BORN LUCKY: THE INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES BEHIND THE THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY HEADQUARTERS’ PROCEDURES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE, 1944-45

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

BORN LUCKY: THE INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES BEHIND THE THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY HEADQUARTERS’ PROCEDURES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE, 1944-45, by MAJ Mark K. Snakenberg, United States Army, 73 pages.

Historical narratives often feature Patton-centric explanations for Third United States Army’s (TUSA) World War II conduct in Northwest Europe. Although certainly a central figure in TUSA’s story, General George S. Patton, Jr. may not represent the only factor that influenced this headquarters’ development and procedures. Instead of a discrete event, one best views Patton’s command of TUSA as the continuation of a process of development at the army level initiated in World War I’s aftermath. Between 1919 and 1942, the U.S. Army devoted significant thought and energy to improving the army echelon’s relevance and performance through doctrinal dialogue, professional military education (PME), and field exercises in response to deficiencies it identified during the Punitive Expedition and World War I. This institutional process affected the officer corps at large, including Patton and his future staff officers coming from two sources: Patton’s early World War II commands, and the stateside TUSA. Patton’s reassignment as TUSA CG in early 1944 required him to fuse these traditions, which he accomplished through a unifying philosophy of warfare coupled with explicit expectations about how his staff must perform in combat. This allowed the TUSA headquarters to operationalize Patton’s philosophy through its procedures – which encapsulated the institutional process, modified to suit his personal command style.

This monograph is of interest to military historians and practitioners alike. Derived from primary and secondary source-based historical research, it offers an alternate explanation for why TUSA fought as it did in Northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945. Historically, this monograph is significant for four reasons. First, it reevaluates the role doctrine played in shaping a major headquarters’ procedures during World War II. Second, it explores an alternative view than that found in Patton-centric narratives for TUSA performance by contextualizing Patton’s leadership. This approach affords one greater understanding into the other sources that shaped the army’s operations, which in turn provides improved insight into exactly how Patton’s personality affected TUSA’s practices. Third, it addresses a historiographical tendency to marginalize the TUSA staff’s contributions in the rush to assess Patton. Fourth, it offers a concise document addressing TUSA staff practices in Northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945.

From a professional standpoint, this monograph represents the first known attempt to link TUSA’s experience with the U.S. Army’s Unified Land Operations concept. This inquiry yields two important insights for modern practitioners. First, it reveals that TUSA practices embodied aspects of the Army’s current mission command philosophy. This suggests that mission command is not only consistent with the U.S. Army’s heritage, but also largely derived from American historical experience. Second, TUSA’s experience demonstrates that under certain conditions, select premises and assumptions underpinning the Army’s operations process may prove invalid. These include doctrine authors’ claims that the operations process occurs sequentially, their characterization of the planning-execution relationship, and their explanation of the Army Design Methodology (ADM) and Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as planning tools. These could pose significant ramifications for planning, execution, and assessment.
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The commander must understand the duties, powers, and limitations of his staff. He himself has been selected for his task because of his high personal character, firm will power, and professional ability. He must imbue his staff with his ideas, his desires, his energies, and his methods. As he gives to his staff, so will he receive. He should encourage its members, in their capacity as advisors, to speak with frankness. He should make full use, after careful evaluation, of the advice of the members of his general and technical staff. He should make them use their minds for him; but they merely furnish him with material, often conflicting, upon which he must come to a decision.

—United States War Department, *A Manual for Commanders of Large Units* (1930)

INTRODUCTION

In an acclaimed 1995 biography, historian Carlo D’Este extolled General George S. Patton, Jr. as a genius for war. This claim closely followed the great man narrative established by dozens of other authors over the last sixty years who chronicled this unique leader’s development and performance during World War II.\(^1\) Patton’s service as Commanding General (CG), Third

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\(^1\)Francis Ford Coppola’s iconic *Patton* elevated an already exalted figure to mythical status. Because of Coppola’s film, George C. Scott’s character is now synonymous in American popular culture with the actual man. For these reasons, *Patton* is a key point of departure when analyzing the ubiquitous Patton narrative. Francis Ford Coppola and Edmund H. North, *Patton*, DVD, directed by Franklin J. Schaffner (Los Angeles: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1970). One may generally divide Patton historiography into two periods: pre and post-film. To historians’ enduring frustration, Patton never penned his own memoirs or had the opportunity to organize or edit his papers because of his sudden death in 1945. That task devolved to his family, confidants, and picked historians. *War as I Knew It*, published in 1947, reflects the hand of his wife Beatrice. The final chapters and appendixes containing Patton’s “Reflections and Suggestions” and his Letters of Instruction (LOI) as TUSA commander are useful to historians. George S. Patton, *War As I Knew It* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947). *The Patton Papers* edited by Martin Blumenson is the most popular and readily available published source approximating autobiography. However, as a compilation of correspondence responding to disparate circumstances and purposes, the text is subject to Patton’s well-documented emotions and whims. His bombastic statements, which often give the impression that he ran TUSA without assistance, have partly fueled the bias diminishing the staff’s contributions, despite ample evidence to the contrary. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers: 1885-1940*, Vol. 1., 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972); *The Patton Papers: 1940-1945*, Vol. 2., 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974). Pre-film biographies include works by Harry Semmes, a close friend who served with Patton in both World Wars; Fred Ayer, Patton’s nephew-in-law; and Charles Codman, his World War II aide-de-camp. These books greatly contributed to the late general’s prominence in the American consciousness. Harry H. Semmes, *Portrait of Patton* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955); Charles R. Codman, *Drive* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1957); Frederick Ayer, *Before the Colors Fade* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). An altogether separate pre-film genre that greatly contributed to the Patton legend includes key TUSA figures’ memoirs. These memoirs provide historians and practitioners with multiple insights when properly employed. Their collective works furnish important insights into how the TUSA headquarters functioned in practice. They also afford eyewitness perspectives into the personalities involved in operations. Brigadier General Brenton Wallace, Patton’s liaison chief, published the first memoir in 1946. His *Patton and His Third Army* provide an excellent account of liaison activities generally, and in TUSA particularly, during World War II. Brenton G. Wallace, *Patton and His Third Army* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000). Colonel Robert
United States Army (TUSA) is particularly well documented. Often portrayed as “starting from scratch” after assuming command of TUSA, conventional wisdom leads one to believe that Patton *ex nihilo* forged an army and led it into combat by dint of his outstanding leadership and personal experience alone. This interpretation has fostered an equally extreme counter-narrative.


that characterizes Patton as an unremarkable and unsteady commander who benefitted from superior American means and his subordinates’ skill.\(^3\) Both Patton-centric interpretations are overly simplistic.

**The Argument**

Instead of a discrete event, one best views Patton’s command of TUSA as the continuation of a process of development at the army level initiated in the aftermath of World War I.\(^4\) Between 1919 and 1942, the US Army devoted significant thought and energy to improving the army echelon’s relevance and performance through doctrinal dialogue, professional military education (PME), and field exercises in response to deficiencies it identified during the Punitive Expedition and First World War. This *institutional process* affected the officer corps at large, including Patton and his future staff officers, who came from two sources (and thus two variants) of the Army’s institutional process: Patton’s early World War II commands, and the stateside TUSA.\(^5\) Patton’s reassignment as TUSA CG in early 1944 required him to fuse these traditions, which he accomplished through a unifying philosophy of warfare coupled with explicit expectations about how his staff must perform in combat. This allowed the

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\(^4\) The term *army* requires definition as it possesses multiple meanings. Capitalized, *Army* refers to the United States Army in total or as an institution. Uncapitalized, *army* refers to a command echelon between Army Group (or Group of Armies) and Corps. This monograph adheres to this convention unless otherwise stated.

\(^5\) The phrase *institutional process* refers to the complex interaction of collective and individual experience with institutions to produce expectations and practices encapsulated in doctrine and professional military education (PME).
TUSA headquarters to operationalize Patton’s philosophy through its procedures – which encapsulated the institutional process, modified to suit his personal command style.

Methodology and Significance

This monograph, “Born Lucky,” is of interest to military historians and practitioners alike. Derived from primary and secondary source-based historical research, it offers an alternate explanation for why TUSA fought as it did in Northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945. In doing so, “Born Lucky” contributes to historians’ existing knowledge in four respects. First, it reevaluates the role doctrine played in shaping a major headquarters’ procedures during World War II. Second, it explores an alternative view than that found in Patton-centric narratives for TUSA performance by suggesting that although a central figure in TUSA’s story, Patton may not represent the only factor that influenced its headquarters’ development and procedures. Properly contextualizing Patton affords one greater understanding into the other sources that shaped the army’s operations, in turn providing improved insight into exactly how Patton’s personality affected TUSA’s practices. Third, it addresses a historiographical tendency to marginalize the TUSA staff’s contributions in the rush to lionize or demonize Patton. Fourth, it offers a concise document addressing TUSA staff practices in Northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945.

From a professional standpoint, “Born Lucky” represents the first known attempt to link TUSA’s experience with emerging doctrine designed to support the US Army’s Unified Land Operations (ULO) concept. This inquiry yields two important insights for modern practitioners. First, it reveals that TUSA practices embodied aspects of the Army’s current mission command philosophy. This suggests that mission command is not only consistent with the US Army’s heritage, but also largely derived from American historical experience – a position at odds with
explicit claims in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0.\textsuperscript{6} Second, TUSA’s experience demonstrates that under certain conditions, select premises and assumptions underpinning the Army’s operations process may prove invalid. These include doctrine authors’ claims that the operations process occurs sequentially, their characterization of the planning-execution relationship, and their explanation of the Army Design Methodology (ADM) and Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as planning tools. These could pose significant ramifications for planning, execution, and assessment.

ARMS-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE INTERWAR YEARS – THE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

Introduction

The evolution of American military thought is a longstanding topic for historical inquiry. Employed to support numerous – and often contradictory – positions, its intellectual roots are subject to various interpretations. Recent scholarship inspired by the United States’ experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan has rekindled interest in the field, yielding fresh insights into how and why America’s armed forces fight as they do.\textsuperscript{7}

Few epochs have generated as much scholarship as the so-called interwar period.\textsuperscript{8} Often characterized as the intellectual catalyst for modern warfare, during this era belligerents synthesized World War I’s perceived lessons with emerging technology to develop future approaches to warfare. The United States proved no exception to this trend. Following 1919, the

\textsuperscript{6}United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0 Mission Command (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), v.


\textsuperscript{8}Although technically the period between any two wars, military historians generally use the phrase interwar period (or interwar years) in reference to the period between the two World Wars.
US Army conducted the largest institution-wide attempt in its history to learn from a recently concluded conflict. These efforts produced significant reforms in doctrine, PME, and training, which affected all aspects of the US Army, especially its officer corps. Historian Peter Schifferle goes as far as concluding that one cannot understand US large unit operations in World War II without first examining the interwar developments that affected the commanders and staff officers who led Americans into combat between 1941 and 1945. Applying such an approach to the study of World War II American armies in general – and TUSA in particular – yields important insights that better contextualize both Patton and the headquarters that he led in Northwest Europe.9

Developments to 1930

The army echelon is a legacy of America’s experience in the First World War. Prior to 1918, the term field army simply referred to an ad hoc organization of multiple divisions, augmented with supporting troops, raised to meet exigencies. According to period Field Service Regulations (FSR), army headquarters were impermanent and concerned only with “broad questions of military policy and strategy”; as such, an army commander was “assigned only such administrative and technical staff as he may require for these broad functions.”10 While suitable

9Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 1. “Largest institution-wide attempt in its history to learn from a recently concluded conflict” claim from Linn, The Echo of Battle, 119-20.

10United States War Department, Field Service Regulations (Corrected to July 31, 1918) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914), 130-132. The term strategy requires definition and contextualization. Coming out of World War I, military professionals understood strategy as “the art of moving armies in the theater of operations.” Later, the definition evolved into “the art of concentrating superior combat power in a theater of war.” Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy, 48, 71. Period military leaders would equate today’s definition of strategy (“a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives”) with policy or ‘the conduct of war’. United States Department of Defense,
for pre-war constabulary duty, such an arrangement greatly hampered US large unit operations, particularly in Mexico during the 1916-17 Punitive Expedition, and in France during World War I.\textsuperscript{11}

Having served as the commander of Army forces during both of these expeditions, General John J. Pershing appreciated the army echelon’s weaknesses. In France especially, Pershing faced administrative and span of control problems exceeding army headquarters’ capabilities. Charged with receiving, transporting, training, sustaining, and employing 43 divisions some 3,300 miles from American shores, Pershing’s newly formed First United States Army (FUSA) required a staff commensurate with its responsibilities.\textsuperscript{12} As part of a holistic effort to prepare the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) for combat, Pershing reformed the FUSA headquarters along French lines and retained the organization throughout the war. Following the conflict, the AEF Superior Board on Organization and Tactics recommended that the army

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\textsuperscript{11}John J. Pershing, \textit{My Experiences in the First World War} (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 9-10; John S. D. Eisenhower, \textit{Intervention!}: \textit{The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1993), 251. The Punitive Expedition, the United States’ first large unit military operation since the Spanish-American War (most operations during the Philippine Insurrection were conducted at regimental level or below), involved a mere 15,000 soldiers at its height. Without the benefit of a modern general staff, however, even this small force stretched American organizational, logistical, and administrative capabilities to the limit. Pershing frequently noted that a lack of equipment and supplies hampered his operations. As a result, he created his own staff out of hide to address these shortfalls.

\textsuperscript{12}Pershing, \textit{My Experiences in the First World War}, 18-20, 102-4, 321-22; Richard W. Stewart, ed., \textit{The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008} (Washington: Center of Military History, 2005), 13-21. The tremendous energy Pershing devoted to selecting, organizing, and training AEF staff officers reflected a clear determination to avoid replicating his negative experience in Mexico. The 1917 General Organization Plan originally envisioned a million-man army organized into five corps and 30 divisions, plus support troops. Throughout the war, Pershing revised his estimated personnel requirements upwards. The Army eventually raised 62 divisions, of which 43 served overseas.
echelon and its staff remain an integral part of future US Army doctrine. Subsequently, the 1920 National Defense Act and 1923 FSR institutionalized this suggestion.\textsuperscript{13}

To train the army headquarters, the AEF Superior Board recommended a resumption and expansion of prewar PME. Throughout World War I, senior American officers had bemoaned the AEF staff’s competency to wage modern warfare. To correct this deficiency, in 1917 Pershing established a General Staff School at Langres, France, to train AEF staff officers in a version of the Fort Leavenworth curriculum, distilled into a six-week course and tailored to the specific conditions on the Western Front. He also mandated the assignment of any graduate of Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff School who arrived in Europe to his AEF headquarters. As postwar Army Chief of Staff, Pershing sought to inculcate the AEF’s hard-won lessons regarding large unit operations throughout the greater officer corps.\textsuperscript{14} Two institutions played a pivotal role in this effort: the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and the Army War College in Washington, DC. Throughout the 1920s, these schools trained and educated the officers who eventually served as large unit commanders and staff officers during

\textsuperscript{13}Stewart, \textit{The United States Army in a Global Era}, 24, 57-60; Matheny, \textit{Carrying the War to the Enemy}, 46-47; Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 118-19; United States War Department, \textit{Field Service Regulations (1923)} (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), 1-5, 45-48. Aside from fixing the army echelon’s structure throughout the interwar period, the 1920 National Defense Act created other long-term ramifications for the Army. Drawing on recent experience during World War I, the bill’s authors accepted the premise that future conflicts would again likely entail mass mobilization of both the US economy and its citizens. Therefore, the act trebled pre-World War I officer strength to enable the Army to accomplish mobilization and training tasks more effectively. Unfortunately, that same logic also relied on the assumption that overseas allies would once again buy time for the United States to mobilize a citizen army prior to major combat operations. As such, the legislation implicitly rejected the large standing force for which Pershing and other senior Army leaders argued at World War I’s end. This produced an unbalanced force structure and climate of fiscal want that continued through the 1920s, and accelerated in the national descent into the Depression in the 1930s.

\textsuperscript{14}Period professionals defined large unit operations as any operation conducted at division level or above. United States War Department, \textit{A Manual for Commanders of Large Units} (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930).
World War II. Equally important, they fostered a continuous doctrinal dialogue within the US Army that affected large units generally, and the army echelon specifically.\footnote{Matheny, \textit{Carrying the War to the Enemy}, 47; Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 119-20; Schifferle, \textit{America’s School for War}, 9-15; Pershing, \textit{My Experiences in the First World War}, 102-4, 155, 259.}

As early as 1920, the Command and General Staff School exerted significant influence on the development of the 1923 \textit{FSR}. Although many of the school’s recommendations regarding large unit operations and the concept of strategic art did not appear in the \textit{FSR}, the faculty transmitted their ideas through lectures and student texts – effectively creating a shared comprehension amongst graduates that transcended official doctrine. The curriculum, which encompassed division, corps, and army operations, stressed the importance of strategy, phasing, and logistics. Most importantly, it taught staff officers how to plan and communicate effectively.\footnote{Matheny, \textit{Carrying the War to the Enemy}, 48-55.}

While Leavenworth instilled a common approach to large unit operations, the War College fostered professional reflection through real-world application. Unlike the Command and General Staff School’s scenario-based instruction, during the 1920s, War College students analyzed actual joint war plans for use during contingencies and provided feedback to the War Department general staff. This annual in-depth review of the interwar ‘color plans’ not only facilitated the students’ education, but also ensured the plans remained relevant and up to date. Additionally, officers analyzed recent campaigns from multiple belligerents’ perspectives to sharpen their ability to conduct what they termed \textit{campaign planning}.\footnote{United States War Department, \textit{Field Manual 100-15 Field Service Regulations Larger Units} (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), 8-11. Although ill-defined even as late as 1942, \textit{campaign planning} referred to strategic-level planning to concentrate forces rapidly for employment in a decisive direction. It differed from tactical planning in scope, and in the nature, quantity, and quality of information required.} The curriculum produced
commanders and staff officers who fully comprehended the logistical challenges of army, army
group, and theater operations, and the importance of joint integration.\textsuperscript{18}

Just as important, the schools revealed doctrinal shortcomings that the US Army needed
to resolve. The 1923 \textit{FSR}'s failure to address aspects of strategic art – as the Leavenworth faculty
originally recommended – cognitively hampered American large unit operations. To address this
shortcoming, the Army required a separate manual specifically addressing operations at division-
level and above. In 1930, the War Department published \textit{A Manual for Commanders of Large
Units (Large Units)} to overcome this doctrinal void.

\textbf{Large Units}

The publication of \textit{Large Units}, which elaborated on the 1923 \textit{FSR}'s description of an
army headquarters’ combat role, proved a watershed event in army-level doctrine’s evolution.
The manual institutionalized the AEF’s World War I experience by codifying the army echelon as
the largest self-contained unit on the modern battlefield, with the capability to act either
independently within a theater of operations, or as part of a larger ground or joint force. To
underscore its newfound importance, \textit{Large Units}’ authors provided the army headquarters with a
permanent complement of assigned troops and services to perform five major roles: to serve as
“the fundamental unit of strategical maneuver,” while executing “territorial, tactical,
administrative, and supply functions.”\textsuperscript{19}

These five prescribed roles greatly differentiated the army from any other command in
theater. Under the new construct, only the theater commander-in-chief possessed anything like
the varied responsibilities of an army commander. According to \textit{Large Units}, the army group,
corps, and division were all tactical units. Army groups only assumed strategic, territorial,

\textsuperscript{18}Matheny, \textit{Carrying the War to the Enemy}, 55-68.

\textsuperscript{19}USWD, \textit{Large Units}, 15-16; USWD, \textit{FSR (1923)}, 1.
administrative, and supply responsibilities when also acting as a theater headquarters. Otherwise, with no permanent troops and only a skeletal staff, army group commanders served primarily as resource allocators and tactical links to the theater commander-in-chief. Likewise, corps-level units and below served primarily as tactical units of execution and maneuver, with administrative and supply responsibilities for their organic troops only, unless augmented with additional capability enabling them to act independently in a theater of operation.²⁰

These assigned roles carried significant ramifications for future army commanders. First, expeditionary operations all but necessitated the employment of an army headquarters, since no other echelon possessed the staff and resources needed to execute every theater command function without further augmentation. Second, because the army group lacked a strategic role in major operations, the Large Unit construct forced army commanders to integrate strategy and tactics at their level, through dialogue with both their superior tactical headquarters (the army group) and the theater strategist (the commander-in-chief). Third, given the army echelon’s territorial, administrative, and supply responsibilities, its commander required a unique mix of expertise, in addition to a well-trained staff with established procedures.

To achieve these responsibilities, Large Units offered army commanders an overarching philosophy for conducting major operations. The manual stressed offensive action, and emphasized the army commander’s vital role in furnishing impetus for the attack, and exploiting tactical success to achieve strategic gain. It considered the defense a temporary condition from which the army returned to offensive action once it had created favorable conditions for a counterstroke. As with the 1923 FSR, the authors of Large Units also stressed war’s human dimension. At the army level in particular, they proclaimed the need to forge a close-knit relationship with subordinates predicated upon mutual understanding, and emphasized the

²⁰USWD, FSR (1923), 1-2; USWD, Large Units, 13-14, 29.
commander’s importance in looking after his troops’ welfare, maintaining morale during a battle, and fostering a reputation for success.21

Large Units also proved instrumental in articulating the army commander’s relationship with his staff, and defining the army headquarters’ routine functions. While the 1923 FSR addressed order formats, information management, and message control in significant detail, it devoted only three paragraphs to the staff’s role in modern combat. Large Units addressed this shortcoming at length. Although the manual’s authors reinforced the commander’s sole responsibility both for all decisions and for his unit’s performance, they also established guidelines for the appropriate employment of the commander’s staff. Recognizing that prosecuting modern warfare transcended a single genius’ ability, they identified five basic staff tasks:

1. Manage information.
2. Plans and order development and transmission.
3. Supervise execution through inspection and observation.
5. Relieve the commander of burdensome details.

The manual also elaborated on the Estimate of Situation planning process outlined in the FSR, reinforced existing guidance regarding rapid order transmission based on effective warning and fragmentary orders, cautioned against the staff’s tendency to expand beyond prescribed size when in combat, and stressed higher headquarters’ responsibility for supervising lower echelons’ compliance with issued orders. Finally, it emphasized the staff’s role as the commander’s “agent in harmonizing and coordinating the plans, duties, and operations of the various units and services of the command,” and advised the commander to “send them to critical points to keep him

21USWD, FSR (1923), 4-5; USWD, Large Units, 1-2, 6, 10-11, 15-29.
promptly advised of what is taking place. . . . [and in emergencies to] explain the views of his commander to the commanders on the ground and urge immediate action without waiting for specific orders.”

**Developments to 1942**

Although far from perfect, *Large Units* filled a major intellectual gap within period doctrine. Throughout the 1930s, officers applied and refined its principles both at the Army’s schools, and increasingly, during practical application in the field. Armed with the new manual’s concepts and revised institutional texts, students and faculty at the Command and General Staff School and Army War College built upon the concepts within *Large Units*, resulting in two key outcomes. First, these institutions systematized the Estimate of Situation process briefly discussed in the *FSR* and *Large Units* as a way to execute planning at all levels. Second, they formalized the preexisting idea of campaign planning as a task distinct from planning tactical actions. To this end, both curricula underscored the importance of large unit commanders foreseeing potential actions one or two operations in advance. Army-level commanders, in particular, needed to plan future campaigns or phases while simultaneously executing current actions.²³

As conditions worsened in Europe and Asia in the late 1930s, the United States increasingly attempted to exercise its major formations with the scant means available to it. These efforts greatly shaped both the Army and TUSA. Reconstituted in 1932 after a thirteen-year hiatus following World War I, TUSA proved instrumental in developing and refining army-level doctrine and procedures. Between 1936 and 1941, TUSA either participated in or orchestrated four major maneuvers exercising large units up to army level. Through these field problems, the

²³ Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy*, 70-91.
TUSA headquarters gained significant proficiency in planning and controlling modern combat operations at great speed and across wide areas.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to training TUSA, the exercises of the late 1930s fueled another round of doctrinal refinement; this time based on American field experience and perceived lessons from overseas. Recognizing the need for increased standardization, in 1940 the Army published Field Manual (FM) 101-5 \textit{Staff Officers’ Field Manual}, which codified the World War II army-level staff’s organization, purpose, individual roles, and key functions. Building upon the 1923 \textit{FSR}, \textit{Large Units}, and PME texts, its authors further standardized combat orders, maps, and staff journals; highlighted the importance of liaison; and explained in detail how to apply the Estimate of Situation construct as practiced at both Leavenworth and the War College. They also granted commanders latitude to deviate from doctrine based on their particular duties and preferences. Finally, FM 101-5 represented the first approved doctrine to divide staff capabilities between a forward and a rear command post (CP).\textsuperscript{25}

Of even greater import, the combination of PME, exercise experience, and international – especially German – military practice enabled interwar military professionals to produce a revised capstone doctrine for the Army. Issued in 1941, FM 100-5 \textit{Field Service Regulations} (FM 100-5) formed the basis for operations throughout World War II. Although sometimes cited as a piece of


\textsuperscript{25}FM 101-5 represented the US Army’s first doctrinal staff manual, which superseded the dated Command and General Staff School’s \textit{Field Service Staff Manual (Tentative)} used by many Leavenworth graduates. United States War Department, Field Manual 101-5 \textit{Staff Officers’ Field Manual} (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), 1-51; 125-28; United States Army Command and General Staff School, \textit{Field Service Staff Manual (Tentative)} (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1925). Although the tentative 1939 FM 100-5 alluded to the concept of dividing command posts (CP), its authors failed to describe the echelons in any detail. United States War Department, Field Manual 100-5 \textit{Tentative Field Service Regulations Operations (1939)} (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 37.
“desperately needed up-to-date doctrinal guidance,” the most surprising aspect of FM 100-5 from the army headquarters’ perspective is its consonance with previous intellectual tradition.26

Aside from reestablishing the basic operational framework contained in both the 1923 FSR and Large Units, FM 100-5’s authors unsurprisingly reiterated previous doctrinal emphasis on the decisiveness of offensive operations. It asserted that one achieved victory by concentrating superior forces – enabled by surprise and an accurate estimate of the situation – at the decisive place, time, and direction. To control such operations, FM 100-5 encouraged commanders to lead from as far forward as possible – a theme consistent with previous doctrine. This necessitated frequent visits to front-line troops – particularly those engaged at the decisive point – and an ability to rely on one’s staff to coordinate details and anticipate contingencies. CPs that employed recently promulgated techniques needed to locate as far forward as possible, retain sufficient means to ensure mobility, and ensure that the proper signal capability was established prior to any relocation. FM 100-5 authors’ assertion that the acme of planning success stemmed from correctly selecting objectives leading directly to the enemy’s quick and decisive defeat directly resulted from PME’s focus on campaign planning in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the new FM 100-5 did contain significant improvements in the realm of tactics and combat in special circumstances such as forested terrain or in cold weather conditions; considerations vitally important to TUSA throughout operations in Northwest Europe.27


27USWD, FM 100-5 (1941), 1-39; 97-136; 211-13; 225-232. Note that two additional versions of FM 100-5 influenced operations in World War II. The tentative FM 100-5 published in 1939 provided much-needed updates to the 1923 FSR. It incorporated perceived lessons-learned from recent developments in Poland and elsewhere. Because FM 100-5 (1941) integrated the 1939 tentative manual’s revisions and expanded upon them based on observations throughout 1940-41, further discussing the 1939 version is unnecessary. Another revision, published in 1944, incorporated first-hand American battle experience gained between 1942 and 1944. Because it generally amplified rather than contradicted FM 100-5 (1941), and because TUSA was engaged in continuous operations (and therefore unlikely to have read the new manual) after its publication in June 1944, it is omitted from this discussion. United States War Department, Field Manual 100-5 Field Service Regulations Operations (1944) (Washington: Government
One final doctrinal revision completed army-level leaders’ intellectual preparation for modern warfare. In light of FM 100-5, in 1942, the Army updated *Large Units* and reissued the manual as FM 100-15 *Field Service Regulations: Larger Units* (FM 100-15). Although largely a refinement of the previous manual, FM 100-15 did provide one significant improvement over its predecessor. Leveraging two decades of inquiry into strategy and campaign planning at PME institutions, the new manual’s authors reaffirmed their predecessors’ characterization of the army’s roles, and finally provided its staffs with the conceptual tools required to execute their myriad duties as a strategic, tactical, territorial, and administrative headquarters. Clearly differentiating between campaign – or strategic – and tactical planning, the authors provided a framework for executing the former, established clear planning horizons for army-level commanders as PME envisioned, discussed the procedures and challenges associated with strategic concentration, and addressed the critical transition between concentration and strategic maneuver.28

**Conclusion**

Between 1918 and 1943, the army evolved from an impermanent, understaffed headquarters into a permanent echelon with significant capabilities and responsibilities matched only by the theater general headquarters. To assist the army echelon in fulfilling its assigned roles, the War Department invested significant effort into developing future army commanders and staff officers through a comprehensive doctrine shaped by PME. Although initially conceptual and philosophical, this doctrine slowly evolved into a detailed exposition of the

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28USWD, FM 100-15, 1-56. Note that period documents often use “administration” to describe activities modern practitioners associate with “sustainment” or “logistics.” To minimize confusion and maintain historical continuity, the author employs period language to describe these activities throughout the monograph unless otherwise noted.
practices, techniques, and procedures required for prosecuting army-level operations successfully. This doctrine, together with experiences gained through PME and major exercises, furnished army headquarters with a solid foundation for operations in World War II.

THE EFFECT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS – PATTON, HIS STAFF, AND TUSA

Introduction

As products of the interwar period, the Army’s institutional processes affected both Patton and his professional staff officers. A common doctrine for army-level operations provided the baseline for individual headquarters to develop expectations and procedures. Shared PME experiences enabled Patton and his senior staff to view situations through a common lens, and engendered mutual confidence. Interwar training allowed leaders to test their approaches and gain experience in commanding and controlling formations under conditions approximating combat. Even with a common institutional heritage, however, American armies in Northwest Europe still adopted differing methods based on individual leaders’ predilections and preferences. This suggests that other factors also shaped each army headquarters’ development. In TUSA’s case, its procedures emerged as a synthesis of three very different experiences. On one hand, Patton’s immense personal experience and knowledge combined with that of his veteran staff officers to produce a first procedure combat-tested throughout 1942-43 with which Patton was both familiar and comfortable. In contrast, TUSA spent the first years of the war training personnel and units stateside for deployment overseas. This experience produced a second procedure rigorously exercised in training, but not validated in combat. Losing the services of all but sixteen of his former staff officers after his relief from command of Seventh United States Army (SUSA),

Patton and his trusted agents confronted the need to link their experiences with those of the TUSA headquarters’ majority to create a third procedure suitable to both traditions.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{Patton}

The institutional process required army commanders to fuse strategy, tactics, and administration through aggressive leadership that fostered collegiality while caring for troops and inspiring confidence in their invincibility. By this exacting measure, no officer was better suited to army-level command in 1944 than George Patton. Even before he earned immortality in Northwest Europe, Patton possessed far more prestige and experience than most American military professionals. Authors frequently cite his extensive combat record, colorful exploits, devotion to self-development, and personal relationships with Pershing, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower as key factors in his selection for high command.\textsuperscript{31} While indisputably true, these same historians frequently overlook the less glamorous assignments that influenced Patton’s readiness to serve in positions of great responsibility.

As early as 1923, US Army doctrine demanded that army commanders perform tactical, terrain, administrative, and strategic functions simultaneously. Patton’s assignment history and professional development ideally prepared him for these responsibilities. Commands at every echelon from platoon to corps afforded Patton significant insight into tactical, and later, terrain management matters; and his combat experience surpassed every other US officer commanding

\textsuperscript{30}The author derived the concept of a first, second, and third procedure from Patton’s observation shortly after assuming command of TUSA that “we now have two staffs merging into one, each with its own procedures. By working harmoniously and intelligently together, a third staff will be developed with a third procedure, which should be better than either of the two.” Allen, \textit{Lucky Forward}, 19.

an army (or larger) echelon in Northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945.\textsuperscript{32} Patton also benefited from a wealth of staff experience in all four primary general staff positions at the regimental, division, and corps levels – ideal preparation for his later administrative role.\textsuperscript{33}

Patton’s greatest advantage, however, resided in his comprehension of strategic matters. This theme occupied center stage in his life-long course of professional self-development, and his command of the subject allowed Patton to participate vigorously in a variety of interwar debates, which put him squarely in the middle of the US Army’s intellectual evolution during the 1920s and 1930s. Further, his intimate relationship with Pershing – first in Mexico as aide-de-camp and later in France as the AEF Headquarters Troop Commander – gave Patton unique insight into senior level command. From Pershing, who maintained a break-neck schedule, he learned the value of front-line visits and inspections, which allowed a commander to both inspire subordinates directly and supervise their readiness and operations. Patton also gained exposure to senior-level decision-making, which revealed that the scope and complexity of modern warfare now exceeded the capacity of a single great captain. Strategic movement and concentration posed particular challenges. Thus, to command large units effectively, one needed to master leading comparatively small staffs.\textsuperscript{34}


As a 1923-24 Leavenworth and 1931-32 War College student, Patton combined his significant personal experience with emerging thought implicit in the institutional process. These institutions exposed Patton to the Army’s official and unofficial combat doctrines, and taught him numerous lessons including: the criticality of commanders conducting personal reconnaissance; the importance of the commander’s estimate and Estimate of Situation process; the value of clear orders; and the necessity of integrating strategic and tactical considerations. These educational experiences also afforded Patton the opportunity to synthesize his considerable notes into a warfighting philosophy that he continually refined over the next two decades. Tellingly, he did not agree with everything the instructors taught. Patton often quarreled with the so-called school solution to tactical problems, which he and a friend characterized as unthinking dogma. He also engaged in a running debate via correspondence with then-Major Eisenhower over the value of planning. Unlike his future superior, Patton regarded planning as secondary to execution in importance, and this underlying belief colored his approach to staff and headquarters procedures for the rest of his career. Despite these nuances, Patton demonstrated his unmistakable mastery of institutional thought by graduating from both the Command and General Staff School and Army War College with honors.35

**Early War Experience – Patton and His Trusted Agents**

Given his experience, education, contacts, and reputation, Patton emerged as a natural candidate for high command after Pearl Harbor. Selected to lead the Western Task Force during Operation Torch, Patton’s performance catapulted him into subsequent assignments as CG, II Corps in North Africa and later, Seventh United States Army (SUSA) during the Sicily

invasion. In each of these roles, Patton operationalized the institution’s expectations for aggressive leadership that embraced the human dimension. He also developed and employed a competent staff as a tool for exercising command. A number of trusted agents followed Patton throughout these transitions, eventually forming the cores of the SUSA and TUSA staffs. Hugh Gaffey, Hobart Gay, Paul Harkins, Charles Codman, Al Stiller, Oscar Koch, Halley Maddox, Walter Muller, R. E. Cummings, John Conklin, Tom Nixon, and Elton Hammond all served with Patton throughout the war. They provided Patton with a measure of stability as he assumed responsibility for units and staffs often unfamiliar with his expectations or predilections. Patton’s relationship with many of these men predated World War II, and often originated with common assignments in Cavalry or Armor units. Amongst this inner circle, Patton forged the sort of close-knit relationship that contemporary doctrine demanded, and he empowered these men to act in his name within their spheres of responsibility to initiate action and supervise compliance. This personal familiarity and shared background helps explain the mutual trust that existed between Patton and his inner circle.

36Operation Torch was the codename for the Allied invasion of Morocco and Algeria.
37Patton, War as I Knew It, 393; Allen, Lucky Forward, 49; Koch, G-2, 1-3; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 180-81; D’Este, Patton, 418-21, 479, 500; Larson, Gay and Gaffey, 132-33. Gay, Harkins, Koch, and Maddox were all former cavalrymen. Gay transferred to Quartermaster in 1934, and first met Patton at Fort Myer in 1939 while serving as Post Quartermaster under the latter’s command. He subsequently followed Patton to 2nd Armored Division (AD) and I Armored Corps, eventually rising to Chief of Staff, a position he retained in each of Patton’s commands through early 1944. Gaffey, originally an artillery officer, later transferred to armor. Patton inherited him as II Corps Chief of Staff when the former relieved Lloyd Fredendall after Kasserine Pass. After commanding 2nd AD in Sicily, Gaffey agreed to serve with Patton again as TUSA Chief of Staff in February 1944 after Eisenhower vetoed Patton’s desire to retain Gay. Koch transferred to military intelligence, and first encountered Patton at Fort Riley in 1940 when Patton established the 2nd AD. With the exception of a brief period where he served as Chief of Staff to General Ernie Harmon’s Task Force Blackstone (under Patton), Koch served continuously as G-2. Stiller served as a Sergeant in the Tank Corps during World War I, and joined Patton as aide-de-camp just before Torch. Codman joined Patton in North Africa after the death of his former aide, Dick Jenson – himself the son of Patton’s childhood sweetheart – in action. Maddox did not accompany Patton to North Africa as part of the Western Task Force, but subsequently joined his staff as G-3 and followed him to TUSA. Conklin returned to the United States after North Africa, but reunited with Patton in TUSA.
38In his memoir, Koch relates an incident that personifies this confidence. During a hasty planning conference following the Sicily landing, Patton weighed the risks associated with a rapid attack inland. He
While Patton trusted his staff implicitly, not everyone shared in his confidence. General Omar Bradley, a Corps Commander under Patton in Sicily and Patton’s superior in Northwest Europe, deliberately fostered the impression – then and later – that the SUSA and TUSA staffs performed poorly in Sicily and Europe respectively. Authors offer varying reasons for these charges, but Patton himself is partially to blame. Reputed quips such as “I don’t need a brilliant staff, I want a loyal one” belied the true dynamic in a Patton-led headquarters, giving the impression of sycophancy run amok. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Of course, Patton maintained the very highest standards, tolerating no foolishness and punishing failure with relief or reassignment. Moreover, like any good commander, he demanded loyalty. However, in Patton’s conception, loyalty to one’s superiors carried less weight than “loyalty from the top down, [which] is even more necessary and much less prevalent.” Rather than stifling initiative or dialogue, subordinates universally reported that Patton fostered frank, honest dialogue both within the headquarters and with subordinate commanders. As Koch related, “staff members knew it was not necessary to get his prior approval before taking such action as they felt necessary in performance of their duties when these duties were in line with established policies.


40 D’Este cites Bradley’s personal jealousy. D’Este, Patton, 466-67. Allen offers a variation on this theme, attributing the slights to differing cultures between Patton’s armor/cavalry dominated staffs and the infantry-dominated staffs of every other US field army/army group in Europe. Allen, Lucky Forward, 45-62.

41 Koch, G-2, 156. Repeated in Essame, Patton, 121; Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” 47.

42 Patton, War as I Knew It, 366.
He expected this of them.”\textsuperscript{43} Despite an acknowledged distance from the staff’s main body, subordinates also noted Patton’s strict attention to matters of staff recognition and welfare. They appreciated his penchant for telling people what to accomplish without stipulating how to achieve it, and he essentially allowed the staff to work without interference. In short, while Patton certainly dominated every unit he ever commanded, he never domineered. Although it would be disingenuous to assert that Patton’s leadership style resulted solely from the institutional process, it is telling that it conformed exactly to doctrinal expectations.\textsuperscript{44}

Professional expertise and leadership ability aside, Patton exhibited significant personality quirks, character flaws, and lapses in judgment throughout his career. One of his most infamous episodes – the twin slapping incidents in Sicily – ultimately cost him command of SUA, and jeopardized his hope for high-level command in the pending invasion of Europe. Forced to endure a form of exile throughout late 1943, Patton watched much of his beloved army siphoned-off to support operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean and in Europe. Ultimately, on 26 January 1944, Eisenhower – with Stimson’s support and Marshall’s blessing – tapped Patton to oversee Operation Fortitude, an elaborate deception supporting the Normandy landings.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Early War Experience – TUSA}

While TUSA’s early war role is relatively unknown, its mission as a major training headquarters provided valuable experience for the masses comprising the heart of any army-level headquarters. Between 1941 and late 1943, TUSA continued its prewar role of validating army-

\textsuperscript{43}Koch, G-2, 157.

\textsuperscript{44}Patton, \textit{War as I Knew It}, 366; Allen, \textit{Lucky Forward}, 21, 27-29, 45-48; Wallace, \textit{Patton and His Third Army}, 16-18, 197; Koch, G-2, 156-7; Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” 49; D’Este, \textit{Patton}, 574-77.

level doctrine. Under Lieutenant General Walter Kreuger, the headquarters served as both
director and participant in the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, which also featured Eisenhower as the
TUSA Chief of Staff, and Patton as CG of the subordinate 2nd Armored Division (AD). The
exercise, covering some 3,600 square miles, pitted 500,000 soldiers in two armies (Second and
Third) against each other. After only 24 hours, TUSA wrested the initiative from its opponent,
chasing it completely into neighboring Arkansas within two weeks.46

The exercise established the professional reputation of numerous officers, including
Kreuger. After Pearl Harbor, Army Ground Forces Commander, Lieutenant General Lesley J.
McNair, assigned TUSA responsibility for administering the US Army’s 44-week pre-combat
division training program. The headquarters quickly transformed itself from a small peacetime
organization into the Army’s largest stateside training and administrative command. Kreuger
proved an excellent fit for the role. He meticulously organized the TUSA staff to train and
administer the program’s three stages: basic individual training, collective training up to
regimental level, and division-level combined-arms training. With another TUSA staff element,
he personally supervised the final stage of each division’s preparation, a demanding two-month
long exercise to validate unit readiness prior to overseas deployment. During these exercises,
Kreuger maintained a punishing schedule, departing early in the morning to observe and inspect
training, and returning late at night. A demanding commander, he constantly instilled the
importance of attention to detail and training into his troops. Those who observed his methods
characterized Kreuger’s training critiques as often blunt, always thorough, and unmatched in both

46Harkins, When the Third Cracked Europe, 13; Allen, Lucky Forward, 3-14; Forty, The Armies of
George S. Patton, 147. For Patton’s role in the exercise, see D’Este, Patton, 395-97; Hirshson, General
Patton, 246-251. Interestingly, Patton served as an umpire during the 1940 TUSA maneuvers, and D’Este
credits this experience for turning Patton back to armor after two decades of staunch support for the horse
cavalry. His support assisted Adna Chaffee in creating an independent Armored Force shortly after the
exercise’s conclusion, and gained Patton preferred consideration for armored commands. D’Este, Patton,
378-79.
quality and instructional value. Eventually, Kreuger’s performance earned him a field command in the Pacific as CG, Sixth Army in late 1942.⁴⁷

While the early-war training mission benefitted Kreuger personally, it proved even more invaluable to the TUSA staff. The experience refined the headquarters’ ability to conduct its tactical, territorial, and administrative roles as assigned by FM 100-15. As trainers and evaluators, the mission familiarized the TUSA staff with current tactical doctrine and emerging best practices. Exercise participation under Kreuger’s able command then allowed the headquarters to apply its procedures in simulated combat, and refine its ability to plan, execute, and control army-level tactical operations. The staff’s exposure to, and direct support of Kreuger’s critiques of numerous corps and division training exercises enhanced its awareness of modern combat’s demands, and afforded the headquarters insight into the procedures employed by other formations that worked best in a variety of situations. Territorially and administratively, responsibility for some 750,000 soldiers scattered across the southern United States forced the TUSA staff to develop techniques for controlling and sustaining large formations operating across widely dispersed areas. Finally, the requirement to support and cope with a strong-willed CG who routinely operated away from the headquarters proved excellent preparation for TUSA’s later interaction with Patton.⁴⁸

The experience also allowed the TUSA headquarters to weather significant turnover. When Kreuger left for the Pacific, he took many of the headquarters’ staff primaries, and its most talented officers, with him. In their stead, TUSA’s newly appointed CG, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, inherited a skeleton staff of professionals leavened with draftees. Although Hodges and his Chief of Staff proved largely ineffectual throughout 1943 – which ultimately cost

Hodges command of TUSA when it deployed to Europe – enough residual expertise remained at the deputy and action-officer level to rebuild the staff, train new members in its procedures, and deploy the headquarters to the United Kingdom on 31 December 1943.\(^{49}\)

**Patton Assumes Command**

Unbeknownst to the TUSA headquarters, a new CG awaited them in England. In addition to the starring role in Fortitude, Patton’s rehabilitation included command of Hodges’ old army, earmarked as the exploitation force for Overlord.\(^{50}\) To assist his transition and provide continuity in key staff positions, Patton secured sixteen of his trusted agents from SUSA to serve as the nucleus of his new headquarters, which he codenamed “Lucky.”\(^{51}\) In his first official act as CG, Patton replaced the stateside TUSA Chief of Staff, three of its four General Staff primaries, and select Special Staff primaries with these officers. Although authors frequently characterize these changes as a sort of SUSA purge, the episode’s effect is exaggerated. Total turnover represented less than one percent of the 1,450 personnel assigned to the TUSA headquarters. Virtually every staff executive officer remained, as did the action officers who comprise the heart of any headquarters.\(^{52}\)

The combination of two experiential sources within the TUSA headquarters posed advantages and disadvantages for its CG. On one hand, TUSA’s early-war experience furnished Patton with a partially trained staff whose ability to execute basic staff functions compared

\(^{49}\)Allen, *Lucky Forward*, 3-14.

\(^{50}\)Blumenson, *The Patton Papers* Vol. 2, 409. Overlord was the codename for the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe. Although Patton did not officially assume command of TUSA until 26 March 1944 for security reasons – and to maintain the Fortitude deception that he was preparing to invade the Pas de Calais as First United States Army Group Commander – he unofficially commanded much earlier.


favorably with the other armies preparing to invade Northwest Europe.\textsuperscript{53} On the other, TUSA lacked both SUSA’s hard-earned combat expertise, and its familiarity with Patton’s personality and tendencies. Entirely replicating SUSA’s experience and procedures was impossible, especially given the brief time available between his assumption of command and anticipated commitment on the continent. Nonetheless, TUSA required strong leadership to guide its transition from a training command into a combat headquarters. Patton’s sixteen trusted agents provided the means.

The day after his assumption of command, Patton assembled the entire headquarters and, with Chief of Staff Hobart Gay at his side, outlined his intent: “we now have two staffs merging into one, each with its own procedures. By working harmoniously and intelligently together, a third staff will be developed with a third procedure, which should be better than either of the two.”\textsuperscript{54} Patton’s word-choice is telling. Rather than imposing SUSA’s systems, he left in place the routine procedures with which the 1,450-man headquarters were comfortable, but added his trusted agents as the principal conduits linking the staff’s work with his decisions. At this senior level, he then adopted the battle-tested techniques that had served him well in North Africa and Sicily.

Patton’s management of TUSA’s command transition reveals a leadership style consistent with institutional expectations. Appreciating the human dimension’s importance, Patton immediately fostered a climate of mutual respect by publically recognizing the value of TUSA’s early-war experiences. This seemingly trivial consideration instantly dissolved any potential tension between the headquarters’ ‘green’ majority and his handpicked agents who

\textsuperscript{53}Ironically, Overlord excluded the United States’ two combat-tested American armies in Europe. Allied senior leaders reserved Patton’s former SUSA, now under Lieutenant General Alexander Patch, for the invasion Southern France. The only other veteran headquarters, Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s Fifth United States Army, fought in Italy.

\textsuperscript{54}Allen, \textit{Lucky Forward}, 19. Note that Patton’s speech occurred before Eisenhower forced Patton to remove Gay in favor of Gaffey.
supplanted the organization’s most senior leaders. The remaining staff immediately recognized a newfound attitude in the headquarters: “mediocre top brass had palled initiative and morale. The surging infusion of Pattonism again restored the Staff’s latent outstanding effectiveness. It began to look, talk, and act like a dynamic Army Headquarters.”\textsuperscript{55} In short, Patton took the first step in forging a close-knit relationship with subordinates and instilling in them an expectation of success. Inspiring confidence, however, was one thing; getting the army to perform its doctrinal roles and staff functions to Patton’s expectations was quite another. To accomplish this task, Patton resorted to two other institutional tools: the written order, and the unit visit. These provided the vehicles through which Patton first fused Lucky’s diverse experiences, and then operationalized his third procedure.

**Conclusion**

The US Army’s interwar institutional process greatly affected Patton, his trusted agents, and the army headquarters he inherited in early 1944. Combining personal experience, self-study, and doctrinal exposure through PME, Patton demonstrated all the requisites for high command. After Pearl Harbor, his unique talents enabled Patton to secure commands of increasing responsibility. A number of handpicked staff officers followed him through these transitions. Sharing similar backgrounds and experiences, Patton entrusted these officers with significant latitude and authority to coordinate and supervise his army’s operations. After his relief as CG, SUSA following the Sicily campaign, these officers accompanied Patton to England. There, he assumed command of TUSA, an army recently deployed from the United States. Far from a \textit{tabula rasa}, the headquarters that Patton inherited in early 1944 possessed its own traditions and systems developed during years of training and maneuvers. This situation surrounding Patton’s assumption of command forced the TUSA CG to combine Lucky’s existing – but untested –

\textsuperscript{55}Allen, \textit{Lucky Forward}, 45.
procedures with those he employed in earlier campaigns. His subsequent leadership personified institutional expectations for army-level commanders, and set the conditions for a third procedure that retained the best of both merging traditions.

OPERATIONALIZING FUSED EXPERIENCES – TUSA’S THIRD PROCEDURE

Introduction

While Patton’s assumption of command produced an immediate effect on Lucky’s personnel, his impact on its procedures proved more gradual. For some six weeks after Patton took command, he reflected upon his experiences and learned new skills. This ruminative period allowed Patton to update the evolving warfighting philosophy that he maintained throughout his career. Significantly, this philosophy bore the imprints of deep institutional penetration. Through written orders and unit visits, Patton then inculcated his methods and expectations into the army, effectively fusing the interwar institutional process with SUA and TUSA’s previous traditions into a third procedure. Armed with this understanding, the TUSA headquarters then operationalized its CG’s expectations using the five doctrinal staff tasks in *Large Units*, which enabled Patton to fight his army in accordance with both institutional expectations and his own personal preferences.

A Classroom for War

As Patton welded the TUSA headquarters into a close-knit team, he also expanded upon his already incomparable understanding of warfare. During his first six weeks in command, Patton toured England widely. His travels simultaneously enabled him to fulfill his Fortitude deception role while enhancing his preparation for combat on the continent. During this period, he frequently consulted with Eisenhower, Bradley, and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the initial ground-force commander, to gain an appreciation for how they might employ his army both tactically, and as a tool of strategic maneuver. He also maintained a
running correspondence with British theorist B.H. Liddell-Hart, a self-proclaimed expert in armored warfare with whom Patton often disagreed. Most importantly, Patton read and reflected upon his army’s future role in what he optimistically envisioned as a highly mobile war in Northwest Europe.56

Most of these discussions merely refined Patton’s philosophy without affecting any of his core beliefs. His interaction with Brigadier General Otto P. “Opie” Weyland, the CG of XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), however, proved an exception. Throughout his career, Patton evinced a deep-seeded animosity toward aviators; an attitude exacerbated after German planes killed Dick Jenson – his aide-de-camp – and left his CP demolished in North Africa. Prior to 1944, he considered aviation, at best, a supporting arm suited only to protect his ground forces from air attack. Patton’s interaction with Weyland’s XIX TAC, assigned a supporting relationship to TUSA for the forthcoming campaign, changed this perception. In historian Stanley Hirshson’s words, “from February on Patton received basic training in tactical aviation from Weyland,” who both befriended the TUSA CG and converted him into an airpower enthusiast.57 As a result, Patton devoted significant attention thereafter to air-ground integration. The transformation proved so complete that a postwar analysis of TUSA-XIX TAC cooperation termed it “a model for close cooperation between army and aviation forces in future conflicts.”58

56Hirshson, General Patton, 435-65; D’Este, Patton, 566-82. For Patton’s disagreements with Liddell-Hart see Nye, The Patton Mind, 85 and 88.

57Hirshson, General Patton, 440.

58Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front: The Role of XIX Tactical Air Command during August 1944, An Interim Report (Washington: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1992), Foreword. Also see Spires, Patton’s Air Force, vii-49 and Hirshson, General Patton, 439-442 for more on air-ground integration.
Based on this recent experience, Patton revised and finally published his updated warfighting philosophy in two letters of instruction (LOI) to TUSA personnel dated 6 March and 3 April 1944. According to period understanding, these LOI transcended simple policy, enjoying the force of a direct order intended to “regulate movements over large areas and for considerable periods of time.” These LOI combined with Patton’s postwar reflections contained in his posthumously published autobiography (hereafter “Reflections and Suggestions”) provide insight into Patton’s approach to fighting TUSA. These expectations reflect an encapsulation of the interwar institutional process, fused with SUSA and TUSA’s early-war experiences.

Patton’s instructions demonstrate a complete understanding of the army-echelon’s doctrinal roles. His observation that “army and corps commanders are not so much interested in how [italics original] to beat the enemy from a tactical standpoint as in where to beat him” clearly reveals Patton’s intent to employ the army as “the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver . . . executing strategic and tactical operations.” Tellingly, he remarked that “the greatest study of war is the road net . . . one has to decide on general policies and determine the places, usually road centers or river lines, the capture of which will hurt the enemy most. How these places are to be captured is a matter for the lower echelons to determine.” This observation completely captures interwar thinking about the interplay of strategy and tactics, and the army’s role viz-à-viz the army group and theater command levels. Patton’s remark does not imply, however, that he was unconcerned with tactics or administration: more than half of both Patton’s LOI and

59 USWD, FSR (1923), 6.
60 Patton, War as I Knew It, 358; and USWD, FM 100-15, 51-52.
61 Patton, War as I Knew It, 92.
“Reflections and Suggestions” addressed administrative concerns and tactics at division level and below.62

Also in keeping with the institutional process, Patton devoted significant attention to the human dimension. He directed subordinates to lead personally from as far forward as possible, and stressed the need for absolute discipline. Patton also devoted a full section to troop welfare, addressing minute details down to officers’ responsibilities to inspect feet and check boots and socks for proper fit. Another paragraph emphasized that commanders must afford their staffs sufficient rest and opportunities to conduct physical conditioning, which he regarded as essential to good staff work.63

The remainder of Patton’s guidance described the aggressive operations he envisioned and desired. Patton’s proclivity for violent and rapid maneuver proved the single factor that spared his career after the Sicily slapping incidents. Anticipating TUSA’s role as Overlord’s exploitation force, Marshall and Eisenhower selected Patton for this command despite his earlier missteps because the army’s mission perfectly suited his personality and professional ability. Throughout both his LOI and “Reflections and Suggestions,” Patton stressed the offensive and emphasized the enemy’s destruction as its ultimate goal. Based on his Leavenworth notes, he also expected subordinate commanders to seize always the far side of prominent terrain features such as rivers and ridges to allow for a rapid resumption of offensive operations. Patton’s aggressiveness even surpassed doctrinal expectations in some regards. He demanded constant forward movement, eschewing even temporary entrenchments on the basis that their construction sapped soldiers’ offensive will. He also encouraged commanders to attack for sixty hours continuously to prevent the enemy from reestablishing a coherent defense. This suggests that

62 Ibid., 335-366, 397-416.
63 Ibid., 397-99, 403-05, 415-16.
through his aggressive nature, guided both by his personality and his adoption of the Army’s institutional processes, Patton deliberately tailored TUSA to conduct an extreme form of mobile warfare perfectly suited to Lucky’s anticipated mission.\textsuperscript{64}

This constant war of movement required Lucky to control fluid operations over extended areas with minimal communications. Patton demanded that the TUSA staff consider every situation as mobile, “since a mobile situation would be the most difficult. Anything which would work in a mobile situation without further refinement would work in a static one, while the reverse was not necessarily true.”\textsuperscript{65} This basic assumption underpinned all Lucky procedures. To assist the headquarters in developing techniques to support his preferred command style, Patton offered explicit guidance to the TUSA staff that encompassed the five basic staff tasks. Information management served as a central theme. Mobile operations required the staff to frequently displace and divide capabilities across vast areas to control army formations. FM 101-5 described headquarters’ division into a forward and rear CP, which greatly enabled such operations. Although Patton preferred to consolidate his headquarters whenever possible, he understood that battlefield conditions often necessitated split CPs, and he offered appropriate guidance for their composition and employment. In TUSA, the forward CP (Lucky Forward) included the CG, Chief of Staff, Secretary of the General Staff, G-1, G-2, G-3, select special staff, and elements of both XIX TAC and the rear CP. Patton mandated that this node establish itself as far forward as possible, and ideally co-locate with a corps’ CP to minimize its radio signature and the amount of wire required for communications. He also stipulated that Lucky Forward remain


\textsuperscript{65}Koch, G-2, 159.
as small and mobile as possible, to enable rapid displacement. For extremely dispersed and fluid circumstances, Patton’s instructions provided for a non-doctrinal advance tactical headquarters consisting of himself, a deputy chief of staff, and a small section of G-2, G-3, G-4, engineer, artillery, and signal personnel, which allowed the commander to control operations effectively at a particularly critical point. The rear CP, led by the G-4, would establish itself within three hours of Lucky Forward and control the majority of special staff personnel concerned with sustainment operations.  

Within Lucky Forward, Patton mandated a daily staff conference with himself, the Chief of Staff, General Staff primaries, select Special Staff, and staff inspectors in attendance. Because of his experiences with Weyland, he later insisted that either the XIX TAC CG or Chief of Staff also attend. These meetings provided a routine, predictable forum for commander and staff to gather, share knowledge, develop common understanding, and synchronize the army’s operations and activities. Eventually, these sessions developed into the primary venue for collectively executing the staff’s other four key tasks.

While Patton’s philosophy generally corresponded to the spirit of the Army’s institutional process, his approach to planning differed somewhat from the common practice developed through PME. As early as 1926 he noted that “victory in the next war will depend on EXECUTION not PLANS [emphasis original].” Throughout his career, Patton always adhered to this mantra. As he emphasized in his LOI, “the promulgation of the order represents not over ten percent of your responsibility . . . plans must be simple and flexible. Actually, they only form

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66USWD, FM 101-5, 4, 6-7, 18-19; Patton, War as I Knew It, 358-361, 399. Ironically, Patton gives the subject much more attention than period doctrine.

67Patton, War as I Knew It, 398.

68D’Este, Patton, 332.
a datum plane from which you build as necessity directs or opportunity offers.” This did not mean that Patton failed to plan. Rather, he simply recognized that a plan is only valuable to the extent that it facilitates execution. Given the highly mobile operations he preferred and expected, he believed that speed from conception to execution counted for more than detail and synchronization. This philosophy placed significant emphasis on anticipating future contingencies, and at times, this proved a major liability. Nonetheless, it explains TUSA’s dynamic planning and orders process.

Given Patton’s emphasis on execution, it is no surprise that he devoted significant energy to supervising order implementation and execution. Like Kreuger, he spent the majority of his day forward visiting and inspecting troops, and conducting personal reconnaissance. Drawing directly on the institutional process, he also expected his staff to visit the front daily and serve as his agents for coordinating, observing, and facilitating communication across the chain of command. Patton explicitly charged the Chief of Staff with managing Lucky’s front-line visit program, and required a rotating member of every General Staff and select Special Staff sections (on a duty roster) to visit a portion of the combat zone daily. To underscore this practice’s importance, he empowered these staff inspectors to coordinate directly with the Chief of Staff to resolve time-sensitive issues. Otherwise, they attended the daily staff conference and briefed the headquarters of their significant observations. The Chief of Staff then issued the sections their new inspection zones for the day, and the process repeated itself.

69 Patton, War as I Knew It, 398-99.

70 For a detailed explanation of Patton’s planning philosophy, see Rickard, Patton at Bay, 9-11. In Patton at Bay and Advance and Destroy, Rickard described two cases where this philosophy proved problematic: the Lorraine Campaign, and the later stages of the Battle of the Bulge. In each of these instances, inadequate planning led TUSA to wage positional warfare against prepared German defenses instead of the fluid maneuver Patton envisioned.

71 Patton, War as I Knew It, 397-98.
Operationalizing the Third Procedure

Although familiar with the mechanics of many of Patton’s expectations, the stateside TUSA staff was unaccustomed to strategic maneuver, and incapable of fulfilling many of their responsibilities at the speed Patton envisioned. To correct this deficiency, Patton and newly appointed Chief of Staff Gaffey initiated a training regimen to improve Lucky’s ability to operate in mobile situations. With Patton’s detailed guidance, extant doctrine, and their own diverse experiences, the TUSA headquarters eventually devised numerous methods for meeting their CG’s intent. Using the staff tasks as a guide, they operationalized Patton’s desired third procedure, which allowed him to cope with the dispersed, fast-moving conditions he expected TUSA to encounter in Northwest Europe. In doing so, TUSA ultimately fulfilled its role as an army headquarters in ways very similar to doctrinal expectations.72

Manage Information

Effective information management is vital in any headquarters, particularly for organizations spread over wide areas and moving at great speeds. TUSA coped with this challenge through its physical layout, extensive liaison, and the employment of a predictable daily schedule – today’s battle rhythm – that set the conditions for regular staff interaction, improving staff support to the CG while minimizing distractions.73

To maintain uniformity, the layout of the headquarters (or divided CPs) remained consistent at all echelons from regiment to army. Personnel entered at the message center, which directed visitors to other locations including offices, rest areas, the mess, or the “war room.” This

72Hirshson, General Patton, 435-65; D’Este, Patton, 566-82. For a joint perspective, see David N. Spires, Patton’s Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-Ground Team (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 44-46.

73Battle rhythm: “A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.” United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-02 Operational Terms and Military Symbols (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1-5.
latter facility represented the hub of situational understanding with an up-to-date map and telephone. In Lucky, the war room reflected Patton’s expectation that the staff provide the latest information in a quickly understandable visual format. Patton strongly believed that at the army level, maps represented an essential tool for effective commanders. In his own words:

Maps are necessary in order to see the whole panorama of battle and to permit intelligent planning.

. . . a study of the map will indicate where critical situations exist or are apt to develop, and so indicate where the commander should be. In the higher echelons, a layer map of the whole theater to a reasonable scale, showing roads, railways, streams, and towns, is more useful than a large-scale map cluttered up with ground forms and a multiplicity of non-essential information.74

Taking this guidance to heart, the staff placed a 1/250,000 scale map of the entire Western Front with the disposition of every Allied and known German division in the war room’s center, flanked by a 1/100,000 map of the entire TUSA sector with dispositions down to battalion level. In the war room one could also find maps of the Eastern Front and the Pacific, terrain models of the TUSA sector, relevant statistics including comparative casualties, replacements, logistical status, and intelligence products such as terrain analysis, orders of battle, and weather forecasts. This facility served as the nexus for information and provided the backdrop for daily operations.75

The battle rhythm set the tenor for the organization. Every evening, liaison officers (including TUSA’s liaisons to other headquarters) exchanged information with their parent commands. The resulting reports then fed into the G-2 and G-3 summaries, prepared by 0800 every morning. Between 0700 and 0900, the staff participated in two key meetings: a small group meeting with the CG, and a larger staff conference in the war room involving the entire command group, representatives from all General and Special Staff sections, staff inspectors, and liaison

74 Patton, War as I Knew It, 399.
75 Patton, War as I Knew It, 358-360, 398; Allen, Lucky Forward, 50-53; Essame, Patton, 124; Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 20; Koch, G-2, 149.
officers – approximately 40 personnel. After the later meeting, Patton, the Chief of Staff, and select staff officers departed for the front for mandatory visits. Simultaneously, the rest of the staff executed necessary actions including: reconnaissance, coordination, meetings, orders transmission, tear-down, movement, setup, updates, assessments, training, physical exercise, and rest. Throughout, the liaison section refreshed its situational understanding, informing a second update prepared by 1600. At approximately 1700, either the staff executed a second conference for the TUSA leadership, or a hasty update for the CG as circumstances demanded. These regular commander-staff interactions proved invaluable in synchronizing a huge organization that operated across vast distances, and often at great speeds. Although the early morning small group meeting and the staff conferences achieved different purposes, the synergistic effects of both allowed the staff to execute its four other primary tasks effectively by developing shared understanding across the army.76

76 Lucky’s huge liaison apparatus included some twenty-five officers from Twelfth Army Group, adjacent armies (FUSA and SUSA), subordinate corps, separate divisions, and multinational (British, French, Belgian) representatives, not to mention the TUSA officers reciprocally attached to those headquarters who reported back through the liaison section. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 19-20. For more on Patton’s overlooked ability in coalition warfare, see Blumenson and Stokesbury. Masters of the Art of Command, 241-245, 254-262. The principal sources significantly disagree about the daily events’ timing, which suggests flexibility in execution. Patton’s standing guidance mandated only a daily staff conference approximately three hours after dawn, to include certain designated staff from TUSA and its supporting XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC). Koch and Allen, both direct participants, generally agree that the small group meeting began at 0800, with the staff conference beginning at about 0830. Larson, drawing on Gay’s wartime Chief of Staff Diary, puts the daily staff conference at 0900, with the small group meeting (including only Patton, Gaffey, Gay, and Harkins) afterward. Essame, Munch, and D’Este fix the small group meeting at 0700 with the staff conference at 0800. Wallace, another direct participant though outside Patton’s inner circle, mentions only a 0900 staff conference. Additionally, Munch and Wallace describe another 1700 staff update omitted by the others. Larson cites a 2000 update between Patton and the G-3 staff only. Nearly all the sources give different attendees for the two meetings. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army, 19-20; Koch, G-2, 147-49; Allen, Lucky Forward, 67-69; Larson, Gay and Gaffey, 133-34; Essame, Patton, 124; Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” 49; D’Este, Patton, 576-77.
Plans, Orders, Execution, Assessment, and Anticipation

The effective information management procedure that the war room, liaison, and battle rhythm fostered laid the foundation for Lucky’s other essential activities. Modern Army doctrine describes a commander and staff’s *operations process*, which consists of distinct planning, preparation, execution, and assessment phases. Although doctrine acknowledges that these phases overlap and recur as circumstances demand, it explicitly depicts the process beginning with a planning iteration.77 Because of its constant commitment in combat, this construct did not apply to TUSA in Northwest Europe during World War II. Instead, Lucky planned, prepared, executed, and assessed both iteratively and near-simultaneously. TUSA executed multiple operations concurrently, and because the progress and outcomes of each of these operations affected the others, one should view the army’s overall operations process as simultaneous. For this reason, one cannot differentiate Lucky’s four overarching operational tasks into separate actions without losing a sense of their synergistic importance. A ‘day in the life’ presentation better suffices under these circumstances.

The institutional process, Patton’s personal preferences, and TUSA’s frequent requirement to control rapidly moving forces dispersed across wide areas necessitated what modern professionals term a *collaborative planning* approach.78 Under this construct, commanders and staffs from multiple echelons iteratively share common understanding, ideas, assessments, and concerns throughout the planning effort. This practice, in turn, enables subordinate staffs and headquarters to engage in *parallel planning*, in which multiple commands

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77 Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 defines the *operations process* as “the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing.” United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 The Operations Process (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1.

78 *Collaborative planning* refers to “commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners sharing information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts regardless of physical location throughout the planning process.” United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 The Operations Process (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-23.
plan for the same operation at the same time, rather than each headquarters waiting for orders from its higher echelon. This technique—explicitly derived from interwar doctrine and practice—exactly suited Patton’s expectation for rapid execution.

Another doctrinal tool supported collaborative efforts. The Estimate of Situation process taught at PME institutions and promulgated in interwar doctrine greatly assisted TUSA in the rapid planning that Patton demanded. Although contemporary literature often equates the Estimate of Situation process with today’s MDMP, this comparison is flawed, despite the two process’ superficial similarities. Most notably, the World War II Estimate of Situation process yielded a decision, whereas the MDMP results in an order. This distinction is significant.

In the institutional process, commanders maintained their own estimates of the situation. Ideally, staffs produced written estimates, although doctrine tolerated mental estimates during time-sensitive situations. These commanders’ estimates formed the basis for planning. To assist in developing the commander’s understanding, doctrine provided for separate estimates by the G-2, G-3, and G-4 as necessary. These estimates focused on enemy analysis, friendly analysis, and the command’s administrative status, which provided information and details beyond the commander’s immediate scope of awareness. Ideally, staff sections also created written versions of these estimates for submission to the commander for his review prior to issuing a decision.

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79 Parallel planning is “two or more echelons planning for the same operation sharing information sequentially through warning orders from the higher headquarters prior to the higher headquarters publishing their operation plan or operation order. Since several echelons develop their plans simultaneously, parallel planning can significantly shorten planning time.” DA, ADRP 5-0, 2-23.

80 USWD, Large Units, 6; USWD, FM 100-5 (1941), 24-25; and USWD, FM 100-15, 52 trace collaborative and parallel planning’s evolution.


82 USWD, FM 101-5, 90-95 and 125-28.
The concept of decision is important, and differs from an order. According to period understanding, the commander’s decision provided the mechanism to initiate orders development. Under the Estimate of Situation process, the commander – aided by staff estimates – completed the activities included in the steps of the modern MDMP: receipt of mission, mission analysis, and course of action development/analysis/comparison/approval. The commander then arrived at a decision, which he communicated to the staff, which then initiated coordination and movement through an order that translated the commander’s decision into action. The Estimate of Situation thus produced a decision that furnished the basis for an order rather than the order itself. In short, while today’s MDMP is a tool for planning, the Estimate of Situation process constituted a tool to support planning. This nuance is critical.83

The Estimate of Situation process reflected an entirely different understanding of planning from today’s construct. The interwar institutional process expected commanders to serve as their organization’s lead planner. Patton frequently boasted that he always served as his own G-3.84 Far from typical Patton bombast, his remark reflected a generational trend. Other commanders such as Bradley and Montgomery expressed similar sentiments during their wartime service.85 The commander’s direct and critical role in operational planning does not suggest, however, that staffs played no role in the planning process. Staff officers developed assessments and offered recommendations that proved instrumental in assisting their commander as he strove to arrive at a decision. In addition to providing their staff estimates, senior staff personnel served as crucial advisors and sounding boards for the commander during his deliberations. They also

83USWD, FM 101-5, 125-28.
84See Blumenson, The Patton Papers Vol. 2, 461 for but one example of this propensity. Also see Farago, Patton, 385.
provided up-to-date information that informed the commander’s situational understanding in the ever-changing world of combined arms mechanized warfare. Once the commander communicated his decision, the staff played a vital role in coordinating the required actions necessary to support the decision, and in issuing the order that synchronized efforts to implement the commander’s will. This arrangement suited TUSA particularly well.86

Collaborative planning in TUSA occurred primarily within two components of the established battle rhythm: regular meetings within the army headquarters, and front-line visits. Lucky’s daily small group meeting, which a select group of about eight TUSA and XIX TAC officers attended, afforded Patton his first daily opportunity to collaborate. Armed with their estimates, portable maps, blackboards, and up-to-date data from the war room, Patton and his trusted agents engaged in what Koch described as an informal, “freewheeling and free-thinking” dialogue about the current situation, probable developments, and future courses of action. Here, Patton asked questions and floated ideas in a frank, non-attribution environment. Often, the sessions amounted to a key-leader war-game, which drove decisions and revealed concerns that Patton needed to raise with Bradley or Eisenhower. Most importantly, the fifteen-minute sessions fostered mutual understanding, and allowed the staff to better anticipate their commander’s decisions and execute coordination while staying up to date on Patton’s views regarding how the staff could best support operations.87

86USWD, FM 101-5, 125-28.
87Koch offers the best description of how these small-group meetings functioned. Koch, G-2, 147-48. According to Allen, the attendees included Patton, Weyland and his Chief of Staff, the TUSA Chief of Staff (Gaffey) and Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Gay, Harkins), the G-3 (Maddox), the G-2 (Koch), and the Deputy G-2 (Allen). Allen, Lucky Forward, 68. XIX TAC’s participation in these discussions is notable. Patton’s LOI and postwar "Reflections and Suggestions” stress the importance of air-ground integration at the army level. TUSA staff procedure reflected this guidance, with XIX TAC representation prominent in all significant meetings, planning sessions, and war-games. Patton, War as I Knew It, 356-57, 361, 364, 409; Koch, G-2, 138-40.
These small group sessions enabled a process that worked much like the methodology that modern Army doctrine refers to as integrated planning. This idea suggests that conceptual and detailed planning, generally defined as “what to do and why” versus “how to do it,” are interrelated and influence each other. Although primarily conceptual, these early morning interactions between commander and staff gave Patton a sense of whether his contemplated decisions were feasible, and more importantly, if they were likely to develop in the manner he visualized. Equally important, these discussions recalibrated the TUSA and XIX TAC leadership’s common understanding, which informed subsequent actions for the rest of the day.

Armed with this renewed collective insight, Patton and his trusted agents then transitioned to the subsequent formal staff conference, which generally lasted about 20 minutes. Unlike the unstructured small-group sessions, these highly structured meetings afforded Patton an opportunity to communicate directly with a larger segment of the staff, and ensured that all sections received the same up-to-the-minute information at predictable intervals. Aside from the briefers, only Patton and the Chief of Staff usually spoke. Patton invariably began with a review of comparative casualties. Next, the G-2 section assessed the enemy’s updated situation, the G-3 section provided a friendly ground situation update, and the G-3 Air provided an updated air picture. Finally, the public relations officer concluded the brief with a summary of media reports to provide the leadership with an understanding of Allied public perceptions. Every presentation

88Conceptual planning “involves understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to operational art and is the focus of the commander with staff support.” Detailed planning “translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the science of operations including the synchronization of the forces in time, space, and purpose. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of force as a whole toward a common goal. Effective planning requires the integration of both the conceptual and detailed components of planning.” DA, ADP 5-0, 6; DA, ADRP 5-0, 2-3 to 2-4; and Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr.; Dr. Scott Gorman; Colonel Jack Marr; Lieutenant Colonel Joseph McLamb; Dr. Michael Stewart; and Dr. Pete Schifferle, “Integrated Planning: The Operations Process, Design, and the Military Decision Making Process,” Military Review, January-February 2011, 28-35 discuss integrated planning in detail.
started in the TUSA sector, expanded to cover the entire Western Front, and addressed relevant
developments on the Eastern Front and in the Pacific. Sometimes, staff sections provided special
briefings regarding evolving tactics, new weapons, or other items of interest to the CG. Patton
and his staff normally held these conferences twice daily. The morning conference concluded
with Patton issuing guidance for the day. An evening conference concluded with Patton’s
observations from front line visits, and staff tasks to address his emergent concerns.\(^{89}\)

Just as the small-group sessions enabled common understanding amongst the senior
leadership, the staff conferences informed and synchronized the larger headquarters for the day.
These meetings allowed Patton to interact with the staff directly and at regular intervals to
exchange information iteratively. By providing the entire staff with the latest information at a
predictable time and place, these meetings also minimized the requirement for additional in-
process reviews, special presentations, and approval briefs to the CG. This arrangement allowed
Patton to make decisions rapidly with the best information available. It also allowed him to
provide clear direction to the entire staff, which then translated his broad, conceptual decisions
into action through detailed planning, coordination, and orders transmission. In short, TUSA’s
daily battle rhythm embedded the commander into the staff’s operations without dominating his
time. This allowed the staff to focus on its coordinating and supervisory functions between
regular meetings, and afforded Patton the opportunity to conduct what he considered his primary
function: front-line supervision and leadership.\(^{90}\)

Visits to the combat zone afforded Patton his second daily opportunity to engage in
collaborative planning – this time with subordinate commanders and staff. These visits served


\(^{90}\)Patton’s subordinates marveled at their CG’s gift for rapid decision-making. However, none
considered his ability a natural, ‘sixth sense’. Rather, they universally attributed Patton’s gift to a
combination of experience, study, and staff preparation. Wallace, *Patton and His Third Army*, 197-98, 205;
as I Knew It*, 350, 354-58, 361, 397-98, 400, 403.
two purposes: to ensure Patton’s subordinates implemented his guidance, and more importantly, to provide motivation and gain an understanding of operational realities with his own senses. Armed with an updated situational understanding gained from the morning meetings at Lucky, Patton shared his recent decisions and intentions with TUSA units, thereby socializing future operations with subordinate commanders and staffs. In turn, these subordinates provided Patton with their most current estimates, assessments, and situational understanding gained from their recent activities and based on their unique tactical perspective. This fed another iteration of dialogue, which recalibrated situational awareness between the army-echelon and its subordinate headquarters, refined Patton’s conceptual approach, and allowed him to better anticipate heretofore-unforeseen requirements and contingencies.  

While Patton executed the supervisory and motivational duties the institutional process required, his Chief of Staff and staff inspectors served as Patton’s eyes and ears across the army’s front. Although Patton initially intended that either he or his Chief of Staff (Gaffey or, after November 1944, Gay) remain at Lucky Forward at all times, the speed and dispersion of TUSA operations – particularly after the Operation Cobra breakout in July 1944 – often necessitated both leaders’ presence at the front. Serving as Patton’s harmonizing agents as described in Large Units, these staff officers enabled operations in two ways. First, the constant but unobtrusive visits improved inter-staff coordination and afforded TUSA personnel insight into subordinate echelons’ requirements and challenges. These routine interactions provided subordinates early warning, the opportunity to articulate ideas and concerns, and gave them confidence that the TUSA staff would appropriately support committed units while sparing them multiple trips to Lucky. Second, the visits created mutual identification between the army echelon and its front-

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91 Patton, War as I Knew It, 350, 354-58, 361, 397-98, 400, 403; Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” 46-54; Larson, Gay and Gaffey, 130-139.
line units. These efforts greatly improved information transmission and cooperation between echelons. 92

Command and staff visits also hastened execution by streamlining orders production. Generally, Patton expected divisions to execute an operation between twelve and eighteen hours after receiving an order from higher headquarters – an extremely ambitious standard. Rather than cumbersome written orders that required significant time to generate and transmit, TUSA relied instead on verbal orders. Often during a visit, Patton would issue verbal orders to subordinate commanders based on the common understanding he developed with the TUSA staff that morning. An accompanying aide (Deputy Chief of Staff Harkins, Codman, or Stiller) would record the instructions, relay the content to the staff, and the G-3 section would then prepare a written order of record for transmission. These documents – often no longer than one type-written page with a sketch – furnished the subordinate command with the minimum information and control measures necessary for execution, and reflected what to accomplish rather than how to achieve it. Subsequent fragmentary orders or future warning orders were also generally verbal, with a record of the conversation maintained in the staff’s log. These procedures greatly reduced the time between planning completion and execution, and allowed TUSA to maintain pressure against enemy formations, thereby keeping them off balance and retaining the initiative. 93

While Patton and select staff supervised current operations, the remainder of Lucky focused on future actions. As D’Este noted, “in the Third Army, planning was three-dimensional.

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92USWD, Large Units, 5-6; USWD, FSR (1941), 22, 26; Patton, War as I Knew It, 350, 354-58, 361, 397-98, 400, 403; Allen, Lucky Forward, 59; Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” 49. It is interesting to note that Patton’s initial guidance stipulated that either he or the Chief of Staff would execute daily visits to the front. However, both would never be away from the headquarters at the same time. Eventually, Patton modified that guidance to conform to the reality of mobile operations. Larson’s research reveals that Gaffey routinely visited front-line units while Patton was away to provide “another set of eyes and ears.” This modification reflected Patton’s absolute confidence in his staff by mid-1944. Larson, Gay and Gaffey, 134-35.

93USWD, Large Units, 6; USWD, FSR (1941), 24-25; Patton, War as I Knew It, 357, 400-401; Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” 49; Koch, G-2, 158.
When Patton went to war there were always three campaigns in his head: the one he was fighting, the one he believed would follow – and the one beyond that.”\(^{94}\) This observation perfectly captured the essence of interwar experience regarding campaign planning and planning horizons. FM 100-15 stipulated:

“In his planning the army commander must project himself well into the future; his plans must cover considerable periods of operations; and while one operation, which may extend over many days or weeks, is progressing, he must be planning the next. The plans of the army commander must be flexible so that full exploitation of favorable situations can be effected, and unfavorable situations, should they occur, can be rectified.”\(^{95}\)

Patton’s proclivity to lead conceptual planning personally, and his emphasis on execution’s primacy, suited these requirements. Given their CG’s philosophy, in the pre-decisional phase Lucky’s staff focused less on detailed planning and more on building situational understanding and coordination. When combined with his own extensive assessment through constant interaction with his staff and subordinates, these activities allowed Patton to better anticipate potential contingencies. In turn, he directed efforts to confirm or deny whether the conditions indicating those contingencies were likely to develop. Based on these refined assessments, Patton then either rendered a decision that initiated detailed planning, coordination, and orders transmission or retasked the staff to investigate another possible contingency. Detailed running estimates and shared understanding throughout the command enabled the staff to translate Patton’s decisions quickly into action.

These practices generally served TUSA well throughout its campaign in Northwest Europe. During the headquarters’ toughest test during the German winter counterattack in the vicinity of Bastogne, popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge, the third procedure allowed Lucky to anticipate the German counteroffensive against FUSA on its northern flank; switch its

\(^{94}\)D’Este, *Patton*, 577.

\(^{95}\)USWD, FM 100-15, 52.
main effort north from a crossing of the Saar to a hasty attack against the German 15th Army’s southern flank; and prepare contingency plans before a key commander’s huddle in Verdun. During this meeting that included Eisenhower, Bradley, and other key Allied leaders, TUSA was the only army with a coherent plan of operation to defeat the German attack. As soon as Eisenhower adopted Lucky’s plan, Patton wired a code word to Gay to initiate action. With his advance tactical headquarters, Patton immediately established a CP at Luxembourg collocated with Bradley’s 12th Army Group. Here, Patton and select staff controlled TUSA’s concentration and advance to strategic maneuver.

Meanwhile, Lucky Forward displaced north to join its commander in Luxembourg, and the rear CP reorganized logistic support in the combat zone to sustain a major offensive toward the north while facilitating a tactical consolidation of the Saar bridgehead as an economy of force effort. Over the next week, Patton executed the expected front-line visits to assess progress and as Large Units once advised, “furnish impetus for the attack.” Meanwhile, the staff coordinated troop movements, supplies, replacements, signal infrastructure, chemical protection gear, and even hot Christmas dinners for many units as they advanced toward the Bastogne salient. At the same time, Patton and the staff planned for future operations in the Eifel and for a crossing of the Saar.

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97 USWD, Large Units, 21.
Rhine. By 16 January 1945, TUSA relieved Bastogne, affected a linkup with Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, and continued its attack east toward Germany.98

**Conclusion**

Patton’s personal leadership, unifying philosophy, and rigorous training and inspection program in England proved instrumental in operationalizing Lucky’s third procedure. Founded on its CG’s warfighting philosophy – which itself bore imprints of the interwar institutional process – TUSA developed techniques specifically designed to cope with highly mobile warfare. Operating on the assumption that procedures suitable for mobile conditions would always prove equal to the challenges positional warfare posed, Lucky’s method favored rapid execution over elaborate planning. This requirementstructured TUSA’s approach to operations through *Large Units*’ five primary staff tasks.

Under such dynamic conditions, information management proved critical. To provide predictability across echelons, the army standardized the layout of its CPs. Within Lucky, a central war room fostered common understanding by displaying up-to-the-minute information about enemy and friendly units’ status and dispositions and developing situations. When combined with running staff estimates enabled by effective liaison, and a predictable battle rhythm, this facility provided the backdrop for the headquarters’ daily operations. These systems also allowed Patton and his trusted agents to structure Lucky’s operations along predictable lines to meet the army’s doctrinal responsibilities and the staff’s obligations to its CG.

This proved no minor feat. Throughout the campaign in Northwest Europe, TUSA frequently found itself simultaneously planning and preparing for future operations while

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executing current actions and assessing their effects. Under such circumstances, TUSA’s battle rhythm allowed Patton and the staff to anticipate and control operations effectively with minimal daily contact. Through routine morning and evening interactions, Patton and the staff developed a common understanding that facilitated integrated planning and simplified assessment. This allowed Patton to spend the majority of his time forward, inspecting and interacting with subordinates, which in turn improved his situational understanding and hastened execution through parallel planning. TUSA’s employment of staff officers in the role of staff inspectors enhanced this understanding and parallel planning effort by providing additional coverage across the army’s combat zone. These daily visits afforded subordinate headquarters the opportunity to discuss forthcoming operations with the staff, and improved Lucky personnel’s understanding and ability to contribute to the assessment process. The visits also enhanced informal coordination across echelons, hastened the orders process, and improved mutual confidence. Meanwhile, the majority of the TUSA staff at Lucky conducted detailed planning, coordination, orders production, updates, reconnaissance, liaison, and rest. Informed by these activities, CG and staff met again in the evening to share updated insights and refine the headquarters’ activities. This subsequently fed into the next day’s activities, which iteratively repeated the cycle. While not always successful, this approach generally aided rapid decision-making and execution greatly while also preserving the commander and staff’s time to perform their primary functions.

**IMPLICATIONS**

**Introduction**

Contextualizing Patton and TUSA’s third procedure within the institutional process offers historians and practitioners multiple benefits. From a scholarly perspective, such an approach suggests that much of the standing narrative explaining TUSA’s World War II development and conduct may be incomplete. By reassessing Patton’s leadership in light of these findings, one more clearly sees how doctrine, education, and experience coalesced to shape one headquarters’
methods. In so doing, historians gain a greater appreciation for exactly how Patton influenced his army, and more importantly, how the oft-neglected staff enabled his command. For military professionals, Lucky’s experience provides a basis for analyzing and questioning aspects of modern doctrine, which in turn should generate recommendations that spur further consideration and testing of alternative concepts.

Historical Insights

Expanding the aperture of historical inquiry into Patton’s World War II conduct is a relatively recent phenomenon pioneered by historians such as David Spires and John Nelson Rickard. Such efforts have paid dividends in better explaining operational outcomes once attributed solely to Patton. Shifting this practice away from the battlefield yields similar results for the study of the TUSA headquarters. Setting Patton and his army within the interwar and early-war context reveals that many of its procedures once celebrated by earlier authors were, in fact, firmly rooted in doctrine and institutional practice. Far from minimizing TUSA’s achievements, this awareness affords historians improved understanding into just how Patton influenced his staff and the areas in which his leadership proved exemplary.

Careful comparisons of the institutional process, Patton’s philosophy, and TUSA’s procedures suggest that Patton’s lead from the front attitude was hardly exceptional from a purely doctrinal perspective. Actually, his performance reflected basic US Army expectations for its army CGs. Whether or not he proved the only army-level commander in Europe to meet this standard is beyond this monograph’s scope. One reaches a similar conclusion regarding Patton’s concern with the human dimension. Intimates and soldiers alike recount his uncommon interest in troop welfare, his unique ability to motivate and inspire, and his adroitness at mixing collegial

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99 See Spires’ Patton’s Air Force, and Rickard’s Patton at Bay and Advance and Destroy.
leadership with forcefulness and resolution. While quite possibly superior to his peers, period expectations also took these traits for granted in an army commander.

Patton truly distinguished himself in two respects. First, his extensive expertise and capacity for learning suited Patton ideally for the multiple responsibilities he discharged as TUSA CG. His ability to conceive, articulate, and enforce a unifying warfighting philosophy informed by institutional practices fused a hybrid headquarters of multiple experiences into an effective organization capable of controlling operations at great speeds across the combat zone’s depth and breadth. Second, his personal participation in the headquarters’ operations coupled with his willingness to delegate authority to select staff officers imbued TUSA with agility beyond institutional expectations. This proved particularly important in the area of planning. Rather than simply receiving periodic updates on an upcoming operation, Patton regularly interacted with the staff to develop shared understanding, issue immediate guidance, make course corrections based on personal and staff assessments, and guide detailed planning. Instead of a participant, Patton served as his own G-3, effectively leading planning; the staff supported and acted as an extension of his will.

This does not imply, however, that the staff simply executed Patton’s fiat. Throughout Lucky’s operations in Northwest Europe, the staff played a vital role in operationalizing the third procedure. Its ability to effectively collect information, analyze its value, synthesize it into knowledge, and share it across the chain of command greatly contributed to shared understanding between the CG and his headquarters, and between TUSA and subordinate organizations. Using the Estimate of Situation process, the staff greatly contributed to planning by serving as a foil for Patton’s decision-making and the agent for translating his conceptual ideas into detailed – but brief – orders. Likewise, the staff’s forward presence at the front facilitated execution by providing a mechanism through which subordinates could easily interface with the army headquarters. This, in turn, allowed the staff to assess progress and identify shortfalls more
effectively and with fewer formal requirements. When combined with Patton’s own observations, their daily insights improved collective understanding and fed the next day’s cycle of planning, execution, and assessment, which also allowed the headquarters to anticipate contingencies with greater accuracy. The fact that Patton never fixated on operational details is perhaps the best indicator of Lucky’s success in achieving its institutional responsibilities.

Cumulatively, these insights challenge two popular, Patton-centric explanations for the TUSA headquarters’ operations in World War II. The first, that Patton created Lucky from scratch and led it to victory by sheer force of his genius and will, seems questionable when one expands the analytical aperture to include interwar developments. The second, which states that the staff essentially compensated for its CG’s lack of systems, appears to ignore both Patton’s philosophy and the actual procedures Lucky employed in combat. If this monograph achieves nothing more than casting doubt on these two longstanding myths, it has served its purpose.

Contemporary Relevance

Lucky’s World War II experience is also relevant for modern military professionals. TUSA’s third procedure demonstrates that prewar institutional processes – an analogue for today’s DOTMLPF construct – exert significant direct and indirect influences upon practice in future combat.\(^\text{100}\) While it is always dangerous for one to extrapolate discrete lessons from history – especially a single case – Lucky’s methods reveal several implications for contemporary doctrine that merit further research and analysis, with three crucial caveats. First, TUSA entered a campaign already underway; it did not participate in the initial operation into Northwest Europe. This nuance means that Lucky’s experience may possess greater relevance for units already engaged in a prolonged campaign than for organizations preparing to conduct a discrete operation.

\(^\text{100}\) \textit{DOTMLPF} stands for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 1 \textit{The Army} (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 4-3.
or opening phase of a campaign. Second, ULO recognizes three kinds of operations within its decisive action framework: offense, defense, and stability. Although TUSA’s insights into doctrine might apply to all three kinds of operations, Patton built the organization for two specialized offense tasks: exploitation and pursuit.\textsuperscript{101} Third, as the nexus of strategy, tactics, and administration in World War II, the army echelon shares similarities with a modern operational-level headquarters, which \textit{Joint Publication 1-02} defines as the point “at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.”\textsuperscript{102} Although TUSA’s experiences may possess significance for Joint Task Force and the Army’s tactical-level headquarters, Lucky’s greatest salience probably resides at modern Theater Army and Corps levels. These caveats do not imply that the following observations are inappropriate to other operations or levels of war. It simply suggests that one must specify under what conditions each implication may apply, and that greater research across types of decisive action is necessary to substantiate any tentative recommendations one may offer based on this specific historical experience.

Mission Command

The first potential implication TUSA’s experience may hold for contemporary doctrine concerns the Army’s emerging mission command concept.\textsuperscript{103} As the universal philosophy of command underpinning the ULO construct, observations addressing this topic are likely to

\textsuperscript{101} United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 \textit{Unified Land Operations} (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), 5-6; and United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 \textit{Unified Land Operations} (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-4 to 2-5 discuss offensive operations and their subordinate tasks.

\textsuperscript{102} DOD, JP 1-02, 270-71.

\textsuperscript{103} ADP 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 \textit{Mission Command} (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1.
possess the widest application across US Army formations. While it is anachronistic for one to state that TUSA practiced mission command as contemporary professionals understand it, Patton’s philosophy and Lucky’s systems bear strong resemblances to modern mission command’s tenets and activities. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 touts the concept as “a human solution to complex operational challenges.”104 This theme is strikingly similar to explicit expectations contained throughout the interwar institutional process and within Patton’s warfighting philosophy.

This latter proved particularly instrumental in enabling a mission command-type approach. The product of a lifetime of self-study, experience, and institutional exposure, Patton’s written philosophy provided a baseline for every Lucky staff officer, subordinate commander, and headquarters in TUSA. More than a collection of aphorisms, these documents represented Patton’s distilled knowledge and expectations, imbued with the force of an order. As such, his philosophy provided a unifying approach to operations throughout the army that supplemented official doctrine and common practice. This greatly contributed to welding the headquarters’ disparate experiences into a third procedure capable of operationalizing Patton’s will. Moreover, they encompassed kernels of modern mission command’s six principles that drive command and leadership.105

Aspects of these six principles – build cohesive teams through mutual trust; create shared understanding; provide a clear commander’s intent; exercise disciplined initiative; use mission orders; and accept prudent risk – relate directly to interwar and World War II institutional expectations implicit in Patton’s philosophy. TUSA achieved these six objectives through a combination of both commander and staff activities. As CG, Patton’s selection of key personnel

104 DA, ADP 6-0, 2.
105 Interwar and World War II doctrine defined the two concepts as inseparable. USWD, FM 100-5, 23.
and his rigorous training program, particularly in England before Overlord, set the conditions for mutual trust based on common experiences and a demonstrated ability to accomplish tasks to the commander’s satisfaction. His personal involvement in planning, front-line visits, assessment, and anticipation helped forge a common understanding with both the staff and subordinates, which the TUSA staff then reinforced through its own visits, coordination, and liaison activities. Although the term commander’s intent is a recent development in US Army doctrine, Patton’s personal involvement with both the Lucky staff and subordinate headquarters ensured that the entire army clearly understood his intentions and expectations. This clarity, his insistence that Lucky concern itself with army-level roles and responsibilities, and Patton’s penchant for brief orders afforded subordinates wide latitude in execution and promoted initiative. With that said, he did not equate initiative with independence. He personally supervised execution – along with his staff – to ensure that subordinates achieved his expectations, and provided ample impetus for action when he assessed that lower-level leaders were falling short. Finally, although he attempted to limit risk to the greatest degree possible before execution, Patton’s conscious preference for rapid execution over elaborate planning constituted his favored method for limiting risk. This attitude proved well suited to the mobile-warfare conditions that doctrine assumed and he preferred.  

Cumulatively, Lucky’s experience provides two important insights relating to the contemporary concept of mission command. First, it provides a concrete historical example of US Army leaders applying elements of the mission command philosophy in combat. Second, it demonstrates that instead of an adaptation of the German auftragstaktik concept – as Army

106United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986) is the first capstone doctrine to discuss the contemporary concept of commander’s intent in detail.

107Rickard, Patton at Bay, 227-42. Rickard described how, under stabilized front conditions such as TUSA faced in the Lorraine Campaign, this approach proved a liability.
Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 explicitly claims – mission command’s roots are planted firmly in American tradition.\textsuperscript{108} This suggests that mission command is compatible with the US Army’s heritage, and that by studying that heritage, modern professionals may glean further insights that will better inform both the doctrine and the conditions under which it may best apply or likely fail.

The Operations Process

TUSA’s experience also sheds light on the contemporary operations process, which provides the framework through which one executes mission command. The operations process encompasses four principles: commanders drive the operations process; build and maintain situational understanding; apply critical and creative thinking; and encourage collaboration and dialogue. As with mission command, Lucky demonstrates aspects of each in action. Through his philosophy and personal leadership, Patton certainly drove the operations process within TUSA. Far from simply “the most important participant in the operations process,” Patton represented the driving force and principal agent for its implementation.\textsuperscript{109} In addition to serving as the army’s \textit{de facto} lead planner, he personally supervised preparation and execution through frequent front-line visits, and employed the staff in a similar fashion across the army’s combat zone. These practices fostered daily collaboration and dialogue between the army CG, his staff, and subordinate echelons, which resulted in a common understanding, increased agility, and better assessment across the organization. Armed with this knowledge, Patton and the staff exchanged observations nightly, which fed another cycle of the operations process the next day. At his morning small group meeting, Patton then engaged in collaborative planning with his trusted agents to refine their common understanding and drive critical and creative thinking. After they departed that

\textsuperscript{108}DA, ADRP 6-0, v.

\textsuperscript{109}DA, ADP 5-0, 2.
meeting having developed a common approach, Patton and his key leaders synchronized Lucky as a whole at the morning staff conference, and issued guidance that drove detailed planning, coordination, and execution.

While TUSA’s practices appear to validate the operations process’ principles, its experience reveals potential shortcomings in doctrine’s description of its key activities of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Rather than iterative, overlapping events as ADP 5-0 portrays, Lucky’s conduct suggests that the operations process is both iterative and simultaneous.\textsuperscript{110} Once it engaged in a protracted campaign, distinguishing between TUSA’s key activities proved nearly impossible. On any given day, the headquarters found itself planning future operations, supervising execution, assessing progress, and anticipating future developments; and each activity informed all of the others. Although this dynamic is familiar to many veterans of the last decade’s conflicts, contemporary doctrine continues to underplay these activities’ simultaneity.

Lucky’s battle rhythm provided the key to coping with these circumstances. When the operations process’ activities occur simultaneously, time becomes a critical factor – specifically the commander’s time. Current techniques require the commander to participate in numerous updates, in-process reviews, and decision-making forums in order to drive the operations process. Personnel from different staff sections often lead these related but disparate project teams, with varying degrees of cooperation. Because each operates in a sort of vacuum, each team must recalibrate its understanding and contextualize its problem before developing recommendations for the commander’s decision. Further, these teams often present their findings in small group settings, denying the rest of the staff insights into their particular problem and opportunities to

\textsuperscript{110}DA, ADP 5-0, 1.
contribute to the decision-making dialogue on that particular subject. TUSA’s experience suggests that, perhaps, this approach is unnecessary.

Patton met daily with his staff in three forums: a morning small group meeting, a morning staff conference, and an evening update. At each of these brief events, he and the headquarters updated their situational understanding, discussed their observations, and weighed developments’ significance. Based on their discourse, Patton rendered decisions and issued guidance that focused the staff’s efforts and drove detailed planning. Because he and his trusted agents executed the majority of conceptual planning, and Patton empowered his staff to make detailed planning-level decisions, TUSA faced few situations where the commander required a special update prior to a decision. In the majority of cases, staff officers who needed to inform the CG of a particular concern or request a specific decision did so in the presence of the entire staff. This approach offered numerous benefits. First, because these interactions occurred in front of the entire headquarters, staff officers eliminated the need to recalibrate understanding, since the entire headquarters refreshed its common understanding at once. Second, the problem often needed little framing, since subordinates presented it within a preexisting context with which all attendees could identify. Third, it allowed the entire staff to comment on the issue in question, which enabled Patton to consider multiple points of view. Finally, it left the headquarters with a common impression of what Patton decided, and how the issue in question affected the army’s operations as a whole.

This sort of synergy required multiple conditions in order to succeed, starting with Patton. His personality and philosophy ensured that the staff felt empowered to act by defining which decisions belonged to him, and which ones he felt comfortable delegating. His personal involvement also ensured that TUSA remained focused on its level. Small expectations such as demanding that the army-level headquarters only conduct analysis (initially) on 1:1,000,000 scale maps or only track units two levels down helped scope army-level problems appropriately, and
reduced both his and the staff’s burdens while shielding subordinates from micro-management.\textsuperscript{111} Further, his constant vigilance to prevent the staff from swelling beyond its authorized strength, and his insistence that it minimize reporting requirements, also set the conditions for a headquarters focused on issues appropriate to its echelon. Finally, his insistence that Lucky’s officers personally visit the front afforded the staff sections opportunities to gain information through personal reconnaissance rather than written reports. It also forced TUSA staff officers to develop face-to-face relationships with subordinate staffs at their headquarters. This created mutual trust and lines of communication, which allowed the army to accomplish many of its activities informally, through detailed coordination either over the phone or face-to-face, with a brief follow-up order to make the action official.

Patton’s technique also required a number of trusted agents to act as the primary interface between the CG and the headquarters’ masses. Because Patton and the staff conducted the majority of its conceptual work in the early morning small-group meeting, Patton’s hand-picked staff primaries and special advisors needed to maintain absolute mastery of their individual section’s work at all times. Armed with their running staff estimates and aided by the war room’s common operating picture, these officers both aided Patton in conducting what one would today term mission analysis, course of action development, course of action comparison, and course of action approval while offering a foil to analyze contemplated actions and war game their outcomes as necessary. Once the small group meeting concluded, these officers – especially the Chief of Staff – played a pivotal role in contextualizing Patton’s guidance and decisions to the larger staff, and ensured that their individual section’s coordination and detailed planning conformed to the commander’s intentions.

\textsuperscript{111}Patton, \textit{War as I Knew It}, 92, 354-55, 399.
These practices pose numerous implications for the today’s operations process, beginning with planning. Although current doctrine recognizes conceptual and detailed planning as two distinct but interrelated components of the same activity, it also asserts that Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: namely, the ADM, the MDMP, and Troop Leading Procedures (TLP). This unfortunate claim obscures the truly critical insight that planning must account for conceptual thinking – which the commander personally leads – in addition to detail. Although they can serve as invaluable tools to assist with planning, Army leaders need not adhere to these three methodologies, provided that their selected alternative method accounts for both conceptual and detailed components of the planning process. Divorcing the activity of planning from specific methodologies – while retaining these processes within doctrine as planning tools and examples of an effective plan’s components – would greatly assist the institution in its efforts to ensure that plans account for real-world conditions rather than blindly adhering to a mechanical process.

By focusing on the conceptual and detailed components of planning rather than the means employed to produce an order, one may also identify further insights from Lucky’s procedures that could improve the utility of both the ADM and the MDMP. Doctrine asserts that leaders must combine ADM with MDMP to create executable plans. Under normal conditions characterized by discrete operations and a non-simultaneous operations process, this premise is plausible (except for its reliance on a specific framework for detailed planning). However, during protracted campaigns evincing mobile conditions such as TUSA faced in Northwest Europe, this observation may require reconsideration. Lucky’s experience suggests that a small team armed with the appropriate knowledge may sufficiently integrate conceptual and detailed planning using ADM to the point that the headquarters can direct action in one of two ways. Either it can issue

\[112\text{DA, ADP 5-0, 7; United States Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 The Operations Process (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-4.}\]

\[113\text{DA, ADP 5-0, 7; DA, ADRP 5-0, 2-4 to 2-5 and 2-13.}\]
subordinates a concise mission-type order to enable rapid execution, or articulate a decision in sufficient detail to allow the staff to conduct coordination and detailed planning under the supervision of senior staff officers who participated in the ADM process. While either approach entails risk, the promise of compressing the planning process without significant risk warrants further consideration and testing, perhaps in a combat training center environment.

TUSA’s techniques may also inform a renewed understanding of the MDMP. Doctrine describes the conduct of its seven steps sequentially, although iterative revisitation of previous steps may occur.\textsuperscript{114} While this serves as a viable paradigm for discrete operations, Lucky’s experience suggests that under certain conditions, its steps may occur simultaneously. For example, Patton and his trusted agents demonstrated an ability to complete the process’ first six steps in a very short time. Under these conditions, it is difficult to determine where mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis, course of action comparison, and course of action approval begin and end. The latter step may not even prove necessary with an experienced and involved commander. In such cases, each step synergistically results from and informs each of the other steps. Collaboration and dialogue replace fixed inputs and outputs as the driving force for the process.

This insight may prove extremely valuable from a time management perspective. In situations where events are extremely fluid, commander-staff interactions are predictable, and the commander serves as planning’s driving force, the headquarters may harvest significant time savings by eliminating the MDMP’s distinct steps and briefings in favor of brief updates at each commander-staff interaction that generate collective dialogue and incremental decision-making. Once the concept is developed and war-gamed to a sufficient level of detail no longer requiring the commander’s decision, the staff can then assume responsibility for completing detailed

\textsuperscript{114}DA, ADP 5-0, 8; DA, ADRP 5-0, 2-11 to 2-13.
planning and orders production. Such an approach would require an exceptionally trained and empowered staff, but doctrine should consider such a level of expertise as both possible and desirable.

Finally, the observation that the activities constituting operations process may occur simultaneously calls ADP 5-0’s characterization of the planning-execution relationship into question. Current doctrine defines planning as “the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about.” On the other hand, it defines execution as “putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission.” Despite numerous qualifications that planning is continuous and but a framework from which to adapt, it is clear that as an institution, the Army believes that planning drives execution. Although reasonable for a discrete operation, this assumption is invalid under conditions where planning and execution may occur simultaneously. In these situations, TUSA’s philosophy that plans serve as but a datum plane upon which to build may apply better than doctrine’s current construct.

Alternative definitions for planning and execution may clarify the causal relationship between the two activities. Stating, for example, that “planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of increasing the probability for successful execution” while “execution is the act of applying combat power to accomplish assigned missions” would unequivocally remind practitioners that rather than driving execution, planning simply enables it. In and of itself, planning accomplishes nothing – its value lies solely in supporting action, which alone can transform current conditions.

115DA, ADP 5-0, 6; DA, ADRP 5-0, 2-1.
116Patton, War as I Knew It, 399.
into a desired future state. Explicitly placing planning in its proper subordinate role to execution may also assist the Army in overcoming its propensity to confuse processes with planning.\footnote{One detects an example of this confusion in ADRP 5-0 when the doctrine’s authors claim “in time-constrained conditions requiring immediate action, or if the problem is familiar, commanders may conduct the MDMP and publish an operation order without formally conducting Army design methodology.” Substituting the terms “detailed planning” and “conceptual planning” for “MDMP” and “Army design methodology” respectively would instantly reveal the illogic of this statement, since one could not successfully produce an order (or even conduct detailed planning) without first conceptualizing the operation. DA, ADRP 5-0, 2-13. For more on the acknowledged importance of action, see DA, ADP 5-0, 13; DA, ADRP 5-0, 4-1.}

To highlight execution’s importance, the Army may draw upon Lucky’s technique of sending staff officers forward to subordinate units in combat. While the need for commanders’ forward presence is firmly entrenched in doctrine and practice, extant literature is virtually silent on the subject of staff visits and reconnaissance. TUSA’s experience suggests that this method represents a powerful tool for commanders to improve their situational understanding, and an ideal vehicle for promoting interstaff coordination and compressing decision cycles. Although the contemporary operating environment’s conditions and resources may modify how this practice is implemented, the concept appears sound – especially when conducting fluid and dispersed operations.

Such visits may also enhance assessment activities. By leveraging his staff’s observations to supplement his own assessments, Patton gained a fuller understanding of conditions and friendly dispositions across TUSA’s combat zone. This understanding informed his decision-making, fostered greater shared awareness within the headquarters, and quickened decisions by minimizing the requirement for intermediate briefings and reports. Armed with his preferred measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, liaison officers and Lucky staff translated data into comprehensible indicators of progress.\footnote{Measure of effectiveness (MOE): “criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.” Measure of performance (MOP): “a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.” DA, ADRP 5-0, 5-2. Patton’s interest in...}
in the war room, these enabled Patton and his trusted agents to plan and assess operations with minimal research. This, in turn, allowed subordinates to focus on tactical actions, and the TUSA headquarters to concentrate on coordination and anticipation instead of running down data in support of topical briefings.

**Recommendations**

Combining institutional expectations, experience, and knowledge with his own immense expertise, George Patton fused a staff with different backgrounds into an organization capable of operationalizing his philosophy through a so-called third procedure. Although TUSA’s methods sought primarily to cope with mobile, dispersed offensive operations within the context of a protracted campaign, Lucky’s experience potentially poses implications for the modern mission command concept, and the operations process, in contemporary Corps and Theater Army headquarters. Although these findings require further research and analysis under varying conditions to validate their suitability for general decisive action, one may offer the following recommendations for doctrinal consideration:

1. Rewrite ADRP 6-0’s introduction to reflect mission command’s American origins.
2. Continue to incorporate historical case studies into mission command training to demonstrate the timelessness of its principles in American practice.
3. Revise ADP 5-0, paragraph 2 and ADRP 5-0, paragraph 1-8 to reflect the possibility that the operations process’ activities may occur simultaneously under some conditions, in addition to occurring/recurring iteratively.
4. Revise ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0, specifically paragraphs 28 and 2-23 respectively, to emphasize that integrated planning, consisting of conceptual and detailed

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comparative casualties and the amount of time between calls for fire and fire initiation provide examples of TUSA’s MOE and MOP respectively. Allen, *Lucky Forward*, 51-52; Patton, *War as I Knew It*, 409.
components, is the Army’s way of planning, not a particular methodology. These publications should retain their discussions of the ADM, MDMP, and TLP as tools to execute integrated planning, and to provide examples of an effective plan’s components, but not as prescriptive methods for conducting planning.

5. Revise ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 to reflect that under certain conditions, ADM may provide the basis not only for conceptual planning, but for integrated planning as well. In these situations, ADM may yield either a mission-type order for execution, or a detailed decision that could serve as the basis for subsequent detailed planning and orders production.

6. Revise ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0’s MDMP discussions to reflect that under certain conditions, its steps may occur simultaneously. In such cases, each step synergistically results from and informs each of the other steps, and collaboration and dialogue replace fixed inputs and outputs as driving forces for the process.

7. Revise the Army’s definitions for planning and execution contained in ADP 5-0, paragraphs 24 and 51, and ADRP 5-0, paragraphs 2-1 and 4-1. The definition for planning should read “the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of increasing the probability for successful execution.” The definition for execution should read “the act of applying combat power to accomplish assigned missions.” Such changes would recalibrate the planning-execution relationship by emphasizing that planning is valuable only insomuch as it enables successful action.

8. Incorporate Lucky’s technique of staff visits forward to subordinate units in combat into doctrine, specifically in the ADP/ADRP 5-0 and 6-0 series. Such visits provide numerous benefits including improved common understanding, greater interstaff coordination, faster decision-cycles, and better assessment.
CONCLUSION

One better understands TUSA’s World War II conduct as the result of complex interactions between institutional doctrine, PME, and experience on the one hand, and personal experience on the other. With interwar experience as a basis, individuals including General George S. Patton Jr., his trusted agents, and the 1450-man TUSA staff integrated two distinct traditions – informed by a common institutional process – into a third procedure tailored to meet its commander’s expectations and preferences. Patton’s unique warfighting philosophy and personal leadership provided the vital fusion mechanism to effect this transformation. While articulating institutional concepts generally familiar to all Lucky personnel, this philosophy provided explicit guidance about how the staff must operationalize these concepts under specific conditions to conduct the types of operations its CG expected and demanded. Armed with this guidance, TUSA then developed and trained procedures suited to highly mobile warfare before employing these methods in combat. Although not always successful, overall, the third procedure suited TUSA’s requirement to control rapid and widely dispersed operations characterized by simultaneous planning, preparation, execution, and assessment over a prolonged period.

This explanation challenges Patton-centric narratives explaining TUSA’s conduct in Northwest Europe by contextualizing his leadership within institutional norms and requirements. Doing so reveals that Patton’s unique accomplishments as an army commander laid beyond his front-line leadership and concern for the human dimension. Rather, his ability to synthesize his immense personal expertise and experience with his incomparable life-long self-development program into a unifying warfighting philosophy is what truly marked Patton as an ideal army-level CG. Further, his personal involvement in TUSA’s operations combined with his willingness to delegate staff-level decisions and detailed planning to trusted subordinates greatly enabled the army to quickly decide and act. This insight helps highlight the Lucky staff’s invaluable contributions, which historians sometimes overlook in their rush to assess Patton individually.
For modern military professionals, incorporating the institutional process into an analysis of TUSA’s combat operations confirms the DOTMLPF construct’s importance. As the construct’s cornerstone, doctrine is especially crucial; and Lucky’s experience offers a unique opportunity to reconsider institutional expectations through an alternate lens. TUSA’s procedures exhibit remarkable consonance with aspects of modern mission command, which suggests that the emerging philosophy is both compatible with, and derived from, the US Army’s heritage – a fact that ADRP 6-0 obscures. Further, the third procedure possesses potential ramifications for the Army’s operations process. Instead of a sequential but iterative process, Lucky’s experience demonstrates that under certain conditions, the process may occur simultaneously as well as iteratively. This insight calls the Army’s current characterization of the planning-execution relationship into question. As a result, the Army should reconsider its characterization of planning, the ADM and MDMP methodologies, and the mechanisms supporting execution and assessment. TUSA provides some signposts capable of informing future analysis and testing for decisive action beyond exploitation and pursuit – if modern practitioners are willing to investigate the possibilities.
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