CANDOR IN THE U.S. ARMY'S MISSION COMMAND
PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND

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Although prominently mentioned in previous generations of Army leadership doctrine, explicit mention of candor is completely absent from the U.S. Army's mission command philosophy of command doctrine. Candor's benefits in organizational leadership, including its enhancement of mutual trust and indirect facilitation of shared understanding, helps to strengthen these two foundational elements of mission command and helps build cohesive teams and create shared understanding more efficiently. The additional benefits of candor to leader development provides added relevance to the concept as the U.S. Army deals with post-war transition and talent management within a leaner force. Although developing candor in an organization is difficult due to a multitude of obstacles within the human domain, well-implemented organizational systems and norms can aid in generating candor throughout the organization. Ultimately, the benefits of candor to individuals and entire organizations, if incorporated into the mission command philosophy, provide compelling support for the concept of candor within U.S. Army doctrine. Furthermore, the complexity in developing a culture of candor indicates that candor requires explicit inclusion into the mission command philosophy to explain its purpose and implementation if it truly is a principle valued by U.S. Army leadership.

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ABSTRACT

CANDOR IN THE U.S. ARMY'S MISSION COMMAND PHILOSOPHY OF
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AR	Army Regulation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CO	Commanding Officer
COL	Colonel
COP	Combat Outpost
CPT	Captain
CSS	Central Security Service
DA	Department of the Army
FM	Field Manual
GEN	General
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HQ DA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ITAS	Improved Target Acquisition System
LRAS3	Long Range Advance Scout Surveillance System
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
MSAF360	Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback 360

NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NSA	National Security Agency
TC	Training Circular
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire Guided
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
1LT	First Lieutenant
1SG	First Sergeant

ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

       There are apparently two types of successful soldiers. Those who get on by being unobtrusive and those who get on by being obtrusive. I am of the latter type and seem to be rare and unpopular: but it is my method. One has to choose a system and stick to it; people who are not themselves are nobody.
       — George S. Patton, *Letter from General George S. Patton to His Son*

From his written correspondence, one can plainly see that General Patton believed there was value in candor and that it had a direct contribution to his success. He describes that there are two types of Soldiers within the U.S. Armed Forces: those who obtain success by being obtrusive, or forward in manner or conduct; and those who do the same by avoiding extra attention through conformity. We can tell through his words that General Patton believed himself to be of the former category and looked upon the latter individuals with a level of disdain, naturally favoring his own straightforwardness.

Candor has been a popular topic of discussion in the business world over the last 10-15 years, primarily due to organizational leadership's focus on increasing productivity and output using intangibles and low cost means such as candor. Although this idea could be a fad in the competitive business environment, it seems that candor may be an enduring attribute present in healthy and successful organizational climates. Articles, books, and other literature regarding candor tend to agree that candor is a positive component to have in an organization, however, just as any other intangible, there are challenges is in measurement and assessment in an organization and in discovering effective methods to encourage it to permeate the organization.

1

Candor was described in the 1990 edition of the Army's principle leadership manual, Field Manual (FM) 22-100, as one of four values expected of all Soldiers, not just leaders. The publication defines candor as "being frank, open, honest, and sincere with your Soldiers, seniors, and peers" (HQ DA 1990, 23). As General Patton's quote indicates, candor was a personal guiding principle for his Army career in 1944, well before indoctrination of the concept for the entire Army nearly 50 years later in 1990. However, with at least 70 years of history in the United States' profession of arms, candor is not included in the Army's current mission command philosophy doctrine, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, and is mentioned only four times in the Army's current leadership doctrine, ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22 (HQ DA 2012b; HQ DA 2012c; HQ DA 2012e; HQ DA 2012f).

The primary purpose of this qualitative meta-analysis of literature is to explore organizational candor and current U.S. Army mission command philosophy doctrine to understand the impacts of organizational candor on an Army organization as it is applied through the Army mission command philosophy doctrine. This qualitative research will then be applied to a single case study of the Battle of Wanat to provide real-word, U.S. Army context as method for discussing candor's potential roles in the mission command philosophy with the intent of recommending explicit or implicit inclusion of candor in Army mission command philosophy doctrine.

Primary Research Question

Should candor be explicitly included in the U.S. Army's mission command philosophy of command doctrine?

What is the definition of candor?

What are candor's organizational impacts?

What is candor's role within the mission command philosophy of command?

What are the obstacles to developing candor?

How can candor be developed in an organization?

How can candor be measured or assessed?

Assumptions

The following assumptions add relevance to this study:

First, Army doctrine contained within ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, is insufficient alone in outlining a baseline Army mission command philosophy of command as evidenced by the presence of separate doctrine, ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, to address the philosophy.

Second, candor's absence from the Army's mission command philosophy of command was not deliberate nor does it imply the Army believes candor does not or should not serve a role or purpose in the mission command philosophy of command.

Third, the U.S. Army is, by necessity, an authoritative and hierarchical institution, which is not unlike many businesses and corporations. In addition, the concept of candor is human based and does not violate the Army's values or policies as evidenced by its limited presence in current Army doctrine. Therefore, it can be assumed that candor's impacts on a business or corporate organization that is similar in structure to the Army would produce similar impacts on an Army organization. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Command and General Staff College's Department of Command and

Leadership validates this assumption through the regular practice of utilizing qualitative leadership research comparing corporate business and the Army in instruction for the Command and General Staff Officers Course, Pre-Command Course, and the U.S. Army War College.

Definitions

The Army's "mission command philosophy of command," defined in *ADP* 6-0 and ADRP 6-0, will be referred to as "mission command philosophy" throughout this study.

Delimitations

The following are delimitations to this study to limit its scope and focus specifically on the application of candor to mission command philosophy doctrine:

First, the human aspects, or psychological analysis, of candor and the application of candor, including socialization and American culture as it relates to the individual practice of candor will not be explored in depth. However, the human aspects of candor will be discussed briefly within the study for a basic understanding because the overarching concept may prove relevant to the application of candor at the individual and organization levels. It will not be discussed in further scientific detail due to the complexity and minimal relevance of the underlying details to the mission command philosophy.

Second, the study will only explore explicit inclusion within the mission command philosophy doctrine contained within current ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*. The doctrinal limitation is due to the mission command philosophy forming

the foundation of all command philosophies for organizations within the U.S. Army as directed and implied through the publication of the doctrine. Other doctrinal publications will be discussed and are undoubtedly linked to mission command doctrine, but the goal of the research is to provide a logical, reinforced recommendation regarding the explicit inclusion of candor within the mission command philosophy only.

<div align="center">Significance and Conclusion</div>

This qualitative, meta-analysis explores the relevance of candor in the Army's mission command philosophy and its impacts on the organization. If candor plays a significant role and can positively affect an organization, it is important to explore research supported methods and guidelines for cultivating a culture of candor within the organization to implement candor at the organizational level. Additionally, it would be important for a commander to communicate his or her vision of candor through their individual philosophy of command if candor is not explicitly stated in mission command doctrine and remains absent in future doctrinal revisions.

Ultimately, candor may be a beneficial concept for the Army as it transitions from current operational engagements and realigns the force under fiscal constraints while preparing to win in a future, global, complex environment. As Army leaders challenge individuals and organizations to adopt a mantra of adaptable, agile, innovative leadership, candor may be a key component in fostering open dialogue and collaboration to find creative solutions to problems and improve the Army's capabilities with fewer resources while managing talent within a leaner force structure.

This research aims to enhance the understanding of candor, its impacts on an organization through the mission command philosophy, its applicability to the Army, and

methods to develop it within an organization, all with the goal of improving the Army

and its subordinate organizations as required by Army leadership doctrine.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> The first change the rest of the senior leadership team and I want to see at NSA
> and in CSS will look trivial to some and scary to others: we want each of us to
> give and get honest, candid feedback about the things that count every day to the
> people we work with and for. Tell it like you see it. We're not inviting you to be
> rude, but we don't want anyone to be shy about important things. We want
> everyone at every level to know what's really going on, and to know when they,
> personally, need to act to make it better. I expect this every step of the way up the
> chain to me. We can and will work with bad news and controversies, but we can't
> and won't tolerate not hearing about them. I don't want you to, either.
> — Michael Hayden, "Change, Candor, and Honesty"

Army doctrine defines leadership as "the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization" (HQ DA 2012f, 1-1). This definition is unique to the Army in that it calls on leaders not only to accomplish the mission, but also to "improve the organization" (HQ DA 2012f, 1-1). Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael V. Hayden, U.S. Air Force, although not operating under the construct of Army doctrine, supports this unique U.S. Army definition of leadership in the above note penned to his entire organization during transformation efforts with the NSA and CSS. LTG Hayden asked the individuals in his organization to "give and get honest, candid feedback . . . to act to make [the NSA/CSS] better" and believed this could be achieved, in whole or in part, by encouraging an environment of candor within the NSA and CSS (Hayden 1999).

In 2007, General (GEN) Hayden, acting as the Central Intelligence Agency director, demonstrated his belief in candor by declassifying some of the agency's deepest secrets that were hidden from the public for over three decades. The New York Times reported, "Hayden said it was essential for the C.I.A., an organization built on a bedrock

of secrecy, to be as open as possible in order to build public trust and dispel myths surrounding its operations" (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 7-8). Again, GEN Hayden demonstrates that he believes candor will improve the CIA as an organization, through its relationship with the American people primarily by means of building trust and confidence. Clearly, GEN Hayden believes candor is important and has made it a priority as leader of high profile government organizations, but what exactly is candor?

<u>Candor in Doctrine</u>

Mission command doctrine defines the concepts that guide the execution of decisive action to support unified land operations, which is the Army's contribution to unified action. Unified action is the doctrinal umbrella that all branches of the U.S. military share with other governmental and non-governmental organizations to achieve unity of effort (HQ DA 2011, iii). One of the four foundations of unified land operations is the mission command philosophy – "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations" (HQ DA 2011, 6).

As mentioned in the introduction, candor is completely absent in mission command doctrine, receiving no explicit mention in both ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0. However, it is possible that candor is implied or discussed in concept, which is most evident in *Mission Command* regarding the creation of shared understanding.

> Establishing a culture of collaboration is difficult but necessary. Through collaboration and dialogue, participants share information and perspectives, question assumptions, and exchange ideas to help create and maintain shared understanding, resolve potential misunderstandings, and assess the progress of operations. Shared understanding takes time to establish. Successful commanders

8

> invest the time and effort to visit with Soldiers, subordinate leaders, and partners to understand their issues and concerns. Through such interaction, subordinates and partners gain insight into the commander's leadership style and the issues and concerns of the commander. (HQ DA 2012e, 2-3)

Although candor may be implied, ADRP 6-0 makes no mention of the quality of the communication between parties, how to develop this type of climate, or its impacts beyond creating shared understanding.

This absence of explicitly mentioned candor in mission command doctrine is insignificant without consideration of ADP 1, *The Army*, and ADRP 1, *The Army Profession,* which together explicitly mention candor three times. These capstone publications of the Army profession link candor to trust directly and explicitly, saying, "trust between all levels depends upon candor" (HQ DA 2012a, 2-2). Again, this statement alone may be insignificant, except for the fact that ADP 1 and ADRP 1 explain that trust is an absolutely vital characteristic of the Army profession, both internally within the service and externally to sister services, the American public, and the Nation's civilian leadership (HQ DA 2012a, 2-2–2-3). Army doctrine indisputably emphasizes and depends upon trust to legitimize the profession of arms' existence.

Mission command doctrine also emphasizes trust as one of its six principles: "Build cohesive teams through mutual trust" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-1). Curiously, though, the candor that ADP 1 says trust depends on is nowhere to be found within the mission command doctrine. ADRP 6-0 makes mention of "two-way communication and interaction" and utilizing interpersonal skills to build relationships, but candor is never specifically addressed or defined (HQ DA 2012e, 2-1–2-2). The absence of candor becomes even more prolific when previous generations of doctrine are examined and the Army's current definition of candor from leadership doctrine is considered.

9

Candor was a significant principle in FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, published in 1990, as one of four values (the others being commitment, competence, and courage) expected of all Soldiers, including "leaders and led." The publication defines candor as "being frank, open, honest, and sincere with your Soldiers, seniors, and peers" (HQ DA 1990, 23). Current leadership doctrine outlined in ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, provides the Army's current definition of candor, which is similar to the previous version: "Candor means being frank, honest, and sincere with others. It requires impartiality and fairness" (HQ DA 2012f, 3-3).

Although the two definitions are comparable, their primary difference comes from their doctrinal context, not definition. While FM 22-100 discusses candor as one of four, individual values, ADRP 6-22 discusses candor as a method of expressing moral courage, which is a subset of personal courage, the seventh Army value. Interestingly, FM 22-100 also addresses moral courage, as a subset of the value of courage, but it is a concept independent from candor.

ADRP 6-22 defines moral courage as "the willingness to stand firm on values, principles, and convictions" and links moral courage to candor by affirming "Moral courage also expresses itself as candor" (HQ DA 2012f, 3-3). From this definition we can infer that, by Army doctrine's definition, candor is merely a method to communicate personal or organizational "values, principles, and convictions" which then demonstrates moral courage. However, candor can also be used with the intent of expressing personal opinions, ideas, or assessments that are independent of personal or organizational morals or "values, principles, and convictions." Therefore, one could conclude solely from

ADRP 6-22 that candor is merely a method of expressing moral courage and is not equivalent to moral courage in regards to the Army's doctrinal definition.

FM 22-100 defined moral courage as "the courage to stand firm on your values, your moral principles, and your convictions. An individual demonstrates moral courage when they do something based on one of your values or moral principles, knowing that the action may not be in your best interest" (HQ DA 1990, 23). This definition, alongside the independent definition of candor, implies that moral courage is completely independent from candor and that moral courage expresses itself in other ways than just candor, reaffirming the previous conclusion that moral courage is not equivalent to candor.

Although the doctrinal definition of candor remains nearly identical between the outdated FM 22-100 and the current ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22, the question remains: How does the U.S. Army's doctrinal definition of candor relate to the definition for other non-military organizations in regards to organizational leadership?

<u>Candor Defined Outside U.S. Army Doctrine</u>

Merriam-Webster defines candor as "the quality of being open, sincere, and honest" which is consistent with the Army's doctrinal definition (Merriam-Webster 2014). However, an examination of candor's definition in organizational leadership literature and research can ensure that the Army's definition is synonymous to enable further analysis with the intent of applying concepts explained outside of the military framework to the military and more specifically, the Army.

Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric for 20 years, describes candor in his 2005 book *Winning* by describing the inverse, or lack of candor. He describes a lack of candor as:

> How too many people–too often–instinctively don't express themselves with frankness. They don't communication straightforwardly or put forth ideas looking to stimulate real debate. They just don't open up. Instead they withhold comments or criticism. They keep their mouths shut in order to make people feel better to avoid conflict, and they sugarcoat bad news in order to maintain appearances. They keep things to themselves, hoarding information. (Welch 2005, 25-26)

Welch's inverted definition of candor indicates that the doctrinal Army definition is consistent with that of a non-military organizational leader, because if there is candor, people are frank in expression, straightforward, and open. Welch's definition also suggests that lack of candor can have negative impacts or effects.

Warren Bennis, a widely recognized expert in organizational leadership, describes candor in his 1999 *Leader to Leader* article "The Leadership Advantage" as "perhaps the most important component of trust. When we are truthful about shortcomings, or acknowledge that we do not have all the answers, we earn the understanding and respect of others" (Bennis 1999, 5). Bennis' statement indicates that candor involves truth telling or honesty, but primarily concerns communication of negative information. Although it is much more limited in description and scope than the Army definition and Welch's description, Bennis' description is still within agreement. His description, like Welch's, includes suggestions of candor's impacts for further examination.

According to Bennis, Daniel Goleman, and James O'Toole's book, *Transparency: How Leaders Create a Culture of Candor*, the definition of candor is much clearer. The distinguished authors describe it as "the free flow of information within an organization and between the organization and its many stakeholders, including the public . . . the

organization's effectiveness depends upon it" (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 3).

The most interesting part of this definition is the confidently asserted positive relationship

Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole establish between candor and organizational

effectiveness. The authors, from their description, imply candor has at least one positive

effect: increased organizational effectiveness.

In his 2006 *Industrial Management* article "Practicing Candor," David Antonioni,

an associate professor of management at the University of Wisconsin-Madison school of

business, describes candor as being "open, straightforward, and sincere in our expression,

sharing what we think without evasion and without being rude" (Antonioni 2006, 2).

Antonioni's definition again agrees with that of Welch, Bennis, and ADRP 6-22, but he

includes a rule governing its use that neither Welch, Bennis, or Army doctrine address,

which suggests that he believes candor should be controlled to some extent, which in turn

suggests that candor can have either unintended or negative impacts.

Nancy Eberhardt, a former regional bank president with background in industrial

and organizational psychology, describes candor in her book *Uncommon Candor: A*

Leader's Guide to Straight Talk as "simple and sincere honesty. When it lapses in a big

way, our respect for leadership erodes" (Eberhardt 2013a, 11). This statement makes it

seem as though Eberhardt believes that candor is merely honesty, but she clarifies this

later by indicating that lack of candor is not necessarily lying. Lack of candor, as she

describes, is diverting emphasis from or holding back an individual's true feelings either

solicited or unsolicited, regarding a certain issue (Eberhardt 2013a, 15). She goes on to

affirm, "Candor is honesty in communication that is helpfully forthright in a way that

supports people's success and fully shares impressions of 'how it is for you'" (Eberhardt

2013a, 29). Finally, Eberhardt explains, "Candor, by its nature, also is succinct, without irrelevant information" (Eberhardt 2013a, 33). It is apparent that Eberhardt's continuously revised descriptions of candor indicate that effective communication is an important trait of candor and implies that communication must be present to even demonstrate candor. It is important to note that within her descriptions, Eberhardt touches on some of candor's impacts that will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.

James Bolton, CEO of the firm Ridge Training, whose goal is to improve organizations, may provide the most succinct description of candor in regards to organizational leadership. In his 2006 *Industrial and Commerical Training* article "The Candor Imperative," Bolton affirms, "most people think of candor as 'telling the truth'. But in meaning and in practice, candor is closer to 'authenticity' than it is to 'truth'" (Bolton 2006, 2). He bases his affirmation on the combination of two definitions of candor: "frankness or sincerity of expression" and "freedom from prejudice; impartiality" (Bolton 2006, 2). Bolton's succinctness in regards to organizations is introduced with his refined definition around his concept of "rigorous candor." He proposes that rigorous candor creates "the interpersonal openness that creates fertile ground where different perspectives can be explored . . . candor is a source of actionable organizational wisdom that, in small ways and large yield the competitive advantages" (Bolton 2006, 2). As common with the other definitions relative to each other, Bolton's unmodified definition is within agreement. However, his theories of candor's impacts are contained within a separate, modified definition of candor, which he refers to as "rigorous candor." By doing this, Bolton implies that candor requires a separate definition when is applied to an

organization because it involves individuals interacting under the premise of candor, and therefore the interaction must be further defined.

Just like Bolton, Colonel (COL) Paul Paolozzi, a senior Army officer with command experience at the company, battalion, and brigade level, goes beyond a standard definition to describe candor in his 2013 research study titled "Closing the Candor Chasm: The Missing Element of Army Professionalism." Simply, COL Paolozzi initially defines candor as "openly expressing truth and being transparent," but he goes on to describe four different methods candor is employed between individuals, a concept he titles "the four facets of candor." The four facets he describes are: subordinate to senior candor, senior to subordinate candor, peer candor, and self-candor (Paolozzi 2013, 5-9). COL Paolozzi's "four facets" is a theory that predicts the relationship conditions in which one could observe candor during human interaction within an organization-it provides us with context. The "four facets" concept is important because it implies that a requirement for an individual to exhibit candor is at least one other individual on the receiving end of the candid interaction. This suggests that the concept of candor is dependent on the relationships between individuals. Furthermore, this also implies that any of candor's impacts would affect that relationship and the group/organization the relationship resides within, not just the individual being candid.

In their well sourced 2009 *Journal of Leadership* research titled "Creating a Culture of Candor in the Leadership Classroom," Timothy Galpin and J. Lee Whittington, both professors at University of Dallas Graduate School of Management, describe candor as being synonymous with "frankness, openness, honesty, forthrightness, and straightforwardness" (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 10). Galpin and Whittington go

on to then describe candor in the negative by affirming "lack of candor amounts to a cordial hypocrisy in which we are aware of problems, but refuse to discuss them in a meaningful and constructive way" (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 11). Similar to other descriptions, Galpin's affirmation implies that the presence of candor can have positive effects and the lack of it produces negative effects.

It is important to set a definition for candor as a constant to ensure doctrinal comparisons to other literature are appropriate for the remainder of this study. Through examining definitions of candor, it is reasonable to conclude that the Army's definition of candor as defined in its most recent doctrine, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, agrees with the public's definition based on candor's dictionary definition as well as the definitions from multiple organizational leadership experts. For the purposes of this thesis, the Army's most current definition of candor as provided in ADRP 6-22 will be utilized. Table 1 provides a visual, side-by-side comparison of the doctrinal and reviewed literature definitions of candor.

Table 1. Candor Definitions by Source

Source	Definition
(Antonioni 2006)	"open, straightforward, and sincere in expression, sharing what we think without evasion and without being rude"
(Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008)	"the free flow of information within an organization and between the organization and its many stakeholders, including the public . . . the organization's effectiveness depends upon it"
(Bolton 2006)	"frankness or sincerity of expression"; "freedom from prejudice; impartiality"; "authenticity"
(Eberhardt 2013a)	"simple and sincere honesty. When it lapses in a big way, our respect for leadership erodes"; "honesty in communication that is helpfully forthright in a way that supports people's success and fully shares impressions of 'how it is for you'"; "by its nature, also is succinct, without irrelevant information"
(Galpin and Whittington 2009)	"frankness, openness, honesty, forthrightness, and straightforwardness"
(HQ DA 1990)	"being frank, open, honest, and sincere with your Soldiers, seniors, and peers"
(HQ DA 2012e)	"being frank, honest, and sincere with others. It requires impartiality and fairness."
(Merriam-Webster 2014)	"the quality of being open, sincere and honest"
(Paolozzi 2013)	"openly expressing truth and being transparent"
(Welch 2005)	frank in expression, straightforward, and open

Source: Created by author.

Candor's Impact on Trust

As this thesis begins to review literature on candor's effects, it is important to examine Army doctrine first when the purpose of the research is its application to the Army's mission command doctrine. In fact, candor's first impact has already been revealed through the initial doctrine review. As discussed previously in the "Candor in Doctrine" section, ADP 1 establishes a noteworthy relationship between candor and trust by simply stating: "trust between all levels depends upon candor" (HQ DA 2012a, 2-2).

This relationship is relevant to the mission command philosophy because one of the philosophy's six principles is "Build cohesive teams through mutual trust" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-1). Army doctrine affirms that the existence of trust within an organization depends on the existence of candor, or that the level of trust within an organization is proportionate to the level of candor. Either way, ADP 1 clearly asserts that candor has a significant impact on trust and that the impact is based upon human relationships because trust requires at least two entities.

Another implication from ADP 1 comes from the phrase "between all levels" (HQ DA 2012a, 2-2). "All levels" in this context refers to the echelons of the Army command or organizational structure, which includes superiors (upper level), subordinates (lower level), and peers (same level). This connection is confirmed in ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, during discussion of "mutual trust" where the doctrine states that "Mutual trust is shared confidence among commanders, subordinates, and partners" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-1). By using the term "among commanders" in this statement, ADRP 6-0 is likely referring to the relationships between commanders at differing echelons (superiors) and fellow commanders (peer). The addition of "subordinates" makes the ADRP 6-0 definition nearly identical to that of ADP 1 in meaning, but ADRP 6-0 adds an interesting additional entity "partners," suggesting that trust with entities external to the U.S. Army, such as joint, interagency and multinational partners, is also important. This is also evident in ADRP 6-22, which discusses candor's role in civil-military relationships. "To be effective, this relationship [with civilian leaders] requires candor and authority to execute the decisions of the civilian leaders" (HQ DA 2012f, 11-1). This would be a prime of example of and support to the "partners" concept referred to in ADRP 6-0.

Warren Bennis claims "Candor is perhaps the most important component of trust. When we are truthful about our shortcomings, or acknowledge that we do not have all the answers, we earn the understanding and respect of others" (Bennis 1999, 5). Bennis agrees that candor is a critical component to trust, but he provides some relevance for COL Paolozzi's fourth facet, self-candor, in regards to the concepts of candor and trust. Bennis goes further in describing the link of between candor and trust: "Without candor there can be no trust. And by building trust, leaders help create the reliability and consistency customers demand" (Bennis 1999, 5). In the case of the U.S. Army, "customers" can be defined as the people of the United States, U.S. Congress, senior Army leaders, peers, subordinates, many other entities, or any combination of the aforementioned groups. All of these parties are stakeholders who benefit from and are inherently owed reliability and consistency from the Army based on its mission. Additionally, the stakeholders that Bennis discusses here may be a form of the "partners" discussed in ADRP 6-0.

Bennis is reinforced through an analysis of Stephen M.R. Covey's book *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing that Changes Everything*. According to Nancy Eberhardt's analysis she discerns "Covey is saying . . . that trust is the most important quality of leaders today and that candor is the first behavior to building trust" (Eberhardt 2013b, 1). Eberhardt clearly interprets Covey as agreeing with Bennis and Army doctrine that candor is important to trust. In contrast, Eberhardt and Covey assert that the behavior of candor is the first behavior that can build trust between individuals.

Marillyn Hewson, CEO of Lockheed Martin, one of the world's largest defense contractors, makes a similar claim in her 2013 article "The First Things a New Leader

Should do to Build Trust" based on her experience as a CEO. "I find that one of the most powerful tools for building trust is simply being open, honest and transparent in all of your communications. Employees recognize in an instant when a leader is being honest, and if you communicate frequently, you'll earn their trust and respect" (Hewson 2013, 2). Based on the definition of candor used for this study, Hewson is essentially asserting that candor, in communication and professional relationships, earns trust and respect, and therefore agrees with the general consensus that candor is related to trust.

Robert Whipple, CEO of Leadergrow, an organization that develops leaders, and author of three books on leadership and trust, further explains the relationship between candor and trust in his 2009 *Leadership Excellence* article "Reinforcing Candor." "When candor is not reinforced, people hide their true feelings and do not challenge the leader, so trust is hard to maintain. Leaders who consistently reinforce candor build a culture where trust grows and deepens" (Whipple 2009, 1). Whipple implies that he believes not only that candor has a proportional effect on trust, but that the amount of candor compounds into trust over time.

General (GEN) Rick Hillier, former Chief of the Defence Staff for Canadian Forces, demonstrates his military perspective candor and the trust it generates in a 2013 interview with Mary Crossan and Alyson Byrne of *Ivey Business Journal Online*. In his interview, GEN Hillier generally agrees with candor's relation to trust:

> You have to have the moral courage to develop a relationship with all those people and then be frank with them and build the trust that comes with being a leader. If you've got the trust of your infantry battalion, and every soldier is part of defining, achieving, and contributing to the mission, you have to be candid at the start of it, and it takes moral courage to do that. (Crossan and Byrne 2013, 2)

In modest fashion, GEN Hillier goes on to state the importance of the trust that came about because of candor to him and his organization: "I was carried on the backs of incredible men and women because we had a trust that came from a straightforward all-in-the-shop-window approach to leadership" (Crossan and Byrne 2013, 3). GEN Hillier agrees with candor's relation to trust, and develops the idea of facilitating candor within and organization as leadership development. At first glance, this idea may seem more suited as an Army Leadership topic based on this premise, however, GEN Hillier's refinement of the idea of candor within an organization make it clear that the power of candor relies on mission command and it has clear relevance within the mission command concept:

> I think how you develop your leadership and how you put your leadership in place is how you develop candour. It's about how you select, train, educate, experience and mentor your leaders, and the principles and values that you articulate to them. You set the standard that you expect everyone, especially yourself, to be accountable to. Leaders have to be candid because they have to bring their people onside. We call it "mission command." (Crossan and Byrne 2013, 3)

COL Paolozzi also believes candor has a definite relationship with trust, stating that "a dearth of candor impedes the flow and accuracy of information and ultimately erodes trust between parties" and "candor in the Army has eroded . . . effectively limiting the manner in which trust is reinforced" (Paolozzi 2013, 2-3). Both of these statements imply that candor only maintains or enhances trust and does not establish it. Interestingly, COL Paolozzi also states that "trust and candor show no relationship to one another in Army literature" which conflicts with the research findings of the previous "Candor in Doctrine" section, specifically regarding the candor-trust relationship explained within ADP 1.

In a 2011 *Military Review* article, Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert L. Caslen,

then commander of the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, and

Captain (CPT) Nathan K. Finney discuss the results of an Army-wide survey conducted

in conjunction with the Profession of Arms Campaign. LTG Caslen and CPT Finney state

the results of this survey indicated "a large majority of all cohorts agreed that their units

are truthful and do not hide bad news and instead view honesty and forth-rightness as

extremely important attributes to our [the Army] profession" (Caslen and Finney 2011,

19). They also affirm that "enough evidence surfaced in the survey and focus groups to

consider the addition of an eighth Army Value – candor" (Caslen and Finney 2011, 19).

The results of the survey LTG Caslen and CPT Finney refer to, Training and Doctrine

Command's (TRADOC's) *US Army Profession of Arms Campaign 2011 Interim Report*,

demonstrated that the Army, in a force-wide survey, indicated a strong perceived

relationship between candor and trust, enough to have senior Army leadership discuss

candor as an Army value. Additionally, LTG Caslen and CPT Finney state:

> Candor applies inside and outside the army, up and down the chain of
> command. A climate of trust between subordinates and superiors is required for
> us as Soldiers, legally and ethically beholden to the officers appointed over us,
> and to our clients the American people, to create a culture where frank, informed
> discussion is expected and encouraged. This is particularly important with regard
> to the relationship at the civilian-military level between our senior leaders and the
> civilians appointed over them. Only through candor can we build the trust with
> our civilian leaders and through them the American people. (Caslen and Finney
> 2011, 19)

LTG Caslen and CPT Finney's affirmation reinforces the "four facets" of candor

concept introduced by COL Paolozzi, with the exclusion of self-candor but the inclusion

of external entities such as the American people and civilian political leaders of the

United States. Their statement also indicates that, in their opinion, candor is the only way

to build trust with these external entities, without citing or suggesting any other alternative means.

Finally, LTG Caslen and CPT Finney again cite the TRADOC report's findings: "Candor is an important value that is not captured well enough in our current formulation of the Army Values and is important to this relationship" (Caslen and Finney 2011, 19). Here, the TRADOC report concedes that Army doctrine outlining the Army Values, and presumably related doctrine such as *Leadership* and *Mission Command*, does not explicitly or prominently enough discuss candor's importance to the U.S. Army.

Candor's Other Impacts

Lynn Harris, an organizational development consultant and executive coach with over a decade of experience explains in her 2008 article "Truth-Telling: Confronting the Reality of the Lack of Candor Inside Organizations" that she believes candor does enhance trust, but the resulting impacts may be more valuable. "Authentic and honest internal communication results in better, faster decisions and actions. It also builds a culture of trust and collaboration where opposing views are debated and more effective solutions and innovations are created" (Harris 2008, 2). Harris seems to imply that candor adds efficiency to an organization in the pursuit of solutions solved by candid collaboration, but ultimately she openly believes candor facilitates innovation after trust is established.

Jeffrey Gandz, a professor at the Richard Ivey School of Business with over 30 years experience as an Ivey faculty member in executive development and leadership programs, implies that he believes candor's impacts outside of trust are more noteworthy:

Candor . . . can be a source of competitive advantage for organizations. It ensures that good news travels fast and bad news travels faster, allowing mistakes to be recognized quickly and fixed promptly; people own their actions and own up to their errors so that they can learn from them; people know where they stand, know what's expected of them, and know what it takes to get promoted and fired. Candor is at the heart of aligning people with strategy, and is essential to effective execution, performance management and people development. (Gandz 2007, 1)

Gandz's summary of his theory on candor's impacts in his 2007 *Ivey Business Journal Online* article titled "A Culture of Candor" demonstrates that he believes candor serves to improve the organization through both individual and collective performance, but also is critical to individual professional or leader development and the harvesting of talent from within the organization.

Welch asserts that the effect of candor, in his words, "leads to winning" in a business environment. Welch explains this effect by splitting it into three distinct areas or sub-effects, all of which contribute to improvement or success. First, Welch indicates that candor gets many people into a conversation that generates many ideas. The power is in the environment of having many people and their minds generating options and communicating those openly. Second, Welch claims that candor generates speed. His approach of "surface, debate, improve, decide" in rapid succession, enabled and fueled by candor, is necessary to maintain pace with the rest of the business sector and changing market conditions. Interestingly, Welch asserts that smaller organizations achieve this speed easier than larger organizations. Finally, Welch claims that candor can cut costs for an organization, brought about by the efficiency gained through direct conversation that eliminates the wasted time in meetings and other forums. Although, because topics of discussion and the amount of intangible candor present both vary, it is nearly impossible to quantify the cost savings in a dollar amount (Welch 2005, 27-28).

O'Toole and Bennis address candor's link to innovation in a well received 2009 *Harvard Business Review* article titled "What's Need Next: A Culture of Candor." The business professors and leadership experts contend, "Your company won't innovate successfully if you don't learn to recognize, then challenge, your assumptions" (O'Toole and Bennis 2009, 2). Furthermore, "Companies can't innovate, respond to changing stakeholder needs, or function efficiently unless people have access to relevant, timely and valid information. It's thus the leader's job to create systems and norms that lead to a culture of candor" (O'Toole and Bennis 2009, 4). Here, O'Toole and Bennis affirm that candor aids innovation, efficiency, and agility when present within an organization's norms, culture, and systems simultaneously.

Eberhardt, throughout her book on candor, clearly proposes the impacts of candor, most of which support the overarching idea of increased organizational success. She affirms "Research shows a significant return on investment from a culture of candor, a powerful tool that builds trust and is a force for positive change. Authentic conversation, quickly getting to the heart of what matters, translates into organizational success" (Eberhardt 2013a, 12). She later states, "it is this type of candor [that doesn't feel good in the moment] that allows an organization to be wholly more successful than its parts" (Eberhardt 2013a, 14). This affirmation, in isolation, implies that candor that is practiced throughout an entire organization, rather than just between two individuals, is where candor can truly make an impact on the organization's success. Eberhardt also claims that "Our failure to be straightforward is a barrier not only to productivity but also to satisfaction," which indicates that candor has the ability to enhance productivity and

25

satisfaction at the individual and organizational levels, and the absence of candor creates a hurdle to achieving both (Eberhardt 2013a, 17).

Rittenhouse Rankings, a consulting company for CEOs and CFOs, releases an annual report titled *Rittenhouse Rankings CEO Candor & Culture Survey*. This survey measures candor within corporations in its communications with shareholders. In Rittenhouse's 2012 report, there is a strong association between high levels of measured candor utilizing their analytic model and the corporation's performance against the S&P 500 index. In fact, 2012 was the seventh straight year a positive association was indicated between the top-25 and bottom-25 businesses in the culture and candor rankings. This analysis of candor, within the scope of Rittenhouse's survey, reinforces the positive impacts of candor on an organization in terms of efficiency and performance discussed previously (Rittenhouse Rankings 2013, 2-4).

Roy Serpa, in his 1985 *Journal of Business* ethics article "Creating a Candid Corporate Culture," asserts that "false or deceptive communication can undermine the trust" of other parties and that leaders must generate and maintain a candid culture to strengthen trust and instill confidence (Serpa 1985, 425). Serpa, a ranking manager at Gulf Oil Corp., published business author, and guest lecturer, furthers this assertion by implying that candid communication, honest communication, is essential to leaders receiving "information that is descriptive, explanative, interpretive, predictive and evaluative in order to guide their thinking and decision making" (Serpa 1985, 425). The author reinforces this by citing a study by Henry Mintzberg indicating that 40 percent of upper level leaders' time was utilized for transferring information, which clearly demonstrates the importance and potential efficiency gained by candid communication.

He goes on to state that candid information "provides the decision maker with the greatest likelihood of formulating realistic objectives and strategies" and " allows subordinates to deal more effectively with the opportunities and problems that exist internally and externally" (Serpa 1985, 426). Finally, the author states "candid culture would encourage the presentation of the most current view of a situation without . . . fear of diminishing credibility" (Serpa 1985, 428). Serpa's collective description is similar to the Army concepts of shared understanding and decision making, while also touching on initiative. Both of these impacts are essential to the author's overall impact of "management's ability to meet the challenging economic environment" (Serpa 1985, 425).

COL Paolozzi describes candor's impacts in the negative: "A dearth of candor impedes the flow and accuracy of information and ultimately erodes trust between parties. The net effect of its absence goes beyond ineffective communication; it degrades confidence in institutions, leaders, and organizations" (Paolozzi 2013, 2-3). This statement effectively tells us that candor improves the flow and accuracy of information and sustains trust between parties. COL Paolozzi also affirms that candor improves confidence in institutions, leaders, and organizations, but does not specify whether that confidence is internal, external, or both. However, it can be assumed Paolozzi means both due to the use of the ambiguous "parties" in the previous sentence.

<u>The Expansion of Trust in U.S. Army Mission Command Doctrine</u>

Because candor is not present in mission command doctrine and other Army doctrine does not explain candor's effects or impacts beyond trust, it is important to further examine trust's role in the U.S. Army's mission command philosophy doctrine.

This method could provide insight into candor's potential other direct or indirect effects and relationships beyond trust, as explained by the mission command doctrine.

ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, states, "Mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose." It also notes that, "commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue within their organizations and with unified action partners to create unity of effort" (HQ DA 2012e, 1-2). Expanding on shared understanding, ADRP 6-0 says "critical and creative thinking facilitate understanding and support decisionmaking" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-8). This not only reinforces the importance of trust to the Army's mission command doctrine already discussed, but it also establishes the importance of shared understanding in mission command.

From these doctrinal concepts of *Mission Command*, it can be ascertained that four major principles support shared understanding: collaboration, dialogue, critical thinking, and creative thinking. ADRP 6-0 further defines one of these concepts, creative thinking, as "thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight and novel ideas" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-8).

The six principles of mission command, which guide the mission command philosophy, and outlined by ADRP 6-0 are: build cohesive teams through mutual trust; create shared understand; provide a clear commander's intent; exercise disciplined initiative; use mission orders; accept prudent risk (HQ DA 2012e, 1-3). Figure 1 graphically depicts the mission command philosophy in relation to its supported and supporting elements and includes the aforementioned principles.

Figure 1.   The Mission Command Philosophy's Role in Doctrine

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1-3.

Obstacles to Candor–The Human Aspect

So far, it appears that candor is not a natural phenomenon that emerges in

absolutes under certain conditions or periods of time. In fact, the amount of leadership

literature discussing candor would be far less if developing candor did not require some

effort in the form of art and/or science. There is one constant that remains throughout the

candor discussion, regardless of the type, size, or structure of an organization: humans. The human aspect of candor, a topic that could probably be an entire psychology thesis alone, is important to this research to gain a basic understanding of human tendency and behavior.

Lynn Harris' explanation of obstacles to candor is the most succinct. She categorizes obstacles in achieving it into three reasons: "socialization, fear, and skills" (Harris 2008, 2). Socialization is described primarily as our human and cultural tendencies in attempt to avoid social conflict in consideration of others emotions. With this, Harris cites the most common violation relating to performance appraisals, which negatively impacts developing talent within the existing workforce. Second, Harris describes fear as the fear people have of the consequences of being candid with others, especially superiors who may control their longevity in the organization. It is important to note though that this fear is mostly predictive, unless there is a history or precedent of candor being treated as unacceptable within the organization. Either way, fear, whether real or imagined, does affect people's candidness. Finally, the skills in the delivery of candor are also a key factor in whether or not individuals are candid. Some people just may not possess the skill or knowledge to be tactful and appropriately timed with candor within the organization. It is easier to avert the perceived risk of candor than risk delivering it with little tact and poor timing (Harris 2008, 2-4).

Expanding on Harris' category of fear, James Bolton writes about "candor-based fear" as the primary obstacle in the human dimension to achieving candor and summarizes the fear as risk aversion. Bolton proposes five separate subcategories of "candor-based fear": job retribution, social retribution, hurting others' feelings, losing

face, and change, as listed in table 2. Bolton explains that within these categories, people

too often consider only the negative possible consequences or reactions to speaking their

mind, rather than the potential positive outcomes, which is the natural reaction for a

human in fear. Although sometimes candor aversion can be caused by previous

experiences in the current or former organizations, this theory emphasizes that more often

than not, the aversion is due to the imagined or potential negative consequences of being

candid (Bolton 2006, 343).

Table 2.   Bolton's Categories of Candor-based Fear

Subcategory	Candor-based Fear
1	Job Retribution
2	Social Retribution
3	Hurting Others' Feelings
4	Losing Face
5	Change

Source: James Bolton, "The Candor Imperative," *Industrial and Commercial Training*
38, no. 7 (2006): 343.

Jack Welch may have the simplest description of the human dimension of candor.

Welch affirms that people "keep their mouths shut in order to make people feel better or

to avoid conflict, and they sugarcoat bad news in order to maintain appearances" (Welch

2005, 25-26). He goes on to state that, in his experience as a speaker and consultant for

business, the average portion of his audience that receives candid feedback is around ten

percent. Moreover, possibly the most startling, is that fact that more often than not,

"candor is missing from performance appraisals" – a private, and probably the most

intimate, interaction between a subordinate and superior with little to no pressure from outside sources (Welch 2005, 26).

Welch goes on to explain that socialization is the primary reason candor is not as prevalent as it should be within organizations. "We are socialized from childhood to soften bad news or to make nice about awkward subjects. That is true in every culture and in every country and in every social class" (Welch 2005, 28). Welch expands by explaining that many times when we are candid in social situations, we feel the need to rationalize or back track to make others who we perceive to be negatively affected feel better. The human rationalization is that by not being candid, we prevent hurting others, but, in actuality, we may not be candid for our own self-interests and comfort. A similar viewpoint is that lack of candor to preserve a relationship or social exchange on the micro level may actually have bigger negative impacts on the macro level later on (Welch 2005, 29-30).

Similarly, Jeffrey Gandz echoes a bit of Welch, but expands a bit in his description of obstacles that hinder an organization's progress towards candor.

> Many managers in organizations have difficulty with candid conversations, whether they are delivering a message with candor or are receiving feedback from someone. Candor may be resented, rejected, or re-gifted by those who are the recipients; it will be avoided in communications by those who dislike conflict or become acts of cruelty by those who lack compassion or respect for individuals, no matter what their failings may have been. (Gandz 2007, 1)

Gandz goes on to explain, in more detail, three specific obstacles to candor that he feels are the most critical. First, Gandz describes "gatekeepers" – individuals who through official capacity or social standing block candor from flowing vertically in an organization, either to prevent senior leadership from being "bothered" by the information, or to gain a perceived power with other employees or leadership. This can

be a dangerous phenomenon, but is quite common within organizations. Second, Gandz's asserts that people self-censor to leadership because they are wary of the perception by their and peers of what they are saying. They do not want to be viewed as whiners or dissenters. Finally, people censor themselves out of fear for their own employment security. In an environment or economy where individuals sense that their tenure in an organization is at risk, they will not take risks in speaking their mind. Gandz believes this is especially true regarding sensitive, personal topics with organizational leaders, such as leadership style, competence, and climate. Ultimately, Gandz indicates that the primary obstacle to candor in an organization is the people within the organization themselves (Gandz 2007, 1-2).

Eberhardt writes of the obstacles to candor extensively, most of which relate to human nature and socialization. Her description of this point is very clear: "It's within each of us to be totally lacking in candor at times, yet that doesn't mean we're unscrupulous. It means we are human. To be candid is an art, and we have to practice it to be perfect" (Eberhardt 2013a, 12). She touches specifically on the aversion people have by saying "Candor might not feel good in the moment" and that "A lot of time when we're not being candid, it's not purposeful. It's almost accidental. We are trying to project something, maybe subconsciously, or we're trying to make a point, so we selectively choose information" (Eberhardt 2013a, 14-15). Eberhardt clearly believes, and reinforces, that candor is an unnatural practice for humans in general, but that it is possible to overcome the perceived obstacles and practice it effectively in communication. This indicates that candor is a learned behavior, and that in order to get the people comprising an organization to practice it effectively, it must not only be the

33

organizational leader's priority, but also that some individual training and reinforcement is necessary.

Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole discuss the obstacles, or impediments as they refer to them within three broad categories: mishandling of information, structural impediments that hamper information flow, and "the shimmer effect" (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 21-25). As described by Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole, the mishandling of information is primarily caused by the human tendency to view information as power. Some organizations even see the access to and knowledge of information as a benefit of being a leader, with higher-level leaders obviously gaining access to more information. The second obstacle, structural impediments, is the stifling of information flow through an organization that causes problems or failures, and, according to Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole, usually impact decision making by leadership. Unfortunately, the authors describe that, in most instances, this is not discovered until after a significant failure or event, which requires a full scale investigation and the dedication of man power to reveal the structural failure and find solutions to prevent future shortcomings (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 20-23). Finally, Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole describe the "shimmer effect" as the "demigod" type status that employees attribute to their leadership. They affirm that this high, somewhat superhuman, regard that employees hold their leadership in often prevents the employees from being frank and straightforward, especially on sensitive topics (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 23-25).

Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole also discuss obstacles leadership themselves cause or exacerbate while leading their organizations. Although it is made to seem as though

34

the authors do not necessarily believe this is done purposefully, they do believe these occurrences are common and counterproductive. The first of these obstacles is simply stated "narcissism can lead people at the top to refuse what others say" (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 26). This indicates that even if leaders want candor, that they may not listen to it, and it also demonstrates the ability of a single person to exhibit behavior that can stifle candid communication throughout the entire organization they lead. Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole also state that subordinates often alter the nature of communication with leadership to place certain emphasis or spin the information (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 26-28). This can be done for a multitude of reasons, consciously or not, but the purpose is nearly always to increase the acceptability of the information for the leader. The potential worst case impacts of perverted communication like this for an organization can be easily predicted: leader is given spun information that drives a decision which ends up being catastrophic for the organization.

Galpin and Whittington discuss obstacles to candor in their research and cite previous research by Galpin to explain some of the obstacles. Galpin explains:

> People possess limiting beliefs about offering open and honest comments to others. These limiting beliefs include fear that people become upset or defensive or demoralized. Often people are hesitant to provide candid and constructive feedback because they believe others "should know by themselves what is needed, and they may think I'm being too critical." (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 11)

Galpin again describes the human social aspects of candor aversion, just as other authors have described, as obstacles to achieving individual and organizational candor. Assuming candor is a desirable organizational trait, the problem then becomes how to reduce or overcome these obstacles to develop and achieve candor.

Developing Candor

James Bolton claims, through "social scientist and early organizational development pioneer" Kurt Lewin's work, that there is a definite relationship between behavior, a person, and their environment. Bolton cites Lewin's theoretical formula that states: "behavior is a function of the person in his/her environment" (Bolton 2006, 2). This formula, if accurate, implies that both the person and the environment (organization) affect the person's behavior, and therefore, the person and the environment can both be changed to affect the individual's behavior. This rationale provides the support for Bolton's candor development approach, aimed at both individuals within an organization, and the organizational environment, of which he explains there are two echelons (Bolton 2006, 2-4).

Bolton's approach of affecting the individual, as one variable to the candor producing behavior function, requires the individual to reconcile the "private and public self." Bolton suggests the use of a four-step reconciliation process to aid in self-actualization and self-develop candor despite whatever reservations are currently present. The four steps Bolton encourages are: clarify your candor ideal, identify the internal conflict (fear and underlying need), explain your candor commitment/goal, and the actions required to move the commitment from private to public. Most importantly, these steps can be conducted in a self-development capacity, or can be coached by a supervisor to assist with development (Bolton 2006, 344). Table 3 depicts Bolton's four-step reconciliation process in sequence.

Table 3.   Bolton's Four Step Candor Reconciliation Process for the Individual

Step	Action
1	Clarify your candor ideal.
2	Identify the internal conflict (fear and underlying need)
3	Explain your candor commitment goal.
4	Determine actions required to move the commitment from private to public.

Source: James Bolton, "The Candor Imperative," *Industrial and Commercial Training* 38, no. 7 (2006): 344.

The organization is the second half of Bolton's candor behavior function, which he divides into to sub-groups: the local work group environment (4-20 people) and the organizational environment (systems and norms that create the organization's culture). Both of these sub-groups have formal and informal structures that effect the and Bolton theorizes that, in the case of candor, the center of gravity to really develop it within an organization lies with the ability to affect the local work group levels. However, that does not preclude change from occurring when driven at the organizational/cultural level, as Bolton cites in the examples of GE and Six Sigma (Bolton 2006, 4-5).

A method Bolton suggests for impacting candor initiatives at the organizational/cultural level is the use of "Candor Teams" or "C-Teams" comprised of individuals who demonstrate mutual respect that can operate collectively to be visible to the entire organization and symbolize candor development as a priority to leaders of the organization. The overall intent for this team, once functioning at an efficient level, would be to split and become members of other teams with the purpose of spreading candor throughout sub-groups of the organization. This method uses an organizational level initiative to control the development of candor within Bolton's theoretical center of gravity–the local work groups–answering to the organization and reporting progress of

candor development within the small groups. Bolton's ideal is realized once the propensity of individuals and local work groups develop the candor to tip the scales of the organization through its informal and formal norms (Bolton 2006, 5).

Timothy Galpin and J. Lee Whittington offer a fairly robust plan for developing candor within the leadership classroom to not only increase the quality of leadership instruction, but also to demonstrate the value of candor so leaders can implement it in their own organizations. Galpin and Whittington cite research that suggests, "in order to facilitate group learning and reflection, an appropriate space must be created in order to encourage the ongoing discussion which is relevant to the issues being addressed" (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 12). They go on to state that the development of candor in the classroom must be a deliberate, intentional effort by the instructor and affirm that "candid participation can be established if leadership instructors conscientiously implement a set of seven actions" (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 12).

Galpin and Whittington's seven actions are divided into the three categories of preparing for candid participation, the instructor's role, and engaging participants in facilitating each other's learning. Table 4 lists Galpin and Whittington's proposed actions to implement candor within this categorization.

Table 4.   Galpin and Whittington's Seven Actions to
Establish Candid Participation in the Classroom

Category	Action
Preparing for Candid Participation	Establish Participation Ground Rules
The Instructor's Role	Hold Back
	Ask the Right Questions
	Shut "Over Participants" Down
	Be Comfortable with Silence
	Accept All Input
Engaging Participants in Facilitating Each Other's Learning	The Feedback Mill: Implementing Regular Feedback and Coaching

Source: Timothy Galpin and J. Lee Whittington, "Creating a Culture of Candor in the Leadership Classroom," *Journal of Leadership* 8, no. 2 (2009): 12-15.

The first proposed action may be the most important to Galpin and Whittington's entire process as it sets the foundation to establish a space in which candor is acceptable. The authors propose basic rules such as "stay on topic, do not over participate, agree to disagree, listen, respect others' ideas, and be brief" (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 12). Interestingly, many of the authors proposed basic rules, and the entire action of establishing ground rules itself, are an effort to reduce or mitigate many of the obstacles discussed in the previous section. Not only do Galpin and Whittington affirm that developing candor in an organization must be a deliberate effort, but they imply that to develop, maintain, and ensure the benefits of candor, rules and guidelines are a necessity.

Galpin and Whittington also devote much time to describing the seventh action of feedback. In their description, there is again the discussion regarding discomfort with candor, an obstacle, with the affirmation that the discomfort will subside over time as the participants gain familiarity. The most important point made by the authors though may be the destructive power of retribution in regards to efforts in establishing a candid

organization. Although the author's offer little more solution than reassurance of no retribution and building trust over time by not taking retribution, this ties to obstacles discussed in the previous section. Implied in their research is that the leader's actions must match their words in regards to the safe environment established in Galpin and Whittington's first action to facilitate candor, otherwise the environment is degraded, trust is violated, and the candor effort experiences a setback (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 14-16).

These seven actions suggested in Galpin and Whittington's research, although tailored for a classroom environment and outlined for implementation by an instructor, remain relevant to candor in an organizational environment such as a corporation or the U.S. Army by simply replacing the instructor with the organization's leader. The leader, like the instructor, can have a direct effect on candor by facilitating interaction of the students, or subordinate leaders, in the same manner as suggested of the instructor. Therefore, the organization would essentially be the equivalent of the classroom and class referenced in the author's work and theoretically would yield similar results based on the research cited.

In Crossan and Byrne's interview, GEN Hillier indicates that he does not believe in candor development. He asserts that developing candor is a product or goal of leader development. GEN Hillier believes that candor is developed and maintained throughout the force via selection and leader development, including education, mentorship, and experience. Ultimately, GEN Hillier's point is that candor is a required leadership trait that must be developed and maintained through stewardship of the profession. He also refers to the application of candor as mission command, thus justifying the requirement to

develop it within leaders over the duration of their career. Further, he explains that leaders also need to be able to receive candor to accurately represent the feelings and concerns of the organization they represent. If leaders only project candor but fail to receive it, GEN Hillier believes it destroys credibility throughout the organization (Crossan and Byrne 2013, 3).

Roy Serpa describes a different approach to developing candor that focuses first, and primarily, on leader behavior. Serpa cites a survey conducted by Posner and Schmidt, in which 80 percent of the respondents "believed that their organizations were guided by highly ethical principles" (Serpa 1985, 426-427). As a corollary to this though, the respondents rated the actions of their leaders as more important to influencing unethical behavior than policy (Serpa 1985, 427). Table 5 shows Serpa's description of the impacts of consistent and inconsistent leader behavior, in regards to honesty and honest communication, on the organization and its culture.

Table 5.   Serpa's Leader Actions Consistent with Honesty

	Leader Inconsistent with Honesty Value	Leader Consistent with Honesty Value
Actions	Limited Communication	Open Communication
	Instills Fear	Instills Confidence
	Discourages Differing Views	Encourages Differing Views
	Avoids Confrontation	Supportive of Confrontation
	Rewards "Good News" Only	Rewards Truthfulness
Produces…		
Belief	Best to agree and not question.	Disagreement and questioning welcome.
Results in…		
Norm	Defensive, Deceptive Communication	Truthful, Candid Communication

Source: Roy Serpa, "Creating a Candid Corporate Culture," *Journal of Business Ethics* 4, no. 5 (1985): 428-429.

Because the actions of leaders seems to be of utmost importance, Serpa's candid culture development plan obviously begins with awareness of the need to change, but is followed by improving the consistency of the leader's actions to ensure efforts to instill candor in the organization are more likely to be successful and to prevent subversion by the leader themselves. Serpa then describes the influencing of the leader's immediate subordinates, primarily during meetings to enable observations of behavior and create an isolated space to work towards candor. Simultaneously, Serpa indicates that change should be initiated in the organization, external to these meetings with candid behavior rewarded and corrections administered for non-candor. Finally, the obstacle of fear must be reduced in the organization, both verbally and by observed behavior, to cement the changes to the organization's values. Table 6 shows the progression of Serpa's candor development plan.

Table 6.   Serpa's Steps for Developing a Candid Corporate Culture

Step	Action
1	Leader identifies/is aware of need for change to a more candid environment.
2	Leader commits to example of candid behavior.
3	Leader influences immediate subordinate leaders in isolated environment, such as leadership meetings.
4*	Leaders and subordinate leaders initiate candor change throughout the organization, rewarding candor and correcting instances lacking it.
5	Reduce perceived fears of all individuals in the organization by example and verbally.

 * Simultaneous with previous step.

Source: Roy Serpa, "Creating a Candid Corporate Culture," *Journal of Business Ethics* 4, no. 5 (1985): 428-429.

This may be a slow process, especially as candor is permeating the organization outside of leadership meetings, but once it affects the majority of the organization, Serpa asserts that leaders will see their organizations strengthened.

<u>Measuring Candor</u>

Jeffrey Gandz discusses the use of surveys to measure candor in his writing on candor and makes the case that surveys are often ineffective for a multitude of reasons, ranging from survey design to leadership use of survey data collected. In regards to survey design, Gandz makes the case that surveys are often too bland and focus on positive questions or qualities vice negative. The overall result, according to Gandz, is data with high mean scores and small variance, which gives leaders a potentially false impression that their organizations are performing somewhere within an acceptable band. The other flaw Gandz points out regarding design and blandness is that the survey results are often times designed to be compared to other organizations and require question uniformity, and therefore blandness, to fairly compare. Gandz also asserts that leaders

often misuse the data collected in surveys by either abusing it, or failing to make

corrections in the climate or organization that reflect solutions to what survey data

identifies as a problem. Leaders' lack of corrective action or inappropriate corrective

action often times leads those responding to surveys to lose confidence in the survey as

the process is repeated over time (Gandz 2007, 2).

In a 1991 Navy Personnel Research and Development Center study titled

"Impression Management, Candor, and Microcomputer-Based Organizational Surveys:

An Individual Differences Approach," Paul Rosenfeld, Robert A. Giacalone, and Stephen

B. Knouse examined the potential advantage of utilizing computer-based surveys over

paper surveys to increase the amount of candor in responses. The study found that there

was no significant advantage of either test type, but the study does include some

research-backed information that is relevant to measuring candor in an organization using

surveys. Rosenfeld's initial research indicated that:

> Lack of candor is a problem affecting the interpretation of psychological
> tests, surveys, and questionnaires. Especially when the information is
> embarrassing, or threatening, individuals often exhibit a tendency to "fake good."
> This tendency may significantly bias survey data. (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, and
> Knouse 1991, 4)

Rosenfeld and his team cite further examples and research to support the basis for his

study, but the implications of one study's findings are fundamental to measuring candor.

> An examination of the psychological and organizational behavior
> literature in the field of impression management . . . reveals inflated self-
> evaluations and salary aspirations when individuals were publicly associated with
> a survey and the results were to be shown to a supervisor. (Rosenfeld, Giacalone,
> and Knouse 1991, 4)

These findings agree with Gandz's aforementioned points regarding the use of surveys to

measure candor and also provide the primary purpose for anonymous surveys:

44

individuals designing surveys and leaders utilizing the results desire candid feedback and believe they must make the surveys anonymous to achieve the highest level of candor and yield the most accurate results.

Rittenhouse Rankings' *2012 Rittenhouse Rankings CEO Candor & Culture Survey* indicated that there was a positive association between the generated candor scores and share performance, which indicates that candor may have an impact on a business' performance. But, for the purposes of measuring candor, the Rittenhouse survey provides a relevant and unique approach. Although Rittenhouse does not provide its exact analytic model (it is proprietary), the company indicates that it analyzes language in corporate and CEO communications across a variety of mediums such as letters, teleconferences, and other communications. The survey report cites shareholder letters as the most important of these communication mediums because it reveals the CEO's understanding of the business he heads and the direction he or she is guiding it in regards to shareholder interest. The use of this survey, although the details are not fully disclosed, implies two highly relevant points: candor in an organization may be measurable via analysis of the organization's external communications and the method of Rittenhouse's survey has validity enough that it keeps the exact analytic model/algorithm secret as a part of its CEO/CFO consulting business (Rittenhouse Rankings 2013).

The Rittenhouse Rankings survey report further explains that external communications are utilized because the CEO and corporation are accountable to their shareholders, which is where the trust must be established and maintained to be successful as a CEO or CFO. However, the method of candor analysis Rittenhouse uses is not applied to the internal communications of a corporation or CEO/CFO, which may be

45

more indicative of the true nature of a corporation and its CEO. Because the analysis of

candor for this survey is based upon language in communications, it could theoretically

be applied to any communications that the corporation or CEO/CFO is a party to, which

is acknowledged and outlined by Rittenhouse in the report. External communication may

be a delimitation in Rittenhouse's survey and report, but the analytic method and

application of that method demonstrates potential in measuring candor within an

organization (Rittenhouse Rankings 2013).

In stark contrast to the more scientific approaches of surveys and analysis of

language in communications, Roy Serpa asserts that the best manner to identify lack of

candor within an organization is to observe the behaviors of the people in that

organization. Serpa states the following five indicators are the easiest to observe:

> (1) subordinates seek clues to what management thinks and wants before
> expressing themselves in support and agreement only; (2) there is a recurrent
> agreement on various issues among managers with a lack of any dissenting views;
> (3) there is a reluctance to provide negative information on bad news; (4) the
> same information is provided over a period of time to justify an action or an
> investment; (5) many informal one-on-one meetings follow group management
> meetings. (Serpa 1985, 427)

Serpa's assertion is rooted in the idea that ultimately words and actions of

individuals can be manipulated, so ultimately the behaviors of the organization as a

collective group can truly reveal how candid it truly is in practice. Serpa also cites a

survey conducted by Posner and Schmidt, in which 80 percent of the respondents

"believed that their organizations were guided by highly ethical principles" (Serpa 1985,

426-427). The importance of this survey are the additional findings where respondents

rated formal policies least important in influencing unethical conduct while the actions of

leaders and peers were rated as most important. This reinforces Serpa's theory regarding

observed behavior and demonstrates its importance, despite being qualitative and subjective, in measuring candor in an organization.

The U.S. Army requires the use of three standardized, formal methods to assess individuals and organizations. These assessments include the MSAF360, the NCO and officer evaluation system, and the Command Climate Survey. Although none of these methods serve the sole purpose of evaluating candor within an organization, they may have components that provide candor assessment and/or may provide valuable insight to measuring candor within Army organizations and should be considered within the body of candor research in the context of the Army.

The U.S. Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback 360 system, the first of these methods, is a potential method of measuring candor within the U.S. Army. The purpose of the MSAF360 system is to gather anonymous feedback from a group of co-workers, including superiors, peers, and subordinates, for the individual utilizing the MSAF360 assessment to gain self-awareness of their leadership qualities from the perspective and perception of the aforementioned groups. The ultimate goal of the MSAF360 the self-improvement of leadership capabilities through the self-awareness provided by the system. The MSAF360 consists of nine topic areas varying in the number of questions each, with a total of 82 questions for the entire assessment, two of which are open-ended (HQ DA 2014c). Upon reviewing all 82 questions, only one question directly addressed candor, while many others addressed its potential impacts, such as trust, or related behaviors such as clear communication, as listed in table 7

Table 7.   MSAF360 Candor Related Questions

Topic Area	Question	Question
Prepare Self to Lead	4	Recognizes how own actions impact others.
Prepare Self to Lead	5	Considers and uses personal feedback received from others.
Leads Others	1	Creates and shares a vision of the future.
Leads Others	3	Conveys the significance of the work.
Leads Others	5	Establishes clear intent and purpose.
Leads by Example	1	Own actions are consistent with guidance given to others.
Leads by Example	5	Is open to diverse ideas and points of view.
Leads by Example	6	Uses critical thinking and encourages others to do the same.
Gets Results	1	Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of opportunities to improve organizational performance.
Gets Results	10	Incorporates feedback as a routine part of work.
Extend Influence Beyond Chain of Command	1	Negotiates with others to reach mutual understanding and to resolve conflict.
Extend Influence Beyond Chain of Command	8	Builds trust with those outside lines of authority.
Develops Leaders	9	Provides appropriate feedback to subordinates.
Create a Positive Environment	1	Creates a learning environment.
Create a Positive Environment	9	Encourages open and candid communications.
Communicate	2	Presents recommendations with clarity.
Communicate	4	Engages others with appropriate communication techniques.
Communicate	5	Listens actively.
Communicate	6	Achieves shared understanding.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQ DA), "Individual Feedback Report," U.S. Army Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback, accessed November 7, 2014, http://msaf.army.mil/LeadOn.aspx.

The Army's evaluation system for officers and non-commissioned officers is another assessment method that is designed to assess an individual's performance and potential based on the observations and opinion of their supervisor/rater and their next echelon supervisor/senior rater. The evaluation is provided on a standard Department of the Army form unique to the individual's rank (officer or NCO) that is just the end product of a mandated system of periodic counseling concerning the rated individual's performance. The standard evaluation forms themselves are designed primarily to facilitate free-writing by the rater and senior rater, meaning that rather than a survey, the evaluation is more of a narrative supported by factual information regarding the individual's performance of their duties.

Because of the evaluation system's format, there is no directed measurement of candor of the rated individual. However, the evaluation itself serves as an indicator of candor from the rater and senior rater to the rated individual along with the supported periodic counseling that functions to ultimately build the performance evaluation. Army Regulation 623-3, *Evaluation Reporting System*, directs that "Commanders at all levels will ensure that . . . Rating officials provide candid assessments of rated Soldiers" (HQ DA 2014b, 2). It may be difficult to ascertain candor in a written evaluation, especially without knowledge or observation of the associated performance counseling and supporting periodic counseling, but aforementioned measurement methods such as Rittenhouse's language analysis could be an initial solution to measuring candor in language used in Army performance evaluations for officers and NCOs.

The Command Climate Survey is a method of collecting information for an organization to assess the organization's climate. Army regulation requires the

anonymous survey to be administered within 30 days of assuming command at the

company level, six months thereafter, and annually thereafter, however, the survey can be

administered at any time and supplemented as directed by the commander (HQ DA

2014a, 102-103). The Command Climate Survey consists of 34 questions, two of which

are open ended instead, with the remaining 32 being multiple-choice. The electronic

version of the survey allows a commander to choose from a pool of additional question to

include up to ten more of his or her choice. The survey is estimated on average to take

10-12 minutes for an individual to complete and has versions designed specifically for

active duty units, trainees, reserve component, units with a combination of military and

military, and civilian only (HQ DA 2005, 4-6; HQ DA 2013). Upon review of the current

Command Climate Survey itself, none of the 34 questions directly address candor,

however some of the questions address candor indirectly through some of its

aforementioned impacts and are listed in table 8 (HQ DA 2013).

Table 8.   Command Climate Survey Candor Related Questions

Question #	Question
1b	How much do you agree or disagree with the statement "Leaders in my unit trust their Soldiers?"
1g	How much do you agree or disagree with the statement "Leaders Soldiers in my unit trust each other?"
4b	How would you rate your unit regarding "Respect from the chain of command?"
4c	How would you rate your unit regarding "Respect for the chain of command?"
4e	How would you rate your unit regarding "Respect Soldiers have for others from diverse backgrounds?"
5e	How much do you agree or disagree with the statement "It is easy for Soldiers in the unit to see the CO about a problem?"
5f	How much do you agree or disagree with the statement "It is easy for Soldiers in the unit to see the 1SG about a problem?"
6c	Evaluate your immediate leader/rater on "Communication skills."
6e	Evaluate your immediate leader/rater on "Adapting to change."
6f	Evaluate your immediate leader/rater on "Creativity and innovativeness."
6h	Evaluate your immediate leader/rater on "Addressing poor performance."

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQ DA), "Army Command Climate Survey: Soldiers in TO&E units (ver. 6.2)," 2013, accessed November 7, 2014, http://www.armyg1.army.mil/documents/CMD_Climate_Surveys/TOE-CCSv6.2%2006_2013.pdf.

<u>Conclusion</u>

The research reviewed is generally compartmentalized and oriented towards business and corporate organizations. Collectively, the research provides a robust description of candor and its potential impacts on an organization, non-specific to the U.S. Army. However, the research alone is insufficient in answering the primary and secondary research questions. With the application of a research methodology, such as a qualitative meta-analysis, to the literature and its concepts, the analysis of the research should facilitate answering the secondary research questions to support the primary

research question. This chapter has provided the research foundation while chapter 3 will

provide the research methodology needed to achieve the research's objectives.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

This research intends to explore organizational candor and current U.S. Army

mission command philosophy doctrine to understand the impacts of organizational

candor on an Army organization as it is applied through the Army mission command

philosophy doctrine. Findings from the analysis of literature are applied to the Battle of

Wanat case study applied to provide real-word, U.S. Army context to discuss candor's

potential in the mission command philosophy. Overall, the research's objective is to

make a recommendation regarding candor in Army mission command philosophy

doctrine to answer the primary research question: Should candor be explicitly included in

the U.S. Army's mission command philosophy of command doctrine?

This study's qualitative meta-analysis of literature is comprised of scholarly,

academic, and professional literature and research, from both civilian and military

organizations and leaders, regarding organizational leadership and candor. A qualitative

meta-analysis is a method to combine information and findings from other qualitative

research to develop a single conclusion which is likely more accurate due to including

other research findings. This method was chosen in an attempt to generate more robust,

collective findings from literature sources that focus on limited aspects of candor that

apply both to the military and similar organizations. To maintain currency and enhance

the validity of the study, the research utilized contemporary sources (within the last 30

years) and contained firsthand accounts from individuals with extensive, personal

organizational leadership experience, recognized organizational leadership experts and publications, or organizational leadership focused peer-reviewed publications.

The study was organized into sections corresponding to each sub-question supporting the primary research question and therefore each section attempted to address its respective question based on the meta-analysis of literature reviewed. The meta-analysis of literature initially focused on establishing whether or not candor in the business arena is equivalent to candor in the military to enable further comparison and the inclusion of non-military focused research and sources for the analysis. Through answering the sub-questions, the analysis yielded a set of concepts that have varying degrees of applicability and relevance to Army organizations.

The meta-analysis of research regarding candor in organizations culminated with the application of the analysis to a single case study on the Battle of Wanat. This case study facilitated the application of concepts yielded by the meta-analysis for further analysis and discussion. Although speculative, the case study intended to provide an Army operational context to research findings from sources that may not be military related but refer to similar hierarchical organizations and businesses; a widely accepted method of case study within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and U.S. Army War College for leadership instruction. The case study ultimately aimed to confirm or deny the meta-analysis findings, reveal additional aspects of candor not previously considered or discussed, and further the answering of the sub-questions posed in Chapter 1 that support the primary research question:

Overall, this qualitative meta-analysis will enable the study of literature and research regarding organizational leadership and candor and apply the analysis of the

research to a case study in military context to examine candor within the mission command philosophy applied to an Army organization. A qualitative approach will enable the extrapolation of organizational leadership on a case-by-case basis, as determined from the research, to make general determinations regarding candor's impacts on any organization, applicability to the mission command philosophy, and a final recommendation on whether or not candor should receive explicit mention within Army mission command doctrine. Chapter 4 provides the analysis of the literature reviewed that leads to the conclusions to answer the primary and secondary research questions and provide further recommendations in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

<u>Definition</u>

Research has established that the Army's doctrinal definition of candor in *ADRP 6-22* is sufficient and accurate in comparison to other definitions. For review, "Candor means being frank, honest, and sincere with others. It requires impartiality and fairness" (HQ DA 2012f, 3-3). The bulk of this analysis is contained within the "Defining Candor" section of Chapter 2, "Literature Review". Refer to chapter 2, table 1 for a summary of candor's definitions from research that support the U.S. Army's doctrinal definition from ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*.

Upon examination, the definition implies that candor requires effective communication between two parties, as you cannot be "frank, honest, and sincere with others" without communicating with another person. From this implication follows another: the framework for effective communication must be established before candor can be developed. This framework is likely comprised, at least partially, by the "systems and norms" that O'Toole and Bennis refer to in their *Harvard Business Review* article. Systems and norms will be discussed further in regards to developing candor.

<u>Candor's Organizational Impacts</u>

Research clearly establishes a strong relationship between candor and trust, and although the research is not definitive on which (candor or trust) should exist first, the research does definitively indicate that candor enhances trust. The strength in the research is that the candor-trust relationship is not only strongly supported by business and

corporate leadership experts, but it is also directly supported by U.S. Army doctrine. Mission command, whose foundation is mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose, is therefore directly affected by candor through the enhancement of one half of its foundation. Additionally, the mission command philosophy is also guided by the principle of building cohesive teams through mutual trust, meaning that candor would also indirectly support the building of cohesive teams while directly supporting one of mission command philosophy's six major principles.

It is vital in this case that analysis of the reach of the effects of candor within the mission command philosophy be discussed prior to expanding the effects candor may have beyond enhancing mutual trust. ADP 1 states that mutual trust between all echelons depends upon candor and, in the case of the Army's command structure, all echelons indicates superiors, peers, and subordinates. ADP 1 only reaffirms the research findings regarding the candor-trust relationship, but it also implies that candor must be present within these three echelon relationships, relative to the person or organization applying the candor (HQ DA 2012a, 2-2). Mission command doctrine in ADRP 6-0 supports this, saying "Mutual trust is shared confidence among commanders, subordinates, and partners" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-1). This again supports the statement regarding trust and candor in *ADP 1*, but also introduces a fourth facet for candor: partners. Finally, Warren Bennis affirmed that candor with one's self is also essential to building trust, thus providing a fifth and final facet for candor–self. LTC Paolozzi also explicitly stated the self-facet in his research as a facet of candor, bringing it further relevance.

These five facets are consistent with the findings of LTC Paolozzi and his four facets, with the exception of the addition of partners as the fifth, as depicted in figure 2.

Based on the explicit mention of candor in ADRP 6-22 in regards to strategic communications and civil-military relationships as discussed in the research, the partner facet seems to have been overlooked by LTC Paolozzi. Additionally, with the anticipated shift of general U.S. military strategy to expeditionary, joint, and multinational efforts within the Joint Operational Access concept, partners will be critical to international legitimacy and unity of effort created by mission command as it supports Unified Land Operations.

Figure 2.   The Five Facets of Candor

Source: Created by author.

As discussed in the literature review, O'Toole and Bennis simply state, "Companies can't innovate, respond to changing stakeholder needs, or function efficiently unless people have access to relevant, timely and valid information. It's thus the leader's job to create systems and norms that lead to a culture of candor" (O'Toole and Bennis 2009, 3). The Army equivalent of this affirmation would be: "It is the commander's responsibility to create a culture of candor to facilitate shared understanding and support decision making through the flow of timely and accurate information." This is relevant because it nearly summarizes the commanders role within mission command as stated within doctrine, however O'Toole and Bennis make clear the role of candor, as reflected in the "translated" version, while mission command doctrine makes no mention of it.

O'Toole and Bennis' statement also says that innovation, agility (reacting to a changing environment), and efficiency are positively affected by candor. As the mission command philosophy was expanded in the doctrinal research, it was clearly stated that "critical and creative thinking facilitate understanding and support decisionmaking" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-8). This indicates that a positive relationship between candor and innovation could support a positive relationship between candor and creative thinking, in which candor would then indirectly facilitate understanding and support decisionmaking. And, as stated, "mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose" (HQ DA 2012e, 1-2). Based upon the analysis of candor's impacts on trust and now its impacts on creative thinking, it is possible that candor has direct (trust) and indirect (creative thinking) positive impacts on both components of mission command's stated foundation, as depicted in figure 3.

Figure 3.   Candor's Impacts on the Mission Command Philosophy

Source: Created by author.

In regards to the changing environment O'Toole and Bennis refer to, ADRP 6-0

also references a similar environment and addresses how leaders can lead an organization

through that environment. "Empowered with trust, authority, and a shared understanding,

[commanders] can develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively under fluid, dynamic

conditions" (HQ DA 2012e, 2-4). The ability to for the Army to operate effectively in a

dynamic or complex environment is extremely important in regards to mission success, and therefore anything that can enhance this ability would therefore potentially increase the probability of mission success in that environment.

Table 9 summarizes the impacts of candor by source to display the similarities and differences between research that contributed to the analysis of candor's organizational impacts.

Table 9.   Summary of Candor's Impacts by Source

Source	Summary of Candor's Impacts
(Eberhardt 2013a)	Builds trust. Is a positive force for change. Translates into organizational success. Increases productivity and satisfaction.
(Gandz 2007)	Is a source of competitive advantage. Ensures good news travels fast and bad news travels faster. Allows for rapid identification and fixing of mistakes. Creates a learning environment. Aligns people with strategy. Is essential to effective execution, performance management, and people development.
(Harris 2008)	Results in better, faster decisions and actions. Builds a culture of trust and collaboration. Allows for debate of opposing viewpoints. Produces more effective solutions and innovations.
(O'Toole and Bennis 2009)	Allows for recognition and challenging of assumptions. Enables transmission of relevant, timely, valid information. Assists with successful innovation. Helps adaptation and efficient functioning.
(Paolozzi 2013)	Improves the flow and accuracy of information. Builds trust. Contributes to effective communication. Builds confidence in institutions, leaders, and organizations.
(Rittenhouse Rankings 2013)	Is positively associated with organizational performance. May increase efficiency.
(Serpa 1985)	Strengthens trust. Instills confidence. Helps guide leaders' thinking and decision making. Provides decision maker greater likelihood of formulating realistic objectives and strategies. Allows subordinates to deal with internal and external opportunities and problems. Encourages presentation of the most current view of a situation.
(Welch 2005)	Leads to winning. Generates ideas and speed. Is necessary for an organization to maintain pace with competition. Allows an organization to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. Cuts costs by eliminating wasted time in meetings and forums.

Source: Created by author.

Obstacles to Candor

Through the literature review regarding obstacles to candor, a common theme appears: most of the obstacles revolve around human nature and socialization. In essence, the research indicates that the very people considering or attempting to implement candor are the same people that make it difficult to achieve or prevent it from occurring naturally. Although it is not done purposely, the research suggests that leaders must counter this to achieve individual or organizational candor, which demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of the obstacles. Of utmost importance is the understanding of two distinct sets of obstacles from the research: individual obstacles and organizational obstacles.

Although there is much agreement within the research regarding the nature of individual obstacles preventing the transmission of candor by individuals within an organization, only two sources offer distinct models or structures in which to understand and categorize these individual obstacles. Lynn Harris' categorization of candor obstacles as "socialization, fear, and skills," and Bolton's "candor-based fear" sub-categorization are the most detailed and robust of the individual obstacle descriptions. By maintaining Harris' model of socialization, fear, and skills, and then expanding fear into subcategories matching Bolton's five fear categories, the result is a model as depicted in table 10 that encompasses nearly all of the individual obstacles discussed in the research.

Table 10. Individual Obstacles to Candor

Obstacles (Harris 2008, 2)	Categories of Candor-based Fear (Bolton 2006, 343)
Socialization	Job Retribution
Fear	Social Retribution
Skills	Hurting Others' Feelings
	Losing Face
	Change

Source: Created by author.

It is critical to understand that multiple sources agreed that the fear an individual may have that prevents candor is either based on perceived threats and imagined consequences or precedent of leader or organizational actions and behavior. The significance of these two assertions is that they impact methods of candor development that likely incorporate measures to reduce these fears. If individual obstacle mitigation or reduction is to be part of a candor development method or plan, then fear should probably be accounted for and both the perceived/imagined fear and precedent based fear should be addressed in the method.

The organizational obstacles described in the research are mainly discussed by Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole. The organizational obstacles are also just as relevant because the organization is an entity in itself and has an overall effect on whether candor is present within it. At first glance, some of the organizational obstacles described by Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole and listed in table 11 may seem as though they are individual obstacles because they are dependent on an individual. For example, the mishandling of information could occur with an individual or a small group within an organization however, by the definition the individual is using their position to mishandle

the information, or function as a "gatekeeper" described by Gandz. However, it is the

organization's structure or systems that allows the mishandling to occur, although it is an

individual with nefarious or poor motives actually conducting the mishandling. This is

also the case for the "shimmer effect," as the leader's position in the organizational

structure essentially creates the opportunity and may subsequently then link with the

three aforementioned primary individual obstacle categories.

Table 11.   Organizational Obstacles to Candor

Obstacles (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 20-31)
Mishandling of Information – "Gatekeepers" (Gandz 2007, 1-2)
Structural Impediments – "Systems" (O'Toole and Bennis 2009, 3)
"Shimmer Effect"
Sunken Costs
Intoxication with Ambition

Source: Created by author.

The sunken costs and intoxication with ambition obstacles are related, as many

times sunken costs may cause overambition or exacerbate it, but it is possible for either to

exist independently as supported by Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole. These obstacles

could also be attributed to an individual leader, pushing the organization too hard for

perceived personal or organizational benefit. Because both phenomenon likely govern the

organization's objectives and priorities, they become organizational obstacles unless the

organization's paradigm is changed.

It is important to recognize that although humans comprise, guide, and drive

organizations, ultimately the organization as an institution has the capacity to shape the

behavior of the humans that comprise it. Because of this, the obstacles to candor may transcend and relate both to individual humans and the organization, and may even be rooted or caused by the same psychological or sociological phenomenon. Awareness of the obstacles to candor suggested in this study are key for leaders to understand that implementation or development of candor will be met with some level of resistance that may or may not be deliberate or natural, regardless if the suggested obstacle models are completely accurate.

Although the research into the psychology and sociology behind candor for this study was limited, a basic understanding is necessary to reduce, mitigate, or counter the obstacles to develop organization candor for its potential benefits. The development of candor and reduction of obstacles, both of which have relevance in relation to the obstacles discussed will be discussed further in subsequent sections. The obstacles discussed also reveal some of the potential negative effects of candor to an organization for further analysis.

<center>Candor's Negative Effects</center>

Although none of the reviewed research explicitly mentioned the potential negative effects of candor, there are indeed some implied negative effects, which require mention as a caution to leaders attempting to develop candor within their organization. Most of these negative effects are directly tied to the obstacles to candor previously discussed, and to the "rules of engagement" for candor covered in the next section.

It is important to note that candor research, mostly as it applies to the business/corporate environment, is only discussed as applicable to the professional environment for which it is meant to benefit. This means that the candid communication

discussed in concept is always related to the organization, or to individual performance as it relates to the organization. A potential negative effect of candor in the workplace is therefore implied to be the spillage of that candor into the personal realm. An example of this may occur at an organizational social function where an individual may be candid with a co-worker regarding his or her spouse. Jack Welch, explaining obstacles to candor, uses a similar, real-world example, and although it may be candor, it is not the type of candor desired in a professional environment. Although the organization values candor and the candid exchange occurs at an organizational function, it is clearly inappropriate. This may be an extreme example, in most cases governed by an individual's common sense and emotional intelligence, but it is possible and can cause friction within the organization and in professional relationships.

Leaders must consider implementing guidelines to prevent "candor spillage," as it is referred to in the previous section. These guidelines, covered in detail in the next section and discussed in the research, provide the rules for which the organization employs candor and help to create conditions to develop and maintain it over time. In addition, training to help develop the interpersonal skills, emotional intelligence, and tact by which individuals express candor, as referenced in Lynn Harris' work as "skills," also serve to prevent "candor spillage" from the professional environment and keep candid communications professionally oriented.

Similarly, as briefly described by COL Paolozzi, there are individuals that may believe they have a free ticket to say whatever they want, whenever they want when candor is implemented: "Welcoming candor is not a license to be brash, angry, or habitually wrong" (Paolozzi 2013, 1). This phenomenon may not qualify as "candor

spillage" as previously defined because it can still occur within the professional environment. A more appropriate term may simply be candor abuse or misuse of candor. Either way, this misuse must be controlled by training and "rules of engagement" to prevent widespread misuse and behavior that is counterproductive to the organization and candor initiatives.

Candor can also have negative effects when appropriate groundwork is not established prior to developing candor within the organization. Examples of this phenomenon are tied to the fears discussed in Harris' research pertaining to the obstacles to candor. If the appropriate emphasis and groundwork is not implemented by a superior leader, subordinates may not be completely committed to implementing organizational candor or fully understand their superior's intent. It is situations like these that may result in subordinate leadership taking offense to candor, whether it be personal feedback, organization issues, or even whistleblower type situations, causing leader reprisals through release of employment, poor performance appraisals, public humiliation, or other methods. These actions are clearly counterproductive to the superior leader's intent: they violate the trust of employees and undermine the superior leader's objective of developing candor. However, mid-level leaders are not solely to blame as it is also likely that this could be a product of the superior leader's lack of preparation of his lower echelon leadership via communication of his vision and intent.

The negative effects by those wayward mid-level leaders can be devastating to trust within an organization, both between senior leaders and mid-level leaders, and between all leaders and their subordinates. Not only does is trust violated, but efforts to develop candor will be greatly set back as well. To prevent this, the implementation of

candor within an organization must be deliberate, and be managed similar to implementing change. Along with this change, the leader driving it must issue clear, concise guidance, vision, and intent to ensure subordinate leaders understand and, like previously discussed, they must be individually developed, especially regarding the skills needed for candor, to make candor implementation successful.

Finally, moral courage, as discussed in chapter 2, is required to report incidents of misconduct or wrongdoing using candor. Encouraging candor may result in increased reporting of misconduct or other concerns within the organization. However, human nature sometimes drives individuals in power to act with a negative response to those reporting incidents. The individuals reporting these incidents of wrongdoing are commonly referred to as "whistleblowers" and have gained notoriety among a variety of government agencies over the past decades. Most organizations would likely prefer to deal with internal issues prior to the media and public being involved, and therefore not only must candor be supported by the organization's leadership, but the organization must take care to treat whistleblowers properly and follow through with whistleblowers to visibly support the candor they preach. Any retribution or reprisals towards "whistleblowers," which are common and discussed in the literature review, will violate the trust of members of the organization and compromise leadership's efforts to encourage candor within the organization.

Candor's Rules of Engagement

Much of the literature reviewed attaches rules or conditions to candor within the definition or discussion of candor's aspects but does not necessarily address rules directly as an essential element or component of candor. Perhaps the best example of this comes

from a single statement from Eberhardt's book: "Candor is respectful. It is committed to success. It is interested in a better outcome for all involved" (Eberhardt 2013a, 30). Galpin and Whittington, on the other hand, are the exception to this based on their research focusing on creating candor in the classroom and using formal rules at the onset of the class to create the environment required to foster candor.

The most obvious of all rules is probably that the intent of candor must be improving individuals within the organization or the organization itself. The primary objective of nearly every source and piece of literature reviewed is to leverage candor to gain an advantage for the organization in some or all of the areas of decision making, information flow, trust, efficiency, and profit for businesses. It is likely when this rule is not followed that individuals misuse candor, as in the candor spillage discussed previously, and can damage relationships with individuals and the organization. Additional rules are scattered throughout the literature, some of which are captured and listed in table 12.

Table 12. Summary of Candor's Rules of Engagement by Source

Source	Rules Embedded Within Source's Literature
(Antonioni 2006)	"Open, straightforward, and sincere in expression, sharing what we think without evasion and without being rude."
(Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008)	"For information to flow freely within an institution, followers must feel free to speak openly, and leaders must welcome such openness."
(Eberhardt 2013a)	"Candor that allows an organization to be wholly more successful than its parts." "We need to be open and direct, to speak simply and honestly, and to communicate respectfully." "Candor is honesty in communication that is helpfully forthright in a way that supports people's success and fully shares impressions of 'how it is for you.'" "To be candid is not to be insulting." "Candor is respectful. It is committed to success. It is interested in a better outcome for all involved." "We need to see candor as talking openly or being curious, versus attacking or confronting our colleagues. Real honesty, committed to someone's success, is never brutal." "So much of communication is in the delivery. And if we deliver it in a responsible, mature way, we can motivate change without destroying relationships." "Clarity is the goal of candor, and we cannot reach it through either confrontation or concession."
(Galpin and Whittington 2009)	"Facilitators must be intentional about creating an environment that is psychologically safe by fostering trust and mutual respect." "Ground rules may include stay on topic, do not over participate, agree to disagree, listen, respect others' ideas, and be brief."

Source: Created by author.

Ultimately candor's rules of engagement serve as a bridge to connect the negative impacts of candor to the obstacles to candor along with the development of candor. As revealed through Galpin's research, the rules serve to mitigate, reduce, or eliminate some of the aforementioned individual and organization obstacles to enable development of candor within the organization. Although the rules are a formality that may seem

unnecessary and/or intuitive for mature adults, the establishment and communication of

the rules may have the ability to increase candid participation from a sub-organization or

the entire organization itself by forcing the repression of some human tendencies. The

potential rules of engagement proposed in table 13 should be considered when attempting

to develop candor, as discussed in the following section.

Table 13.   Candor's Potential Rules of Engagement

Rule (Candor . . .)
Is regarding professional matters.
Benefits an individual in the organization or the organization itself.
Is respectful.
Is delivered tactfully with maturity.
Is received, considered, and valued.
Requires impartiality and fairness.
Is non-confrontational.
Is succinct.

Source: Created by author.

Developing Candor

The development of candor within an organization, as implied by the existence of

research on candor development, must be a deliberate effort. This is especially true due to

the human aspect and associated obstacles that prevent candor from occurring naturally

without leader influence. Galpin and Whittington's research regarding candor in the

classroom supports the deliberateness of candor implementation: "candid participation

can be established if leadership instructors conscientiously implement a set of seven

actions" (Galpin and Whittington 2009, 12).

Bolton's use of Lewin's theory regarding behavior that states "behavior is a function of the person in his/her environment" forms the basis of not only Bolton's recommended method of candor development, but also nearly all other research (Bolton 2006, 2). From this theory, there are two variables, the environment (organization) and the individual, that can be affected to achieve a candid organization. It may not be unreasonable to expand the theory to further hypothesize that affecting the organization and the individual simultaneously yields the desired results more efficiently than if each variable is affected independently in sequence.

Serpa's leader-focused approach to candor development differs from others only in the emphasis on the leader first, but it serves to reinforce the common assertion that leader behavior must be consistent with the candor they seek (Serpa 1985, 428-429). This seems intuitive but may be a problem in practice due to lack of self-awareness or misalignment of intent and perception. Regardless, it seems that leaders must behave consistently in alignment with their stated goals and values and, in regards to candor, must both transmit candor and genuinely receive it while enforcing the established formal guidelines to foster it.

Overall, it seems that Serpa's five steps for developing a candid corporate culture, as stated in table 6, may be the best-suited and simplest plan for developing a candid corporate culture. However, the plan is lacking the establishment of formal rules for the organization's candor implementation discussed in a previous section. The inclusion of rules establishment as step three into Serpa's existing method is simple and creates a more robust development method that is supported by Galpin and Whittington's seven actions to establish candid participation in the classroom, as listed in table 4. Finally, by

expanding Serpa's leader awareness action in step one with Bolton's candor

reconciliation process listed in table 3 and also expanding Serpa's leader behavior action

in step two with Serpa's own leader action consistency as listed in table 5, a highly

detailed model is created with complimentary research to created a method for candor

development.

ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, provides a model which is Army doctrine

and provides a potential method for the development of candor within an organization

based on this study's research while linked to and working within the doctrinal guidelines

of ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*. The commander's role in the operations process, as

graphically depicted in figure 4, consists of six steps: understand, visualize, describe,

direct, lead and assess, with lead and assess being continuous throughout the entire

process (HQ DA 2012d, 1-3). This doctrinal framework could be an existing Army

paradigm that could be modified to help develop candor within an organization with the

benefit that it is already familiar to leaders within the Army.

Figure 4.   Commander's Role in the Operations Process

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1-3.

In the case of organizational candor, the first step in the model, understand, would require the organizational leader to gain an understanding of his organization and the level of candor within as he or she transitions into a leadership role, or decides to explore candor as a potential initiative for the organization. Understanding would be achieved through current leader assessments that would include peers, superiors, and subordinates. The previous leader, although potentially biased, would also be able to provide information regarding candor within the organization during the transition period. A review of applicable organizational surveys, such as a command climate survey, may also give indications regarding the organization's culture and climate. Finally, leaders can also

use observation of behavior to provide a strong indication of whether or not candor permeates the organization, and which individual peer and subordinate leaders display the most candor in organizational forums. If the organization was previously attempting to pursue candor, further past assessments may also be available.

During the visualize stage, a leader would consider their understanding of the organization and create a realistic and achievable vision of the organization concerning candor. The leader would determine the desired environment and culture and the objectives for which he or she is attempting to achieve with candor. These objectives would likely be some or all of the aforementioned potential impacts of candor. It is likely that the vision for the organization that is developed would not exclusively discuss candor however, and that organizational candor would most likely be a mere component of the entire organizational vision. However, if an organizational vision has already been communicated, candor would need to be an amendment to that vision.

The leader's vision itself is important, but the communication of the vision is probably more important. Without clear communication to subordinate leaders, peers, and the organization as a whole, the vision would likely never be realized. The "describe" step of the commander's role in the operation's process is critical, as it begins the drive for the organization to achieve the vision and, in regards to candor, serves as the catalyst for change and the notification to the organization that candor is an organization priority for the organization's leader.

The "direct" stage would arguably be the most tangible portion of the process to develop candor. Here the organization's leader would initiate actions to begin the transition to a more candid organization. Based on the research reviewed, this would

76

likely be at least a two-pronged approach. The first prong may consist of placing effects on the organization as a whole in a top-down fashion via the modification or creation of policies that attempt to build candor and the modification of current systems and norms to encourage more candor. The objective of this first approach would be to match the vision of the organizational leader with the systems of the organization of which he has ultimate control. The second prong may seek to seed the organization with candor at lower echelons in controlled environments or forums such as meetings, working groups, and other collaborative efforts. The objective of this prong would be to demonstrate the practice of candor to the organization, as well as its benefits.

The "lead" portion of the model is one of two steps that occur continuously throughout the entire process, and in this case would serve two purposes for the organizational leader: personally exhibiting behaviors that demonstrate candor and leading the organization to the achieve the vision/objective of being a candid organization. Leading by example requires that a leader exhibit behaviors consistent with their vision, and in the case of candor would not only be the transmission of candid communication, but also the genuine receipt of candor from others and using that candor actively to demonstrate its value in improving the organization. Secondly, the organization's leader must guide and lead the organization to becoming more candid, which may require encouraging it in open forums and helping the organization overcome some of the aforementioned obstacles while avoiding the potential negative aspects.

The second step that occurs continuously throughout the commander's role in the operations process is "assess" and requires the measuring of progress through evaluation, which serves as a guide through the entire process. Assessment can let the organization's

leader maintain awareness on the organizations performance and effectiveness in regards

to a certain objective, in this case candor. This assessment usually requires a method of

measurement to determine performance and effectiveness, which for candor is discussed

in the following section.

<center>Measuring Candor</center>

Research of candor has provided three distinct concepts to consider regarding

measurement of candor within organizations that have little overlap, making the

identification of a single concept as the most effective or efficient very difficult. The

three concepts discussed-Gandz' organizational survey, Rittenhouse's language analysis

of communications, and Serpa's analysis of observed behavior-all appear to be valid

methods of attempting to measure candor within an organization. Therefore, it is possible

that the most robust approach to measuring candor would be utilizing all three methods in

concert to obtain a more complete candor assessment.

When the three methods of measurement are compared, one of the primary

differences is the target of the measurement. For example, the target of Gandz' survey

method is every individual comprising the organization, of course the survey could be

only issued to certain sub-populations or groups for more specificity by demographic.

The target of Rittenhouse's language analysis is the substance of the communications of

the entire organization or any sub organization, and can be internal communication,

external communication, or both. Finally, the targets of Serpa's behavior analysis are

subordinate leaders in small groups, meetings, forums, or other closed environment

where behavior observation is possible. Each method analyzes a different portion of the

<center>78</center>

organization and none of these portions alone is necessarily indicative of the entire organization as evidenced in the research.

Another difference in methods is the individual or party conducting the candor measurement. In the case of a survey, the measurer could be internal or external to the organization because the method of measurement is a survey. If the survey is electronic or paper, the measurer's affiliation is irrelevant because it will not really influence the survey outcome. However, if the survey is conducted in an interview, there could be unintended or intended influence from the interviewer if the interviewer is part of the organization being examined. In the case of language analysis, analysis needs to be completed by a computer due to the amount of data needing to be examined and the application of a strict, well-defined algorithm to maintain uniformity during the entire analysis. The measurer is therefore a computer, analyzing human input, but external to the organization. Finally, for behavior analysis, the individual conducting the candor measurement could be internal or external to the organization. An external measurer would most likely be trained to observe behavior and have the expertise to identify candor in the workplace. Conversely, an internal measurer would have a more detailed understanding of the organization and the individuals that lead it while the organization would be less skeptical of their presence in potentially sensitive meetings or forums. Consideration of the individual or party responsible for measurement of candor for each method is important for estimating resource requirements, eliminating potential sources of bias, and obtaining a candor measurement that is both accurate and helpful to an organization's leaders. Table 14 provides a by-source summary of the three candor measurement methods reviewed.

Table 14.   Summary of Candor Measurement Methods by Source

Source	Measurement Method	Considerations
(Gandz 2007)	Survey analysis.	Anonymous vs. Identifiable.
		Unique to organization.
		Specific questions.
		Compare Organizations vs. Internal Analysis
(Rittenhouse Rankings 2013)	Organization communications language analysis.	Internal communications.
		External communications.
		Both internal and external communications.
(Serpa 1985)	Observed behavior analysis.	Do subordinates seek clues to what management thinks and wants before expressing themselves in support and agreement only?
		Is there recurrent agreement on various issues among managers with a lack of any dissenting views?
		Is there reluctance to provide negative information on bad news?
		Is the same information provided over a period of time to justify an action or an investment?
		Do many informal one-on-one meetings follow group management meetings?

Source: Created by author.

Like the measurement methods reviewed, the Army also uses a variety of mandatory assessments that differ in terms of their evaluation target, the evaluator and the measurement method. However, the three assessment methods discussed, as listed in table 15, really only utilize the survey analysis method or individual subjective performance evaluation written in a narrative form.

Table 15.   Comparison of U.S. Army Mandatory Assessments

Evaluation	Evaluation Target	Evaluator	Measurement Method	Mand-atory	Anony-mous
MSAF360	Individual	Selected Subordinates, Peers, Superiors	Electronic Questionnaire/ Survey	Yes	Yes
Officer & NCO Evaluation	Individual	Formal Rater and Senior Rater	Performance and Potential Narrative	Yes	No
Command Climate Survey	Organization	Organization's Members	Electronic or Manual Questionnaire Survey	Yes	Yes

Source: Created by author.

Upon researching the MSAF360 system, the system, as currently configured, seems insufficient to measure candor for an organization but it does address individual candor directly and indirectly through the questions that comprise it. Because the MSAF360 is based around the individual leader and the results are only available to the individual leader requesting the assessment, it is inadequate to measure any organizational trends. However, if the MSAF360 report for a leader was able to accessed by the leader's superior for analysis, this would change the utility of the MSAF360 for measuring candor. A superior leader could essentially direct or examine the MSAF360 results for all of his or her direct reporting subordinates and use the information to develop a well-informed, subjective assessment of candor within his or her organization.

Although the questions on the Command Climate Survey do not directly address candor, some of the questions concern indicators that candor may be present. However, the answers to those survey questions may be less important than the quality and

thoroughness of the responses given on the survey. The responses themselves may provide a better indication of the amount of candor present within the organization.

The same concept applies to the Army's evaluation system, which has no inherent measurement of candor, but the written evaluation's narrative itself provides an indication of the rater and senior rater's candor with the rated Soldier. The evaluation system, like the MSAF360, is also designed to measure individual's performance and potential, independent from the organization. However, since the rater and senior rater presumably rate many individuals, the examination of many rater and senior rater's evaluations within the organization could provide a useful indication of the amount of candor present, at least on evaluations. For this, a system like Rittenhouse's language analysis for candor would be helpful and could quantify candor while keeping performance evaluation information private.

The more interesting fact regarding both MSAF360 and the Command Climate Survey is that both are directed to be anonymous by regulation, presumably, just as Gandz explained in his research, to encourage more candid responses. The fact that the both of these assessments are anonymous reveals that the Army desires candid feedback and felt by making the surveys anonymous that responses would be more candid. This also potentially implies that Army organizations require mechanisms, such as anonymous surveys, to gain candor, because the desired amount of candor is not already present.

Case Study-The Battle of Wanat

Introduction and Background

On July 13, 2008, nine Soldiers from Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second

Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade suffered the loss of

nine Soldiers and 27 wounded at the hands of insurgents near the village of Wanat,

Waygal District, Afghanistan. Coined the Battle of Wanat, the incident was of intense

scrutiny as one of the deadliest days for the United States in the history of Operation

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The Battle of Wanat was the focus of two separate investigations, the second of

which, led by Lieutenant General (LTG) Richard F. Natonski, recommended reprimands

be issued to upper echelon leaders that were doled out but later revoked. Because of the

amount of information collected through the investigations and the media, Wanat remains

a relevant, contemporary case study, regardless of the investigations findings, within

discussions on tactics, leadership, risk, transitions, and warfighting function integration

among presumably many other subjects. This study used the Battle of Wanat, as

recounted in the Combat Studies Institute report, LTG Natonski's investigation executive

summary, and Mark Bowden's *Vanity Fair* article titled "Echoes from a Distant

Battlefield," to examine the days leading up to the battle, as a case study to demonstrate

the application of candor and provide context for the meta-analysis.

The use of the Battle of Wanat to explore the application of candor is not to

suggest that candor could have prevented the Battle of Wanat or the casualties that

occurred on July 13, 2008. However, candor, when included in a command philosophy

for an entire organization and prioritized as a command initiative may help improve an

organization's ability to prepare for and react to an incident like Wanat. More importantly, the study of Wanat in regards to candor in the mission command philosophy provides context for candor within the Army and a combat environment, both of which are not prevalent within research or Army doctrine.

Candor inherently requires people and, as the research and analysis seem to indicate, people are the communicators, the leaders, and the obstacle to achieving organizational candor. In the case of Wanat, five separate parties were considered regarding candor: Second Platoon, Chosen Company; First Lieutenant (1LT) Jonathan Brostrom, platoon leader of Second Platoon; Captain (CPT) Matthew Myer, Commander of Chosen Company; Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William Ostlund, Commander of Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment; and the Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment staff.

The Presence or Absence of Candor

One of the nine Soldiers lost at Wanat was 1LT Jonathan Brostrom, Second Platoon's platoon leader. 1LT Brostrom was given the responsibility of directly overseeing the construction and operating of Combat Outpost (COP) Kahler near the village of Wanat as part of the larger Operation Rock Move. 1LT Brostrom was the first officer in the chain of command for second platoon, and the direct link between the platoon and their company commander, CPT Myer.

In a 2011 *Vanity Fair* article, Mark Bowden describes second platoon's feelings upon arriving at the site chosen for COP Kahler located just outside the village of Wanat.

> The men had felt vulnerable in these first days. It wasn't just that the outpost sat at the bottom of a giant bowl. There were also dead zones all around it where you couldn't see. The ground dipped down just outside the perimeter, to a creek and to

the road. The battalion headquarters could not provide the Wanat outpost with steady, overhead visual surveillance because of weather and limited availability of drones. Where the land sloped uphill to the northeast there was a bazaar and a mosque, together with other village buildings. It was as if Wanat were staring right down at them. There were just too many places for the enemy to hide. Platoon sergeant David Dzwik shared the misgivings of his men. (Bowden 2011, 215)

Bowden's description paints a picture of uneasiness among most, if not all, members of second platoon, both at Wanat and in the weeks leading up to the operation. Some of this uneasiness may have been caused by the platoon's scheduled departure from Afghanistan about two weeks after the move to Wanat, but through the words of one of second platoon's NCOs, there seems to have been a bit more to it:

> No one in the company wanted to do this Wanat thing. We all knew something bad was going to happen. I mean, guys were writing on their Facebook pages to pray for them, they felt like this mission was the one they weren't coming back from. (CSI 2010, 85)

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Dzwik's concerns are more clearly described in the Combat Studies Institute's study, which also explicitly states that the platoon sergeant expressed his concerns regarding Operation Rock Move and Wanat to his enlisted supervisor and CPT Myer's enlisted counterpart, the Chosen Company first sergeant.

> Dzwik stated that he also expressed concerns about ROCK MOVE to the Chosen Company first sergeant. The platoon sergeant feared that there would be a lack of assets to reinforce the COP and foresaw potential problems with logistical support while the incoming forces from the 1st Infantry Division (ID) relieved the paratroopers. He thought those issues would become especially problematic if the plan's assumptions about the enemy and local population proved incorrect. However, Dzwik also noted that he believed the plan for ROCK MOVE was essentially sound and acknowledged that some amount of risk is inherent in all combat operations. (CSI 2010, 85)

1LT Brostrom was undoubtedly aware of his platoon's feelings, as he was close to his Soldiers, a bit too close according to CPT Myer (Bowden 2011, 217). The Combat Studies Institute's study indicates that 1LT Brostrom was aware of his platoon's feelings

regarding Operation Rock Move, but also that he had similar feelings himself. 1LT

Brostrom, in conversing with a peer, "expressed concerns . . . about the number of men

he was taking with him for the mission . . . and that he was also concerned about the

terrain surrounding [Wanat]" (CSI 2010, 86). A week prior to the operation, 1LT

Brostrom expressed these concerns to his commander, CPT Myer.

> Myer recalled that his 2d Platoon leader did not request specific resources but was
> seeking ways to mitigate the risks associated with the operation. As the company
> commander remembered, "That is when we decided to make sure he had a 120-
> mm mortar tube and attach a weapons truck (up-armored HMMWV with TOW
> missile and ITAS) as well as additional ISR (LRAS3)." Brostrom mentioned to [a
> peer] that Captain Myer had addressed his concerns by arranging for the direct
> and indirect fire support. Despite this fire support, [a peer] felt that Brostrom
> retained some anxiety about his platoon's role in ROCK MOVE. (CSI 2010, 86)

There is no evidence indicating that 1LT Brostrom ever presented second

platoon's concerns directly to his battalion commander, LTC Ostlund. In fact, Bowden

states "Two days before the move to Wanat, Ostlund had met with Brostrom to discuss

the operation further. He said he found the lieutenant eager to proceed" (Bowden 2010,

229). Bowden's article also discusses a meeting between the three leaders prior to the

battle, likely weeks or months earlier during a shura visit to Wanat to arrange for use of

the land area for COP Kahler. CPT Myer indicated that the three leaders would often

conduct reconnaissance of the proposed COP Kahler site during these Wanat visits (CSI

2010, 49). Regardless, either interaction would have been an ideal venue for 1LT

Brostrom to have employed candor with his upper echelon leadership, LTC Ostlund,

representing the concerns of the entire platoon that were evident.

However, the research does imply that CPT Myer most likely conveyed some of

1LT Brostrom's and/or his own concerns to LTC Ostlund. This is supported by the fact

that CPT Myer was able to provide 1LT Brostrom with a 120-mm mortar tube, an up-

armored HMMWV with TOW missile and ITAS, and an LRAS3 (CSI 2010, 86), all of which are assets not usually available to a light infantry battalion's rifle companies (the 120-mm mortar and LRAS usually reside within the headquarters and headquarters company while the HMMWV resides in the weapons company). To provide these assets to Chosen Company, LTC Ostlund would have had to issue an order to the other companies to provide the equipment. This indicates that CPT Myer may have communicated concerns to LTC Ostlund and LTC Ostlund agreed the assets would serve to mitigate some risk and enhance second platoon's capabilities based on the concerns discussed. Despite this, it is reasonable to propose that CPT Myer's communication with LTC Ostlund was not identical to 1LT Brostrom's communication with him, and there was likely a filtering of information.

Although 1LT Brostrom may have exhibited candor with CPT Myer with his concerns regarding Operation Rock Move, it is prudent to view this exchange between the platoon leader and the commander with cautious skepticism. Because 1LT Brostrom's peer recalled his concern over the number of Soldiers available for the operation and CPT Myer did not recall that being a portion of 1LT Brostrom's expressed concerns to him, it is possible 1LT Brostrom did not his express true concerns to CPT Myer regarding the operation. Clearly 1LT Brostrom's peer felt that despite the additional resources CPT Myer provided, 1LT Brostrom remained uneasy. This suggests that 1LT Brostrom had more anxiety and reservations than what he conveyed to CPT Myer and withheld his concerns for a reason, possibly out for fear of being thought of as fearful or a coward. Finally, it remains curious that a conversation regarding assets required for Operation Rock Move was taking place less than two weeks prior to execution when the operation

had been conceived and in discussion since April, three months earlier. This suggests that obstacles to candor may have been present prior to the point, preventing honest, straightforward communication between the platoon leader and both the company and battalion commanders regarding the requirements for the operation.

The Battle of Wanat should also be examined at the higher echelon, in this case the battalion, in regards to the study of candor. LTC Ostlund, the commander of Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment was supported by a group of officers and non-commissioned officers of varying levels of experience that comprised the Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment staff. The staff had the responsibility of assisting the commander in creating shared understanding through critical and creative thinking to support the commander's decision making, as expressed in U.S. Army doctrine. This responsibility entails, but is not limited to, the analysis of information and intelligence to drive operations as well as identifying and mitigating risk for operations. Moreover, the staff's responsibility required significant candor on the part of all members to reach a required level of situational understanding leading to the Battle of Wanat. As see n in subsequent investigations of the Battle of Wanat, candor indicators in the areas of intelligence analysis and risk were both highlighted.

As mentioned previously, the Army conducted two investigations into the Battle of Wanat, the second falling on the shoulders of LTG Richard F. Natonski under the direction of USCENTCOM. In this report, LTG Natonski provided his opinion based on the investigation's findings on both intelligence analysis and risk:

> In the absence of multi-source threat indicators of a major impending attack and based on the units' experiences, the analysis and dissemination of available information was reasonable . . . The Battalion's and Company's risk assessment

and risk mitigation determinations were inadequate with respect to determining the resources required to establish the COP at Wanat or address the enemy's 'most dangerous course of action' . . . There were insufficient forces available to simultaneously secure the site with OPs and patrols while using Soldier labor to construct defenses. (Natonski 2010, 7-8)

In analyzing LTG Natonski's statement regarding intelligence and information analysis surrounding the Battle of Wanat, he clearly did not find fault in the analysis and dissemination of available information. However, the description of the analysis as "reasonable" is interesting. "Reasonable" could indicate that the analysis was within reason, fair, sensible, or of sound judgment, but it does not mean the analysis was of the best or above average. Howeverm the second part of LTG Natonski's analysis could suggest a lack of candor in articulation and assessing risk. The following CSI excerpt suggests further concern that candor, or lack of candor, among the key participants may have played a role in the outcome:

> In his expectation that the enemy would respond in a systematic gradual manner to the American presence at Wanat, Myer was not alone. Reflecting the views of the TF Rock S2, the ROCK MOVE operations order briefing indicated that the enemy would try to "disrupt the construction of [a Coalition Forces] base in the village of Wanat." Before any general attack, the insurgents were expected to gradually establish a series of positions and weapons caches near Wanat. ROCK MOVE considered that the most dangerous enemy action would be an ambush of US forces as they moved into Wanat . . . "the most likely enemy course of action would be to conduct probing attacks of the new US position in order to discover any weaknesses." Reflecting on the enemy reaction after the [COP Bella] battle, Lieutenant Colonel Ostlund, echoed the beliefs of his staff and subordinates, "I think that the perception across the task force is that probes would come long before a deliberate effort [by the enemy]." He then stated that in his opinion "there was enough force protection and combat power [at COP Kahler] to dissuade any anticipated attack." In terms of expectations of enemy actions, Ostlund and Myer were supported by Colonel Preysler, their brigade commander, and Generals Milley and Schloesser at CJTF-101. These officers all felt that a large attack at Wanat was unlikely, at least in the near future. (CSI 2010, 205)

The accounts are unclear whether the aforementioned officers gained their consensus independently or without influencing each other, but the consensus does support LTG Natonski's findings of the analysis being "reasonable." In addition, due to the high profile nature of the Battle of Wanat and the multiple investigations conducted, it is very likely that any individual who may have challenged or disagreed with the intelligence analysis would have been identified and given a prominent position as a skeptic of the intelligence analysis within both investigations. It is also peculiar that in a somewhat subjective area such as intelligence that there was no dissent regarding the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action in response to Operation Rock Move within the Waygal Valley.

The discussion of risk was also interesting from a candor perspective. LTG Natonski's findings indicated that risk was not adequately managed at the company and battalion levels, specifically in regards to the size of the force required for Operation Rock Move. 1LT Brostrom identified, by the accounts provided, risk in the number of Soldiers he was being provided to execute Operation Rock Move. He also reportedly communicated this risk, to some degree, to his commander, CPT Myer, prior to the execution of the operation. Because the LTG Natonski investigation report indicated that there was risk mitigation failure at the Company and Battalion levels in regards to manning and that forces available at COP Kahler were insufficient, it implies there may have been a failure in this communication or the action taken in response to it. This failure could be a combination of 1LT Brostrom not being fully candid with his concerns interacting with CPT Myer, CPT Myer not accepting the candor and acting upon it, CPT

Myer not demonstrating candor with LTC Ostlund regarding 1LT Brostrom's concerns, or 1LT Brostrom not being candid with LTC Ostlund.

Figure 5 depicts the summarized interaction between the Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment parties involved in the Battle of Wanat while highlighting the areas of concern regarding candor.

Figure 5.   Battle of Wanat, 2-503 Infantry Regiment Candor Analysis

Source: Created by author.

<center>Candor's Organizational Impacts within
the Mission Command Philosophy</center>

The primary component of mission command revealed as a potential weakness through the analysis of Wanat in regards to candor is "create shared understanding." This is evidenced through the Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment staff's analysis of the enemy situation leading up the to Battle of Wanat that occurred on July 13, 2008. Although the enemy analysis was considered "reasonable," candor between 1LT Brostrom and higher could have played a role, as indicated by the lack of consideration for extreme enemy possibilities to force more robust planning and risk management at the company and battalion levels. Shared understanding is also an exposed weakness in regards to 1LT Brostrom's concerns regarding Operation Rock Move and COP Kahler. It is possible that LTC Ostlund possibly did not fully understand the dire situation as presented by 1LT Brostrom because they were not directly or clearly communicated with necessary candor. Further, when 1LT Brostrom communicated concerns to CPT Myer, they were potentially not conveyed with full candor, but rather filtered by CPT Myer in further communication with his higher headquarters during the process of obtaining more equipment assets to mitigate risk for second platoon.

The shared understanding that may or may not have been present leading up to the Battle of Wanat would also have second order effects on decision making, mainly that the quality of the understanding would logically result in the same quality of the decision made at the decision point. The chain of command's decision to execute Operation Rock Move, despite some of the shortcomings, was made based upon the situation, as it was understood by all parties with decision-making authority. In the case of Wanat, that situation included the analysis and assessment terrain, weather, the enemy, Chosen

<center>93</center>

Company's capabilities, and other assets available to support the mission. Any lack of candor from the staff or other parties regarding information within any combination of those areas of consideration could cause a less than desirable decision.

Trust could also be a potential weakness leading up to the Battle of Wanat, but none of the research seems to question the relationship between 1LT Brostrom, CPT Myer, and LTC Ostlund, nor does the research discuss the climate within Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment or its subordinate units as being of any particular concern. In fact, in his *Vanity Fair* article, Bowden goes as far to state "What [First Lieutenant] Jonathan [Brostrom] was doing in seeking combat was not foolish to the extent that he trusted in his mission and his leadership" (Bowden 2010, 223). Following 1LT Brostrom's death, his father continued praise for his son's leadership: "His leadership at the brigade and below were probably the best you'll ever find, the best in the world, [but] they were put in a situation where they were under-resourced" (Bowden 2010, 224).

Obstacles to Candor

Although specifics regarding the nature of the three leaders' communication or Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment's command climate are not discussed in any of the reviewed literature regarding the Battle of Wanat, it is possible that many of the obstacles to candor, both individual and organizational, could have been present. Because specific information is not available, it is critical to state the discussion regarding obstacles is purely speculative, but is relevant to understanding candor in an Army organization.

On the individual level, 1LT Brostrom's partial candor with CPT Myer regarding resources for COP Kahler, and possible lack of candor with LTC Ostlund could have had elements of individual candor-based fear, lack of skills and training on how to be candid, and socialization issues present with most humans. In regards to fear, it is plausible that the two most likely subcategories of fear that would be relevant in this situation for 1LT Brostrom would be job retribution and losing face. Job retribution, or the fear of that possibility, could have come from the idea that CPT Myer could pass judgment on 1LT Brostrom for his "inability" to complete the Operation Rock Move mission with the assets he was given. Understandably, imagined outcomes from this could be a negative or neutral evaluation, a less desirable follow-on duty position, or less visible or desirable missions and tasks. On the other hand, the fear of loss of face, although far less quantifiable, could be perceived as more undesirable. If 1LT Brostrom perceived a loss of face, he would likely believe that his reputation in the unit would be ruined, potentially up to the brigade level, and have future negative effects with other units if leaders shared opinions regarding his performance. The most important aspect of this is that the most important part of the individual obstacles for 1LT Brostrom is the fact that the obstacles are primarily based on his perception and the imagined consequences, not necessarily reality.

The other category of obstacles to candor, organizational obstacles, could have also been an element to preventing candor between the three leaders and among the Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment staff with LTC Ostlund. Focusing on the staff within the organization, the staff could have fallen victim to nearly all of the

95

aforementioned organizational obstacles. Examples of organizational obstacles that could

have been present in the organization preceding the Battle of Wanat are listed in table 16.

Table 16.   Potential Organizational Obstacles to Candor in
2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment

Obstacles (Bennis, Goleman, and O'Toole 2008, 20-31)	Possible Wanat Examples
Mishandling of Information – "Gatekeepers" (Gandz 2007, 1-2)	Intelligence Officer (S2) selective filtering of information and intelligence or withholding of information/intelligence to retain relevance or power.
Structural Impediments – "Systems" (O'Toole and Bennis 2009, 3)	Targeting meetings, intelligence working groups, or other venues designed in such a way that does not allow for candid communication for all participants.
"Shimmer Effect"	Staff blind compliance with the commander or shaping of information to meet the commander's already stated opinion or belief.
Sunken Costs	The unit as a whole desiring a final "victory" prior to redeployment and/or to avenge those Soldiers lost in combat during the deployment.
Intoxication with Ambition	The unit or commander wanting to impose their will on the enemy or operational environment over a tight timeline just prior to the replacing unit's arrival and redeployment.

Source: Created by author.

Risks Associated with the Lack of Candor

Understandbly, the value of candor increases in combat situations. LTC Ostlund

was responsible for 15 combat outposts with over 1,000 Soldiers in a land area

comparable to the state of Delaware during his command in Afghanistan when the Battle

of Wanat occurred (Bowden 2010, 228). Not only was LTC Ostlund busy, but his face-

to-face time with subordinate leaders and Soldier and the frequency of his visits were

likely limited, and justifiably so. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 1LT Brostrom had limited direct interaction with LTC Ostlund throughout his combat tour, making the substance of those interactions extremely important. For the sake of efficiency, it was essential that subordinates be candid with LTC Ostlund based on his inability to circulate with much frequency.

However, as discussed in the literature review and analysis, it is not solely the responsibility of the individual transmitting information to be candid; the individual receiving the information must be accepting of candor from junior leaders. If a leader's observed behavior makes candor seem unwelcome or unvalued, the information received during these rare and short visits during his battlefield circulation could be jeopardized. A limited picture of accuracy would be painted for the battalion commander, and a reality a commander's desires would be fashioned around him. A potential result of this could be group think-agreement among individuals supporting the leader with limited critical or creative thinking applied. Potentially, a the staff's enemy analysis leading up to a battle such as Wanat could very easily have been influenced in this same manner, limiting the possibilities for the commander and creating a less robust set of courses of action to employ at the decision point.

The Wanat case study reveals that the importance of candor to an organization may increase as the organization becomes more decentralized or grows, as depicted in figure 6 and figure 7. 1LT Brostrom assumingly had few direct interactions with LTC Ostlund as the execution of Operation Rock Move approached due to the size and scope of LTC Ostlund's area of responsibility: 15 outposts and over 1,000 Soldiers over an area the size of Rhode Island. With fewer and or shorter interactions, there are likely fewer

opportunities for communication and/or the quality of communication must be high to make efficient use of limited available time. In the case of Wanat, no evidence reviewed indicated 1LT Brostrom candidly communicated his concerns to LTC Ostlund, nor was there a summary of their interactions leading up to Operation Rock Move's execution. However, the value of candor is evident in the situation: a leader who rarely directly interacts with a subordinate leader or only interacts under time constraints would benefit from candid communication to get an accurate picture of the situation. Further, the subordinate leader also benefits from candor because they make good use of their superior's time and prevent the struggle for more of their superior's attention when there may be higher priorities.


Figure 6.   Organizational Decentralization's Potential Relationship with Candor

Source: Created by author.

Figure 7.   Communication Frequency/Duration's Potential Relationship with Candor

Source: Created by author.

Also revealed is the potential that the higher degree of separation from a subordinate to a superior, the less likely the subordinate is to communicate candidly, as depicted in figure 8. In the case of Wanat, 1LT Brostrom communicatesd some concerns to CPT Myer, one leadership echelon above, but as discussed previously this may not have been done with full candor. Subsequently, LTC Ostlund, two leadership echelons above 1LT Brostrom, speaks with 1LT Brostrom and finds that he is eager to proceed with Operation Rock Move without voicing any concerns. 1LT Brostrom's eagerness could have been due to the fact that CPT Myer had already supplied 1LT Brostrom with some equipment in an attempt to mitigate risk. However, 1LT Brostrom's perceived eagerness could also be due to lack of candor with LTC Ostlund to cover his reservations and communicate what he thinks LTC Ostlund wants to hear. Understandably, 1LT

Brostrom likely had less interaction with, less of a personal relationship with, and therefore less trust with LTC Ostlund than his leader one echelon higher, CPT Myer. This theory provides an interesting point for organizational leaders to consider when attempting to develop candor within their organization and to manage expectations in regards to receiving candor from subordinates, especially those at the lower echelons of the organization.

Figure 8. Degrees of Separation's Potential Relationship with Candor

Source: Created by author.

Ultimately, the primary risk associated with lack of candor appears to be less than ideal decision making for the individual with authority to make decisions. Lack of clear, succinct information delivered in a timely fashion has the potential to drive the decision maker to choose a course of action that may not be the best for the situation, or be the

best for a situation that is not the reality. The leader himself, through his or her own behavior, priorities, value, and climate, can either promote candor and enhance the performance of the organization or ignore it and risk reduced performance. In the Army, reduced performance could mean the loss of life, equipment, or mission failure.

Conclusion

The analysis of literature reviewed has provided insight into candor's overall organizational value through the examination of its components. The use of a qualitative meta-analysis methodology has facilitated the combination of research findings to create more robust theories. A case study, The Battle of Wanat, provided a scenario for which to apply these theories for examination in a U.S. Army context. The analysis of the case study also enhanced the development of the candor concept within the mission command philosophy with concepts that were not apparent in the literature review and analysis. With this understanding, Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations regarding candor in the mission command philosophy and the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapters 1-4 provided the signifance of the study, research questions, research methodology, and a review and analysis of applicable literature with the objective of answering the secondary research questions. The following sections provide conclusions to the secondary questions, which in turn provides suggestions to the primary question of whether candor should be explicitly included in the U.S. Army's mission command philosophy of command doctrine.

Secondary Questions Conclusions

Candor Defined

The current doctrinal definition of candor, stated in ADRP 6-22 as "being frank, honest, and sincere with others. It requires impartiality and fairness" is an accurate and acceptable definition to describe candor, making it comparison with other organizational leadership literature reasonable (HQ DA 2012f, 3-3). The definition implies that there is effective communication framework present to facilitate candor, as candor depends upon communication. Additionally, because communication is critical for candor, there also appears to be five facets to candor: superiors, peers, subordinates, self, and partners. Each of these facets may require unique considerations for the individual at the center, but more importantly the facets describe candor's complexity in the organizational context.

Candor's Organizational Impacts

Trust within an organization appears to have a positive relationship with candor; therefore, to gain a certain level of trust throughout an entire organization, it is likely that

a corresponding level of candor should be present. Trust without candor may be possible, but it would most likely be shallow or without substance. Although it is unclear whether candor or trust needs to exist first, it seems that candor at increases trust internally within an organization and externally with other parties. To make decisions, leaders must have the best information possible based upon its accuracy, so they must trust those providing the information to trust the information itself. Candid communication regarding the meaning of information, possible courses of actions, and the effects of those potential actions help to enhance decision making to solve problems and meet the leader's intent.

Aside from trust, candor's likely impacts appear to improve an organization in the domains of efficiency, culture, climate, leader development, shared understanding, and decision-making. These impacts provide proposed purpose and potential impacts of candor as it is applied to the organization. However, because of the positive benefits, leaders within organizations should never misuse candor for counter-productive purposes that may result in a reduction of candor throughout. Because candor and trust have a positive association, a misuse of candor is essentially a violation of trust between members of the organization.

The risks associated with the lack of candor also have organizational impacts, which concern the quality and timeliness of information being the primary risk. The quality and timeliness of information internal and external to an organization drives decision-making, which can lead to failure or success. It is likely that decisions made on only partially accurate information or information that is stale would most likely be of lesser quality than those made with accurate, timeline information. The effect of good

decision-making not only generates success (relative of course), but it also builds trust in the organization.

The less frequent or time constrained interactions are between two individuals, the more important the succinctness and accuracy of their communication may become. Because candor is frankness in expression, organizational candor can encourage straightforward communication throughout an organization between various echelons of leadership. Based on this logic, it is possible that the greater the separation between two leaders in the organizational structure, the more critical candor becomes for their communication. The paradox then is the amount of trust between these leaders could logically be less because they have multiple degrees of separation, little interaction, and therefore a very formal relationship with little knowledge of each other. Because of the suspected relationship between trust and candor, it may be difficult to achieve candor between two leaders separated by many echelons because trust may be limited which complicates the candid communication critical to the leaders' communication and interaction.

<div align="center">Candor's Role in the Mission Command Philosophy</div>

Within the mission command philosophy, candor's organizational impacts seem to primarily benefit the philosophy's building blocks and first two principles: trust and shared understanding and purpose. As both Army doctrine and other literature both suggest, candor may have the ability to directly enhance trust within the organization and its partners. Candor also has the potential to indirectly facilitate critical and creative thinking and encourage collaboration and dialogue. These two impacts then create and

facilitate shared understanding and purpose, the second foundational element of the mission command philosophy, and ultimately support decision making.

Candor's role in the mission command philosophy is primarily evident in the decision-making of a leader of the organization or its subordinate leaders. Good decision-making depends upon timely, accurate information that represents reality. As mentioned in regards to risks associated with lack of candor, candor seems to have the ability to make decisions better if present, and worse if lacking. Candor, because it is honest and succinct, is inherently timely, and can provide information for consideration when the decision-maker is weighing a decision. This principle grows in importance with a dynamic or complex environment that is naturally changing rapidly while decisions are being considered for execution.

Decision-making also has a potential relationship with trust: good decisions results in success, building the organization's confidence in its leaders and increasing trust due to demonstrated competence. Assuming this is reasonable, a lack of candor then would potentially degrade the quality of decisions and therefore the organization would likely lose trust and confidence in the organization and/or its leadership due to a perceived lack of competence.

<div align="center">Obstacles to Candor</div>

Organizations or leaders attempting to pursue a more candid organization should be cognizant of the obstacles to candor, which seem to be split between two categories: individual obstacles to candor and organizational obstacles to candor. Each category is important because each seem to require some sort of mitigation or reduction to facilitate developing more candor within the organization.

Individual obstacles to candor appear to fall within three distinct categories: socialization, fear, and skills. Fear can likely be sub-divided into five categories: job retribution, social retribution, hurting others' feelings, losing face, and change. More important than the actual categories themselves though is the realization that candor is not natural for humans and to develop candor means overcoming discomfort and the unnatural. Further, the obstacle of fear and its subcategories seems to be based upon imagined fear driven by perception or predicted outcomes rather than fear of a real, true threat.

The concept of organizational obstacles is not only reasonable, but is likely universal to leadership in general, especially in regards to change or transition. The research suggests that if a leader is striving for organizational candor, systems or norms within the organization may actually inhibit the growth of candor. This serves to remind leaders that they should examine their organizational systems and norms when attempting to implement any change, such as a more candid organization, to ensure the systems and norms are aligned with the changes they are pursuing. In this case, a misalignment could hinder the development of candor and cause loss of time, waste of effort, and improper focus and prioritization of leadership and resources.

<center>Developing Candor</center>

An organization should have a framework for effective communication established prior to attempting to implement candor within the organization. Because candor is conveyed through various modes of interpersonal communication, candor could be said to depend on effective communication. Without a foundation of effective communication, a leader could pursue candor as an organizational goal or part of an

<center>106</center>

organizational vision, but the chances of success seem to intuitively be reduced. The organization's systems and norms, comprising the culture of the organization, appear to be a natural baseline for establishing this framework for effective communication.

In addition to a framework for effective communication, an organization striving to achieve organizational candor should also strive to account for candor in its systems and norms. Systems and policies established that are not cognizant of the leader's desire to develop organizational candor may counteract, hinder, or prevent the development of organizational candor within the organization.

The implementation of candor within an organization seems to rely on the leader of the organization not only establishing candor as a priority, but also personally demonstrating candor. Demonstrating candor requires the leader to both transmit and receive candid communication, indicating and reaffirming candor's interdependence with trust. A leader that states candor as an organizational priority should be just as willing to receive candor as he or she is willing to provide it otherwise the effect could be perceived as a double standard or hypocrisy. Any leader attempting to implement candor and whose subordinates observe behavior conflicting with full candor could hinder the development of candor within his or her own organization.

The organizational leader should consider the application of two approaches to implement candor within an organization, top down and bottom up, and should consider utilizing both approaches simultaneously. Gaining buy-in for candor implementation from key subordinates will help a leader infuse the organization from the lowest levels, gaining momentum as subordinates' peers observe and experience candor and its effects.

Meanwhile, the organization's values, exhibited by their systems and norms through policy, must match the leader's established vision and associated command messaging.

Research also suggests that rules governing the use of candor, or candor "rules of engagement," are necessary when attempting to develop candor within an organization. The rules serve to reduce the obstacles to candor to allow individuals to overcome individual obstacles and to prevent organizational systems and norms from hindering candor's development within the organization. The rules also attempt to prevent the abuse or misuse of candor that can compromise implementation efforts across the organization because, as candor seems to have a positive relationship with trust, the misuse of it may degrade trust.

Measuring Candor

Three distinct methods of measuring candor were found to be feasible, but none provided a single source solution robust enough to provide a measurement with complete certainty. It is more likely that to measure candor with the most accuracy, all three methods explored should be employed simultaneously. The three methods, survey, communications language analysis, and observed behavior, have different target and evaluator combinations which theoretically makes the use of all three in unison the most robust measurement. The most important concept gained from the examination of candor measurement though is perhaps the notion that measurement of candor is only possible by measuring indicators of candor, such as language, behavior, and personal opinion.

The U.S. Army employs three different formal, standard measurement tools across the force: Command Climate Survey, MSAF360, and the officer and NCO evaluation system. None of these three methods is designed to exclusively measure

candor, however, the Command Climate Survey and MSAF360 both touch on elements/indicators of candor. Like the methods of measuring candor, the Army's measurement tools, as they are currently designed and employed, are ineffective individually in providing an assessment of candor within an organization. However, it is possible that these methods could be modified or improved to provide a better measurement of candor. To do this, both the MSAF360 and Command Climate Survey would require supplemental questions specifically designed to collect data regarding candor and the MSAF360 would have to allow a command directed function in which a superior could see a subordinate's results. Additionally, the officer and NCO evaluation reports, if able to be analyzed for language content, could also provide indicators of candor to unit leadership without compromising the integrity of the evaluation system between the rated individual, the rater, and the senior rater. Finally, observing behavior is always possible, but must be deliberate, unbiased, and trained accordingly to collect information effectively. A leader or commander could feasibly observe behavior him or herself, but the leader's presence in a forum could obviously change the behaviors of those individuals in the environment and provide skewed observations.

<div align="center">Primary Question Conclusion</div>

The primary question for this research was: Should candor be explicitly included in the U.S. Army's mission command philosophy of command doctrine?

Based upon this research, the Army should consider explicit inclusion of candor and its concepts within the mission command philosophy contained in ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*. Candor's impacts on the mission command philosophy, as defined by current doctrine, are not concretely reinforced by current mission command

doctrine. Additionally, candor has other indirect positive impacts on the mission

command philosophy that outweigh the potential negative effects produced from its

misuse. Candor's impacts seem to reinforce and improve current mission command

concepts, enhancing the mission command philosophy. However, with implicit mention

or absence from doctrine, the Army risks lack of active leader support of candor, either

by inexperience or negligence. Additionally, the complexity of candor in regards to

development and assessment within an organization may require written guidance in the

form of doctrine to assist leaders in achieving candor and improving their organizations.

Recommendations

The Army should consider further discussion and/or research regarding the

explicit inclusion of candor within established doctrine. If the aforementioned

recommendation for explicit inclusion of candor within the mission command philosophy

is considered and executed, the Army should create defined relationships and continuity

between all associated doctrine, to include ADP 1 and ADRP 1, *The Army*, and ADP and

ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, as well as other doctrine and assessments such as the

Command Climate Survey, evaluation system, and MSAF360. This could involve the

addition of candor to the Army Values and the Army Leadership Requirements Model.

Further research could explore how leaders can measure the effectiveness of

candor within their organizations or sub-organizations and whether current Army

measurement methods, such as the Command Climate Survey, Multi-Source Assessment

and Feedback, and Non-Commissioned Officer/Officer Evaluation Reports, can be

adapted to effectively measure candor. If these methods are insufficient, methods for how

the Army can develop candor assessment tools to provide leaders with a better awareness and understanding should also be researched.

Further research could also examine the human aspects of candor, including psychological aspects, focused on American culture and socialization in more depth. This research could also include methods for the Army to develop candor in individual Soldiers through professional military education and leader development processes. Further research could also explore the role of the individual Myers-Briggs Type Indicator in an individual's likelihood to be candid and techniques to mitigate apprehension or encourage more candor from those personality types that are less prone to candor, if they exist.

Lastly, further research could attempt to determine the organizational reach of candor to manage the expectations of candor's impact and the expectations of senior leaders when communicating with subordinates many echelons below their command. An example of this the maximum number of echelons up or down that candor is truly and effectively displayed or employed. Measures that the Army could employ to affect the entire force's development of candor to improve continuity throughout multiple echelons would also naturally be of interest.

<div align="center">Conclusion</div>

While explicitly adding candor to U.S. Army mission command doctrine will not assure the effective application of mission command within organizations, candor seems to be an intangible concept to enhance the foundation of the U.S. Army's mission command doctrine. With candor, commanders and leaders seem able to gain efficiency, enhance trust, facilitate shared understanding, and support decision-making. Without it,

those same commanders and leaders risk creating an artificial environment that will likely

lead to decisions producing undesirable results. Although any leader can encourage

candor within any organization, failure for it to be part of organizational goals or visions

will likely cause it to be ignored, not nefariously, but through human nature. As the U.S.

Army enters post-conflict drawdown of forces, intangibles such as candor become

increasingly important to enhance the performance of organizations without cost. Candor

itself may not be the performance enhancer, but it is a means to generate open,

constructive dialogue to identify those low cost performance enhancers. If the U.S. Army

values candor, as it seems to in its profession doctrine, candor should be considered for

explicit inclusion within the mission command philosophy due to its complexity and the

complexity of its development within an organization.

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