Defense Academy. It is sound to begin with small deployments; mayors of Miyako, Ishigaki, and Yonaguni Islands have thus far supported military presences—but this willingness cannot be taken for granted in the future. The presence of a rapidly deployable, combined-arms force—while likely not based in the island chain itself—is essential to dissuading a would-be aggressor from challenging the status quo. “In this age deterrence is most important and Japan needs to actively display the capabilities of the SDF. To implement this strategy they must actively train, identify shortcomings, and retrain to address these concerns,” argues a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation.

It will take sustained effort to develop an understanding of the operational implications of geography. For instance, 47 percent of the SDF’s total training area is located on Hokkaido, the northernmost and second largest of Japan’s four main islands. In 2010 the SDF started an “area group”-sized field training exercise series in the vicinity of the offshore islands, involving all three services, to improve deployment capabilities that would be needed to contend with a range of scenarios. In the mid-2000s a contingent of foreign military officers visited a GSDF unit in Kyushu having responsibilities for southern-islands defense. They discovered a lack of doctrine and planning for operations in the region. The
briefing officer candidly admitted that the unit had no means of lift and that in case of an emergency he would have to call his air and maritime counterparts to see what they had available. Increased, sustained attention to Japan's southwestern islands is needed from its political and military leadership.

U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE OPPORTUNITY
Cooperation between Japan and the United States is essential to realizing an amphibious capability in the SDF, and it offers a real chance for the alliance to bolster the security of Japan's southwestern islands. When former defense minister Satoshi Morimoto took up his post in June 2012, he made explicit his focus on the alliance relationship: “The most important task for people who think about Japan's national security and build its policy is making the alliance even more reliable.” Morimoto, who brought experience in the Air Self-Defense Force to the post, emphasized the importance of enhancing the force posture in the southwestern islands: “Japan has 6,800 islands, and territory that stretches over three thousand kilometers; it's necessary to have troops at its southwestern end to beef up our warning and surveillance capability.”

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has signaled how strengthening the alliance will be prioritized during his time in office. Securing the southwestern islands is a shared objective and a task that has grown more urgent as tension has escalated in 2013. While he will certainly govern differently from his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) predecessors, both parties agree on the need to place greater emphasis on defense of the southwestern islands and on the need to enhance the ability to respond to contingencies there. Prime Minister Abe and the LDP feel the United States should be pleased that they have returned to government after DPJ missteps within the alliance, the most telling being Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's failed promise to relocate the Futenma Air Station off Okinawa and the resulting damage to his credibility. However, some Americans disagree with him on the overall state of the alliance under the DPJ, with some pointing to the 2010 NDPG, which allocated, for the first time since the end of World War II, more defense resources to western Japan. It is important to maintain momentum, particularly the progress made under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (also DPJ, 2011–12). Alliance managers must address such differences in perspective to ensure that the progress made toward a “Dynamic Defense Force” in recent years is not lost.

INTEROPERABILITY
The evolving security environment in Japan’s periphery has led to calls for an updated roles, missions, and capabilities review, as the most recent one was done
in the 1990s. The often-applied analogy in past years of “sword and shield” does not accurately reflect present dynamics or Japan’s need for offensive capabilities for its own defense. While Japan has long possessed robust platforms that can be employed offensively, the issue returned to the forefront in February 2013 as Prime Minister Abe reconvened the advisory panel that he had set up in 2007 (during his earlier term as prime minister) to tackle the issue of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. “With respect to Article 9 [of the Japanese constitution, renouncing war], anything that has to do with territorial defense is acceptable. Strengthening Southwest Islands defense through an amphibious capability is legally well within Article 9,” according to one scholar of international studies. Nonetheless, forward-based and rotationally deployed U.S. forces will continue to have essential roles in the defense of Japan. The 2012 Armitage-Nye Report on the alliance calls for integrated operational competence eventually leading to a Japanese-U.S. combined task force for contingency response.

Bolstering Japanese capability with respect to the defense of offshore islands should be seen in the broader context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The final months of 2010 saw the deterioration of China-Japan relations when a Chinese fishing-boat captain was arrested following a collision with a JCG cutter. At the height of the resulting tension, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that “with respect to the Senkaku Islands, the United States has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan.” That is, the goal of improving Japan’s ability to defend its offshore islands and conduct amphibious operations specifically envisions a JSDF that can operate more effectively and efficiently with American counterparts. After a period of drift in the alliance, new cooperation and interoperability are essential to reinvigorate it. The 2010 NDPG calls for development and deepening of the alliance to adapt to evolving security conditions as well as operational cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.

The U.S. contribution to alliance operations goes beyond forces deployed in Japan. However, access is no longer as assured as it once was, potentially undercutting American commitments to allies, such as Japan, within range of the precision weapons of potential regional opponents. The U.S.-Japan alliance is predicated on strategic mobility. It was the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), diverted from a planned exercise near South Korea, that responded to the 11 March triple disaster (as part of Operation TOmodachi), not the forward-deployed George Washington (CVN 73) from its home port at Yokosuka. Reagan supported the flight operations of JSDF and JCG helicopters, a task facilitated by years of combined training and the interoperability of assets. To reassure regional allies, the U.S. Senate has approved an amendment to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act reaffirming that the Senkaku Islands are
administratively controlled by Japan and that they fall under the United States–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.\textsuperscript{57}

**GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE/MARINE CORPS COOPERATION**

The U.S. Marine Corps, working closely with the U.S. Navy, possesses the experience and institutional knowledge that would be needed to support the JSDF in developing amphibious capability. Synergy at the level displayed during TOMODACHI is a realistic objective. In the 27 April 2012 “2 + 2” statement, Japanese and American officials emphasized combined training in the territories of Guam and the Northern Marianas. Just months later, a group of forty soldiers from the GSDF’s Western Army Infantry Regiment began a first-ever, month-long series of training events focused on amphibious operations with U.S. Marines. The exercises culminated in a landing on Guam simulating an attempt to retake an island. Marine lieutenant general Kenneth Gluek observed, “It takes many, many training evolutions to develop and maintain your proficiency, but over the next year, I believe they should be able to develop a very credible capability.”\textsuperscript{58} An SDF capability to conduct amphibious operations is receiving more attention from senior leadership. The chief of staff of the GSDF, General Eiji Kimizuka, who observed the training on Guam, has stressed the importance of preparing equipment and conducting training toward an amphibious capability so that the GSDF can perform the functions of marines.\textsuperscript{59}

This increased emphasis builds on existing efforts, especially Exercise IRON FIST, a bilateral amphibious exercise conducted annually in California since 2006. An infantry company from the Western Army Infantry Regiment trains there in amphibious maneuver, the securing of beachheads, and preparation for follow-on forces.\textsuperscript{60} “The task to defend or retake offshore islands is becoming the main mission for the GSDF, but the lack of experience in carrying out a landing mission from the sea is a key challenge. Training exercises such as IRON FIST with the Marines are particularly valuable for our unit commanders,” according to a senior MOD official.\textsuperscript{61} Such combined (IRON FIST involved USS Boxer [LHD 4]) and joint training evolutions have grown in complexity and advance the degree of interoperability that could be relied on should both alliance partners be called on to respond to a crisis in tandem.

Shortly after taking office for his present term in 2012, Prime Minister Abe announced that the government would introduce a bill that would set the conditions for when Japan can exercise collective self-defense after the elections to the House of Councillors (the upper house of the Diet) in July 2013. While discussions of constitutional revision are ongoing, much attention has been placed on the scenarios in which Japan can exercise collective self-defense.\textsuperscript{62} A December 2012 survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun following the election that
brought Abe to power found that 72 percent of lawmakers in Japan's lower house believed the constitutional interpretation on collective self-defense should be revised.63

This focus on the direction of Japanese capability development comes at a crucial juncture for the U.S. Marine Corps as well. As the United States carries out the “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region, the Marines have a critical role, as they possess the ability to insert decisive military force rapidly and sustain operations ashore.64 A key asset is the MV-22 Osprey, which can transport expeditionary forces at greater range and speed, and operate with supply ships like the T-AKE dry cargo ship.65 Okinawa-based Osprey aircraft took part in the November 2012 Exercise FORAGER FURY, transporting personnel and equipment to Tinian, a 1,500-mile transit beyond the range of the CH-46 helicopters that the MV-22 replaces.66 Notwithstanding local opposition to the stationing of the Osprey on Okinawa, ultimately its forward deployment strengthens the alliance. During his April 2013 meeting with Secretary of Defense Charles T. “Chuck” Hagel, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera confirmed that a second squadron of MV-22 Ospreys would deploy to Japan in the months ahead.67

Working together to build a Japanese amphibious capability offers an opportunity to rearticulate the critical role of forward-deployed U.S. forces for regional security. The 2011 defense white paper explains that “the stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa—including the U.S. Marine Corps, which has high mobility and readiness and is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies—. . . contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.”68 Increased integration between U.S. Marines and their Japanese counterparts could also lead to a more politically sustainable U.S. force posture. The present constant interaction between Japanese and American naval personnel is an important example to emulate; it has led to increasingly critical roles for the MSDF in U.S.-led multilateral exercises. During RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) 2012, MSDF rear admiral Fumiyuki Kitagawa served as the deputy commander of a joint task force comprising some forty-eight ships and submarines, two hundred aircraft, and over twenty-five thousand personnel from twenty-two nations.69

The December 2010 NDPG calls for Japan to engage in multilayered security cooperation. “The Japan-US Alliance has evolved over time, but what hasn’t changed fundamentally, and what will not change, is the fact that the alliance plays an extremely important role in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region,” according to former defense minister Morimoto.70 Developing a capacity for amphibious operations not only would help meet the NDPG requirement for a “Dynamic Defense Force” but also would potentially produce cooperation with a number of Asia-Pacific partners. The Armitage-Nye report
highlights expeditionary capabilities as a growing focus not only of Japan and of the United States but also of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea. Australia would be a natural partner for training, being the first country other than the United States with which Japan has signed a joint declaration on security matters. U.S. Marine rotations to Darwin are growing, and the 2nd Royal Australian Regiment is training to become the ground component of a future Australian amphibious capability. The three nations have a mechanism for defense cooperation in place, presenting favorable circumstances for trilateral amphibious training.

As for China, while Japan must weigh broad issues as it manages that complicated bilateral relationship, dissuasion through security cooperation is important to consider. The impact could be clearly seen in Beijing’s response to the expansion in 2007 of MALABAR, an annual Indian-U.S. naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, to include the navies of Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Such considerations caused an abrupt shift in the conduct in November 2012 of the KEEN SWORD exercise, which involved over forty-seven thousand Japanese and U.S. personnel. The scenario called for the Western Army Infantry Regiment and U.S. Marines stationed on Okinawa to retake by amphibious assault an island held by an enemy force. The exercise was to have been carried out on Irisunajima Island as part of KEEN SWORD, and it would have been the first of its kind in Japan. Japanese officials decided in October to cancel it as too provocative, as it would have taken place during the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighteenth Party Congress.

The development of Japan’s amphibious capability must continue to move forward, and such choices will certainly arise again. In this case the decision to cancel the amphibious assault did nothing to limit the Chinese response to the overall exercise, which took place as planned. Beijing condemned it and Japanese efforts to woo “extraterritorial nations for joint military drills that only increase regional tensions.” Meanwhile, marines of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continue to conduct exercises in which they retake contested islands. It is, therefore, a positive step that Japan sent around a thousand personnel from all three services to take part in DAWN BLITZ, a training exercise in June 2013 with the U.S. Marines in California that focused on a large-scale amphibious assault. A few hundred GSDF personnel with helicopters embarked on three MSDF ships, including Hyuga, gaining familiarity with the vessels during the transit from Japan, and on arrival took part in their most ambitious amphibious training thus far.

During DAWN BLITZ MSDF and GSDF planned and executed complex components of an amphibious operation including fires, communications, supply, ship-to-shore movement, and air operations. There remain, certainly, elements to be enhanced, such as joint communications and the controlling of aircraft,
but this is an impressive effort for what is essentially their first joint evolution of this scale. The Japanese showed a good understanding of the necessary aspects to execute complicated amphibious and heli-borne landings. As former foreign minister Koichiro Gemba has emphasized, the concern that China might dispatch vessels to upset through coercion the status quo in such areas as the Senkaku Islands is very real. Engagement between the GSDF and the Marines is directly relevant to such security challenges.

OPERATIONAL APPLICABILITY AND RESOLVE
The most critical reason for Japan to develop an amphibious capability is to provide its political leaders with options, both to shape the security environment and to respond to crisis. In early January 2013 Prime Minister Abe ordered Defense Minister Onodera to bolster surveillance around the Senkaku Islands, where Chinese government vessels were actively operating. Following the completion of a PLAN exercise in the western Pacific in early December 2012, two guided-missile destroyers and two missile frigates of the North Sea Fleet had patrolled the waters around the disputed islands for several hours. This was the second time PLAN vessels had done so since Japan’s nationalization of the islands in September 2012. The mid-October episode marked a departure from the usual Chinese pattern of presence patrols by civilian vessels; Beijing was sending a strong message.

In March 2010 China enforced a Law on Island Protection that covers its claim to territorial rights on the Senkaku Islands as well as on the continental shelf in the waters off Okinawa, asserting this law as its legal basis for patrolling these waters. The territorial disputes in the East China Sea will not likely be resolved in the near term. Chinese strategic culture urges the sustained application of multiple instruments of power to pursue national interests; China has indicated, for instance, that it will survey the disputed islands in 2013 as part of a larger project of island and reef mapping.

As the tension has grown in the East China Sea, the Chinese have continued to develop their forces relevant to contesting control of islands. For example, Kunlun Shan, a Type 071 Yuzhao-class landing platform dock (hull number 998), entered service in 2008 as the PLAN’s first modern amphibious assault ship. It is capable of lifting and supporting a reinforced battalion of four hundred to eight hundred marines with landing craft and midsize helicopters. PLAN marines spend four months each year, including two months at sea, training in tasks related to landing operations.

Of the sixteen major straits and channels critical to China’s oceanic access, eleven are situated along the Japanese-controlled southwestern islands. Certainly, Japanese control over these islands, combined with robust alliance forces
on station, represents a defensive barrier against Chinese maritime ambitions beyond the island chain. The United States has been clear that the United States–Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. However, these unoccupied islands are themselves of questionable strategic value to the United States. Understandably the Japanese continue to seek reassurance as to how the United States would respond to a Chinese attempt to change unilaterally the status quo.

Plans are in place for a GSDF presence in the far southwestern islands. Currently, however, the approximately ten thousand Japanese who reside on the four Sakishima Islands have seen little military presence beyond the Air Self-Defense Force ground-based air-surveillance radar site on Miyako. Forces stationed on the islands would require support. On the positive side, Okinawa Island could become a transport hub for forces transiting from Kyushu to the Sakishimas. But an adequate military presence would not come without risk. One would anticipate a Chinese response comparable to that of Lieutenant General Ren Haiquan, who took part in an October 2012 conference organized by the Australian army, where he warned Australia against cooperating more closely with a “fascist” Japan that had once bombed Darwin.

REGIONAL UTILITY

Japan must push back against such characterizations; the Japan of today is not the Japan of the 1930s and early 1940s. With respect to hardware, the MSDF’s new 22DDH, which will be able to embark nine helicopters, displaces 19,500 tons, while China’s expected Type 081 amphibious assault ship (landing helicopter dock) will displace twenty-two thousand tons. The perspectives on Japan from other regional countries have also evolved; MSDF vessels now call in nations that previously expressed fear of a Japanese military resurgence. In December 2012, just days before Japan’s lower-house election, the Philippine government took the unusual step of stating that it would strongly support a decision in Tokyo to rearm, notwithstanding the constraints of its pacifist constitution, as a counterweight to China. In late May 2012, during a Philippines standoff with China over the Scarborough Shoal, three MSDF vessels called on Manila Bay on a goodwill visit.

In the present environment, therefore, Japan can bolster its defenses in the southwestern islands through an amphibious capability and yet avoid actions that Beijing would seize on as a return of “militarism” in Japan. But the Abe government, with increased Japanese defense spending for the first time in eleven years, must avoid rhetoric that plays into the hands of potential opponents. The commandant of the JCG, Takashi Kitamura, captured this balance well in a December 2012 speech. The Japanese, he declared, are prepared to respond to a growing
Chinese presence but at the same time are willing to reduce patrols around the disputed islands if the Chinese cut back on their own maritime activity in the vicinity.\textsuperscript{95}

Amphibious forces are most associated with forcible entry, and in Japan’s current context, planning must take place for operations at the high end of the spectrum to retake offshore islands. However, of the more than a hundred amphibious operations carried out by the U.S. Marines since the end of the Cold War, very few were combat missions.\textsuperscript{96} With adequate ship-to-shore connectors, doctrine (especially cross domain), and training (particularly in the integration of ground and maritime forces), the JSDF could conduct advanced amphibious missions ranging from raids and offshore-island scenarios to humanitarian assistance and the extraction of nationals.

A combined-arms force could respond rapidly to domestic disasters. Following the 11 March triple disaster, Hyuga quickly got under way and steamed to the Tohoku region. Its four helicopters flew urgent search and rescue missions, and its extensive command-and-control suite was essential in directing the multivesSEL operation.\textsuperscript{97} The MSDF moved relief supplies ashore via LCAC from Osumi LSTs in the proximity of Ishinomaki, whose harbor had been destroyed by the tsunami.\textsuperscript{98} Japan has responded in support of numerous international disaster-relief situations, and on the seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire, such tragedies must be expected to continue.

Indonesia requested Japanese transport support following the December 2004 tsunami, which struck the coast of Aceh. Three MSDF ships deployed with three CH-47, two UH-60, and three SH-60 helicopters to deliver relief supplies. Their LCACs, which carried engineering vehicles used to reestablish the road network, were cited as of particular value to local authorities.\textsuperscript{99} The heavy lift of the CH-47s is of key utility in disaster relief operations; the GSDF’s 1st Helicopter Brigade’s dropped approximately thirty tons of seawater on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station’s Unit 3 during the 11 March disaster.\textsuperscript{100} Operation from a sea base of amphibious ships allows commanders to task-organize a force that will go ashore to meet the specific needs of local authorities.

These employments, especially that of Hyuga, suggest what an amphibious capability could bring Japan. The SDF has limited experience operating jointly, and developing an amphibious capability should increase its proficiency, in that joint command and control is implemented early in an expeditionary operation.\textsuperscript{101}

These capabilities are critical also to Japan’s role beyond the Asia-Pacific region. When a massive earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, the United Nations Security Council expanded its stabilization mission in that country. The preparations for such United Nations peacekeeping missions typically take months, but in this case the majority of the detachment came from the GSDF
Central Readiness Force, which deployed approximately two weeks after the order was given. SDF engineering capabilities again added value, moving a tremendous amount of rubble. Haiti also offered a valuable lesson that could inform Japanese planning—how Spain, with a modest capability of four amphibious ships, made a considerable contribution to relief operations, having previously made sustained efforts to integrate its three services to realize the capabilities needed for a contested landing. The four Spanish ships got under way promptly after the disaster struck and, Haiti’s port facilities being inoperable, moved their operations ashore with helicopters and amphibious craft.

Initial signals from Prime Minister Abe suggest recognition of the importance of reinforcing relationships in Southeast Asia. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida’s first trip included the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, and Australia; the prime minister then traveled to Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. An amphibious capability is a sound platform for engaging regional partners; for Japan it would complement the Overseas Training Cruise, which has been conducted for nearly six decades. Such a capability would significantly improve readiness to contend with threats to the southwestern islands, where challenges show no sign of abating. To the contrary, the growing presence and intensity of actions from Chinese maritime forces in regional waters increase the urgency of the need for a Japanese amphibious capability.

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AN UNPERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR OVERCOMING CHINA’S A2AD CAPABILITY

Marshall Hoyler


Princeton professor Aaron Friedberg has made a valuable contribution to the debate on how the United States should respond to a rising China. He argues that the United States should build military forces capable of overcoming China’s emerging antiaccess/area-denial (A2AD) capability in the western Pacific. Failure to do so, he says, may lead to Chinese control of East Asia’s resources, which in turn will enable China to “project power into other regions, much as the United States was able to do from the Western Hemisphere throughout much of the twentieth century.”

Before coming to his conclusions and recommendations, Friedberg provides an informative survey of several relevant subjects. First, he places China’s rise in historical context and shows how and why the wealth and power concentrated in the West for the past two hundred years are increasingly shifting to Asia. Next, he provides a useful overview of U.S. relations with China. From 1950 through 1969, U.S. policy sought to isolate and contain China. For the next twenty years, China and the United States developed a much more open relationship and became aligned to offset the power of the Soviet Union. From 1989 until today, U.S. policy toward China has necessarily had elements of both containment and engagement—“congagement.”

Friedberg next turns to an analysis of Chinese thinking. He explains why it is hard to discern China’s strategy—available information comprises

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“a confusing blend of cacophony and silence.” In addition, Chinese leaders themselves probably do not know how their strategy will unfold. Given these caveats, Friedberg outlines an assessment of China’s strategic position that, on the basis of open sources, appears to be shared by most Chinese analysts and decision makers. He says three ideas appear to govern China’s approach: avoid confrontation, build comprehensive national power, and advance incrementally.

Friedberg believes that the U.S. military edge over China has eroded dramatically in the past twenty years. China is close to having a secure nuclear second-strike capability, which heightens the importance of the conventional balance. That balance has shifted, and China has increased its capacity to find and attack U.S. Navy units, as well as U.S. and allied bases near its borders. America is still ahead militarily, but China is closing the gap. Finally, Friedberg notes several reasons why, over the next few decades, the United States may not spend enough to balance China.

Friedberg’s most valuable contribution is that he explicitly states why he thinks a conventional military buildup serves a vital U.S. interest. Without it, he says, China will have a powerful A2AD capability, threatening the United States and allied bases in the western Pacific and making U.S. surface naval operations within the “second island chain” prohibitively risky. In such circumstances, he says, America’s allies and friends may well decide to pursue an accommodation with China. Most seriously, “unchecked Chinese domination over East Asia could give it preferred access to, if not full command over, the region’s vast industrial, financial, natural, and technological resources.” According to Friedberg, “the same kinds of geopolitical considerations that caused American strategists to conclude in the early twentieth century that they had a vital interest in preventing the domination of Eurasia by potentially hostile powers are still applicable today.”

China apart, Japan controls most of East Asia’s “vast resources.” Therefore, Friedberg needs to show how a fully developed A2AD capability would permit China to cow Japan into giving “preferred access to, if not full command over,” those resources. Such an explanation would have to show how China could credibly threaten Japan with unacceptable consequences if it failed to do so. In other words, Friedberg needs to show how China could credibly threaten Japan with invasion, blockade, or bombardment, or some combination of all three.

A Chinese invasion of Japan is utterly beyond China’s current military capabilities. (According to a RAND study Friedberg cites, China’s amphibious lift is barely adequate to enable an invasion of Taiwan, only one hundred miles away.) In principle, China could try to build the forces needed to make an invasion feasible. Were it to do so, however, Japan could create “porcupine defenses” to defeat any invasion force at a fraction of that force’s cost to China, and it could do so even if the U.S. surface fleet could not operate within the second island chain.
Similarly, Friedberg does not explicitly discuss the prospect of a Chinese attempt to blockade Japan. That is an important omission. Japan has good reason to believe that it could ride out any Chinese attempt at blockade by implementing a range of defensive measures. For example, it could reroute merchant shipping to sea-lanes far distant from Chinese bases and support U.S. submarines in sinking any blockading Chinese ships. Even if China were to make great strides at increasing its capacity for blockade, what is there to prevent Japan from making offsetting moves? And why need the United States necessarily overcome China’s A2AD systems to defeat a blockade when its submarines can operate with impunity despite those systems?

Friedberg indirectly refers to bombardment, the only other way China might threaten Japan militarily. He provides a Department of Defense (DoD) figure showing that much of Japan is within range of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile. However, China only has seventy-five to a hundred such missiles and builds them at a rate of nine to fifteen per year. It needs many for the antiship ballistic missile force often seen as the heart of its A2AD capability, and could spare few for striking Japan. DoD’s figure also shows that much of Japan lies within range of the DF-10 land-attack cruise missile, but Japan’s existing force of F-15J fighters and airborne warning and control platforms could defeat sizable numbers of incoming cruise missiles while operating from bases hardened to survive missile attack. Were Japan to perceive a plausible threat from Chinese missiles, it could readily invest further in active and passive defenses that could “deter by denial” such attacks.

If the United States should appear “irresolute, incompetent, unwilling, or simply unable to fulfill its security commitments,” Friedberg says, threatened states “would probably try to build up their own defenses.” If so, he needs to show why a Japanese buildup would fall short. After all, if Japan can defend itself successfully with help only from U.S. Navy submarines, why should a U.S. choice not to counter China’s A2AD buildup lead Japan to see America as “unwilling, or . . . unable,” as Friedberg fears?

Friedberg also mentions threatened states “perhaps acquiring nuclear weapons in hopes of deterring aggression and preserving a measure of independence” if they perceive the United States as “unwilling, or . . . unable” to stand by its allies. China has had nuclear weapons since 1964, and Japan has decided to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for all that time. Again, if Japan and the United States can defeat Chinese attempts at invasion, blockade, and bombardment, even in a world where everyone believes Chinese A2AD systems will work, why should Japan go nuclear?

Some U.S. Navy and Air Force communities want to persuade Congress to cut ground force budgets and to buy costly next-generation weapons by arguing that
the United States has a vital interest in overcoming Chinese A2AD systems. They may cite Professor Friedberg in making their case. If they cannot make a more persuasive argument than his, they ought not to receive such funding.
A HISTORY OF GAMING


War gaming is part of the Naval War College's storied past. Then as now an integral part of the College's curriculum, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, gaming provided the Naval War College's faculty and students an opportunity to examine various courses of action and operational plans that would later be put to use in the Second World War. Many observers have noted that the games conducted at the College were important to the successful outcome of the war in the Pacific against Japan. Frank McHugh's *Fundamentals of War Gaming* explains the techniques and procedures that the Naval War College developed and utilized in the games of those years.

McHugh's half-century with the War Gaming Department began in 1934, precisely the time when the College faculty was testing and evaluating various contingency plans for the expected conflict with Japan. McHugh planned and participated in games, later he served as an analyst, and in 1957 he helped to deploy the Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator. He was known both nationally and internationally for his lectures on gaming techniques. In this work McHugh does not present a general thesis examining gaming's effectiveness, value, or importance. Rather the book describes in detail the technical aspects of gaming, with chapters outlining various gaming techniques and procedures. McHugh provides a thorough overview of all aspects of war gaming that the Naval War College employed in the first half of the twentieth century.

The first chapter provides an introduction to war games, explaining the types of games most likely to be employed and the roles of the players, participants, and observers. This is followed by a chapter on the history of gaming, from its beginnings in the Prussian military. McHugh gives the reader a thumbnail sketch of gaming as it developed in the nineteenth century and was eventually adopted by most major combatants prior to World War II. He explains that the U.S. military adopted war gaming as a tool to examine emerging doctrine at the service colleges. It was not just the Navy that integrated war games into its service school curriculum but the Army and the Army Air Corps as well. Following the chapter on the history of games, which
comprises about seventy pages, McHugh presents four chapters that delve into the mechanics and details of how games were organized and conducted. The concluding chapter introduces the reader to the computer system that revolutionized naval gaming in the late 1950s (since replaced by successive generations of more sophisticated machinery). Four appendixes provide greater detail on determining chance and probability, as well as a glossary of war-gaming terms. However, no index is included. Not necessarily geared toward a general reading audience, Fundamentals of War Gaming delivers a technically oriented war-gaming operator an essential handbook on the history and importance of the craft. It is a user’s guide, and some of the techniques and methodologies for planning, executing, adjudicating, and analyzing war games are still in use today.

This is a reprint of the third edition of McHugh’s book, which was originally published in 1966. If there is an heir to Frank McHugh—a nationally recognized gaming expert with the expertise that once set McHugh apart from his peers—perhaps he or she would consider updating the text by bringing the reader into the twenty-first century. This is a potential avenue for further inquiry, one that would be of great interest to those looking to what the future holds for the profession of gaming, or to the relationship in the twenty-first century between war games and curriculum at service schools. This additional insight would provide enough material for a useful fourth edition. However, as it stands, McHugh’s book chronicles the history of gaming and describes the various techniques, procedures, and parameters employed by war gamers throughout the first half of the twentieth century. It is an interesting and useful book, one that I highly recommend.

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At the end of Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (2007), Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor concluded that Americans and Iraqis had created an Iraq of “chaos, suffering, and a future that is still vexed.” Six years later that vexed future is realized in their latest book, The Endgame. Thoroughly researched, this book leverages not only documentary sources but interviews with American and Iraqi leaders who shaped the post-Saddam Iraq to give the most encompassing narrative to date of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Nearly eight hundred pages in length, this is the best single-volume study of the American and Iraqi experiences in postinvasion Iraq from 2003 to the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Any future histories of the Iraqi war will have to acknowledge this comprehensive research and account.

After retracing some territory familiar from Cobra II, Gordon and Trainor present a detailed account of the American occupation and effort to create a new Iraq. What becomes clear in this volume is that President George W. Bush, his administration, and the first team of military leaders failed to create an adequate policy and strategy to transform the fractious Iraqi people into a stable nation. Sectarian violence, internal
and external terrorism, and American myopia created a stew of insurgency, instability, and fear in Iraq while the United States focused on “transitioning” the nation to a new sovereign government. In many respects Endgame is the tragic story of ill-conceived policy and strategy followed by a succession of ill-fated and politically charged efforts to get out of the quagmire that Iraq had become after April 2003.

Gordon and Trainor divide their narrative into three parts. First they explore the descent into sectarian violence and the inability of the United States to shift the nation to Iraqi control between 2003 and 2006. Readers will recognize the all-too-familiar shortcomings of Donald Rumsfeld, Tommy Franks, Paul Bremer, and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez in their attempt to end the occupation as quickly as possible. The second part is the core of the story, detailing the genesis of the “surge,” the “Awakening” movement, and the effects of David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency approach on an Iraq that was effectively transforming its religious demographics through violence and intimidation. In the third section, the authors describe the fait accompli of the American withdrawal under President Barack Obama, leaving an unsettled Iraq under a suspect coalition government led by Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and “a dysfunctional political system.”

While some may take issue with the authors’ liberal use of what they label simply “classified sources” and “authors’ notes” in their citations, for those of us who served in Iraq the prose is hauntingly accurate. As a veteran of the Iraq War, I find that my personal recollections of events do not differ from this book’s narrative, especially the account of the changeover from General George Casey to General David Petraeus in the winter of 2006–2007. As Casey (and General John Abizaid) sought to end the war for the coalition by accelerating the transition of control to Iraqi security forces (ready or not), troops on the ground recognized that the strategy was a rush to failure. Gordon and Trainor deftly juxtapose Casey’s increasingly irrelevant assessments to Bush with the daily “SIGACTS,” reports of the increased military and civilian casualties from vehicle-borne improvised-explosive-device attacks across Iraq.

Petraeus certainly comes out better here than do the other American leaders, but he is not spared scrutiny entirely. The authors are careful to note that Petraeus was opportunistic in embracing the Anbar Awakening movement and that he was lucky to have Ryan Crocker and General Ray Odierno on board with his counterinsurgency approach in 2007 and 2008.

The real value of this book lies in the effort that Gordon and Trainor make to explain the dynamics of Iraqi politics and sectarian fractrures. To be sure, they argue that Iraq is not now the democracy desired by the United States but remains a nation of “sectarian tensions and potential flashpoints.” Perhaps Endgame is the best attempt to understand the complex relationship of Maliki with other Shiite groups, the Iranians, the Sunnis, and the Kurds as they all competed in those years to stake out their interests in a post-Saddam Iraq.

In this sense, this volume is the most complete of the three that Trainor and Gordon have written and should be read by anyone seeking to understand the ordeal of the United States in Iraq.

Jon Scott Logel
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The eminent naval historian David Rosenberg once advised this reviewer that serious readers of good naval history can expect one of three outcomes: they will be entertained; they will be informed; or they will be empowered. The fortunate readers of this timely book will fall into all three categories. But above all, they will be empowered.

This book is a compendium of thirteen case studies of various wars and campaigns by some of the most distinguished naval historians and analysts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The case studies are short, readable, and often exciting. Some of the events are well known, others less so. So the book will certainly entertain.

It also will certainly inform. Andrew Lambert’s tale of the Royal Navy’s White Sea campaign of 1854 contributes enormously to our understanding of the nineteenth century’s great global maritime war against Russia—mismnamed the Crimean War. (That real-world event was a key progenitor of Admiral Mahan’s formulation of a construct for a counter-Russian war in “The Problem of Asia” [1900] and of the concepts that underlay the Reagan administration’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.) Coeditor S. C. M. Paine provides a fascinating analysis of Japanese military and naval strategy during World War II, making the point that peripheral and expeditionary campaigns are not necessarily panaceas but can even prove disastrous. Later in the volume, David Stevens reminds us of the details of one of those campaigns, in New Guinea—a campaign that while peripheral to the great powers was central to Australia, a country whose military past must become much more familiar to us as our focus shifts to the Asia-Pacific. Bruce Elleman’s quick description of China’s 1974 naval expedition to the Paracels should be required reading for anyone scanning today’s headlines. Other chapters explore legal issues in expeditionary campaigns and shed fresh light on the Peninsular War, Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Guadalcanal, Korea, Malaya, the Falklands, Iraq, and the war on terror. John Hattendorf contributes a short but perceptive foreword, a perfect scene setter.

However, where the book truly excels is as a vehicle of empowerment. In both their analytical and well-argued introduction and conclusion, Elleman and Paine propound a thesis that there are insights to be gained from considering naval expeditionary operations in peripheral areas as constituting a discrete subset of military operations and that those insights can be compounded by comparing and contrasting the thirteen cases under scrutiny. They are correct. However, it will be the rare reader who will buy completely into their characterization of the coherence of their concept, and an even rarer one who will not pause to think about the rationale they present for including these specific case studies. (Examples would be Peter Jones’s discussion of the 2003 maritime campaign in Iraq and John Reeves’s treatment of the war on terror.) It can be difficult to view, as the editors do, the relationship between the Pearl Harbor raid and the Sino-Japanese War in the same
light as that between the 1982 battle for the Falklands/Malvinas and the Cold War, or that between the U.S. Navy’s contribution to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and the global war on terror. Their analogies sometimes appear forced and their syntheses sometimes, well, stretched.

But far more important is the expansion in thinking that this book is sure to engender. For all the debates with the editors and authors that will arise in readers’ minds as they turn the pages, previously unthought-of concepts and insights are bound to emerge as well. Peripheral naval campaigns can win a war or waste valuable resources in profitless undertakings. This book explains how and why this has happened, and it yields insights for future planning. No serious reader who actively engages with the arguments that the editors present and the examples that they provide will finish this provocative book without a greatly enlarged understanding of the past, present, and potential uses and limitations of naval power. As we enter a new era of military and naval operations, that understanding can empower us indeed, especially the policy makers, staff officers, and analysts who support those operations.

This, of course, is not the first time that Professors Elleman and Paine have done something like this. This book follows at least two similar earlier efforts, a volume on naval blockades and sea power and one on naval coalition warfare. Like those compendiums, Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare seeks to get its arms around a topic vital for naval policy and strategy today by looking to the past for data and concepts. Like those earlier volumes, it definitely succeeds. All in all, this is an important book for naval historians, strategists, and operators to engage with, learn from, and ponder.

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The last volume of Paul Koistinen’s five-volume study of the political economy of American warfare from the nation’s colonial period of the seventeenth century to the present day, this new book analyzes U.S. foreign policy and national defense from the end of World War II to the present. In it Koistinen studies the decisions and actions that led to the development of the current U.S. national security system and what was termed by Dwight D. Eisenhower the “military-industrial complex” (MIC).

This study includes a comprehensive historical examination of the relationships among American political, economic, and military institutions and of the combined effects of U.S. policy decisions. It is an assessment of the actions and decisions made by important institutions in the U.S. national-security establishment. Koistinen devotes a chapter each to the presidency, Congress, the military, the defense industry, the scientific community, and think tanks in a consistently organized and chronological assessment of key foreign and domestic events, government policies, and institutional actions. The last two chapters synthesize government actions and policies, with their resulting impacts on the national economy.
In his farewell address to the nation in January 1961, Eisenhower advised government to ‘guard against the unwarranted influences, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.’ Koistinen analyzes Ike’s caution and considers the evolution and development of the MIC.

Koistinen does not argue that the MIC created itself or was constructed with intent in some coordinated or collaborative effort led by the government. He, however, does state that U.S. foreign policy and national security requirements led to its development and that the MIC’s pervasive influence in government, economics, and society is the result of numerous mutual and supporting interests of government and nongovernment institutions and organizations.

The author evaluates what he describes as the “noncompetitive” defense industry as an economic sector within the U.S. domestic economy, considering fundamental economic principles. This government-constructed defense sector operates free of the market pressures of supply and demand; prices, accordingly, result from the contracting processes between the military services and contractors. The conditions of the defense sector rarely stimulate competition, owing to numerous mergers among a decreasing number of defense corporations.

Today, the U.S. defense budget remains large, yet insufficient to meet the requirements placed on the military. Koistinen observes that the MIC continues to produce high-technology weapons at high cost. The cost of these weapons results in smaller quantities, a fact that results in a force structure that is insufficient to meet the requirements of the national strategy.

The author concludes that over time the MIC has become so entrenched in the economic, political, and social lives of the nation that today it is nearly impossible to diminish its influence. This book presents a compelling explanation of the effects on the U.S. economy of government and private-sector actions of recent decades regarding the development of the current national-security system.

SEAN SULLIVAN
Naval War College

Bell, Christopher M. Churchill and Seapower. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013. 429pp. $34.95

Although Winston Churchill is still regarded as one of the great British leaders of the twentieth century, he continues to attract not only praise but a large measure of criticism. This book is a valuable addition to a formidable library of such analysis. As its title tells us, this is a review of Churchill’s thinking about seapower in general and British sea power in particular. Its central theme is nicely encapsulated by a famous remark made about Churchill by General Sir Alan Brooke, arguably one of Britain’s most famous and successful soldiers during the Second World War: “A complete amateur of strategy, he swamps himself in detail he should never look at and as a result fails ever to see a strategic problem in its true perspective.”

However, Christopher Bell asks, is this kind of criticism, from a number of scholars, any more justified than the uncritical adulation Churchill usually receives? Where does the truth lie in this spectrum of possible reactions to Churchill as naval strategist?
Bell, an established and well respected historian of the twentieth-century Royal Navy, explores the subject by a balanced and stimulating chronological review of Churchill’s direct and indirect association with the Royal Navy from before the First World War to the end of the Second. Churchill generally emerges quite well, in much better shape than his detractors would lead us to expect. But this is no hagiography. Churchill’s limitations, mistakes, and misperceptions are pointed out as well as his achievements. Bell shows Churchill to have been realistic and pragmatic about naval construction in the period before the First World War; not wholly and solely to blame for the disastrous outcome of the Dardanelles campaign of 1915; and capable of recognizing, even in political exile, that the battle of Jutland had been in fact a strategic victory for the British. In the First World War, and indeed the Second as well, Churchill was an “ideas man” who continually pushed for offensive schemes, running up against the staid and conservative counsels of his service chiefs.

His was one voice, but there were many others. Occasionally too, his ideas now seem extraordinarily ill judged (most obviously that of sending a “surplus” fleet into the Baltic to attack the German coast without defeating the German fleet and air force first). Normally, though, Bell shows that there was sense in what he said, and certainly his restless pursuit of action that could help bring victory was a necessary, though sometimes much resented, goad to his military men. Many were less than happy with his infatuation with, and pretended expertise in, military technology. “Machines save life,” he said in 1917; “machine-power is a substitute for manpower.” Hence his enthusiasm for the airpower in the First World War, an enthusiasm that, when allied to his push for offensive action, led to the British strategic bombing offensive of the Second World War but also the relative neglect of the all-important Battle of the Atlantic.

This is rich fare. Many of Churchill’s conceptions of sea power are thoroughly and sensibly considered in this book, which deserves to be read not just because it is about Churchill but also for its secondary topic (which the author could well have better developed)—the balance struck between the military and its political masters in the direction of war. To what extent should civilian leaders like Churchill “interfere” in the planning and conduct of military operations when their motivations are more operational than political or diplomatic? It was on this very point that Churchill’s service chiefs really had objections during the war. Churchill insisted that his operational ideas about what the Royal Navy could and should be doing were good enough to be taken seriously, even if not accepted in the end by professional sailors. Christopher Bell shows us that in the main they were taken seriously, and deservedly so.

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The War Below is a remarkable historical analysis of submarine warfare in the Pacific during World War II. It interweaves stories of submariners (especially their skippers) with comprehensive description of naval warfare from Pearl Harbor.
to the liberation of American prisoners of war. Author James Scott chose three diesel fleet boats (*Silversides*, *Drum*, and *Tang*) and their crews to narrate his eloquently crafted tale of the significance of America’s submarine force in cutting off vital supply lines and strangling Japan. These three submarines alone sank a confirmed sixty-two Japanese freighters, tankers, and transports.

Scott’s first book, *The Attack on the Liberty* (2010), won the Samuel Eliot Morison Award, and his experience as investigative reporter shines throughout this new work, in its arguably unequaled research, which involved interviews with over one hundred World War II submarine veterans and several thousand pages of unpublished letters, diaries, and memoirs of commanding officers and crew members. Scott’s riveting narrative brings these submariners to life and draws readers into the naval strategies of the Pacific.

A primary strength of *The War Below* lies in the personal stories of these American heroes. These anecdotes provide the book’s spine. In a Tom Clancy-like style, Scott portrays insiders’ views about serving in the silent service while at war with a powerful enemy. Displaying his unusual gift of combining storytelling and research (detailed in seventy-six pages of endnotes), Scott portrays various leadership styles and decision-making processes, as well as fear and pure bravery. Submarine commanders, qualified by prewar experiences and on-the-job training, often trod the fine line between taking risks too great for their boats’ safety and not accomplishing their missions. A well-trained crew, strong skippers, and pure luck contributed to the ultimate successes of these courageous submariners, many of whom lost their boats and lives.

Underlying this compelling tale is the importance of training and preparation for attack and the absolute necessity of creating teams whose members trust one another. Confinement to tight quarters for long periods of time, often below the surface, demanded teamwork. Scott follows the skippers’ actions as they execute their orders with tenacity, competitiveness, ambition, patience, and brilliance.

Readers will experience a sense of excitement when the submariners succeed, as well as dismay over missed targets. Until the problem was solved several years into the war, U.S. submariners faced the likelihood of firing and failing because of defective torpedo design. Since the war, what lessons have been learned from this disastrous engineering mistake about preparedness for future wars and weaponry?

Why had the Navy failed these men, who risked their lives for their country?

In the last, memorable chapters, the fate of American prisoners of war (including *Tang*’s captain, Dick O’Kane, and eight of his crew) is recounted—one of torture and agony. Scott, with impeccable detail, writes of unimaginable circumstances in Japan’s “hellships” that transported Allied prisoners to camps. Descriptions of the camps, based on hundreds of pages of war-crimes depositions, take the reader to hell and back.

This work is a must-read. It is a spellbinding narrative that transcends the simple historical genre and makes present and accessible the personalities and perils of submarine warfare during wartime. On behalf of the members of the Navy’s silent service—past and present—and of their families, thank you, James Scott, for writing this history.

**COMMANDER BETH F. COYE, USN (RET)**

*Ashland, Oregon*
STATUS QUO, STATUS CHANGE

Sir:

I read the article by Dr. Paul Smith entitled “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed” [Naval War College Review, Spring 2013], and I would like to comment with a few points.

First of all, the author wrote that Tokyo’s nationalist Governor Ishihara’s efforts followed by the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkaku Islands triggered a change of the status quo. Status quo change on this issue, however, was triggered by China in 1992 when it announced a Territorial Law declaring that its territorial water not only included almost all of the South China Sea but also much of the East China Sea. This law was followed by many intrusions into the territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Secondly, the author missed the very important point that China never claimed the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands after 1895 until 1971, right after the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East announced the possibility of oil below the seabed in the area.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the author put Japan and China on the same level and recommended solutions that ignored Chinese expansionistic and hegemonic intentions. According to reports by the U.S. think tanks CSBA and RAND, by 2020 China will be well on its way to having the means to achieve its first-island-chain policy. In May 2013, a Chinese newspaper even discussed the legitimacy of PRC possession of Okinawa. In 2012, one of the PLA think tanks, the Military Science Academy, published “Strong Military Strategy,” which insisted that the PLA Navy must protect Chinese national interests west of 165 East and north of 35 South. According to Chinese internal documents, China insists on a three-line configuration, including a third island chain, which includes the Hawaiian Islands. We should remember that members of a Chinese delegation suggested a potential PRC claim to Hawaiian sovereignty to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012. Admiral Keating, then the commander of U.S.
Pacific Command, was approached in 2007 by a Chinese admiral with a plan to divide the Pacific into U.S. and PRC zones of influence.

The above indications demonstrate Chinese intentions to change the status quo. Japan does not possess such an ambition. Therefore, China is the status changer, while Japan is the status quo power. That point is not clear in Dr. Smith’s article. If Japan concedes sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, China will advance to claim the entire Okinawa Islands, potentially followed by the Hawaiian Islands. There is no international justice or legitimacy in ignoring those Chinese expansionistic and hegemonic intentions.

Last, but not least, the United States had used part of the Senkaku Islands as bombing/gunnery ranges until mid-1980s. It is obvious if the U.S. recognized Chinese sovereignty over the islands, the U.S. would not have used the Senkaku Islands as bombing/gunnery ranges. The U.S. position over sovereignty should not be neutral.

FUMIO OTA
Vice Admiral, JMSDF (Ret.), PhD
OF SPECIAL INTEREST

BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES L. COLLINS, JR., BOOK PRIZE IN MILITARY HISTORY

The U.S. Commission on Military History announces the 2013 Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., Book Prize in Military History. The prize entails a $1,000 award for the author of any nationality of the best book written in English on any field of military history published during 2012. The Book Prize Committee, chaired by Dr. Edward J. Marolda, will review the submitted books and select a winner to recommend to the USCMH Board of Trustees. Topics in all periods and all aspects of military history, including naval and air warfare, will be considered. Books for consideration by the Collins Prize Committee must be submitted by 30 December 2013, one copy each to the following:

• USCMH Collins Prize, c/o Dr. Edward J. Marolda, 15570 Golf Club Drive, Dumfries, Va., 22025
• USCMH Collins Prize, c/o Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, 1011 North Van Dorn Street, Alexandria, Va., 22304
• USCMH Collins Prize, c/o Dr. Kelly DeVries, 1170 Crab Walk, Charleston, S.C., 29412.

Upon notification from the selection committee, the Collins Prize will be presented at the USCMH Annual General Meeting, usually held in early November. For further information contact the Collins Prize Committee Chair at edwardmarolda@yahoo.com or Edward.Marolda@navy.mil.

“STRATEGY AND THE SEA”: AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Hosted by All Souls College, Oxford, 10–12 April 2014, the conference will bring together academics and naval professionals to celebrate John B. Hattendorf’s distinguished career and leading role in expanding the field of maritime history. This international gathering of research students, senior military representatives, and recognized authorities presents a unique opportunity to discuss cutting-edge naval history research that challenges traditional perspectives, pushes disciplinary boundaries, and asks innovative questions. For further information, see www.oxfordnavalconference.co.uk/.
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s program manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

Reading is the rock upon which you will build the rest of your career. Here is your chance to create real intellectual capital from which you will earn interest, draw dividends, and make withdrawals in the decades to come. In this way, I share Teddy Roosevelt’s mindset when he stated, “I am a part of everything I have read.”

ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Admiral James Stavridis completed a four-year assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in July 2013 and now serves as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Widely recognized as one of the brightest minds ever to wear a Navy uniform, he speaks, in the words cited above, eloquently of the value he sees in professional reading. Recently he applied his decades of professional reading and operational experience to developing a vision of the future that may face our military leaders. In a widely published article, he identifies what he calls a “New Triad.” He argues that the long-standing triad of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, manned bombers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles will continue to serve as the backbone of America’s nuclear defense capabilities.

He sees these systems, however, as being joined by a New Triad of conventional forces, consisting of special operations forces, unmanned vehicles, and cyber capabilities. He notes, “Each has an important individual role to play, but taken together, the sum of their impacts will be far greater than that of each of the parts when used alone.” His notion of a New Triad is worthy of consideration, and several books in the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program can effectively inform such a discussion. You can find them in your command library or download them at no cost from the Navy General Library site on Navy Knowledge Online (NKO). Look for links to these and other books on the CNO-PRP website, at www.navyreading.navy.mil/.

To learn more about how the special-operations leg of the New Triad can function, we suggest reading Seal of Honor: Operation Red Wings and the Life of
Lt. Michael P. Murphy, USN, by Gary Williams. This very readable book provides details on what it takes to become a Navy SEAL, how SEAL teams are organized and operated, and the prices these men of honor are willing to pay for the nation’s freedom. One reviewer—Brigadier General Anthony J. Tata, U.S. Army (Ret.), former deputy commander of the task force that conducted Operation RED WINGS—states, “Gary Williams tells the story of an American hero with such clarity that the leadership lessons spring from every page. This book is a must read for all who hold freedom dear.”

Much has been written about how unmanned vehicles have helped to shape the way America and its allies fight wars in the twenty-first century. The fascinating background on many aspects of the unmanned-vehicles leg of the New Triad can be found in P. W. Singer’s best seller Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. This book is widely considered to be the single best work addressing the full range of issues related to unmanned/robotic systems in warfare. Singer speaks knowledgeably on the research and development that brought these systems to the battlefield; on the operational capabilities that are redefining what it means to “go to war”; and on the moral and legal implications of using robotic warriors.

Stavridis calls the third leg of his theoretical New Triad “cyber-capabilities.” An excellent primer in this headline-grabbing topic was added to the CNO-PRP in October 2012. Former White House staffer (under four presidents) Richard A. Clarke teams with Robert Knake, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow, in the chilling Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It. One indication of the degree of interest in the subject of cyberwarfare is that a simple web search on the term returns over 84 million hits. This book is not written by, or for, “geeks and nerds.” Instead, it is accessible to all readers who want to understand the nature of the threat and the potential damage that unlimited cyberwarfare could have on military forces and society at large. It can be simultaneously frightening and thought provoking. (This book is not currently available on NKO.)

Naval professionals can benefit from exposure to these three interesting books, which will help prepare them if these capabilities come to be recognized as a New Triad. The CNO Professional Reading Program is about helping sailors consider new ideas. These, and the other thirty-nine books in the CNO-PRP, will help them “read to be ready.”

JOHN E. JACKSON