

**A POLITICAL THEORY OF HEGEMONIC SUSTAINABILITY: A
LEGITIMATE GRAND STRATEGY FOR AMERICA**

BY

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DISCLAIMER

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ABSTRACT

The problem of declining relative US power and increasing US commitments, both foreign and domestic, have caused the US to accumulate staggering debt, threatening the sustainment of US hegemony and the Liberal rules-based international system. In addition, the problem of hegemonic resource limitations is exacerbated by the shifting of US post-Cold War grand strategy between egoistic short-term interests and the shaping of the international system in accordance with Liberal values. This study is a theoretical analysis of the benefits provided by a grand strategy propelled by Liberal legitimacy as opposed to the egoistic self-interests of realism. Simply put, does legitimacy increase the sustainability of hegemony?

To answer the research question this study defines, evaluates, and compares coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy as distinct aspects of social control theory, capable of providing the dominant explanation for why states generally comply with a given system of societal power rules. This inquiry focuses on legitimacy to examine the validity of three hypotheses: (1) Process Legitimacy increases system sustainability by reducing operating costs; (2) Normative Legitimacy increases sustainability of hegemonic power by constituting the coherence of domestic, allied, and international societies; (3) Effective Legitimacy promotes system stability through public demonstrations of consent, congruence, and utility of the current order.

To explain the international society's organizing principles and justifiability this study constructs a synthesized Legitimacy Framework to evaluate the type and degree of legitimacy present. The framework is then applied to the existing international system to determine its character and constituent parts. The results are useful to inform the creation of a grand strategy that seeks to control costs, preserve the US bases of power, and maintain the international order.

The argument of this inquiry asserts that US grand strategy should be based on a better understanding of the role Liberal values play in sustaining domestic unity, allied cohesion, and the rules-based international system. Interestingly, legitimacy is essential to maintaining all three of these fundamental sources of US power. Therefore, aligning US grand strategy with US and allied values resolves the superficial conflict between US self-interests and values; thereby leading to a more consistent, effective, and efficient grand strategy. The theory developed herein states that legitimacy, rather than coercion or self-interest, is the main propelling principle of sustainability in current society, whether at the domestic or international level.

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INTRODUCTION

[I]t simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates, technological advance, and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.

Paul Kennedy

The People were at first highly irritated at the mention of an oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised themselves someday to change the government [back to democracy] again.

Thucydides

The aim [of theory] is to try to find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to single out the propelling principle even though other principles operate, to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors are present.

Kenneth Waltz

All great powers fall. History can provide no exception. International systems rise and fall as well. Their fate is often related but not always interdependent. The evolution of governance is not over, but instead remains an enduring political competition between control and liberty, governance by power and consent of the governed, command and market economies, long-standing sources of power and nascent ones, interests and values, and the West and the East. Long-range historical context demonstrates, and Clausewitz affirmed, even in war results are never final. After all, war is simply politics through violence. Defeated states, and today transnational groups, often consider a negative outcome a transitory condition, to be corrected through further political struggle conducted at a later date.¹ Eminent strategist Everett Dolman defines strategy, in its simplest form, as “a plan for attaining continuing advantage.”² History suggests the United States’ hegemonic position in the post-Cold War era will not last indefinitely.

Is it possible that US exceptionalism can achieve a privileged position of endurance in world history? Robert Gilpin suggests otherwise, asserting that change is

¹ Carl von Clausewitz et al., *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80.

² E. Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 6.

inevitable anytime disequilibrium of power develops in the international system so long as the costs of change are justified by the benefits of change.³ The rise of China marks a shift in international power from the West to the East. The relevant question is how great the disequilibrium has become.

The nature of US power is exceptional because of its unique soft power and egalitarian values.⁴ However, the recurring competition of international politics often leads advocates of realism to emphasize US interests over values. E. H. Carr's realist insight in 1939 that politics is primary to ethics serves as the basis for this view.⁵ In addition, realist interests challenge US claims of exceptionalism by dismissing the relevance of soft power and values.⁶ Instead, realism primarily explains US power through material superiority. But, realism does not account for peace, explain enduring alliances, or allow interests to progress beyond an egocentric view. Hans Morgenthau's assertion that states have an innate desire for power⁷ explains World War II and its horrific results. Kenneth Waltz's structural anarchy requires states to pursue power as a means to survival.⁸ Further still, John Mearsheimer's offensive realism applies these ideas to their logical extreme resulting in the tragedy of great power politics.⁹ He prescribes the unequivocal pursuit of self-interested power regardless of the consequences on domestic, allied, or neutral perceptions. However, egocentric relationships can never achieve real trust, because motives will always be concealed and perceptions can never be truly verified. An egocentric culture easily leads to an increasing spiral of insecurity because security itself is zero-sum and nearly all defensive weapons have some offensive potential. This is the essence of the Spiral Theory and its resultant security dilemma.

³ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), xi-xii, 186.

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power : The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5, 31, 33-34.

⁵ Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the study of international relations* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 19.

⁶ Nye, *Soft Power : The Means to Success in World Politics*.

⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York [etc.]: McGraw-Hill, 1985).

⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

Is there really no escape from this spiral model and security dilemma?¹⁰ Does anarchy condemn humanity to play this self-help game? More importantly, is a realist characterization of the international environment an accurate basis for an effective US grand strategy? Robert Jervis' conceptual framework suggests that alternatives to a purely realist grand strategy may be available. The conclusion of his landmark *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* is that disciplined intelligence can increase explicit and self-conscious judgment in order to refute false images that automatically reject potential alternatives.¹¹

Unfortunately, the US position of international preeminence may be more fragile than commonly perceived. Declining US power and increasing US commitments, both foreign and domestic, have caused the US to accumulate staggering debt, threatening the sustainment of US hegemony and the rules-based international system. The US debt is the result of a mismatch between resources and commitments, and the debt has become a national security problem. Robert Gilpin identifies the increasing divergence between hegemonic system maintenance costs and the ability to finance requirements as a prime indicator of an ensuing economic and political decline from dominance.¹² Dramatic changes designed to increase resources or decrease commitments are not viable because they would create profound destabilizing effects on both international security and the global economy. Therefore, the US needs to pursue a more cost efficient and effective grand strategy. Material considerations alone cannot effectively optimize US foreign policy and actions.

Instead, the US should base grand strategy on a better understanding of the sources of US domestic and international power; resolving the apparent conflict between US self-interests and values will lead to a more consistent, effective, and efficient grand strategy. Legitimacy is an effective measure to discriminate between potential courses of action by providing a bridge between values and interests.

The Iraq War (2003 to 2011) is a principal example of the failure to reconcile values and interests. The war, ultimately judged illegitimate by some, divided the US

¹⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 66, 75-76, 111.

¹¹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*: 10, 111.

¹² Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 157.

domestically and from its allies, eroded the foundations of the international system, and set a dangerous precedent of preventive war.¹³ The Iraq War was a preventative war conducted to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi support of al Qaeda, reinforce international institutional credibility by enforcing violations, and liberate the oppressed Iraqi people. It was fought ostensibly for national security, international security and human rights.¹⁴ However, there was no imminent threat that was espoused or perceived. In addition, removing Saddam Hussein from power promised the additional advantage of creating an Arab democracy in the Middle East. In spite of the unprecedented nature of preventative action, the US population and congress initially supported war. Still, a large majority of the international community, including the UN and NATO, refused to endorse the war.¹⁵ It was a US war of choice. Its necessity was not obvious or consistent with international process, norms, or expected effectiveness. As a result, the international community demanded a high standard of justification. The explanation did not satisfy existing international law, formal alliances, or US espoused values. Does Mearsheimer's prescription for offensive realism have validity? Is the opportunistic pursuit of expanded material power and influence the best use of US hegemonic power? What are the costs of aggressively seeking the creation of new democratic states through force? An accurate appraisal requires a framework of sufficient breadth to consider adequately the relevant factors necessary to secure a continuing US position of advantage.

The Iraq War must be evaluated through a framework of grand strategic effectiveness to determine if the merits of action justify the blood, treasure, and opportunity costs. This raises some important questions for US grand strategy. Did the war further US grand strategy objectives? What was the cost in terms of material power? And ideational power? How did the war affect the international system? Why was the war legitimate or not? How did the legitimacy of the war affect each of the previous questions? These are not simple questions with simple, definitive answers. Yet they

¹³ Falk, Richard, "Legality and legitimacy: the quest for principled flexibility and restraint", 50, J. D. Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁴ Freedman, Lawrence, "The age of liberal wars", 93, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

¹⁵ Falk, Richard, "Legality and legitimacy: the quest for principled flexibility and restraint", 41, Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

provide a point from which to embark on an inquiry into the sources of US power, the character of US alliances, the US role within the international system, and the operations and maintenance of the international system itself. However, before laying a foundation to answer these types of questions, the current US position in the world needs contemporary and historical context to frame the options of grand strategy available to the US.

The US is the first global hegemon the world has even seen.¹⁶ However, what does this mean? No previous country, empire, or international order has matched contemporary US military dominance and economic superiority on a global scale the way the US does today. Not the Persians, nor the Romans, nor the Chinese, nor even the British Empire, upon which the sun never set, equaled the global pervasiveness of post-Cold War US influence.

The international system has both realist and Liberal components. Preeminence offers the US a choice between furthering the Liberal restraints in the international order or exercising its hegemonic position to maximum advantage. Accepting some systemic restraints on power will make the US dependent on its allies, formal and otherwise, for at least tacit consent. Conversely, changing the international system to a more hierarchical order allows the US to take a unilateral course without allied constraints. However, unilateralism does not imply that opportunities for unilateral action come without cost. The US does not have the power or the will to subjugate the world through force, and it is not even close. Further, an opposing alliance could obviate US advantage if the US were isolated from all its allies. This is not likely, but it is worth acknowledging allowing us to bound the extremes of the argument presented here.

So, what is the relevance of US preeminence? The fate of the US is tied directly to the operation of the international system of institutions it helped establish. The US has a material advantage it is likely to maintain for the next fifteen to twenty-five years.¹⁷ Even if China's GDP exceeds that of the US, China's per capita income will remain well

¹⁶ Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), Chapter 3, 75-76; Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 159; G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), Preface, 42, 45.

¹⁷ Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*: 1.

below the US for at least the next two decades.¹⁸ Yet the US's true strength lies in its leadership position within the existing rules-based international order.

Unfortunately, it does not seem as though the US always perceives the international system as advantageous. The US has been recently trying to have it both ways, acting without systemic restraint in Iraq but still expecting to leverage the international system to its advantage. Since September 11th 2001, the US has acted unilaterally, but not absolutely. The US "coalition of the willing" is by its nature unilateral because it accepts no outside check on action. The "coalition of the willing" effectively says, the US will act with or without you - and many chose "without you" in the Iraq war. This makes war expensive, both in resources and in prestige. The US has undercut the sources of justification for its own power. This cost has implications for grand strategy.

Grand strategy requires a combination of material and moral means to influence other states' behavior in war and peace to promote the attainment of policy objectives such as security and welfare. B.H. Liddell Hart was not the first to conceive the concept of grand strategy, but he was the first to publish writings with the term.¹⁹ He defined the "role of grand strategy – higher strategy – [as] to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy."²⁰ Liddell Hart avers that the instruments of grand strategy are the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of all, ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will.²¹ Perhaps, Liddell Hart's greatest insight on grand strategy was his claim that the purpose of strategy is the attainment of a better state of peace.²² Yet, his definition constrains grand strategy's context to times of war. From this has followed an "externalist school" that asserts grand strategy is composed of foreign policy and military strategy.²³ Robert Art's

¹⁸ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 44.

¹⁹ Steve Wright, *Linking US Grand Strategy to US Strategic Security Strategy*, 16 October 2012, slide 5.

²⁰ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Meridian, 1991), 321-27; Paul Kennedy asserts grand strategy should follow Clausewitz and Liddell Hart's terms to conceive it in the widest possible terms. Paul M. Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 7.

²¹ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*: 322.

²² Liddell Hart, *Strategy*: 353.

²³ Adam Grissom, *A New American Grand Strategy*, RAND, October 2012, slide 5.

A Grand Strategy for America provides a good example of the externalist school.²⁴ Art promotes a grand strategy of selective engagement, conditional upon multilateral interventions through alliance, or at minimum through coalitions.²⁵ Conversely, historians Paul Kennedy and Geoffrey Parker have espoused a “unitary school” of grand strategy that asserts full spectrum national ends, ways, and means to include both domestic and foreign, security and non-security priorities.²⁶ Kennedy illustrates his extension of the concept of grand strategy in his title, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*.²⁷

As argued by Williamson Murray, grand strategy is akin to the age-old concept of statecraft, yet Murray reserves the connection with grand strategy exclusively to great states, which alone are capable of conducting strategy on this scale.²⁸ For Murray, grand strategy is a long-term plan, fully cognizant of current circumstance that demands an intertwining of political, social, and economic realities with military power as well as recognition that politics, in nearly all cases, must drive military necessity.²⁹ Finally, Edward Luttwak argues the Roman Empire did have a coherent grand strategy that progressed through three systems of imperial security.³⁰ The salient point Luttwak makes is that all great powers have a grand strategy, whether consciously or not, implied by their international commitments and national priorities. As Adam Grissom of RAND has asserted, this strategy can be coherent or not, consistent or not.³¹ It seems the US post-Cold War grand strategy falls in the not coherent and not consistent category for each question. In essence, the concept of US grand strategy has progressed to a form involving not just providing security for itself, but also securing the rules-based international order it helped create and sustain.

²⁴ Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*.

²⁵ Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*: xii, 9, 82-86.

²⁶ Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*; Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 1998).; Grissom, *A New American Grand Strategy*, slide 6.

²⁷ Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*: ix, 5-7, 168.

²⁸ Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and Jim Lacey, *The Shaping of Grand Strategy : Policy, Diplomacy, and War* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

²⁹ Murray, Sinnreich, and Lacey, *The Shaping of Grand Strategy : Policy, Diplomacy, and War*: 1-2, 5.

³⁰ Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 192-94.

³¹ Grissom, *A New American Grand Strategy*, slide 8.

The position of this inquiry is that grand strategy is ‘domestic and international system strategy’. Examples of international systems are the Greek city-state system, the medieval European state system, and the modern European nation-state system.³² Designing and creating an international system is the highest form of grand strategy. The next level of grand strategy is systemic change, as defined by Robert Gilpin.³³ Systemic change is about the governance of the system and the replacement of a declining dominant power by a rising dominant power.³⁴ It is about leadership and the sustainment of the system. The final level is the operation and sustainment of the system. This occurs through what Gilpin terms interaction change.³⁵ Interaction change is the modification of political and economic processes, which do not change the hierarchy within a system but affect the rights and rules within the system. These changes are the most frequent aspect of and constitute most of what is now understood to be international relations.³⁶ Past US grand strategy has been focused on influencing the international system to the degree it was able, preserving its sources of power, as well as domestic and allied coherence.

US grand strategy has consistently applied four principles derived from the US Constitution, the Monroe Doctrine, its Open Door Policy, Wilson’s fourteen points, and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter.³⁷ In fact, every national security strategy since World War II has supported these principles.³⁸ The four fundamental ways the US has sought to provide for its security and welfare are via defense of the homeland, defense of allies and partners, promotion of and access to market economies, and the promotion of Liberal democratic governance.³⁹ The end of the Cold War and the elevation of the US’s hegemonic preeminence to sole superpower status necessitate adding a fifth principle of US grand strategy: the sustainment of a Liberal rules-based international order. The US grand strategy therefore needs a theory of social control that defines methods of influence that span from material to moral in order to sustain the contemporary international system

³² Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 41.

³³ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 42-43.

³⁴ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 40, 43.

³⁵ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 40, 43-44.

³⁶ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 43-44.

³⁷ Wright, *Linking US Grand Strategy to US Strategic Security Strategy*, slide 8.

³⁸ Wright, *Linking US Grand Strategy to US Strategic Security Strategy*, slide 8.

³⁹ Wright, *Linking US Grand Strategy to US Strategic Security Strategy*, slide 8.

in an affordable manner. In a way, this theory of social control will lay out three very different grand strategies depending on the ‘propelling principle’ with which compliance is sought – the propelling principle of coercion, self-interest or legitimacy.⁴⁰

This makes a theory of social control that explicates coercion, self-interests, and legitimacy a useful place to start when considering US grand strategy. Effective ways to influence other states’ behavior are especially relevant when creating a US grand strategy that reinforces the Liberal rules-based international order because voluntary compliance with rules is a key element of the contemporary order. The US played a prominent role in constructing the current rules-based international order after World War II and continues to reap the benefits of its sustainment.⁴¹ As a result, US security and welfare are reliant on sustaining the existing order and ensuring other states’ compliance in it.

States generally comply with the current rules-based international order and its organizing principles, such as sovereignty, peace, equality, and open markets.⁴² This raises a fundamental question. If US grand strategy is going to shape other states’ behavior as well as the international system, why do states comply with international principles, norms, rules, and commitments? Coercion and self-interest are the traditional answers, yet the concept of legitimacy is also necessary for a more complete explanation. The arguments of this essay aim to show that legitimacy performs a central role in both designing and implementing an efficient and effective grand strategy, especially at a time of diminishing material superiority.

This inquiry examines the utility of legitimacy as a check and balance, useful to a practitioner of US grand strategy. I do not purport to be a grand strategist, let alone suggest I have some practice in conducting grand strategy. Grand strategy is the essence of statecraft, practiced by an elite minority in great powers. I am also not a social scientist or political philosopher, and as a result have found the concept of legitimacy to

⁴⁰ This is a reference to Waltz's identification of the aim of theory. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 10.

⁴¹ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 2.

⁴² Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International organization International organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): 391, 393; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 37-44; Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 51-52.

be elusive and misrepresented. What has troubled me most, with respect to recent US policy, has been the apparent contradictions in US values and interests. I conducted this inquiry to improve my understanding of my role as a military member serving a larger grand strategic purpose. In that light, the use of legitimacy must be placed in context within the reality of state's fears, interests, and pursuits of honor while overcoming the self-fulfilling entrapment of an egoist approach to these purposes.⁴³ It aims toward an idealistic future of greater international cooperation and stability without exceeding what is practically attainable today, without discounting power for a utopian seduction that can only lead to naïve manipulation.⁴⁴ The construction of the current international system's norms is the result of both intentionality and acceptability. US grand strategy must recognize the need for peaceful political change, guided within the bounds established by Liberal values.⁴⁵ Ultimately, this inquiry seeks to develop a grand strategy consistent with the character of US society, its allies and the current Liberal rules-based international order as these are the essence of US power and hegemony and the key to continuing the American way of life.

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to relate the concept of legitimacy to interests and values in order to determine the relevance of legitimacy to grand strategy and hegemonic sustainability. Specifically, the thesis will evaluate the sustainability of US hegemony, focusing on how legitimacy of action influences the cost of sustainability. Chapter One defines key terms such as legitimacy, coercion, and self-interest. Further, it utilizes Max Weber's modes of social control and Alexander Wendt's three logics of anarchy and associated role types to theoretically characterize the international system and present some theoretical options for US grand strategy. This process will help to identify US sources of power that sustain the current US position within the international order. Chapter Two will first lay out a framework of legitimacy to constitute a society, applicable at the international level. Next, this Legitimacy Framework will be made more robust via additional depth, making it more useful for evaluating the degree and

⁴³ Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*: 1.75.2-3.

⁴⁴ Carr and Cox, *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the study of international relations*: 216.

⁴⁵ Carr and Cox, *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the study of international relations*: 191; Hedley Bull, Stanley Hoffmann, and Andrew Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 4-8, 16-19.

type of legitimacy within an international society. Chapter Three traces the foundations of the contemporary international society and its ordering principles to demonstrate and relate its character to US power and grand strategy. Finally, Chapter Four summarizes the argument, provides conclusions, identifies primary implications, and proposes a potential aim point for future US grand strategy development.

The research question that will guide the inquiry asks: Does legitimacy increase the sustainability of hegemony? Or, more modestly, as an antithesis: Does illegitimacy decrease the possible sustainability of hegemony? The theory developed herein states that legitimacy, rather than coercion or self-interest, is the main propelling principle of sustainability in current society, whether domestic or international.⁴⁶ Two assumptions used to develop this theory are key:

Assumption 1: The international environment is of anarchic nature.

Assumption 2: The domestic environment is of hierarchic nature.

Three hypotheses are derived from this theory:

Hypothesis 1: *Process Legitimacy increases system sustainability by reducing operating costs.*

Hypothesis 2: *Normative Legitimacy increases sustainability of hegemonic power by constituting the coherence of domestic, allied, and international societies.*

Hypothesis 3: *Effective Legitimacy promotes system stability through public demonstrations of consent, congruence, and utility of the current order.*

Legitimacy is the propelling principle of hegemonic sustainability because the legitimacy of society reinforces group coherence and the leader's differentiated position of authority, within society and the dominant group. In addition, actions of legitimation reinforce the system because they confer legitimacy to and demonstrate the utility of the system, which exerts a "compliance pull" toward the rules of power within the system. This reduces system-operating costs, extending the life of the system. At a minimum, this thesis will prove illegitimate hegemonic actions decrease hegemonic sustainability by increasing the costs of influence and systemic compliance. In essence, legitimacy is not merely epiphenomenal, but is in fact a useful guide to consistent and effective Liberal

⁴⁶ This is the author's original theory, based on the research and concepts contained herein.

grand strategy, capable of playing an important role in resolving the apparent conflicts between values and interests.

CHAPTER 1

The Theoretical Background, Legitimacy in Context

The health of a social structure is its ability to translate transformation into acceptance, to relate the forces of change to those of conservation.

Henry Kissinger

Prior to laying out an analytic framework for evaluating legitimacy, this chapter lays a theoretical foundation to place the framework, developed below in Chapter Two, into the larger context of potential sources of state behavior. The aim is to distinguish between various explanations of states' behavior (coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy) to generate compliance. This approach provides a particular explanation for a particular decision based on rational cost-benefit calculation. Additionally, the competing theories of Waltz's structural realism and Wendt's social theory of international relations, often called constructivism, will provide two distinct explanations for characterizing the international environment and the consequences of assuming a state of anarchy. The aim here is to determine the structural influences of the system on state behavior and the various roles states assume within that structure. This provides a broader characterization of the system of power rules itself, and the structural influence of system rules on state behavior.

The theoretical tools used in this chapter are: (1) Max Weber's three modes of social control, to include coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. Coercion will be further explained using theories of Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape.¹ Self-interest will then be explained based on the views of realism and liberalism.² Finally, legitimacy will be explained using the views of Ian Clark, David Beetham and the author.³ (2) Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* argues that there exists no single logic of

¹ Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International organization International organization* 53, no. 2 (1999); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword* (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2008); Robert Anthony Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca (N.Y.); London: Cornell University press, 1996).

² Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010); Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York [etc.]: McGraw-Hill, 1985); Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*; Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York ; London: Norton, 1998).

³ Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991).

anarchy; instead, three cultures (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian) exist. These cultures are subject to various degrees of internalization and produce distinct role types: “enemy”, “rival” and “friend”, respectively. (3) Immanuel Kant’s Liberal Pacific Union and the empirical evidentiary base provided by Michael Doyle’s Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) further define society and sources of US power.⁴

Together, the theoretical foundation is intended to lay the groundwork for explaining state behavior in a particular instance and the structural influence that provided the context for that behavior. To make this theoretical discussion relevant to US grand strategy, it will define and relate modes of social control: coercion, self-interests, and legitimacy to power, US hegemony, and the current international order. Once again, the overarching purpose is US grand strategy and the implications of US values and interests on the preservation of the international order. Finally, the definitions and theoretical characterizations will be related back to the thesis that legitimacy can provide a bridge between values and interests in order to guide a more efficient and effective US grand strategy.

The end of the Cold War and the elevation of US’s hegemonic preeminence to sole superpower status necessitate adding a fifth principle of US grand strategy: the sustainment of a Liberal rules-based international order. As a result, US grand strategy needs a theory of social control that defines methods of influence that span from material to moral in order to sustain the contemporary international system in an affordable manner. In a way, a theory of social control lays out three very different grand strategies depending on the propellant principle with which compliance is sought.

This makes a theory of social control that explicates coercion, self-interests, and legitimacy a useful place to start when considering US grand strategy. Effective ways to influence other states’ behavior is especially relevant to creating a US grand strategy that reinforces the Liberal rules-based international order because voluntary rules compliance is a key element of the contemporary order. The US played a prominent role in constructing the current rules-based international order after World War II and continues

⁴ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*.

to reap the benefits of its sustainment.⁵ As a result, US security and welfare are heavily reliant on sustaining the existing order and other states' rules compliance.

States generally comply with the current rules-based international order and its organizing principles, such as sovereignty, peace, equality, and open markets.⁶ This raises a fundamental question: US grand strategy seeks to shape other states' behavior as well as the international system, yet why do states comply with international principles, norms, rules, and commitments? Coercion and self-interest are the traditional answers, yet the concept of legitimacy is necessary to provide a fuller explanation. The primary argument of this essay aims to show that legitimacy always performs a necessary role when designing and implementing an efficient and effective grand strategy, but remains especially important at a time of diminishing hegemonic and material superiority.

All social systems, including the international system, must address the problems of social control and asymmetric power relations to achieve some level of stability through self-restraint.⁷ Social control is necessary to create stability and order from what would otherwise be chaos and a state of Hobbesian war.⁸ In domestic politics, the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force to coerce and enforce rules compliance. The state's monopoly on legitimate force is only vacated in *in extremis* situations of individual self-defense when the state's legitimate force is not present. However, the problem of social control is particularly acute in the international system because there is no global leviathan capable of enforcing absolute order as legitimized by the state in domestic affairs.⁹ This is the reason for the initial assumption, first provided in the introduction above that the international environment is of an anarchic nature.

⁵ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 2.

⁶ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 393; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 37-44; Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 51-52.

⁷ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 383.

⁸ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 111-36.

⁹ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 379; Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 111-13.

Anarchy in the international system implies a lack of a supranational government, or what Hobbes termed “Leviathan”.¹⁰ This assumption does not say or imply anything about the relationships that will exist within an anarchic environment without additional assumptions about differentiating individuals and shared ideas, leading to symmetric and asymmetric role differentiation.¹¹ The chapter will provide more on the implications and possibilities of anarchy in the concluding section.

The US is arguably the closest thing to a global leviathan the world has ever seen. Yet, despite this quality, US’s military superiority is still insufficient and unsustainable to perform the role of global sheriff.¹² Therefore, since brute force or external restraint is incapable of promoting either international order or worldwide compliance, self-restraint is the overarching goal of behavioral influence.¹³ Promoting individual state restraint is one of the primary functions of the Liberal rules-based international order. Self-restraint thus forms the basis for social regularities, a necessary precondition for relationships and society.¹⁴ Shared ideas or shared knowledge primarily determines social regularities that enable predictable behavior.¹⁵ Yet, individuals or states may restrain behavior for a variety of motives other than shared ideas, such as fear or interests.¹⁶ Understanding when each of these motives is operative and how to promote them will aid grand strategy and the sustainment of the international order. Achieving self-restraint amongst states is not as farfetched as it might initially seem, even in an anarchic international system.

States routinely constrain themselves from violence against other states. In fact, it is empirically evident that states even constrain themselves against those who could not possibly mount an effective defense.¹⁷ Empirical evidence shows that states follow most

¹⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge studies in international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 309.

¹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 256.

¹² Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: XV, 2-5, 26-27.

¹³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 2-6.

¹⁴ Hedley Bull, Stanley Hoffmann, and Andrew Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 7.

¹⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 251-54.

¹⁶ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 379; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 250, 66-78.

¹⁷ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 18-19.

of the rules most of the time.¹⁸ The US, for instance, possesses a vast power advantage over its immediate neighbors to the north, south, and especially in the Caribbean. In effect, Canada's border with the US is indefensible for the Canadians. However, the fact the border is indefensible is less relevant than the fact that Canadian border defense against the US is unnecessary.¹⁹ In an example of extreme power disparity, Alexander Wendt lays out a case to explain why the US does not conquer the Bahamas. Coercion does not provide a convincing explanation because no state or collection of states could probably prevent the US from taking the Bahamas.

US self-interest, expressed by a rational cost-benefit analysis to preserve its reputation, appears plausible. However, self-interest is also an unconvincing explanation because it is doubtful that US policy makers have ever explicitly considered the costs and benefits of an action to conquer the Bahamas. US respect for state sovereignty likely explains US inaction in this case.²⁰ However, as Wendt argues, if US respect for Bahamian sovereignty is implicit rather than explicit, then something other than rational self-interest motivates US behavior.²¹ This returns us to the question raised previously: why do states comply with international principles, norms, rules, and commitments? In addition, what dynamics influence state behavior and their interrelationships? The problem of social control necessitates an understanding of potential modes to achieve compliance and social control.

Coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy are three explanations for social behavior that comprise the Weberian ideal types for modes of social control.²² Alexander Wendt and Ian Hurd agree with Weber's three generic reasons actors obey a rule, norm, or commitment: force or the fear of punishment; price or the perception of self-interest; and legitimacy or the perception that the rule, norm, or commitment is right and ought to be obeyed.²³ Wendt calls this phenomenon the first, second, and third degree hypotheses,

¹⁸ Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave : Law and Foreign Policy* (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Columbia University Press, 1979), 47, in Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 391.

¹⁹ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 395.

²⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 289.

²¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 289.

²² Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 383.

²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 250; Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 379.

which operate within three distinct cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.²⁴ This characterization of behavior constitutes a model for social control and is essential because it illustrates the purpose of legitimacy and its associated costs and benefits. Coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy will each be discussed and defined in depth below.

Coercion

This section explains the influence of coercion on state behavior, highlighting it as a mode of social control influencing states to follow rules, norms, and commitments. It also shows the drain coercive behavior places on hegemonic sustainability because of its inability to produce a cost efficient international order. Do the majority of states follow rules, adhere to commitments, and refrain from aggressive behavior because of coercion? Coercion is the use of power, to hurt or destroy value, to cause suffering such that the violence is anticipated and avoidable by accommodation or modification of behavior.²⁵ The instrument of coercion is thus latent violence, or the power to hurt held in reserve.²⁶

Latent violence can either deter or compel action. Deterrence and compellence are subsets of coercion that are distinct in timing and initiative. Deterrence is indefinite but cedes initiative. Compellence is temporary or finite yet possesses the initiative.²⁷ The aim of deterrence is inaction due to a threatened consequence if the other nation acts. It is passive and effective if it places the consequence for action solely on the violator.²⁸ Conversely, the goal of compellence is for a nation or individual to do something because of the coercer's commitment to action or the current consequences of the coercer's actions. Compellence is active and is effective if it establishes a perception that unless the nation acts in a certain way, the consequences of either inaction or deviant action will be unacceptable.²⁹ Therefore, the purpose of coercion, deterrence or compellence, is to influence other state's behavior, to coerce their decision or choice by manipulating costs and benefits.³⁰ The goal is to force a state to apply self-restraint within the coercer's

²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 246-312.

²⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 2.

²⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 3.

²⁷ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 72.

²⁸ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 43-49.

²⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 69-72.

³⁰ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 2; Pape, *Bombing to Win*: 12.

prescribed options.³¹ Importantly, states can be coerced into cooperation, but still view the cooperation as invalid or illegitimate.³² Accordingly, coercion is defined by the nature of the decisions faced by the target state.³³

The success of coercion lies with the target's decision and acquiescence.³⁴ The target's logic can be described as a rational equation where resistance will continue as long as the product of the potential benefits of resistance and the probability of attaining those benefits through continued resistance exceeds the product of the probable costs of resistance and the probability of suffering those costs.³⁵ The victim's decision becomes a purely rational and utilitarian decision, although within a manipulated costs-benefit framework. According to Robert Pape, the logic of coercion is a simple equation:

$$R = B p(B) - C p(C)$$

Where: R = value of resistance

B = potential benefits of resistance

P(B) = probability of attaining benefits by continued resistance

C = potential costs of resistance

P(C) = probability of suffering costs.³⁶

If coercion is based on a rational calculation by the victim, how effective is coercion as a mode of social control? Coercion is effective within its material and ideational limits. The degree of physical control determines the material limit of coercion. The coercer's commitment and victim's perception thereof bound the ideational limits. The coercer's level of control and commitment directly influence the victim's rational calculation of the probability of suffering costs.

The victim must believe that the coercer controls the allocation of pain as well as placing value on the target of the violence.³⁷ Because of coercion's requirement for an extreme level of control, military victory has historically been a prerequisite for coercion.³⁸ In other words, the enemy must be rendered defenseless to be coerced. Yet

³¹ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 385.

³² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 254.

³³ Pape, *Bombing to Win*: 12.

³⁴ Pape, *Bombing to Win*: 13.

³⁵ Pape, *Bombing to Win*: 16.

³⁶ Pape, *Bombing to Win*: 16.

³⁷ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 3.

³⁸ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 12-13.

with nuclear weapons, victory is no longer a prerequisite to hurting others. As a result, coercing nuclear-armed countries becomes much more complex. However, even when a nuclear-armed country attempts to coerce a nonnuclear-armed country, control alone is insufficient; it only represents the possibility to hurt. The coercer must actually possess the political will to hurt and to continue hurting as long as deviance from the rules is present. Hence, in the nuclear age, the ideational limits on coercion have taken a more prominent role.

The essence of the ideational limits on coercion is commitment. Commitment is comprised of credibility, rules interpretation, and morality. These separate aspects of commitment will be addressed in order. It is a paradox for the coercer that to overcome the requirement for constant brute force, the coercer must demonstrate a commitment to the use of violence. Beyond the recognition of subordination, the victim must believe the perceived commitment of the coercer to carry out the threat and exact the anticipated punishment.³⁹ In this respect, the coercer's character and reputation for violence builds credibility by reinforcing perceived commitment. Rationality does not always support this perception. Liberal values and Just War theory, including necessity and proportionality, certainly do not.⁴⁰ It is a paradox of coercion that irrationality actually fosters a coercer's perceived predisposition to use force.⁴¹

Even if the coercer is credible, not all threats will *ipso facto* be inherently credible, especially if the punishment threatened is disproportionate to the rule infraction. Therefore, credibility of the coercive threat is reliant on the potential victim's judgment that violence is the coercer's preferred course of action to influence the specific choice.⁴² Coercion requires having the intention to settle an issue with force, projecting that intention, and when required, using force to back up the threat physically to modify the behavior. That kind of commitment is not to be had cheaply.⁴³

Next, targets of coercion can often justify their interpretation of the rules to exploit the ambiguity of the rules. Circumventing the coercer's commitment is an effective tactic to avoid sanction, because most commitments are ultimately ambiguous in

³⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 35-36.

⁴⁰ Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*: xvi, 119-20, 92.

⁴¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 36-37.

⁴² Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 36.

⁴³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 51.

detail.⁴⁴ Low level probing or tactics of erosion exploit the commitment's ambiguity.⁴⁵ These tactics are called "salami tactics," where manipulation of the letter of the law leads to violation of the intent of the rule. For example, one can direct someone to stay on one side of a line or face a consequence. If the line is stepped on, should the consequence be given? What if only one foot or toe crosses, has the line been fully crossed? What if the line is briefly crossed and the crosser returned to its initial position, and points out that the average position remains behind the line? What if the directive is given to twenty people, each performing salami tactics – who is punished? Is it worth the resources to punish all twenty? Does political will exist to punish one to such an extreme that it makes an example to all?

This illustration simply points out that minor violations of the law may be difficult to interpret and even more difficult to enforce. In other words, there is some undefined threshold, below which the commitment to coerce is not operative.⁴⁶ As another example, in some areas driving five miles per hour over the speed limit will not get you pulled over, in other areas it will. The question is one of the local police officer's commitment to enforce the speed limit as published or to enforce the purpose of the limit, safe driving. The ability to circumvent coercion with such tactics represents a significant weakness of coercion, limiting its ability to maintain social control.

However, morality, especially as defined in Just War theory, provides the greatest limitation for Liberal democracies employing coercion as a mode of social control. The character of western Liberal values and the major ordering principles of the international system such as sovereignty, peace, equality, and open markets impose moral limits on coercion. By no means is this to say that force and coercion play no role for Liberal democracies. If that were the case, the military profession of western nations would be without purpose. Instead, the limitation springs from the inherent cultural and political contradictions caused by an egalitarian America acting in an imperialist manner over other sovereign nations.⁴⁷ Coercion is counterproductive to US values and interests because it is repressive, resulting in resentment and resistance. It expends local social

⁴⁴ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 66-67.

⁴⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 67.

⁴⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 67.

⁴⁷ Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff : America's Defense of the New World Order* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), x.

capital in the area coerced and reduces the likelihood of future compliance without additional coercion.⁴⁸ This makes coercion costly in the short and long term. Further, coercion impairs the potential for cooperation or the leveraging of subordinate creativity, investment, and production.⁴⁹ As a result, coercion is not an efficient or enduring form of social control, especially for a Liberal hegemon.

Since World War II and the remaking of the world order, the US has restrained its use of coercion in areas beyond the use of force as well. Restraint in the name of multilateral legitimacy has been instrumental since the postwar settlements of World War II.⁵⁰ After the war, the US assumed the unequivocal leadership position of the Western world. American officials, building an international economic order with Europe, knew that to do so on a coercive basis would be costly and ultimately counterproductive.⁵¹ The resulting Bretton Woods agreement created a postwar economic order deemed legitimate by other governments because Liberal multilateralism moved beyond the trappings of hegemonic opportunism and the previous system's overt imperial preference.⁵² This leads to the following implication:

1st General Implication – The US cannot employ a primarily coercive grand strategy: (1) without changing US identity and its fundamental values, because coercion is inconsistent with Liberal tenets of principled respect and shared commercial interests; (2) and, without changing the Liberal rules-based international order because one primary purpose of the order is institutional restraint.⁵³

Ultimately, coercion is diplomacy, or bargaining, backed by threat of violence. Coercion is not the primary instrument of the Liberal rules-based international system, but it can be a necessary one. Coercion is primarily required in an international environment dominated by a realist culture or against specific actors who hold realist assumptions about the international environment. Coercion is the opposite of legitimacy,

⁴⁸ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 384-85.

⁴⁹ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 385.

⁵⁰ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 20.

⁵¹ Ikenberry, John, G., "A world restored: expert consensus and the Anglo-American postwar settlement", 320, in Peter M. Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1997).

⁵² Ikenberry, John, G., "A world restored: expert consensus and the Anglo-American postwar settlement", 289-293, 319-321, in Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*.

⁵³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 295.

but does not necessarily undermine legitimacy if applied consistently within the power rules of the society or order. The value of coercion is that it speaks to anyone who can feel pain. States with hostile intentions must be coerced to achieve any semblance of international stability and security. However, coercion has material and ideational limits as well as specific consequences for Western morality and the Liberal rules-based international order. Fortunately, few states are openly hostile to the current world order. In addition, the international order has rules that legitimize force and coercion when hostile states violate them. Coercion is thus insufficient to explain why most states comply with rules and is counterproductive to regularly enforcing the ordering principles and rules of the international system, and as such we now turn to self-interest.

Self-Interest

If coercion provides an insufficient explanation is it possible instead that states are always seeking self-interest? The promotion of self-interest is another possible mode of social control to explain why states comply with principles, norms, commitments and rules. The concept of self-interest is easily conflated with interests, goal seeking, or utility.⁵⁴ But the proposition that states act on perceived interests says nothing important without connecting the kind of interest to the content of the behavior.⁵⁵ Al Capone and Mother Teresa could both have acted in their interests, yet defined what those interests were in very different ways. In order for the concept of self-interest to have explanatory power with respect to behavior, it must be defined as a particular *kind* of interest.⁵⁶ Thus, self-interest is not simply the behavioral pursuit of goals or interests; instead, self-interest is about motivation, not behavior.⁵⁷ The larger purpose of understanding self-interests is to identify the sources of motivation and recognize how legitimacy can shape the common understanding of the best way to achieve self-interested, but not egoistically self-interested ends.

Do the majority of states follow rules, adhere to commitments, and restrain from aggressive behavior because of self-interest? Compliance, due to self-interest, means states perceive that they get something valuable out of following a rule; price or

⁵⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 239.

⁵⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 239.

⁵⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 240.

⁵⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 240.

inducements thus motivate state behavior. This is because self-interest is a subjective belief about *how* to meet one's needs, such as security and welfare. Individual profit is often an effective way to meet one's needs. Self-interest can encompass both the means and the ends. It distinguishes between benefits to the self and benefits to others by concerning itself only with optimizing benefits for the self and is typically defined as egocentric. Yet this is a realist definition of self-interest - Liberal self-interest blurs the line between self-interest and legitimacy.

Waltz's description of balance of power theory is a fine example of nations acting in myopic self-interests and utilizing other states as instruments to balance against more powerful threats, whether intentionally or not.⁵⁸ In balance of power theory, states act through internal and external efforts to seek their own preservation at a minimum, or drive for universal domination at the maximum extreme.⁵⁹ Alliances are an important component of the theory. But the pursuit of alliances is exclusively self-help, out of self-interest to increase survival potential. The choice of who to ally with is uninfluenced by identity, values, or any other substantive commonality. This does not mean a state's rhetoric will not attempt to emphasize common enemies or even to construct a common identity with an alliance. Nevertheless, it does mean that such words are simply that, words to galvanize popular support for the new allied flavor of the week. In balance of power theory, alliances can and should be disregarded when no longer useful.

At the abstract level of principles, realist, Liberal, and constructivist international relations (IR) theorists possess relative agreement about what comprises state interests and values; various definitions include security, autonomy, welfare, and honor.⁶⁰ However, these are not self-interests as defined above. Part of what makes each theory interesting is that they differ fundamentally on the implications of realizing national interests and how best to attain them.⁶¹ These distinctions result in significantly different grand strategies. The distinctions also result in different definitions of self-interest and its resulting motivations for behavior, leading to different potential ways to achieve social

⁵⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 116-23.

⁵⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 118.

⁶⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

⁶¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 134.

control for different groups. Whereas coercion takes all men down to a common level of compliance to survive, self-interests are not so universal. Self-interests have varying degrees of cultural constructions and influences.⁶² It is necessary to explicitly expound upon the differences between IR theories because their differing views of self-interests provides a good launching point to begin to integrate legitimacy into states' calculations of self-interest.

The ideology of realism leads to the construction of a particular kind of international system. An international system based exclusively on realist assumptions of self-interest would look very different from the international system we have today. It is important to understand realist views of self-interest and their implications to understand why. The goal in this section is to define realist self-interests and to discuss why they do not require any degree of legitimacy. In fact, realist egoistic self-interests lead toward coercive power struggles.

Realist interests are egoistic, short-term, and agnostic of relationships. Realists have no incentive for others to perceive self-interests as they do. In fact, the opposite is true. Realists would prefer if all others pursued collective interests because it would more easily allow them to achieve their own self-interests. As a result, legitimacy has no intrinsic value to decision making, but may have instrumental value, especially as a leader attempting to reduce costs or increase compliance. Still, legitimacy may exert an intervening influence on realist choices to attain self-interest, as discussed below. Realists vary their emphasis individually within the four varieties of state interests. However, all realists believe that man is in a constant state of war, Hobbes' "all against all".⁶³ And, as Sun Tzu famously writes, all warfare is based on deception.⁶⁴ It is a lonely place to be, but inescapable from the realist perspective, and as Mearsheimer termed it, a tragedy.⁶⁵ This characterization of the international environment is the dominant idea, from which to derive all other realist interests. Constant war establishes

⁶² Aaron Wildavsky, "Journal of theoretical politics," *Journal of theoretical politics*. (1989): 131-59. in; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 231.

⁶³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 111, 200.

⁶⁴ S.T.S.B.G. Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War: The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 64, 96.

⁶⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

the purpose, time-frame, and implications of realist interests. It is the reason realist interests are inherently self-interests in the egoistic sense.

Some of the more prominent modern realists diverge a little in their specific description of the ultimate form of self-interest. Morgenthau deviates slightly from the generalized interests of security and welfare because he emphasizes that the “will to power” within human nature provides the dominant explanation for states’ motivation.⁶⁶ However, achieving supremacy necessarily provides survival, security, and welfare. Thus, in the author’s opinion, the will to power is a means to the same ends described above. For Waltz, the anarchical structure of the international system creates a self-help system where states primary concern is their survival, while domestic welfare is immaterial because it lies outside the theory.⁶⁷ Waltz’s theory is about international relations, not policy or strategy; though survival is an obvious precondition for welfare. Because of Waltz’s emphasis on survival, his interests tend toward maintaining the status quo. Robert Gilpin characterizes states’ interests, in a recurring contest between states in anarchy, as a struggle for wealth and power.⁶⁸ Mearsheimer assumes survival is the primary goal of great powers, but he also implicitly elevates the unending pursuit of power to equal status in order to seek global hegemony.⁶⁹

Generally, realists believe a nation’s interests are implicitly self-interests in the egoistic sense.⁷⁰ After all, as George Kennan stated, our own interests are all that we are really capable of knowing and understanding.⁷¹ However, even for the realist, egoistic self-interest does not preclude the rational consideration of other’s interests into the decision-making process.⁷² Consideration of others is part of the rationalizing process that determines what maximizes egoistic self-interest. This is a requirement in any social setting. In Weber’s sense, accounting for others’ interests is essential to anticipating their

⁶⁶ Morgenthau, Hans J., *Scientific Man, 192 and Politics Among Nations*, 208, in Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: 18-19, 407-8 n32-35.

⁶⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 105.

⁶⁸ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 7.

⁶⁹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: 31, chapter 2.

⁷⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 239.

⁷¹ George F. Kennan and John J. Mearsheimer, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 109.

⁷² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 240.

behavior and thus in an independent world to gratifying the ego.⁷³ In addition, egoist self-interest does not preclude cooperation. Keohane, a Liberal theorist, assumes a realist myopic self-interest in his argument to show cooperation still occurs in spite of the focus on self.⁷⁴ However, the consideration and cooperation amongst realist states is of limited quality and quantity, as compared to Liberal or constructivist outlooks.

Realist self-interests emphasize survival over welfare, because survival is a necessary precondition to welfare concerns.⁷⁵ In addition, all self-interests gains are relative, not absolute, because security is a relative commodity. Even when states cooperate and objectively increase the goods produced, the gains realized are still relative because power is a zero-sum entity.⁷⁶ All aims are unilateral, especially when cooperating, since power cannot be shared. Power is not an end in itself, through very prominent realists would disagree.⁷⁷ Power is an immediate, sometimes called primary, objective in the sense that Corbett describes.⁷⁸ Power is the ultimate means; possessed absolutely, it is capable of delivering any possible ends. But every primary object has its ulterior motive, or overall purpose of rationality.⁷⁹

Realists' self-interests have a temporal framework as well. Realists perceive self-interests in a shorter contextual period of evaluation than Liberals do. This follows naturally from the realists' "continuous state of war" characterization of the international environment.⁸⁰ In a continuous state of war the future is not certain and one may not survive long enough to see it; thus increasing risk in the present is not worth a deferred benefit in the future, even if the future benefit promises to be of greater worth.⁸¹ Realism still allows for long-term future planning, it just subordinates long-term plans to immediate priorities more readily than Liberalism would.

⁷³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 240.

⁷⁴ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), chapters 1, 4, 6.

⁷⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 104-07, 34.

⁷⁶ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 118-28.

⁷⁷ Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace*; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

⁷⁸ Julian Stafford Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 307.

⁷⁹ Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*: 307-10.

⁸⁰ Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (London: Collier, 1962, [1651]), 100, in Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 112.

⁸¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: 33.

Realists consider principles, norms, and rules merely as the reflections of the values of those who dominate international politics.⁸² Norms, rules, and commitments have no legitimacy to realists, at least not in the sense that they ought to follow a rule for any motive other than egoistic self-interest. After all, norms, rules, and commitments are purely instruments of advantage to the realist. Realists may comply, even most of the time, but only if the rationalizing cost-benefits logic tilts the benefits toward compliance, as exemplified by Pape earlier.⁸³ Therefore, to motivate a realist to act out of their self-interest is expensive, especially if they perceive their behavior is more valuable to the “other” than themselves. If all states apply realist assumptions of egoistic self-interest, the international environment would be a Hobbesian state of war. Hobbes assumed that individuals are rational, but envious egoists.⁸⁴ Further, without a Leviathan to enforce rules, there could be no order. The result would therefore be a war of all against all.

However, legitimacy as a tool of a Liberal alliance exerts a coercive effect on realist states outside the alliance. The legitimacy of a particular rule, norm, or commitment influences realist self-interest calculation, at least as an intervening variable. Even if a realist does not accept an obligating principle, such as sovereignty, the realist is aware that the shared idea of sovereignty is commonly accepted.⁸⁵ Therefore, other states’ views on the legitimacy of a rule are consequential because the other states’ commitment to sovereignty will increase costs for a realist who violates the principle. The commitment is enhanced when embraced by an alliance that excludes the realist state opposed to the principle. For the realist, these cost calculations are only material costs in a material calculation. Nevertheless, in this example, the legitimacy of sovereignty operates in the coercion equation against a realist because the legitimacy of sovereignty, or those willing to act to preserve the principle, increases the commitment of the coercer toward the realist. Provided countries remain committed to the principle of sovereignty, maintain an effective military with the power to hurt, destroy, or cause suffering, and their commitment to enforce the principle of sovereignty is anticipated, it follows that

⁸² Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 31.

⁸³ Pape, *Bombing to Win*: 16.

⁸⁴ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 113.

⁸⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 286-88.

most of the time the realist will accommodate sovereignty to avoid any material consequence.⁸⁶

There is no doubt the realist in this instance acts out of egoist self-interest because of coercion. Yet, indirectly, legitimacy exerts a pull towards compliance through coercion on realists who do not even view sovereignty as legitimate. In doing so, legitimacy affects the realist's self-interested cost assessment, thereby supporting this essay's normative and effective legitimacy hypotheses. Therefore, since legitimacy can simultaneously interact with realist self-interests and a Liberal alliance, which embraces legitimacy, it is now necessary to transition to an in-depth discussion of Liberal self-interest. Though before we do, the discussion above leads to a second implication: **2nd General Implication** – A legitimate system, deemed so by a sufficient number of members, changes the cost-benefit calculations of all actors within a system but in varying degrees.

Liberalism, like realism, also creates a particular kind of international system. Liberal interests have formed the basic justification for the current rules-based international system. Therefore, it is essential to understand the historical basis of Liberal justifications to understand the standard of legitimacy today. The purpose of this section is to show that general Liberal self-interests pursue cooperation based on moral justification because of their recognition of the benefits of enduring relationships. The introduction of morality into self-interest creates a Liberal link with legitimacy.

Liberal interests are so ingrained into contemporary western governmental structures and regimes it is sometimes difficult to separate Liberal principles and values from interests. This issue is further exacerbated by the effective requirement for Liberal self-interests to be perceived as common interests. The attainment of Liberal self-interests requires others to cooperate. Liberals explicitly associate self-interest with cooperation, whereas realists clearly do not. Therefore, Liberals need others to perceive their self-interests as common to or at least not exclusive of Liberal self-interests.⁸⁷ From a cultural perspective, getting other states to agree on both the existence of rules and

⁸⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence : with a new preface and afterword*: 2.

⁸⁷ Robert Keohane provides a cogent argument of this phenomenon, but is careful to distinguish between "harmony of interests" where cooperation is not necessary and "common interests" where discord is a necessary precondition to cooperation. Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.

cooperative content of the rules is a much higher standard to achieve than for realists. In other words, Liberal interests assume people are not just self-interested but that they also are moral actors. As Walzer asserts and Morgenthau agrees, we live in a moral world, even if it is secular.⁸⁸ This requirement necessarily introduces the need to educate others and convince them of what is good and right. Liberals' primary appeal in this case is to the moral rightness of their position, based on rational deduction of the laws of nature or God, not a reaction to the consequences of the state of nature.⁸⁹ As a result, Liberal self-interests relate more closely to legitimacy than realist self-interests, because Liberals assume morality is secular and value the benefits of enduring relationships.

Individual Liberal theorists, like realists, vary their emphasis within the four varieties of state interests: security, autonomy, welfare, and honor. However, Liberalism is a domestic theory with a moral component, and as such, Liberals project domestic interests and moral values into international politics.⁹⁰ This projection brings moral oughtness and implied legitimacy because of their derived source. Thus, Liberals more readily transfer all three of Weber's modes of social control from domestic politics into the international system. Once again, legitimacy relates more closely to Liberal self-interests than to realist self-interests.

Liberals can thus pursue cooperation as an end because they do not believe in a constant state of war, but rather in a heterogeneous state of war and peace.⁹¹ The Liberal allowance for an existing state of peace establishes the purpose, time frame, and implications of Liberal interests, differentiating them from those of realists. Liberals prioritize their national interests based on the current environmental state: war or peace. For Liberals, war is defined in the Clausewitzian sense, as active violent conflict with a declaration of intent.⁹² Absent active war, the international environment is at peace. Peace involves competition for wealth, honor, and cultural influence without expecting to

⁸⁸ Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*: 20; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf; [distributed by Random House, 1972), 217, in Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 168, 242.

⁸⁹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 216-17.

⁹⁰ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 405; Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 208.

⁹¹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 210.

⁹² Carl von Clausewitz et al., *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75-76; Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 218.

have to resolve competition through war.⁹³ In times of peace, Liberals essentially assume survival and autonomy, and more willingly accept mutual gains instead of fearing relative gains. Liberal self-interests aim for future cooperation with others, which requires justification and predictability of future behavior. Institutions and international laws are both used to provide justification for and predictability within international politics.

Moral justifications, whether secular or religious, form the foundation of Liberal self-interests. John Locke, the founder of modern individualism, and utilitarian Jeremy Bentham provide Liberal foundations of international law and representative government today.⁹⁴ Locke explicitly countered Hobbes's assertion that free men would choose a Leviathan and remain in a state of war. Yet, the recognition of universal human rights on one hand presented a constant tension with national prudence on the other. Ultimately, Locke sought to delegitimize any form of absolute rule and to legitimize representative government.⁹⁵ The United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank and International Monetary Fund are all examples of Liberal institutions that regulate international relations through formal international law. International law and representative government have formed the Liberal understanding of process legitimacy, the essay's first hypothesis. Additionally, equality or human rights along with security and welfare are the criteria of Liberal measures of effective legitimacy, the essay's third hypothesis.

The US Declaration of Independence and Constitution both attempt to maintain the balance between individual rights and prudent government. The former states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."⁹⁶ This highlights how Liberal interests such as equal rights were a founding principle of the US and remain central to US identity. In light of this, it is tragic that equal civil rights were not realized until after the Civil War and Civil Rights Movements. Additionally, the Constitution aids national prudence through both the separation of the power to declare and make war, as well as by the requirement to get

⁹³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 210.

⁹⁴ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 206.

⁹⁵ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 216.

⁹⁶ The US Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html, accessed 17 March 2013.

consent for war from the House of Representatives. Article I, Section 8 of the US constitution gives congress the power “to declare war,” but Article II, Section 2 reserves the right to make war for the President, the Commander in Chief.⁹⁷ The Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on the War Powers Act of 1973 is an important recognition of the need for governmental prudence in matters of war.

Immanuel Kant represents the synthesis of Liberal interests and sees them best met in a community. Kant focuses Liberalism on international interactions and extends Liberal theory beyond Locke’s individualism to international politics, while incorporating Smith and Schumpeter’s market-based interdependence.⁹⁸ Methodologically, Kant asserts that a theory of the systemic relation of states cannot be isolated from the varieties of state behavior.⁹⁹ Kant predicts an ever-widening pacific union of Liberal states, now revisited as Doyle’s Democratic Peace Theory (DPT).¹⁰⁰ DPT requires three necessary and fully sufficient conditions to provide lasting peace among Liberal states. Republican representation, Liberal respect, and transnational interdependence constitute three causes that combine to create peace-prone relations between Liberal states. The causes address constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan law sources, respectively.¹⁰¹ The effects of these conditions are institutional restraint, principled respect, and a shared commercial interest.¹⁰² In essence, Kant builds from Locke’s domestic principle of equality and human rights by extending the norm to principled equal rights of all Liberal peoples. Cosmopolitan law adds material incentives and economic interdependence to restrain war against other Liberal states. Finally, requiring the consent of the citizens to embark on a war places constraints on a representative government’s capacity for aggressive policy.¹⁰³ In this sense, Kant’s self-interests are intertwined with Liberal values, but are the *promotion* of representative governance, equal or non-discriminatory human rights, and free-trade or market economics. Promoting common interests becomes enlightened self-

⁹⁷ Linda R. Monk, *The Words We Live By : Your Annotated Guide to the Constitution* (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 21, 63.

⁹⁸ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 252.

⁹⁹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 254.

¹⁰⁰ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 253-58, 77-300.

¹⁰¹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 284.

¹⁰² Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 295.

¹⁰³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 279-82.

interest for Liberals. Kant's DPT supports this essay's second hypothesis and its effect on domestic and allied coherence.

Robert Keohane and G. John Ikenberry are modern theorists who present Neoliberal arguments that derive from Locke and Kant, respectively. Both forward contemporary Liberal arguments founded on the assumption of a realist definition of self-interest.¹⁰⁴ They each advocate for institutionalism or international regimes by arguing that institutions are in the self-interest of a current or waning hegemon because they facilitate enduring cooperation, even after the demise of the hegemon.¹⁰⁵

Keohane's argument is much more in line with the Lockean character, achieving cooperation through discord and within the constraints of formal processes and rules. Keohane's argument is limited to interactions between advanced market-economy countries on friendly political terms.¹⁰⁶ This meets Kant's interdependence condition or shared commercial interest effect, but not the other two requirements for pacific union. Keohane argues that the discord of differing self-interests motivates policy adjustments and ultimately cooperation. Regimes, which include international institutions, are mechanisms for cooperation because they apply politically consequential intermediate injunctions that are sufficiently significant to influence the behavior of states, resulting in cooperation.¹⁰⁷ Thus Locke and Keohane's arguments each support this essay's first hypothesis, that of procedural legitimacy. In essence, they espouse a method to conduct interaction change, as laid out in the discussion of grand strategy.

Ikenberry takes on a much larger problem that involves all states in the international system, by recommending constitutional order and constraints, which practically implies Kant's community. He emphasizes how Liberal hegemons exercise strategic restraint by binding themselves with institutions to reassure weaker partners' security concerns while acquiring long-term advantages and order for themselves.

¹⁰⁴ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: xiv-xv; Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*: 7-10, 13; Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 10-11.

¹⁰⁵ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 27-32; Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*: 51-64; Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 78-79, 270, 73.

¹⁰⁶ Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*: 6.

¹⁰⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*: 59.

Ikenberry identifies the Liberal self-interests of free-markets, cooperative security, and a rules-based order.¹⁰⁸ In Ikenberry's view, states promote international institutions as secondary interests because they are necessary to achieve primary self-interests. For Ikenberry, institutions create a constitutional order that is inherently legitimate because secondary states agree on their own to abide by the rules of the order.¹⁰⁹ By closely associating Liberal institutions with inherent legitimacy, Ikenberry links Liberal self-interests and legitimacy. Kant and Ikenberry's arguments each support this essay's second hypothesis, that of normative legitimacy. In addition, Ikenberry's discussion of designing and creating an international system is the highest form of grand strategy because its aim is continuing political advantage through structural design.

If all states apply general Liberal assumptions of self-interest but do not redefine the Self to include the Other, the international environment would be a Lockean state of peace and war. Cooperation is increased over the Hobbesian state, but does not approach the Kantian state of cooperation. Locke's individual liberty reinforces the international principles of sovereignty and equality.¹¹⁰ As a result, much of today's international politics assumes a Lockean culture of self-interested individualists in a partially self-help system, but one that recognizes and respects other states' sovereignty. This makes states rivals as opposed to Hobbesian enemies. Additionally, the respect of others' sovereignty leads to status quo interests, self-restraint, and cooperation against common threats. In this sense, the Lockean culture is partly an "other-help" system as well.¹¹¹

In sum, the purpose of Liberal self-interests is the realization of the natural laws, natural rights, and duties. They spring from moral foundations, secular and religious, to create society in times of peace, based on a longer-term view of relationships and shared ideas about rules of interaction. However, man must overcome the state of war to achieve those rights. To do this, men come together and make agreements they must keep, requiring trust. Society (and its relationships for that matter) is about securing life in a way that creates a more conducive environment for exercising liberty and pursuing

¹⁰⁸ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 32; Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.

¹⁰⁹ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 52 n4.

¹¹⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 285, 96.

¹¹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 296.

property.¹¹² The heterogeneous state of war and peace relieves the immediate pressure felt by realists and allows Liberals to take a longer view of self-interests. Liberals consider principles, norms, and rules as the primary means of international politics outside of war. As a result, Liberal self-interests both possess and require a greater degree of legitimacy than purely egoist self-interests. This raises another relevant question in terms of why Liberal states develop different self-interests than realist states. Ultimately, where do interests come from and how do they relate to Liberal and realist identities?

Social constructivists have a much shorter tradition of academic theorizing about international relations than either realists or Liberals. As a result, the views of Alexander Wendt in his *Social Theory of International Politics* will represent the constructivist view of self-interest. The constructivist definition aligns with the definition of egoist self-interest adopted at the beginning of the discussion because the chosen definition was derived partly from Wendt. Yet, constructivism goes deeper, locating the root of self-interest in a conception of identity. In other words, it is not possible to understand self-interest without understanding the Self, and its instrumental use of the Other.¹¹³ Wendt asserts that culture actually shapes self-interests itself.¹¹⁴ Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content, so will interests.¹¹⁵ Additionally, interests are variable because the boundaries of the Self are variable.¹¹⁶ The potential international systems consistent with constructivism's tenets are various; however, once formed they are more difficult to change than a realist or Hobbesian system.¹¹⁷

The constructivist definition of self-interest constitutes an assault on the tragic implications of the realist definition and its resulting Hobbesian state of war. In fact, realists do not escape external behavioral influences, nor do they claim to.¹¹⁸ The system

¹¹² Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 4-6.

¹¹³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 240.

¹¹⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 268.

¹¹⁵ Wildavsky, "Journal of theoretical politics," 131-59, in Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 231.

¹¹⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 243.

¹¹⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 271, 87-88.

¹¹⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 95-96.

exerts dominant influence on the state's behavior.¹¹⁹ But, as Locke describes and Wendt shows, anarchy does not create a singular structural influence, nor is it even the dominant influence all the time.¹²⁰ By placing identity prior to self-interest, constructivism is saying that there may be a way out of realism's trap. Wendt states, "The question, however, is not whether there are pressures on states to be self-interested – there are – but whether states are capable ever of transcending those pressures and expanding the boundaries of the Self to include Others."¹²¹ Wendt goes on, "This they might do initially for self-interested reasons, but if over time the identification becomes internalized, such that a group of states learns to think of itself as a 'We,' then its members will no longer be self-interested relative to each other with respect for the issues that define the group."¹²² Despite human beings' biological bias toward self-interest, they are social and would likely have never formed societies were they always egoistically self-interested.¹²³ Wendt asserts not only that collective identities are possible, but that "the vast majority of states today see themselves as part of a 'society of states' whose norms they adhere to not because of ongoing self-interested calculations that it is good for them as individual states, but because they have internalized and identify with them."¹²⁴ The constructivist definition of self-interest, especially the potentially more collective redefinition of the Self, opens another theoretic door to Kant's Liberal Pacific Union and Doyle's DPT. In doing so, constructivism reinforces the bridge between interests and values, strengthening both the normative legitimacy hypothesis and the effective legitimacy hypothesis. This leads to a third general implication:

3rd General Implication – States have a choice about their self-interests and the level of cooperation they associate with self-interest. States can choose to be egoist and pursue unilateral interests, or to incorporate varying degrees of respect for others up to and including community and multilateral interests.

¹¹⁹ K.N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 2001), Chapters 6 and 7, 159-223; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹²⁰ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 216-19; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 309.

¹²¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 241.

¹²² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 241-42.

¹²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 242.

¹²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 242-43.

In sum, self-interests are not generic "interests" in the sense of choosing any means to achieve goals. Self-interests are a subjective belief about how to meet one's needs, such as security and welfare. Realist self-interests are egoistic because they take an instrumental attitude toward other actors and toward rules. Many diverse models of human behavior accept that actors pursue "interests," but they disagree on whether they are "self-interested" in this strong sense. The distinction is essential, because the difference between self-interest and legitimacy comes in competing accounts of how interests are formed and associated with identity, not in whether actors pursue goals. Without this difference, there is no behavior that could possibly contradict the self-interest hypothesis.¹²⁵ Now it is time to expound upon the legitimacy hypothesis.

Legitimacy

What is the role that legitimacy plays as a mode of social control in the exercise of power? David Beetham provides a cogent beginning to the answer that touches upon each of the four necessary preconditions for legitimacy. "Where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate."¹²⁶ Implicit in his answer is a relationship or plurality. Obviously, power is the subject of Beetham's statement. The introduction of power to relationship elicits rules of mutual understanding for continued interactions. Finally, the rules must possess some moral, or ideational, justification that influences the behavior calculation of at least one member of the relationship, either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the four elemental building blocks of legitimacy are relationship, power, rules, and morality. Anywhere these four preconditions exist, so does legitimacy. Therefore, legitimacy is a means to reconcile disputes over the rightful application of power through rules in society.

Legitimacy exists as a concept because power is highly problematic and a recurrent feature of human societies.¹²⁷ Legitimacy both constrains power and is an element of power.¹²⁸ Therefore, legitimate rules define rightful conduct for all members of society governing their interactions to prevent exploitation by powerful citizens and

¹²⁵ Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 387; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 224-45.

¹²⁶ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 3.

¹²⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 3.

¹²⁸ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 20.

promote compliance amongst the others.¹²⁹ In this way, society and the power relations within it are necessary to make sense of the concept of legitimacy. In essence, legitimacy lies at the heart of what constitutes a given society because legitimacy is the glue that holds a given society together.¹³⁰ This is true of both domestic and international societies;¹³¹ however, legitimacy says nothing about the values of the society it constitutes, only that through shared ideas rules are formed and agreed upon to govern the interactions in that society.¹³²

Consequently, the influence of legitimacy as a mode of social control derives from how it defines membership in society and rightful conduct within that society.¹³³ Further, rightful conduct is based on conformity to rules that must be justified by their source and content. Finally, compliance with the rules through expressed or contractual consent is both the result of moral obligation as well as a legitimating source for the entire system of power relations within the society.¹³⁴ As a result, legitimacy reinforces power, but is dependent upon morality to do so. Herein lays the strength of legitimacy, but also its limits of influence, which is its potential for justifiability. Nevertheless, before dismissing the utility of legitimacy in grand strategy due to its moral limitations, it should be recognized that human beings are both rational and moral agents who seek to ensure that their social relations provide for their material needs while conforming to their moral sense.¹³⁵

Morality's role in human relationship is a complimentary concept to all but purely material realist thought. In the Kantian philosophical tradition, morality is a belief schema under the heading of Reason that guides rules of social interaction.¹³⁶ Morality is not religion, though religion is a form of morality. Traditionally, realists recognize some level of operative rules in society, even if those rules promote or justify force. Morgenthau affirms morality's relation to power: "The confidence in the stability of the

¹²⁹ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 13, 22-50.

¹³⁰ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5.

¹³¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: Part II, 117-242; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 11-30.

¹³² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 251.

¹³³ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 26-29.

¹³⁴ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 95.

¹³⁵ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 22.

¹³⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 129-30.

modern state system...derives...not from the balance of power, but from a number of elements, intellectual and moral in nature, upon which both the balance of power and the stability of the modern state system repose."¹³⁷ The balance of power in the Cold War that produced stability was not dependent on material power alone. Next, it is necessary to declare and explain a full definition of legitimacy.

The synthesized definition of legitimacy for this essay is a political property, spectral in nature, interpreted through perception, of rightness or oughtness, which induces compliance and self-restraint through shared morality, exercised explicitly and implicitly.¹³⁸ In its simplest statement, legitimacy is the congruence of rules and morality, reinforced through events. The purpose or intended effect of legitimacy is the acceptance of a system of power, commonly called society - society is a system of power. This requires some additional explanation.

As a political concept and like all political concepts, the application of legitimacy is contextual within a particular society.¹³⁹ From a social science perspective, different political structures removed in time and place can possess differing degrees of legitimacy. Yet, from the political philosopher's perspective, each case can be evaluated from a common kind of criteria.¹⁴⁰ Politics can be primary to morality, or ignore morality altogether.¹⁴¹ However, for any political system to move beyond the exclusive use of coercion requires morality as the instrument of legitimacy. Legitimacy and

¹³⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace*: 217 in Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 168-69.

¹³⁸ This definition's basis is a confluence of conceptual extensions from David Beetham, Thomas Franck, Ian Clark, Andrew Hurrell, Martha Finnemore, and Alexander Wendt. Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*; Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16-18; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*; Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 29; Finnemore, Martha, "Fights about rules: the role of efficacy and power in changing multilateralism", 201-202, in J. D. Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

¹³⁹ Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 29 in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*; Lundestad, Geir, "Introduction", xv, in Symposium Nobel and Geir Lundestad (ed.), "The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy" (Oslo; New York, 1994); Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 13-14.

¹⁴⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 14.

¹⁴¹ Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939 : an introduction to the study of international relations* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 19.

coercion are opposites. Legitimacy produces a willingness to comply with rules or to accept a political order even if this goes against specific interests at specific times.¹⁴²

To say that legitimacy is spectral in nature is to say that it is a matter of degree. Power is legitimate to the extent that it complies with the three conditions Beetham lays out: rules conformity, rules justifiability, and legitimation through consent.¹⁴³ Each will be expounded upon later. Thomas Franck expresses this idea by associating the degree of a rule's legitimacy with the extent a rule exerts a "compliance pull", or obligation, on those it addresses.¹⁴⁴ For now, it is only necessary to identify that legitimacy has multiple distinct conditions, each of which is necessary, but none of which are sufficient.

Perception does not play a central role in the overall argument; however, it must be addressed in greater depth than just supporting the argument requires because of the common belief that perception is the dominant element of legitimacy. As in the established definition, to say that someone interprets legitimacy through perception is to say that perception informs and shapes judgment about legitimacy, but legitimacy is not perception itself. Acknowledging the role of perception in legitimacy is necessary, but risks convolution. The common cliché that perception is reality is an aphorism for some, but it is an oversimplification. Instead, perception and misperception in legitimacy is analogous to Robert Jervis's landmark association he addresses in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, legitimacy is subject to the cognitive processes explained by Jervis. This is not a theme that can be developed at any length here, but relating the role of perception to legitimacy, as Jervis did to international relations, is necessary to place the role of perception in context.

This argument takes Beetham's position on relating perception and legitimacy, in contrast to Max Weber's commonly accepted definition. Weber asserts legitimacy is simply the "belief in legitimacy" on the part of the relevant social agents; and power relations are legitimate where those involved in them, subordinate as well as dominant,

¹⁴² Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 16 in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

¹⁴³ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 15-20.

¹⁴⁴ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16, 19, Chapter 3, 41-49.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

believe them to be so.¹⁴⁶ This definition makes legitimacy a purely social construction, devoid of any material attribute. As Beetham rightfully points out, Weber's definition is reductionist because "it leaves the social scientist with no adequate means of explaining *why* [my emphasis] people acknowledge the legitimacy of power at one time or place and not another."¹⁴⁷ The consequence of Weber's definition precludes any predictive or explanatory capacity for *why* people stop treating power as legitimate. Beetham founds his disagreement on two fundamental points that are necessary to summarize because they are relevant to the grand strategy argument throughout that takes issue with a lack of congruence between the current system of power and the beliefs, values, and expectations that provide its justification.

First, the Weberian definition misrepresents the relationship between legitimacy and people's beliefs. "A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be *justified in terms of their beliefs* [original author's emphasis]." The distinction is not trivial. As Beetham continues, one essential component of assessing the legitimacy of a regime, or political order, is the assessment of how far the system can be justified in terms of citizen's beliefs, how it conforms to their values, and how far it satisfies their normative expectations.¹⁴⁸ As a result, a failure does not come from a lack of "belief in legitimacy," but instead from a system's inability to deliver what the people believe in. The "what" that the people want delivered is often material. Here perception does have a role, but the role is only one part of judging legitimacy, not constituting legitimacy. We can disagree about whether something *is* legitimate, without disagreeing *what* legitimacy is.

Secondly, the Weberian definition ignores the elements of legitimacy that are not about beliefs at all.¹⁴⁹ Actions such as whether power is acquired and exercised within the law are judicial determinations, not people's beliefs. In addition, consensual actions are important to legitimacy, not because they are evidence of belief, but because the actions actually confer additional legitimacy by contributing to making power legitimate. Actions confer legitimacy through the public demonstration of subordinate consent to the

¹⁴⁶ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 6.

¹⁴⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 10.

¹⁴⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 10-12.

¹⁴⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 12.

power relationship, and “through the resulting obligations that derive from them on the part of both dominant and subordinate alike.”¹⁵⁰ The public act of consent possesses simultaneously a symbolic and a normative force.¹⁵¹ So, this argument asserts that perception takes a Jervisian role in legitimacy to inform and shape judgments about legitimacy, but legitimacy is not constituted by perception.

Further unpacking the definition of legitimacy leads one to believe its means are the rightness or oughtness for the rules of the system.¹⁵² Power needs legitimation to overcome three negative components of the dominant and subordinate relationship. First, there is a palpable difference between the dominant and subordinate with respect to quality of life, potential scope of purposes, and capacity to achieve those purposes. Second, these inequalities are interrelated through the system such that the expanded powers of the dominant are achieved at the expense of the subordinate. Third, the power relationship necessarily restricts the freedom of the subordinate.¹⁵³ As a result, dominant and subordinate groups interact to substantiate the rightness and oughtness of the rules, ranging from establishing and contesting the authoritative sources of the rules to evaluating the effective content of the rules.¹⁵⁴

The purpose of legitimacy is to induce societal compliance and self-restraint through shared ideas of relationship, or morality. Compliance and self-restraint exert a pull on both the dominant and subordinate. However, there are important distinctions between the dominant and subordinate in the mechanisms of enforcement and the implications for breaching the rules.

Legitimate power is always limited power.¹⁵⁵ Limitations on the dominant are one of the primary reasons the subordinates continue to provide un-coerced consent. The legitimate exercise of power, by definition, is valid according to the rules and the rules themselves are justifiable by and in conformity with shared norms and beliefs.¹⁵⁶ So, when the powerful breach the rules, or act illegitimately, and refuse to consent to the

¹⁵⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 12.

¹⁵¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 12.

¹⁵² Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 15-21; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 2, 7, 25-29; Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16-19.

¹⁵³ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 56-63.

¹⁵⁴ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: Chapter 3, 64-99.

¹⁵⁵ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 35.

¹⁵⁶ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 35.

rules, they delegitimize the very system that legitimates their own power. Again, Beetham provides a guide with two basic kinds of limits on the powerful.

The first limit on the powerful, as already alluded to above, are the rules of the system that determine the powers of the powerful, regardless of level or formality. The rules could be constitutional or legal in nature or could be customary or conventional. One example of a breach of this nature would be the powerful imposing a new obligation on subordinates without warning or consultation.

The second kind of limit on the powerful is the requirement to respect and protect the basic principles of moral justification that underpin the system. For example, rulers who claimed the divine right to rule were then required to respect religious traditions and defer to religious authorities.¹⁵⁷ However, it is worth emphasizing the powerful typically possess the greatest degree of control over material resources, including the instruments of law enforcement within society. There exists no higher physical authority to punish, coerce, or physically stop the powerful in government from breaking the rules. So, while the powerful can break the rules, they typically don't because the rules also sustain their power. Rules accountability associated with each societal role induces compliance, not coercion, for domestic governments. This provides a powerful linkage for the behavioral influence of legitimacy between domestic governments and states acting within the anarchic international system.

The way requirements and self-restraints work to limit the freedom of subordinates is more intuitive because most of us are not rulers and live with it daily. Still, it is important to remember that legitimacy requires freedom from coercion.¹⁵⁸ Subordinates comply because they believe in the source of authority and the justifiability of the content, such as serving the common interest.¹⁵⁹ For example, the use of seat belts was not common practice in the US in the early 1980's, measured at fourteen percent in 1984.¹⁶⁰ The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration December 2011 research note identifies that usage rates increased from fifty-eight percent in 1994 to eighty-five

¹⁵⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 35-36.

¹⁵⁸ Felix E. Oppenheim, *Political concepts, a reconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 94.

¹⁵⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 72.

¹⁶⁰ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Buckle Up Now, *sTEPs to Achieving a High Belt Use Rate*, 1, www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/enforcement/pdf/achieving.pdf, accessed 7 May 2013.

percent in 2010.¹⁶¹ What caused the dramatic increase usage rates? New seat belt laws and enforcement certainly played a major role, but did you buckle up today because you were afraid of a ticket? Or, did you buckle up because there is a law, passed by a duly elected representative government, for the common safety of its citizens? Likely, you buckled up without much thought. In other words, the seat belt law was initially a nuisance, but the law coerced compliance. Then, wearing a seatbelt became consciously self-interested because of a common belief about safety. Now, the vast majority of citizens comply with the implicitly legitimate seatbelt law voluntarily. It is worth noting, that a segment of the population, fifteen percent in this example, still require coercion to comply. The entire population will not internalize the legitimacy of a rule because the currency of power is not the same for all relations.¹⁶² However, after the initial phase of coercion, necessary to encourage compliance with the new rule, coercion can become an unnecessary expense and become counterproductive to the authority's legitimacy. This example leads to the final concept integrated into the definition of legitimacy, the explicit and implicit exercise of rules into legitimate norms.

The process by which a principle, rule, or norm progresses from explicit to implicit occurs through a theoretical construct laid out by Alexander Wendt. Wendt's three cultures of anarchy and degrees of internalization were used to introduce the modes of social control framework. It will now serve to conclude the discussion on legitimacy and relate all three modes of social control discussed above. Wendt provides a path to tie all the concepts discussed and defined throughout this chapter, while linking them back to the thesis and grand strategy.

Wendt characterizes the process of explicit to implicit rule normalization as progressing through three different degrees, not stages, of internalization, which yields corresponding hypotheses.¹⁶³ Wendt uses the three hypotheses, following language from the English School, to associate culture and its primary behavioral influence mechanism within each culture: Hobbesian anarchy, realism, force or coercion, and enemy; Lockean

¹⁶¹ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Buckle Up Now, *sTEPs to Achieving a High Belt Use Rate*, 1, www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/enforcement/pdf/achieving.pdf, accessed 7 May 2013.

¹⁶² Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 379.

¹⁶³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 249, 68.

anarchy, Neoliberalism or rationalist, price or inducements, and rival; and Kantian anarchy, constructivism, legitimacy, and friend.¹⁶⁴

At the first level of internalization of a cultural norm; actors know what the norm is, but comply only if coerced. It is like someone thrown into a gladiator arena and forced into Hobbes' environment of war. The person does not want to fight to the death, but is coerced into killing or being killed. In the second level of internalizing a cultural norm, an actor knows what the norm is and chooses to follow it out of self-interest.¹⁶⁵ This could represent the gladiator who fights the unlucky "volunteer." Here, the gladiator chooses to fight to the death for his own motives, perhaps glory or profit. The third degree of internalization is a little more difficult to show for a violent society, but there are still empirical examples. At this level, the cultural norm is not followed because of gain or interest, but instead is voluntarily followed because the actor "fully accepts the rules claims on himself, which means appropriating as a subjectively held identity the role in which they have been positioned by the generalized Others."¹⁶⁶ Recall generals in Spartan society. They desired to end their lives as they had lived, in service to Sparta. As a result, upon reaching older age, Spartan generals would place themselves at the front of the battle with the intent to perish in battle, the ultimate service to Sparta. Now, what is important here is that the desire to die in battle was not coerced by force. It also was not in pursuit of enduring glory, though that was true. The desire came from accepting the legitimacy of their position in society and acting in accordance with that role's expectations. Interestingly, when a leader of Spartan society acted this way, his actions reinforced the whole system of legitimacy, even for the subordinate. Service to Sparta through the military was Sparta's foundational morality and justification for its rules.

At last, with coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy fully defined, it is time to relate this discussion back to the overall argument. The purpose of this chapter has been to relate these modes of social control to the concepts of US power, hegemony, and the current international order. This can best be done by completing the underlying theme of Wendt's three cultures of anarchy and his three degrees of internalization to identify its implication for the international order.

¹⁶⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: Chapter 6, 246-312.

¹⁶⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 268-72.

¹⁶⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 272-73.

The essence of Wendt's argument, that only the Hobbesian structure is truly a self-help system, rebukes the idea of a single existing "logic of anarchy."¹⁶⁷ In other words, there is no exclusive logic of anarchy that governs all state interactions at the international level. The key to Wendt's approach, in his words, is "conceptualizing structure in social rather than material terms."¹⁶⁸ The implication is that roles, such as enemy, rival, and friend, are structural positions, not actor or decision-maker beliefs.¹⁶⁹ Thus, "the structure and tendencies of anarchic systems will depend on which of our three roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate those systems, and states will be under corresponding pressure to internalize that role in their identities and interests."¹⁷⁰ In other words, both states' roles and the international system are ongoing processes of practice.

There is no one right practice, ie. Hobbes, Locke, or Kant, but instead the different practices are in competition with one another. "Anarchy is what states make of it."¹⁷¹ Anarchy is a "lack" of rules or "lack" of government to enforce rules. Either way, "anarchy is a nothing, and nothings cannot be structures."¹⁷² Anarchy is an empty vessel in Wendt's words, or a blank slate upon which society can make its own rules. The fact that realism has dominated the last 2,000 years only means that society's rules were based on realism's assumptions and perceived as highly legitimate, with a high degree of agreement about the rules. Conversely, the fact that Liberal democracies cooperate on security or at least have not fought each other for almost two hundred years shows that other societies of anarchy are not only possible, but currently exist today.¹⁷³

A final point on Wendt's framework is that cooperation is not synonymous with legitimacy. Legitimacy is the acceptance of value neutral rules, good or bad, peaceful or violent, just or unjust. Self-interest is the induced acceptance of value neutral rules. And, coercion is forced acceptance of value neutral rules. Cooperation comes from a specific kind of rules; rules that value cooperation as morally right over force being morally right; rules that value the respect of others' sovereignty; rules that value peace

¹⁶⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 247.

¹⁶⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 249.

¹⁶⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 257-59.

¹⁷⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 259.

¹⁷¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 313.

¹⁷² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 309.

¹⁷³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 258-300.

and negotiation as a means to conflict resolution; rules that value equality in governance through representation; rules that value profit through merit exercised in free markets.

The true value of Wendt's framework to grand strategy is not that it espouses legitimacy over coercion (it does not), but instead that the theory integrates all three modes of social control, based on the degree of societal coherence.¹⁷⁴ Further, by denying a single "logic of anarchy" it shows that states have free choice to determine the international structure and their structural role. Legitimacy alone does not make right, it makes acceptance and coherence. This demonstrates legitimacy's purpose today; the sustainment of a particular *kind* of society, not just any. In other words, to the extent that Liberal states in an alliance are operating as part of a society, they operate according to Kant's Pacific Union and Doyle's DPT, not a realist balance of power. This has profound implications for this essay's argument and the role of legitimacy in creating society, even in an anarchic international environment, to bridge values and interests. This leads to a fourth (and final) general implication:

4th General Implication – The international system is what the states make of it. The structural roles of enemy, rival, and friend are necessary to explain state interactions. Functional differentiation explanations are based on structural role differentiation and roles may be symmetric or asymmetric.¹⁷⁵

It is time to identify some general and specific implications and recapitulate this chapter's contribution to the argument: to make meaning out of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy in light of a US hegemon of Liberal character with an indispensable role in sustaining the stability of the Liberal rules-based international order. Wendt's model accurately interrelates coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy with three societal options and three resulting structural roles: enemy, rival, and friend. The framework and definitions further show that the concept of legitimacy in and of itself is value neutral. US grand strategy needs to reinforce a particular kind of legitimate society because legitimacy does not necessarily equal cooperation. As a fifth fundamental principle of US grand strategy, the US should promote and comply with the current Liberal rules-based society, because it furthers two objectives: first, it maintains domestic and allied

¹⁷⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 250.

¹⁷⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 256.

cohesion because it reinforces Liberal society, which preserves a Liberal balance of power advantage; and second, it provides justifiable ends: institutional restraint, principled respect, and shared commercial interest to unite international consensus on peace and stability through Doyle's DPT. Restating the hypotheses illuminates some additional implications of this chapter's definitions and argument.

Hypothesis 1: *Process Legitimacy increases system sustainability by reducing operating costs.*

Hypothesis 2: *Normative Legitimacy increases sustainability of hegemonic power by constituting the coherence of domestic, allied, and international societies.*

Hypothesis 3: *Effective Legitimacy promotes system stability through public demonstrations of consent, congruence, and utility of the current order.*

Three Additional General Implications:

1. US interests are Liberal in origin and therefore implicitly linked to Liberal values and the legitimacy of the Liberal rules-based international system.
2. Legitimacy is the glue that binds societies, both domestic and international. Most citizens voluntarily comply with legitimate societal rules.
3. Legitimacy will not pull toward compliance equally on all actors (enemy, rival, and friend); thus coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy are all necessary components of any grand strategy.

Implications for Coercion:

1. Egoistic states may only respond to coercion because no level of inducements or justification of rules will satisfy their desire for relative dominance. However, most men and states are both, self-interested and moral, as well as materially and ideationally motivated.
2. As a means of influence, coercion is necessary against enemies, but is only consistent with Liberal character in defense of the accepted principles of sovereignty, peace, equality, and open markets.
3. Coercion is counterproductive in relations with rivals and friends.

Implications for Self-Interest:

1. As a means of influence, inducing self-interest is necessary in dealing with rivals who are not full citizens of the Liberal society.
2. As a means of influence, inducing self-interest is expensive and produces only temporary compliance.

Implications for Legitimacy:

1. Legitimacy preserves power by exerting a pull toward voluntary compliance.
2. Legitimacy exerts a compliance pull on everyone because of shared knowledge of formal and customary rules, whether the rules are agreed upon or not, so long as the society it constitutes is sufficiently powerful. However, the pull acts in differing degrees depending on the degree of internalization of the rules.
3. Legitimacy limits power, so US compliance limits the threat posed by US power. This delegitimizes counterbalancing alliances opposed to the US. It also delegitimizes opposing justifications for international order that do not limit power.

Chapter Two will expound upon the hypotheses to lay out the argument more explicitly. Additionally, Chapter Two will establish a legitimacy framework to evaluate the legitimacy of any international system. Then, in Chapter Three, the framework will be applied to the contemporary international system to determine its present state of legitimacy and to demonstrate that it is more Liberal than not and why. Understanding why the current rules-based system is Liberal and the consequences for illegitimate or delegitimizing behavior can help inform policy makers of the costs and benefits of their future strategic choices.

CHAPTER 2

The Legitimacy Framework

Where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate.

David Beetham

Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.

John F. Kennedy

We will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order until we first form some conception of it.

Henry Kissinger

Legitimacy is necessary in all societies to moderate the exercise of power by one person over others, or by one group over another.¹ As a result, legitimacy is the glue that holds groups or societies together.² It determines whether you are in the group and what the group expects of you to remain in the group.³ The rules-based international order today is no different. There are rules for membership and rules for conduct.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a framework of legitimacy to explain an extra-national system's essence, character, and sources of legitimacy. In the next chapter, the Legitimacy Framework will be applied to explain the contemporary Liberal rules-based international order, illuminate for whom that system is legitimate, and to what degree. The framework will show what principles justify legitimate rules in today's international order and why. This will demonstrate in today's international order how Liberal values create Liberal interests, because as Wendt established, culture precedes interests. The result builds more support for the thesis that legitimacy can provide a foundation for US grand strategy that sustains US power by establishing a conceptual bridge between US interests and values. Further, this process helps to identify the limits of legitimacy by connecting the current international order to those states which will naturally internalize the principles, rules, and norms to the level of Wendt's third degree

¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 3.

² Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 19-25.

³ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 26-29; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London; New York: Routledge, 1992), 252.

and those who will only do so to the second degree level or not at all. The chapter is organized by first showing, through Ian Clark's work, how legitimacy and society are formed together. Second, David Beetham's basic framework for explaining the legitimacy of a domestic society will be extended with the help of Clark and Thomas Franck's work on legitimacy to the international system of states and society within that system.

It should be no surprise that Liberal nations will find a high degree of legitimacy in the contemporary international order; after all, they were the dominant actors in its construction and are the primary sustainers. The Liberal rules-based international order actually constitutes a Liberal society of states. However, other states accept the legitimacy of the order to varying degrees, based on their belief in the justification of the principles, rules, and norms. In combination, states accept the order based on how they answer the question: "Does the system accommodate my state and meet my interests?" The former belief establishes an upper bound for any potential degree of internalization, while the latter question forms the minimum threshold for state acquiescence to the order. If a system of power rules fails to meet minimum requirements of a state's basic security and welfare interests, the state will employ subversive tactics or attempt revolutionary changes to modify the existing order.⁴ The principles of the current rules-based international order, as identified in Chapter One are: peace, sovereignty, open markets, and equality. The general state interests established in Chapter One are: security, autonomy, welfare, and honor. Before amplifying Ian Clark's argument about legitimacy denoting international society, it is necessary to introduce the full framework of Legitimacy.

The purpose of the framework is to establish the *degree* and *type* of legitimacy structure in the international system to assess the degree of societal coherence and to identify sub-groups more closely bound within the society. Thus the framework will help discern overall international order stability, and the order's influence on the coherence of US domestic and allied populations. The framework addresses the heart of the questions solicited by the three hypotheses of this study.

⁴ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 186-210.

The framework is comprised of first and second order principles. The first order principles, prerequisites to constituting international society, are rightful membership and rightful conduct.⁵ They are necessary to establish legitimacy as a fundamental property of international society. The second order principles, compliance, justification, and legitimation, are useful to evaluate a system's degree of legitimacy and characterize the contextually specific type of legitimacy. The framework I describe is laid out as follows:

I) International System Legitimacy Framework

Purpose: To establish the degree and type of legitimacy structure in the international system; to assess the degree of societal coherence; and to identify (the core of society or) the coherence of the powerful sub-groups within the society

II) First Order Principles: Constituting International Society

Purpose: To establish legitimacy as a property of international society by identifying its constitutive qualities⁶

1. Rightful membership

2. Rightful conduct

III) Second Order Principles: Evaluating System Legitimacy

Purpose: To establish the legitimacy condition of a given society and its resultant coherence, categorized by type and measured in degree; to identify (the core of society or) the coherence of the powerful sub-groups within the society

1. Rules and compliance (legal validity) – Process legitimacy hypothesis⁷

a. Constitutional codes and principles

b. International law

i. Formal

ii. Customary

2. Justifiability of rules (shared beliefs) – Normative legitimacy hypothesis⁸

⁵ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5, 24-29.

⁶ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5, 24-29.

⁷ Adapted from Beetham, compliance was chosen as the category title by the author instead of Beetham's term, conformity because it better represents the author's concept. In addition, my use of this category is more encompassing than Beetham. Whereas Beetham uses conformity to locate the role of rules in legitimacy (he equates with legalism), I intend the compliance section to incorporate the entire rule-making process. In other words, the Justifiability section is the source of beliefs, but the compliance section is both the process how beliefs are translated into rules, and the rules themselves. Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*.

- a. Authoritative Sources
 - i. External
 - ii. Internal
- b. Content
 - i. Differentiation
 - ii. Common interests

3. Legitimation of the system of rules (actualization of the order) – Effective legitimacy hypothesis

- a. Expressed consent⁹
 - i. Electoral
 - ii. Contractual
 - iii. Mobilization or expressive
- b. Rules-Values (particular rule justification) congruence¹⁰
 - i. Selective application
 - ii. Incoherent effects (intentional and unintentional)
- c. Utility¹¹
 - i. Policy success
 - ii. Accommodation

The model acts like a cybernetic feedback loop, but in an open system, wherein compliance, justification, and legitimation interact by exchanging inputs and outputs that reinforce or modify the others. Its components interact and react to external inputs through a many-sided implicit cross-referencing process. This process describes the way a legitimate order conducts “interaction changes” as Robert Gilpin labels the process in *War and Change in World Politics*.¹²

First Order Principles: Constituting International Society

Hedley Bull asserted in *The Anarchical Society*, “A society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a

⁸ This is the only section taken directly from Beetham without modification of categorization or content. Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*.

⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*.

¹⁰ Rules-Values congruence is added by the author to Beetham’s domestic model. It is similar to, but distinct from Franck’s coherence.

¹¹ Effectiveness is added by the author to Beetham’s domestic model.

¹² Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.

society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions.”¹³ This is an outstanding description of an international society, but Bull stops short of identifying a unifying theoretical concept to link the elements described. This is likely because Bull’s primary interest, responding to realists, is simply to show that “international society” exists in spite of the anarchic environment of the international system, defined as a lack of international hierarchical government order possessing the means of law enforcement.¹⁴ As a result, Bull emphasizes examples of shared ideas as evidence of order in international society, such as a sense of common interests, rules that sustain common goals and institutions that make rules effective.¹⁵ In contemporary society, circa 1977, the shared ideas Bull emphasized were a balance of power, international law, diplomacy, and war – fundamental elements that constitute international society.¹⁶ It seems Bull’s explanation would be strengthened by placing his evidence and description within a theoretical framework. Ian Clark provides a theory where “[c]ore principles of legitimacy offer the possibility of a more parsimonious theory of international society.”¹⁷

Establishing an international society is an appropriate foundation to begin explaining the legitimacy framework because legitimacy has no obvious basis except in a community or society.¹⁸ In essence, legitimacy lies at the heart of what constitutes a given society because legitimacy is the glue that binds a given society together.¹⁹ This is true of both domestic and international societies.²⁰ Additionally, Beetham’s model of legitimacy serves as the predominant framework in this essay for explaining a given society’s degree of legitimacy and type of legitimacy regime, but was conceived by

¹³ Hedley Bull, Stanley Hoffmann, and Andrew Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 13.

¹⁴ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010), 114-16.

¹⁵ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 51-73.

¹⁶ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8.

¹⁷ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 7.

¹⁸ Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 26; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5-7.

¹⁹ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5.

²⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: Part II, 117-242; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 11-30; Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 13-15, 225.

Beetham as a domestic state model.²¹ Clark's theory connects Beetham's model to the international level because it shows international society is only possible through its legitimacy. Some scholars have asserted that international society is not possible because government is necessary for society. This is false, mainly because rules compliance at the international level is precisely the phenomenon that needs explaining, in light of the lack of monopoly of force available to enforce rules.²² Thomas Franck unequivocally states that the concept of legitimacy developed in the national context is adaptable to international usage.²³ Clark's theory therefore explains the *nature* of society, while Beetham's model explains the *character* of a society.

There are two core principles of legitimacy that constitute international society, rightful membership and rightful conduct.²⁴ The principles not only explain what society's nature is, they explain what it is not. International society is not merely a moral and legal framework. International society is a political framework based on a commitment to a politically contested and consensually mediated application of rules, norms, and commitments by dominant, peer, and member states.²⁵ Society's rules also make judgments about who is a citizen and who is not.

Rightful Membership

The first order principle of rightful membership determines citizenship within society. It answers the question: who has a right to have rights?²⁶ It is desirable to be a member of the group because membership confers status, with socially recognizable privileges and duties.²⁷ The benefits derived from the status of membership are the ultimate motivator of conformist behavior.²⁸ That international society discriminates on the basis of membership is clear.²⁹ Withholding membership marginalizes the outsider's

²¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 6.

²² Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 13-17.

²³ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 21.

²⁴ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 6.

²⁵ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 7.

²⁶ Jean-Marc Coicaud and David Ames Curtis, *Legitimacy and Politics : A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 252. in; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 26.

²⁷ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 38.

²⁸ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 38.

²⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 75.

influence and importance within the society.³⁰ For example, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries Western Christendom still constituted a Christian international society. Christian societies at this time had a strong sense of differentiation from other cultures, especially the Ottomans.³¹ Even as Christendom was disintegrating, natural-law thinkers like Grotius, who implied that international society might ultimately dispense with its Christian foundations, upheld the distinction that relations between Christian powers were unique and separate from those outside the society.³² This was because each side, both the Europeans and the Ottomans, regarded the other as too alien to normalize rules of political and economic interaction between them.³³ Acknowledging the other group as a legitimate member of society implied rights that neither side wanted to grant the other. Consequently, society creates recognition tests because inclusion requires reciprocity.

Recognition tests for entry into an international society are based on conformity to a specific type identity criterion, which discriminates between forms of state.³⁴ The international principle of sovereignty provides a clear example. Sovereignty, by its nature, implies reciprocity. States claiming sovereignty for themselves must also and simultaneously acknowledge another state's sovereignty for their own to have any real meaning.³⁵ Ever since the Peace of Westphalia functionally rescinded the authority of the universal church, sovereignty has thus been a fundamental principle of international society.³⁶

Locke provides a theoretical example of the principle of rightful membership. Locke's criteria for membership require states to acknowledge other states' individual rights.³⁷ For Locke, states have individual rights and interests analogous to the

³⁰ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 27.

³¹ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 26-28.

³² Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 27.

³³ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 257.

³⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge studies in international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 292.

³⁵ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 26; G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 241.

³⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 163, 82-97.

³⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 291.

individual's right to life, liberty, and property.³⁸ However, states or actors that fail Locke's criteria are not recognized by the international society, which makes it much more difficult for their interests to be realized.³⁹ Only Liberal international law, concordant with Liberal principles, has a categorical authority in Lockean international relations.⁴⁰ Therefore, the Lockean culture achieves a greater relative tranquility, but at the cost of a less open membership policy.⁴¹

Contemporary disputes of rightful membership are central themes of political discourse. Domestically, the US debate on immigration reform centers on citizenship and its formal preconditions or possible exemptions for non-citizens residing in the US without legal sanction. Internationally, the 29 November 2012 election of Palestine into "non-member observer state" status at the UN serves as an example of the powerful political forces seeking to control membership into the larger international society.⁴² The legitimate type identity required today "is being a 'nation-' state, having institutions of a 'modern' state, refraining from genocide, and, increasingly, being a 'capitalist' and 'democratic' state."⁴³ Much of the impetus to leverage the concept of rightful membership for greater state conformity is motivated by the Liberal assumption that commonality furthers harmony, which leads to prosperity.⁴⁴ Commonality within society derives from common values that justify rightful conduct.

Rightful Conduct

The other first order principle of right conduct governs societal interactions to ensure predictability through their normative or prescriptive force and to impose obligations and create corresponding entitlements that are publicly acknowledged and collectively enforced.⁴⁵ Rules are the foundation of social life. In a rule-governed society, power cannot be separated from legitimacy because both occur simultaneously.⁴⁶

³⁸ Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York ; London: Norton, 1998), 216-18, 23-26.

³⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 292.

⁴⁰ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 226.

⁴¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 292.

⁴² UN News Centre, "General Assembly grants Palestine non-member observer State status at UN", <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43640>, Accessed 3 April 2013.

⁴³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 293.

⁴⁴ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 28.

⁴⁵ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 65.

⁴⁶ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 65.

Rules are necessary to prevent exploitation by powerful citizens and to promote compliance amongst all.⁴⁷ Legitimacy exists as a concept because the problem of power in society is a recurrent issue.⁴⁸ Rightful conduct is nothing more than compliance with society's rules.

Second Order Principles: Evaluating System Legitimacy

Since the first order principles of legitimacy, rightful membership and conduct constitute international society and promote conformity to society's rules, two questions remain: to which rules must we conform and why? Society's rules are not arbitrary; they must be justified by their source and content.⁴⁹ They also must promote actions that are congruent with intent, while producing legitimation events such as popular expressions of support and effective results.⁵⁰

These second order principles derive primarily from David Beetham, but rely on Ian Clark to connect them to international society and on Thomas Franck to help explain the process. Additionally, this thesis will amend and supplement the framework in the conformity and legitimation sections below. This synthesis is necessary because Clark insightfully abstracts rightful membership and rightful conduct as core principles of legitimacy, but his theory really constitutes a theory of society, not legitimacy. Franck most accurately locates the significance of rules and rule-making institutions or processes, but his argument is insufficient. Beetham best defines and categorizes the whole concept of legitimacy; connects it to power, stability, and politics; anticipates changing degrees of legitimacy; and even provides a means to compare competing paradigms of legitimacy.⁵¹ In short, Beetham's model meets the requirements for a theory of legitimacy most effectively. Still, Beetham's conformity and legitimation categories are not comprehensive or sufficient. Beetham's conformity only represents legal rules and the legal acquisition of power, but not the process of how the rules are created and enforced. Additionally, Beetham's legitimation does not include congruence or utility. However, with a few modifications the framework more fully explains the

⁴⁷ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 26-29.

⁴⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 3.

⁴⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 72.

⁵⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 90-97; Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 179-81.

⁵¹ Harold R. Winton, "An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Professional," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 6 (2011).

structure of legitimacy within a given society. This explanation is provided in the section below.

Process Legitimacy – Rules and Compliance (legal and process validity)

Hypothesis 1: *Process Legitimacy increases system sustainability by reducing operating costs.*

Legitimacy conceptually links rules and self-interests through an implicit justification that the rules are in the self-interest of states.⁵² Further, it does so through constitutional codes, law, and institutions to execute governance in international society. So long as the process of governance accommodates and resolves the development of power asymmetries, the system will undertake incremental changes and avoid possible disequilibrium.⁵³ This reduces the cost of operating the international order because it increases voluntary compliance and reduces the need for material coercion and expensive inducements.⁵⁴ Process legitimacy maintains an acceptable system to the powers capable of challenging the system, at an acceptable operating cost to system leadership.⁵⁵ A legitimate order does not make conflict impossible, but it limits the scope.⁵⁶

Thomas Franck best defines process legitimacy, albeit with his comprehensive definition of legitimacy.⁵⁷ This is because he focuses on rules and rule-making processes, but connects them to their justification source and legitimation processes as well. “Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally

⁵² Armstrong, David, and Farrell, Theo, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Introduction", 5; Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 18-20, in J. D. Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁵³ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 33, 70; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*: 40-49, 186-210; S.T.S.B.G. Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War: The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 209.

⁵⁴ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16, 19.

⁵⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁵⁶ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 1-2.

⁵⁷ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 19.

accepted principles of right process.”⁵⁸ Thus, process legitimacy in the international system can be broken down into constitutional codes, international law, and institutions.

Constitutional codes and principles. Constitutional codes are a collection of overarching principles of order that bind together distinct political entities and define the rules of their political engagement. The term “code” is intended to denote a “code of conduct” or higher order principle of organization that contains principles of action. Historically, all orders of states have an implicit or explicit set of constitutional codes manifested as principles, equivalent in concept and form to formal and/or customary law.⁵⁹ Constitutional codes assign and divide power, establish decision-making processes, and perpetuate enforcement norms.

G. John Ikenberry’s works, *After Victory* and *Liberal Leviathan* clearly establish an Institutional Theory based on a Constitutional order.⁶⁰ Constitutional code, as described here, is not equivalent to Ikenberry’s concepts.⁶¹ The term, as used here, is akin to ordering principles, which are general and encompassing of any system’s organizing doctrines. Instead, Ikenberry’s “institutional theory” is an explicit Liberal form of constitutional code, where strategic restraint applied through institutions are the constitutional principles.⁶² Ikenberry’s constitutional code, created in major war, is a settlement or bargain between the leading state and the weaker states. The leading state obtains acquiescence for a predictable and legitimate order that conserves power, in exchange for limits on its own actions that avails accommodation to a political process open to weaker states interests.⁶³

In theory, constitutional codes require neither strategic restraint nor legitimacy. A constitutional code based on Hobbesian assumptions of the environment and accepted by

⁵⁸ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 24.

⁵⁹ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 3, in Geir Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oslo; Oxford: Scandinavian University Press; Oxford University Press, 1994); Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 13-14; Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 21-23, 120-32.

⁶⁰ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*; Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*.

⁶¹ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: Chapter 3.

⁶² Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 53-57.

⁶³ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 57.

all societal members is a legitimate war of all against all. Conversely, a constitutional code based on strategic restraint, unaccepted by its citizens, is illegitimate, even if it appears, judged by modern values, to be more egoistically advantageous. The measure of legitimacy within the constitutional code is in accordance with Wendt's three degrees of internalization, as described in Chapter One.

Constitutional codes have guided humankind's social rule-making processes since the origins of society. From the earliest historical artifacts, whenever economic and strategic interests pressured states or authorities of the ancient world to interact, they evolved sets of rules and customs to regulate their intercourse.⁶⁴ The records of Sumerian cities, grouped around the modern day Persian Gulf, indicates that by the time communities were developed enough to write things down, they had already achieved a high level of civilization including agriculture, seafaring, trade, and accounting. Cities engaged in continual disputes over water rights and territory.⁶⁵ It seems the basic issue that dominated relations between the Sumerian cities was how to regulate the commerce and the competition between them, and prosper in their close involvement with each other while still preserving their independence.⁶⁶

According to Adam Watson, "the Sumerian system of international relations was not a single empire like ancient Egypt, nor was it based on absolute independence such as prevailed between the Sumerians and their non-Sumerian neighbors. It was a hegemony, that is a system in which one city, through its ruler, was accorded legitimate authority to arbitrate between other cities and to keep competition and the use of force within acceptable limits, but not the right to interfere in their internal affairs."⁶⁷ Sumerian cities constituted an integrated society of independent city-states, hegemonial rather than imperial and international rather than domestic in character. It is illuminating that the oldest historical records of a state system describe an integrated and legitimate society positioned midway between the theoretical poles of hierarchy and anarchy as postulated by Waltz.⁶⁸ In its quest for parsimony, Waltz theory asserts that society is either a

⁶⁴ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 120.

⁶⁵ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 24-25.

⁶⁶ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 25.

⁶⁷ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 27-28.

⁶⁸ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 32; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 100-01.

hierarchy, typical of domestic government, or anarchy, such as in the international environment.⁶⁹ The Sumerian city-state system had its own constitutional code to assign and divide power, establish decision-making processes, and perpetuate enforcement norms.

The contemporary constitutional principles of order are peace, sovereignty, open markets, and equality. Together these principles perform, at the international level, an analogous function to those of the US constitution. They define the rules of power acquisition and separate its application into constrained avenues. Further, they define the process of rule-making and its enforcement mechanisms. Finally, they establish the basis for interpreting international law and its application. This is not to say that today's international order is a constitutional order; it may or may not be. Instead, it asserts that all general orders have fundamental principles that perform these constitutional code functions to a greater or lesser degree.

The United Nations Charter serves the constitutional function in the current international order.⁷⁰ For example, the United Nations Charter immediately acknowledges in the preamble the core concepts of the “overarching principles of order:” peace “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest”; sovereignty, addressed in chapter two on membership states: “Members of the United Nations shall be the states,” thereby acknowledging states as sovereign units capable of consent and by emphasizing the “self-determination of peoples” and the “sovereign equality of all its Members” in chapter 1; open markets “for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”; and equality “in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”⁷¹

International Law. Next, international law consists of formal and customary laws, rules, and practices. Formal law is treaty law as well as regimes, which can be collections of treaties. Regime rules are administered by international institutions

⁶⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 88.

⁷⁰ Armstrong, David, and Farrell, Theo, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics : Introduction," 5, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁷¹ UN Charter, Preamble, Chapter 1-2, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml>, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>, accessed 5 April 2013.

specific to their purpose and function of regulation. Dolman describes a regime as possessing four hierarchical characteristics: principles or beliefs of fact; norms or standards of behavior; rules or specific prescriptions or proscriptions; and decision-making procedures for making and implementing collective choice.⁷² The Outer Space Treaty is an example of both formal law and a component of an international regime. The Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), is referred to now as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). The General Assembly of the United Nations agreed to the OST by unanimous declaration on 19 December 1966 and it entered into force on 10 October 1967.⁷³ The international outer-space regime consists of four generally recognized treaties and the unratified Moon Treaty (1979).⁷⁴ The OST as well as the international outer-space regime, though partially unratified, is an unchallenged body of international law normatively complied with.⁷⁵

The second type of international law, or customary international law (CIL), is typically defined as a “customary practice of states followed from a sense of legal obligation.”⁷⁶ CIL is a controversial subject among those who apply and study it such as courts, arbitrators, diplomats, politicians and scholars. CIL is unwritten and unratified and consequently tends to be defined poorly. Standard views of CIL hold that it binds all nations in the world with the same force as treaties. It is universal in the sense that its obligations bind all nations except those that “persistently object” during development of CIL norms.⁷⁷ Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, from the University of Chicago Law School, submit an alternate view that CIL compliance is best explained as coincidence of interest or successful coercion.⁷⁸ They use game theory to explain and justify their alternative explanation.⁷⁹ However, this pessimistic view of CIL compliance does not

⁷² Everett C. Dolman, *Astropolitik : Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age* (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 87.

⁷³ Dolman, *Astropolitik : Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*: 129.

⁷⁴ Dolman, *Astropolitik : Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*: 129, 32.

⁷⁵ Dolman, *Astropolitik : Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age*: 129-41.

⁷⁶ Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1986), in Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," *International law International Law / ed. by Beth A. Simmons, ISBN 9781412912556 1*(2008): 1.

⁷⁷ Goldsmith and Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," 4.

⁷⁸ Goldsmith and Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," 78.

⁷⁹ Goldsmith and Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," 10.

undermine legitimacy as established in chapter 1, because their assumptions are rational enemy or rival role types.⁸⁰ And, in their theory these two role types may still internalize CIL to the second degree. Under either interpretation, CIL represents an informal form of rule subject to second or third degree internalization depending on one's point of view. Nevertheless, whether we consider constitutional codes or international law, each is based on various forms of moral justification.

Normative legitimacy – Justifiability of rules (shared beliefs)

Hypothesis 2: *Normative Legitimacy increases sustainability of hegemonic power by constituting the coherence of domestic, allied, and international societies.*

Alliances are, to a degree, based on substantive norms that are justifiable on the basis of shared goals and values such as human rights, self-determination, and defense of open markets against a common threat.⁸¹ Domestic populations hold substantive norms, analogous to alliances, but possess a stronger shared identity based on superior political coherence, shared values, and united purpose such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.⁸² Hegemon or peer leader actions, consistent with normative legitimacy, reinforce the respective shared identities of the domestic and allied groups, while reducing fear of hegemonic exploitation of power by demonstrating strategic restraint.⁸³ This increases domestic and allied political coherence, thereby increasing the potential for future coherent actions.⁸⁴ An order with a large normative legitimate group does not make conflict impossible, but it may limit its occurrence. This is because a united alliance may deter aggression by its existence or apply coercive measures short of war to deter enemies. Further, it increases domestic and allied support when wars do occur.

“The fundamental problem of politics is the justification of power. Power is not self-justifying; it must be justified by reference to some source outside or beyond

⁸⁰ These assumptions are not made explicit by Goldsmith and Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," but in my view are implicit in their argument.

⁸¹ Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 20-21, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁸² Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 5.

⁸³ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 105, 213, 52, 322, 25, 60.

⁸⁴ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 164, 68; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf; [distributed by Random House, 1972), 217, 19-20; Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War: The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith*: 100, 14, 24.

itself.”⁸⁵ Legitimacy is the means to justify power. This is the principal instrumental use of legitimacy. To the realist, legitimacy is a strategic move in a political game and not part of the idealized world of legal and moral debate.⁸⁶ To the Liberal, legitimacy is the result of shared understanding with their beliefs. Because the modern world contains both realists and Liberals, legitimacy is effective for both purposes today.

Identifying justifiability as a foundational element of legitimacy is fairly unique to Beetham and as such this section will largely summarize his views from *The Legitimation of Power*.⁸⁷ Justification creates a common framework of shared beliefs between dominant and subordinate to provide the powerful moral authority for their exercise of power while normatively binding the behavior of the subordinate.⁸⁸ In essence, the requirement for the justifiability of the rules to the subordinate is analogous to how effective coercion is dependent on the coerced party’s acquiescence. The difference here is with coercion, acquiescence buys freedom from sanction; in legitimacy, acquiescence buys the agreement of powerful states to restrain themselves. The key question when discussing shared beliefs is what kinds of beliefs are relevant? That is what Beetham’s framework seeks to explain. The justifiability of rules consists of two categories, the sources of authority and the content of the rules themselves.⁸⁹

Justifiable Authoritative Sources, External and Internal. What is the ultimate source of law and social rules? What makes one set of rules better than another? These are philosophical questions, beyond verification or falsification, of metaphysical basis.⁹⁰ Historically they have come from divine command and tradition, but more recently from scientific doctrine and popular will. Therefore, “[i]n identifying the ultimate source of authority and validating basis acknowledged within a society,”...“we shall find the legitimating principle for the system of political power as well as for its body of law in

⁸⁵ Martin Wight et al., *International Theory : The Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes & Meier for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 99, in Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 16 in Armstrong, Farrell, and Miguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁸⁶ Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 16 in Armstrong, Farrell, and Miguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁸⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: Chapter 3, The Normative Structure of Legitimacy.

⁸⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 69.

⁸⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 72.

⁹⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 70.

general.”⁹¹ The authority for a society’s legitimating principle and rules can descend from sources external and internal to the society.

The external sources of justification for the authoritative basis of societies’ rules have historically derived from divine command, natural law, or scientific doctrine, each with its respective interpreters who hold prominent positions of power.⁹² For most of history, divine command has dominated as the source of authority. This elevated priests and prophets to powerful positions. Religion is one of the earliest means of justification to produce legitimacy, present in the earliest of historical artifacts in Mesopotamia dating back to the third millennium BC.⁹³ It linked the emperor or king to the subject as never before. Political leaders seized this fountain of popular will. Again, in the third century B.C. with Asoka in India, and with Han emperors of China, imperial rulers forged an alliance between rule and religion that would ultimately become universal within five centuries.⁹⁴ Shared religion united emperors and polyethnic subjects in a common worldview that gave rulers a legitimacy that mere military force and conquest could never confer.⁹⁵ The French Revolution finally overturned the European divine right of kings and subsequently attacked its source of legitimacy, the church state alliance.⁹⁶ Since the separation of church and state in Western Liberal societies, religion has been unable to provide a unifying source of legitimacy in society. This trend continues throughout the world, except within most Islamic societies.⁹⁷

Conversely, natural law has provided a secular source of legitimacy, deriving from principles grounded in human nature and human reason. This source of authority privileges the philosopher and charismatic leader. The ancient Greeks are well known for their development of philosophy and reason, beginning with Thales questions of the

⁹¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 70-71.

⁹² Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 71-74.

⁹³ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 24-32.

⁹⁴ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 18, in Symposium Nobel and Geir Lundestad (ed.), “The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy” (Oslo; New York, 1994).

⁹⁵ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 18, in Nobel and Lundestad (ed.), “The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy.”

⁹⁶ Armstrong, David, and Farrell, Theo, “Force and Legitimacy in World Politics : Introduction”, 8 in Armstrong, Farrell, and Manguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁹⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 191-204.

‘basic stuff’ of the universe and Anaximander’s rudimentary concept of natural law.⁹⁸ Pericles was the political archetype that reason balanced with human nature could produce, as Thucydides chose to highlight, which led to democratic self-determination in Athens.⁹⁹ The Greeks looked down upon non-Greeks who did not possess free and enquiring minds, but instead naturally accepted an overlord or exogenous rule.¹⁰⁰ However, even the Athenians could not fully silence sources of religious authority.

Thucydides relates the multiple stories of appeals to ‘gods and goddesses’, and the ensuing social disorder that resulted from defacing or disregarding the gods.¹⁰¹ After the Greek experiment, human rationality and natural law went dormant, religion returned to the fore until the culmination of the scientific revolution and the enlightenment period rekindled alternative forms of legitimating political power back to the people. Great thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Kant began to question again the nature of reality, ultimately culminating in more individualistic and natural sources of authority. Enlightenment-era philosophers such as Anne Robert Jacques Turgot carried this impulse to the extreme, elevating man’s creation (technology) to the status of primary cause, determining politics of revolution and man’s future course.¹⁰² This leads to the final external source of legitimacy, science and technology.

“Scientific theories are logically incapable of generating normative principles on their own yet the prestige of science in the modern world is such that it is often appealed to as an authoritative source for rules of social organization.”¹⁰³ As Semmel describes in *Imperialism and Social Reform*, the science of political economy followed by the theory of Social Darwinism justified laissez-faire economics, creating the belief in a hands-off absolute market economy.¹⁰⁴ The Soviet Union, led by Lenin and the Bolshevik regime, embraced science as a legitimating and political organizing principle as never before.

⁹⁸ Forrest E. Baird and Walter Arnold Kaufmann, *Ancient Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1997), 1, 6-9.

⁹⁹ Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 112-15, 540.

¹⁰⁰ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 51.

¹⁰¹ Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*: 70-71, 134, 271, 319, 472.

¹⁰² Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, *Does Technology Drive History? : The Dilemma of Technological Determinism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 223-24.

¹⁰³ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 73.

¹⁰⁴ Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform; English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1960), Chapter 2. in ; Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 73.

Lenin founded the world's first technocracy to solve the industrial and economic development problems of the new Soviet Union through the widespread enlistment of experts in science and technology.¹⁰⁵ Khrushchev and his heirs would continue to emphasize the “scientific-technical revolution” as the contemporary stage of human history, and the basis for Soviet legitimacy and rule.¹⁰⁶ Interestingly, Beetham points out that whenever science has served as a source of authority, such as during the Cold War, it works in an anti-democratic manner because it assigns the power of decision-making to the expert at the expense of the citizen.¹⁰⁷ The dominant source of truth has profound implications for the organization and legitimation of society, often placing religion, philosophy, and science at odds.

Internal sources of justification have always been necessary to supplement the external sources to complete the picture of the authoritative basis of societies' rules. External and internal sources are strongest when they mutually reinforce each other. However, so long as they do not obviously contradict one another they can form the basis for a coherent society. Internal sources have historically derived either from the past and tradition or from the present and the people.¹⁰⁸

Authority based on tradition derives validity from the past through sanctification over time. The embrace of the past is not out of habit or because it has always been done, but because best practices are purported to have been distilled over time.¹⁰⁹ Elders are the respected authorities who interpret the cultural legacy of society and perpetuate what they deem fit. Traditions are often varied and complex enough to permit most circumstances to be addressed; however the ability to adapt is limited by past experience and the ability to apply experience to the present. As a result, tradition-based authority has had a difficult time adjusting to the continuous change present in modern industrial

¹⁰⁵ Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 23-25.

¹⁰⁶ McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age*: 276-93.

¹⁰⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 73.

¹⁰⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 74.

¹⁰⁹ Lynn Townsend White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); W.H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

economies.¹¹⁰ Conversely, the conception that history is proceeding along a determined path towards a more progressive future moves authority from the past to the present.¹¹¹

The ‘people’ are modern day’s most common source of authority and legitimacy. This provides greater potential flexibility and accommodation within society’s rules through the legislative process, freed from the mooring influence of tradition.¹¹²

However, the particulars of who is included in the definition of the people have profound implications for the practical application of popular authority to politics.¹¹³ Ancient Athens considered themselves democratic while restricting citizenship to approximately ten percent of the population.¹¹⁴ Marxism defines the working class as “the people.” The modern US defines adults above the age eighteen as the people. The definition has both inclusive and exclusive implications that point back to the previous discussion of rightful membership.

Various internal and external sources of legitimacy have provided the basis for a society’s rules about power. The various sources are clearly distinguishable, though sometimes melded into an individual or societal belief system. For example, religion still survives in the US, but its political role has been diminished because of the constitutional separation between church and state. These core beliefs of ultimate truth are a foundation of society, such that their change provokes the most profound societal evolutions. To have real meaning in people’s lives, the sources of authority must take on a tangible role in daily activities.

As the utility or explanatory justification of rules wanes, people often tend to disassociate their individual wellbeing from that of the system; this creates system vulnerability - hereditary monarchy was toppled in this manner. Historically, it seems sources of authority have shifted from religious to secular; from external and universalistic to internal and particularistic; from society as past, to society as its “people” in the present.¹¹⁵ The essential point to take from this is that certain forms of

¹¹⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 74.

¹¹¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 74-75.

¹¹² Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 108-09.

¹¹³ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 75.

¹¹⁴ Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*: 577-82.

¹¹⁵ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 75-76.

governance are more consistent with certain views of truth. Imposing Liberal democracy on a traditional society, for example, creates a gap between rules and beliefs that may prove irreconcilable without changing the beliefs about sources of authority or modifying the form of democratic governance.¹¹⁶

Beetham concludes the discussion on sources of authority by placing their influence in perspective. He states that although disjunctions can develop between rules of power and beliefs, it is essential to recognize that any particular legitimating source does not produce an unequivocal set of power rules. Religion has been used to justify everything from individual to collective property, from hereditary monarchy to representative democracy. In other words, shared beliefs define the boundaries of possible belief and debate by framing the discourse and dictating the terms the debate must follow. The systems of justification discussed determine an ultimate source of authority, rather than regulate the form they must take. Who should benefit most from the system or be responsible for running the system is a different question altogether.¹¹⁷

Justifiable Rule-Content. The questions asked earlier still remain to answer: why these rules and why these particular powerful groups? Beetham provides two elements necessary to answer the questions. First, differentiation distinguishes between dominant and subordinate to justify the dominant's access to essential resources and positions. Second, common interests link the dominant and subordinate through a shared sense of community. The former principle is sufficient for the dominant to accept the rules and justify their position to themselves; however, without the latter the subordinate would not consent without constant coercion.¹¹⁸

Differentiation is necessary to create even the most basic hierarchical order. A totally flat, universally egalitarian society is not a form of political organization that is common in recorded human experience.¹¹⁹ All social relations of power presuppose differentiation between the dominant and subordinate based on the possession (or lack) of unique characteristics or qualifications, specific to each system of rules.¹²⁰ The two

¹¹⁶ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 75-76.

¹¹⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 76.

¹¹⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 76-77.

¹¹⁹ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*; Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*.

¹²⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 77.

primary justifying principles of differentiation are ascriptive theories and meritocratic theories. Ascriptive theories presume that separating qualities are assigned through and detectable at birth. Meritocratic theories reward those who demonstrate through performance and achievement their superior competence.¹²¹

Aristocracy and gender are two of the most prevalent historical examples of ascriptive theories of differentiation.¹²² Aristocracy places ultimate value on noble birth traced through ancestry; the idea being that heredity confers the superior qualities necessary to exercise legitimate power and thus possess and manage greater wealth.¹²³ In addition, gender has provided a means of differentiation by conceiving of separate roles for men and women. The identification of specific roles is not in itself an ascriptive limitation. The ascriptive theory forwards the idea that it is not possible to act outside of the assigned role due to one's very nature.¹²⁴ This base assumption then justifies the positions and experience each person acquires, thereby perpetuating the roles through exclusive role-based development, providing its own evidence for the original assumption. In essence, ascriptive theories become self-fulfilling prophesy because they restrict access to the resources necessary to be successful within a given system. As a result, it is no surprise who becomes most successful - those with access based on a predetermined selection criteria.

Meritocratic theories presume that open and fair competition identifies the most competent individuals through "survival of the fittest."¹²⁵ Meritocracy claims superiority over ascriptive processes because the best rise to the top by demonstrating their capabilities in relevant activities. William McNeill makes this case in his book *The Pursuit of Power*, where he compares the market economies of post-Medieval Europe with the command economy of post-sixteenth century China to explain how the West surpassed China's initial economic superiority.¹²⁶ However, for merit to realize the dominant determinant role, competition must occur among participants with an equal

¹²¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 77.

¹²² McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 24-62; Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 135-51, 63-81.

¹²³ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 77-78.

¹²⁴ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 78-79.

¹²⁵ Darwin's "survival of the fittest" was actually an application of Adam Smith's theory of markets applied to biology, not the reverse. Adam Smith was published in 1776, whereas Darwin was published in 1859.

¹²⁶ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*.

opportunity to succeed. Equal opportunity or a level playing field exists only in the ideal type. In reality, there are many obstacles to achieving a true merit-based hierarchy of power.

For example, in a society of capitalistic economic principles, those who are born into wealth start with a tremendous advantage over others because of their access to capital.¹²⁷ Perhaps the only way to implement a fully meritocratic society would be to abolish property rights in order to deny the intergenerational transmission of power. Even still, unless the family unit itself was also eliminated, it would not be possible to prevent families from sharing privileged information or developing familial alliances to confer social advantage upon their posterity.¹²⁸ Obviously, neither the abolition of property nor the family is either feasible or suitable to correct the problem. Both courses of action would probably do more harm to the progress of society than the benefits of pure meritocracy could overcome. Meritocratic theories have advantages over ascriptive theories, yet possess their own limitations as well. One question that applies to both ascriptive and meritocratic theories is why differentiation is necessary at all. To overcome this deficiency, differentiation requires a compelling argument of social necessity or utility.¹²⁹

Common interest, the second element of justifiable content, links the dominant and subordinate through a shared sense of community. Common interests answer these questions: why these rules and why differentiation is necessary in the first place? As Beetham states, in the absence of any idea of community where the subordinate has some interest worth protecting, they are excluded not only from power, but also from a shared moral order within which any justification could make sense to them. It is therefore a characteristic of power that it seeks to justify itself to the subordinate by claiming the system of power serves a common interest.¹³⁰ For example, in Feudalism the peasant exchanged their labor for law and order, security and the means of subsistence.¹³¹ In capitalism, the workers expect a just wage to share in the profits, while the free flow of capital maximizes potential production, increases individual choice of products, and

¹²⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 80-82.

¹²⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 81-82.

¹²⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 82.

¹³⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 82.

¹³¹ White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change*: 4-5; Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 82-83.

elevates everyone's standard of living.¹³² In socialism, the proletariat expects liberation from forced labor to work according to their choice, an equal share of the abundant industrial production, distribution by a classless administration, and consumption according to individual needs.¹³³

“Why these rules?” and “Why these particular powerful groups?” must be addressed within any legitimate society to attain the consent of the subordinate group. Beetham's model provides two elements, differentiation and common interest, to justify the dominant's access to essential resources and positions. Common interest creates a shared sense of community, producing compliance without constant coercion.¹³⁴

Effective legitimacy – Legitimation of the system of rules

Hypothesis 3: *Effective Legitimacy promotes system stability through public demonstrations of consent, congruence, and utility of the current order.*

Effective legitimacy confers legitimacy through three distinct processes of legitimation. Public consent makes evident the subordinate's acceptance of the rules of power. Rules-values congruence is the agreement or coincidence between the application of a rule and its principled purpose.¹³⁵ Finally, utility represents the capacity of the system to achieve desirable outcomes such as security and welfare in relatively distributed fairness.¹³⁶

Hegemon actions, consistent with effective legitimacy, reinforce the utility of the system by meeting desirable outcomes within the system constraints for a sufficient number of members. Effective legitimacy increases hegemonic soft power and reduces risks for bandwagoning states. It also demonstrates to neutrals and potential adversaries that strategic restraint can produce acceptable, if sometimes sub-optimal, outcomes. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure and the

¹³² Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 234-35.

¹³³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 330.

¹³⁴ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 76-77.

¹³⁵ Franck uses coherence instead of congruence, and includes the principles previously employed to solve similar problems, and a lattice of principles in use to resolve different problems. Congruence better represents the author's concept. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 147-48.

¹³⁶ Armstrong, David, and Farrell, Theo, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Introduction", 5; Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 20, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Miguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*; Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16-18.

peace that follows will be justified as a better expression of the “legitimate” general consensus.¹³⁷

Legitimation is essential to bring shared beliefs and the rules intended to implement those beliefs into actual being through concrete actions. Legitimation not only actualizes a system of power, it also reinforces and confers legitimacy back into the system. It completes the feedback loop from belief to implementation to experience, which in turn informs belief. This is analogous to a cybernetic model, but within an open system, as alluded to at the introduction of the framework. Three primary elements constitute a system’s primary legitimating influences: consent, congruence, and utility.

Legitimation through consent. Public consent is the voluntary demonstration of both dominant and subordinate compliance with their differentiated roles and the limits on their freedom of action. Public consent is not important as evidence of belief in legitimacy per se; it is important because it is an action that confers legitimacy on the powerful and the system itself.¹³⁸ Public expressions reinforce the system through actions that constitute consent to position and rules. The kinds of actions that confer legitimacy are specific to each particular system of power.

Liberalism confers consent through contractual agreements and electoral participation. In this case, the key conditions of legitimation are the “voluntariness” of participation and the availability of distinct choices.¹³⁹ Contractual and electoral consent create an implicit obligation to obey the terms of the agreement. By voluntarily selecting one agreement or party of political persuasion over another, the participant has contributed to the formation of the rules and is more compelled to adhere as a result. This is why coerced contracts, confessions, nonunionized labor, arranged marriages, etc. upset a Western Liberal sense of right; consent was not voluntary and therefore, is not as binding.

Historically, three additional forms of consent have acted as legitimation, though in differing degrees and with different temporal implications. The swearing of an oath of allegiance binds the subordinate to dominant. Even where there is no choice of whom to

¹³⁷ Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*: 1-2.

¹³⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 90-91.

¹³⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 91-92.

swear allegiance, the oath has not been viewed as any less binding.¹⁴⁰ Next, negotiations and consultations with the powerful over policy or term of service, where an agreement is reached, legitimate the differentiation and rules of the relationship. In traditional societies, recurrent consultation between ruler and subordinates served to reinforce the initial oath of allegiance.¹⁴¹ A third distinct type, because it carries no connotation of future commitment, is the mass public mobilization of demonstrated support at key symbolic events such as a coronation or a rally in support a specific policy.¹⁴² This demonstration, often present in revolutions, is effective at conferring or withholding legitimation. Ackerman and Duvall capture the power of this phenomenon well in *A Force More Powerful*.¹⁴³ Examples such as Gandhi's salt campaign to liberate and unite India, Martin Luther King's civil rights movement in the US, and the 1980-1981 Solidarity movement in Poland for industrial rights each led to dramatic societal changes facilitated through mass public mobilizations.¹⁴⁴ The force of public sentiment mobilized to public demonstration can legitimate or de-legitimate a system of power.

Beetham identifies a crucial distinction between the mobilization and electoral modes of consent because of the way they confer moral authority. A contractual agreement contains a promise of future commitment extended to the future or completion of the contract. Mass mobilization agrees to no such future constraints, but confines affirmation to the present instead. This distinction is essential to appreciate because of its implication. Contractual modes of consent compel compliance regardless of the motives for which the agreement was entered. In other words, consent due to egoistic self-interest does not undermine the contractual mode because its normative force is based in the action itself.

Conversely, the expressive or mobilization mode is temporary in its effect and is undermined when conducted out of self-interest.¹⁴⁵ It is common to be annoyed with sycophants who publically suck up to the boss. This does little to reinforce the boss's position, because the expressed support is insincere. However, an employee who agrees

¹⁴⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 92.

¹⁴¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 92.

¹⁴² Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 93-94.

¹⁴³ Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful : A Ccentury of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

¹⁴⁴ Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful : A Ccentury of Nonviolent Conflict*: Chapters 2, 3, 8.

¹⁴⁵ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 94-95.

to a policy that provides him advantage can less effectively complain about the policy when other employees achieve greater advantage because they first agreed and acted in accordance with the policy. The rules of the game were agreed upon and set, and the competition was fair. The policy continues to compel compliance or must be changed in accordance with the rules of policy amendment, but cannot be ignored altogether. That would be tantamount to violating the first order principles of rightful membership and conduct, and subject to expulsion from the group.

Legitimation through rules-values congruence. The second element of legitimating influence on a system of power is rules-values congruence. Rules-values congruence is the agreement or coincidence between the application of a rule and its principled purpose.¹⁴⁶ The deviation of application and purpose take two prominent forms: selective application of rules and the incoherent effects of rules. Both forms of deficient rules-values congruence work to undermine the legitimacy of a rule, or system should the deficiency reach sufficient proportion. Conversely, the congruence of rules and values legitimates a particular rule and the system as a whole by delivering on what is claimed and what society demands. Congruence is subject to perception, but its essence is not founded upon perception. This marks a significant distinction between the author and Thomas Franck's use of the term coherence, which provides the impetus for the use of the term 'congruence' here.¹⁴⁷

Congruence requires that the application of rules is consistent so that 'likes be treated as likes', but also that distinctions in treatment of likes be justifiable in principled terms.¹⁴⁸ Distinctions are necessary because cases are never factually the same, but distinctions must not appear to provide special treatment to select populations.¹⁴⁹ This idea is also used by the powerful with various levels of success to justify contradictions in the shared beliefs and the practice of those beliefs. For example, distinction based on higher principle is precisely how Stalin justified his dictatorship within the communist ideology of the Soviet Union. This is not the same idea as

¹⁴⁶ Franck uses coherence instead of congruence, and includes the principles previously employed to solve similar problems, and a lattice of principles in use to resolve different problems. Congruence better represents the author's concept. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 147-48.

¹⁴⁷ For more on Franck's inclusion of perception as fundamental to coherence see his chapter 9, Validation and Coherence. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 142.

¹⁴⁸ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 144.

¹⁴⁹ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 144.

differentiation between dominant and subordinate discussed previously because Stalin's position fundamentally contradicted the basic shared beliefs of communal society. Initially, as long as remnants of capitalism existed within Soviet society the maintenance of the dictatorial form was justified. However, once domestic sources were removed it became necessary to relocate the threat to the existence of capitalism abroad.¹⁵⁰ Stalin invoked the fear of communist survival, a higher-level principle, to avoid the congruent application of the shared beliefs to himself and the government. This created an inherent contradiction in the Soviet system that would require updated resolution throughout its history.

Incongruent UN validation of rightful membership diminished the organization's legitimacy as a whole through the selective application of its criteria to South Africa. The usual UN test for admission is "who is in charge?"¹⁵¹ However, in the case of South Africa considerations such as likeableness, representativeness, and legality were introduced as informal criterion.¹⁵² This equivocation on admission not only undermined the legitimacy of the specific decisions to withhold accreditation, it also derogated the UN's legitimacy as an institution.¹⁵³ At the time, most UN members were willing to strike a symbolic blow at South Africa's system of apartheid, but did not favor the erosion of the rightful membership principle to the point of subjective popularity.¹⁵⁴

Incoherent effects of rules development and application can occur due to intentional manipulation, selective prioritization of principles, or as unintended consequences. Each works to delegitimize the individual rule and the system as a whole because they create a gap between beliefs and actions. Incoherent effects may also work to delegitimize a leader, but typically only due to a perception of incompetence instead of criminal misconduct, because the latter is much more difficult to verify or prosecute. Often incoherent effects operate to delegitimize the underlying shared beliefs, whether the beliefs themselves are the root cause of the problem or not. The fall of Soviet communism and the associated delegitimation of Marxist socialism provide a recent

¹⁵⁰ George F. Kennan and John J. Mearsheimer, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), xix, 118-19.

¹⁵¹ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 136-37.

¹⁵² Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 137.

¹⁵³ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 138.

¹⁵⁴ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 142.

example. The critique does have merit and can be convincing when emphasizing the inability of the (apparently valid) abstract idea to be translated into effective practice. Regardless of the actual cause of a problem, when the results of beliefs and rules are not useful, they are subject to de-legitimizing influence that often promotes alternatives.

Legitimation through utility. The final element that provides a legitimating influence on a system of power is utility. The legitimation effect of utility is composed of public policy success and accommodation. This element is perhaps the most intuitive of all aspects of legitimacy, and therefore requires only a brief explanation. Utility is implicit in the common usage of legitimate, meaning right and proper. The underlying reason something legitimate is right and proper is that it is useful and works. After all, the whole point of society is to increase one's security and welfare. The members of society will judge both the individual rules and the system as a whole by their ability to contribute to achieving these purposes and meeting their individual needs. The combination of justification through shared beliefs manifested in rules of conduct result in effects that either sustain society or they do not. Public policy successes legitimate the society and its system of rules. Within society, power asymmetries develop and must be accounted for. The ability of a system of rules to adapt in order to accommodate the new distribution of power is essential to the system's survival and its overall utility.

This was clearly evident during the Cold War competition of legitimate societies; in other words, the East versus the West. And among the many levels of competition, the space race is an excellent example of the Cold War competition for legitimacy. The character of the race was indicative of the US and Soviet societies involved. The race began as the US and Soviets claimed German rocket engineers and technology after WWII.¹⁵⁵ President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev intensified the race in the 1950's as both sides developed nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.¹⁵⁶ However, the space race became official with the Soviet launch of Sputnik I in 1957 and essentially culminated with the US lunar landings.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Michael J. Neufeld, *Von Braun : Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2007).

¹⁵⁶ Neil Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War : Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon* (New York: Random House, 2009).

¹⁵⁷ McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age*: 63-65, 413-14.

The stakes of the race were less about gaining access to the moon, than gaining the prestige of a superior society. The US and Soviets both understood that the areas of the checkerboard that were in play, the states of the Third World, were watching. As Walter McDougall stated, if the US wanted to implement its societal model to the underdeveloped world, then it needed to demonstrate the model worked at home.¹⁵⁸ The Soviet victories with Sputnik and the first man in space, Yuri Gagarin, were indicative of the Soviet emphasis on appearance instead of reality.¹⁵⁹ Yet, these apparent losses cost the US prestige and temporarily worked to legitimate the Soviet technocratic system. The shock of Sputnik to the US public actually motivated a US push toward a more centrally controlled and technocratic society itself.¹⁶⁰ The space race was a test of effective legitimacy assessed through utility, by the rival and neutral states, as well as the participants themselves.

International System Legitimacy Framework Summary

In sum, legitimacy is necessary in all societies to regulate the exercise of power by one person over others, or by one group over another.¹⁶¹ Legitimacy is the glue that holds groups or societies together.¹⁶² It determines whether you are in the group and what conduct the group expects of you in order to remain in the group.¹⁶³

The purpose of this chapter was to establish a framework of legitimacy to explain an extra-national system's essence, character, and sources of legitimacy. It did so by developing a framework that evaluates the degree and type of legitimacy structure in the international system. Additionally, the framework can help assess a society's degree of coherence and identify sub-groups more closely bound within the society. Ultimately, the framework helps discern the overall stability of the international order, and the order's influence on the coherence of US domestic and allied populations. The framework explains and supports the three hypotheses of this study.

The framework is comprised of first and second order principles. The first order principles, prerequisites to constituting international society, are rightful membership and

¹⁵⁸ McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age*: 216-17.

¹⁵⁹ McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age*: 8, 64.

¹⁶⁰ McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age*: 70-73.

¹⁶¹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 3.

¹⁶² Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 19-25.

¹⁶³ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 26-29; Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 252.

rightful conduct.¹⁶⁴ They are necessary to establish legitimacy as a formal property of international society. The second order principles, compliance, justification, and legitimation, are useful to evaluate a system's *degree* of legitimacy and characterize the contextually specific *type* of legitimacy.

In the next chapter, the legitimacy framework will be used to explain the contemporary Liberal rules-based international order, and illuminate to whom that system is legitimate, and to what degree. The framework will show what principles justify legitimate rules in today's international order and why. Further, this process will help to identify the limits of legitimacy by connecting the current international order to those states who will naturally internalize the principles, rules, and norms to Wendt's third degree and those who will only do so to the second degree or not at all. Finally, the completed framework shows why Liberal interests are more closely bound to Liberal values than commonly understood. This conclusion strengthens the thesis that legitimacy can provide a foundation for US grand strategy that sustains US power by establishing a conceptual bridge between US interests and values.

¹⁶⁴ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5, 24-29.

CHAPTER 3

The Liberal Rules-Based International Order

For however horrendous, it is to live in the face of uncertainty, the future, like the past, depends upon humanity's demonstrated ability to make and remake natural and social environments within limits set mainly by our capacity to agree on goals of collective action.

William H. McNeill

Our beliefs about human nature help shape human nature itself. What we think about ourselves and our possibilities determines what we aspire to become; and it shapes what we teach our children, both at home and in the schools. Here the pernicious effects of the self-interest theory have been more disturbing. It tells us that to behave morally is to invite others to take advantage of us. By encouraging us to expect the worst in others, it brings out the worst in us: dreading the role of chump, we are often loath to heed our nobler instincts.

Robert H. Frank

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the development of the current international order to demonstrate its Liberal character. The character of the order imposes restrictions on US grand strategy that if ignored would undermine both US power and the international system. Because the US is the primary creator and hegemon of the system, it derives the greatest benefits from the system. The principle means to explain the character of the current international order are by using the second order principles of the Legitimacy Framework, developed in the last chapter.

This task will begin by tracing the historical sources of the current constitutional codes from the key post-war settlements of 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945. While doing so, the codes will be compared to the Liberal sources of justifiability to demonstrate the congruence between the two, thereby revealing the Liberal character of the rules-based international system. Finally, this coherence between justifiability and rules leads to a discussion of rightful membership, which opens the door to a realistic appraisal of the power of a Western Liberal society of states within the international order. The implications point to Doyle's DPT and establish a potential aim point for US grand strategy. This linkage further evinces the argument of this inquiry: legitimacy can provide a bridge between values and interests to increase the sustainability of US hegemony and promote a more effective and efficient US grand strategy. This chapter

cannot comprehensively apply the full Legitimacy Framework to today's international order, because the project is too ambitious for a single chapter. However, the evidence of earlier chapters will aid explanations, and help to validate the conclusions presented herein.

Legitimacy in any society is not a static entity, because politics are not static. Its components interact and react to external inputs through a many-sided implicit cross-referencing process. The Legitimacy Framework does not represent a linear phenomenon, but is instead like an open system cybernetic process or Boyd's formal observe-orient-decide-act or OODA loop.¹ The OODA loop is a decision-making model, but the Legitimacy Framework provides an explanation of political decision-making and subordinate response. Consequently, evaluating a society's legitimacy can begin at any point in the framework, but follows most logically from normative legitimacy or the justifiability of shared beliefs, to process legitimacy and rules compliance, and finally to effective legitimacy and legitimation. However, because the purpose of this chapter is to show that today's international system relates to a specific set of beliefs, it is necessary to start with constitutional codes from the Rules and Compliance section of the framework.

The current international order can trace sources of justification back to the earliest of historical records, however its symbolic beginning often is attributed to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.² The Westphalian Treaty formalized principles of sovereignty yet more subtly brought forth one corollary (equality) through reciprocity.³ In parallel, the market in Europe began its ascent over command economies worldwide, accelerating the trend much more rapidly after 1600.⁴ Finally, the representatives of fifty nations formally introduced and ratified the principle of peace in the UN Treaty of 1945 at San

¹ A. Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battle Fields of Modernity* (Columbia University Press, 2010), 128-61; F.P. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (London, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 230-31.

² Wallerstein, Immanuel, "Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, 1990-2025/2050", 345, in Geir Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oslo; Oxford: Scandinavian University Press; Oxford University Press, 1994); Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 51; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London; New York: Routledge, 1992), 196.

³ Hedley Bull, Stanley Hoffmann, and Andrew Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 16-17; Gilpin, Robert, "The Cycle of Great Powers: Has it Finally Been Broken?", 325, in Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*; G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 51-52.

⁴ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 102, 14-16.

Francisco.⁵ The confluent development of these four principles: sovereignty, equality, open markets and peace helped constitute the constitutional codes of today's international system of states. However, before describing the ascendancy of each constitutional principle, it is helpful to trace briefly the history of legitimacy to provide historical context with some past examples of constitutional codes.

How long has the practice of legitimacy been an element of international society? It seems the concept of legitimizing power into acceptable authority may be as old as society itself. The character of legitimacy evolved through history and is unique to each society; its substance is not fixed, but its framework is. Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy is not an absolute set of rules, but is instead the norms of a specific cultural system at any given time and place within a construct of rules, justifications, and legitimating practices.⁶

Creating and sustaining a multicultural international society is fully consistent with norms of history. Long-range historical context suggests that polyethnic empires are the dominant norm of pre-Westphalian political patterns.⁷ They ruled diverse ethnicities through forced compliance, appeals to self-interest, and common worldviews resulting in legitimacy.⁸ Coerced compliance takes many intense forms, as discussed in Chapter One. Self-interests are circumstantial, culturally produced, and therefore transient. However, a common worldview, begotten through shared ideology, creates a framework for common understanding and ultimately, legitimacy. Religion is one of the earliest means of justification to produce legitimacy, linking the ruler to the ruled as never before. Political leaders across the world embraced this source of popular mobilization. Sumerian society, as of approximately 2300 B.C., believed in a world made by gods, who created men to serve them.⁹ Later, in the sixth century B.C., Cyrus and Darius of Persia leveraged the prophet Zarathustra to restore virtue to their empire.¹⁰ As discussed earlier but worth

⁵ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 17-18.; UN, "History of the United Nations", <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/>, accessed 19 April 2013.

⁶ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 13.

⁷ McNeill, William H., "Introductory Historical Commentary," 3, in Symposium Nobel and Geir Lundestad (ed.), "The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy" (Oslo; New York, 1994).

⁸ This parallels Max Weber's modes of social control and Alexander Wendt's three reasons why cultural norms are followed. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 250.

⁹ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 25, 29.

¹⁰ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 41.

repeating in full context, in the third century B.C. with Asoka in India, and with Han emperors of China, imperial rulers forged an alliance between rule and religion that would ultimately become universal within five centuries.¹¹ Shared religion united emperors and polyethnic subjects in a common worldview that gave rulers a legitimacy that mere military force and conquest could never confer.¹² The French Revolution finally overturned the European divine right of kings and subsequently attacked its source of legitimacy, the church-state alliance.¹³ The coherence of past empires has always relied, in varying degrees, on legitimacy. And, as Adam Watson shows, wherever legitimacy is present, international society is as well.¹⁴

The exceptional nature of the modern, ethnically idealized, sovereign nation-state did not coalesce as an idea in practice until ca. 1450, and was institutionalized formally in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia.¹⁵ This event is a key marker in the transition of the sources of power and legitimacy. Unity between ruler and ruled was transferred from common religious affiliation to common ancestry. However, this powerful linkage is a product of social construction permitted by the extended plurality of West-European imperial competition. The French and British both artificially chose to idealize the Gauls and Britons respectively. Their choice selectively ignored the subsequent conquerors from which they inherited their respective national languages.¹⁶ As McNeill summed up, “hence, beginning in the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth, the model of the Roman republic and/or the Athenian democracy, superimposed on the invented virtues of ancient Gauls, Britons, Germans, or some other barbarian ancestor, inspired modern European states to demand active loyalty from almost everyone within their boundaries.”¹⁷ In Europe at least, the legitimacy of national unity, derived from ethnic

¹¹ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 18, in Nobel and Lundestad (ed.), “The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy.”

¹² McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 18, in Nobel and Lundestad (ed.), “The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy.”

¹³ J. D. Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Miguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8.

¹⁴ Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*.

¹⁵ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 3, in Nobel and Lundestad (ed.), “The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy.”

¹⁶ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 6-7, in Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*.

¹⁷ McNeill, William H., “Introductory Historical Commentary,” 7, in Nobel and Lundestad (ed.), “The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy.”

solidarity, supplanted religion. However, ethnic solidarity brought with it egalitarian implications that opposed the hierarchical nature of religious foundations. The claim “We are all French” does not justify superior social order the way God’s will and its hierarchical model of differentiation can. The new ideational basis for social mobility provided fertile ground for the Liberal ideals of democracy to become normalized values. The Peace of Westphalia rightly deserves its symbolic status as the formal mark that initiated the movement towards the current rules-based international order. Westphalia will also mark the initial exposition of today’s international constitutional principles.

The Peace of Westphalia and the principle of sovereignty constituted a collective effort to restrain hegemonial power through the fragmentation, decentralization, and later distribution of power post-World War I. According to G. John Ikenberry, the most basic strategy to restrain power is to reinforce state sovereignty, and the most important objective of the Westphalia settlement was to confer sovereign autonomy to territorial states, subordinate to no other authority such as religion or universal monarchy.¹⁸ Territorial rulers received new rights that revived Roman ideas of exclusive territorial property ownership, an idea also embraced by the Liberal natural law philosopher John Locke.¹⁹ An additional Liberal principle, self-determination flowing from individual liberty, provided the justification to extend individual state sovereignty post-World War I, and again after World War II, to erode imperialism and break up former European empires. Bull describes Westphalia as “a kind of constitutional foundation of international society.”²⁰ In addition to these essential Liberal symmetries, Clark makes a convincing argument that Westphalia, though it did suffuse the principle of sovereignty into legitimacy for centuries hence, made its greatest contribution because of its fundamental articulation of legitimacy as constitutive of an international society.²¹ Therefore, we have reasonable interpretations of the Treaty of Westphalia marking

¹⁸ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 37.

¹⁹ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 38-39; Everett C. Dolman, *Astropolitik : Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age* (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 97-99.

²⁰ Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford [England]; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1990), 76, in Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 61.

²¹ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 62.

significant steps toward today's Liberal rule-based international system that employs legitimacy to constitute society possessing the constitutional code of sovereignty as a restraint on power. Sovereignty effectively forwards the Liberal interests of individual life, liberty, and property at the state level.

The Utrecht settlement of 1713-14 further extended and codified both the anti-hegemonial current present at Westphalia and the Liberal extension of individual rights to states.²² Utrecht is known for its explicit articulation of balance of power strategy, and for its pronouncement of state autonomy, self-determination, and the notional equality of states.²³ As Osiander argues, "The triumph of equality is evident from the fact that, at Utrecht, the idea of a hierarchy of actors was discarded."²⁴ The more formal acceptance of equality, first implied by the reciprocity demanded by sovereignty, derived logically from states' autonomy.²⁵ Balance of power provided the dominant influence on international relations for two hundred years, but was proven insufficient prior to World War I. The character of states had outgrown pure balance of power; states turned from an agnostic balance to favor ideological similarity. The end of the Cold War extinguished the remnants of balance of power strategy. However, equality has slowly but continually advanced in importance and influence. This is due to recurrent US espousal of equality, and its derivatives self-determination and human rights. Weaker nations bandwagon behind equality because it serves their interests, justifies their input to the process of interaction change, and continues the anti-hegemonial banner.²⁶ Utrecht integrated Liberal values into legitimate international society by explicitly acknowledging equality.

The settlement of 1815 and the Congress of Vienna constituted another step forward for Liberal ideas, but this time for process instead of principle, introducing coherent means to achieve the desired ends. The greatest contribution to order the

²² Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 71-76.

²³ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 40.

²⁴ Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990 : Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford; Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1994), 121, in both Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 40, and Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 76.

²⁵ Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990 : Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability*: 87, in Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 67.

²⁶ Doyle, Michael, "The Voice of the People: Political Theorists on the International Implications of Democracy", in Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*: 283; Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: New Press : Distributed by W.W. Norton, 1995), 102.

settlement produced was the agreement to create the congressional system itself. This was the first time a great power, Great Britain, attempted to use institutions as the means to manage great power relations in peace.²⁷ In 1818, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle inaugurated the new system intended to provide some measure of restraint on the autonomous exercise of raw power by the major states.²⁸ The institutionalization of international relations laid the foundation for the eventual adoption of the principle of peace in 1945, by establishing an alternative international mechanism, collective in nature, for conflict resolution beyond diplomacy and war. As Henry Kissinger writes, the issue at Vienna was “to create an order in which change could be brought about through a sense of obligation, instead of through an assertion of power.”²⁹ He goes on, “The health of a social structure is its ability to translate transformation into acceptance, to relate the forces of change to those of conservation.”³⁰ Thus, the settlement of 1815 explicitly intended to create a legitimate international order in both principle and device. The subsequent “concert of Europe” evidenced by the immediate response to Napoleon’s reemergence, and the formation of a coalition to defeat him, served as events of legitimation for the order.³¹

In 1919, the settlement at Versailles famously failed to secure a lasting peace or achieve a Liberal democratic consensus on the utility of constructing a world order founded upon Liberal principles. This occurred even though, for the first time in history, the major victors were democratic states and Woodrow Wilson’s centerpiece for peace was the League of Nations.³² Wilson asserted self-determination for all nations; the equivalent of universal suffrage for sovereign states, like individuals with an equal vote within states, mandated that every state be sovereign and equal in the world system.³³ However, France saw little value in Wilson’s proposal, instead preferring to dismember

²⁷ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 80-81.

²⁸ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 81.

²⁹ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 172.

³⁰ Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*: 173.

³¹ Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*: 174.

³² Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 117, 23-28; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 127.

³³ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 116-62.

Germany and reestablish a balance of power alliance that overwhelmingly favored French interests. The British took a more moderate stance, actually working out the details of Wilson's lofty ideals to establish formal institutional agreements, but remained tethered to a return to a more traditional postwar order.³⁴ In the end, Wilson failed to meet his objectives of equality, failed to get the Treaty ratified in the US senate, and even compromised his position on self-determination, allowing the Japanese to take control of former German territory in China.³⁵ Versailles "was neither peace nor settlement."³⁶ The Versailles order proved illegitimate, among other reasons, because neither Russia nor Germany was included in its negotiation and hence had no interest in complying with its peace. Even the US eventually abandoned the agreement as well.³⁷ Ultimately, the inability of the Liberal nations to reach consensus on the value of a Liberal rules-based international order, that exercised strategic restraint to prevent excessive reparations and demilitarization of Germany, doomed the peace and set the stage for the most destructive war in world history. The US would not make this mistake the next time.

Dual settlements that followed World War II constituted the most comprehensive reorganization of the international order in history. The ratification of the United Nations Charter formally introduced peace as a constitutional code. Additionally, the dual settlements reinforced sovereignty, equality, and self-determination. The world had finally achieved a truly Liberal rules-based international order, at least outside the Soviet bloc states.

One major settlement between the US and the Soviet Union and their respective allies created the East-West bipolarity that would endure throughout the Cold War.³⁸ This was the "containment order," based on balance of power and nuclear deterrence. The ideological battle between Liberal democracy and Communist socialism defined its

³⁴ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 130-31.

³⁵ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 137.

³⁶ Jacobson, J., "The Soviet Union and Versailles", in Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Gläser, *The Treaty of Versailles : A Reassessment After 75 Years* (Washington, D.C.; Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: German Historical Institute ; Cambridge University Press, 1998), 451, in Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 110.

³⁷ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 128-29.

³⁸ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 163.

culture.³⁹ In a sense, this “containment order” was more a reflection of the past than of the future. The US recognized in the containment order the need to treat enemies in accordance with their role type. The Soviet Union professed enmity with the West and the US accordingly obliged. Coercion became the currency of the Cold War culture. Coercion is legitimate and dominates in Hobbesian relationships and cultures of anarchy. In a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, it is necessary to collect allies and prevent your enemy from doing the same. The US and Soviets actively pursued additional support from the Third World during the Cold War.⁴⁰

However, the other collection of settlements among the Western Liberal nations and Japan established new institutions to manage security, economics, and politics. It was “built around economic openness, political reciprocity, and multilateral management of an American-led Liberal political order.”⁴¹ The years 1944 to 1951 saw the US and its Liberal allies embark on a course committed to building institutions to restrain unilateral power and manage peaceful relations. The vast US power differential as compared to the rest of the world, and especially its allies, allowed the possibility of imposing egoist US interests on the international system.

Instead, the US walked the line carefully between Kantian friendship and Lockean rivalry. As in these types of relationships, the US carefully considered, moderated, and merged collective interests with its own self-interests. The US did not dictate conditions, but instead negotiated and compromised based on the particulars of each issue. The behavior of the US in establishing the post-war settlements accurately represents the effective interplay between relationships based on both rivalry and friendship. This example is intuitively understandable at the international level, by analogy to interpersonal relations within a functional society. The difference at the international level is that the US voluntarily chose strategic restraint as a strategy, without the threat of a domestic government to enforce restraint. The society that resulted from these settlements appears to contain elements that balance Lockean and Kantian cultures of

³⁹ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 170.

⁴⁰ Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth : A Political History of the Space Age* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

⁴¹ Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*: 170.

anarchy. The US refused to accept a Hobbesian culture, at least where it could, among the Western bloc of states.

The Western nations' settlements included an American push for an open international economy based on a Liberal, nondiscriminatory, multilateral trading system.⁴² The result was a compromise, an open market-based system of welfare capitalism. The open market economy represents the idea of welfare capitalism, the final ordering principle, or constitutional code, within the Liberal rules-based international order.

The competition between market and command economies is a phenomenon traceable back at least to Athens and Sparta. Thucydides notes that during Pericles' delivery of the war's first funeral oration, he exhorts Athenian principles of success to be equality, priority of merit over class, and open markets that draw "the produce of the world into our harbor."⁴³ He further identifies Athens' deep reserves of capital as a source of power and advantage over Sparta.⁴⁴ Conversely, Sparta was a hierarchically-ordered society based on traditional sources of authority. It was a slave society and a command economy in the extreme sense. Prior to the war in a speech comparing relative power, the Spartan King Archidamus acknowledges Athens' superior economic power and accumulated capital. Archidamus implicitly identifies the Spartan system to be at a disadvantage in potential competition between the two societies because of Athens' greater potential to generate resources and Sparta's inability to influence Athens' economy.⁴⁵ As a result, Archidamus actually wonders aloud how Sparta can win.⁴⁶

McNeill emphasizes the preeminence of market versus command economies when he hypothesizes that "China's rapid evolution towards market-regulated behavior in the centuries on either side of the year 1000 tipped a critical balance in world history"...

⁴² Ikenberry, G. John, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement", in Peter M. Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 289.

⁴³ Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 112-13.

⁴⁴ Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*: 98.

⁴⁵ Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*: 45.

⁴⁶ Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides : A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*: 45.

that “set humankind off on a thousand-year exploration of what could be accomplished by relying on prices and personal or small-group (the partnership or company) perception of private advantage as a way of orchestrating behavior on a mass scale.”⁴⁷ In essence, McNeill attributes the rise of China’s global economic supremacy to its acceptance of private accumulation of capital and market economics. The apogee was reached under the Yuan dynasty from 1227-1368.⁴⁸ Its demise, initiated under the Ming from 1368-1644, though not all at once, followed from China’s move back toward state resource control and command economics.⁴⁹ Had the return been avoided, “Chinese Columbus might well have discovered the west coast of America half a century before the real Columbus blundered into Hispaniola.”⁵⁰

From the fourteenth century onward, Western Europe had unquestionably separated itself from the world in a march toward market capitalism, “thanks to the absence of effective prohibitions against the private accumulation of relatively large amounts of capital.”⁵¹ Europe’s uniquely fragmented political organization prevented any one monarchy or state from achieving self-sufficiency. In addition, military occupations of key industry, such as Liege armaments, always proved counterproductive, actually reducing the manufacture and distribution of weapons.⁵² “Paradoxically, the mix of managerial opposites—kings and ministers struggling against and collaborating with bankers and merchant suppliers—hurried along an ever deepening penetration of market relationships into European society.”⁵³ The development of markets profoundly affected traditional, local, and established patterns of social behavior.

The market created meritocratic results that dissolved more traditional and hierarchical structures. Most people and rulers despised greed and immorality, but could do nothing to surpass the market’s effectiveness at motivating efficient human behavior. Market incentives promoted cooperation amongst strangers and specialization that led to increased technological development. The market was a force in Europe that even the

⁴⁷ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 25.

⁴⁸ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 42.

⁴⁹ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 53, 112.

⁵⁰ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 45.

⁵¹ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 112-13.

⁵² McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 113.

⁵³ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 114.

most powerful monarchies could not contain.⁵⁴ More than that, it transformed the world. By the eighteenth century, the worldwide European-managed system of trade transformed the lives of millions of people from Asia to Africa to the Americas. “[A]ll such people shared the fact that their daily routines of life”... “in which the supply of goods, credit, and protection affected the livelihood, and often governed the physical survival of persons who had no understanding of, nor the slightest degree of control over, the commercial network in which they found themselves enmeshed.”⁵⁵

The post-World War II global economic order, agreed to at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, established a new monetary regime founded upon the US dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency.⁵⁶ The allied negotiators sought a politically acceptable middle ground between a Liberal laissez-faire system on one hand and regional or national capitalist arrangements on the other.⁵⁷ Liberal-minded economists and policy experts created the order through a legitimate process of consensus that extended trade relations and protected welfare capitalism.⁵⁸ US policy makers did not exploit their powerful position, but instead pursued an agreement that would have a normative appeal to leaders in other nations.⁵⁹ As Reinhard Bendix remarked, “Power needs ideas and legitimation”... “the way a conventional bank needs investment policies and the confidence of its depositors.”⁶⁰ The post-World War II economic agreements formalized the market economy as a legitimate constitutional code for the international economic system.

⁵⁴ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 115.

⁵⁵ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 152.

⁵⁶ Ikenberry, G. John, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement", in Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*: 294 n6.

⁵⁷ Ikenberry, G. John, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement", in Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*: 316, 19.

⁵⁸ Ikenberry, G. John, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement", in Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*: 291, 318, 20.

⁵⁹ Ikenberry, G. John, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement", in Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*: 320.

⁶⁰ Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People : Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 16, in Ikenberry, G. John, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement", in Haas, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*: 320.

The Peace of Westphalia thus marks the symbolic beginning of the modern international order.⁶¹ The four constitutional codes (sovereignty, equality, peace, and markets) combine to make up the organizing principles of today's Liberal rules-based international order. The Westphalian Treaty formalized the principle of sovereignty, the Utrecht settlement formalized equality, and the UN Treaty formalized peace.⁶² Meanwhile, the Western European market asserted control over command economies worldwide.⁶³ The contemporary order is consistent with and founded upon various layers of Liberal justifications.⁶⁴ Although the entire Legitimacy Framework cannot be explicated in this chapter, the framework's major points can be shown consistent with Liberal ideas and institutions.

Rules and compliance – Process legitimacy hypothesis

- a. Constitutional codes and principles
 - i. Sovereignty, peace, equality, open markets
- b. International law
 - i. Formal
 - 1. Treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty
 - 2. International institutions such as the UN, World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB)
 - ii. Customary

Justifiability of rules (shared beliefs) – Normative legitimacy hypothesis

- a. Authoritative Sources
 - i. External to the society

⁶¹ Wallerstein, Immanuel, "Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, 1990-2025/2050", 345, in Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*; Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 51; Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis*: 196.

⁶² Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 16-18; Gilpin, Robert, "The Cycle of Great Powers: Has it Finally Been Broken?", 325, in Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*; Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 51-52; UN, "History of the United Nations", <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/>, accessed 19 April 2013.

⁶³ McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*: 102, 14-16.

⁶⁴ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 21-22.

- a. Liberal natural law philosophers – John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, and Joseph Schumpeter
 - ii. Internal to the society
 - a. Tradition/History – 1648, 1712, 1815, 1919, 1945
 - i. Cultural Leaders – US, UK, and France
 - b. Present society – UN member nations’ representatives
 - i. Societal sub-group – Western Liberal nations
- b. Content
 - i. Differentiation
 - a. Military power
 - i. Military contributions to victories of 1648, 1815, 1945
 - b. Economic power
 - i. Scale of economy
 - ii. Gross trade
 - iii. Trade balance
 - ii. Common interests
 - a. Security, autonomy, welfare, and honor
 - b. Liberal ideals
 - i. Representative government
 - ii. Principled respect for others life, liberty, and property
 - iii. Transnational interdependence through cooperative security and trade based market economies

Legitimation conferred (actualization of the order) – Effective legitimacy hypothesis

- a. Expressed consent
 - i. Electoral
 - 1. UN Security Council
 - 2. UN General Assembly
 - 3. Formal alliances
 - a. NATO and US bilateral defense treaties
 - ii. Contractual

1. UN
 2. WTO
 3. WB
 4. Mutual defense treaties
- iii. Mobilization or expressive
1. Public declarations of policy support
 2. Financial contributions to a policy or institution
 3. Troop participation in collective security actions
- b. Rules-values congruence – assessed on a particular event basis
- i. Selective application
 1. Ex. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation
 - ii. Incoherent effects (intentional and unintentional)
 1. Ex. Destabilization of Iraq and the Middle East
- c. Utility
- i. Policy success
 1. Per capita gross domestic product and purchasing power parity (PPP)
 2. Technological advancement
 - ii. Accommodation
 1. Increased incorporation of China and Russia into international society

David Beetham provides an interesting argument that adds insight to the development of the current rule-based international order and its constitutional codes. He highlights that many who scoff at the relevance of legitimacy do so because of its political nature and the realization that from a position outside all power relations it seems that all systems reproduce the conditions for their own legitimation.⁶⁵ The implication is that subordinates can never escape the self-confirming cycle of power; power structures will always consolidate and succeed in justifying themselves, or the

⁶⁵ David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991), 111.

conditions of discourse are manipulated by the powerful to justify themselves or obscure the very nature of their power position.⁶⁶ This position views the normative philosopher as Utopian, because no change can ever be truly meaningful with respect to emancipation from power asymmetries.⁶⁷ Beetham then counters by making an argument that various legitimating principles of different societies are not “value-free,” but qualitatively different in a significant way. The distinction lies in the conditions produced by a given principle and their self-confirming results (or lack thereof).

Representative governance and meritocracy are one-way doors of legitimate process. Meritocracy avails the positions and means of power to all, on a basis of equal opportunity to all.⁶⁸ Representative governance locates the ultimate source of authority for political power in the people.⁶⁹ Together they provide the equal opportunity to acquire power and the equal right to determine the rules that define common interest. Societies do not return to traditional sources of authority once they have experienced legitimacy that does not require self-reference or self-legitimation.⁷⁰ History clearly provides anomalies to this proposition; nevertheless, Beetham’s argument provides a powerful explanation for the last millennium of humanity’s political and social development. Finally, it is necessary to consider the criteria of rightful membership in contemporary international society and the associated implications for US power.

Rightful membership

a. UN Charter

What defines rightful membership in the contemporary international society? Primarily, the UN charter and its criteria determine rightful membership. The legitimate identity required today is being a nation state and having the institutions of a modern state.⁷¹ Chapter II of the UN charter states that membership includes: (1) via Article 3, the original Members and signatories as of 1 January 1942, who ratified the Treaty in accordance with Article 110; and (2) via Article 4, all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the

⁶⁶ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 111-12.

⁶⁷ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 112.

⁶⁸ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 112-13.

⁶⁹ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 113.

⁷⁰ Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*: 111-14.

⁷¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 293.

Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.⁷² Conversely, member states may have their rights and privileges revoked: (1) via Article 5, by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council when preventive or enforcement action is taken by the Security Council against a Member nation; and (2) via Article 6, when a Member has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter they may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.⁷³

Increasingly, additional criteria such as abstaining from genocide, representative governance, and participation in market-based trade are becoming requirements for UN membership.⁷⁴ Not coincidentally, these are Liberal values. As noted in an earlier chapter, Palestine was granted “non-member observer state” status, even though it lacks the basic criteria of territorial statehood.⁷⁵ However, one exception does not redefine the validity of existing principles. In addition to the existing international society, there is a more coherent sub-group possessing a greater harmony of interests and values. Liberal democracies constitute a unique society of their own within the larger international community of states.

Rightful membership for a Liberal society

- a. Liberal-democracy and open market economy
- b. Kantian requirements for Democratic Peace
 - i. Republican representation – institutional restraint
 - ii. Liberal respect – principled respect
 - iii. Transnational interdependence – shared commercial interest

Kant’s theory of a Liberal Pacific Union is based on the assumption that the systemic relation of states cannot be isolated from the varieties of state behavior.⁷⁶ Kant

⁷² UN Charter, Chapter 2, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml> Accessed 28 April 2013.

⁷³ UN Charter, Chapter 2, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml> Accessed 28 April 2013.

⁷⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 293.

⁷⁵ UN News Centre, “General Assembly grants Palestine non-member observer State status at UN”, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43640>, Accessed 3 April 2013.

⁷⁶ Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York ; London: Norton, 1998), 254.

was not a reductionist, but a structural IR theorist.⁷⁷ Liberal nations will share restraint, respect, and interests. The predicted result is an ever-widening pacific union of Liberal states. Doyle analyzed empirical data of armed conflict from the eighteenth century through the present, and did not find a single instance of two Liberal nations going to war.⁷⁸ From this analysis he reinvigorated Kant's theory, renaming it the Democratic Peace Theory.⁷⁹ The DPT requires three necessary and fully sufficient conditions to provide lasting peace amongst Liberal states; Republican representation, Liberal respect, and transnational interdependence constitute three causes that combine to create peace-prone relations between Liberal states. The causes address constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan legal sources, respectively.⁸⁰ The effects of the three conditions are institutional restraint, principled respect, and shared commercial interests.⁸¹ Liberal principles have proved to provide a strong bond of coherence and alliance for Western Liberal nations in times of peace and war. Consequently, the Liberal society of nations possesses a dominant measure of the world's power, regardless of how their coherence is explained.

In sum, the legitimacy framework explains why the system is highly legitimate to Liberal nations and others who believe the principles, rules, and norms are justified *and* meet their self-interests. The Legitimacy Framework has implications for US grand strategy and its approach to sustaining or changing the international system. The current international system meets US needs because the ordering principles align with basic interests well beyond the superficial level; the principle of peace supports the interest of security, the principle of sovereignty supports the interest of autonomy, the principle of free-markets supports the interest of welfare and the principle of equality supports the interest of honor. Additionally, the Liberal system's legitimacy creates a Liberal society of states that ally together, forming a balance of power that deters opposing alliances from forming or creating an alternative international order. Finally, the desire for states to be accepted as legitimate "citizens" in the international society has exerted pressures toward democratization and open markets, two primary US grand strategic objectives.

⁷⁷ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 253.

⁷⁸ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 261-67.

⁷⁹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 253-58, 77-300.

⁸⁰ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 284.

⁸¹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 295.

CHAPTER 4

Grand Strategic Conclusions and Implications

Thinking is also research

Samuel Alexander

The pure strategist understands that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality.

Everett Carl Dolman

It can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind.

Immanuel Kant

The research question that guided the inquiry throughout this thesis was: Does legitimacy increase the sustainability of hegemony? Multiple related theories and empirical evidence convincingly suggest that legitimacy does increase the sustainability of the hegemon and the international system maintained by the hegemon. This conclusion was reached by comparing coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy as means of social control to achieve compliance with the hegemon's system of power rules. Each had separate implications for the operating costs of the international system, the culture of the system, and the character and relationships of the hegemon within the system. It was shown that legitimacy constitutes society, even at the international level, and that the character of international society can be determined through the Legitimacy Framework developed in Chapter Two. Finally, the character of the contemporary international order was shown to be Liberal in origin and content. Because a society's system of power rules restrains both the hegemon and member states, the Liberal character of the international order requires the US to act consistently with its Liberal values in order to preserve the system that gives US power its legitimacy. The Liberal rules-based international order exerts a compliance pull on all states: enemy, rival, and friend, though not all to the same

degree. US actions consistent with Liberal values were shown to be both part of historical progression toward an ideal type of peace and a marshaling of power through Kant's Liberal Pacific Union and Doyle's Democratic Peace Theory. Liberal principles have proved to provide a strong bond of coherence and alliance for Western Liberal nations in times of peace and war. Consequently, the Liberal society of nations possesses a dominant measure of the contemporary world's power. Further, representative governance and meritocratic systems of differentiation have qualitative advantages, beyond simply cultural value-based preference, over traditional forms of governance and ascriptive systems. This marks a historical trend of progress toward systems of power theoretically open to all and accountable to the 'people.' The currents of humanity must be seriously considered and integrated into grand strategy.

The purpose of the research was to relate theory, conclusions, and implications to US grand strategy in order to determine the relevance of legitimacy to grand strategy. Grand strategy is the integration of domestic and international system strategy. Because of the relation of legitimacy to societal coherence and the sustainability of a system of power rules, legitimacy must be a central aim of hegemonic grand strategy. US security and welfare are most dependent on three hierarchically ordered conditions: domestic stability, allied coherence, and the preservation of the Liberal rules-based international order. The thesis, that legitimacy can best facilitate all three conditions simultaneously by providing a bridge between Liberal values and US interests, has strong support. Multiple established theories, including a novel one provided by the author, and empirical evidence led to the conclusion that legitimacy is not only the most cost effective way to preserve the US way of life; it is the only way to do so without fundamentally changing the character of US society.

The primary theoretical tools used to validate the thesis were Weber's three modes of social control: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. Next, Wendt's social theory of international politics helped establish that multiple different cultures of anarchy are possible in the international environment. This opened the door to move beyond an exclusive reliance on Waltz's status quo realism. Realism represents only one sub-culture within international society, and not necessarily even the most prominent or influential culture on state behavior. Instead, three cultures of anarchy are present in

today's international environment in varying degrees: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Because culture constructs identity, which is prior to and forms preference, there are three resulting role types, each associated with the rules of power within each of the three cultures of anarchy just listed. The theoretical roles types are "enemy" from Hobbesian culture, "rival" from Lockean culture, and "friend" from Kantian culture. These can be associated with the three modes of social control (coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy) respectively. Kantian society is really associated with a particular kind of legitimacy—Liberal legitimacy. This is because legitimacy constitutes society and its system of power rules, but says nothing of the *type* of society or rules.

The four elemental building blocks of legitimacy are relationship, power, rules, and morality. Anywhere these four preconditions exist, so does legitimacy. Therefore, legitimacy is a means to reconcile disputes over the rightful application of power through rules in society. It seems the concept of legitimizing power into acceptable authority may be as old as society itself, yet just as relevant today. The character of legitimacy evolved through history and is unique to each society; its substance is not fixed, but its framework is. Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy is not an absolute set of rules, but is instead the norms of a specific cultural system at any given time and place within a construct of rules, justifications, and legitimating practices.⁸²

The synthesized definition of legitimacy constructed for this essay is a political property, spectral in nature, interpreted through perception, of rightness or oughtness, which induces compliance and self-restraint through shared morality, exercised explicitly and implicitly.⁸³ In its simplest statement, legitimacy is the congruence of rules and morality, reinforced through events. The purpose or intended effect of legitimacy is the acceptance of a system of power, commonly called society.

⁸² Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 13.

⁸³ This definition's basis is a confluence of conceptual extensions from David Beetham, Thomas Franck, Ian Clark, Andrew Hurrell, Martha Finnemore, and Alexander Wendt. David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991); Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16-18; Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 29; Finnemore, Martha, "Fights about rules: the role of efficacy and power in changing multilateralism", 201-202, in J. D. Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge studies in international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

The primary problem addressed in this inquiry takes us back full circle to the first sentence in this thesis. All great powers fall. History can provide no exception. International systems rise and fall as well. Their fate is often related but not always interdependent. The evolution of governance is not over, but instead remains an enduring political competition between control and liberty, governance by power and consent of the governed, command and market economies, long-standing sources of power and nascent ones, interests and values, as well as the West and the East. The rise of China marks a shift in international power from the West to the East. How is the US postured to deal with changing geopolitical realities?

Declining US power and increasing US commitments, both foreign and domestic, have caused the US to accumulate staggering debt, threatening the sustainment of US hegemony and the Liberal rules-based international system. The US debt has become a national security problem. Therefore, the US needs to pursue a more cost efficient and effective grand strategy. Material considerations alone cannot effectively optimize US foreign policy and actions. Instead, the US should base grand strategy on a better understanding of the sources of US domestic and international power, specifically, resolving the apparent conflict between US self-interests and values will lead to a more consistent, effective, and efficient grand strategy. Legitimacy is an effective measure to discriminate between potential courses of action by providing a bridge between values and interests.

The US still has many opportunities due to its unique status as the first global hegemon the world has even seen.⁸⁴ Preeminence offers the US a choice between furthering the Liberal restraints in the international order or exercising its hegemonic position to maximize unilateral advantage. The Iraq War of 2003 to 2011 is a principal example of the failure to reconcile values and interests. The war, ultimately judged illegitimate by some, divided the US domestically and from its allies, eroded the

⁸⁴ Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff : America's Defense of the New World Order* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), Chapter 3, 75-76; Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 159; G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), Preface, 42, 45.

foundations of the international system, and set a dangerous precedent of preventive war.⁸⁵

The fate of the US is tied directly to the operation of the international system of institutions it helped establish. The US has a material advantage it is likely to maintain for the next fifteen to twenty-five years.⁸⁶ Even if China's GDP exceeds the US, China's per capita income will remain well below the US through 2030.⁸⁷ The US's true strength lies in its leadership position within the Liberal rules-based international order. This is nothing new for a poly-ethnic international order.

Finally, the argument, the theory, and the Legitimacy Framework can be summarized with the implications identified through research:

Assumption 1: The domestic environment is of hierarchic nature.⁸⁸

Assumption 2: The international environment is of anarchic nature.⁸⁹

Proposition: Anarchy is what the international society of states makes of it.⁹⁰

The implication of this proposition is that three primary cultures of anarchy are present in contemporary international society: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures.⁹¹ States compete over creating the dominant culture of international society.

Theory of politics: Legitimacy is the propelling principle of sustainability in society, domestic and international.⁹²

Hypothesis 1: *Process Legitimacy increases system sustainability by reducing operating costs.*

Legitimacy conceptually links rules and self-interests through an implicit justification that the rules are in the self-interest of states.⁹³ Further, it does so through constitutional codes, law, and institutions to execute governance in international society.

⁸⁵ Falk, Richard, "Legality and legitimacy: the quest for principled flexibility and restraint", 50, Armstrong, Farrell, and Maignushca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁸⁶ Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*: 1.

⁸⁷ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 44.

⁸⁸ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010), 88.

⁸⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: 88.

⁹⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 254-55, 308-12.

⁹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: Chapter 6.

⁹² This is the author's theory, based on the research and concepts contained herein.

⁹³ Armstrong, David, and Farrell, Theo, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Introduction", 5; Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 18-20, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maignushca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

So long as the process of governance accommodates and resolves the development of power asymmetries, the system will undertake incremental changes and avoid possible disequilibrium.⁹⁴ This reduces the cost of operating the international order because it increases voluntary compliance and reduces the need for material coercion and expensive inducements.⁹⁵ Process legitimacy maintains an acceptable system to the powers capable of challenging the system, at an acceptable operating cost to the leadership of the system.⁹⁶ A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope.⁹⁷

Hypothesis 2: *Normative Legitimacy increases sustainability of hegemonic power by constituting the coherence of domestic, allied, and international societies.*

Alliances are, to a degree, based on substantive norms that are justifiable on the basis of shared goals and values such as human rights, self-determination, and defense of open markets against a common threat.⁹⁸ Domestic populations hold substantive norms, analogous to alliances, but possess a stronger shared identity based on superior political coherence, shared values, and united purpose such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.⁹⁹ Hegemonic or peer leader actions, consistent with normative legitimacy, reinforce the respective shared identities of the domestic and allied groups, while reducing fear of hegemonic exploitation of power by demonstrating strategic restraint.¹⁰⁰ This increases domestic and allied political coherence, thereby increasing the potential

⁹⁴ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 33, 70; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 40-49, 186-210; S.T.S.B.G. Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War: The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 209.

⁹⁵ Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16, 19.

⁹⁶ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁹⁷ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 1-2.

⁹⁸ Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 20-21, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*.

⁹⁹ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 5.

¹⁰⁰ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 105, 213, 52, 322, 25, 60.

for future coherent actions.¹⁰¹ An order with a large normative legitimate group does not make conflict impossible, but it may limit its occurrence. This is because a united alliance may deter aggression by its existence or apply coercive measures short of war to deter enemies. Further, it increases domestic and allied support when wars do occur.

Hypothesis 3: *Effective Legitimacy promotes system stability through public demonstrations of consent, congruence, and utility of the current order.*

Effective legitimacy confers legitimacy through three distinct processes of legitimation. Public consent makes evident the subordinate's acceptance of the rules of power. Rules-values congruence is the agreement or coincidence between the application of a rule and its principled purpose.¹⁰² Finally, utility represents the capacity of the system to achieve desirable outcomes such as security and welfare in relatively distributed fairness.¹⁰³ Hegemonic actions, consistent with effective legitimacy, reinforce the utility of the system by meeting desirable outcomes within the system constraints for a sufficient number of members. Effective legitimacy increases hegemonic soft power and reduces risks for bandwagoning states. It also demonstrates to neutrals and potential adversaries that strategic restraint can produce acceptable, if sometimes sub-optimal, outcomes. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure and the peace that follows will be justified as a better expression of the "legitimate" general consensus.¹⁰⁴ Legitimation is essential to bring shared beliefs and the rules intended to implement those beliefs into actual being through concrete actions. Legitimation not only actualizes a system of power, it also reinforces and confers legitimacy back into the system. It completes the feedback loop from belief to implementation to experience, which in turn informs belief.

¹⁰¹ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 164, 68; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf; [distributed by Random House, 1972), 217, 19-20; Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War: The Definitive English Translation by Samuel B. Griffith*: 100, 14, 24.

¹⁰² Franck uses coherence instead of congruence, and includes the principles previously employed to solve similar problems, and a lattice of principles in use to resolve different problems. Congruence better represents the author's concept. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 147-48.

¹⁰³ Armstrong, David, and Farrell, Theo, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Introduction", 5; Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", 20, in Armstrong, Farrell, and Maignashca, *Force and Legitimacy in World Politics*; Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*: 16-18.

¹⁰⁴ Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*: 1-2.

The research of the three hypotheses led to some relevant implications:

1st General Implication – The US cannot employ a primarily coercive grand strategy: (1) without changing US identity and its fundamental values because coercion is inconsistent with Liberal tenets of principled respect and shared commercial interests; (2) and, without changing the Liberal rules-based international order because one primary purpose of the order is institutional restraint.¹⁰⁵

2nd General Implication – A legitimate system, deemed so by a sufficient number of members, changes the cost-benefit calculations of all actors within a system but in varying degrees.

3rd General Implication – States have a choice about their self-interests and the level of cooperation they associate with self-interest. States can choose to be egoist and pursue unilateral interests, or to incorporate varying degrees of respect for others up to and including community and multilateral interests.

4th General Implication – The international system is what the states make of it. The structural roles of enemy, rival, and friend are necessary to explain state interactions. Functional differentiation explanations are based on structural role differentiation and roles may be symmetric or asymmetric.¹⁰⁶

5th General Implication – US interests are Liberal in origin and therefore implicitly linked to US values and the legitimacy of the international system.

6th General Implication – Legitimacy is the glue that forms societies, domestic and international. Most citizens voluntarily comply with legitimate societal rules.

7th General Implication – Legitimacy will not pull toward compliance equally on all actors, enemy, rival, and friend, thus coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy are all necessary components of any grand strategy.

Implications for Coercion:

¹⁰⁵ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*: 295.

¹⁰⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*: 256.

1. Egoistic states may only respond to coercion because no level of inducements or justification of rules will satisfy their desire for relative dominance. However, most men and states are both, self-interested and moral.
2. As a means of influence, coercion is necessary against enemies, but is only consistent with Liberal character in defense of the accepted principles of sovereignty, peace, equality, and open markets.
3. Coercion is counterproductive in relations with rivals and friends.

Implications for Self-Interest:

1. As a means of influence, inducing self-interest is necessary in dealing with rivals who are not full citizens of the Liberal society.
2. As a means of influence, inducing self-interest is expensive and produces only temporary compliance.

Implications for Legitimacy:

1. Legitimacy preserves power by exerting a pull toward voluntary compliance.
2. Legitimacy exerts a compliance pull on everyone because of shared knowledge of formal and customary rules, whether the rules are agreed upon or not, so long as the society it constitutes is sufficiently powerful. However, the pull acts in differing degrees depending on the degree of internalization of the rules.
3. Legitimacy limits power, so US compliance limits the threat posed by US power. This delegitimizes counterbalancing alliances opposed to the US. It also delegitimizes opposing justifications for international order that do not limit power.

Building on the implications, the three hypotheses can be better placed in context through the Legitimacy Framework, established in Chapter Two. The framework is comprised of first and second order principles. The first order principles, prerequisites to constituting international society, are rightful membership and rightful conduct.¹⁰⁷ They are necessary to establish legitimacy as a formal property of international society. The second order principles, compliance, justification, and legitimation, are useful to evaluate a system's *degree* of legitimacy and characterize the contextually specific *type* of

¹⁰⁷ Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 5, 24-29.

legitimacy in the international system, assess the degree of societal coherence; and identify (the core of society or) the coherence of the powerful sub-groups within the society.

Applying the Legitimacy Framework to the contemporary international system demonstrates the Liberal character of the current rules-based international order. The Peace of Westphalia marks the symbolic beginning of the modern order.¹⁰⁸ The four constitutional codes (sovereignty, equality, peace, and markets) combine to make up the organizing principles of today's Liberal rules-based international order. The Westphalian Treaty formalized the principle of sovereignty, the Utrecht settlement formalized equality, and the UN Treaty formalized peace.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, the Western European market asserted control over command economies worldwide.¹¹⁰ The contemporary order is consistent with and founded upon various layers of Liberal justifications.¹¹¹ In addition, Liberal principles have proved to provide a strong bond of coherence and alliance for Western Liberal nations in times of peace and war. Consequently, the Liberal society of nations possesses a dominant measure of the world's power, regardless of how their coherence is explained.

The current Liberal international system meets US needs because the ordering principles align with basic interests well beyond the superficial level; the principle of peace supports the interest of security, the principle of sovereignty supports the interest of autonomy, the principle of free markets supports the interest of welfare, and the principle of equality supports the interest of honor. Additionally, the Liberal system's legitimacy creates a Liberal society of states that ally together, forming a balance of power that deters opposing alliances from forming or creating an alternative international order.

¹⁰⁸ Wallerstein, Immanuel, "Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, 1990-2025/2050", 345, in Geir Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oslo; Oxford: Scandinavian University Press; Oxford University Press, 1994); Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*: 51; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London; New York: Routledge, 1992), 196.

¹⁰⁹ Bull, Hoffmann, and Hurrell, *The Anarchical Society*: 16-18; Gilpin, Robert, "The Cycle of Great Powers: Has it Finally Been Broken?", 325, in Lundestad, *The Fall of Great Powers : Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*; Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 51-52; UN, "History of the United Nations", <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/>, accessed 19 April 2013.

¹¹⁰ W.H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 102, 14-16.

¹¹¹ Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*: 21-22.

Finally, the desire for states to be accepted as legitimate “citizens” in the international society has exerted pressures toward democratization and free markets, two primary US grand strategic objectives.

The four historic tenets of US grand strategy are effective, but insufficient without a fifth that recognizes the relation of US power to the current system of international rules. The four fundamental ways the US has sought to provide for its security and welfare are: defense of the homeland; defense of allies and partners; promotion of and access to open markets; and the promotion of Liberal democratic governance.¹¹² The end of the Cold War and the elevation of the US’s hegemonic preeminence to sole superpower status necessitate adding a fifth principle of US grand strategy: the sustainment of a Liberal rules-based international order. This fulfills the idea that grand strategy is a process to achieve continuing political advantage through an indirect approach that seeks to manage the international and domestic structural systems.¹¹³

To overcome the problem of unsustainable costs and endless global interventions, the US needs a more effective and efficient grand strategy. The solution is a simple one - fall back on the US’s enduring sources of power. The US should intentionally pursue legitimacy as an aim of grand strategy because doing so reinforces the current system of power rules, which are built upon US values and meet US interests. The US should intentionally avoid actions easily perceived as egoistically self-interested because doing so perpetuates the opinion that the US is merely a modern day empire, though employed with more nuanced rhetoric than those of the past.

The American Revolution changed the world forever. It brought forth a powerful republic, but more importantly, the enlightened nation of which Kant spoke. Since then, the US has attracted many to its side through its principles and its actions. These ideas are worth sustaining and preserving as long as possible. Ultimately, this author recommends a grand strategy fully consistent with the character of US society, its allies, and the US constructed Liberal rules-based international order because these are the essence of US power and hegemony and the key to continuing the American way of life.

¹¹² Steve Wright, *Linking US Grand Strategy to US Strategic Security Strategy*, 16 October 2012, slide 8.

¹¹³ Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age*: 6.

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