PLANNING FOR MACARTHUR: HARNESSING THE COMPLEXITY OF POSTWAR JAPAN

A Monograph

by

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This monograph proposes General MacArthur’s staff based the operational plan for Japanese occupation activities on understanding operational environment’s realities, strategic guidance, and the Japanese culture to prepare for and execute the occupation of Japan from April 1945 to November 1946. Regarding the operational environment, planners focused primarily on the economy, government and military to institute immediate change in 1945. The speed of change is the emergent trait inherent in all three lines of effort during the initial years of MacArthur’s military government in Japan. Planners received guidance from international actors in the form of the Potsdam Proclamation, as well as from within the United States Government executive departments. Finally, with respect to considering culture in executing the occupation plan, operational planners implemented immediate change in Japan’s education system, facilitated religious tolerance and strictly controlled information through censorship and targeted information operations.

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ABSTRACT


In a relatively short period of time, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers/General Headquarters, led by General Douglas MacArthur transformed Japan from a militaristic Imperial nation to a stable, peaceful, democracy. Changing a government, military, economy, and culture is complex and requires significant concerted effort, time and resources. How did operational planners harness the complexity and prepare for and execute the occupation of Japan?

This monograph proposes General MacArthur’s staff based their plan on understanding operational environment’s realities, strategic guidance, and the Japanese culture to prepare for and execute the occupation of Japan from April 1945 to November 1946. Regarding the operational environment, planners focused primarily on the economy, government and military to institute immediate change in 1945. The speed of change is the emergent trait inherent in all three lines of effort during the initial years of MacArthur’s military government in Japan. Planners received guidance from international actors in the form of the Potsdam Proclamation, as well as from within the United States Government executive departments. Finally, with respect to considering culture in executing the occupation plan, operational planners implemented immediate change in Japan’s education system, facilitated religious tolerance and strictly controlled information through censorship and targeted information operations.

Although many officials in the Japanese Diet and Imperial government initiated policies which directly led to the loss of American soldiers’ lives, the necessity of keeping the officials within the interim government was critical. It provided MacArthur’s staff time to understand the realities of the operational environment and plan without worrying about basic governance issues. Therefore, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, it is critical to incorporate the conquered officials into the post war plan for peace. Although this monograph focused on specific sections within General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, it is clear that operational planners on MacArthur’s staff used the principles of understanding the realities of the operational environment when planning and executing operations. They also implemented strategic guidance from various departments to ensure tactical actions were aligned with strategic goals. Simultaneously, planners on MacArthur’s staff understood the importance of culture and its effect on reconstruction progress. A combination of all three variables greatly facilitated General MacArthur’s successful reconstruction of Japan after World War II.
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## ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>AFPAC</td>
<td>Army Forces in the Pacific (also USAFPAC)</td>
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<td>CID</td>
<td>Civil Intelligence Division (SCAP)</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Counter-Intelligence Section (SCAP)</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>Economic and Scientific Section (SCAP)</td>
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<td>FEAC</td>
<td>Far Eastern Advisory Commission (Allied)</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far Eastern Commission (Allied)</td>
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<td>FECOM</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters (as in GHQ/AFPAC or GHQ/SCAP)</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>Government Section (SCAP)</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>MGS</td>
<td>Military Government Section (AFPAC)</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SCAPIN</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Index</td>
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<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State War Navy Combined Committee</td>
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<td>SFE</td>
<td>Subcommittee for the Far East (SWNCC)</td>
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<td>USAFPAC</td>
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INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 1945, a small Japanese delegation departed Tokyo leaving behind a country literally destroyed by war. The United States employed the most destructive bomb ever created against two Japanese cities. Kamikaze pilots, known for their strict devotion to the emperor, organized a mutiny against the military leaders. Most of the Japanese citizens were starving with no prospect of relief. Additionally, the relentless Allied bombing also destroyed many homes and communities leaving most citizens homeless. Nevertheless, the small military delegation confidently and stiffly arrived on a hot August day in woolen uniforms to “negotiate” surrender. They were met by General Headquarters/Army Forces in the Pacific’s intelligence officer, Brigadier General Charles Willoughby, who ordered them to remove their swords before entering the conference room. Over the course of four hours in a humid and still conference room in Manila, General Headquarters’ chief of staff, Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland, delivered surrender instructions to the overcome delegation. Sutherland spelled the terms out, unconditional surrender, with cold, cutting commands. With both uniforms and pride wilted from the heat and oppressive terms of surrender, the Japanese officials departed with heads hung low. Thirteen days later, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of General Headquarters/Army Forces in the Pacific and General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presided over the famous surrender ceremony on the battleship USS Missouri, symbolizing Japan’s acceptance of the surrender terms and complete defeat. Sutherland’s meeting with Japanese officers was the culmination of hundreds of hour’s worth of staff work to ensure the success of the Allied occupation force. General MacArthur’s staff faced the daunting task of planning Japan’s civil administration, military demobilization, and economic stabilization.

Although operational planners on his staff often joked about hardly recognizing the plans they submitted to MacArthur once they returned with his corrections, their work was instrumental in the Allied forces’ successful occupation of Japan.²

Japan’s ultimate destruction came much faster than anyone in Tokyo had anticipated. Since 1941, the empire’s military had conducted operations against China and the Western Allies while maintaining a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. This non-belligerent accommodation had worked well for both parties throughout most of the war.³ As the Red Army’s string of victories over the German military, beginning with Stalingrad in 1943 continued to mount up, the Soviet government found fewer reasons to continue this arrangement. In October 1943, Premier Josef Stalin decided to join the war with Japan at the first opportunity and, in April 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Viatcheslav Molotov notified the Japanese ambassador that the Soviet Union did not intend to renew the Neutrality Pact.⁴ Stalin confirmed this decision at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Germany finally capitulated to the allies by signing two installments of surrender, once in Reims, France on May 7 and again in Berlin, Germany on May 9.⁵ Stalin now had the chance to reposition forces east to join the war against Japan. The Allied leaders, President Truman of the United States, Prime Minister Atlee of Britain, and Premier Stalin met in Potsdam, Germany on July 1945 to discuss Allied strategy. All three heads of state focused the

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⁴Hasegawa, *Racing*, 45.

discussion on defeating Japan and ending the war.⁶ Although the majority of focus of the leaders centered on seizing Japan by force, senior officials in Allied headquarters received intelligence reports suggesting Japanese officials were considering conditional surrender.⁷

However, invasion planning, began in the summer of 1944, continued. With Manila, Philippines, under control, and Okinawa, Japan, under attack by the Marines, the attack on Japan was the start of a new campaign. The campaign, called Operation Downfall, required a significant Allied force (5,300,000 men) currently unavailable in the Pacific theater.⁸ Following the successful seizure of the Philippines, Brigadier General Chamberlin, operations officer for General Headquarters, issued Operation Downfall to subordinate units on May 28, 1945. However, because of the shortage of forces, Downfall would occur over the course of a year as troops were repositioned from the European theater. It consisted of two successive operations, Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet. Olympic involved seizing southern Kyushu in November of 1945. Coronet involved seizing the Honshu Island, near Tokyo, in March of 1946.⁹

Due to the possibility of unconditional surrender or sudden collapse, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed MacArthur to develop a contingency plan for occupying Japan sooner than March 1946.¹⁰ Therefore, Chamberlin developed Operation Blacklist as the contingency plan in the event Japan surrendered or suddenly collapsed.¹¹ Blacklist planning began in May 1945.¹²

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¹⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum to General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz,” June 15, 1945, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA.

By August, events demonstrated that the contingency plan may soon become the current operational plan. On August 6, 1945, an Army Air Force bomber dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and attacked the Japanese army in Manchuria. The next day, another B-29 dropped the second atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki. On August 10, 1945, the Japanese Emperor ordered the Japanese government to accept the Potsdam terms. Therefore, the planners on General MacArthur’s staff, led by Sutherland, executed Chamberlin’s Operation Blacklist after only four months of development and refinement.

By October 1945, MacArthur commanded two General Headquarters. General Headquarters/Allied Forces Pacific controlled occupation forces in Okinawa and Korea (south of the 38th parallel), along with U.S. Army forces in the Philippines and the Western and Mid-Pacific. General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers oversaw the non-military aspects of occupation in Japan proper. Initially, Chamberlin developed Blacklist in General Headquarters/Allied Forces Pacific. The large occupation tasks facing his officers led MacArthur to briefly consider adding a civil affairs section to the staff. However, such a small section was woefully inadequate to handle the task of civil administration. Therefore, he established a more powerful military government section on August 5, 1945. MacArthur appointed Brigadier General William Crist as the head of the new section. In October MacArthur expanded the military government section into a complete and integrated new headquarters called General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with the former military government section as one of eight new sections charged with controlling civil

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12Rogers, Years, 298.
13Weinburg, World, 889-890.
15Ibid., 48.
administration of Japan. Along with the same commander, both General Headquarters shared a single chief of staff and military general staff (personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics), but relied on separate civil staff sections. The civil staff sections received more direct guidance and access to the commander in chief than his chief and military general staff. This point is important as during combat operations leading up to the occupation, all business travelled to the commander through his chief of staff. However, his section chiefs, or operational planners, became more important as the occupation progressed through their direct access to the decision maker. History provides a wealth of credit to General MacArthur for the successful reconstruction of Japan. However, little attention is given to the operational planners in MacArthur’s headquarters.

Remarkably, little is written how operational planners juggled the myriad of tasks during the initial years of Japanese occupation. Many historians focus on MacArthur’s leadership and interaction with staff and subordinates. Historians such as Gerhard Weinberg in *A World at Arms*, Theodore Cohen in *Remaking Japan*, Robert Harvey in *American Shogun*, Ronald H. Spector in *Eagle Against the Sun*, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa in *Racing the Enemy* identify the myriad of decisions facing General MacArthur without mentioning the effect of his planners on the occupation. Some historians go further such as Takemae Eiji in *Inside GHQ* and Robert Ward in *Democratizing Japan* by discussing the interactions between staff members and

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16 Ibid., xxvii.
17 Ibid., 49, 137.
subordinates. However, they again fail to mention how operational planners prepared for the occupation of Japan. The historians generally only write about the execution of occupation and General MacArthur’s impact on Japanese occupation.

Memoirs of General MacArthur’s trusted staffers such as Courtney Whitney in *Rendezvous With History*, Paul P. Rogers in *The Bitter Years: MacArthur and Sutherland*, and Roger Egeberg in *The General: MacArthur and the Man he Called ‘Doc’* provide critical insights into operational planners’ guidance and inner workings. General MacArthur’s autobiography as well as a biography by William Manchester provides a glimpse into the interaction between commander and planning staff. Memoirs of subordinate commanders such as Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger in *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, General Walter Krueger in *From Down Under to Nippon* and General George C. Kenney in *The MacArthur I Know*, provide an excellent look at subordinate commanders’ understanding of plans delivered by MacArthur’s staff. Subordinate commanders most always reference MacArthur as the sole origin of orders and directives. However, both staffs initiated and coordinated many of the functions in Japan with only in progress reviews from MacArthur. Additionally, such an enormous problem is impossible for MacArthur to control alone. Even the most brilliant commander requires an

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21Paul Rogers personally typed many of the orders and memoranda from Generals MacArthur and Sutherland’s offices. He had intimate daily contact with the men, the events they dominated, and the documents they created.


equally capable staff to identify and analyze the problems facing the organization, especially an organization consisting of two separate and distinct headquarters led by one commander.

Potsdam accords and State War Navy Coordinating Committee directives, specifically Directive-150, addresses the issue of navigating sensitive issues of the Emperor without providing any coherent conclusions or guidance to planners on General MacArthur’s staff. 25 They also provide a look at strategic guidance from senior governmental officials to MacArthur’s planning staff. Other guidance given to planners regarding military matters came from Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, specifically Directive 1380/15 which provides considerations and specific tasks for MacArthur’s operational planners. 26 Insight into Sutherland’s planners is possible through Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government. These original documents, scanned and published online through various universities and the Japanese Diet, provide insight into changes made to Operation Blacklist after August 1945. However, all these documents fail to address the characteristics and principles synthesized by planners to prepare and execute occupation duties in Japan. Therefore, a nagging question remains. How did operational planners prepare for the occupation of Japan?

Several possible answers exist. Numerous directives and guidance to General Headquarters’ planners came from the State War Navy Combined Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is possible operational planners took the guidance and published it to ground commanders for execution without analysis. However, Operation Blacklist and its annexes and subsequent changes plainly show the differences from guidance received by planners and their subsequent orders to subordinate units. Planners may also only acted as glorified clerks, relying


only on MacArthur’s guidance much like Napoleon Bonaparte’s Chief of Staff, Berthier, had done in the early 19th Century.\(^{27}\) However, MacArthur’s tendency to give wide leeway in planning to trusted staff members disproves this theory. Allied staff in Europe developed a successful occupation plan in Germany; therefore, a successful template already existed from which to base Japanese occupation. Yet major differences in Germany’s occupation plan and Operation Blacklist precludes this explanation. General MacArthur’s staff based their plan on understanding operational environment’s realities, strategic guidance, and the Japanese culture to prepare for and execute the occupation of Japan from April 1945 to November 1946.

**OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

Generals Sutherland, Chamberlin, and Crist faced a complex operational environment in September 1945. Modern U.S. Army doctrine defines the operational environment as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.\(^{28}\) With a failing Japanese economy, a militaristic imperial government, and military known for suicidal tendencies, the U.S. State and War Departments tasked MacArthur’s planners with restructuring Japan as a democracy. Through Operation Blacklist, Chamberlin stressed the importance of controlling the political, economic, and military life of Japan and Korea.\(^{29}\) However, as Carl Von Clausewitz prophetically mentioned, the probabilities of real life replaced theory, and MacArthur’s planners

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adjusted Operation Blacklist to address the realities of the operational environment. His staff considered the operational environment during planning and execution of Japanese occupation with respect to the realities of the Japanese economy, government, and military.

In the operations order for Operation Blacklist, Chamberlin directed subordinate units to: “Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.” Major General William Marquat, former deputy to MacArthur, became the lead planner for economic recovery in 1945. Over the course of six years as the chief of the command’s economic and scientific section, Marquat emphasized practicality over theory. Although the Allies sought severe reparations to punish Japanese aggression, the logic of reality prevented severe austerity measures. Specifically, it quickly became apparent to planners that commerce was seriously jeopardized by the sad state of Japanese industry and rampant inflation.

By the war’s end in the fall of 1945, the Japanese economy had collapsed. Deprived of its colonies, from which Japan imported raw materials and exported finished goods, its economic future looked grim. Allied firebombing destroyed most industrial cities and what remained of Japan’s equipment and factories were earmarked for reparations. The state of its currency was also uncertain. The Finance Ministry and the Bank of Japan printed currency to pay off government obligations to workers, soldiers, and contractors, setting the stage for rampant inflation. Because Japan traditionally played a large role in the economy of the pacific region, collapse could potentially throw the economy of the world into dangerous imbalance. Therefore,

stabilizing the Japanese economy to the maximum extent benefitted both operational planners in
regards to Japanese reconstruction and policy makers in the United States in regards to economic
stability in the pacific region. However, to facilitate successful commerce, as directed by
Operation Blacklist, planners first established conditions for a free market system by increasing
industrial production while controlling rampant inflation.

With imports of essential commodities and raw materials completely cut off, food, fuel,
clothing, housing, and nearly all the necessities of daily life were in short supply.34 Even if Japan
had managed to keep raw materials flowing into the country, an increasing tempo of allied
bombing sorties greatly decreased Japan’s industrial infrastructure. Firebombing all but
destroyed six major industrial cities of Japan.35 Industrial production amounted to 10 percent of
prewar levels. Diversion of manpower into the armed forces and war industries took valuable
farmers away from farmland. The result of the diversion led to abnormally low levels of harvests.
Official rations for the people of Japan dropped to 1,050 calories a day (1/5th of the amount
furnished to each American soldier daily).36 Loss of infrastructure, combined with loss of
production in the remaining industrial plants, further damaged Japan’s economic situation.

Additionally, reparations threatened the existence of the remaining industrial
infrastructure. Planners faced the daunting task of appeasing Allied countries requests for
industrial plants through the Far Eastern Commission, while ensuring reparations did not stall
economic democratization.37 Industrial capability loss caused the United States to increase
economic aid to offset reparations, which effectively switched the reparation financier from Japan
to the United States. To address the dilemma, planners in the General Headquarters/Supreme

34Ibid., 65.
35Rogers, Bitter Years, 296.
36Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960),
135.
37Ibid., 140.
Commander for the Allied Powers scrapped the reparations program in 1949.\textsuperscript{38} However, Japanese inflation and a failing market system required the same attention from planners.

Japanese bank officials printed new money to reimburse people for buildings and land procured by the occupation force. This practice of quantitative easing resulted in a considerable increase of paper money. An increase of monetary supply combined with the government paying off demobilized soldiers, the end of forcing people to deposit large parts of their earnings in frozen savings accounts, and a severe shortage of goods led to runaway inflation.\textsuperscript{39} Although General MacArthur’s initial guidance to Chamberlin included taking a hands off approach to Japan’s economy and specifically its inflation, MacArthur and planners in Washington D.C. knew the adverse ramifications if Japan’s inflation ran unchecked. Therefore, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380/15 proclaimed: “Serious inflation will substantially retard the accomplishment of the ultimate objectives of the Occupation.”\textsuperscript{40} Marquat received a reversal of the hands off approach and developed a strategy for improvement first by gaining time. Instead of applying strict economic theories to problems facing his section such as inflation, he addressed the problem in terms of protecting the Japanese society from the consequences of the inflation first. This policy of preventing social turmoil based on the economic realities of Japan ultimately allowed time to fix the inflation issue.\textsuperscript{41}

The initial plan, Operation Blacklist, gave overarching guidance to subordinates and staff for military governance in its “common tasks.”\textsuperscript{42} Chamberlin directed subordinate commanders to “Institute Military Government and insure (sic) that law and order are maintained among the

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., 141.
\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{40}Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JCS 1380/15,” 2.
\textsuperscript{41}Cohen, Remaking, 184-186.
The magnitude of the complexities and tasks facing the government section planners to institute a “military government” is highlighted in a quote from its section chief, Brigadier General Courtney Whitney: “Here was a nation living in the twentieth century but feudalistic in virtually every other way.” To change the government in Japan, the occupation force required Allied civilians and officers well versed in twentieth century government. However, Whitney could not rely on them exclusively to govern the nation of Japan due to the sheer number of officials required and the need to ensure a new Japan arose by the work of Japanese, not Americans. Although the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, commonly called the Potsdam Proclamation, required General MacArthur to remove officials “who deceived and misled the people of Japan,” the majority of political officials remained in place until general elections occurred in April 1946. Why did the officials stay in power for so long? After recognizing the enormity of the problem he faced, Chamberlin directed his planning staff to maximize use of existing Japanese officials. Through the publication of Operation Blacklist and its subsequent Annexes, Chamberlin encouraged the maximum use of existing Japanese political and administrative organizations since the agencies already exerted a modicum of control over the Japanese people. Using existing political officials also diminished the numbers of military officers required to execute the duties of government should existing Japanese officials be dismissed. Additionally, a Japanese government redesigned by Japanese officials facilitates buy-in from the Japanese people. The realities facing operational planners such as political corruption and the unicameral party system of the Japanese officials required

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43Ibid.
44Whitney, Rendezvous, 241.
45Eiji, Inside, 266.
significant changes before democratization began, however. A number of directives from Crist, and later Whitney’s government section of general headquarters directed such changes in the Japanese government. By May 1947, the government of Japan completely changed with the two biggest changes occurring in the Japanese Diet and the Constitution.

The imperial government of Japan kept a tight hold on the political freedoms of its people, and also stifled human rights. Therefore, by October 1945, the government section working with the civil liberties and education section published a memorandum to the imperial government called Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government-93: ‘Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties,’ which immediately started a chain reaction of reform. Directive-550: ‘Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office,’ published January 1946, set the conditions for the April 1946 general elections. By effectively lifting the ban on free speech and political assembly with Directive-93, and removing corrupt officials from the existing government with directive-550, Crist and Whitney (who assumed the role of chief of government section in December 1945) addressed the underlying problem facing democratization of the Japanese Diet. Upon publication and implementation of Directive-93, political parties quickly formed and rose in prominence. The Japanese communist party re-emerged in October with Directive-93, then the Socialist Party in November, followed by three conservative parties and the Japanese Progressive Party. However, even with a multi-party Diet, feudalism would continue without a significant revision or rewrite of the Japanese Constitution.


49 Eiji, Inside, 260.
General MacArthur told the Japanese Prime Minister almost immediately after the surrender that the Japanese government must revise the antiquated, restrictive, and feudalistic constitution to promote a democratic society. By October 1945, a committee of Japanese political leaders sat down to revise the constitution with copious suggestions from the Japanese people through the now free presses. By the end of January, the committee presented an unofficial submission of recommended changes to supreme headquarters. Whitney, the section chief, and his staff immediately realized the “changes” only consisted of rewording without changing its basic nature of feudalism. The power of the Emperor remained intact except now he simply became “supreme and inviolable” instead of “sacred and inviolable.” MacArthur scheduled the general elections for Japan on April 1946. This date quickly became a deadline for constitutional reform as a way to show progress to the Japanese people. As the deadline for a viable constitution loomed, General MacArthur directed Whitney to draft a revision as a basis for future negotiation with the Japanese constitutional committee. In six days, a team of dedicated military officer planners wrote a new draft constitution. Whitney handed the draft back to the Japanese and after several such processes of revision, General MacArthur and the Japanese cabinet approved the new constitution in March 1946, a full month before the general elections. After the new elections in April, both houses of the Diet debated the new constitution and made minor form changes. By November 3, 1946, the Diet approved it and it became the official constitution of Japan in May 1947. The original plan to let the Japanese change the constitution and remove feudalism completely became mired by the Japanese committee’s aversion to make radical changes to the existing constitution. General Whitney and his team of planners effectively and

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50 Instructions-93 facilitated the resumption of freedom of press by removing restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties.

51 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 300.

52 Whitney, Rendezvous, 252-254.

53 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 301.
efficiently developed a plan of action after noticing the lack of Japanese progress in constitutional reform. However, as Chamberlin initially directed, the military aspect of Japan also required attention.

As evidenced in the operations order for Operation Blacklist, Chamberlin expected to encounter active resistance in the form of suicidal attacks after the Japanese surrender. Additionally, he assumed the total forces requiring disarmament amounted to 4,900,000 combatants between the Japanese military and civilian volunteer defense units. Chamberlin task his subordinate units to immobilize resistance and demobilize the Japanese military. However, his assumption of resistance to occupation began to prove false as evidenced by Generals MacArthur and Robert Eichelberger’s initial arrival on the Japanese mainland. General MacArthur initially arrived in a small, unarmed and unescorted airplane at Atsugi Air Base in Japan, which Kamikaze pilots used as their main training base towards the end of the war. MacArthur, however, encountered none of the intensely fanatical pilots as he arrived at their home base. Additionally, two divisions of armed Japanese soldiers lined the fifteen mile route from Atsugi to Yokohama to protect him from any resistance to his presence. Chamberlin quickly realized initial estimates of enemy resistance needed refinement if not a complete overhaul. As another example, one of two armies committed to the occupation, the Sixth Army, landed on the beaches of Japan without any resistance. Neither the Japanese armed forces nor the civilian population showed significant animosity towards the landing force. In addition to a lack of hostile intent, the Sixth Army found its area of operations relatively devoid of Japanese forces.

55 Eichelberger, Jungle, 269.
56 Krueger, Down Under, 336.
In accordance with MacArthur’s directives issued to Japan in early September 1945, the Japanese already demobilized 80 percent of its troops.\(^{57}\)

Strategic guidance to General MacArthur also clearly articulated that Japan should retain only civil police. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed occupation forces to disband or demobilize all other military, para-military, and civilian volunteer corps.\(^{58}\) However, realities of the operational environment, specifically the Soviet Union’s intentions, proved that completely disarming Japan was foolhardy. Therefore, the original plan, which assumed active resistance from the 4,900,000 enemy troops in Japan, and a complete demobilization of all means of Japanese armed resistance, now required significant refinement. Operational planners recognized the need to quickly adjust the operational plan to demobilize Japanese land forces yet keep a small defense force based on the speed at which Japanese forces were deactivating along with a growing Soviet threat.

In the operations order for Operation Blacklist, Chamberlin planned on using four armies to occupy Japan.\(^{59}\) As previously mentioned, the initial assumption of 4,900,000 Japanese troops requiring demobilization and disarmament necessitated a large American force. Additionally, intelligence sections reported several disheartening changes in the direction of military training and preparation. Regular fighter pilot training units converted en masse to kamikaze suicide squads. Ultra intercepts identified mainland forces tunneling and fortifying landing over watch positions. The Japanese Diet passed the People’s Volunteer Corps Law which enabled the government to raise local militias and draft all males between the ages of fifteen and sixty and females from seventeen to forty.\(^{60}\) However, all the discouraging intelligence quickly became

\(^{57}\)Ibid., 354.

\(^{58}\)Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JSC1380/15,” 2.


\(^{60}\)Eiji, Inside, 38.
moot when General MacArthur landed on a Kamikaze pilot training base without incident. His subsequent road trip fifteen miles in an unarmored car effectively demonstrated that the occupation required fewer forces than originally planned. As early as September 26, 1945, general headquarters authorized subordinate commanders the flexibility to remove entire divisions from their manifested troop lists.  

Although Operation Blacklist called for four armies, only two landed in Japan. By December, Chamberlin relieved the Sixth Army of occupation duties and the Eighth Army became the sole occupation force in Japan. The troop plan drastically fell from one hundred and ten divisions in August, to forty-five divisions by September and finally only twenty-two divisions by December.  

Meanwhile, Stalin pushed for the Soviet Union to control more territory in Japan than the Allied leaders agreed during the Yalta Conference. On August 17, Stalin instructed his military representative to MacArthur’s Allied headquarters, General Derevyanko, to demand the creation of a Soviet occupation zone for stationing Soviet troops in Tokyo.  

President Truman stepped in and flatly rejected the offer regarding Tokyo but gave in to other demands for more Japanese land than was previously agreed upon. Additionally, although the 38th Parallel in Korea was the agreed upon line dividing reconstruction responsibility for the Soviet Union and the United States, a Joint Chiefs of Staff memo stated: “There are unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are planning movements south of the 38th line.” In addition to President Truman, General MacArthur also felt the effects of Soviet encroachment. General MacArthur remarked in his memoirs, “The Russians commenced to make trouble from the very beginning…[Derevyanko]  

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64 Ibid., 270.
threatened that the Soviet Union would move in [to Tokyo] whether I approved or not.”

Although strategic guidance directed MacArthur to completely disarm Japan, the potential threat of communism diluted the strict requirement of demobilization. The Allied occupation forces provided the military means against internal and external threats. However, the occupation was a temporary solution and the occupation forces would not remain in Japan indefinitely. Therefore, a requirement existed for Japan to maintain a defensive force in the event the Soviet Union violates the limits of the Yalta Conference when the occupation force is gone. The war with Korea in 1950 demonstrated the radical change from Directive 1350’s clear guidance. When MacArthur pulled American occupation forces from Japan to fight in Korea two years before the occupation would officially end. Planners in General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers allowed the creation of four divisions of security forces under the auspices of the “National Police Reserve.” Using Directive 1350’s authorization of a Japanese civil police as authorization, planners ensured the internal security force did not violate strategic directives while responding to the realities within the operational environment.

Planners incorporated the operational environment’s realities of Japan’s economy, government, and military situation to change the original Operation Blacklist plan. Helmuth Von Moltke’s common phrase, no plan survives initial contact with the enemy, could potentially explain the impressiveness and agility of MacArthur’s staff as an obvious approach. It is obvious that planners should adjust the original plan if reality forces change. The key aspect of MacArthur's staff is the speed and significant change in which the corrections occur. Within a short period of four months, planners such as Generals Crist, Whitney, Chamberlin, and Marquat.

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66 Whitney, Rendezvous, 260.
67 The exact quote is “No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength” found in Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke On the Art of War: Selected Writings (New York: Presidio Press, 1995), 45-47.
significantly impacted the government, military, and economy of Japan by adapting to the operational realities and enacting incredible change.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Guidance and directives arrived at General Headquarters often and occasionally contained nonsensical information. Staff officers in the government section more than once received directives to arrest a prefecture and even once received guidance to arrest a Japanese lake.68 General MacArthur’s staff received guidance and directives from many departments within the United States government and its Allies. However, despite occasional misinformation from Washington D.C., several documents provided the foundation of General Headquarters’ staff planning.

The Potsdam Proclamation directed the occupation force in Japan to accomplish three major tasks: demobilize and disarm the Japanese war machine, democratize Japan’s political and social institutions, and construct a reasonable and solvent peacetime economy.69 After the Potsdam Conference ended on August 2, 1945, the United States Government became the sole decision authority for MacArthur’s actions in Japan. Although allied in name, occupation forces in Japan largely consisted of American civilians and military personnel. Consequently, several countries, the Soviet Union in particular, resented the United States’ monopoly on power with respect to Japan.70 In an attempt to reconcile the resentment and foster international cooperation, the United States invited the eight other countries listed on the Japanese surrender document, along with India and the Philippines, to participate in a Far Eastern Advisory Commission.


70Eiji, Inside, 97.
However, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission only had “recommendation” authority. The Soviet Union flatly refused to participate and British voiced reservations about the advisory character of the commission. Therefore, the United States acquiesced and shared decision authority through a new international organization, the Far Eastern Commission. This organization, based in Washington D.C., took the charge of formulating policies and principles from the United States’ State and War Departments and gave the power to a commission of representatives from eleven countries, including the Soviet Union. Even though the Truman administration ceded its decision authority to the Far Eastern Commission, MacArthur still received orders from the United States through the State and War Departments. The State, Navy, and War Combined Committee, working closely with the service Chiefs of Staff, became the conduit between strategic guidance from the Far Eastern Commission and MacArthur. Direct orders came from the Chiefs of Staff within the War Department and policy suggestions came from the State, Navy, and War Combined Committee within the State Department. Despite the convoluted structure of strategic guidance to MacArthur, his staff produced orders and directives to the occupation forces and Japanese government quickly and efficiently. MacArthur and Sutherland divided the staff into niche sections such as the government and economic/scientific section. Interestingly, MacArthur uncharacteristically intended to rely upon an array of aides and section chiefs instead of solely on his chief of staff. He also used the Allied occupation forces, specifically the 8th US Army, as another “section” dealing with the demobilization of Japan’s military units. How did staff officers accomplish this monumental task of sorting and filtering a

72Ibid.
steady supply of strategic guidance with such speed and efficiency? MacArthur’s elaborate civil staff sections addressed incoming strategic guidance and considered operational environment realities to quickly translate strategic guidance into tactical action planning in dealing with Japan’s economy, government, and military.

Colonel Raymond Kramer, a former staff officer on Crist’s military government section within General Headquarters/Army Forces in the Pacific, became the economic and scientific section chief in September and then relinquished control to Brigadier General William Marquat, a former reporter for the Seattle Times in December 1945. The responsibilities of the chief of the economic and scientist section of General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, largely involved implementing strategic directives in regards to the Japanese economy. Although several other sections of General Headquarters such as civil transportation and natural resources certainly included economic aspects, Kramer and Marquat held the preponderance of economic responsibility for Japan’s recovery and reconstruction. Strategic guidance regarding Japan’s economy changed over the course of the occupation in relation to the dynamic operational environment. However, the Potsdam Proclamation outlined two requirements for Japan: Retain basic industries and participate in world trade while making payments of reparations to allied countries and reduce economic capacity to prevent rearmament. 75 After Potsdam, the State, War, and Navy Combined Committee and Joint Chiefs of Staff used the two economic stipulations to provide guidance and direction to General MacArthur and Kramer. Two strategic guidance documents, State, War, and Navy Combined Committee Policy 150/4 76 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380/15 77, along with the economic and scientific section chief’s

76 Hereafter referred as Policy 150/4 or 150/4.
77 Hereafter referred as Directive 1380/15 or 1380/15.
subsequent action in regards to the economy highlight the quick and efficient incorporation of strategic guidance into tactical action.

*Policy 150/4* was a product of numerous revisions over the course of two years. The first substantial document developed in March 1944, titled *Japan: The Postwar Objectives of the United States in regard to Japan*, contained only a general economic policy. In June 1945, the Subcommittee for the Far East, under the supervision of the State, War, and Navy Combined Committee, added more details to the economic section of the original document and renamed it *State, War, and Navy Combined Committee Policy 150*. Although various principles changed throughout the revision of *Policy 150* from June to September 1945, the economic strategy remained the same. In mostly descriptive language, *Policy 150* outlined nine major points for MacArthur’s staff to consider with respect to economic conditions. It also gave the Chiefs of Staff guidance from which to draw and provide clear orders to General Headquarters.

Whereas the State, War, and Navy Combined Committee established policy, the War Department, through the Chiefs of Staff, translated policy into clear orders for General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The War Department published *Directive 1380/15* in response to the State Department’s *Policy 150*. Instead of State Department’s “you should” language, *Directive 1380/15* outlined General Headquarters’ economic policies with “you will” type language. The same policies outlined in the State Department’s documents are throughout *1380/15*. When the War Department published *1380/15*, Sutherland and the colonels of all the sections of General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for

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80 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “JCS 1380/15,” 2.
the Allied Powers literally cut out the various paragraphs of the 7,500 word document and parceled them out to the thirteen staff sections for implementation. Relating to the Japanese economy, Directive 1380/15 ordered the supreme commander to take “direct charge of economic disarmament, reparations, and subsequent development of economic ways which contribute to the growth of a peaceful and democratic Japan.”

Colonel Kramer led the economic and scientific section of General Headquarters. Colonel Kramer was a former department store executive from New York. As the economic and scientific section formed, Colonel Kramer used his business connections and requested the services of several well-known US industrial and financial experts. The other sections soon followed Colonel Kramer’s method and civilian experts within General Headquarters became prevalent within the first months of the occupation. Although the State, War, and Navy Combined Committee provided only policies, Colonel Kramer enacted several major economic priorities outlined in Policy 150/4 before being specifically directed by Directive 1380/15. A major economic policy of Policy 150/4 regarded breaking up the large business trusts by “favor[ing] a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan’s trade and industry.” A month later, in publishing Directive 1380/15, the Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur to “submit plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines…” On October 16, between the publication of 150/4 and 1380/15, Colonel Kramer persuaded several big companies to submit

81 Cohen, Remaking, 10.
82 Ibid., 4.
83 Eiji, Inside, 174.
84 Department of State, “SWNCC 150/4,” 3.
85 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “1380/15,” 6.
plans for dissolution after approval from the War Department. Such quick action, before the Chiefs officially provided instructions, hastened removal of the business trusts’ effect on Japan’s economic growth.

Along with an economic policy, the Potsdam Proclamation clearly articulated plans for Japan’s government: “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies...” General MacArthur entrusted Crist, former chief of the military government section in the General Headquarters/Army Forces in the Pacific and now chief of the government section in the General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with democratizing Japan. The Potsdam Proclamation bluntly suggested that the Japanese people should peacefully choose to establish a democratic government. Therefore, both Policy 150/4 and Directive 1380/15 ordered MacArthur to work through the Japanese government to enact change focused toward democratization. Additionally, both documents direct Crist to remove Japanese officials who participated explicitly in Japan’s wartime transgressions. The two strategic guidance documents and Crist’s subsequent action in regards to Japan’s government highlight the efficient amalgamation of tactical action with strategic guidance.

Although the economic policy remained unchanged during the many revisions of Policy 150, the government strategy changed significantly. As late as May 1945, a senior ex-ambassador in the State Department told President Truman that the “best we can hope for is a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work.”

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This sentiment is also seen in the March 1944 strategy (pre-150 policy) on post-war Japan. The authors of the document mention a “friendly” Japan without explaining what type of government constitutes friendliness. However, by June, with the publication of Policy 150, the State Department articulated that Japan should abolish militarism and strengthen democratic tendencies “which will facilitate the emergence of a liberal government.” However, Policy 150 indicated MacArthur’s military government should directly control Japan’s government. On August 11, 1945, the Subcommittee for the Far East published Policy 150/1 which suggested the concept of indirect control. By the fourth revision, 150/4, the policy of indirect control clearly emerges: “the Supreme commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor.” The document continues to explain that the Japanese Government will be allowed to exercise the normal powers of government “in matters of domestic administration.” However, all State, War, and Navy Combined Committee policies after the Potsdam Proclamation contained the principle of removing from public office all officials “who have been active exponents of… militant nationalism and aggression.” The Chiefs of Staff also instructed MacArthur to administer indirect control: “You will not establish direct military government, but will exercise your powers…through the Emperor of Japan or the Japanese Government.” Generals Crist and Whitney therefore, received clear guidance to execute military governance.

Dealing with the Japanese Emperor was General MacArthur’s. Therefore, the government section dealt with all other government officials, to include Japan’s legislative body,


91Department of State, “SWNCC 150/4”, 2.

92Ibid.

93Joint Chiefs of Staff, “1380/50”, 1.
the Japanese Diet. Although Crist’s insistence on Japan forming a constitutional reform committee in October 1945 provides an example of the government section’s indirect control, another example merits attention. Both Policy 150/4 and Directive 1380/15 stipulated: “in no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold...positions of responsibility...who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.”94 However, such a directive implicated the majority of the Japanese government. Without Japanese officials to run the government, “indirect control” was impossible. Maintaining a semblance of Japanese control over the government was paramount during the initial months of the occupation. Its fragility is evidenced by the fact that it nearly fell apart when the entire parliament submitted resignation letters to the government section in November 1945.95 Therefore, Crist faced a major dilemma. Fortunately, working with his successor, Whitney, they came up with a plan tied to the upcoming legislative elections in April, 1946. Although published in October, the government section, now under the control of Brigadier General Whitney, implemented 1380/15’s directive in January 1946.96 The decision to implement the purge coincided with the elections. With parliamentary elections scheduled for April 1946; announcing the removal of senior officials showed progress through old regime replacement without sacrificing indirect control. Whitney and Crist’s delay in implementing the directive led to a small window of vacancy between the purges and elections which minimally affected parliamentary functions. The order, “Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction for the Japanese Government 548”, eliminated war criminals, career and special

94Ibid.
95Whitney, Rendezvous, 245.
service military personnel, among others. The purge occurred over three years and a total of 201,815 persons were removed from office, including career military officers.97

After fighting across the Pacific Ocean and witnessing the ferocity of Japan’s military first hand, the Allies agreed on one important aspect of Japan’s occupation, demobilization of the Japanese military. However, according to MacArthur’s intelligence officer, General Willoughby, American occupation forces faced the demobilization of 1.97 million troops.98 The significant number of forces requiring demobilization fell to General MacArthur’s staff to coordinate. Although army commanders are not staff officers, during the occupation, they certainly played a critical role in planning the safe and uneventful demobilization of Japan’s large military force. Specifically, Generals Walter Krueger, commander of Sixth Army, and Richard Eichelberger, commander of Eight Army, planned the Japanese military’s demobilization in addition to executing the various occupation policies. In a quick and bloodless manner, both armies completed the Potsdam directives of demobilizing Japan’s military might in a relatively short period of time. Comparing Policy 150 and Directive 1380/15 with the United States Sixth and Eight Army’s demobilization of Japan’s military highlights the efficient integration of tactical action with strategic guidance.

The initial State, War, and Navy Combined Committee Policy 150 implied demobilization of Japan’s military. After the Potsdam Proclamation’s insistence on the complete disarmament of Japan’s military forces, directives to MacArthur quickly clarified his duty with respect to Japan’s military. Although the State Department’s policies were usually descriptive, Policy 150/4 provided rigid directions with respect to Japan’s military: “Japan is not to have an army, navy, airforce [sic], secret police organization or any civil aviation…[Japan’s] forces shall be disarmed

97Government Section, Political Reorientation, 553.
and disbanded.” Additionally, 1380/15 directed General Headquarters to promptly disarm all units of the Japanese armed forces. Unlike Allied forces in Germany, who already occupied portions of the surrendering country, MacArthur’s two armies had to move to the Japanese mainland. Therefore, General Headquarters issued directives number 10 and number 27 on September 7 and 14, respectively, to the Japanese military instructing them to conduct radio contact with the two army headquarters. The delicate linkup complete, the two armies began converging on the Japanese mainland to demobilize the ground forces in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation and the State and War Departments directives.

General Krueger’s memoirs provide an illuminating account into the method Sixth Army used to carry out strategic directives. The army’s sixty regiments, each composed of approximately 1000-2000 men, occupied the southern half of the Japanese mainland and General Eichenberger’s equally large force, the eighth army, occupied the northern half. Generally, each regiment consisted of two battalions. As soon as a regiment moved into its area of operations, the Japanese commanders and police submitted lists of all installations and inventories within the area to the regimental commander. After regimental reconnaissance patrols verified the inventories and located any unreported or hidden materiel, the regiment’s battalions moved in and executed the demobilization and demilitarization. The two battalions seized all installations of the Japanese armed forces within the regiment’s area of operations. The battalions also disposed war materiel and supervised the demobilization of Japanese armed forces no longer required for maintenance of captured armament and materiel. This relatively simple and effective procedure soon eliminated the need for a large occupation force. In fact, by

99 Department of State, “SWNCC 150/4,” 2.
101 Nelson, Reports, 46.
102 Krueger, Nippon, 350.
November 30, 1945, the Sixth Army began re-tasking regiments from occupation duties to training and rehabilitation.\(^{103}\) On December 31, 1945, MacArthur relieved the army of its occupation duties completely leaving the Eighth Army as the sole occupation force.\(^{104}\)

General MacArthur created staff sections which focused on specific areas of the Japanese government. To ensure compliance with strategic guidance, General Southerland dissected the directives, disseminated the various parts to the corresponding specialty staff sections, and planned tactical action to accomplish the strategic goals. Although the initial strategic documents to General MacArthur were relatively short, they provided enough information to effectively plan and execute occupation duties. Although directive and polices sometimes contradicted each other or ordered General Headquarters to arrest lakes, they generally provided strategic guidance for MacArthur’s staff to quickly and efficiently translate into executable tactical action, the essence of operational art using modern definitions.

**CONSIDERATION OF CULTURE**

“Your way may be called an airway and [our] way a Jeep way over bumpy roads.”\(^{105}\)

Japanese official on the Constitution Reform Committee

MacArthur took a picture with the Japanese Emperor and then published it in newspapers, knowing full well the cultural attachment of manifest deity. Loyal subjects were taught to avert their eyes from the veiled imperial portraits kept in schools and public offices. The published picture of the Emperor’s act of homage to the Supreme Commander demonstrated to all that the General wielded supreme authority yet not indifferent to the feelings of the defeated.%\(^{106}\) Previous sections spoke only of the operational environment and strategic guidance

\(^{103}\)Ibid., 351.  
\(^{104}\)Ibid., 369.  
\(^{105}\)Whitney, *Rendezvous*, 252.  
\(^{106}\)Eiji, *Inside*, 236.
in terms of stark realities within the government, military, and economy without mention of the cultural realities of the Japanese people. The culture of Japan played a significant role in General Headquarters’ planning considerations. The contemplation of Japan’s culture is necessary due to the mutual undertaking of the occupation between the Japanese people and the Allied forces. Although the vanquished partner in the undertaking, Japanese cooperation with the Allied forces greatly facilitated recovery. Demobilizing the army and navy were important steps towards changing a militaristic culture; however, changes in the civil society’s thoughts and behaviors were also fundamentally necessary. The people of Japan had to accept the occupation’s efforts of democratization for lasting success. Prior to 1945, Japanese militarism manipulated the people for three quarters of a century in three areas: education, religion and information. 107 Militarism defined the Japanese culture leading to the end of World War II. Therefore, to facilitate the programs and directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers, operational planners changed the militant nationalism society through reforms in education, religion, and information. The civil information and education section, hereafter shortened to the education section, undertook the reforms required to change the Japanese culture of militarism to accept democratization. To address the militaristic manipulation of Japan’s culture, the education section, led by Lieutenant Colonel D. R. Nugent, subdivided his section into six divisions. Although all six divisions played a role in reconstruction, the education division, information division, and the religion division were instrumental to changing the culture. 108 Operational planners within Nugent’s section addressed the cultural aspect of Japan to facilitate the reforms required for the Japanese people’s acceptance of democracy. General MacArthur’s staff planned

107Ibid., 347.
108Nelson, Reports, 77
and executed the occupation of Japan with consideration to the unique aspect of Japan’s culture in the realms of education, religion, and information.

*Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directive 178* provided the basic educational policy of the occupation for the Japanese Imperial Government. It contained broad provisions for two major responsibilities assumed by the occupation force and the Japanese government: Elimination of militaristic, ultra nationalistic and military education and drill and creating a more democratic ideology by inculcating the concepts and establishment of practices “in harmony with representative government, international peace, the dignity of the individual, and…fundamental human rights…”¹⁰⁹ General Headquarters provided a simple task: stop teaching militaristic ideology to children and replace it with the same values and virtues being taught to American children across the Pacific Ocean. However, execution of the directive was understandable complex. At the start of the occupation, 50,000 schools with a combined total of 400,000 teachers were responsible for educating almost sixteen million students.¹¹⁰ Although numerous minor changes occurred over the course of the occupation in regards to educational reform, MacArthur’s staff encountered two major obstacles. First, the 40,000 teachers needed vetting to ensure their commitment to occupation’s principals. Next, a portion of the curriculum and textbooks of the 50,000 schools and sixteen million students needed replacement. Replacing the curriculum and vetting teachers allowed Lieutenant Colonel Nugent of the civil liberties and education section to plan and execute the reforms of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese culture.


By the time General MacArthur created the education section, the Japanese Education Ministry, led by Minister Maeda Tamon, already outlined the first tentative reform measures. The ministry announced a comprehensive plan to revitalize education in an attempt to pre-empt a more radical Allied reform. On October 3, 1945, the Ministry formally abolished military training in the schools and established a plan for re-educating the nation’s teachers. However, Minister Tamon preserved the Imperial sovereignty of the Emperor as a basic tenet of education which violated the basic occupation policy of “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies.” Although Tamon’s reforms provided a step in the right direction, Lieutenant Colonel Nugent’s section delivered the educational reform blow which Tamon attempted to prevent. *Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directive 212* addressed the re-education of teachers in a more direct and punitive way. *Directive 212*, published October 30, 1945, directed the Education Ministry to remove immediately and bar from future position in the educational system “all persons who are known to be militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, or antagonistic to the objectives and policies of the occupation.” Additionally, *Directive 212* barred all former members of the military within the educational system of Japan. It also directed the Japanese Ministry of Education to establish a system to investigate, screen, and certify all serving and prospective teachers and educational officials. By April 1949, the Education Ministry deposed 119,700 wartime educators, or 24% of its total number of teachers available in 1945. This educational “purge” created an enormous

113Education Division, *Education in the New Japan*, 29.
114Ibid., 30.
shortage of trained professionals which took years to overcome.\footnote{Ronald S. Anderson, \textit{Education in Japan: A Century of Modern Development}, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 63.} Regarding the remaining teachers, the re-education required expertise outside the education section and the Japanese Education Ministry. Therefore, Major Harold G. Henderson, chief of the education and religion divisions under the education section, broached the subject of creating an “education mission” to Minister Tamon. Tamon agreed with Major Henderson and they developed a tentative list of prospective foreign advisors to help Japan with its educational reforms. The State Department took over the task and created a twenty seven member “mission” headed by New York State commissioner of education and president elect of the University of Illinois, George Stoddard.\footnote{Eiji, \textit{Inside}, 354.}

The “Stoddard Mission”, as it is commonly referred, provided a report which included educating teachers. To implement the findings and recommendations of the mission, the Education Ministry established the Education Reform Committee in 1946. The committee played one of the most innovative roles in changing Japanese education in all aspects.\footnote{Nobuo K. Shimahara, \textit{Adaptation and Education in Japan}, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 64.} Thus, Major Henderson’s initial idea of creating an education mission began a process which fundamentally reformed Japan’s militaristic educational program.

The second main point of educational reform pertains to the curriculum of Japanese schools. General Headquarters published \textit{Directive 519}, titled “Suspension of Courses in Morals, History, and Geography” on December 31, 1945.\footnote{Education Division, \textit{Education in the New Japan}, 25.} The next day, the Japanese Emperor supported \textit{Directive 519} by issuing an Imperial Rescript, in which he denied his divinity. Because Shinto nationalism relied heavily upon the Emperor’s divinity, the Imperial Rescript effectively ended the old system of State Shinto. However, even before the rescript, and as early
as October 1945, Minister Tamon began removing militaristic curriculum from his schools’ syllabus. Shinto nationalism depended on the morals course as the primary means of indoctrination. Japanese education officials also distorted geography and history to support State Shinto ideals. Tamon, working with the education section, implemented an anti-militaristic purge of content in the nation’s curriculum and textbooks. However, new textbooks, without State Shinto influences, were unavailable for almost a year. While teachers waited for new textbooks, students and teachers either marked or cut out sections in the old books containing militaristic or “divine nation” type language.\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Directive 519} removed even these interim textbooks by required the Ministry of Education to “collect all textbooks and teachers’ manuals...for disposal.”\textsuperscript{121} Folded pamphlets, developed jointly by education section officers and the Japanese Education Ministry, temporarily replaced the old textbooks. By April 1946, began to receive revised geography hard bound texts and by October, received revised history books to replace the flimsy folded pamphlets. The morals course, on the other hand, never returned to the Japanese classroom.\textsuperscript{122}

Lieutenant Colonel Nugent assigned the task of demilitarizing State Shinto and ensuring basic religious freedoms to Navy Lieutenant William K. Bunce. Lieutenant Bunce led the education section’s religions branch.\textsuperscript{123} In addition to State Shinto, Japanese officials tolerated two other religions, Buddhism and Christianity, but at the same time actively discouraged their growth. However, Shinto was the national faith and became a test of loyalty to the state.\textsuperscript{124} Therefore, it dominated other Japanese religions in 1945. Although Shinto historically played a

\textsuperscript{120}Anderson, Education, 63.
\textsuperscript{121}Education Division, \textit{Education in the New Japan}, 36.
\textsuperscript{122}Eiji, \textit{Inside}, 363.
\textsuperscript{123}Ibid., 373.
large role in Japanese culture, State Shinto originated with the ratification of the Meiji Constitution on February 11, 1889. The language clearly articulated the emperor’s role. As the divine leader of Japan, directly descendant of the gods, the emperor enjoyed “sacred and inviolable” powers. Establishing the Japanese Emperor as a divine entity facilitated Shinto’s perversion by militaristic officials in the Japanese government. As a result, Lieutenant Bunce needed to remove constitutional wording which suggested the Japanese Emperor’s divinity while facilitating the existing weak religious diversity. Broad strategic guidance from Washington D.C. gave Lieutenant Bunce plenty of leeway to exercise his powers. Article ten of the Potsdam Declaration provided the only strategic guidance with respect to religious reform: “Freedom…of religion and of thought…shall be established.” Bunce first set out to understand the problem he faced and then implement a means to implement the change. He developed a directive to the Japanese people separating Shinto from the government. He also helped the government section revise the religious aspects of the new constitution. Bunce would later remark, “my directive…written without any guidance from above… was not changed in any way by higher headquarters.” Understanding the Shinto religion and then implementing change through directives and with the government section regarding the constitution allowed Lieutenant Bunce of the religion division to plan and execute the reforms of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese culture.

The religions branch within the education section began as a reaction to a State Department representative’s statement to the press. On October 7, 1945, John Carter Vincent, Chief of the State Department’s Far Eastern Division, told an NBC commentator during a radio

126Education Division, Education in the New Japan, 7.
127Eiji, Inside, 375.
interview that Shintoism would be done away with as a state religion but not tampered with as an individual creed.\textsuperscript{128} This statement provided guidance to Lieutenant Colonel Nugent indirectly and he acted quickly by establishing the religion division. Nugent transferred Lieutenant Bunce from the education section to lead the newly formed religion division. Bunce immediately set out to understand Shinto and how he would abolish it as a state religion without tarnishing its importance in the Japanese culture. Bunce first set out to understand Shinto and began a Shinto staff study. He received help from Dr. Kishimoto Hideo, a Harvard-educated religious scholar who previously taught at the Tokyo Imperial University. He also regularly conferred with Dr Anesaki Masaharu, head of the Religious Studies Department at Tokyo Imperial University. Additionally, Bunce corresponded with Dr. Daniel C. Holtom, an American missionary and expert on modern Shinto, who sent him a list of recommendations for the reform of State Shinto. Bunce and staff and before mentioned civilian advisors completed the Shinto staff study on December 3, 1945.\textsuperscript{129} They identified two primary concerns to address: assure freedom of belief and deal adequately with State Shinto.\textsuperscript{130} Bunce determined Shinto could not be abolished as it would violate freedom of belief. However, he had to guarantee that it would never become the tool of governmental propagandists. Therefore, religion must be completely separated from the state to prevent Shinto, or any other religion, from influencing the government.\textsuperscript{131} Consequently, Bunce implemented directives and worked with the government section to ensure the constitution reflected the religious changes.

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., 374.
\textsuperscript{129}Ibid., 375.
\textsuperscript{130}Masaharu Anesaki, revs by Hideo Kishimoto, \textit{Religious Life of the Japanese People} (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1961), 100.
\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., 101.
Upon completion of his staff study of Shinto, Bunce issued *Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directive 448*\(^{132}\), titled “Abolition of Governmental Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto” on December 3, 1945. The directive depoliticized Shinto belief and practice without discouraging or restricting Shinto practice.\(^{133}\) It specifically targeted references to Shinto in the government. The directive also directed the removal of physical symbols of State Shinto in any office, school, institution, organization, or structure supported fully or partly by public funds. In Section 2a of *Directive 448*, Bunce explained the purpose of the directive as separating religion from the state and to put all religions, faiths, and creeds on the same basis, entitled to the same opportunities and protection.\(^{134}\) *Directive 448* also became the basis for the new constitution’s articles 19 (freedom of thought and conscience), 20 (freedom of religion), and 89 (prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for ‘the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association’).\(^{135}\) Bunce also produced a handbook on Japanese religions for military government teams.\(^{136}\) The textbook specifically highlights the differences between state and non-state Shintoism. This distinction provided the military government teams a common understanding of Shinto to prevent its discouragement from uninformed American occupiers. By 1946, over five million Japanese practiced non-state Shinto (sectarian, shine, and unclassified sects).\(^{137}\) This fact demonstrates that even after *Directive 448*, General Headquarters’ efforts of removing State Shinto without discouraging Shinto worked. Japanese

\(^{132}\) Hereafter referred as *Directive 448*.

\(^{133}\) Eiji, *Inside*, 376.


\(^{136}\) Bunce, *Religions in Japan*, v.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 173-180.
people continued to practice Shinto, although not in its state sponsored form. In a limited amount of time, Lieutenant Bunce managed to fundamentally change the religious structure of Japan with minimal guidance. From October 7 to December 3, 1945, Lieutenant Bunce received his orders, developed relationships with prominent religious scholars and developed a plan of action to separate a vital religious belief from government control.

On September 10, 1945, MacArthur’s General Headquarters issued *Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directive 16* 138 which pledged an absolute minimum of restrictions upon freedom of speech. 139 However, within the same directive, his headquarters banned: news that did not adhere to the truth, disturbed the public tranquility, criticized the Allied powers, and/or discussed Allied troop movements. Therefore, a contradiction developed. General Headquarters needed to foster freedom of speech yet stifle any speech which may be detrimental to the occupation effort. Two sections undertook the duel nature of information management within General Headquarters. The civil censorship detachment under Colonel Rufus S. Bratton’s civil intelligence division monitored and censored the mass media, the entertainment media, and other expressions of public and private opinion. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Hoover led the civil censorship detachment until November 1945 and then Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Wordsworth led the detachment. 140 The section responsible for fostering freedom of speech by reorienting Japanese culture towards democratic values fell to the civil information and education section, led by Lieutenant Colonel Nugent. Censorship is an unfortunate fact in postwar Japan and does not directly support the democratic values General Headquarters openly valued. Additionally, “reorienting” Japanese culture is an insensitive aspect of postwar Japan’s reconstruction. However, both played a large part in facilitating the speed and success of post-war Japanese

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138 Hereafter referred as Directive 16
139 Eiji, *Inside*, 167
140 Ibid.
reconstruction. Controlling information within Japan and indoctrinating the Japanese people with democratic values facilitated reforms by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese culture.

Although *Directive 16* championed Japanese free speech, from September 14-18, the censorship detachment suspended four major newspapers in Japan. Once the civil censorship detachment lifted the suspensions, it mandated pre-publication review for all four newspapers. The detachment also imposed censorship on Radio Tokyo, the nation’s sole source of broadcast news.\(^\text{141}\) This fact stands in stark contrast from an article in *Military Review* from 1946 authored by Major General Charles Willoughby, chief intelligence officer for General Headquarters whom Colonel Bratton reported directly. General Willoughby claims the occupation provided the press with a “rebirth of freedom” in marked contrast to the “controlled press of the militaristic factions.”\(^\text{142}\) Papers and radio were not the only censored media. Entertainment also fell under the jurisdiction of the censorship detachment. When a popular entertainer criticized the Emperor, MacArthur, and democracy, the detachment banned the show. The detachment scrutinized incoming media as well. Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* is an example of banned materials during the initial period of occupation.\(^\text{143}\) At the zenith of its power, the detachment numbered well over eight thousand Japanese officials hired by the civil censorship detachment.\(^\text{144}\) Ironically, these Japanese citizens executed the same zeal for the censorship detachment that they had executed for the Imperial government. Although the detachment’s reach and scope of scrutiny probably

\(^{141}\)Ibid., 385.  
^{144}\)Eiji, *Inside*, 386.
exceeded its initial intent, it provided a control on influences of the Japanese people which facilitated the civil information and education section’s reorientation program.

If the civil censorship detachment acted to prevent negative propaganda from reaching the Japanese people, the civil information and education section propagated positive messages to the Japanese people. Under the education section, the task of reorientation fell to the information division. Unlike the censorship detachment, which suppressed undemocratic ideas, ideological conversion constituted the division’s primary function. Mr. Bradford Smith, a former state department official, led the information division. The division regulated all cultural material entering Japan to include: newspapers, editorials, feature films, documentaries, plays and musical recordings.145 The division licensed only cultural imports which supported the reorientation. To distribute the selected imports, the division, in cooperation with the education division within the education section, established information centers in cities and major universities across the country. The division stocked them with between 5,000 and 10,000 books and 400 periodicals.146

General MacArthur’s staff planned and executed the occupation of Japan with consideration to the unique aspect of Japan’s culture in the realms education, religion, and information. Major Henderson’s inclusion of Japanese officials into the restructuring of educational policies and Navy Lieutenant Bunce’s inclusion of Japanese religious leaders facilitated the speed of reform. Both efforts were facilitated by Lieutenant Colonel Hoover’s censorship of negative influences on the Japanese people and Smith’s deluge of positive western democratic media flooding Japanese culture. Although censorship highlights a potential negative

146Eiji, Inside, 396.

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aspect of the occupation, it prevented subversive material from damaging the efforts of General
Headquarters in the early years of the occupation.

CONCLUSION

When Brigadier General Willoughby and Lieutenant General Sutherland received the
small Japanese delegation on the hot August day to negotiate surrender terms, Japan’s future was
uncertain. Only a basic contingency document, Operation Blacklist, provided limited guidance to
subordinate units. The Potsdam conference provided limited strategic guidance to MacArthur’s
staff. However, within one year of the meeting, fundamental changes, implemented by
operational staff officers in General Headquarters, drastically changed the political, military, and
economic landscape of Japan.

Section chiefs within General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
attuned to the operational environment, made constant adjustments to ensure Japan’s economy
and government continued to change and improve during the first critical year of occupation.
They also quickly adjusted the occupation force required based on a quicker than anticipated
demobilization of Japan’s military. In addition to the operational environment, planners took the
strategic guidance available from State War Naval Committee’s Policy 150 and Joint Chiefs of
Staff Directive 1350 and ensured tactical level action in Japan were completely in line with
strategic goals. Initiative from officers like Colonel Raymond Kramer of the economic and
scientific section, Brigadier General Crist and Willoughby’s Government Section under Brigadier
General Crist and Major General Whitney, and commanders like General Walter Krueger of the
6th Army greatly facilitated the speed of Japanese reconstruction. Last, and certainly not least, is
the operational planners’ consideration of culture to the progress of the occupation’s goals.
Influencing the young generations of Japanese civilians became a critical task in changing a
militarism Japanese culture. Major Henderson of the education and religion division acted
quickly using renowned Japanese scholars to assist his small section. Working with Japanese
Minister Tamon, Major Henderson and his section targeted the most radical subjects and removed them quickly. One year after MacArthur led the surrender ceremony aboard the USS Missouri; all sixteen million Japanese students used historically and geographically correct textbooks. Naval Officer Lieutenant Bunce’s thorough consideration of religion and Japanese culture in reconstruction also provided the impetus for timely change. Ensuring military government teams understood the intricacies of the fundamental Japanese Shinto religion prevented an unintentional assault on Japanese culture. Additionally, the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Hoover’s civil censorship detachment assisted Bunce by limiting cultural influences to only those supporting democratization and progress, albeit heavy handed at times. One trait inherent in all of the discussed general headquarters sections is speed.

The sheer speed of change is remarkable. Upon assuming duties as the occupation force, SCAP headquarters removed oppression of press and political parties, prosecuted war criminals, held elections for the national congress, and rewrote the Japanese constitution within seven months. The people of Japan saw immediate improvement in their daily lives, albeit noticeable economic recovery did not occur until approximately five years after the beginning of the occupation. However, the planners’ ability to adjust quickly to the conditions of the operational environment is critical to the United States' execution of future stability operations. Size in terms of staff officers also played a large role in the ability of general headquarters to enact timely change.

The utter size of the occupation staff ensured every aspect of Japanese government, culture, and economy received attention. Two U.S. armies initially occupied Japan along with both General MacArthur’s staffs which totaled, by itself, almost 6,000 members by 1946. Each ministry in Japan’s government, from the beginning of the occupation, answered to an auditing

\[\text{\textsuperscript{147}}\text{Ibid.}\]
Allied section. The sections received instructions from General Headquarters who then met with their Japanese counterparts to implement the instructions. Without a large force, the speed of change required to quickly show progress to the occupied people is exponentially more challenging.

Using existing Japanese officials to implement change also facilitated the immediate successes of reconstruction. Major Henderson’s efforts with Minister Tamon highlight this point. Although many officials in the Japanese Diet and Imperial government initiated policies which directly led to the loss of American soldiers’ lives, the necessity of keeping the officials within the interim government was critical. It provided MacArthur’s staff time to understand the realities of the operational environment and plan without worrying about basic governance issues. As the government section began to build the situational understanding and developed a plan of action, only then did they implement Directive 550 to purge the undesirable officials from the Japanese government. In addition to working through Japanese officials, the planners also worked with Japanese employees. For example, some staff echelons, such as legal section and civil information and education section, had more Japanese employees than American. Therefore, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, it is critical to incorporate the conquered officials into the post war plan for peace. Although this monograph focused on specific sections within General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, it is clear that operational planners on MacArthur’s staff used the principles of understanding the realities of the operational environment when planning and executing operations. They also implemented strategic guidance from various departments to ensure tactical actions were aligned with strategic goals. Simultaneously, planners on MacArthur’s staff understood the importance of culture and its effect on reconstruction progress. A combination of all three variables greatly facilitated

148Eiji, Inside, 141.
General MacArthur’s successful reconstruction of Japan after World War II. Future planners on staffs tasked to conduct stability operations would be prudent to follow the operational art evidenced by staff officers in General Douglas MacArthur’s General Headquarters.
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