Enhancing and Managing Regionally Oriented Individuals and Organizations

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About this Publication
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Executive Summary

This paper analyzes the management of regionally oriented U.S. military Service personnel and organizations. The focus is on current personnel management practices for general purpose forces (GPF) and relevant specialist communities (such as Foreign Area Officers and Special Operations Forces); force management systems for organizations; and U.S. and allied preparation of both uniformed personnel and military organizations for regionally specific missions. This paper also canvasses the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) relevant regionally oriented initiatives, cross-Service and Joint initiatives, as well as what partner nations and Allies do to ensure their uniformed personnel and organizations are fully prepared regionally. The paper also documents senior leaders’ perspectives on creating an enduring approach to regional preparedness, and identifies potential transformational steps to enhance and manage these regionally oriented capabilities.

Findings and Recommendations

These research findings and recommendations represent IDA’s synthesis of the observations and insights provided by the many individuals interviewed for this effort. Appendix A contains a complete list of research participants.

Personnel Management: Findings

Personnel management of the all-volunteer uniformed military is governed by legislation (specifically, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (G-N))\(^1\), which places strict parameters on career length, promotion rates, time in grade, compensation, and advancement to flag officer ranks. These Acts, considered together, represent a framework that guides DOD’s personnel management systems. It is within this framework that the Secretaries of the military departments execute their 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) responsibilities, which include organizing, training, and equipping forces that are supplied to the combatant commands (CCMDs), which employ the forces operationally.

These legislative acts standardized many aspects of uniformed personnel management systems across DOD to meet the Cold War needs of producing a large corps of command-oriented generalist officers who could lead a large force to fight in major combat operations. Such a system optimizes by having military branches or communities define command-oriented skill sets and gates that have to be met within times in grade. Communities with regionally specific skills face challenges within such a one-size-fits-all, command-oriented, generalist system.

The purposeful tracking of personnel experiences and skills lies at the heart of any meaningful assessment of the demand for regional expertise throughout DOD. Except for specialty communities, regional experiences and capabilities are not uniformly monitored across the Department; therefore, demand or need is unclear. Service regionally oriented capabilities should be tracked so that the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense can identify risks associated with reduced capability and capacity.

**Personnel Management: Recommendations**

- Track regional expertise/experience in DOD personnel management systems
- More widely incentivize regional expertise and experience
  - Use monetary incentives as force shaping tools
  - Consider other incentives, such as broadening and educational opportunities, and service awards
- Consider selecting geographic combatant and Service component commanders with significant regional experience
- Consider having the Chairman certify that people assuming Joint and interagency billets requiring deep regional expertise (including Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché positions) have appropriate regional experience
- Consider creating competitive categories for those with regional expertise
  - For specific niche communities, consider lifetime of service, with appropriate on and off ramps to guide their career
  - For *long-lead time* communities, consider career trajectories up to 35 or 40 years of service
  - Promote to billets and vacancies rather than to a standardized career pyramid
- Consider locating some percentage of non-kinetic, specialized communities in the Reserve Component (RC) in order to provide surge capacity
- Monitor and track National Guard State Partnership Program participation
• Ensure OSD, the Joint Staff, and others have greater visibility regarding the assignment process/policy regarding billets that require regional expertise and experience
  – For Joint-utilized Service personnel, consider establishing an annual report by the Chairman, with inputs by the Services, regarding those specialties where Joint billets comprise more than 20 percent of the overall community billets
  – Investigate the extent to which Joint duty and performance evaluation compares with Service duty and performance evaluation

**Force Management: Findings**

Global force management (GFM) is the process that provides sourcing solutions (aligning force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy), Joint force availability requirements, and Joint force assessments. GFM sourcing via allocation works against the development of regional expertise unless the same forces are repeatedly allocated to the same region. Forces are only allocated for a year or less, and commanders often have limited periods in which to prepare for their allocated mission away from their region of assignment.

Senior commanders interviewed indicated that they routinely are forced to circumvent the GFM process to accomplish their missions, and described how GFM is personality driven. According to research participants, stronger personalities tend to get the capabilities that they need from GFM, at the expense of others.

Forces previously assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) were not fully assigned to other CCMDs upon USJFCOM disestablishment. Instead, the military Services retained many of these forces, identifying them as *Service retained* forces. This construct appears to distort the G-N concept of operational versus administrative chains of command, as outlined in 10 U.S.C. 162.² Service retained forces also increase the allocation requirement of the GFM process, which research participants indicated may no longer be necessary following the large, concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many Service component commands presently have limited or no forces assigned to them. In addition to the fact that such components will, over time, not have a large number of officers and non-commissioned officers who develop deep regional skills and experience in the region, such commands also face structural challenges. When mission needs dictate that forces must be allocated to such a component, there is no operational command between the tactical unit and the senior commands that can serve as the Joint

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Task Force (JTF) headquarters. In such cases, operational commands would then have to be allocated, or ad hoc JTF headquarters established and deployed.

With limited forces forward deployed, DOD prioritizes where it positions forces in accordance with strategic priority and then economizes in other areas. The development or advancement of enduring regional expertise in those other geographic areas is limited.

**Force Management: Recommendations**

- Consider revisiting the concept of *Service Retained* forces
- Monitor the ability of Combatant and Service component commands *without forces* in terms of their ability to develop regional expertise
  - Where there is no operational headquarters or JTF between the combatant and Service component commands, and the tactical units, consider alternative mechanisms to enable mission execution
  - Consider giving some of these commands to the RCs, as the Navy has done with US Naval Forces South
- Consider creating an appropriately sized office for security assistance and cooperation within the Joint Staff J-3 to unify disparate elements of that mission set, and to provide visibility and priority within DOD decision-making systems
- If forces are not forward deployed and/or assigned, consider as an enduring regional approach allocated forces repeatedly deploying to the same region (such as Special Operations Forces), and small-footprint enablers (such as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and participants in the National Guard State Partnership Program (NG SPP))

**Training and Education: Findings**

DOD’s regionally oriented initiatives emerged within the general framework of foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities (LREC), with DOD’s greatest emphasis on the language aspect of the LREC acronym. DOD largely leveraged existing institutions—those designed to provide foreign language training to specialists—for the language training for GPF.

The Services’ approaches to preparing individuals and organizations for missions with tasks that have to be executed in or focusing on other regions of the world vary widely. They each have uniformed personnel, including General and Flag Officers, who serve in assignments with some regional focus or orientation. GPF Service members often receive little or no formal regional preparation in advance of such assignments. The extent to which individuals are prepared for such assignments is often a matter of whether they personally seek regionally focused preparation, as available.
Training and Education: Recommendations

- To have greater clarity on training and educational needs, consider requiring all organizations operating in a region or carrying out regionally focused missions to report on their readiness for appropriate regionally specific tasks.
- Consider requiring Flag Officers assuming overseas command to attend in-depth regional training (and education) prior to assuming command.
- Better leverage the training and educational enterprises already established with U.S. allies.
- Consider where Non-Commissioned Officers may augment capabilities, then invest in their training.
- Establish and invest in the training of the NG SPP; consider the effectiveness of these partnerships.
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1. Introduction

We are hearing the same claim now. Those who assert that we will fight only certain kinds of wars in the future forget history and the reality that our enemies, as I’ve said, always have a vote.

Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 2014

The January 2012 defense strategic guidance document, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, emphasized the need to “develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”¹ In his December 2012 speech to the National Press Club, entitled “The Force of the 21st Century,” Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Leon Panetta echoed and reinforced the January 2012 defense strategic guidance document. In particular, he highlighted the need for a smaller, leaner, agile, and flexible military, adept at building partner capacity and security cooperation.² In June 2013, SECDEF Chuck Hagel delivered a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue), Singapore, in which he emphasized the need to “continue to strengthen existing alliances, forge new partnerships, and build coalitions” (especially, but not exclusively, in the Asia-Pacific region). He stated, “This rebalancing should not, however, be misinterpreted. The U.S. has allies, interests and responsibilities across the globe. The Asia-Pacific rebalance is not a retreat from other regions of the world.”³ Recently, at the May 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Secretary Hagel again emphasized “Our people, our capabilities, our partnerships[...] They will be my guiding focus, all the leadership of DOD’s guiding focus as we reshape, rebalance, and reform our defense enterprise for the challenges ahead and ensure America's global leadership….This will require innovation and agility in every area. And it will require engagement around the world.”⁴ Most recently, at the May 2014 commencement ceremony at the U.S. Military Academy, President Barack Obama also

emphasized partnerships. In particular, he identified training and building partner
capacity as an essential part of developing “a network of partnerships from South Asia to
the Sahel” to expand “our reach” without requiring large numbers of forward deployed
and assigned forces.5 These speeches and the defense strategic guidance document
repeatedly identify cultivating partnerships with other nations as critical, calling for the
Services to retain the security cooperation capabilities developed over the last decade,
and for them to continue to make investments in regional expertise.

Some of the Services, combatant commands (CCMDs), and other Department of
Defense (DOD) components are already implementing plans and training to enhance
regional expertise. These initiatives include efforts to develop language proficiency,
regional expertise, and cultural knowledge; the regional alignment of Army brigades and
Special Forces; Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs); habitual
association of other forces with CCMDs; and regionally focused personnel assignments.
In some of the more recent examples, efforts are made to provide a capability to the
combatant commanders, but are in lieu of forces that would actually be stationed or
assigned to the CCMD.

And yet, historically the Services have struggled to develop and support
communities requiring unique or regionally specific skill sets. In particular, the Services’
personnel processes and force management systems do not always support the
development of regional expertise in general purpose forces (GPF), the tracking of
regional experience, or the preparation for organizations for regional missions.

This paper summarizes the results of an independent assessment of DOD regional
orientation, focused on personnel management and force management issues. The
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) conducted this assessment at the request of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Readiness.

In conducting this research, IDA employed a blended methodology, drawing on
both qualitative and quantitative approaches. This blended-research approach enabled
IDA to canvass the landscape of regionally oriented individuals and organization and
gain insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with training, force
management, and personnel management.

The qualitative data collection centered on not-for-attribution interviews and site
visits. IDA conducted interviews and focus groups with hundreds of Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps Service members—from the lowest enlisted through the former Chairman

5 President Barack Obama, Commencement Address at West Point, 28 May 2014, Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-commencement-address-at-
west-point/2014/05/28/cfbcdeaa-e670-11e3-a0c6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html.
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), DOD civilians, and senior leaders from allied and partner nations. These research participants represented the following organizations: Geographic CCMDs; U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); Service Theater Component Commands; Service Special Operations Commands; Theater Special Operations Commands; training centers; the National Guard Bureau (NGB) (J5, J8); Joint Task Forces; Service headquarters staffs; Service training commands; Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Policy, and Personnel and Readiness (P&R)); the Joint Staff (J5, J7, J8); U.S. embassies; Regional Centers for Security Studies; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); NATO Defense College; the NATO School; the French Foreign Legion; and others. Senior Field Grade Officers were also asked to reflect on their most recent assignments and experiences. IDA also interviewed recently retired senior leaders: Combatant Commanders; Component Commanders; Service Chiefs and Commandants; and a CJCS. The insights and perspectives gathered during these not-for-attribution interviews are reflected throughout this report; the themes highlighted in each chapter were selected based on inputs from research participants.

The IDA research team would like to express sincere gratitude to the research participants involved in this effort; they conveyed great interest in participating, welcomed our interaction with them, and showed unusual candor and genuine professional concern. For the complete list of research participants, see Appendix A.

The quantitative component of this research focused on Requests for Forces (RFFs) via the Joint Capabilities Requirements Module (JCRM); the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) with modifications and annexes; Joint Individual Augmentees (IAs) data; lessons learned products; Integrated Priority List submissions/fiscal guidance/program review decisions/DOD budget submissions; Personnel data (Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)); selection board precepts and board selection results; Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress (QRRCs); the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS); Global Force Management Board decisions; Chairman’s Execute Orders; Exercise Program; and Joint Training Information Management Systems (JTIMS).

In accordance with the sponsor’s preference, this report consists of four sections, organized as follows: IDA’s findings regarding (1) current personnel management practices for GPF and relevant specialist communities; (2) current force management systems for organizations and relevant specialist communities; and (3) U.S. and Allied preparation of both uniformed personnel and military organizations for regionally specific missions. The final section of this report contains IDA’s synthesis of the recommendations identified by research participants regarding enhancing and managing regionally oriented individuals and organizations. In accordance with the sponsor’s request, we both documented senior leaders’ perspectives on creating an enduring
approach to regional preparedness and identified potential transformational steps needed to enhance and manage these regionally oriented capabilities.\(^6\)

\(^6\) IDA would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contribution to this effort: General Hansford T. Johnson, General Carlton Fulford, Vice Admiral Robert Murrett, Rear Admiral Richard Porterfield, Lieutenant General Glenn Spears, and Ms. Gail McGinn. Their efforts during the compressed timeline associated with this research, compounded by the extended government shutdown, ensured that data were obtained from a representative sample of senior leaders and organizations.
2. Current Personnel Management Practices for General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Relevant Specialist Communities

Those asked to drive the car are not the same ones who prepare the car.

Comment by a senior research participant regarding operational commands employing units and individuals, vice the military Services that organize, train, and equip them.

Personnel management of the all-volunteer uniformed military is affected by legislation that places strict parameters on career length, promotion rates, time in grade, compensation, and advancement to flag officer ranks. These Acts represent a framework that limits the ability of DOD to make wholesale changes, even if desired, to personnel management systems without legislative concurrence. It is within this framework that the Secretaries of the military departments execute their 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) responsibilities to organize, equip, and train forces that are supplied to the CCMDs. In this chapter, current management practices for both GPF and specialist communities are outlined within the framework of these legislative acts, followed by research findings associated with creating enduring approaches to regional expertise.

A. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 unified several reforms initiated after World War II and established a common management system addressing how officers would be trained, appointed, promoted, separated, and retired. This legislation emplaced the *up or out* system of the American armed forces, and created the *pyramid* associated with distribution of ranks. *Up or out* refers to the process whereby a Service member is either promoted to the next grade or, if twice passed over for promotion, is released from military service. Such a system tends to be unique to the U.S. armed forces. The *pyramid* is a descriptor portraying the rigid promotion system that establishes limits on how long officers can be retained by grade, sets when they can be

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10 While research engagements with foreign officials were limited, the IDA research team did not hear of any other partner or Allied nation having a similar *up or out* system.
promoted, and delineates what percentage can advance to the next grade. Attempts to codify similar systems for the enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces and for the Reserve Component (RC) (Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)) have also been considered and in the latter case enacted.

B. Goldwater Nichols

As enacted, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (G-N) advocated strengthening civilian authority in DOD, called for improvements on the military advice provided to the president and other senior leaders of the government, clarified the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and sought significant changes to Joint officer management. These legislative changes were enacted with the hope that the effectiveness of military operations and the management and administration of DOD would improve.

G-N also differentiated the operational and administrative chains of command for DOD. Under this construct, the CCMDs are the organizations that place demands on the Department in order to execute operational missions, while the military Services administratively execute their 10 U.S.C. responsibilities of manning, training, and equipping forces that would ultimately be employed by the CCMDs.

The legislation mandated a framework whereby uniformed officers seeking advancement to the flag or general officer positions would be required to be certified as having Joint education and experience. Additionally, G-N dictated that Joint Qualified Officers would be selected for promotion at a rate not less than the rate for officers of their Service in the same grade and category.

C. Intended and Unintended Consequences

The legislative acts previously described standardized many aspects of uniformed personnel management systems across DOD to meet the Cold War needs of producing a large corps of command-oriented generalist officers who could lead a large force in major

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
combat operations. Such a system optimizes by having military branches or communities define command-oriented skill sets and gates that have to be met within times in grade. “It is a one-size-fits-all system that requires the same command skills for each officer, rather than a distribution of skills across the officer corps as a whole.”

Former SECDEF Robert Gates, described this system as a being focused on “next in line” rather than selection based on best qualification for a mission. Former SECDEF Robert Gates, described this system as a being focused on “next in line” rather than selection based on best qualification for a mission.

Historically, this system struggled, and there was tension when demands for skill sets or for tenure did not match the supply aspects identified by existing branches and their career gates. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BGN) series of reports by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described how the changes that took place throughout DOD as a result of G-N, in conjunction with DOPMA, did not necessarily achieve many of the legislative goals. The Phase 2 report highlighted specific problems with the Officer Management System (OMS), including how the system favors the command-oriented generalist at the expense of specialists with deep knowledge in a narrow area, even when there is a clear need for both types of officers; OMS only supports one pathway.

Generally, Service communities divide along various lines in terms of organizations, qualifications, and the billets to which individuals are assigned, such as:

- Operator, non-operator
- Combat, combat or service support
- Restricted, non-restricted line
- Rated, non-rated
- Special Operations Forces (SOF), GPF

Across the Services and the above-mentioned lines or communities, members of the U.S. Armed Forces must meet certain expectations—they must possess certain traits and attributes, fulfill educational and training requirements, and hold certain key positions in accordance with a specific time horizon. In addition to maintaining currency and expertise in their primary occupational specialty (and any subspecialties), these individuals are expected to be physically fit, mentally stable, resilient, adaptable, possess

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16 Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*.
17 Ibid.
19 Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*.
20 Each Service has similar, but not identical, required traits and characteristics, as well as different criteria associated with career advancement and promotion. Every effort was made by the authors to present a brief, generalizable overview.
leadership and managerial capabilities, have strong military bearing, and comport themselves in a professional manner. Over the course of a career, Service personnel must also meet rigid academic and professional military education requirements. For commissioned officers, career gates add time limitations to this rigid career structure—generally, limitations on time in grade, and specific command-oriented skill sets and experiences that must be met within a grade. Another challenge Service personnel face involves the conditions of their job assignments. These assignments may involve being “placed in dangerous situations with the risk of serious injury or death.” Moreover, these assignments may entail frequent relocations and often long periods of time away from their families. When such individuals are also asked to acquire some unique attribute (such as deep regional expertise and/or experience) it often poses significant career challenges. Especially if they are GPF, who must be able to “perform a broad range of missions across the range of military operations,” they are now asked to be generalists with specialist attributes, while attempting to adhere to the rigid time frame.

Each military Service has examples of communities of individuals that were disadvantaged because acquisition and utilization of unique skills made these personnel look different in front of promotions boards composed of individuals who would select those officers for advancement with branch experiences similar to their own. The larger communities would tend to dominate other communities during selection boards, thereby creating a cloning process.

For the Army, several of the communities that were historically disadvantaged included Aviation, Special Forces (SF), and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), the latter being an Army functional area that is described in Chapter 4. In the case of aviation, there was a demand to correct deficient doctrine and training, better integrate aviation in combat arms, better manage aviators and resources, increase flying expertise within the Army, and improve aviation safety. Prior to becoming its own branch, aviation constituted a secondary specialty for officers. Although Army SF can date its creation back to the Kennedy presidential administration, it was also a secondary specialty for all officers and non-commissioned officers. It was not until 1987 that Army Chief of Staff

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24 Frank W. Tate, Army Aviation as a Branch, Eighteen Years after the Decision (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394423.
General John Wickham issued General Orders 35 formally establishing SF as a branch.\footnote{Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., General Orders 35: Army Special Forces Branch (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 19 June 1987).} These secondary career specialties, without prospects for advancement to the highest levels of military Service, often become “pastures for the marginally competent.”\footnote{Tim Kane, Bleeding Talent: How the US Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for a Revolution (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).} Long lead times to become proficient in SF regionally specific skills, followed by SF assignments, kept Service members away from their primary branches for extended periods. In this type of situation, the conventional Army considered SF to be a wasteful diversion of resources from “the decisive land battle,” while SF resented the conventional Army for treating SF “like a stepchild.”\footnote{Peter J. Gustaitis, II, Coalition Special Operations an Operational-Level View, US Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Service College Fellow (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 1998).} The overall impact to DOD for this type of marginalization was “a special operations capability weakened by Service neglect and mis-utilization.”\footnote{Ibid.} In addition to SF becoming its own branch within the Army, amendments to G-N elevated the role of Special Operations vis-à-vis the military Departments by creating a four-star CCMD, with limited program budget authorities.

The other Services also have divided communities (e.g., operators and combat support, special operations elements and GPF), which also present challenges for their personnel management systems. For the Navy, one of the divides is between restricted and non-restricted line officer communities; the Air Force has its rated and non-rated communities; and more recently, the Marine Corps has struggled with the creation of a Marine Corps component to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Members of the Marine Corps expressed concerns that talented, mature Marines would “go to MARSOC never to be seen again, or that MARSOC would drain the traditional rifle squad’s most talented leaders.”\footnote{J. Darren Duke and Jeff Landis, “Embracing MARSOC: The Future of the Marine Corps,” 2014, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/embracing-marsoc-future-marine-corps.}

D. Other Specialists, Regionally Skilled Communities

Communities with regionally specific skills likewise do not fit the one-size-fits-all, command-oriented generalist system previously described and may merit special monitoring to ensure that the Department retains critical regional expertise. It can be argued that SF and SOF, as a whole, have generally found career paths complete with command opportunities and selection to the highest levels of military service. One need only look at the current commander of USSOCOM (Navy), the commanders of the
Service component commands, theater special operations commands, and even several of
the recent former Service chiefs of staff to see that some change, over a period of years,
has taken place within DOD. The adaptations to the personnel systems of the Services
that have enabled these changes have been at times significant, requiring the intervention
of OSD, the Joint Staff, and even the Congress.

Other communities with expertise in regionally specific skills have not experienced
the same level of congressional attention and subsequent DOD support as SOF. As
highlighted in the 2012 DMDC Quick Compass Survey of FAOs and Supervisors, non-
FAO supervisors did not feel that this community had all the skills and leadership
experiences to assume many higher flag officer positions, especially those involving
leadership or management over conventional skill communities. For communities of
FAOs who never command beyond the company grade level because they do not return
to the operational force to assume commands, their career experience will be quite
different from that of other officers of their Service. In fact, the CJCS describes FAOs as
“highly trained advisors” to commanders in his December 2013 memorandum
introducing the Asia-Pacific Hands Program. Interviews with non-FAO supervisors also
highlighted concerns regarding FAO ability to conduct operational and strategic level
planning, while at the same time these leaders lauded the valuable skills related to foreign
language capability, regional expertise, cultural understanding, and personal foreign
contacts that FAOs contribute to the effectiveness of the organizations to which they are
assigned. This particular regionally oriented community has a unique challenge in that
the majority of billets are Joint, and therefore FAOs are Joint employed, while the
participants themselves are accessed, developed, and potentially promoted by an
individual military Service. This divide means that the extent to which these skilled
contributions are recognized and valued by those of the Joint and non-DOD communities
may not necessarily translate to those within a military Service, who ultimately determine
whether a Service member is advanced or not as part of their overall responsibility to
supply personnel and forces to the operational chain of command. The BGN Phase 2
report stressed this issue:

Officers know that putting joint interests before Service-specific interests
can harm their careers. Although Goldwater-Nichols tied promotion to
joint duty, it did not define joint career paths that identify the sequence of
assignments necessary to qualify an officer for the most senior joint
billets. Nor is there a joint promotion board that might manage and

31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Asia-Pacific Hands Program, Memorandum CM-0301-13, 5
December 2013.
32 Amy A. Alrich, Joseph F. Adams, and Claudio C. Biltoc, The Strategic Value of Foreign Area
support the careers of officers choosing to pursue only joint billets. The final word in an officer’s career rests with Service promotion boards, which often put loyalty to the Service first.\textsuperscript{33}

Other regionally skilled or focused communities meriting investigation and monitoring include cryptologic language analysts, Army 09L heritage speakers, those accessed into DOD via Military Accessions Vital to National Security (MAVNI), and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands (APH) Program. In the case of 09L heritage speakers, Service members were recruited because of their existing language capabilities that could be leveraged in support of ongoing contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These individuals would be attached to deploying brigade combat teams, then returned to their translator-interpreter companies in the continental United States, where limited, if any, career advancement opportunities had been planned for or programmed, even within the companies.\textsuperscript{34} Officers and non-commissioned officers were assigned to the companies from other units and specialties, and the utility of the 09L in theater significantly varied.\textsuperscript{35} Over the course of this current research, IDA learned that the Department of the Army is reviewing the 09L program and presently not accessing additional individuals as 09Ls.\textsuperscript{36}

The MAVNI pilot program permits DOD to access “certain legal aliens, whose skills are considered vital to national interests, such as physicians, nurses, and certain experts in language with associated cultural backgrounds.”\textsuperscript{37} Individuals with skills from forty-four listed languages are considered for the program in exchange for expedited U.S. citizenship and eight years (four active) of enlistment.\textsuperscript{38} The program permits recruitment of up to 1500 Service members each year. Research participants repeatedly voiced support for MAVNI, identifying examples of the program’s successes.\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{33} Murdock et al., \textit{Beyond Goldwater-Nichols}.

\textsuperscript{34} David R. Graham et al., \textit{An Analysis of Alternatives for Providing Foreign Language, Regional, and Cultural (LRC) Capabilities for General Purpose Forces (GPF)}, IDA Paper P-4930 (Alexandria, VA: IDA, 2014).

\textsuperscript{35} IDA 2012 visit to the Translator Interpreter Company, Fort Polk, LA, and discussions with recent Brigade Commanders.

\textsuperscript{36} Site visit at U.S. Army FORSCOM, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, October 30, 2013; confirmed via teleconference 18 May 2014.


\end{flushright}
The APH program provides yet another interesting example of a high interest, regionally focused program created by CJCS Michael Mullen, to which Services were instructed to send their top performers to be participants. According to the Chairman’s December 14, 2009 memorandum, Career Management of Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program, APH was the number one manpower priority, with a charge to the Services to ensure that APH consists of individuals with sustained excellence, recognized through selection boards for promotion, professional military education, and key assignments. Those qualifications, as well as career protection, with continuous monitoring and feedback, were specifically called out by the Chairman as necessary. Service commitment and system processes have not yet proven that investment in such programs have been beneficial—and not harmful—to Service participant careers. Promotion and command board selections have not shown that APH participants have been afforded any Service preferential treatment.

While endorsing this program, the current Chairman decided to take a different approach with his Asia-Pacific Hands program. In his December 5, 2013 memorandum to the chiefs of the military Services and the combatant commanders, Chairman Martin Dempsey wanted this new program to support the development, synchronization, implementation, and assessment of policy, strategic guidance, and efforts in the Pacific, by focusing on command-path officers who would ultimately build a “deep bench of general and flag officers who are all regional experts.” The Chairman continues his discussion by stating that “future commanders of our force will need deep regional understanding to execute their missions, starting in the Phase 0 shaping environment.” Rather than incorporating all communities of current regional specialists into the new program, the Chairman stated that “FAOs, linguists, and other regional specialists provide military staff and interagency organization decision makers critical perspective; however, regional acumen should not be limited to a few highly trained advisors.” The focus of the Asia-Pacific Hands Program is command-line officers, not advisors. Does such a purposeful omission acknowledge the existence of a personnel system and culture that does not value, or perhaps does not know how to value individuals with deep regional skill sets? It certainly merits discussion regarding why individuals already trained and educated in regional and cultural domains would not be considered for the

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40 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Career Management of Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program, Memorandum CM-0948-09, 14 December 2009.
41 Ibid.
43 CJCS, Asia-Pacific Hands Program.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
program, and what the Chairman wants this Joint community of regional experts to actually do.

E. Processes, Tracking, and Policy

IDA noted during interviews of research participants that former Service Chiefs of Staff and other senior leaders expressed a lack of confidence in the personnel processes and the extent to which these systems are capable of meeting Service, Joint, and Department needs; therefore, they sought system workarounds. Unless in line with Service perceptions of what makes for a promotable command-oriented generalist officer, even the purposeful inclusion of specific desired characteristics and experiences in promotion board precepts seemed to only produce limited desired outcomes. These findings are not unexpected, given the fact that a 2011 survey of general officers on active duty showed that they rated personnel management as one of the weakest functions of the Service.46

DOPMA provisions require congressional exemptions to consider different career management of specialty communities. Exemptions are already in place for some specialist, highly educated communities, such as the medical community. Rather than strictly adhering to standard career lengths and promotion in accordance with the pyramid, physicians, with their unique skill set, are permitted to stay in uniform for extended years and not be subjected to DOPMA promotion rates. Other communities, with valued, specialized skill sets that are expensive to train and sustain, could also be identified as competitive categories for DOPMA relief, so that these Service members could serve longer with lower attrition rates by grade—bypassing the up-or-out system. The pyramid could be reserved for those command-tracked communities, while those with unique skills could be promoted to billets, based on performance, in a more rectangle shaped career system.47 Longer tenure and higher promotion rates would help ensure that DOD maintains individuals with specialty skills.48 An example of one such differentiated officer management system is depicted in Figure 1, where the vertical axis represents years of service and the stacked, color-coded boxes represent pools of officers based on grade.

46 Kane, Bleeding Talent.
47 Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.
In this example, from the BGN Phase 2 report, the standard DOPMA pyramid is depicted in the upper left hand corner, whereas the authors propose a system whereby officers not already part of a specialized competitive category are inclusively part of a “Term Commission” pyramid, which includes unrestricted line officers (“URLs” in the figure) and line officers. When officers begin acquiring specialized skills, they can move into specialist career tracks so that the Department can make greater use of these skills and experiences. A significant culling of the force takes place at the rank of O-4 as officers either continue on the Command Track or are part of a Specialist Track, the latter no longer tied to the strict DOPMA pyramid.

The purposeful tracking of personnel experiences and skills lies at the heart of any meaningful assessment of the demand for regional expertise throughout DOD. Except for specialty communities, regional experiences and capabilities are not uniformly monitored across the Department; therefore, demand or need is unclear.

As an outlier to this trend, the Command Profile of the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) links to educational backgrounds and assigned regional area (via the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization, or RCLF, program) of all Marines assigned to a unit. The system permits Marine Corps commanders to view specific

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49 Murdock et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.
academic backgrounds of unit members and which Marines are assigned to each of the RCLF regions. Chapter 4 contains a greater discussion of this capability. This is the only Service system IDA identified that tracks these specific regional elements.

In 2010, Army leadership asked the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) to launch “Green Pages,” “a small-scale, proof-of-concept talent management test bed.”50 Still a pilot program, Green Pages is presently focused on “the engineer branch and a few functional areas.”51 According to an SSI study by Michael Colarusso and David Lyle, “[o]fficers in the reassignment window build personal profiles and provide information heavily augmenting their official files, which are also drawn into Green Pages from the Army’s Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB).”52 Colarusso and Lyle stated that approximately 750 officers have participated in this pilot program.53 In IDA’s discussions with the Army G1 and G3, research participants did not reference the Green Pages pilot program. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) construct, for example, does not currently incorporate a mechanism to track soldier participation and expertise gained from an assignment of one region of unit alignment to another.54 Even foreign language proficiency is not uniformly tracked by the Services in their personnel management systems. Foreign language proficiency is captured in these systems only in one of two circumstances: if Service members take the Defense Language Proficiency Test and receive a score, or if individuals self-report that they have foreign language capability. In addition, incentives such as foreign language proficiency bonuses are implemented differently across DOD. For example, the Army does not pay bonuses for Service members with foreign language skills below the 2/2 Interagency Language Roundtable level of proficiency (with the exception of their SF members, who are paid by USSOCOM).55 Such incentives can be used by the Services as force-shaping tools as appropriate.

The Marine Corps RCLF program is now a mandatory component of Professional Military Education (PME) for all career Marines—Active, Reserve, officers and non-

52 Colarusso and Lyle, Senior Officer Talent Management, 75–76.
53 Ibid.
54 Army Regionally Aligned Forces Talking Points, August 2013, and discussions with Army G1 and G3.
55 Graham et al., An Analysis of Alternatives for Providing Foreign Language, Regional, and Cultural (LRC) Capabilities.
commissioned officers. In making this mandatory, the Marine Corps articulated the value they see in the development of foreign language, regional, and cultural “knowledge, skills and attitudes within the GPF.” In particular, the identified goal is thereby to “enhance a unit’s organic ability to globally support operational planning and execution to achieve mission objectives.” With the exception of RCLF, there has been no clear, military Service-wide articulation of the value of the development of foreign language, regional, and cultural experience and expertise within a GPF Service member’s career.

In contrast, many of the militaries of our Allies and partner nations clearly articulate the value of regional expertise and experience. Discussions with senior foreign leaders indicate an officer is generally expected to develop deep regional skills, including language proficiency; such officers are typically rewarded with desired assignments, commands, and promotions. A more detailed description of Allied and partner regional preparation is included in Chapter 4 of this paper.

DOD directives and guidance have been issued that describe the value of and need for regional skill sets and experience. Compliance with these issuances varies. One need only look at the Department’s FAO programs and the corresponding DODI to ascertain the extent of compliance with such policies. DODI 1315.20, Management of Department of Defense (DoD) FAO Programs, identifies the education, training, experiences, and competencies FAOs should possess, and delineates responsibilities across the Department. For example, although this instruction requires certification of FAO requirements prior to assignment, one can routinely find numbers of officers at commands who are identified or selected to be FAOs but have not completed their training or FAO certification. This creates an unfortunate but expected cycle whereby untrained Service members, identified as regional experts, are sent to positions where they are expected by their leadership to already possess these skill sets and they do not. The result is that leadership will often not see the value added to the organization by having FAOs on staff; the Service member may ultimately be penalized via the

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58 Discussions at the Inter-American Defense College (October 2013), at the NATO Senior Officer Policy Course (February 2014), and with officers serving in liaison roles at the CCMDs.

59 DOD Instruction (DODI) 1315.20, Management of Department of Defense (DoD) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs (Washington, DC: USD(P&R), 28 September 2007).
fitness/evaluation report process, and the senior leader may see regional expertise or experience as having little to no value.

DODI 1315.20 also calls for the Secretaries of the Military Departments to establish Reserve Component (RC) FAO programs, thus having a surge capacity of regional experts for DOD. Again, compliance with this instruction varies greatly; two Services have no RC FAO program, and the existing programs are not managed to the same extent as the Active Component (AC) programs.60

The instruction also establishes the requirement for an annual report on DOD FAO programs, establishing reporting requirements and procedures. The Services, Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff are all required to provide specific inputs to OSD Personnel and Readiness (P&R) (specifically, per the instruction, to DUSD(Plans)) for their Annual DOD FAO Report; this report is to include standardized metrics for monitoring DOD FAO accession, retention, promotion, and utilization rates. Despite the requirement, the document is not used as a management tool to gauge compliance with DOD guidance.

The IDA research team discovered that members of the National Guard (NG) who have considerable roles in the State Partnership Program (SPP), which consists of state partnerships with more than sixty-five nations around the globe, are currently not identified or tracked as regional experts by the Services in a manner similar to FAOs or SOF. State partnership coordinators and bilateral affairs officers (BAOs)—the latter with assignment in partner countries—develop significant experience over the years that could be tracked, advanced, and purposefully leveraged by DOD. The March 2014 DOD Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Request Overview highlighted SPP as one of two Army programs that build regional relationships:

Army forces build trust, foster long-term relationships through people-to-people engagements, gaining operational access through a wide variety of activities that include bilateral and multilateral exercises, theater security cooperation, and training. The Army’s Special Forces Groups provide unique and extraordinary regional expertise, as well as years of experience, to the COCOMs. The Army National Guard, through the State Partnership Program, maintains long-term partnerships worldwide.61

In addition to Service members with regional expertise and experience, there are also DOD civilian specialty communities relevant to this discussion. These include civilians who work in the intelligence communities and those in the various operational commands and staffs posted throughout the world. With reductions in the number of forward deployed Service personnel, and military units that are only allocated for finite

60 Alrich, Adams, and Biltoc, *The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers*.

periods and missions abroad, civilians become another critical pool of regional experience and expertise. DOD personnel policy, however, places a five-year limit on civilian overseas assignments, thereby rotating DOD civilian employees out of foreign areas. According to DODI 1400.25,

this policy serves to increase employment opportunities for military spouses and family members and developmental opportunities for employees in the United States, periodically renew the knowledge and competencies of the overseas workforce, including familiarity with current strategic goals, enhance the interoperability of employees, and promote a joint perspective in the workforce.62

Overseas commanders and organizations highlighted that this policy can work against continuity and both the development and sustainment of regional expertise. Overseas personnel managers cited concerns regarding inconsistent application and potential recruiting and talent issues as a result of the policy.

When emergent situations require a surge of regional skills, DOD has programs such as the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce and the Ministry of Defense Advisor Program (MoDA) for getting critical capabilities resident in the civilian workforce into the operational theaters.63 Other communities that could be leveraged if demands exceed DOD capability include the National Language Service Corps, retired military members of FAO and SOF associations, and former members of intelligence organizations that were regionally focused.

F. Conclusions

This chapter described the legislative framework set up by the enactment of both DOPMA and G-N and illustrated how the focus on supplying command-oriented generalists within a one-size-fits-all system from the administrative chain of command conflicts with demands for individuals with specialized skill sets from the force employers of the operational chain of command. Examples were given in which communities such as Aviation and SF, which were initially only secondary specialties, became branches within their Service to address repeated selection board shortfalls, to advance expertise, and to provide a viable career path for Service members. The recent AFPAK Hands (APH) experience and the new Asia-Pacific Hands program, articulated by the current CJCS, also serve as examples of programs that illustrate that the Service personnel systems could not appropriately address and value certain specialized skills

sets, without placing careers at risk. Recent Service board results support this finding. In many cases, policies regarding the need for regional expertise are clearly articulated, but mechanisms are not transparent, therefore the demand is not captured and compliance with policies widely vary. DOD-wide tracking of regional proficiency and experience is fundamental to all considerations regarding the development and valuing of these personal skills. In Chapter 3, force management and the impact on both generalist and specialist communities are addressed.
3. Current Force Management Systems for Organizations and Relevant Specialist Communities

What is mine is mine; what is yours is negotiable.

Comment by a senior research participant regarding combatant command attitudes associated with the Global Force Management Process

As described in Chapter 2, G-N differentiated the operational, force employment chain of command of the combatant commanders from that of the administrative, force generation chain of command, which runs through the military Services. The former places demands associated with operational missions on the military Services, which organize, train, and equip forces to provide capabilities to the CCMDs. In this chapter, we describe the extent to which force management systems work to enable the development of regionally oriented skills.

A. Global Force Management, G-N, and 10 U.S.C.

According to the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, global force management (GFM) is the process that “provides near-term sourcing solutions while providing the integrating mechanism between force apportionment, allocation, and assignment.” GFM applies the right level of priority and aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy, Joint force availability requirements, and Joint force assessments. To provide forces that conduct the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere globally, GFM allocates the vast majority of forces from one CCMD of assignment to another (in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)). By law, only SECDEF can allocate forces from one CCMD to another and in the case of recent and ongoing contingency operations, allocations tended to be for fifteen months or less.

In accordance with Combatant Commands: Assigned Forces; Chain of Command, 10 U.S.C. §162, the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces to unified and specified CCMDs or to the U.S. element of North American Aerospace

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65 Ibid.
Defense Command. Such assignment provides long-term, enduring focus to forces in terms of developing regional expertise. Interviews with current and former regional commanders highlighted how assigned, forward deployed units tend to be more regionally astute, skilled, and focused than units unfamiliar with the region of operations. Individuals within units assigned to geographic CCMDs, whether forward deployed or located in the United States, execute missions or know that their unit may be called upon to perform missions within the geographic region.

The decade of GFM sourcing via allocation, however, works against the development of such regional expertise unless the same forces are repeatedly allocated to the same region. Forces are only allocated for a year or less, and commanders often have limited periods in which to prepare for their allocated mission away from their region of assignment. Even the regionally oriented SOF organizations felt the impact of being allocated repeatedly into the USCENTCOM area of operations, witnessing degradation in critical regional and foreign language skills. An entire Joint Staff GFM directorate within the J-3 and an enterprise evolved to address the large-scale overseas contingency deployments, complete with management information systems, implementation guidance, Secretary of Defense Operations Book timelines, and business rules. The disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the conventional Joint Force Provider, added another complicating factor to the development of regionally oriented skills. Forces previously assigned to USJFCOM were not fully assigned to other CCMDs upon USJFCOM disestablishment in accordance with Title 10 edicts. On the contrary, the military Services retained many of these forces and identified them with the moniker of Service retained forces. This construct appears to distort the G-N concept of operational versus administrative chains of command, as outlined in 10 U.S.C. 162. Service retained forces also increase the allocation requirement of the GFM process, which research participants indicated may no longer be necessary following the large, concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Consider, for example, the Army’s RAF concept; a construct centered on the allocation of Service retained forces to the CCMDs. At the time of this research, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division was allocated to the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), via U.S. Army Africa, to conduct missions for a single year. When the term of the allocation completes, the unit returns to Service retained status and no longer focuses on the USAFRICOM region. As the Service members rotate to subsequent assignments and new leadership assume their positions of authority, limited, if any, responsibilities.

67 Philip A. Buswell, Keeping Special Forces Special: Regional Proficiency in Special Forces (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011).
regional expertise and focus has been retained by the unit. Allocated forces from all the military Services would share this identical experience unless the same units and individuals repeatedly return to the same geographic region.

**B. Service Force Management and Multi-Hatted Commands**

Service force management policies, via GFM, ultimately determine which organizations are prepared for allocation to CCMDs to conduct operational missions. In the case of the contingency operations of the past decade, GFM, in concert with Service force management constructs, determined which forces would participate in combat operations and which forces would not. GFM also identifies which forces will participate in the various Phase 0 theater security cooperation activities in support of the geographic CCMDs. With regard to Service force management, these processes can work against regional skill development, sustainment of these skills, and the development of regional relationships. For example, if a unit is identified for a forthcoming deployment (or mobilization and subsequent deployment), the commander must identify all of the pre-deployment training requirements that must be satisfied prior to deployment. Skills that require a long-term training investment, such as language, tend to be minimized by commands because they fall into the hard-to-do category instead of less time-intensive regional or cultural training. The shorter the timeline between notifications of allocated mission responsibilities and deployment, the greater the stress in investing in long lead time skill acquisition. If units repeatedly deploy to the same region, risks associated with the lack of regional expertise are minimized as unit members and their leaders gain experience though each deployment.

According to research participants, CCMDs, especially Service component commands with limited or no assigned forces, struggle to develop any enduring regional expertise. Forces from outside of command, often with no habitual relationship with the command and its theater of operation, are allocated with limited if any regional expertise, and then focus elsewhere once the period of allocation is complete. Yet these are the forces often tasked to conduct theater security operations in support of the CCMDs. Commanders indicated that they routinely are forced to circumvent the GFM process to accomplish their missions, and described how GFM is personality driven. Stronger personalities tend to get the capabilities that they need from GFM at the expense of others. If a mission need arises, commands without organic, assigned capabilities must ask via a request for forces (RFF) for SECDEF to allocate forces from another CCMD to their CCMD. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), commands face planning challenges [and uncertainty] as to whether current efforts are sufficient or
whether additional capabilities will be required.\textsuperscript{68} There is no integrating entity that
considers all security cooperation requirements across DOD. The condition of Service
components with or without assigned forces was described to IDA as \textit{big C} or \textit{little c},
with the latter referring to those components with limited or no forces. Components
depicted as \textit{little c} will, over time, not have a large number of officers and non-
commissioned officers that develop deep regional skills and experience in the region.
Sheer numbers work against such development; if more individuals are in a region and
there are more opportunities to be in a region, the pool of individuals with experience and
expertise will be greater than in those regions with limited opportunities.

Complicating matters, when forces are allocated and there are no assigned forces
within the component or CCMD, there is also no operational command between the
tactical unit and the senior commands that can serve as the Joint Task Force (JTF)
headquarters. In such cases, operational commands would then have to be allocated, or ad
hoc JTF headquarters established and deployed. Again, such a process works against the
development or advancement of enduring regional expertise and is the condition faced by
those components described as \textit{little c}.

With limited forces forward deployed, DOD prioritizes where it positions forces in
accordance with strategic priority and then economizes in other areas. Unfortunately,
DOD does not always get to choose where forces are needed for contingencies. Former
SECDEF Robert Gates highlighted this by stating that, “in the 40 years since the Viet
Nam War our record in predicting where we will be militarily engaged is perfect...we
have never once gotten it right.”\textsuperscript{69} In the case of a multi-hatted command, whether
functional and geographic or two geographic areas of responsibility, the limited staff
must attempt to plan and execute missions for both a Service Chief and a geographic
combatant commander or for two geographic combatant commanders. Such a
requirement dilutes the ability of the command to focus and develop meaningful regional
expertise, as they attempt to juggle all of these multiple demands. The commanders are
pulled in multiple directions as well; limiting the focus that they can provide on a single
geographic region.

Although the associated NG units are not assigned to any CCMD, CCMD staff and
leadership, as well as Service component commanders, identified the NG SPP as an
enduring approach to developing regional expertise.\textsuperscript{70} Briefly referenced in Chapter 2,

Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts}, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-12-
556, May 2012.

\textsuperscript{69} Gates, \textit{Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War}.

\textsuperscript{70} Sgt. 1st Class Jim Greenhill, “Combatant Commanders: National Guard Builds Global Partnerships,
Proven on Battlefield,” 8 March 2014, \url{http://www.army.mil/article/121516/Combatant_commanders__National_Guard builds_global_partnerships__proven_on_battlefield/}.
this program presently involves more than sixty-five *partnerships* between U.S. states and countries around the world, incorporating both military-to-military engagement and a civilian component. Countries request, via the U.S. ambassador, the establishment of a state partnership; then the CCMD, working with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) finds a state to partner with the country for sustained engagement. Such a habitual relationship tends to mirror the *assignment* portion of GFM, since the state is able to focus on the individual country, leadership and relationships within the country, and the greater region. Although senior leaders of the operational chain of command regard SPP as a critical enabler, discussions with NGB representatives indicate that Service budget submissions will significantly reduce participation in the program. As an example, while not enacted, the March 2014 Department of the Army President’s Budget Submission describes a 25 percent cut in the resourcing of the mission support operations and maintenance portion of the SPP program and a much greater cut in NG pay and allowances.71

**C. Conclusion**

In this chapter we considered the critical role of GFM in the development of regionally oriented skills. The disestablishment of USJFCOM and the resulting Service Retained construct works against enduring regional approaches unless the same units and individuals are allocated to the same region. Forward deployed and assigned forces are able to focus on their regions and develop both skills and experience; however, multi-hatted commands have to dilute that focus as they must meet the demands of functional requirements, multiple regions, and multiple CCMDs. Although not an assigned force, the NG SPP does provide an enduring construct with sustained regional interaction.

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4. U.S. and Allied Preparation of Both Individuals and Organizations for Regionally Specific Missions

I was reminded that nearly always we begin military engagements - wars - profoundly ignorant about our adversaries and the situation on the ground.

*Robert M Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 2014*

This chapter provides an overview of how the United States and partner nations are preparing uniformed personnel and military organizations for regionally specific missions. Section A canvasses DOD’s relevant regionally oriented initiatives. Section B provides an overview of what the Services are doing to prepare individuals and organizations for missions with tasks that have to be executed in other regions of the world. Cross-Service and Joint initiatives are discussed in Section C. Section D addresses what partner nations and Allies do to ensure their uniformed personnel and military organizations can operate effectively in such environments.72

A. DOD

DOD’s regionally oriented initiatives emerged within the general framework of foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities (LREC), with emphasis on the language aspect of the LREC acronym. This subsection broadly and chronologically canvasses DOD’s relevant initiatives over the last decade to highlight the relevant developments.

In the Defense Science Board (DSB)’s “2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities,” the authors identified foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as beneficial capabilities for complex missions and environments. Reflecting on the current operating environment, the authors emphasized the necessity for U.S. military forces to have an understanding of how culture and religion affect that environment. They stated, “We must be able to travel in the minds of our opponents. They are already traveling in our minds.”73 The authors of the report emphasized the

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72 Please note that we canvassed the landscape of relevant initiatives and programs. It is not the authors’ intention to present an exhaustive list of every development relevant to regional preparation.

need for a broadly defined combat skill set, one that includes cultural, regional, and language-based capabilities, together with the ability to operate weapon systems. This 2004 DSBD study established a tone and context for subsequent DOD and Service efforts and initiatives that promoted such capabilities for Service personnel.

Also in summer 2004, OSD, in collaboration with the Center for the Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland, convened the National Language Conference, *A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities,* with the stated goal of moving “the Nation toward a 21st century vision.” The conference drew 300 language and policy experts from across all levels of government, from the full range of educational entities, from heritage language communities, and from the private sector. These experts discussed the need for action with regard to foreign language and cultural understanding to meet U.S. national security demands and ensure U.S. economic competitiveness and “domestic well-being.” The subsequent white paper, “A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities,” identified essential actions:

- Develop cross-sector language and cultural competency
- Engage Federal, State, and local government in solutions
- Integrate language training across career fields
- Develop critical language skills
- Strengthen teaching capabilities in foreign languages and cultures
- Integrate language into education system requirements
- Develop and provide instructional materials and technological tools

It is important to note this event was not focused on DOD or on military Service personnel. The *Call to Action* identified a severe national deficit in foreign language capabilities and in knowledge of other cultures, and referenced the need for “dedicated professionals with language skills,” but also stated that “[a]ll Americans need a more universal understanding of the complex world we live in.”

DOD guidance of that time period reflected similar concerns. In the May 2004 directive-type memorandum, *Management of the Defense Foreign Language Program,* Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) Paul Wolfowitz identified the “critical need” for foreign language capability and established a “senior governing structure for

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74 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 12.
the Defense Foreign Language Program.”78 This governing structure, initially called the Defense Foreign Language Steering Committee (FLSC), consisted of Senior Language Authorities (SLAs), individuals with “direct access to senior leadership,” who understand “the totality of the organization’s language needs.”79 The agencies and organizations who were directed to establish SLAs included the CCMDs, the Office of the CJCS, the Military Departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) was directed to appoint the OSD SLA, who was designated as the chair for the FLSC.80

In January 2005, DOD released the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR). This document established strategic planning goals, designated offices of primary responsibility, and identified desired outcomes for building foreign language skills and regional expertise across the force. The DLTR’s four strategic planning goals focused on creating “Foundational Language and Regional Area Expertise,” addressing surge capacity needs, establishing “a cadre of language professionals possessing a 3/3/3 ability,” and developing a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of language professionals and FAOs.81

The DLTR established a series of required actions, including the creation of a “capabilities-based language requirement determination process”82 and a language readiness index.83 It also called for the Secretaries of the Military Departments to conduct “a one-time self-report screening of all military and civilian personnel for language skills,” established the requirement for DOD to publish a list of strategic languages, and

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 5. “In order to obtain a true picture of language needs, this process will be a zero-based, systematic, and comprehensive process that identifies and validates language and regional expertise requirements in DoD, based upon national security strategy documents including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Security Cooperation Guidance, as well as contingency and operational planning.”
83 Ibid. “This index will measure language capabilities within Component missions and roles. It will compare the proficiency level of the language mission to the language capability of the individuals available to perform that mission, as measured by testing. Its purpose: to identify gaps in language readiness resource needs. This index will be integrated into the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).”
called for improvements to language testing mechanisms. All of these actions have been or are in the process of being implemented.

The DLTR also announced the creation of the Defense Language Office (DLO). According to the roadmap, this organization was to “ensure a strategic focus on meeting present and future requirements for language and regional expertise.” The DLO also had the following responsibilities: to “establish and oversee policy regarding the development, maintenance, and utilization of language capabilities; to monitor relevant promotion, accession and retention trends; and to explore innovative concepts to expand capabilities.” In accordance with the roadmap, in May 2005, The DLO, under the jurisdiction of the USD(P&R), was established.

Also in 2005, in accordance with the fourth goal of the roadmap, DOD released the Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs. This issuance directed each Service to develop and sustain an FAO program. The directive identified “foreign language proficiency and detailed knowledge of the regions of the world gained through in-depth study and personal experience” as “critical war fighting capabilities.” The DODD stated that it was through the deliberate development of “a corps of FAOs” that the military departments would provide this capability critical for meeting national security objectives.

In October 2005, in accordance with the second goal of the roadmap, DOD Directive (DODD) 5160.41E, Defense Language Program, was revised and reissued. In addition to emphasizing foreign language skills, this directive also identified regional expertise as a “critical” competency “essential to the DOD mission.” This directive defined regional expertise as:

Graduate level education or 40 semester hours of study focusing on but not limited to the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country or specific global region through

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84 Ibid., 6.
an accredited educational institution or equivalent regional expertise
gained through documented previous experience as determined by the
USD(P&R) or the Secretary of the Military Department concerned. 89

While this directive addressed language professionals, it identified these competencies as
“critical” for “all military (Active duty, National Guard, and Reserves) members and
DOD employees.” 90

This directive also re-designated the FLSC as the Defense Language Steering
Committee (DLSC), and further refined the mission of SLAs. They were to maximize
“the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these
critical skills appropriate to the Department of Defense’s mission needs.” The directive
also further differentiated roles and missions of each SLA by organization. For example,
the SLAs at CCMDs were directed to “[i]ncorporate language needs into all operational
and contingency plans.” They were also to include in those plans surge capacity “beyond
organic capabilities” and screen the Command’s civilian personnel for foreign language
skills and regional expertise (the results of which were to be forwarded to “the OUSD
(P&R) personnel system.”) 91 DODD 5160.41E directed SLAs of the military Services to
“[o]rganize, train, and equip a level of language professionals and personnel with
regional expertise (military and civilian) to meet operational requirements and maintain a
plan to meet surge requirements.” DODD 5160.41E also required Service SLAs to
monitor “accession, retention, and promotion” of personnel with foreign language and
regional expertise, reporting the results to the USD(P&R). Service SLAs also had the
responsibility of ensuring that deploying units “have an appropriate capability to
communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or transit and provide
appropriate cultural awareness training, basic language familiarization, and language aid,
in coordination with DLIFLC [Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center],
except in cases of emergency.” 92

DODD 5160.41E also identified the responsibilities and roles of the entity now
known as the DLSC. These responsibilities included making policy recommendations,
creating and maintaining “a DOD strategic language list,” establishing “a language
readiness-reporting index,” and identifying personnel and instructional foreign language
requirements. 93

89  Ibid.
90  Ibid.
91  Ibid., 6–9.
92  Ibid.
93  Ibid., 4. It should be noted that DODI 5160.70, Management of DOD Language and Regional
Proficiency Capabilities (Washington, DC: USD(P&R), 12 June 2007), while focused primarily on
This directive was followed by DODI 5160.70, *Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities.* This DODI provided guidance for Defense Language Program implementation and identified responsibilities. It also contained guidelines regarding the six regional proficiency skill levels developed by USD(P&R). These six skill levels rated “an individual’s awareness and understanding of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious), sociological (including demographic), economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country or specific global region.” Higher proficiency levels included knowledge of U.S. strategic goals and objectives relevant to a country or region. As stated in the DODI, “[t]hese guidelines are intended to provide the DoD Components with benchmarks for assessing regional proficiency needs, for developing initial and sustainment regional proficiency curricula at Service and JPME schools, and for assessing DoD-wide regional proficiency capabilities.”

In January 2006, the CJCS issued CJCSI 3126.01, *Language and Regional Expertise Planning,* which provided policy and procedural guidance in support of the DLTR.

In June 2007, USD(P&R) hosted a DOD summit that was considered to be a sequel to the 2004 *National Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities* initiative. This summit, entitled *Regional and Cultural Expertise: Building a DOD Framework to Meet National Defense Challenges,* was intended as vehicle to further the synchronization of efforts to promote foreign language, regional, and cultural expertise. As documented in a white paper written after the summit, entitled *DOD Regional and Cultural Capabilities: The Way Ahead,* participants “agreed that an intense focus on regional and cultural capabilities is critical if we are to grow leaders, operators, and analysts who understand both the broader regional, as well as the cultural contexts, in which they perform their jobs.” The white paper established five action items:

- **ACTION:** Build a DOD Regional and Cultural Capabilities Strategic Plan
- **ACTION:** Establish common terminology and a typology for identifying, developing, measuring, and managing regional and cultural capabilities

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94 Ibid.
95 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01, *Language and Regional Expertise Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 21 January 2006).
• ACTION: Define and prioritize the Department’s strategic and operational demands for regional and cultural capabilities
• ACTION: Operationalize the Department’s regional and cultural needs
• ACTION: Partner with the public and private sectors in solutions

As emphasized in the white paper, “regional and cultural competencies” are viewed as “integral capabilities of the 21st Century Total Force.”

In August 2009, the CJCS announced that the Department was creating the APH Program. As described in the Chairman’s memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff of the Services and the Commanders of the CCMDs, the objective of the APH Program was to “create greater continuity, focus, and persistent engagement across the battlefield.” This program would develop a “cohort of experts,” culturally attuned, with regional expertise and understanding, and who can “speak the local language.” The desired end-state is a program that will support critical elements of the National Security Strategy while preserving the member's career progression. According to the subsequently issued December 14, 2009 memorandum, Career Management of Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program, APH was the Chairman’s number one manpower priority. The Chairman instructed the Services to send their top performers to be participants in this program.

Also in 2009, the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF)/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) issued a Memorandum, entitled COMISAF/USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance, which announced counterinsurgency (COIN) training guidance for individuals deploying to Afghanistan. This memorandum is perhaps best known for establishing the requirements that “[e]ach platoon, or like sized organization, that will have regular contact with the population should have at least one leader that speaks Dari at least at the 0+ level, with a goal of level 1 in oral communication.” This training guidance also emphasized the criticality of understanding the operating environment, cultural dynamics, and human terrain. Fundamentally, the memorandum emphasized governance and building partner capacity.


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97 Ibid., 4–6.
99 CJCS, Career Management of Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program.
100 COMISAF/USFOR-A, Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance, Memorandum, 10 November 2009, 2.
to Succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, built on the COMISAF/USFOR-A memorandum by establishing policy, assigning responsibilities, and clarifying the roles of the DOD Components. The DTM emphasized the instructional needs of personnel and units deploying to Afghanistan, established readiness reporting guidelines, and expanded the language requirement from the initial COMISAF/USFOR-A memorandum to include Urdu. As with the COMISAF/USFOR-A memorandum, “cultural knowledge and skills” were also identified as essential for deploying personnel and were to be considered “commensurate with their duties, needed for the successful conduct of COIN operations.”

In 2011, the USD(P&R) released the DOD Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (2011–2016), a document that was to “build upon the foundation established by the DLTR and to institutionalize language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities across the Department” and establish an “actionable way ahead.” This strategic plan outlined three goals, focusing on the identification and validation of foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness requirements; building and sustaining these skills within the Total Force; and strengthening these skills to enhance interoperability “with other agencies, coalition partners, allies, and non-governmental organizations (NGO).” The DOD Strategic Plan concludes with references to the development of an implementation plan, “action plans to support strategy deployment,” and a statement regarding the fact that “[t]his Strategic Plan is a ‘living’ document that will be reviewed annually and modified as required to ensure its alignment and relevance with overarching DOD strategies.”

In January 2011, the USD(P&R) hosted a summit entitled Language and Culture: A Strategic Imperative. Summit participants spanned DOD, the intelligence community, academia, the Congress, and professional organizations. The purpose of this summit was to build on the achievements of the DLTR, and also to further the 2011 DOD Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities. Summit participants reached a consensus on the view that foreign language, regional, and cultural

103 Ibid., 8, 18, 20.
104 Ibid.
expertise are among the “core warfighting competencies that cut across the full spectrum of operations in a dynamic, interconnected global world.”

In a memorandum issued on August 10, 2011, SECDEF Leon Panetta indicated continuing support for foreign language, regional, and cultural skills as “enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment.” This August 10 memorandum, *Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities in the Department of Defense (DOD)*, emphasized the value of these skills both for specialists and the general purpose forces, skills that are enablers for communication and essential for understanding “the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations.” Moreover, Panetta emphasized the value of cross-cultural training for both military and civilian personnel, stating that such training enables the Total Force “to successfully work in the DOD’s richly diverse organization and to better understand the global environment in which we operate.” For commanders of deploying units, the need for such skills—depending on missions and responsibilities—may also be critical. Panetta emphasized that global missions require not only skilled foreign language and regional professionals, but also officer and enlisted personnel from deploying units, to have access to foundational language and culture training commensurate with their roles and responsibilities. Panetta requested that these “vital skills” be institutionalized in the Total Force.

In February 2012, the DLO merged with the National Security Education Program and became the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO). As a merged organization, DLNSEO integrates both national and DOD policy and initiatives focused on foreign language, regional expertise, and culture. DLNSEO maintains oversight of many of the actions identified in the DLTR, including the “capabilities-based language requirement determination process,” the language readiness index, and the efforts to improve language testing mechanisms. In addition, DLNSEO continues to expand the number of regions covered by its scenario-based, interactive training application, Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer (VCAT). DLNSEO also has an

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initiative underway to develop a Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool (RPAT), an algorithm based survey instrument.\textsuperscript{108}

In addition, DLNSEO maintains oversight of the DOD FAO Program. In that capacity they coordinate DOD FAO issuances (DODD 1315.17 and DODI 1315.20), they produce the DOD Annual FAO Report, and they chair the quarterly Joint FAO Proponent Council. DLNSEO also funds and provides oversight of FAO Language Sustainment; the FAO Orientation Course (Phase I); the FAO Sustainment Course (Phase II); and FAOWeb, an online tool hosted on a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Server.

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) is a Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) directorate that provides Security Cooperation training and education. In response to curriculum reviews and DSCA guidance, DISAM has recently increased the regional content of its course offerings, particularly in the Security Cooperation Management-Overseas Course and the Security Cooperation Management State Partnership Course.\textsuperscript{109}

In 2013, the current CJCS launched the Asia-Pacific Hands Program, which is focused on supporting U.S. efforts in the Pacific by building a “deep bench of general and flag officers who are all regional experts.” Because the Chairman sought regionally attuned command line-officers, his implementation guidance specifically excludes FAOs, linguists, and others who are “highly trained advisors” to decision makers from participation in the program.\textsuperscript{110} The information paper attached to the Asia Pacific Hands Program memo states “[r]egional acumen should not be limited to a few highly trained experts.”\textsuperscript{111}

The most recent version of CJCSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning, is CJCSI 3126.01A, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing, was issued in January 2013. This expanded instruction provides “guidance and procedures for operational planners to identify LREC capability requirements in security cooperation and joint adaptive (contingency and crisis action) planning (AP) and execution processes, day-to-day manning and Individual Augmentee planning in support of joint military operations.” This latest instruction also describes the Capabilities Based Requirements Identification Process (CBRIP) and provides examples of cultural as well as regional competencies and

\textsuperscript{108} Claudia Brugman et al., Assessing Regional Proficiency: The Completion of the RPAT Algorithm, University of Maryland: Center for the Advanced Study of Language, February 2013. For more information on RPAT, contact the DLNSEO.

\textsuperscript{109} DISAM Curriculum Review Minutes, 20–21 February 2013, 10, 16–18, 31.

\textsuperscript{110} CJCS, Asia-Pacific Hands Program.

\textsuperscript{111} Asia Pacific Hands Program Information Paper, 29 October 2013, Attachment B to the Asia-Pacific Hands Program memorandum dated 5 December 2013, 1.
proficiencies.\textsuperscript{112} CJCSI 3126.01A emphasizes that “the CBRIP has shown it is possible to need regional expertise and/or cultural knowledge without needing language proficiency, but that it is highly unlikely to need language proficiency without also needing regional and/or cultural competence.”\textsuperscript{113}

In January 2014, OUSD(P&R) released the \textit{Department of Defense (DOD) Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (LREC)}.\textsuperscript{114} The goal of this implementation plan is to operationalize the vision of the 2011 Strategic Plan for LREC, supporting the Strategic Plan’s goals. The implementation plan also announced the development of a tracking tool to identify the progress made with regard to the operationalization of this vision.\textsuperscript{115}

Also in January 2014, USD(P&R) released a document entitled \textit{Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA)}, which established training standards to assist GPF in “sustaining the capability to perform the” SFA mission. This document focused on SFA tasks; relevant knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs); and modality level. Prominent among the tasks identified is “Possess Regional Experience/Orientation/Expertise.” Although the signature page states that this guide applies to the DOD Components, Section 1.6 specifies that “[n]othing in this document is meant to preclude commanders and Services from conducting SFA as they deem appropriate in accordance with existing requirements.”\textsuperscript{116}

In conclusion, it is noteworthy that DOD efforts largely focused on foreign language capabilities. The fact that DOD leveraged existing institutions—designed to provide foreign language training to specialists—for the language training for GPF is also noteworthy. Research participants suggest that an emphasis on regional and cultural capabilities would be most valuable for GPF to be prepared for regionally oriented missions.


\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., A-2.

\textsuperscript{114} USD(P&R), \textit{Department of Defense (DOD) Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (LREC)}, January 2014.


B. The Military Services

The Services’ approaches to preparing individuals and organizations for missions with tasks that have to be executed in or focusing on other regions of the world vary widely. Each Service has specialist communities with regional areas of focus. Each Service developed educational and training programs over the last decade that have regional elements. Each Service also has uniformed personnel, to include General/Flag Officers, who serve in assignments with some regional focus or orientation. From research participants, including General and Flag Officers, we learned that GPF Service members often receive little or no formal regional preparation in advance of such assignments. The extent to which individuals are prepared for such assignments is often a matter of whether they personally seek regionally focused preparation, as available.

Based on the latest DOD budget submissions, the Services are increasingly focusing on what they deem to be their core missions; they are allocating resources in accordance with what they regard as their most critical capabilities.117 In general, the Services are aligning resources in a manner that enables them to retain traditional warfighting capabilities. As many programs and organizations that provide some regional skills sets for GPF are being reduced in capacity or defunded, there are other relevant adaptations and concepts that are in development, albeit with limited or no funding available. The following overview addresses what the Services are presently doing to prepare individuals and organizations for missions with tasks that have to be executed focused on or in other regions of the world.

1. U.S. Army

The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance identified “aligning Army forces with regions” as an important near term objective that would enable the Army to “support the eleven missions outlined in the President and Secretary of Defense’s Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.”118 According to the 2013 Army Posture Statement, “The Army Vision” focuses on the Army being “regionally engaged and globally responsive; it is an indispensible [sic] partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational environment.”119 To embrace the role of being “globally responsive,

regionally engaged,” Army leadership has emphasized regional orientation as a force management construct.\(^{120}\)

The Army’s RAF\(^{121}\) concept for Service-retained forces is both in development and ongoing, with RAF units being allocated even as the concept is in progress. One of the first RAF units, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division (ID) (Dagger Brigade), was the first BCT aligned to Africa.\(^{122}\) To date, the Dagger Brigade has sent approximately 2,500 soldiers to Africa.\(^{123}\) This alignment is of limited duration; the 4th BCT, 1st ID will be the next unit aligned to Africa, backfilling the Dagger Brigade during the second half of FY 2014.\(^{124}\) After completion of its RAF mission, the 4th BCT, 1st ID is scheduled to be inactivated.\(^{125}\)

Regionally focused preparation for a RAF rotation includes engagements with the Service Theater Component Commands, home station training, and some limited region-specific content at the rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). The emphasis of the training at NTC is decisive action, which “will prepare BCTs for what the Army sees as the probable thrust of future deployments and engagements they will face.”\(^{126}\)


The RAF concept has evolved over time; even the name of the program has been revisited multiple times and is likely in the process of changing again—that regionally aligned is not a legally or doctrinally appropriate GFM designation may result in a name change. With the recent emphasis on engagement, it has been suggested that the concept may next be termed Regionally Engaged.\textsuperscript{127}

One of the critiques of the RAF concept focuses on the ephemeral nature of the engagement. As discussed by Army leadership in October 2013 during the RAF forum at the Association of the U.S. Army’s 2013 Annual Meeting and Exposition, “Units are not permanently assigned to regions. They rotate in and out of the various regions.” As they discussed how RAF works, Army leaders also emphasized that “units assigned to a region could also be deployed outside their area, should the need arise.”\textsuperscript{128}

It must also be noted that personnel systems have not adapted to enable the Army to track regional experience, regionally specific expertise, or ensure that such experience and expertise within the GPF is leveraged. This lack of tracking of such experience and/or expertise is a challenge that may affect the strategic value of RAF.

An additional challenge with the Army’s approach to RAF is funding. According to a recent article in Military Review, “very little ‘juice’ comes with regional alignment; it currently does not trigger additional resources of people, money, or equipment.”\textsuperscript{129} A recommendation from that article was that “[t]he Army should therefore develop a force generation model for regionally aligned headquarters, which addresses personnel manning, additional resources (funding and equipment), and training requirements and opportunities.”\textsuperscript{130}

A recent article in Foreign Policy, “Portrait of the Army as a Work in Progress,” depicted RAF as a vague concept generating widespread confusion: “Evaluated as a clear blueprint for change, the regionally aligned forces construct is rife with contradictions. But evaluated as Odierno’s canny effort to protect his beloved Army from the fickle


\textsuperscript{128} David Vergun, “Regionally Aligned Forces Continue to Organize Despite Budget Uncertainties.”


\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
winds that blow through Washington? It's brilliant.”131 It is important to note that RAF is in development, with an estimated implementation timeline of at least five years.132

The Army leverages several organizations and programs for training and education for regionally specific missions. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center is a source for “modular cultural training programs for deploying units and Army schools.”133 Another TRADOC initiative, the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFCMS) tailors programs to the needs of an array of missions, cultures, and participants.134 Also of note is the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College. In addition, the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group’s new Asymmetric Warfare Training Center may provide training relevant to regionally specific missions.135 Through collaboration with U.S. Army Africa, OSD, and the Joint Staff, the Army is also seeking development of regionally specific Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) modules that can be used for pre-deployment and region-specific cultural awareness training for Africa.

To provide advisor training in support of all geographic CCMDs, the Army recently sought to consolidate Security Force Assistance (SFA) training within the 162nd Brigade at Ft Polk, Louisiana. This training would be applicable both to individuals and units that would be deploying in support of advisory missions. Army FAOs played a central role in training SFA teams; in fact, the largest single concentration of Army FAOs existed at Ft Polk. The Army has since decided to disestablish the 162nd Brigade in favor of commander-initiated home station training. Discussions suggest that the Army may retain a small (175-member) advisory core at Ft Polk, albeit non-region-specific in nature.136

Several recent initiatives relevant to regional orientation include the Army’s Strategic Broadening Seminars and the Army Special Operations Forces Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Fellowship. According to the program manager for Army's Broadening Opportunity Program, these programs will “enhance a Soldier's

132 Field, Learmont, and Charland, “US Landpower in Regional Focus.”
136 Advise and Assist Battalion TDA Proposal Briefing, February 2014.
understanding of the complexities associated with strategic choices, the varied cultures of the interagency and federal government, and diverse approaches to strategic decision-making."

The Army also has some specific communities with both regional expertise and experience, in particular, their FAO program, the Army NG SPP (a multi-Service program with a more than twenty-year history and enduring long-lasting relationships with partner nations), and Army Special Forces, a community with units possessing enduring regional orientation, roles, and missions, as well as in-depth language and cultural expertise.

Army FAOs represent some of the most experienced, uniformed regional experts in the U.S. military. The Army’s FAO program is managed as a single-track branch with the designation of Functional Area (FA) 48. At present, Army FAOs are accessed five to seven years after commissioning, primarily via the Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP). Army FAOs are now accessed at an earlier point in their careers than was previously the case, which decreases the amount of time the FAOs spend in their primary branch. Unless they are viewed already to possess FAO qualifications, Army FAOs proceed through a rigorous program of training and skill acquisition, which includes the Joint FAO Course, Phase I; language training (typically ranging from twenty-six to sixty-three weeks); In-Region Training (IRT); and a twelve-month Master’s Degree with a regional focus. The compressed training timeline associated with recent changes to FAO accession and skill acquisition (five- to seven-year accession, twelve-month graduate school, and accession primarily via VTIP) are not viewed favorably by FAOs or their supervisors.

2. U.S. Navy

In his statement before the House Armed Services Committee on FY 2014 Department of Navy Posture, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), stated the Navy’s “first responsibility” is to “deliver the overseas presence and

139 For the Army FAO program, the designation “In Region Training (IRT)” has replaced the previous “In Country Training (ICT).” The new designation reflects the emphasis is on providing FAOs with regional exposure.
capabilities required by our Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) document, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, as manifested in the GFMAP [Global Force Management Allocation Plan].” In this testimony, Greenert identified as the Navy’s primary tenets “Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready. Regardless of the size of our budget or our fleet, these tenets are the key considerations we apply to each decision.”141 In this posture statement, Greenert also reiterated the Navy’s “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, outlined in the CNO’s Navigation Plan 2014–2018, which includes increased presence, home-porting, expanded capabilities, and increased training and exercises.142

In later testimony, Admiral Greenert specified that fiscal constraints would circumscribe the Navy’s ability to do much of what was outlined in the FY 2014 posture statement. The size of the “2020 Fleet,” “about 30 less than today,” would preclude much of the Navy’s planned rebalancing and also decrease presence.143 Also in that testimony, he specified that fiscal constraints would circumscribe the Navy’s ability to support “non-core” missions, including “Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW).” Admiral Greenert stated that future scenario projections indicate that the Navy “would not have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions, as defined in the DSG. There would be inadequate LCS [littoral combat ships] available to allocate to this non-core Navy mission.”144

If these statements are considered in the context of the January 2010 *The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, the relevance for regional orientation initiatives is clear. In this vision document,145 four outcomes were emphasized as the manner with which the Navy would “confront irregular challenges.”

The outcomes were:

- “Increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, by securing and leveraging the maritime domain, with and in support of national and international partners;

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144 Ibid.
• Enhanced regional awareness of activities and dynamics to include a deeper understanding of ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics and norms;
• Increased regional partner capacity for maritime security and domain awareness;
• Expanded coordination and interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners.”

This vision emphasized “Cooperative security as part of a comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability” and stated that the Navy would “operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular threats.”

Moreover, in the November 2011 Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities Hearing, Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Navy leadership emphasized that

[t]he Navy’s emphasis on building partner security capacity is reflected in the establishment of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and its Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTC[OM]). MCASTC[OM] provides Security Assistance Detachments; mobile training teams (MTTs) that conduct security force assistance with the navies of developing countries and support the Navy’s partnership programs in the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America.

As IDA learned, MCASTCOM is being disestablished. OPNAV Notice 5400, Ser DNS-33/13U102300, stated that the disestablishment of MCASTCOM and the MCASTCOM Detachment was “the result of the assumption of command mission by other Department of Defense agencies.” MCASTCOM’s Navy Reserve Detachments will also be

146 Ibid., 3.
147 Ibid.
disestablished.\textsuperscript{150} In addition, the Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center and the Expeditionary Training Group will also be disestablished.\textsuperscript{151}

As with the Army, the Navy also has some specific communities with both regional expertise and experience. Navy FAOs are one of the Navy’s most prominent communities of regional experts, identified in the Secretary of the Navy’s March 2013 All Navy Message as a critically important “elite cadre of Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) specialists.”\textsuperscript{152} In this message, the Secretary of the Navy elaborated on the strategic value of FAOs stating, “trust and cooperation cannot be surged, and neither can the LREC skills required to build these long term relationships.”\textsuperscript{153} The Navy’s FAO program is a single-track branch, with Navy FAOs as a restricted line officer community. The Navy’s approach to FAO training consists of a Master's Degree (generally from the Naval Postgraduate School) and language instruction at DLI/FLC. Very few Navy FAOs have the opportunity to complete In-Country Training and, based on field research, a portion of Navy FAOs serve in FAO billets prior to being fully certified as FAOs.\textsuperscript{154} A recent announcement from the Navy’s senior FAO indicated that the Navy will expand its FAO billets from 300 to 400.\textsuperscript{155}

In the absence of an overarching regional orientation initiative, the Navy will leverage its FAOs, Navy SOF, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), Naval Construction Group/Seabees (now reduced in number), and the participants in the Navy’s


\textsuperscript{153} Ibid. It should also be noted that this All Navy Message stated, “Success in these operations, and on the asymmetric battlefields of the future, requires specialized officers with a sophisticated understanding of the international security environment, capable of facilitating close and continuous military diplomatic interactions with foreign governments and their defense establishments. Only the best and most highly qualified officers in the Navy and Marine Corps will be selected, educated, and trained for this mission.”

\textsuperscript{154} DODI 1315.20, Management of Department of Defense (DOD) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs. This instruction emphasized as critical for FAOs “in-country/regional experience involving significant interaction with host nationals and host-nation entities in the foreign countries or regions in which they specialize.” See also Alrich, Adams, and Biltoc, The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers.

\textsuperscript{155} Richard Burgess, “Navy to Increase Foreign Area Officers to 400 by 2019,” Seapower Magazine (5 February 2014).
Asia Pacific Hands pilot program.\textsuperscript{156} As the Secretary of the Navy highlighted in his March 2013 Message, “Budget reductions and the decreased availability of conventional forces globally highlight the importance of fostering relationships with our international partners.”\textsuperscript{157}

Also of note, the Navy’s Center for Language Regional Expertise and Culture Office (CLREC) develops training materials for regionally specific missions. As identified by CNA in their 2012 report, CLREC provides MTTs, “[s]emiautomated group presentations,” and online individualized instruction.\textsuperscript{158}


The Air Force shifted from twelve Air Force Core Functions, as described in their FY 2013 Air Force Posture Statement, to five Air Force Core Missions, as emphasized in the FY 2014 Air Force Posture Statement.\textsuperscript{159} Among those core functions that did not translate into the core missions is Building Partnerships. The fact that the Air Advisor Academy, formerly a program of record, is in the process of being disestablished, reflects a trend.\textsuperscript{160} In fact, already in November 2011, in the Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities Hearing, Brigadier General Jerry Martinez described building partnerships as a “resource-intensive mission,” requiring “adequate authorities and predictable funding.”\textsuperscript{161} Moreover, Martinez reflected on the fact that the mission, supported by the Air Advisor Academy, is not in line with traditional Air Force capabilities. General Martinez stated, “[t]hroughout my years growing up in the Air Force, we were taught simply to go out and destroy an enemy’s air force. That was our job: to go defeat the enemy, not to build an air force. And as we started getting into irregular warfare operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, you clearly see the need that those foreign countries, they need a developed air platform, they need a developed capability to help

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} “Secretary of the Navy’s March 2013 All Navy Message.”
\item \textsuperscript{160} Recent reporting indicates that efforts are underway to retain some aspects of the program in some way. See, for example, Kristen Davis, “U.S. Steps Up Air Adviser Work with European, Asian Air Forces,” Air Force Times, 27 April 2014, http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20140427/NEWS05/304270017/U-S-steps-up-air-adviser-work-European-Asian-air-forces.
\item \textsuperscript{161} H.A.S.C. 112-89, Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities Hearing, 31.
\end{itemize}
ensure stability in their region. And in order to do that, we have done several things in the Air Force to promote that.”

The Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) provides training and education for regionally specific missions. The AFCLC’s Region Branch provides regional learning materials, such as the Expeditionary Culture Field Guides and Expeditionary Skills (ES) computer-based training modules.

In 2009, the Air Force Culture and Language Center launched the General Officer Pre-Deployment Acculturation Course (GOPAC), which is held at the AFCLC. GOPAC consists of fifteen hours of intensive language and fifteen hours of “cross-cultural competence classes designed to ensure deploying leaders have the skills they need to be successful in culturally-complex environments.”

The Air Force also has some specific communities with a regional orientation and/or expertise and experience. Of particular note are the Regional Affairs Strategists (RASs), Air Force FAOs. Unlike the Army and the Navy, the Air Force employs a “dual track” career management system for the RAS program, permitting RAS Officers to maintain their primary branch or Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), with RAS as a secondary AFSC. RAS officers then do alternating assignments between both their primary and secondary specialities. The Air Force’s approach to RAS training consists of a Master's Degree (generally from the Naval Postgraduate School), language instruction at DLIFLC, and Regional Affairs Strategist Immersion (RASI—the Air Force’s version of In-Region Training/In-Country Training (IRT/ICT), which is usually a two-part immersion, totaling approximately four to six months. Due to pilot shortages, in 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force elected to return all rated officers to their original AFSC.

Other specific communities of note include the Language-Enabled Airmen Program, the Air Force Political Affairs Strategists, and Service members participating in the NG SPP. In addition, the Air Force Contingency Response Groups are regionally focused

162 Ibid., 7.
165 As a result, the RAS community’s numbers dropped by 65. Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs Regional Affairs Strategists Action Panel, 5 February 2013.
entities critical to the Air Force’s “‘Global Mobility Forces’ for deployed operations.” Air Force Special Operations Forces likewise represents a community with enduring regional orientation, roles and missions, and cultural expertise.

4. **U.S. Marine Corps**

As stated in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the Marine Corps is emphasizing forward presence and crisis response. General Amos described the Marine Corps as the “nation’s expeditionary force in readiness […] poised to swiftly respond to crisis and disaster.” Amos referenced force reductions and posited that the Marine Corps “will bridge the gap. We will maintain forward presence. We will remain on scene to engage with partners and allies. We will provide our nation access where our adversaries try to deny it.”

The Commandant of the Marine Corps described the March 2014 *Expeditionary Force 21—Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future* as the vision and action plan that will “shape and guide” the Marine Corps’ “capability and capacity decisions while respecting our country’s very real need to regain budgetary discipline.” As part of this reconfiguration, the *Expeditionary Force 21* document also identified a regional orientation for the Marine Corps: “Regionally orient, resource, and employ Marine Corps operating forces to ensure familiarity between GCC and Marine Corps commanders and staffs. Regional orientation is intended to promote consistency in operations and procedures among naval forces, special operations forces (SOF), partners and the interagency communities.”

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168 Ibid.


170 *Expeditionary Force 21—Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 4 March 2014), 11. Examples of the regional orientation described therein include (on p. 13): Under I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – “global response focus…oriented on PACOM and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)” – are 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) – “orient on…CENTCOM…and will support GRF requirements”; and 2d MEB – “orient on U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and also support the GRF.”; “Established under III MEF, 3d MEB is a standing command element regionally oriented on PACOM.”
The Marine Corps has recently developed a type of scalable expeditionary unit, the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), which can serve a variety of functions, including crisis response Security Force Assistance. In the 2013 USMC Posture Statement, General Amos described SPMAGTFs as “capable of rapidly responding when conditions deteriorate,” augmenting Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) “forward security locations in key regions.”

He also addressed the role of such rotational entities in training and building partnership capacity, emphasizing the Black Sea Rotational Force, the SPMAGTF-Africa, the SPMAGTF-Crisis Response, and the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D). MRF-D, along with the partnership with Australian allies, was also identified as a “cornerstone of our Pacific rebalance.”

The Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) and the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning (CAOCL) are two of the key entities that provide training and education for regionally specific missions. MCSCG provides pre-deployment training to operating forces engaged in SFA missions. MCSCG also “coordinates, manages, executes, and evaluates security cooperation programs and activities to include assessments, planning, security cooperation-related education and training, and advisory support. The organization’s aim is to ensure unity of effort in building partner nation security force capacity in order to facilitate Marine Corps support to GCC objectives.”

CAOCL provides operational culture and language familiarization training tailored to missions and the “cultures, countries, and regions in which the supported unit will operate.” CAOCL also implements the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) program, which now has an associated PME requirement. The completion of RCLF blocks is required before a career Marine may be “considered PME complete for grade.” The purpose of the RCLF, as stated in the Marine Administrative Message announcing the program’s implementation, was not to develop experts, but rather to develop foreign language, regional, and cultural “knowledge, skills and attitudes within the GPF that will enhance a unit’s organic ability

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172 Ibid., 12.


175 USMC RCLF FAQ, “What is the PME requirement,” https://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/SitePages/RCLF_FAQ.aspx
to globally support operational planning and execution to achieve mission objectives.”

RCLF is now a component of PME for all career Marines, Active, and Reserve officers and non-commissioned officers.

The Marine Corps also has some specific communities with both regional expertise and experience. Of particular note are the Marine Corps FAOs. The Marine Corps employs a “dual track” career management system for their FAOs that permits them to maintain their primary branch, with “FAO” as an additional Military Operational Specialty (MOS). This additional MOS means that Marine Corps FAOs can do FAO assignments, as well as assignments in their primary MOS, as needed and available. To the extent possible, the Marine Corps FAO proponent office seeks to ensure that FAOs’ non-FAO assignments are consistent with their regional focus areas.

The Marine Corps’ approach to FAO accession consists of two paths: Marine Corps FAOs can either be “study track” or “experience track.” The training available for “study track” FAOs consists of a Master's Degree, language instruction at DLIFLC, and a twelve-month ICT (typically a total of 30 to 36 months). “Experience track” FAOs are selected on the basis of their already meeting FAO requirements.

While Marine Corps FAOs perform roles that are both operational and tactical, in terms of the value FAOs represent, the Marine Corps’ emphasis is on the tactical value of FAOs. In comparison with the other Services, fewer of the Marine Corps billets are Joint assignments. In terms of Service billets, the Marine Corps largely employs FAOs across the range of Marine Corps Formations and Organizations.

Of note, the Marine Corps is also developing a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) FAO-like program, the Enlisted Foreign Area Staff NCO program. The objective of this enlisted FAO program is to install Marines with language and regional expertise in Marine Corps operational units.

Other specific regionally oriented communities include Regional Affairs Officers (RAOs) and Regional Affairs Staff NCOs. The Marine Corps Special Operations Forces likewise represent a community with enduring regional orientation, roles and missions, and cultural expertise.

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176 MARADMINS Active Number: 619/12, Implementation of the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program.

177 MARADMINS Active Number: 196/13, Implementation of the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program for the Reserve Component.

The Marine Corps is the only Service with the means to track what they term *Irregular Warfare Manpower Skills*, which include both functional and regional experience and education. The Manpower and Reserve Affairs Command Profile System is the platform through which commanders may “easily identify Marines with documented civilian education, military skills and experience that could be useful in the conduct of IW.” Among the available search categories are “Civil Security, Restoration of Essential Services, Governance, Justice and Reconciliation, Economic Development, Agriculture Development, and Regional Experience.” This development came about as a result of the CJCSI on Irregular Warfare (CJCSI 3210.06).

**C. Relevant Multi-Service and Joint Initiatives**

The NG SPP is a multi-Service initiative linking states with partner nations across all geographic CCMDs. Managed by the NGB, SPP involves more than sixty-five partnerships between states and countries around the world in sustained, habitual relationships, representing an example of an enduring approach to developing regional expertise. Critical individuals who form these enduring relationships include the State Adjutant Generals, the SPP Coordinators, and the BAOs (who are located in the host nations, either in the Ministry of Defense or in the U.S. embassies).

In May 2013, General Raymond Odierno, General James Amos, and Admiral William McRaven launched a tri-Service initiative, the Strategic Landpower Task Force. In the task force charter, they defined Strategic Landpower as “the application of landpower towards achieving overarching national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance for a given military campaign or operation.” The purpose of creating this task force was to provide these organizations with the opportunity to explore their “combined application of military power at the nexus of the land domain and what we have informally termed the “human domain.” At a recent Association of the United States Army Aviation Symposium, General Robert Cone discussed how Strategic Landpower, as an operational concept, would change Army doctrine. A fundamental change already identified is the addition of “a seventh

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warfighting function called ‘engagement,’” which “would involve skills used to influence foreign governments and militaries.”

Although not the focus of this report, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) features robust regional content, especially in elective courses. As communicated in the Officer Professional Military Education Program (OPMEP), the Joint Staff’s perspective is that GPF personnel “benefit from understanding both cultural terrain and specific regional information.” As such, the educational experience derived through JPME “should lay the intellectual foundation for both culture and regional awareness with a worldwide focus.”

D. Allied and Partner Nations’ Regional Approach

Discussions with allied senior officers and officials provide yet another view into management of regionally oriented organizations and individuals. While these armed forces do not necessarily deploy to every global region, they did have significant experience in Afghanistan, and sometimes in Iraq and other regional locations. Attaché and liaison positions with other governments and militaries tend to be viewed as favorable assignments, if an officer wants to advance to the highest levels of their military. Pre-assignment training, up to a year, is regularly afforded to these officers. The United Kingdom offered a different model, in which officers are not even selected to be attachés until they reach the colonel or brigadier general level, but these officials also receive in-depth training prior to assignment posting.

In terms of regionally preparing forces, Allied officers presented several different models based on current experience. In the case of the Italian Army, SOF forces receive extensive training, but when general forces were deploying to Afghanistan the determination was made that language training in Pashto was too difficult for the forces to learn. Instead, deploying forces were provided with regional and cultural training, along with rudimentary Farsi language training, since the unit would be posted near the Iranian border.

The French Foreign Legion (FFL) provides an historic model. Members can join the organization, regardless of their country of origin and obtain French citizenship and identity at the end of five years of service. Within the ranks will be individuals from

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183 Sheftick, “TRADOC: Strategic Landpower Concept to Change Doctrine.”
184 Alrich et al., The Infusion of Language, Regional, and Cultural Content into Military Education: Status Report. This report contains detailed descriptions of the cultural and regional content in JPME institutions.
185 Discussions with senior NATO officers at the NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany, February 2014.
186 Ibid.
across the globe; currently from 136 different nations. The FFL uses French as their official language, but records what language each member speaks. With regiments forward deployed in French Guiana, Djibouti, and other places on the African continent, the FFL does not focus on specific language training for these forces. When deploying to other locations, such as Afghanistan, legionnaires receive limited language training but extensive regional orientation and cultural training by current and former legionnaires.

Throughout discussions, Allied officers stressed the importance of training together as allies, since operations entail combined forces. They highlighted the efficiency of leveraging training facilities such as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, and the twenty-three different NATO centers of excellence. As an example, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe trained Georgian armed forces at Grafenwoehr prior to the Georgians deploying to support an ISAF mission in Afghanistan. U.S. senior research participants also repeatedly highlighted the importance of “fight together, train together” in all CCMD regions.

Allied senior officers and officials also emphasized the value of PME opportunities that take place at other nations’ educational institutions, particularly U.S. PME. These officers stressed that leveraging such educational opportunities was fundamental to building “high levels of interoperability through common military standards, knowledge, training, leadership networking, and experience.”

E. Conclusion

In this chapter, we provided an overview of how the U.S. and partner nations prepare uniformed personnel and military organizations for regionally specific missions. We examined DOD’s relevant initiatives, the Services’ preparation of individuals and organizations, multi-Service and Joint initiatives, and how partner nations and allies manage and prepare their uniformed personnel and military organizations for such missions.

Over the last decade, DOD established approaches to enhance regional expertise and experience across the Total Force. Many of the initiatives were focused primarily on

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188 Discussions with senior NATO officers at the NATO School.
189 Ibid.
190 Senior research participants in every CCMD region stressed multinational training as critical for multinational operations.
191 This quote reflects many of the areas of emphasis of officers and officials from Allied and partner nations who were among our research partners. See United States Diplomatic Mission to Italy, “International Training and Exchange Programs,” http://italy.usembassy.gov/odc/files/5.html.
foreign language capabilities. JPME institutions now also feature robust regional content, particularly as the elective courses.

Each Service also developed educational and training programs over the last decade that have regional content; of particular note are those programs developed based on emergent requirements associated with ongoing contingency operations. In general, the Services’ approaches to regional orientation of organizations and individuals vary in terms of their perceptions of their core missions and how they define themselves.

Based on their latest DOD budget submissions, the Services are increasingly aligning resources to support what they regard as their traditional warfighting capabilities.

- The Army—with its core competencies being combined arms maneuver, wide-area security, and now special operations—\(^{192}\) is regionally aligning the force, emphasizing engagement as a core warfighting function.
- The Navy—with its primary tenets of “Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready”—\(^{193}\) is leveraging existing regional experts within its ranks.
- The Air Force—with its core missions being “Air and Space Superiority; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Rapid Global Mobility, and Global Strike, Command and Control”—\(^{194}\) looks to specialist niches for regional expertise.
- The Marine Corps—with its core missions being assuring littoral access (Military Engagement, Crisis Response, and Power Projection) and Small Wars—\(^{195}\) is salting the force via RCLF.

Table 1 summarizes this resource alignment via a representative overview of the Services and their regionally oriented individuals and organizations. The final column indicates any reductions (in italics) and cuts. In some cases, entire regionally oriented programs or initiatives are being defunded, disestablished, or downsized—for example, the Ft. Polk 162nd Security Force Assistance Advisory Team (Army), MCASTCOM (Navy), the Air Advisor Academy (AAA) (Air Force), and the Advisor Training Group (ATG) (Marine Corps).

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\(^{192}\) Sheftick, “TRADOC: Strategic Landpower Concept to Change Doctrine.”


**Table 1. Representative Service Overview of Regional Orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Relevant Individuals</th>
<th>Relevant Units and Organizations</th>
<th>Regionally Oriented Programs</th>
<th>Reductions and Cuts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>FAOs, SF, 09L, Linguists, Bilateral Affairs Officers</td>
<td>Army Special Forces Groups, Civil Affairs, National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), Strategic Broadening Seminars, SPP</td>
<td>162nd, 09L, SPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Special Operations Forces, Naval Construction Group/Seabees, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTCOM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MCASTCOM, MCASTCOM Reserve Detachment, Seabees, SEALs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>FAOs, SOF</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), Strategic Broadening Seminars, SPP</td>
<td></td>
<td>AAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Regional Affairs Strategists, Political Affairs Strategists (RAS/PAS), Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs)</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Contingency Response Groups (CRG), National Guard SPP</td>
<td>Air Advisor Academy (AAA), Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP), SPP</td>
<td>MCSCG, Mohave Viper, ATG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>FAOs and NCOs, Regional Affairs Officers (RAOs)</td>
<td>Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Special Purpose MAGTFs, Mohave Viper, Advisor Training Group (ATG), Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG)</td>
<td>Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are also examples of some Services retaining capabilities, while reducing capacity (SPP, Seabees, Civil Affairs, and MCSCG). In addition, the Services are seeking efficiencies in FAO accession and skill acquisition programs, steps that may decrease the ultimate utility of these officers as regional experts. It should also be noted that there are examples of relevant adaptations and concepts that are in development, albeit in some cases with limited or no funding available (RAF, SPMAGTF, Asymmetric Warfare Training Center, and Strategic Landpower). This table excludes forward assigned Service
forces (e.g., 7th Fleet, III MEF and 5th Air Force). Based on the data collection conducted for this research effort, there appears to be no Joint, Department-wide coordinating or oversight function monitoring the reductions and cuts being applied.

The majority of Allied and partner nation militaries demonstrate the extent to which they value regional expertise and experience within their ranks through promotions and opportunities afforded to their top performers. Many foreign General and Flag Officers have had significant experience as attachés or liaison officers, in leadership roles in NATO organizations, and as commanders of United Nations missions around the world. Consideration of how our Allies approach and value this same subject area may provide means to better leverage established training constructs in a more efficient and resourceful way.

As discussed in Chapter 2, because it is not uniformly tracked, the assignment process generally does take into account whether a particular individual has some regional expertise, experience, and/or associated education and training in their record. Across the Services, research participants indicated that GPF generally receive little or no formal regional preparation in advance of selection for assuming regional assignments. In the absence of such deliberate development, some individuals stated that they personally sought to prepare themselves (and sometimes also their subordinates) for assignments with some regional focus or orientation.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations

We must get the economy going again. Until that happens, we will look for convenient enemies that allow us to align capabilities we want to maintain, anyway.

Comment by a senior research participant reflecting the current U.S. strategic situation

A. Conclusions

This paper analyzes the management of regionally oriented U.S. military Service personnel and organizations. This research effort focused on personnel management practices for GPF and relevant specialist communities (such as Foreign Area Officers and Special Operations Forces); force management systems for organizations; and the preparation of both uniformed personnel and military organizations for regionally specific missions. The paper also documents senior leaders’ perspectives on creating an enduring approach to regional preparedness, and identified potential transformational steps to enhance and manage regionally oriented capabilities.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, stated that the Joint Force will have “global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.”\(^{196}\) This emphasis on “global presence” and “strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions” is not new and has been reinforced in speeches by the last three serving Secretaries of Defense (SECDEF). Moreover, at the May 2014 commencement ceremony at the U.S. Military Academy, President Obama also emphasized building partner capacity as essential to developing “a network of partnerships” to expand “our reach” without requiring large numbers of forward deployed and assigned forces.\(^{197}\) These recent speeches and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document identify cultivating partnerships with other nations as critical, calling for the Services to retain the relevant capabilities, and for them to continue to make investments in regional expertise.


\(^{197}\) Obama, Commencement Address at West Point.
There are initiatives across DOD that address the preparation of individuals and organizations for regional missions. These initiatives include efforts to develop and enhance foreign language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness, the regional alignment of Army brigades and Special Forces, SPMAGTFs, and habitual association of other forces with CCMDs.

Yet, historically, the Services have struggled to develop and support communities requiring unique or regionally specific skill sets. In particular, the Services’ personnel processes and force management systems do not always support the development of regional expertise in GPF, the tracking of regional experience, or the preparation of organizations for regional missions.

As observed in FY15 Service budget submissions, the Services seem to be aligning resources to support what they view as their traditional warfighting capabilities. In particular, the Navy and Air Force are disestablishing some programs and initiatives related to regional orientation and irregular warfare capabilities. The Army, while cutting some regionally oriented initiatives, is now embracing engagement as a core warfighting function; the Army is also developing the RAF concept. The Marine Corps is seeking to maintain regionally oriented capabilities, while cutting capacity of organizations such as the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group.

The Defense Strategic Guidance document termed “[w]holesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission” as “unwise” and called for DOD to “manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.” Indeed, Total Force regional preparedness and readiness may only be achieved if the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman work together to encourage greater Service compliance with DOD policies.

1. Findings: Personnel Management

Personnel management of the all-volunteer uniformed military is governed by legislation (specifically, DOPMA and Goldwater-Nichols (G-N)) that places strict parameters on career length, promotion rates, time in grade, compensation, and advancement to flag officer ranks. This legislation, considered together, represents a framework that guides DOD’s personnel management systems. It is within this framework that the Secretaries of the military departments execute their 10 U.S.C. responsibilities to organize, equip, and train forces that are supplied to the CCMDs, which employ the forces operationally.

G-N differentiated the operational, force employment, chain of command of the combatant commanders from that of the administrative, force generation chain of command, which runs through the military Services. The former places demands associated with operational missions on the military Services, who organize, train, and equip forces to provide capabilities to the CCMDs.

These legislative acts standardized many aspects of uniformed personnel management systems across the DOD to meet the Cold War needs of producing a large corps of command-oriented generalist officers who could lead a large force in major combat operations. Such a system optimizes by having military branches or communities define skill sets and gates that have to be met within times in grade. Communities with regionally specific skills face challenges within such a one-size-fits-all, command oriented, generalist system.

The purposeful tracking of personnel experiences and skills lies at the heart of any meaningful assessment of the demand for regional expertise throughout DOD. Except for specialty communities, regional experiences and capabilities are not uniformly monitored across the Department; therefore, demand or need is unclear. Service regionally oriented capabilities should be tracked so that both the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense can identify risks associated with reduced capability and capacity.

2. Findings: Force Management

GFM is the process that provides sourcing solutions, aligning force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy, Joint force availability requirements, and Joint force assessments. GFM sourcing via allocation works against the development of regional expertise unless the same forces are repeatedly allocated to the same region. Forces are only allocated for a year or less, and commanders often have limited periods in which to prepare for their allocated mission away from their region of assignment.

Commanders indicated that they routinely are forced to circumvent the GFM process to accomplish their missions, and described how GFM is personality driven. According to research participants, stronger personalities tend to get the capabilities that they need from GFM, at the expense of others.

In accordance with Combatant Commands: Assigned Forces; Chain of Command, 10 U.S.C. §162, the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces to unified and specified CCMDs or to the U.S. element of North American Aerospace Defense Command. Forces previously assigned to USJFCOM were not fully assigned

199  CJCS, Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.
200  Combatant Commands, 10 U.S.C. §162.
to other CCMDs upon USJFCOM disestablishment. Instead, the military Services retained many of these forces, identifying them as Service-retained forces. This construct appears to distort the G-N concept of operational versus administrative chains of command, as outlined in 10 U.S.C. 162. Service retained forces also increase the allocation requirement of the GFM process, which research participants indicated may no longer be necessary following the large, concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Service-retained construct works against enduring regional approaches unless the same units and individuals are habitually allocated to the same region. Forward deployed and assigned forces are able to focus on their regions and develop both skills and experience; however, multi-hatted commands have to dilute that focus as they have to meet the demands of functional requirements, multiple regions, and multiple CCMDs.

Many Service component commands have limited or no forces assigned to them. In addition to the fact that such components will, over time, not have a large number of officers and non-commissioned officers that develop deep regional skills and experience in the region, such commands also face structural challenges. When mission needs dictate that forces must be allocated to such a component, there is no operational command between the tactical unit and the senior commands that can serve as the JTF headquarters. In such cases, operational commands would then have to be allocated, or ad hoc JTF headquarters established and deployed.

With limited forces forward deployed, DOD prioritizes where it positions forces in accordance with strategic priority and then economizes and considers in lieu of choices, accepting risk in other areas. The development or advancement of enduring regional expertise in those other geographic areas is limited. Sheer numbers work against such development; if more individuals are in a region and there are more opportunities to be in a region, the pool of individuals with experience and expertise will be greater than in those regions with limited opportunities.

3. Findings: Training and Education

DOD’s regionally oriented initiatives emerged within the general framework of LREC, with DOD’s greatest emphasis on the language aspect of the LREC acronym. DOD largely leveraged existing institutions—designed to provide foreign language training to specialists—for the language training for GPF.

The Services’ approaches to preparing individuals and organizations for missions with tasks that have to be executed in or focusing on other regions of the world vary widely. They each have uniformed personnel, to include General and Flag Officers, who

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serve in assignments with some regional focus or orientation. GPF Service members often received little or no formal regional preparation in advance of such assignments. The extent to which individuals were prepared for such assignments was often a matter of whether they personally sought regionally focused preparation, as available and if time permitted.

Based on the latest DOD budget submissions, the Services are increasingly focusing on what they deem to be their core missions, allocating resources in accordance with what they regard as their most critical capabilities. In general, the Services are aligning resources in a manner that enables them to retain traditional warfighting capabilities. Many programs and organizations that provide some regionally oriented skills and capabilities for GPF are being reduced in capacity or defunded. There are some relevant adaptations and concepts in development, albeit with limited or no funding available.

Interviews with representatives from Allied and partner nation militaries demonstrate the extent to which they value regional expertise and experience within their ranks through promotions and opportunities afforded to their top performers. Many foreign General and Flag Officers have had significant experience as attachés or liaison officers, in leadership roles in NATO organizations, and as commanders of United Nations missions around the world.

B. Recommendations

1. Personnel Management
   - Track regional expertise/experience in DOD personnel management systems
   - More widely incentivize regional expertise and experience
     - Use monetary incentives as force shaping tools
     - Consider other incentives, such as broadening and educational opportunities, and service awards
     - The Department should inculcate and reward a culture of regional inquisitiveness
   - Consider selecting geographic combatant and Service component commanders with significant regional experience
   - Consider having the Chairman certify that people assuming Joint and interagency billets requiring deep regional expertise (including Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché positions) have appropriate regional experience
   - Consider creating competitive categories for those with regional expertise
For specific niche communities, consider lifetime of service, with appropriate on and off ramps to guide their career

For long-lead time communities, consider career trajectories up to 35 or 40 years of service

Promote to billets and vacancies rather than to a standardized career pyramid

Consider locating some percentage of non-kinetic, specialized communities in the Reserve Component (RC) in order to provide surge capacity

If one Service cannot provide a qualified individual for Joint and interagency billets requiring deep regional expertise, the billet should become open to other Services with qualified individuals.

This requirement should extend to all Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché positions

Monitor and track National Guard State Partnership Program participation

Ensure OSD, the Joint Staff, and others have greater visibility regarding the assignment process/policy regarding billets that require regional expertise and experience

For Joint-utilized Service personnel, consider establishing an annual report by the Chairman, with inputs by the Services, regarding those specialties where Joint billets comprise more than 20 percent of the overall community billets

Investigate the extent to which Joint duty and performance evaluation compares with Service duty and performance evaluation

Revisit overseas civilian personnel policies; review these billets and have the combatant and Service component commands recommend which positions should be exempt from this policy due to regional expertise demands

2. Force Management

Consider revisiting the concept of Service Retained forces, with the objective of assigning more forces to CCMDs

Examine whether GFM with a focus on allocation, needed for the large demands of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, is still appropriate

Examine whether GFM via allocation is appropriate for developing regional specific skills and capabilities
• Combatant and Service component commands *without forces* should be monitored in terms of their ability to execute Department missions

• Monitor the ability of Combatant and Service component commands *without forces* in terms of their ability to develop regional expertise
  
  – Where there is no operational headquarters or JTF between the combatant and Service component commands, and the tactical units, consider alternative mechanisms to enable mission execution
  
  – Consider giving some of these commands to the RCs, as the Navy has done with US Naval Forces South

• More deliberately leverage NG SPP, with greater coordination of these activities

• Consider creating a Joint Requirements Office (JRO) for security assistance and cooperation within the Joint Staff J-3 to unify disparate elements of that mission set, and to provide visibility and priority within DOD decision-making systems

• If forces are not forward deployed and/or assigned, consider as an enduring regional approach allocated forces repeatedly deploying to the same region (such as Special Operations Forces), and small-footprint enablers (such as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and participants in the National Guard State Partnership Program (NG SPP))

3. **Training and Education**

• To have greater clarity on training and educational needs, consider requiring all organizations operating in a region or carrying out regionally focused missions to report on their readiness for appropriate regionally specific tasks
  
  – Develop a formal mechanism whereby these inputs are communicated to the Joint Staff and to force providers

• Consider requiring Flag Officers assuming overseas command to attend in-depth regional training (and education) prior to assuming command

• Better leverage the training and educational enterprises already established with U.S. allies (for example, the NATO confederation of training/centers of excellence and the Joint Multinational Training Center)

• Examine the extent to which the Services and Joint Staff are adhering to the provisions of the FAO DOD Directive (DODD)
  
  – Examine the role of the Joint Staff vis-à-vis the FAO DODD; Joint proponency
Consider requiring the certification of all officers and non-commissioned officers serving in Joint positions requiring regional specific skills—to include language skills—to, in fact, possess these skills

- Ensure development of FAOs is in accordance with the DODD, to include RC programs; provide greater transparency for OSD regarding FAO developments

- Consider where Non-Commissioned Officers may augment capabilities, then invest in their training

- Establish and invest in the training of the NG SPP; consider the effectiveness of these partnerships
# Appendix A.
## Research Participants

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Appendix B.
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Appendix C.
References

Advise and Assist Battalion TDA Proposal Briefing. February 2014.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01. *Language and Regional Expertise Planning*. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 21 January 2006.


OPNAV Notice 5400, Ser DNS-33/13U102300, Disestablishment of Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command and Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA, 13


### Appendix D.
#### Abbreviations

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<td>Air Force Culture and Language Center</td>
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<td>AFPAK</td>
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<td>Air Force Specialty Code</td>
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<td>Bilateral Affairs Officer</td>
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<td>CAOCL</td>
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<td>Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation</td>
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<td>CBRIP</td>
<td>Capabilities Based Requirements Identification Process</td>
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<td>Commander, International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOPMA</td>
<td>Defense Officer Personnel Management Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRRS</td>
<td>Defense Readiness Reporting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Defense Science Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security and Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>Defense Strategic Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Directive-Type Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTRA</td>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSD</td>
<td>Deputy Under Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAF</td>
<td>Expeditionary Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Expeditionary Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Functional Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFL</td>
<td>French Foreign Legion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLSC</td>
<td>Defense Foreign Language Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFM</td>
<td>Global Force Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFMAP</td>
<td>Global Force Management Allocation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOPAC</td>
<td>General Officer Pre-Deployment Acculturation Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Individual Augmentee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>International Affairs Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>In Country Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Infantry Division</td>
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</table>

D-2
IDA  Institute for Defense Analyses
IRT  In-Region Training
JCRM Joint Capabilities Requirements Module
JFC  Joint Force Command
JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force
JKO  Joint Knowledge Online
JPME Joint Professional Military Education
JRO  Joint Requirements Office
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF  Joint Task Force
JTIMS Joint Training Information Management System
KSAA Knowledge, Skills, Abilities and Attitudes
LCS  Littoral Combat Ship
LEAP Language Enabled Airman Program
LNO  Liaison Officer
LRC  Language, Regional and Cultural
LREC Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities
M&RA Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MAGTFTC Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command
MARFORAF U.S. Marine Forces Africa
MARFORCOM U.S. Marine Forces Command
MARFOREUR U.S. Marine Forces Europe
MARFORPAC U.S. Marine Forces Pacific
MARSOC U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
MAVNI Military Accessions Vital to National Security
MCASTCOM Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command
MCSCG Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
MCTFS Marine Corps Total Force System
MEB  Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF  Marine Expeditionary Force
MLG  Marine Logistics Group
MoDA Ministry of Defense Advisor Program
MOS  Military Occupational Specialty
MRF-D Marine Rotational Force-Darwin
MTT  Mobile Training Team
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NECC</td>
<td>Navy Expeditionary Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>Naval Special Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMS</td>
<td>Officer Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPMEP</td>
<td>Officer Professional Military Education Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;R</td>
<td>Personnel and Readiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACFLT</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAED</td>
<td>U.S. Army Program Analysis and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Political Affairs Strategist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Plans Policies &amp; Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRRC</td>
<td>Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAO</td>
<td>Regional Affairs Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>Regional Affairs Strategist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASI</td>
<td>Regional Affairs Strategist Immersion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCLF</td>
<td>Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request For Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROPMA</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPAT</td>
<td>Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO/DATT</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Senior Language Authority</td>
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<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCEUR</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPMAGTF</td>
<td>Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Strategic Studies Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPDB</td>
<td>Total Army Personnel Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>TECOM</td>
<td>Training and Education Command</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>United States Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>UFMCS</td>
<td>University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies</td>
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<td>USAFE</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force Europe</td>
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<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<td>USARAF</td>
<td>U.S. Army Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>U.S. Army Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td>Unrestricted Line Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDPR&amp;R)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USFORJ</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCAT</td>
<td>Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTIP</td>
<td>Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program</td>
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The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, emphasized global presence, alliances, and partnerships. This emphasis has been reinforced by every subsequent Secretary of Defense. Most recently, at the 2014 West Point commencement ceremony, President Obama emphasized building partner capacity as essential. These speeches and the Defense Strategic Guidance document call for the Services to retain security cooperation capabilities and to continue to invest in regionally oriented capabilities. In contrast with this guidance, the Military Services seem to be aligning resources to support what they view as traditional warfighting capabilities—as observed in Service budget submissions. This situation suggests a misalignment between ends, ways, and means. Some Services are disestablishing relevant programs. Other Services are maintaining some capabilities, while cutting capacity. Yet with such decisions being made, there does not appear to be any oversight function to ensure that senior leadership has a comprehensive picture of what is evolving. This document summarizes IDA's examination of the management of regionally oriented personnel and organizations. IDA focused on personnel management practices; force management systems; and preparation for regionally specific missions. IDA also documented senior leaders' perspectives on enduring approaches to regional preparedness, and identified transformational steps to enhance regionally oriented capabilities.