THE CIVIL SIDE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

A Monograph

by

LTC Justin L. Ticknor

U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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This monograph explores the role of civil affairs or civic action in irregular warfare by posing the question: can civil affairs operations be utilized as an offensive capability in irregular warfare? The purpose of this research is to contribute further understanding and clarification of the irregular warfare concept. The case studies chosen were HAMAS, Hezbollah, and CORDS which offer multiple perspectives from which to pose the research question. The monograph explores the timing and relationship between civil activities, such as governance and social services, and lethal operations. The research demonstrates that civic action could precede doctrine’s current description of the onset of irregular warfare. This conclusion implies a potential reframing of Irregular Warfare in U.S. doctrine, the development of additional tools to enhance understanding of the operational environment, and the need for a theory and refined definition of civil affairs.
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Name of Candidate: LTC Justin L. Ticknor

Monograph Title: The Civil Side of Irregular Warfare

Approved by:

__________________________________, Monograph Director
Dan G. Cox, Ph.D.

__________________________________, Seminar Leader
Geoffrey C. Detingo, COL, LG

__________________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL, IN

Accepted this 22nd day of May 2014 by:

__________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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### ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development (former name of USAID)</td>
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<td>AIWC</td>
<td>Army Irregular Warfare Center</td>
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<td>AMAL</td>
<td><em>afwaj al-muqawama al-lubnaniya</em> (Lebanese Resistance Regiments) = <em>amal</em> (Hope)</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
<td>US Army Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<td>CT</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
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<td>HAMAS</td>
<td><em>Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya</em> (the Islamic Resistance Movement)</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operating Concept</td>
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<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>Other Governmental Agency</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PMESII</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Populace and Resource Control</td>
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<td>SAMS</td>
<td>School of Advanced Military Studies</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Support to Civil Administration</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>ULO</td>
<td>Unified Land Operations</td>
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<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
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<td>Viet Cong</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The past decade of sustained combat operations amongst the population created unprecedented demand, and eventual growth within the Civil Affairs community. After experiencing this significant growth the Civil Affairs community must take pause and assess its role in future warfare. Current strategic guidance states “US forces will no longer be sized for large scale, prolonged stability operations.”\(^1\) Is the growth of Civil Affairs just a response to Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan or is it a critical capability to hybrid warfare? With the completion of the Iraq campaign and the significant fiscal constraint implemented on the Department of Defense, a reexamination is required of our strategic objectives and the ways and means available to achieve them. While the large-scale reviews have been completed and their associated impacts to force structure have largely been published, finer grained analysis within niche areas is warranted. Drawing from history, lessons learned, and recent experience, the Civil Affairs force must reexamine its reason for being, and what factors make the force relevant to the combatant commander in the current and anticipated operational environment.

Recent writing on Civil Affairs capability development focused primarily on force structure requirements and provides little insight into actual capabilities resident or required within the Civil Affairs force. These studies assume a Civil Affairs force and focus so extensively on force structure or command and control issues that they do not answer the “why” or “what for” of a Civil Affairs capability. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report in 2009 titled “The Future of Civil Affairs Forces” and would seem to answer many of the questions posed in this thesis. The authors succinctly summarized Civil

Affairs history from World War II to 9-11, and attempted to describe the Civil Affairs mission and future Civil Military Operations but their analysis focused on force structure and command and control issues instead of articulating what capability the Department of Defense requires from Civil Affairs forces.

Several recent Monographs and Thesis written by students attending Professional Military Education have begun to shift the focus of the literature. MAJ Simpson in his School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph provides a methodology for force sizing based upon demand signal, however does not address what capability gap in the operational environment is generating the demand signal for civil affairs units and whether or not civil affairs units can meet the capability gap. MAJ Curtis in his SAMS Monograph and MAJ Bleakley and SGM Banfield in their Naval Post Graduate School thesis advance arguments articulating Civil Affairs’ role in Unconventional Warfare. MAJ Bleakley and SGM Banfield argue that Civic Action to support shadow governance and mass mobilization is a necessary component of successful unconventional warfare and that current definitions of Civil Affairs Operations are insufficient to capture tasks required for distinct Unconventional Warfare Civil Affairs Operations. MAJ Curtis, utilizing different case studies, also concludes that current Civil Affairs forces can and should support Unconventional Warfare operations through Civil Affairs Operations to support shadow governance and developing popular support; however, his analysis demonstrates that this conclusion is able to fit within the current doctrine of Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations essentially finding no current gaps in Civil Affairs

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2 Samuel Kyle Simpson II, MAJ, "Restructuring Civil Affairs for Persistent Engagement" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010)


4 Clayton D. Curtis, MAJ, “Civil Affairs in Unconventional Warfare” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2013), 51.
missions and doctrine. This monograph takes a larger aperture and attempts to identify the possibilities and limitations to the employment of civil affairs by looking at civil affairs in the Offensive.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, lists the Offensive as a principle of joint operations stating, “The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative” and “Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.”

Offensive operations are clearly understood within traditional warfare, where echelons attack to destroy or fix enemy formations or seize key terrain to achieve a decision, but in irregular warfare, is offensive action limited to combat actions? The purpose of this monograph is to explore whether or not Civil Affairs Operations can be used in an offensive role within irregular warfare to test the feasibility of the US waging IW as written in doctrine and strategic guidance.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

In answering the question can Civil Affairs be used in an offensive role the literature review will first consider current Department of Defense doctrine concerning Irregular Warfare, followed by a review of current Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations doctrine, and conclude with applicable literature on irregular warfare theory specifically focused on the civilian component of the operational environment.

**Irregular Warfare Doctrine**

After much debate, irregular warfare has entered into the Joint Lexicon and most notably became a Department of Defense directed required capability. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Department of Defense’s current strategic

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guidance, lists counter terrorism and irregular warfare as one of ten primary missions for the Department of Defense. Further, in the capstone concept for Joint Operations, Joint Force 2020, this requirement is reiterated for developing the future force, and of note observes, “… the conventions by which wars are fought are no longer as settled as they once were. Notions of who is a combatant and what constitutes a battlefield in the digital age are rapidly shifting beyond previous norms.” This clearly alludes to the expanding realm of the cyber domain, and importantly for this paper’s analysis the expanding democratization of technology has expanded the capacity of the people for mass mobilization. LTG Cleveland and LTC Farris argue that part of this new battlefield should be recognized as a new “human domain” of warfare and that “in the paradigm of irregular warfare, the security objective is indeed the population itself.”

DoD Directive 3000.07 establishes Irregular Warfare “as strategically important as traditional warfare,” and directs maintenance of IW capabilities and capacities on par with traditional warfare. Directive 3000.07 also recognizes that IW may be conducted simultaneously or independently of traditional warfare. This directive is codified in Joint Doctrine through Joint Publications 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, the capstone doctrinal manual for the Armed Forces. JP 1 establishes the DoD’s theoretical understanding of Irregular Warfare as a separate modality of warfare distinct from traditional warfare in purpose, where traditional warfare is warfare between states revolving around imposition of will and irregular warfare is

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8Charles Cleveland, LTG and Stuart Farris, LTC, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” ARMY, July 2013, 22.

competition for “control or influence over … a relevant population.”10 JP 1 also recognizes that recent historical experience shows that in practice, war will be a combination of regular and irregular warfare.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines irregular warfare (IW) as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”11 This definition allows for a wide range of activities to be included in the definition as reflected in the originating Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats version 2.0. This Joint Concept identified five activities or operations that US forces would perform to counter IW threats: Counterterrorism, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency, and Stability Operations.12 DoDD 3000.07 utilized these same five activities but stated in terms of IW that they were concerned with “establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.”13 The JOC also stated that preempting the development of irregular threats was the preferred way of defeating the threat. Noteworthy is that this method would seem contradictory to the definition of irregular warfare, where by definition violence is required, however the JOC highlights that preemption of the irregular threat occurs through non-violent ways and means. This tension is inherent to irregular warfare, as an opponent is just as likely to use non-violent means to achieve his political aims. Clausewitz’s definition of the threat of the engagement can help understand that violence is still present.


13DoDD 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare,” 2.
Four of the five activities listed under IW have their own Joint doctrinal publication. JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, describes the aim of stability operations to be a stable state that is characterized by the society’s acceptance of the political agreements and distribution of power across the societal relationships between human security, economics and infrastructure, and governance and rule of law. JP 3-07 provides the most systemic view of the contested realms of IW, and while IW is not explicitly listed throughout the manual the definition of stability operations dovetails nicely recent practical experience of IW where who is a combatant and what is a battlefield are blurred.

JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (FID), describes FID operations as those operations designed to bolster or enhance the host nation’s internal defense and development capability and capacity. Importantly, the JP identifies IW as a primary focus of FID. While stating that IW is a primary focus, it is really from a defensive mindset. The activities are a response to an adversary’s use or threat of use of IW against the host nation.

JP 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* describes COIN operations as the simultaneous execution of varying combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations as part of unified action to defeat an insurgency and address core grievances. JP 3-24 further describes the means available to adversaries executing IW as “guerrilla warfare, terrorism, subversion, information operations (IO), strikes, and raids.” This view demonstrates a narrow view of IW, unless the reader expands an implicit notion of IW into a wide range of activities such as subversion and information operations.

JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (CT), defines CT as “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” Moreover, states that IW is the way of war preferred by many US adversaries, arguing, “They fight us from amongst the people in protracted struggles for popular support and legitimacy, and limit the utility of our conventional military power.” JP 3-26 argues that CT is to
be performed through both direct and indirect operational approaches and includes “CMO in environments where indigenous agencies, IGOs, or OGAs are unable to do so.” Interestingly the CT manual is the most explicit of the IW activity JPs on the indirect approach as a mode of warfare in IW.

Unconventional warfare (UW) does not currently have a separate Joint Doctrinal Publication but it is listed as a Core Activity of Special Operations in JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, where UW is described as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, serves as the detailed doctrinal guidance for UW. While an Army publication, UW’s implicit Joint and Interagency nature is reinforced throughout the publication. Additionally JP 3-05 argues that SOF are uniquely suited for IW not only in tactical actions but also in command of JTF where the dominating characteristic of the war is IW.

The preceding paragraphs highlight the current doctrine regarding the activities of IW, and other than UW limited itself to Joint doctrine. Currently JPs 3-05 and 3-24 are under review and in various stages of revision; however this review only looked at currently published manuals and does not consider proposed revisions. An information paper published by the Army Irregular Warfare Center concluded that the Department of Defense lacked a consistent model of what constituted IW activities, which creates significant problems with defining and understanding IW.14

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Civil Affairs Doctrine

The capstone doctrine manual for Civil Affairs is JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. With the recent publication of JP 3-57 and its associated changes, Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, has become dated. Though not yet obsolete key definitions have been changed or added to JP 3-57 that have yet to be incorporated into FM 3-57. JP 3-57 updates the definitions of Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are defined as the:

activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.15

And defines Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) as:

actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.16

The JP 3-57 also identifies five components of Civil-Military Operations: Support to Civil Administration (SCA), Populace and Resources Control (PRC), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Nation Assistance (NA), and Civil Information Management (CIM). FM 3-57 lists these same five activities as the core tasks of Civil Affairs.

Within Joint Doctrine Civil Affairs (CA) refers to forces and units specifically designated to conduct CAO. This distinction is often not reflected in academic literature, where civil affairs often more closely reflects the joint definition of CAO. Additionally civic action, another term

16Ibid.
often used within academic literature with a multitude of meanings, was removed from joint doctrine.

The most significant change in the revision is the re-introduction of military government defined as:

The supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, or enemy territory therefore substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government.¹⁷

This definition reflects a return to the original roots of modern US Civil Affairs and the units established during WWII anticipating the occupation of conquered territories.

In regards to IW, JP 3-57 states that CA will support traditional and IW operations, but are “population-oriented” rather than enemy focused. Within the construct of IW, JP 3-57 argues that the enemy’s targeting of civilian populations “erodes distinction between civilian and military institutions, infrastructures, and systems; military and civilian “dual use” infrastructures are becoming more prevalent.”¹⁸ This gray area of dual use creates difficulties in the application of military force in traditional means.

Irregular Warfare Theory

JP 1 establishes Clausewitz’s theory of war as the primary theoretical construct for the joint force’s understanding of the nature of war, and argues that modern war will consist of a combination of two ways of warfare, traditional and irregular.¹⁹ Clausewitz states that war is the continuation of the political intercourse, a human interaction, between states. War cannot be understood without understanding the political aims of the parties, and that these aims are likely to change throughout the war. JP 1 defines war as “socially sanctioned violence to achieve a

¹⁸Ibid., I-4.
¹⁹Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I3-I5.
political purpose,” and from the view of Clausewitz must be understood as a non-static condition. From this definition, and Clausewitz’s nature of war, expanded means can be developed to influence war’s outcome. Since war must be “socially sanctioned,” operations against the civilian population influence the belligerents’ means to wage war. Likewise, Clausewitz’s understanding of the interactive nature between purpose and means, also shows that operations targeting the belligerents’ purpose will influence the outcome. Joint doctrine recognizes this particular effect through the joint principle of legitimacy.

Clausewitz states “force is the means of war,” and further elaborates that “combat” is the “only” means of war, “everything that occurs must originally derive from combat.” This influence on military thought is most clearly represented in the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (ULO). ADP 3-0 states, “The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other military capabilities and the most basic building block for military operations.” From this definition ULO goes on to state that even if force is not used the threat of force is the fundamental idea. This idea is described by Clausewitz in his description of the engagement where he outlines how through evaluation of strength the enemy may choose not to fight, and that the mere threat or presence of force must be considered an engagement. This concept is important to understanding the definition of IW where IW is characterized as “a violent struggle.”

Yet as highlighted in joint doctrine many of the activities of IW are not lethal operations. Antulio Echevarria best captures the true implications of these activities when he states

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20Ibid., I-3.


23Ibid., 95.
“Revolutions in the use of violence occur when one state perceives that conditions have changed enough to allow a different, perhaps, an expanded use of force to accomplish its aims, and acts accordingly.”

This reflects a state on state view of regular war, however it also frames the activities of IW as well where belligerents “attack” the “conditions,” and create the opportunities to exercise violence or the conditions that constrain the adversaries’ ability to exercise violence.

“Attacking” the conditions that shape the ability to exercise violence often occurs through ways and means not associated with the application of military force. Ecehvarria describes these principles as war’s second grammar.

Literature on civil war provides additional insights to irregular warfare. In his treatise on violence in civil wars, Stathis Kalyvas provides a conceptual framework, zones of control, for explaining the level of violence exercised by competing sides. Kalyvas argues that violence is a process in civil wars rather than an outcome of civil wars. His zones of control and his theory on shifts on control rest on “violence” which can be viewed as synonymous with Clausewitz’s “Combat.” An important aspect of Kalyvas’s theory is that a shift in control can trigger violence. Clausewitz’s theory of the nature of war and escalating violence tempered by friction combined with Kalyvas’s further description of violence associated with “initial shift and consolidation” serves the practitioner in understanding the purposes and limits of lethality in stability operations. This understanding opens space for broader ways to be employed in IW, though violence or the threat of violence remains the fundamental means.

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Paul Staniland offers two complementary theories that provide a more nuanced understanding of IW. He argues that once a state of war exists, there are six potential “wartime political orders” that develop dependent upon the “distribution of control” and “state-insurgent cooperation.”27 These six orders; “shared sovereignty”, “collusion”, “spheres of influence”, “tacit coexistence”, “clashing monopolies”, and “guerilla disorder”, provide a more nuanced description for political order during war that goes beyond what is offered in doctrine’s depiction of the state versus the enemy. This typology is significantly more useful than “insurgency,” and can be used to describe relationships amongst multiple actors in complex environments. He limits the theory to the existence of a state of war; however, in a separate article he argues that “preexisting social networks” determine the organizational structure of an insurgency.28 This theory describes the influences of social networks on an insurgency prior to war, and assists in describing reasons for cohesion or fragmentation of the insurgent force. This understanding should shape determinations for SFA, UW, and COIN. By combining the two theories, we see the potentiality of where to act prior to the onset of violence, and a more robust framework for understanding and visualizing IW operations.

Echevarria argues that operational art requires the mastery of two grammars of war.29 By combining the typology presented by Staniland and his insight into structure with Clausewitz and Kalyvas’ purpose for violence, campaign planners have a more robust tool to present understanding to the commander as compared to the operational variables (PMESII)30 construct presented in doctrine. Without presentation of PMESII through the lens of theory, it fails to

27Paul Staniland, "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders," Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (June 2012): 244.
30Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure
demonstrate context from which predictions and hypothesis can be made. The theories presented here help overcome doctrines incoherent approach to IW as highlighted previously by the AIWC information paper.

METHODOLOGY

This research will consist of a focused comparative case study. The three cases that will be compared are Hezbollah, HAMAS, and US CMO in Vietnam. The case studies will look at what role governance and social services serve[ed] in each organization’s overall strategy. A key question will be determining the timing of the introduction of political organization and social service provision in relation to security or military operations. These case studies were chosen specifically because of their irregular component yet all experienced periods of regular war.

The findings will then be compared to current and historical US doctrine of Special Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Military Government. From this comparison, recommendations can be made regarding Doctrine, Organization, and employment of Civil-Military Operations as an offensive capability. This analysis and comparison should contribute to further understanding and clarification of the concept of IW and demonstrate war’s second grammar in different contexts. Specifically it should demonstrate the role played by civic activities.

CASE STUDIES

HAMAS

This case study is by no means a defense of HAMAS or its aims. However, a close look at the origins of its development offer insight into IW capabilities. Fundamentally, HAMAS, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement, seeks an Islamic state within Palestine. Unique to HAMAS as compared to Islamists movements writ large is the national undertones associated with HAMAS. To that end, the unique circumstances that gave
rise to HAMAS are not necessarily replicated. However understanding the different components of HAMAS offers useful insight to IW. This analysis will primarily focus on the period pre-formation to the 2006 elections that brought HAMAS to political power, and will only take a cursory look at post-2006.

HAMAS’ origins lie in the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamist movement emerging in Egypt in the 1920s predicated upon the establishment of an “Islamic order.”31 This new order is to be brought about through the Da’wa, the “call” to Islam.32 Da’wa is further defined as an invitation or appeal, and in the context of Islam theology includes the missionary work of bringing people to Islam. Thus, Da’wa includes bringing new converts (proselytizing) as well as the binding of the Muslim community (revival) to the faith. In tracing the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood, Richard Mitchell shows how the organization’s approach to an Islamic state included “reform … by the people below.”33 The reform of the “people below” through “education of the people to the truth; [because] ‘when the people have been Islamized a truly Muslim nation will naturally evolve.’”34

In order to Islamize the population an infrastructure must be established to spread the ideology. Originally allowed to operate without interference, the precursor to HAMAS, the Mujamma, an embodiment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s missionary work in Palestine, established schools and social safety nets within Gaza. This social safety net attracted followers not due to its ideological teachings but rather through establishment and maintenance of social structure.35 Mosques built by the Mujamma became the center of social life and well-being, and

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33Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 260.
34Ibid., 308.
included the distribution of welfare. The purpose of these institutions was to promote Da-wa, the invitation to Islam, however the more critical features were the connections between individuals, and the connections between institutions and people, thus the formal creation of HAMAS in 1987 reflects the decades of network development through “charitable and social activities.”

The First Intifada provided the energy to create HAMAS, representing the open militarization of the Islamist movement within Gaza. However, the emergence of HAMAS would not have been possible without the structure that had already been created through the education and social welfare networks. Doctrinally HAMAS recognizes the critical component that social services provide to the organization. Centered on the concept that Islam is the solution, social services become a critical arm in HAMAS’ strategy. Since HAMAS’ approach is that Islam is the solution, its proselytizing through mosques and social services directly supports its military arm.

However, Jeroen Gunning argues that the Brotherhood’s weakness as compared to other Palestinian organizations in the 1960s and 1970s led it to social welfare activities. This argument attempts to frame the approach as if it can only be taken from a position of weakness. Rather than viewing the approach as stemming from weakness, it should simply be seen as a recognition of an opportunity that can be exploited by the insurgent. When framed in this manner, social welfare activities can be seen in an offensive or defensive construct. Staniland states, “Successful mass mobilization is often a consequence of prior organization and networks rather than a simple cause.” Therefore, the protagonist should defend to deny opportunities for

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36 Edwards and Farrell, HAMAS, 5.
37 Ibid., 55.
network creation, while the antagonist may attack to occupy space not defended to build the necessary networks for seizing and maintain the initiative in later activities.

Lost in much of Western reporting at the time of the Intifadas was the ongoing fight between HAMAS and Fatah. While much of the literature couches the conflict between HAMAS and Fatah in ideological terms, Islamist versus secular, the methodology presented earlier provides a structural explanation for this conflict as well as the associated interactions between occupying powers, Egypt or Israel, and local political organization within Gaza. Once Israel occupied Gaza following the 6-Day War in 1967, they entered into a period of “active cooperation” with the Muslim Brotherhood, with the Muslim Brotherhood and Israel in collusion against FATAH. During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood and Fatah can be considered as acting in “passive cooperation” with tacit coexistence as well as periods of “no cooperation” where they became clashing monopolies. These periods of clashing monopolies led Israel to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood could be a counter balance to Fatah whose terrorist activities directly threatened Israeli civilians worldwide.40

Israel did not recognize the threat originally posed by HAMAS and actually viewed them as an opportunity to undermine the Palestinian Liberation Organization.41 A more robust conceptualization of IW would have allowed Israel to see the threat posed at an earlier stage. Egypt recognized the threat albeit under a different construct where the Muslim Brotherhood was determined to be a direct threat to the state, as a direct internal competition for state power. Israel failed to see the indirect approach occurring, a second grammar to war, even though the aim of Palestinian Islamists was explicit, an Islamic Palestine, an incompatible ideal with Israeli

occupation or a two state solution. Staniland’s typology allows us to understand the interaction between the actors, while his “Organizing Insurgencies” argument is further supported by the success of HAMAS in resisting Israeli occupation and then subsequently overpowering the Palestinian Authority, socially, politically, and militarily.

When looking at HAMAS through the criteria established by Kalyvas we see violence brought on by the shift in control from Fatah to HAMAS in 2006. This is further highlighted by Staniland’s typology of guerilla disorder when the Palestinian Authority is considered the apparatus of the state. Since the relationship between Fatah and HAMAS had devolved into a period of non-cooperation, the election shifted legitimacy and enabled HAMAS to violently consolidate power within Gaza. Interestingly this shift in control and the associated spiral of violence, as predicted by Kalyvas, did not initiate with a violent action but rather the shift of control occurring through a non-violent election. Once the shift in control occurred then HAMAS did initiate violence to consolidate its power and eliminate any potential security threat posed by Fatah.42

What is not answered in the case study is why, once elected to power, the Islamists were not fully prepared to govern, and remained dependent upon the Da’wa to provide the social services within Gaza.43 If delivery of social services built the network that HAMAS later utilized to obtain power, why aren’t they then able to govern? One possible answer is that the question is built from the framework of a secular state and not a fully Islamized state. From a Western, modern welfare state perspective, HAMAS has a much different role in governing than in the framework envisioned in an Islamic state, so the question is not about ability to govern but rather

43The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (at the Israeli Intelligence and Heritage Commemoration Center), “Society and Politics in the Gaza Strip” (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, November 4, 2008), http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_08_265_2.pdf (accessed December 16, 2013).
what is the meaning and methodology of governing. For the purpose of this monograph, this question must be answered by further research.

The rise of HAMAS was not pre-destined, and provides a unique perspective to understanding IW. However to preempt HAMAS an array of non-lethal measures should have been undertaken by either Fatah or Israel. The question becomes where could Israel have acted to prevent the rise of HAMAS? The obvious answer advanced by many writers is that Israel should not have provided explicit and tacit approval of the Muslim Brotherhoods initial organizational methods. However, the challenge and the challenge faced by Egypt even to this day is how to separate the social welfare provided by the Brotherhood from the aim of the Brotherhood of an Islamic state. When war viewed as an extension of policy, HAMAS’ concept of Islamic resistance through available means as war to achieve political change demonstrates that overwhelming military force can be frustrated by the networks long established before escalation.

**Hezbollah**

Hezbollah represents another Islamist organization however it is contextually different from HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood. First in religious orthodoxy, Hezbollah adheres to the Shiite branch of Islam versus HAMAS and the Muslim Brotherhood’s adherence to Sunni Islam. Second in national identity and interest, Hezbollah retains a Lebanese identity. Hezbollah, literally “Party of God,” is described variously as a terrorist organization, a political party, a welfare organization, and a state within a state. These varying descriptions reflect which aspect of Hezbollah the analyst is observing, as well as the analyst’s personal perspective. For example, prior to July 22, 2013, the European Union could not agree to list Hezbollah as a terrorist.
organization and then only designated the militant wing as a terrorist organization,\textsuperscript{44} while the United States lists the entire Hezbollah apparatus as a terrorist organization. The treatment here will simply be as a single actor and specifically seeks to see how Hezbollah achieves its aims through civil affairs activities.

Official pronouncement of Hezbollah occurred in 1985 with the issuance of the “open letter,” Hezbollah’s public pronouncement of its ideology. However conditions where set long before this pronouncement. Whereas Sunni political Islam is most often associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, political Islam for the Shiite community came to the fore with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution provided “a sense of empowerment, pride, and independence for the Shiite community worldwide.”\textsuperscript{45} This awareness added fuel for change and within both Sunni and Shiite communities political Islam offered “better social welfare networks” and a “strong ideology” that fostered a greater sense of collectiveness.\textsuperscript{46} Specific to the Lebanese context, the pronouncement of the open letter was the “culmination of a process of polarization initiated by Imam Musa al Sadr.”\textsuperscript{47}

Multiple authors point to the work of Musa al Sadr in setting the conditions for Hezbollah. Musa al Sadr saw Islam as the method for overcoming the Shiite plight in Lebanon,\textsuperscript{48} and sought the creation of a political active Shiite community capable of obtaining social


\textsuperscript{46}Gleis and Berti, \textit{Hezbollah and Hamas}, 38.

\textsuperscript{47}Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, \textit{In the Path of Hizbullah} (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 20.

justice. Musa al Sadr did see that violence in obtaining a more just order was justified however his primary methodology was to obtain the revolution through non-violent means. His primary aim was to empower the Shia community in Lebanese politics, and went about achieving this aim through merging “social activism with Shia identity.” This leadership and activism manifests itself in the vocational institute founded by al Sadr in Burj al-Shimali. While Musa al Sadr is not the founder of Hezbollah, his work resulted in the network of connections and the recasting of Shia identity within Lebanon that made the creation of Hezbollah possible.

The final impetus for the creation of Hezbollah was the invasion of Lebanon by Israel. However, initially the Shiite community welcomed the invasion as a means to rid Southern Lebanon of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In support of Arab nationalism, Lebanese Shia initially sympathized with the PLOs plight, but PLO actions in Southern Lebanon caused the Shia community to view the PLO as another manifestation of Sunni power and domination. The PLO had worn out their welcome, and the Shia viewed the Israeli invasion as an acceptable means of evicting the PLO, however once the invasion became to be perceived as an occupation, Lebanese identity began to assert itself and organized resistance developed.

Hezbollah’s emergence as the primary resistance group to Israeli occupation did not come without conflict. Competing organizations were prevalent, most notably AMAL, which means “Hope” in Arabic that originated from the acronym of the Lebanese Resistance Regiments (afwaj al-muqawama al-lubnaniya). AMAL was originally founded by Al-Sadr within his

49Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 21.
52Norton, Hezbollah, 18.
54Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, 111-114.
conceptualization of a Shiite social movement rather than a political or military party, and therefore suffered from weak structural organization. This lack of structure resulted in fragmentation of the group with the precursor to Hezbollah, Islamist AMAL splitting from the group. AMAL pursued a more a secular ideology whereas Hezbollah adopted an Islamist ideology from the influences of Islamist AMAL and Iran.

Hezbollah developed with significant state sponsorship. Iranian Quds forces in exporting the revolution established Hezbollah from the organizational roots of Islamist AMAL. As part of the strategy to continue the Revolution through Hezbollah, Iran provided millions of dollars in aid. This aid established the Jihad al-Binaa, construction Jihad, and the Islamic Health Committee in 1984, though Judith Harik lists 1983 as the beginning of health service provision by Hezbollah. This provision of social services served as part of the strategy for Hezbollah to establish itself as the dominant representative of the Lebanese Shia community. These social services became a strong and durable welfare system that developed, maintained, and expanded reciprocal ties between Hezbollah and the Lebanese population.

Staniland’s typology is especially useful in describing the interactions between various actors within Southern Lebanon. Initially the Shia community and the IDF actively cooperated in period of collusion with the mutual aim of evicting the PLO. However once Lebanese identity reasserted itself, the interaction between the IDF and Lebanese resistance became guerilla disorder. More interesting though is describing the interaction of AMAL and Hezbollah,

55 Gleis and Berti, *Hezbollah and Hamas*, 12.
57 Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, 147.
60 Gleis and Berti, *Hezbollah and Hamas*, 47.
underneath the IDF occupation AMAL and Hezbollah vied for power and control of the Shia population. This conflict can be described through Kalyvas’s zones of control where AMAL and Hezbollah utilized violence to assert their areas of influence. This interaction developed into a period of passive cooperation. Initially as spheres of influence where Hezbollah established primacy in military control and eventually tacit coexistence with pressure from Syria for both parties to reach political accommodation.61

The work of al Sadr best supports Staniland’s argument of social networks providing the structure of insurgencies. In the case of Hezbollah, political activism provided the Shia identity that in turn was initially channeled into social activism to better the Shia community and create additional political activism. The violence of the Lebanon civil war and the Israeli invasion naturally spawned armed elements within these organizations, as the Shia community sought to protect itself. These armed wings owed their initial organization to political and social networks and remained dependent upon these networks to sustain and grow their militant elements. Specifically, Hezbollah with support from Iran actively continued to grow their social welfare net and subsequently established itself as the most powerful element within the Lebanese Shia community.

CORDS

The United States experience in Vietnam offers unique perspectives to Irregular War, with many similarities to the concept of hybrid war, due to its combination of insurgent and conventional threat to the Government of South Vietnam. Unlike the first two case studies, Vietnam provides the opportunity to analyze civic action from a US experience. Timothy J. Lomperis argues that the lessons from Vietnam can only be drawn from comparative analysis since Communists people’s war and Democracy’s nation building are competing struggles for

61Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas, 13.
political legitimacy.\textsuperscript{62} This frame leads to two questions relevant to Civil Affairs. First, this view supports asking the question “Can Civil Affairs be used in the offense?” under the construct of nation building. The second question would be “Is Democratic nation building still a viable strategy in the post-Cold War?” This monograph is concerned with the first and may offer insights to the second. In framing my research, I focused on the United States implementation of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) as the instrument for assessing whether or not Civil Affairs can be utilized in the offense.

When looking at Vietnam as multiple competitions for political legitimacy, numerous wars emerge, and hence the numerous actors that can be picked for asking if and when Civil Affairs was used in the offense. Therefore, assessing CORDS requires briefly establishing its place in time of the United States long involvement US in Vietnam. From the American perspective, from 1945 forward Vietnam can be seen as at least four different campaigns subordinate to the larger Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. The periods are effectively broken apart by depiction of strategy. Beginning with the victory of communism in China, US strategy sought to support the French in Indo-China as a counter to Communist expansion.\textsuperscript{63} Following the departure of the French, the United States essentially assumed the mantle from the French and strove to sustain South Vietnam through aid and advisors with increasing levels of commitment. By 1965, believing that South Vietnam was on the verge of being overthrown by Viet Cong main force units America intervened with large scale

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\textsuperscript{63}Lomperis, \textit{From People’s War to People’s Rule}, 95.
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troop deployments. Once domestic support for the war collapsed following the Tet offensive then began the move towards and eventual implementation of Vietnamization.

The Vietnam War was simultaneously a counterinsurgency and a conventional war. South Vietnam had to defeat an internal communist insurgency and simultaneously defend and defeat conventional force invasion from North Vietnam. Because of this dual threat, US strategy and operational approaches were highly debated at the time and continue to be framed by the debate between large unit war versus “the other war,” pacification. From this conflict in approach emerged CORDS.

Ultimately the United States “lost” the Vietnam War. However, numerous historical works highlight the “campaigns” that the United States won, to include Lewis Sorley’s *A Better War*; Mark Moyar’s *Phoenix, and the Birds of Prey*; and James Willbank’s *Abandoning Vietnam*. A key component of these narratives is a two-part premise: that the tactical and operational defeat of the Tet offensive plus the unifying leadership and strategic direction of CORDS established conditions that defeated the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. Defeat of the Tet offensive resulted in the culmination of Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam and provided the opportunity for rapid expansion of pacification activities into the countryside.

Pacification equates to counterinsurgency in the current era. Pacification’s components emerged from counterinsurgency doctrine of the period and the term was likely a carryover from

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66 Lomperis, *From People’s War to People’s Rule*, 121.


usage by the French in Vietnam. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) defined pacification as “the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people.” This definition parallels the previous Joint definition of counterinsurgency still found in FM 3-24: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” However, the current Joint definition is more nebulous simply stating, “COIN is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.”

In 1967, President Johnson directed that all pacification activities were to be placed under General Westmoreland. The impetus for the directive was a belief that the military was not giving adequate attention to “the other war,” that only the military had the resources necessary for pacification, and that the various civil agencies responsible for aspects of pacification needed a single manager. CORDS emerged as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) vehicle for delivering pacification. Pacification was an advise and assist mission to the Government of South Vietnam, and CORDS’ charter was to improve South Vietnam’s pacification capabilities. Prior to President Johnson’s directive, multiple agencies answering to differing bureaucratic agendas conducted pacification activities. Thus, CORDS’ greatest achievement was establishing unity of effort amongst the various agencies performing

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74Cosmos, *MACV, The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation*, 360-361.
75Hunt, *Pacification*, 86.
pacification related activities, from CIA counter-guerilla or anti-infrastructure activities to Department of State and USAID economic, political, and social reform and strengthening activities.76

CORDS activities included a broad range of programs aimed at protecting the population and extending the reach of South Vietnam’s governance. These programs included providing economic assistance to villages, refugee relief and assistance, police development and advisory, development of local governance capability and capacity, psychological operations, and clemency programs.77 These programs had previously been under their sponsoring agencies, such as AID or CIA, and not under unified authority. CORDS also gained oversight of US Army civil affairs companies and “army civic action.”78 CORDS tasked the civil affairs companies with the responsibility of coordinating CORDS programs with American units’ civic action programs. All of the programs of CORDS revolved around advising and assisting South Vietnamese efforts in these areas, as such the ultimate success of CORDS depended upon influencing South Vietnam’s pacification efforts.79 While many of these efforts sought to improve the lives of Vietnamese civilians, the preponderance of CORDS resources went to civilian security or protection programs80

The Phoenix program, the program charged with attacking the Viet Cong Infrastructure,81 best illustrates the security line of effort of CORDS. The Viet Cong Infrastructure provided command and control, sustainment, recruiting, and political organization to the communists in

77Thomas Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1999), 59, 67.
78Hunt, Pacification, 93.
79Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support, 74.
80Birtle, Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1942-1976, 325.
81Andrade and Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix,” 85.
South Vietnam, and as long as it was in existence competed with the Saigon government for control of the population.\textsuperscript{82} The US government recognized this political infrastructure as a significant threat prior to the introduction of US ground forces. The CIA recommended counter guerilla operations to the French in 1951,\textsuperscript{83} and in 1954, US military planners in assessing options for US military intervention determined “that successful military operations alone would not destroy the Viet Minh political organization… that five to eight years of political and psychological measures” would also have to be conducted.\textsuperscript{84} So even before large unit deployments, combined political military operations were recognized as a critical capability. However, not until CORDS did these efforts become unified under a single command.

North Vietnamese reporting during and after the war attest to the effectiveness of CORDS/Phoenix. Both Sorley and Moyar cite North Vietnamese sources as identifying the Phoenix program as highly successful in destroying the capabilities of the Viet Cong Infrastructure.\textsuperscript{85,86} Moreover, both of these accounts again citing North Vietnamese sources as attributing the spread of government administration as a contributing critical factor.\textsuperscript{87,88} Civic action and security operations were effective in tandem; neither could achieve decisive success without the other.

CORDS and pacification depended upon lethal operations to regain the initiative against an infrastructure that was already firmly established. Security had to be the first condition

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\textsuperscript{82}Hunt, \textit{Pacification}, 109.
\textsuperscript{83}Ronald H. Spector, \textit{Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960} (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1985), 164.
\textsuperscript{84}Spector, \textit{Advise and Support}, 195.
\textsuperscript{85}Sorley, \textit{A Better War}, 147.
\textsuperscript{86}Moyar, \textit{Phoenix and the Birds of Prey}, 273.
\textsuperscript{87}Sorley. \textit{A Better War}, 147.
\textsuperscript{88}Moyar, \textit{Phoenix and the Birds of Prey}, 264.
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established, and the only means for wresting the initiative from the enemy. However as part of
an offensive campaign civil affairs had to be an integral part. Sorley describes the Accelerated
Pacification Program as a counteroffensive encompassing security and counter infrastructure with
supporting operations of civic action. Without simultaneously extending the reach of good
governance and necessary social services, anti-infrastructure operations would have been
perceived as government oppression. Diem’s pacification methods in the 1950s demonstrated
this effect. Additionally civic action enhances anti-infrastructure effectiveness. Betty
Christiansen in her study of US Air Force Civic Action found that USAF civic action teams
contributed directly to enhanced base security and in at least one instance enabled counter-
offensive operations due to the information provided by civilians to the civic action team.
However Kalyvas’ “zones of control” provides a more robust explanation for informant behavior
and the civic action teams, while necessary as a conduit for the information, were likely not the
motivating factor. Risk plays a much larger role and acts of collaboration are highly
individualized. Security and civic action in complementary reinforcing operations achieved the
desired aims.

The strongest criticism of the historical approaches that highlight the success of
pacification is Neil Sheehan’s *A Bright Shining Lie*. The book details the experience of John Paul
Vann, another strong advocate for pacification, but Sheehan argues that while Vann was the most

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91Andrade and Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix,” 90.
93Betty Barton Christiansen, “CIVIC ACTION” Air Force History and Museums Program
Research Studies Series: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia (1998),
visible proponent of pacification he ultimately resorted to attrition warfare.\textsuperscript{95} This dichotomy highlights the initial challenge that faced South Vietnam, winning a counterinsurgency while simultaneously fighting a conventional threat. Pacification resources would be incapable of stopping North Vietnam regular Army units that North Vietnam ultimately used to defeat South Vietnam, yet pacification was absolutely critical to establishing unified political order within the South. The Government of South Vietnam could not consolidate control until the large unit formations of the Viet Cong were destroyed, which occurred through their defeat during the Tet offensive.

The theories of Kalyvas and Staniland help explain aspects of the Vietnam War and offer insight into the place and purpose of civic action. Much of the communist infrastructure within South Vietnam was built upon pre-existing political connections and shared experiences from resisting the French.\textsuperscript{96} This insight supports Staniland’s arguments on insurgency being built upon prior social networks; however, there were contradictions in their approach. While the communist party sought to protect “village loyalty and racial ties,” they also sought to break down familial ties by assigning members far from their homes.\textsuperscript{97} Support for Staniland’s arguments is highlighted by the communities that the Viet Cong could not penetrate. These communities’ ethnic, racial, religious, or political ties were strong enough and divergent enough in aim from the communist party to prevent their infiltration.\textsuperscript{98} This fragmentation is also exhibited by the rural versus urban aspect of South Vietnam society, and explains why the Tet offensive failed to generate the massive uprising envisioned by revolutionary theory. Robert Komer, architect of CORDS and its first chief, may not have recognized these fissures and the

\textsuperscript{95}Neil Sheehan, \textit{A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam} (New York: Random House, 1988), 784.

\textsuperscript{96}Lomperis, \textit{From People’s War to People’s Rule}, 116.


\textsuperscript{98}Moyar, \textit{Phoenix and the Birds of Prey}, 30.
opportunity they presented, but he did recognize the fragmentation of the pacification campaign due to lack of institutional cohesion internally to the US and GVN and between the two.99

Support for the Viet Cong or the Government of South Vietnam largely rested on which side demonstrated strength over the other.100 Kalyvas draws heavily on Vietnam for his insights into purpose and predictably of violence in his theory on zones of control. In relation to CORDS, zones of parity often developed where GVN militias and VC forces families resided in proximity.101 In these type zones then political orders of tacit coexistence developed where “GVN ruled by day, and the VC by night.”102

However, the TET offensive can be described as a period of non-cooperation and clashing monopolies. This marked an attempted shift in zones of control as the VC attempted to expand their areas of control into the cities. Since this was an attempted shift, violence against civilians was indiscriminate, highlighted by the massive requirements of Project Recovery. Following the TET offensive, the Viet Cong could no longer maintain the combat power to enjoy parity in many areas and therefore became vulnerable to GVN operations. Additionally the VCI cadre emerged from secrecy to rally support, but because the Viet Cong lacked strong social ties to the urban centers, the civilian populace reported their identity to GVN forces for capture.103 The Viet Cong lost cohesion with the loss of their local leadership that best “knew the local political and military environment”104 At this time they became vulnerable to the activities of CORDS, the GVN could exercise selective violence due to increased intelligence brought on by

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the shift in control. The culmination of the combat power and loss of cohesion of the Viet Cong resulted in the US and South Vietnam being able to seize the initiative with their increase of cohesion enabled by CORDS.

The strongest argument for civil affairs in the offensive is at the operational and strategic level of war. Culmination is the point at which offensive operations are no longer possible and the commander must transition to the defense. If TET represented the culmination of the Viet Cong then Project Recovery was the US and South Vietnam’s transition to the offense. Project Recovery sought to mitigate the effects of the Tet offensive and included a broad range of activities including restoring essential services, reconstruction, refugee relief, and the reequipping of local security forces. While Project Recovery was primary civic in nature, security operations targeted the exposed leadership of the VCI.

The unity of effort aspect of CORDS and the dual nature of the Vietnam War makes it challenging to separate out the specific outcomes of civic activities from pacification activities writ large. CORDS emerged in response to institutional ineffectiveness and primarily represented an organizational answer required for a shift in strategy. “CORDS was a bureaucracy dedicated to finding ways, usually standardized programs or plans, to get the South Vietnamese to perform better in pacification.” Significant civil affairs and civic action occurred in Vietnam; however, this never resulted in a “legitimate political community.” Civic action served to consolidate gains, which in turn refined targeting, which led to further consolidation. Only by extending the reach of governance could South Vietnam gain and hold territory from the insurgent threat. Civil Affairs can be offensive but only in the context of a secure environment. Christenson quotes

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105 Hunt, *Pacification*, 145.
108 Lomperis, *From People’s War to People’s Rule*, 129.
Komer as saying when evaluating the activities of CORDS everything must be “weighed in the balance,” and argues that Civic Action was a necessary component but her case study of 7th Air Force Civic Action can’t prove that more or better civic action would have resulted in a different outcome, only that 7th Air Force’s Civic Action Program produced outcomes in support of US goals.  

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The answer to the research reveals that Civil Affairs Operations can be used in an offensive role within Irregular Warfare. The Hezbollah and HAMAS case studies demonstrate that civil affairs in a permissive environment, inherent or imposed, provides the force a capability “to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” John Lewis Gaddis’s long view of history allows the practitioner to see characteristics of the offense in the civil affairs activities of Hezbollah and HAMAS, where the key terrain is the network of social connections and beliefs amongst the populace. Their pathways mirror that of revolutionary warfare, but there are distinct differences in the cases. Vietnam and CORDS, however demonstrates the crossover point where civil affairs operations can no longer be considered a stand-alone offensive option, though they must still be an integral part.

Hezbollah and HAMAS reflect differing initial conditions, but both demonstrate the power of civic action to shape future capabilities and capacities. HAMAS began from the Islamic Brotherhood, which fundamentally sought to change society largely through non-violent means. Palestinian conflict and Israeli actions interacted to allow the emergence of the militant aspect of HAMAS as a means to assert Palestinian nationalism. Hezbollah sprang from the unique Lebanese Shia social conditions coupled to resistance to Israeli occupation and manifested itself with the inspiration from the Iranian Revolution. HAMAS establishes the impact of social

109 Christiansen, “CIVIC ACTION,” 259.
conditioning, while Hezbollah better demonstrates an adaption and learning model to civic action. Both of these cases demonstrate the power of civic action prior to conflict, and affirm Staniland’s theory on “Organizing Insurgency.”

The Vietnam War demonstrates a much more nuanced answer. Lomperis argues that Vietnam is always the “case that doesn’t fit.”110 Birtle describes it as “untidy” in regards to placing it in doctrine of the period.111 And in this monograph, CORDS as compared to Hezbollah and HAMAS also seems not to fit. An alternative would have been to pick the Viet Minh or Viet Cong and compare their activities to Hezbollah and Hamas however then only an insurgent, or revolutionary, perspective would have been provided. By picking the US viewpoint, Vietnam’s “untidiness” balances the potential conclusions from the first two case studies. Vietnam, and specifically CORDS, demonstrates the importance of violence and role of force to both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, and affirms Kalyvas’ theory on zones of control. The United States experience in Vietnam shows that security is a critical component of effective civil affairs or civic action. Vietnam seems to demonstrate that “no” civil affairs cannot be utilized as an offensive task; yet asking the question, “Can Civil Affairs be used in the offensive,” forces the practitioner to reconsider the approach or targeting priorities for traditional offensive tasks. Seeing CORDS as part of a “counter-offensive” underscores the sequential and simultaneous aspects of civil affairs operations in relation to lethal force.

The second major finding was the utility of the combined application of the theories of Kalyvas and Staniland to Irregular Warfare. The combination of Kalyvas’ zones of control, Staniland’s typology of political orders, and Staniland’s theory of social cohesion/fragmentation of insurgencies, provides a useful model for understanding the operational environment and for

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110 Lomperis, From People’s War to People’s Rule, preface xi.
operational design in Irregular Warfare and Theater Campaign Planning. Specifically the case studies demonstrated its utility in multi-actor insurgencies. AMAL and Hezbollah within the larger context of Lebanese society continue to compete for representation of the Shiite community but do so in mutually recognized zones of control and political order established in previous periods of violent conflict. Likewise, HAMAS and Fatah continue to compete for representation of the Palestinians and occupy specific zones of control. In line with Kalyvas’ theories of control, Hezbollah used coercive measures to establish their areas of control and in line with Staniland the competition between AMAL and Hezbollah, up until political accommodation, manifested as areas of spheres of influence. HAMAS immediately consolidated control of Gaza through violence upon achieving electoral victory.

Violence clearly became the means that HAMAS and Hezbollah consolidated control over their respective areas. However, both HAMAS and Hezbollah benefited from the networks that they established through social services. These social services generally flowed through the mosques and represent a unifying theme of Islam. In line with Staniland’s theory on insurgencies and social networks, HAMAS and Hezbollah were able to build upon these deep networks, and prevent further fragmentation. Fragmentation occurred along secular versus Islamist lines. The secular forces represented by Fatah and AMAL did not have the deep connections to the community that HAMAS and Hezbollah were able to establish through their social services. Vietnam further establishes the importance of these deep connections and Staniland’s theory helps explain why the rural insurgency of South Vietnam could not penetrate the urban sectors.

Staniland’s typology of political orders and Kalyvas zones of control is scalable across space and actors. Kalyvas and Staniland presented their theories as insurgent and incumbent, and while the case studies presented in this case treated the actors as monolithic in nature, they all included more actors than the binary insurgent/counterinsurgent model. The combination of theories can be placed over a state, a county, or a city with multiple actors competing for control.
in environments navigated through by linkages established prior to war. This visualization tool enables environmental understanding as well as IW design in the defense and in the offense.

The third major finding is the criticality of the purposeful combination of force and civil affairs to establish winning conditions. CORDS and Hezbollah provide the best evidence for purposeful civic action, where each executed governance and social service lines of operations as part of their overall strategy. All case studies showed the use of civil affairs operations to further consolidate control, thus governance and lethal force are intricately linked. The Viet Cong were successful due to the application of force, intimidation or assignation of government officials, plus the implementation of governance. CORDS as a counter-offensive was successful due to the application of force, killing or capture of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and the extension of governance. Successful military campaigns must include both in synchronized and simultaneous fashion. A military operation that does not include both, no matter the scale is simply a raid, understanding this relationship ensures that a war of limited aims does not become nation building nor is nation building fought with the means of a war of limited aims.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since war is an extension of the political discourse and to end war requires a return to civil discourse means that civic action is uniquely situated at the transition point. Civic action is used both to successfully conclude and transition military campaigns as well as shape and stabilize to prevent the requirements for future military campaigns. Civic action’s placement on the transition point is what makes its discussion in the American Way of War so difficult. Conceptual understanding of people’s war and counterinsurgency recognizes the emergence of open armed operations as the point where the insurgency is most vulnerable to lethal force. However, this view rests on the US presumption of overwhelming combat power; however,

112Clausewitz, On War, 86-88.
HAMAS and Hezbollah provide examples where sufficient political work beforehand provides unique advantages in depth through domination of the human terrain.

Since civic action exists on the transition point to lethal force, both shaping and stability operations create operational dilemmas where commanders must seek to ensure American effectiveness and accountability to the American taxpayer while simultaneously trying to uphold American ideals of self-determination and independence by not being overly involved in a state’s internal affairs. Hunt described the balancing act as “CORDS walked a tightrope”\textsuperscript{113} To further understand and conceptualize this tightrope I make the following recommendations.

First, recommend further research and development of a combined model of Kalyvas and Staniland’s theories. All three case studies demonstrated that a bi-polar view of insurgency fails to capture understanding of the operational environment. Staniland’s typology of political order assists in framing the operational environment with the nuance required to develop tactical and operational options and to see opportunities in relationships between actors in the contemporary operating environment. Specifically Staniland’s typology of political orders should be included in COIN and Stability Operations doctrine as a means to better understanding the operational environment. For example moving actors from No Cooperation to Passive or Active Cooperation or vice versa could be the intended or unintended result of third party intervention. And in the space of Active or Passive Cooperation civil affairs operations may be a viable option as this environment may be permissive, but not secure. However recognizing the political order is crucial, as some actors will perceive civil affairs operations as offensive operations aimed at changing the order or actors may manipulate the operations in order to consolidate power and control. A combined model allows the practitioner to see these relationships and anticipate positive or negative outcomes.

\textsuperscript{113}Hunt, \textit{Pacification}, 122.
Second, further research is needed for a theory of civil affairs. This monograph proceeded upon the assertion that Civil Affairs lacks a unifying theory. Further research is needed in establishing a theory of Civil Affairs in pre-conflict environments. Significant literature exists on COIN and stabilization activities, however asking can civil affairs be used in the offense leads to the broader question of how to conceptualize and then operationalize civic action. Interestingly the HAMAS and Hezbollah case studies demonstrate why civic action activities can be seen as a threat to the existing political order and therefore even if done out of altruism or simply seeking goodwill can in fact destabilize an area. Therefore, while the practitioner may view the activity as defending against destitution, other actors can perceive the action as developing networks of resistance.

In current doctrine, defending against IW threats the primary factor is the establishment of quality institutions, but this area is contested space as demonstrated by the case studies. What is the aim of persistent engagement? Does persistent engagement simply seek understanding or are we institution building? Comparing the Vietnam, Hamas, and Hezbollah case studies, when are we perceived to be going on the offense by our adversaries? The lack of Civil Affairs Theory for Phase 0 operations creates ambiguity, both for our practitioners, our partners, and our adversaries. The tension that exists is why is the military conducting civic action in a pre-conflict environment.

Third, there is need for further clarification of the definition of civil affairs and civil affairs operations and associated responsibilities. This is a corollary to the second recommendation as developing a theory for Civil Affairs requires a clearer definition for Civil Affairs Operations. Civic action was removed from JP 3-57; however, it filled a critical conceptual gap, and provided language common to military and civilian personnel. Civil Affairs Operations is limited to actions of civil affairs personnel, which is intellectually dishonest, as military personnel and civilians rarely distinguish between civil-military operations and civil
affairs operations. All three case studies demonstrated the criticality of social services and governance however much of doctrine still assumes a heavy reliance on interagency and intergovernmental partners that lack the unifying chain of command or authorities of a CORDS organization. Further clarification would enable more detailed operational planning and organizational design.

Fourth, further conceptualization of Irregular Warfare. Lack of operational doctrine, language and authorities makes it difficult to conceptualize this practice in a “pre-war” environment. JP 3-57 states “Adversaries may use irregular warfare (IW) to avoid direct confrontation with the US. They may target civilian populations instead of military forces. This erodes distinction between civilian and military institutions, infrastructures, and systems; military and civilian “dual use” infrastructures are becoming more prevalent.” The case studies and methodology presented demonstrate the accuracy of this assertion; however, the components of irregular warfare as defined in the Joint Operating Concept are all on the strategic defensive, except for Unconventional Warfare. Only UW operates as a strategic option for waging IW in the offense in the US construct. However, UW is dependent upon a resistance element already in place.\textsuperscript{114} Additionally, ADRP 3-05 lists military means as the first means for gaining control of the population in IW\textsuperscript{115}, however, HAMAS and Hezbollah demonstrate how developing the network of resistance is a long-term project that primarily encompasses nonlethal activities long before the application of force. Which again highlights the precarious position of civil affairs operations on the apex between war and peace.

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Asking a simple question with a seemingly obvious answer leads to new insights when assumptions are suspended. Can Civil Affairs Operations be utilized offensively? No, according to our doctrinal depiction they fall within the realm of stability operations or shaping activities. Lethal force must be a component of offensive operations as defined in ADRP 3-0, though this distinction is not made in Joint Publications. The case studies demonstrate that civil affairs through actions creates connections that are very much a component of Irregular Warfare, therefore strategically and operationally civic action can be conceptualized as an offensive capability. However tactically civic action can only occur within a permissive to semi-permissive environment. Potential adversaries see civil affairs operations as a means and tactic in offensive warfare, so even though, US doctrine draws a distinction, practitioners must see the opportunities and threats created by civic action. What may appear as a purely humanitarian or stabilization operation can be perceived as a direct threat to established political, ideological and military orders. Explicit recognition of this risk can allow for frank dialog with interagency personnel so that this risk can be mitigated and CORDS like unity can occur through Unified Action.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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