The Decline and Fall of Joint Acquisition Programs

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The Decline and Fall of Joint Acquisition Programs

Findings from Prior Joint Program Research

• “Joint programs, whether large or small, in development or production, and irrespective of age, are statistically more likely to encounter programmatic breaches than their single system counterparts.”
  — “The Acquisition of Joint Programs: The Implications of Interdependencies” by Brown, Flowe, Hamel

• “The resistance to bi-service programs is thus deep-seated and powerful… When asked to consolidate programs they will make powerful arguments in favor of the attributes of their own proposal and against the attributes of the other service’s proposal.”
  — “Inter-Service Weapons Rivalry” by Robert F. Coulam

• “The common problems that cause delays and cost overruns can typically be attributed to ‘mission creep’ requirements that surface during the SDD phase.”
  — “Program Management Challenges in a Joint Service Environment” by LtCol Dorothy E. Taneyhill

• “…Service parochialism… conspires to ensure that individual Service equities… dominate the acquisition process.”
  — “Reforming the Joint Acquisition Process” by Brinson, Jones, and Kelly

• “Pentagon decisionmaking reforms since World War II are largely a history of efforts to curtail the power of the Services to veto joint solutions that serve the entire military better.”
  — “Reforming Pentagon Strategic Decisionmaking” by Lamb, Lachow
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Joint Programs

1. A JPO PM has six stakeholder programs planning to use their joint infrastructure software...

2. ...but each program demands at least one major feature be added to the software just for them.

3. The JPO agrees to the additional requirements, for fear of losing stakeholders (who could build custom software).

4. The additional design changes and coding significantly increase total cost, schedule, complexity, and risk.

5. As the schedule slips, one program decides to leave the joint program and develop its own custom software.

6. With one stakeholder gone, the amortized costs for the other programs increase further—and another program leaves.

7. As cost escalates and schedules lengthen, participation in the joint program unravels and collapses.

This scenario aggregates three SEI software-reliant system acquisition ITAs conducted in 2006-2009.
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What are Social Dilemmas?

What if we all could be better off, but no one has an incentive to change? Dilemmas are all about cooperation—and there are two basic types:

Social Trap: “The Tragedy of the Commons”
- Someone wants a benefit that will cost everyone else
- Some are tempted by that benefit, but if all do, everyone is worse off.

Social Fence: “Producing a Public Good”
- Someone faces a near-term cost that would benefit everyone else
- Some try to avoid the cost, but if all do, everyone is worse off.

Social Trap Examples:
Overfishing: Everyone catching more fish will mean there are no more fish
Congestion: Everyone using a car for their convenience creates traffic jams
Pollution: It’s cheaper to pollute, but everyone else pays the price in smog

“Individually optimal decisions lead to collectively inferior solutions”

Key Idea
The “Tragedy of the Commons” is a multi-player version of the “Prisoners’ Dilemma”
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What Key Mechanisms Undermine Joint Programs?

Stakeholders of joint programs demand additional (custom) requirements later in the lifecycle

- The more time that elapses between establishing the baseline requirements and introducing new requirements, the more effort it takes to develop the software for those requirements.

Underbidding is used to win development contracts

- Underbidding leads to schedule pressure that can shortcut quality processes and increase firefighting and staff burnout.

Developers are motivated to show good progress early in development

- Failing to address the hardest requirements early in the development lifecycle (such as in the first increment) in order to show better progress, leads to greater rework to address them later in the lifecycle, slowing progress.

Take-away

Understanding the underlying mechanism that drives joint program collapse is essential to fixing it.
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System Dynamics Simulation Model Overview

In this diagram, we observe interactions and processes that contribute to the decline of joint acquisition programs. Key elements include:

1. **Stakeholder Pgm's Custom Reqs Accepted**: Stakeholders accepting custom requests.
2. **Stakeholder Pgm's Custom Reqs Rejected**: Stakeholders rejecting custom requests.
3. **Stakeholder Pgm's Custom Reqs Desired**: Stakeholders requesting custom requests.
4. **Stakeholder Pgm's Satisfaction with Custom Reqs**: Stakeholder satisfaction with custom requests.
5. **Stakeholder Pgm's Cooperating**: Stakeholder cooperation in the program.
6. **Stakeholder Pgm's Pressure**: External pressure affecting the program.
7. **DoD Program Buy-In**: DoD's buy-in to the program.
8. **Realization of Program Value**: Program's value realization.

The diagram illustrates feedback loops and variables such as:

- **Cost Performance Index**: Indicating the program's performance relative to baseline.
- **Budgeted Cost of Work Performed**: Cost budgeted for work performed.
- **Average Fix PDY**: Average time to fix artifacts.
- **Average Test PDY**: Average time for testing.
- **Fraction of Work Remaining**: Fraction of work left to be completed.
- **Rework Fraction**: Fraction requiring rework.
- **Budgeted At Completion**: Budgeted cost at completion.
- **Cumulative Developer Revenue**: Cumulative revenue from developer work.
- **Performance Regulated Buy-In**: Performance-regulated buy-in.
- **Development Work Remaining**: Remaining development work.
- **Test Work Remaining**: Remaining test work.
- **Work Complete**: Work completion.
- **Rework Remaining**: Remaining rework.
- **Performance Regulated Buy-In**: Performance-regulated buy-in.

These elements are interconnected to model the dynamics of joint acquisition programs, highlighting the impact of stakeholders, pressure, and work completion on the program's trajectory.
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Grounding and Validating the Model

Model Validation Approaches:
1) Historical Joint Program Performance Data
   • Data tracking the monthly progress was obtained from the PMO and contractor, and correlated with a timeline of other events/actions/decisions

2) Joint Acquisition Program Workshops
   • Conducted two 2-day workshops, each held with senior experts from a single joint program
   • Human subject research protocol ensured confidentiality of the data collected

3) Game-based Joint Program Experiment
   • Some “less attractive” behaviors of joint program stakeholders aren’t willingly revealed
   • Developing web-based game engine to host controlled experiments with experienced acquisition staff, to collect data on realistic behaviors in joint acquisition scenarios

Collected Quantitative and Qualitative Data Corrects and Refines the Initial Model
   • Refine joint program model structure based on the empirical stakeholder behaviors
   • Use collected performance data to drive selected joint program model inputs
   • Compare model simulation performance to historical program performance

Take-away

It’s not enough to have only a notional or qualitative understanding of joint program dynamic behaviors.
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Key Research Findings

A key tipping point is crossed due to unrealistic schedules/late requirements
- Developer productivity as a function of schedule realism & late-addition req’ts
- Program managers need to know if they’re about to “fall off a cliff” at a tipping point

Stakeholders played “Schedule Chicken”
- Stakeholder platforms hid their own performance problems behind the joint program’s schedule issues

There is an inherent “social trap” at the heart of a joint program
- The JPO accepting more late custom requirements to keep stakeholder programs engaged (to prevent defection/collapse) is a “no win” social trap that leads to program collapse, especially when an unrealistic schedule exacerbates the expanded scope.

Mandated joint program participation can have severe unintended consequences
- If a stakeholder program is unwillingly forced to join a joint program, they will find a way to leave—and their defection will likely lead to a cascade of defections that will collapse the joint program
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Candidate Social Dilemma Solutions

Goal: Decrease custom requirements demanded by stakeholder programs
Goal: Increase realism of development schedule

**Altruistic Punishment**
- **PRO:** Pay to penalize uncooperative partners
- **CON:** May escalate and cause retaliation

**Shared Destiny**
- **PRO:** Incentivize based on program outcome
- **CON:** Incentive may be far in the future

**Privatization**
- **PRO:** Gives incentive to care for what’s yours
- **CON:** Loses reason for cooperation

**Authority**
- **PRO:** Regulates the good, prevents overuse
- **CON:** Unpopular to enforce a mandate
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Conclusions

Current Status

• Preliminary observations show a tipping point toward much lower overall development productivity contributing to the joint program social dilemma

Potential Areas of Future Research

• Model possible solution approaches and analyze their effectiveness
  – Identify the most promising solution(s) to be piloted on real programs
• Forecast acquisition program performance
  – Use a parameterized model as a management decision support tool
  – Run “what if?” scenarios on acquisition programs in progress & compare outcomes
  – Generate 3-D maps of the decision space to help decision-makers navigate it
• Influence future policy for joint acquisition programs
  – Help shape how joint acquisition programs are conducted through policy changes via the Service Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) and DoD
• Create an acquisition Management Flight Simulator
  – Educate program staff as to pitfalls awaiting them, as well as potential mitigations