PERSONNEL SYSTEMS IN EUROPE IN PREPARATION FOR OPERATION OVERLORD: HOW DID THEY WORK?

A Monograph

by

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The lessons learned from personnel systems during WWII ultimately contributed to centralizing current G1 and AG divisions into one cohesive staff section at the operational level. Centralizing these two staff sections minimized and prevented duplicate personnel staff efforts. The primary research question of this monograph is what factors enabled the development of American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems in Europe during the preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

The application and subsequent adaptation of 1940's US doctrine on personnel sections enabled experienced leaders to improvise and adapt during the preparation of Operation OVERLORD. In 1944, SHAPE, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group focused on the development of personnel systems and personnel process at the operational level in Europe. The systems assured efficient personnel processes and continued to provide flexibility in decentralized processes at lower echelons. The first section explores the identification, selection, and empowerment of leadership throughout the American and Commonwealth nations staffs. Their selection provided strategic leaders and Eisenhower with the assurance that the best qualified leaders were available.

The second section analyzes the development of US personnel organizational structures consisting of the reorganization, refinement, and synchronization of duties and responsibilities within the personnel system. These systems and processes provided American and Commonwealth nations with the necessary requirements to conduct operations in the ETO. The third section exposed the adaptation and innovation of US Army doctrine to incorporate the complexity of planning and eventually executing Operation OVERLORD. Although doctrine lacked a recommend course of action for all processes, leaders were able to adapt concepts to enable effective personnel processes.

This study concludes that the US Army must continue to remain flexible regarding personnel system requirements, as personnel processes will continue to adapt to current and future operations. The evidence provided in this study arguably illustrates the influence that Operation OVERLORD has on current US Army personnel doctrine and the current centralized structure of the G1/AG at operational level staff.
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ABSTRACT


The lessons learned from personnel systems during WWII ultimately contributed to centralizing current G1 and AG divisions into one cohesive staff section at the operational level. Centralizing these two staff sections minimized and prevented duplicate personnel staff efforts. The primary research question of this monograph is what factors enabled the development of American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems in Europe during the preparation for Operation OVERLORD?

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<td>Allied Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>Adjutant General, War Department</td>
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<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
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<td>US Army Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>Enemy Prisoner of War</td>
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<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
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<td>European Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
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How people react to change and innovation in war, or fail to react, is as meaningful as are the changes themselves.


INTRODUCTION

Although written more than sixty years after Operation OVERLORD, this epigraph explains the cognitive challenge of adapting and innovating during war. The inherent tension of adapting and innovating while in the psychological fog and friction of battle creates part of the strategic narrative of American and Commonwealth nations during the conceptualization, planning, and preparation for Operation OVERLORD. Planning for Operation OVERLORD encompassed the execution of a successful assault into France, the build up of combat power within the lodgment area, an attack from the lodgment, and then preparation for follow-on operations. This operation was the largest amphibious assault conducted in World War II, which involved joint and multinational operations by US and Commonwealth nations under control of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). However, the operations leading up to OVERLORD are what created the successful execution of the assault into Normandy.

The plan for executing Operation OVERLORD came from a series of operations leading up to D-Day. In the fall of 1942, Operation SLEDGEHAMMER was designed to take the German pressure off Russian forces and degrade German morale through deployment of attacks


\[3\] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 139, 177. During the 1940s there was no doctrinal definition for joint or multinational, therefore this study uses the current definition for joint, “Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.” The current definition for multinational is “Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners.”
into Normandy. Operation SLEDGEHAMMER also provided the establishment of a limited beachhead to serve as a lodgment to provide a quick reaction to relieve German pressure off Russia. The successes made during Operation SLEDGEHAMMER enabled the development of Operation NEPTUNE. In September 1943, Operation NEPTUNE provided the deception and security for planners to prepare the details for the execution of Operation OVERLORD. Operations NEPTUNE and SLEDGEHAMMER created the lodgment and basing for the advancement of American and Commonwealth nations into Normandy for Operation OVERLORD.

These operations reinforced the creation of SHAEF as the supreme command to oversee operations in Europe 1944. Under the SHAEF umbrella was the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) for American forces and 21st Army Group for British forces. These two commands provided manning, equipping, training, and operational oversight for each nation’s forces while SHAEF provided centralized oversight and synchronization of all American and Commonwealth nations operations in the European Theater of Operation (ETO). From a management of personnel processes perspective, the adaptation and innovation (overall development) of personnel systems played a vital role in the preparation for Operation OVERLORD. However, most of the SHAEF construct and methodology came from the experience, lessons learned, and efforts of the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in North Africa and the Mediterranean.

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The decision to send forces into North Africa came from the US War Department and British War Office. Combing and integrating personnel from two nationalities for the first time led to the decision to create the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) for actions in North Africa and the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{8} The plan for AFHQ was to oversee operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean in preparation for Operation OVERLORD in Normandy. In late July 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met to determine whether an American or British officer would command AFHQ. With the approval of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister, Sir Winston L. Churchill, an American officer would lead AFHQ forces. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, selected General Dwight D. Eisenhower whom assumed command of ETOUSA on June 24, 1942, to command both ETOUSA and the AFHQ in August 1942. As commander of AFHQ, Eisenhower was responsible for Operation TORCH.\textsuperscript{9}

The plans for Operation TORCH required the integration and coordination between the American and Commonwealth nations, Air Forces, and Navies. Operation TORCH consisted of an invasion into French North Africa to establish the initial basing for American and Commonwealth nations operations into Europe in preparation for Operation OVERLORD. However, Operation ANVIL served as the operation that established the lodgment in the Mediterranean to complement Operation OVERLORD.\textsuperscript{10} In light of operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean, the decision to stand up a headquarters in Europe to provide oversight similar to the AFHQ required a combined effort from American and Commonwealth nations. The creation of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command (COSSAC) headquarters became the designated primary planning headquarters structure to oversee operations in Northwest Europe.

\textsuperscript{8}US War Department, \textit{History of AFHQ, Part I: August-December 1942} (Washington, DC: War Department, 1942), iii.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., 2, 3.

\textsuperscript{10}Blumenson, \textit{Command Decisions}, 279.
The COSSAC was a planning headquarters tasked in April 1943 to develop detailed planning, resourcing, and the operational concept for Operation OVERLORD.¹¹ British Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan, chief OVERLORD planner, structured the COSSAC under the assumption that the Supreme Commander would be British.¹² However, after the selection of Eisenhower to serve as the Supreme Commander, Morgan had to realign the COSSAC to accommodate an American headquarters structure.¹³ As illustrated in Figure 1, Morgan separated the G4 and its administrative section to create the general staff for personnel (G1) while the Adjutant General (AG) Division remained as a special staff. For SHAEF, the G1 managed combat orders and AG managed non-combat orders, however, both served as the proponents for personnel. In late December 1943, Eisenhower sent his chief of staff from AFHQ, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith to Europe to oversee the organizational structure of the COSSAC in preparation for its transformation to SHAEF.¹⁴ Smith’s task was to transform the COSSAC that Morgan stood up from a planning staff to an operational staff to oversee the execution of Operation OVERLORD.¹⁵ One of the elements Smith looked to address was the personnel system. Although the personnel systems existed in COSSAC, the personnel system for SHAEF required specific developments to execute Operation OVERLORD.

¹²Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 49.
¹⁴Pogue, Supreme Command, 20.
¹⁵US War Department, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders, Field Manual (FM) 101-5, (Washington, DC: War Department, 1940), 2-3, 7. According to FM 101-5, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders, “The chief of staff or executive is the principal assistant and adviser to the commander. He may transmit the decisions of the commander to appropriate staff officers for preparation of the necessary orders, or transmit them in the form of orders to those who execute them. The staff of a unit consists of the officers who assist the commander in his exercise of command. The staff secures and furnishes such information as may be required by the commander, prepares the details of his plan, translates his decision and plan into orders, and causes such orders to be transmitted to the troops.”
Figure 1. Organization of the COSSAC Staff (January 1, 1944)


The development of efficient personnel systems and processes assured US and British forces were in order for the execution of Operation OVERLORD. The term personnel system incorporates the interaction and interrelationships of the execution of personnel processes through SHAEFS over ETOUSA and 21st Army Group. The SHAEFS personnel system provided oversight of Operation OVERLORD for American and Commonwealth nations in the ETO. ETOUSA provided administrative and supply oversight for all American forces, and 21st Army Group oversaw British personnel processes. This study’s use of the term personnel processes includes processing of awards and decorations, personnel replacements, accountability of casualties on the
battlefield, and accountability of friendly prisoners of war (POW) and enemy prisoners of war (EPW). As the records indicate, the 21st Army Group executed the majority of their own personnel processes separate from SHAEF, minus their awards and decorations processing.

The ability and capacity to perform processes were necessary to set the conditions for success during Operation OVERLORD. By design, US Army and British Army 1940s doctrine provided the framework for execution and employment of personnel processes. For awards and decorations, the approval required synchronized efforts between US and Commonwealth nations for approval. Field Manual (FM) 100-10 *Field Service Regulations (FSR) Administration* described the function of the replacements systems as a tool to assure dependable and timely arrival of properly qualified replacements as required. The purpose of the Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) processing was to ensure the accurate accountability of captured enemy combatants. In addition, accurate accountability of causalities helped to facilitate the flow of replacements into theater and assist the War Department in the next of kin notification process. In accordance with contemporary doctrine, developing, overseeing, and managing personnel processes became the responsibility of the G1 and AG. Therefore, SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group had to develop, oversee, and manage these processes in Northwest Europe.

The lack of doctrinal guidance to implement a SHAEF personnel system for handing joint and multinational personnel processes was critical because the G1 and AG had only the lessons learned from operations in North Africa by AFHQ to guide the inclusion of joint and multinational forces. Eisenhower commanded the AFHQ and provided oversight for American and Commonwealth nations operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean along with his

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16US War Department, *Field Service Regulations (FSR) Administration*, Field Manual (FM) 100-10 (Washington, DC: War Department, 1943), 123.

Chief of Staff, Smith. Eisenhower and Smith provided the SHAEF team with a wealth of experience in operating and integrating American and Commonwealth nations. During the execution of operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean, Eisenhower and Smith were responsible for the planning, execution, and synchronization of joint and multinational operations. Eisenhower and Smith brought the lessons learned and best practices from overseeing joint and multinational operations with them to SHAEF. Their combined experiences were critical to the development of the American and Commonwealth nation’s personnel systems in preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

The planning, preparation, and eventual execution of Operation OVERLORD through the employment of joint and multinational forces created significant challenges for the existing personnel system and the G1 and AG staff structures. Devising a method to overcome these challenges was the essence of the problem for the leaders within the American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems. The primary research question of this monograph is what factors enabled the development of American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems in Europe during the preparation for Operation OVERLORD?

This study argues that the application and subsequent adaptation of 1940’s US doctrine on personnel sections enabled experienced leaders to improvise and adapt during the preparation of Operation OVERLORD. The identification, selection, and empowerment of leaders throughout the American and Commonwealth nations staffs ensured the successful execution of personnel processes. In addition, the selection of experienced leaders enabled the development of competent personnel organizational structures in the ETO. The development of competent US personnel organizational structures consisted of the reorganization, refinement, and synchronization of personnel processes (duties and responsibilities) within the personnel system. US Army doctrine

\[18\] Crosswell, Beetle, 292.
in the 1940’s served as an initial guide for the employment and execution of personnel processes, but it failed to incorporate joint and multinational operations. Overall, efficient execution of personnel process throughout the American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems helped forces in ETO maintain tempo and extend the operational for Operation OVERLORD.19

This study utilizes primary and secondary evidence/literature in the form of after action reports, general board reports, memorandums, and papers produced by the G1, AG, Secretary General Staff, and Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command. Studying documents develop in sequence created an understanding of the history of personnel system and helped describe the concept of personnel processes executed in preparation for Operation OVERLORD, and their development. This study also provides an understanding of how the development of personnel processes in preparation for Operation OVERLORD can inform and influence current personnel processes and doctrine.

The first section of this study explores the identification, selection, and empowerment of leadership throughout the American and Commonwealth nations staffs. The second section analyzes the development of competent US personnel organizational structures consisting of the reorganization, refinement, and synchronization of personnel processes (duties and responsibilities) within the personnel system. The third section exposes the adaptation and innovation of US Army doctrine to incorporate the complexity of planning and eventually

19HQs, Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 161. According to ADRP 3-0, tempo is “the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.” Operational reach is “the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.” The culminating point is “that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations.” 4-8; JP 1-02 defines lodgment as, “A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. Although these definitions describe current doctrine, they are examples of actions demonstrated in 1944.
executing Operation OVERLORD. The final section of this study concludes by explaining the relevance of personnel processes in tempo and operational reach. Additionally, this section will illustrate the influence personnel processes developed in preparation for Operation OVERLORD has on current US Army personnel operations.

For a man to make it in this war, he had to be a leader with ‘inexhaustible nervous energy and iron-clad determination to face discouragement, risk, and increasing work without flinching.’

-Dwight D. Eisenhower

LEADERSHIP

Eisenhower’s quote described what he expected from a leader. His expectations drove him to selecting the leadership for Operation OVERLORD. Currently, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership, defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” Providing purpose, direction, and motivation converts into the essence of Army leadership and arguably makes leadership the most important attribute of any successful military organization. Among other things, leadership enables officers to employ talent management through identification, attraction, and retention of key personnel who have the capability to make a significant difference to the current and future performance of an organization. Competent leaders understand that getting the right people on the team provides


22Lance A. Berger and Dorothy R. Berger, The Talent Management Handbook: Creating Organizational Excellence by Identifying, Developing, and Promoting Your Best People (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 231. Although talent management is a current term, the actions of leaders in the 1940’s serves as an example of talent management as described today.
easier transitions for superiors when a change in organization has to occur.\textsuperscript{23} For Eisenhower, the addition of experienced leadership, in the right place, and at the right time was critical to the successful preparation of Operation OVERLORD and the development of the American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems.

This section argues that identification, selection, and empowerment of experienced leadership throughout the American and Commonwealth nations personal systems ensured the efficient execution of personnel process during the preparation of Operation OVERLORD. In addition, having the right leaders, in the right place, at the right time set the conditions for the further development of proficient personnel organizational structures and the adaptation of 1940s US Army doctrine on personnel processes. An examination of the experience, selection, and eventual actions of seven officers within the American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems demonstrates the importance and impact of leadership on the creation of personnel policy.

Seven officers held the key leader positions within SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group necessary to understand the effective use of personnel systems. Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith (US Army) was the Chief of Staff for SHAEF and ETOUSA.\textsuperscript{24} Eisenhower selected him to serve as the chief of staff because of his experience in AFHQ’s in North Africa and his accomplishments as a soldier-diplomat.\textsuperscript{25} Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey M. Gale (British Army) was the SHAEF Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). Eisenhower and Smith selected Gale because of his experience in coordinating between American and British administrations. Major General Ray W. Barker (US Army) was the SHAEF G1. Smith selected him because he

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{23}James C. Collins, \textit{Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...and Others Don’t} (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{24}Pogue, \textit{Supreme Command}, 74.
\end{itemize}
represented continuity for the personnel system during the transformation of COSSAC to SHAEF.26 Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis (US Army) was the initial AG for SHAEF. Eisenhower and Smith selected Davis because of his experience in AFHQ’s with joint and multinational forces. COL Emil C. Boehnke (US Army) was the initial SHAEF AG Executive Officer, later the actual AG, his experience with joint and multinational operations and the execution of personnel processes was vital. Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee (US Army) was the Deputy Theater Commander for ETOUSA. Lee was already in place when Eisenhower assumed command of SHAEF. Lee provided his experiences in Europe with managing US forces and communication with the War Department on administrative matters. Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery (British Army), who served as the commander of 21st Army Group, was known for his experience with working in multinational operational environments in North Africa and the Mediterranean under AFHQ.27 Montgomery’s selection was not through American channels but rather British. Sir Winston L. Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, selected Montgomery to serve as the senior British ground force commander under SHAEF.28 Selecting these seven leaders provided SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group with competent leadership that enabled their experiences with integrating and coordinating personnel processes in a joint and multinational environment.

26Ray W. Barker, interviewed by Dr. Macklyn Burg, July 15, 1972, Ray W. Barker Papers, 1942-1946, Eisenhower Library, Box 1. This interview was a collaboration of Barker’s experiences as a commander to serving as the SHAEF G1 under Smith and Eisenhower. Barker provided all the details that he recalled from planning operations, organizational structure, and the dialogue he had with leaders in the ETO.


SHAEF

Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith (US Army)

Smith’s early exposure to personnel processes greatly influenced his ability to oversee them as the SHAEF Chief of Staff. As a captain, Smith was dual hatted as the G1 for the Twelfth Brigade and camp adjutant for the Sixth Corps training center at Camp Custer, outside Battle Creek, Michigan during WWI. These two jobs required him to manage the largest staff in the brigade, while performing adjutant functions simultaneously for the camp. Smith quickly identified the dynamics and responsibilities required for the management of personnel processes.29 This early experience helped him develop the personnel system focused on the efficient execution of personnel processes. Smith’s exposure to joint and multinational operations as the Chief of Staff of AFHQs in North Africa helped him to synchronize and coordinate operations with SHAEF.

Eisenhower initially threw himself into the task of moving key personnel from AFHQ to SHAEF in preparation for OVERLORD.30 He identified Smith to lead and shape the personnel process for the command. Eisenhower depended on Smith’s military judgement because of his capacity for organizing staff work.31 Smith’s first priority involved fine-tuning COSSAC and converting it into the staff he envisioned.32 His primary methodology for building his staff resided in leveraging key personnel away from other commands in the theater of operations.33 This

29Crosswell, Beetle, 150.
30Ambrose, The Supreme Commander, 310.
31John A. Adams, The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 72.
32Ibid., 569.
33US War Department, FSR Administration, FM 100-10, (Washington, DC: 1943), 7; Crosswell, Beetle, 560. According to FM 100-10, “a theater of operations is a term used to designate that portion of the land, sea, and air areas of the theater of war necessary for military operations, either offensive or defensive, pursuant to an assigned mission, and for the administration incident to such military operations.”
ensured that the SHAEF team had leaders that were competent and had experience in the ETO. Drawing upon his experiences in the Allied Force Headquarters, Smith understood that an individual’s professional ability was the most important factor regardless of the uniform he wore. This approach was essential to managing a multinational SHAEF staff.

To build the SHAEF personnel team, Smith based his understanding of a personnel system from the requirements and personnel processes employed by the AFHQ G1 and AG. Smith’s approach to stealing talent from AFHQ did not sit well with leaders in AFHQ. However, Eisenhower’s selection of Smith to serve as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command further enabled leadership and talent management within the G1 and AG for SHAEF. For Smith, assembling a team to prepare the SHAEF staff was essential for Operation OVERLORD. This was because the current SHAEF staff was nothing more than a planning group and required competent leaders to shape efficient staff operations for detailed planning and execution of Operation OVERLORD. Among this initial group that Smith recommended to Eisenhower for retention was Gale.

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37 Walter B. Smith, Cable to Eisenhower, January 2, 1944, Cable Reference No. W-9154, from Lieutenant General Smith to AGWAR (Eyes only of Colonel Sexton, Secretary of General Staff, for delivery to General Eisenhower on his arrival), Walter Bedell Smith: Collection of World War II Documents, 1941-1945, Eisenhower Library, Box 19. On this cable, Smith provided Eisenhower with a report of the current staff organization. Smith also recommended several changes from movement of the command headquarters to leaders to keep within the command as SHAEF prepared for Operation OVERLORD.
Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey M. Gale (British Army)

Gale served as the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) for AFHQ under Eisenhower and Smith, and brought a unique perspective to the SHAEF staff. As the CAO for AFHQ, Gale coordinated American and British administration for Smith. Gale’s experience with the expanding AFHQ in 1943 provided him with lessons learned that he could apply to the evolving SHAEF staff. Smith selected Gale to serve as the Deputy Chief of Staff, CAO because of Gale’s reputation and Eisenhower’s confidence in him as a capable officer on the AFHQ staff. Gale’s understanding of coordinating and integrating personnel processes and personnel divisions at a large headquarters was essential to preparing SHAEF and the personnel staffs for Operation OVERLORD. As historian Forrest C. Pogue explains in his book *The Supreme Command*, “Smith pointed out that Eisenhower had always felt he would be unwilling to undertake another large Allied Command without Gale’s administrative assistance.” Smith agreed wholeheartedly and said he would feel “greatly handicapped if Gale was not working by his side.” Eisenhower and Smith agreed that Gale had to be on the team because of his leadership and experience to integrate and coordinate personnel processes.

Gale brought a different dynamic to the SHAEF team as the CAO. As Eisenhower stated, “it created a post unique in the history of war.” In AFHQ, Gale was responsible for integrating the British and American G1, and had demonstrated the ability to adapt existingorganizational

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38US War Department, *History of AFHQ, Part I*, 32.
42Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 64.
structures to new and unique circumstances. As displayed in Figure 2, personnel processes for AFHQ G1 were not coordinated or integrated until they reached Gale’s desk. This was due to the parallel structure of American and British G1s under Gale. As the senior British officer on the SHAEF staff, Gale additionally served as a liaison between SHAEF and 21st Army Group. As historian John Keegan noted in his book, *Who’s Who in World War II*, “Gale was virtually unknown to the public but was an extremely valuable collaborator for Eisenhower.” Additionally, Gale coordinated administrative planning for SHAEF’s ground and naval commands. Gale’s leadership and talent supported his ability to serve as the SHAEF CAO not only through his talent to manage administration, but also through his competent leadership in the execution of personnel processes in preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

![Diagram of G-1 Section Allied Force Headquarters](image)

Figure 2. Organization of G-1 Section Allied Force Headquarters (November 1, 1942) Revised


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44*US War Department, History of AFHQ, Part I*, 32, 42.
45Ibid., 32.
46Ibid., 42. Taken from the footnotes of the *History of AFHQ, Part I*, “There were no official or approved charts of the G1 Section in this period. The information was obtained from Lt Col G. G. Baker (G1-British) and from the chief clerk (G1-American), who were with the sections from the beginning.” The AFHQ was the first time in history that US and Commonwealth nations combined their staffs and headquarters in support of combat operations.
49Crosswell, *Beetle*, 573.
Major General Ray W. Barker (US Army)

In addition to selecting Gale to serve as the SHAEF CAO, Smith selected Barker to remain in place to serve as the G1. In early 1942, Barker relinquished command of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment at Camp Roberts, California. After relinquishing his command, Barker was assigned as the head planner for Headquarters, US Forces in Europe responsible for preparing the plan for Operation TORCH. Barker gained a wealth of experience in Europe working in both plans and operations divisions before being assigned as the Deputy COSSAC in the spring of 1943.

Smith selected Barker because of his previous position as the Deputy COSSAC responsible for managing personnel and daily operations. Despite Barker’s request to return to soldiering he was retained by Smith to serve as the SHAEF G1. Smith informed Barker, “You’re too deeply into this, and I need you here with me to help me get oriented and get broken in. I can’t consider your going back to a division. You’ve got to stay here with us.” Smith knew that Barker’s experience in the COSSAC, as well as his relationship with British authorities, was essential to building the SHAEF G1. Thus, in the spring of 1944 Barker officially became the G1 for SHAEF in preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

Barker had concerns about serving in the capacity of the G1 because he was a Field Artillery officer by trade and this position was normally served by an AG officer. However, keeping him on the team ensured continuity for the SHAEF team. As any competent leader

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52Ibid., 2, 58. SHAEF was a continuation of the COSSAC staff organized in April 1943 and developed throughout the year to ultimately serve as the initial staff for the Supreme Commander.


54Ibid.
would do, Barker constantly proved that he was able to work within SHAEF staff through his understanding of integrating newcomers from AFHQ to the G1. 55 The experience Barker gained managing personnel processes while serving as the Deputy COSSAC centered on getting the right leaders and personnel replacements for SHAEF. 56 For example, in late December 1943, Barker attended a manpower conference in Washington that addressed critical shortages on replacements for American forces. 57 Barker was fully engaged in dialogue with the War Department and tasked by Smith to ensure they were speaking the same language when it came to manpower shortages for SHAEF. As historian, D. K. R. Crosswell, emphasized in his book, Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith, “Barker informed the War Department, unless we were supported more strongly we might lose the war.” 58 Barker found himself consistently communicating SHAEF manpower requirements and shortages between Europe to Washington. 59 Barker’s leadership and talent enabled the development and implementation of an efficient SHAEF G1 through his experiences in Europe integrating and coordinating American and Commonwealth nations.

**Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis (US Army) and Colonel Emil C. Boehnke (US Army)**

With Gale and Barker on the team, Smith moved Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis to Europe to serve as the SHAEF AG. Similar to Gale, Davis served under Smith in the AFHQ and gained the experiences from working around multinational personnel processes. Davis began to build his credibility among senior US Army leaders when he served as General MacArthur’s

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55 Ambrose, The Supreme Commander, 340.


57 Crosswell, Beetle, 789.

58 Ibid., 840.

aide-de-camp in the Philippines from 1928 to 1930. Davis continued to establish his credibility when he returned to the Philippines eight years later as an adviser on AG affairs. To add to his understanding of AG personnel process, Davis’ assignments in the War Department in 1930 and then again in 1940, provided him with the strategic concept for AG personnel processes. In 1930, Davis served in the Office of the Chief of Staff, and in 1940, Davis first served in the AG office and later in the Special Service Branch. Through his experiences as an AG officer from the late 1920’s to the early 1940’s, Davis was able to implement his understanding of personnel processes while serving as the ETOUSA AG in July 1942 before moving over to AFHQ in August.60

From August 1942 until receiving his reassignment as the SHAEF AG in February 1944, Davis served as the AFHQ AG.61 Smith selected Davis to serve as the SHAEF AG because of Davis’ experience in the Philippines, War Department, and his friendship with Eisenhower.62 Before moving to Europe, Davis requested to bring his AG section from AFHQ to SHAEF to ensure he had competent leaders on his team.63 Initially, Davis served as the AG for SHAEF, but was moved to serve as the Chief, Public Relations Division and was replaced by Colonel Emil C. Boehnke before OVERLORD.64

60Pogue, Supreme Command, 5.
61Ibid.
62Crosswell, Beetle, 561.
63Thomas J. Davis, Organization of Adjutant General’s Division, 9 February 1944, General Thomas Jefferson Davis, Report of the Adjutant General Allied Force Headquarters North Africa to Special Awards, Eisenhower Library, Box 3. Davis requested the authorization to move key staff members from the AFHQ G1 to SHAEF G1 to sustain the team and maintained continuity on personnel efforts established in North Africa.
64Carter L. Burgess, Summary of Decisions made by Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff, dated 13 April 1944, Memorandum for Lieutenant General Smith, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 8. This memorandum consisted of a summary of decisions made by Smith and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of SHAEF on operations and daily staff actions logged by US Army Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Burgess, Acting Secretary, General Staff.
Boehnke’s leadership and talent for personnel process came from serving as the Executive Officer for AFHQ AG under Davis. Moving Boehnke to serve as the AG arguably demonstrated Smith’s ability to influence capable officers like Davis to retain talent and leaders for his team. While at AFHQ, Boehnke gained an understanding of the personnel processes required for an Allied Headquarters. From his exposure at AFHQ, Boehnke grasped the concept of AG processes such as the handling of correspondence and the processing of administrative actions, which provided significant challenges when dealing with Commonwealth nations. To better facilitate AG personnel processes, Boehnke began to expand the AG staff’s responsibilities and increase manpower based on the requirements to support Operation OVERLORD.

As Operation OVERLORD loomed, Boehnke looked to reorganize the AG division as a whole. Boehnke divided the AG into three separate entities for command and control purposes to cover forward, main, and rear personnel processes. Forward handled policy and operational matters. This consisted of correspondence, publications, mail and distribution, personnel functions, operational records, security control, and courier transfer. The main handled routine administrative matters responsible for the reproduction of records, microfilm, security control, War Department publications, and courier transfers. The rear was responsible for mail and distribution of correspondence. Boehnke’s approach for reorganizing the SHAEF AG demonstrated his initiative to establish command and control nodes throughout the ETO to provide efficient personnel support. However, after Davis returned from his duties as Chief,

65US War Department, History of AFHQ, Part II, 264.
66Emil C. Boehnke, Plan for Organization of Adjutant General’s Division, Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, Supreme Headquarters, General Thomas Jefferson Davis, Report of the Adjutant General Allied Force Headquarters North Africa to Special Awards, Eisenhower Library, Box 3. In this memorandum Boehnke request the authorization to establish and expand SHAEF AG elements throughout the ETO. Boehnke’s based his on organizing the SHAEF AG to provide efficient personnel support in preparation for Operation OVERLORD.
67Ibid.
Public Relations Division in late 1944, Boehnke returned to his previous position as the AG Executive Officer.\textsuperscript{68} Smith’s emphasis on leadership and talent management arguably set the conditions for his subordinates to exercise leadership and the implementation of their experiences to develop the personnel system for SHAEF.

\textbf{ETOUSA}

\textbf{Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee (US Army)}

Under the SHAEF personnel system for US forces was ETOUSA that Eisenhower commanded as well. Lee served as the Deputy Theater Commander for ETOUSA under Eisenhower. Lee gained his experience in management by serving as the Chief of Staff of 89th Division in WWI. In 1940, Lee received his first division level command as the Commander, Port of Embarkation in San Francisco, California. After commanding the Port of Embarkation, Lee received another opportunity to command as the commander of 2nd Infantry Division. Lee was a Regular Army engineer by trade, however his experiences gained the confidence of General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces. When the War Department required a leader to create the army supplies system in Europe, Lee was the leader that Somervell recommended.\textsuperscript{69}


\textsuperscript{68} Carter L. Burgess, Summary of Decisions made by Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff, dated 13 April 1944, Memorandum for Lieutenant General Smith, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 8. This memorandum consisted of a summary of decisions made by Smith and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of SHAEF on operations and daily staff actions logged by US Army Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Burgess, Acting Secretary, General Staff.

\textsuperscript{69} Adams, \textit{The Battle for Western Europe}, 29.
experience brought a reputation as an able organizer and strict disciplinarian.” Lee primary concern before departing to England was the team that would accompany him to his new command. Through Somervell’s assistance, Lee’s team was selected within two weeks of his departure. Lee’s previous experience as a division commander provided him with the requirements to lead and organize his command. In May 1942, Lee departed to England with his staff and his plan to organize the SOS and develop an efficient supply and administration system in Europe.70

In mid-January 1944, Eisenhower began to make immediate changes to the current task organization of army headquarters in ETO. First, Eisenhower consolidated SOS and ETOUSA to create one headquarters. Lee served as the Deputy Commander for supply and administration.71 Eisenhower relied upon Lee to address American issues that required War Department action, such as personnel replacement problems.72 As historian Stephen E. Ambrose described in his book, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Lee was a martinet who was both willing and able to handle thousands of details connected with the presence of the American Army in England.” Eisenhower’s confidence in Lee’s leadership and strategic support enabled the SHAEF staff to focus on detailed planning for Operation OVERLORD.73

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70 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 35.
71 Pogue, Supreme Command, 74.
72 Ambrose, The Supreme Commander, 595.
73 Ibid.
21st Army Group

Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery (British Army)

With SHAEF and ETOUSA focused on their leadership for efficient personnel systems, British forces developed a personnel system simultaneously. Before assuming command of 21st Army Group, Montgomery had a wealth of leadership experiences and responsibilities as a commander. Montgomery gained his experience in the ETO during his command of 3d British Division in France 1939 to 1940. In North African in 1942, Eisenhower and Montgomery’s senior/subordinate command relationship came under AFHQ where Eisenhower commanded the AFHQ and Montgomery served as the commander of First British Army. This senior/subordinate command relationship continued when Montgomery assumed command of 21st Army Group and Eisenhower assumed his duties as Supreme Commander in January 1944.74

In late December 1943, Churchill announced Montgomery as the commander of 21st Army Group in preparation for Operation OVERLORD.75 Historian John A. Adams in his book, “The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944: An Operational Assessment,” described Montgomery as a “brilliant practitioner of what military men refer to as the operational level of war. Tactics are what leaders execute when in contact with the enemy.”76 Throughout his career, Montgomery had proven his effectiveness as a leader to execute operations at the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, Montgomery was the ideal officer to lead British forces into Normandy. Under SHAEF Montgomery was responsible for commanding the American and Commonwealth nations

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74 Pogue, Supreme Command, 15.
75 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 194.
76 CJS, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: 2013); US War Department, FSR Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington DC: 1941), 239. According to JP 1-02, the operational level of war is currently defined as, “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.” However, tactics is a contemporary term explained in FM 100-5 as being “based on a small force striking a quick blow with surprise against isolated detachments and unprotected columns or convoys.”
assault in Normandy.\textsuperscript{77} In addition, as the British ground commander, Montgomery maintained
communication with his American counterpart General Omar Bradley, Commander, First Army. This communication was essential since Eisenhower appointed Montgomery to command US and British ground forces as well as gave Montgomery operational control for the early stages of Operation OVERLORD.\textsuperscript{78}

As historian David W. Hogan, Jr. annotated in his book, \textit{A Command Post at War}, “Montgomery as a commander believed in strong, firm direction from the top, and in line with British system, rigidly centralized control, exemplified by detailed orders and closely supervised execution.” To support his centralized control philosophy, Montgomery identified the leadership and talent within the British armed forces for his team. One of the key decisions Montgomery made was bringing experienced staff officers from British Eighth Army to 21st Army Group headquarters that understood American operations.\textsuperscript{79} This enabled the integration and coordination between American and British ground forces. Overall, Montgomery understood that unity of command for American and British forces were required for victory in Normandy.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{Leadership Summary}

The selection of these leaders by Eisenhower, Smith, and American and British strategic leadership provided the framework for the personnel systems of SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group. Eisenhower and Smith’s leadership demonstrated the ADP 6-22 attributes of leadership through their selection of quality and competent leaders to coordinate personnel processes for American and Commonwealth nations. American and British strategic leadership

\textsuperscript{77}Pogue, \textit{Supreme Command}, 15.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., 66.

\textsuperscript{79}Hogan, \textit{Command Post at War}, 45-46, 74.

\textsuperscript{80}Adams, \textit{The Battle for Western Europe}, 57.
assisted the leaders of SHAEF by identifying competent leaders to support the preparation for Operation OVERLORD as well. Selecting these seven officers reflects talent management and leadership in that critical leaders that could motivate, develop, and manage teams that supported personnel processes for American and Commonwealth nations. With these leaders selected, Eisenhower charged Smith to focus his efforts on the organization.  

**ORGANIZATION**

Having the right leaders in place enabled the creation of organizational structures to facilitate personnel processes. In accordance with the 1943 War Department Field Manual 100-10, *FSR Administration*, “A theater of operations is organized administratively to meet the needs of the forces assigned to the theater so as to enable them to carry out their missions in the general plan of operations. Improving the administrative organization is a continuing process based on experience gained in the theater.” Applying the available lessons learned about the proper organization of US and Commonwealth nations that worked for AFHQ added value to organizing the personnel staffs of SHAEF for OVERLORD.

The SHAEF G1 and AG structures developed by Smith’s personnel staff provided an increased capability and capacity to perform personnel processes. The lessons learned from AFHQ G1 organizational structure were minimum because of the lack of an approved task organization chart thoughtout the AFHQ G1’s existance in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Therefore, Barker did not have a reference for how to organize an integrated G1, which provided

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84 US War Department, *History of AFHQ, Part I*, 42.
him the opportunity to create the G1 as he saw fit.\textsuperscript{85} For example, the original structure for the SHAEF G1 did not include the prisoner of war (POW) branch for friendly and enemy forces. However, FM 101-5 recommended prisoner of war administration as a requirement for the G1 and provided the procedures to account for POWs and the handling of EPWs.\textsuperscript{86} For Barker, the development of the POW branch came at a time where he was still getting over the requirement to organize a POW branch, a task previously managed by the AFHQ AG in North Africa.\textsuperscript{87} In addition, the AG structure in AFHQ addressed casualty reporting, but this task became a G1 requirement in SHAEF. Although the SHAEF G1 and AG served in the capacity of an integrated headquarters, the majority of American forces were managed by ETOUSA, with SHAEF providing oversight of operations.

This section analyzes the development of personnel organizational structures consisting of the reorganization, refinement, and synchronization of US personnel processes (duties and responsibilities) within the personnel system in preparation for Operation OVERLORD. This section will only examine the SHAEF and ETOUSA structures and how these organizations supported personnel processes in the ETO. An examination of the reorganization, refinement, and synchronization with the American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems demonstrates the overall impact of having competent leaders and an efficient organization.

\textsuperscript{85}Ray W. Barker, interviewed by Dr. Macklyn Burg, July 15, 1972, Ray W. Barker Papers, 1942-1946, Eisenhower Library, Box 1. The POW branch was responsible for accounting for friendly POWs and the handling and maintenance of enemy prisoners of war (EPW). This branch served in the capacity to handle/oversee friendly and enemy prisoners of war for SHAEF.


\textsuperscript{87}Ray W. Barker, interviewed by Dr. Macklyn Burg, July 15, 1972, Ray W. Barker Papers, 1942-1946, Eisenhower Library, Box 1.
Chief Administrative Officer

Smith brought the CAO position from AFHQ to SHAEF because it proved to be effective in AFHQ. This position did not originally exist in the SHAEF structure. The CAO position, created in the British system, served as one of two senior commander’s principal assistants responsible for personnel operations. This position was developed at AFHQ to coordinate American and British G1 administrative systems because they differed so greatly. However, the CAO had less influence on the G1 because the SHAEF organizational structure did not place the CAO directly over the SHAEF G1. The requirement to coordinated personnel activities and correspondence pertaining to personnel through the CAO accordingly ensured Gale a part of G1 actions before requiring Smith’s approval. Having Gale serve as the CAO was essential to maintaining communication on personnel for British forces.

G1 Division

In addition to the CAO, Smith also sought to integrate elements from elsewhere in the staff, such as the G1 with an American lead, intelligence division (G2) with a British lead, operations division (G3) with a American lead, and the logistics divisions (G4) with an British

90Crosswell, *Butler*, 573.
91Ray W. Barker, Revision of T/O (U.S.) for Prisoner of War Branch, SHAEF, dated 5 June 1944, Memorandum, Major General Barker to Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith thru Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey M. Gale; Revision of War Establishment (British) for Prisoner of War Branch dated 1 June 1944, Memorandum from Barker to Smith thru Gale, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff; Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32. In these memorandums, Barker provides a detail analysis of the requirements needed to effectively organize the POW branch in preparation for the EPWs received during Operation OVERLORD.
Smith’s understanding of G1 personnel processes was to formulate policies that governed the handling of individual assignments and replacements. The SHAEF G1 was separated from the COSSAC G4 as a separate staff section in December 1943. Within the new structure, Barker orchestrated the requirements to build the G1 in order to support personnel processes before the execution of OVERLORD.

In early 1944, Barker spent the majority of his time expanding the responsibilities and increasing manpower requirements to support SHAEF personnel processes. He sought to assemble the structure of the G1 before the execution of Operation OVERLORD. As Barker stated, “Unlike the organization in the War Department, army corps, and army divisions, the SHAEF staff did not have an authorized organizational chart prescribed with authorized personnel positions to fill.” Barker faced initial challenges on personnel because the Tables of Organization and War Establishments planned for SHAEF did not incorporate personnel requirements for the G1. To continue to expand the G1 division and its manpower, Barker provided further analysis on the requirements to structure his G1 staff. As Table 1 depicts, Barker recommended an increase in senior field grades officers. Senior field grade officers are normally

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93Walter B. Smith, Cable Reference No. W-9154, from Smith to AGWAR (Eyes only of Colonel Sexton, Secretary of General Staff, for delivery to General Eisenhower on his arrival), dated 2 January 1944, Walter Bedell Smith: Collection of World War II Documents, 1941-1945, Eisenhower Library, Box 19. This cable consisted of Smith providing Eisenhower with a report of the current staff organization. Smith also recommended several changes from movement of the command headquarters to leaders to keep within the command as SHAEF prepared for Operation OVERLORD.


95Crosswell, *Beetle*, 573.

96Ray W. Barker, Revision of War Establishment (British) for Prisoner of War Branch, dated 1 June 1944, Memorandum from Barker to Smith thru Gale, TAB “A,” Prisoner of War Branch, SHAEF, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32. This memorandum provided a detail analysis of the requirements to increase troop strength to efficiently manage the POW branch.


experienced and have the capacity to work independently. Smith immediately approved Barker’s request to increase his Colonels from four to five, Lieutenant Colonels from three to six, and deleting his Majors by one.99 Key positions in the G1 staff necessitated both military and civilian experience. As Barker stated, “it is necessary therefore to upgrade certain positions in order to secure the caliber of officers capable of planning and of analyzing the problems falling within the scope of the G1 Division.”100

Table 1. Increase in American Officer Manning, G1 Division (May 11, 1944)

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*Source:* Ray W. Barker, Increase in Personnel, G1 Division, Memorandum from Barker to Smith, dated 11 May 1944, approved by Smith on 12 May 1944. DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32.

Increasing the number of senior field grade officer within the SHAEF G1 enabled Barker to place G1 personnel in the SHAEF main and rear headquarters to provide support and situational awareness on personnel processes for the POW branch.101 On top of his liaison work, Barker stated that Smith, “dumped the whole business of prisoner of war” into his division. In

99Ray W. Barker, Increase in Personnel, G1 Division, Memorandum from Barker to Smith, dated 11 May 1944, approved by Smith on 12 May 1944. DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32. In this memorandum Barker addressed the requirement for senior officers within the G1 to fill key and critical position throughout the G1 division.

100Ray W. Barker, Increase in Personnel, G1 Division, Memorandum from Barker to Smith, dated 11 May 1944, approved by Smith on 12 May 1944. DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32.

101Ibid.
addition Barker stated that “this required accountability of friendly and enemy prisoners of war, and what a job that was!”

Furthermore, the requirement to develop a POW branch added the need for more personnel requirements for the G1’s personnel shortages. Although Barker thought Smith was creating additional duties for the G1, Smith was well within the doctrinal guidelines for the G1 by placing the POW requirement on Barker. However, Field Manual 100-10, provided the requirements and responsibilities for handling EPWs. This contemporary doctrine provided Barker with a method to support the organization of his POW Branch. Nevertheless, the POW branch was a requirement that had to be operational to conduct the initial stages of Operation OVERLORD.

In addition to providing the analysis of the senior leaders required to lead the POW branch, Barker determined that it would take several sub-components to account for friendly POWs and manage, coordinate, and administer control of all EPWs. Hence, the emergence of this new requirement led Barker to request additional officers to manage the POW branch. The anticipated need for EPW accountability required the inclusion of a liaison to analyze accurate data for the submission of EPW correspondence. As a result, Barker specifically looked into increasing the authorization to two officers in the POW branch, one forward and one in the rear headquarters in London. The initial expansion of the POW branch required more than 200 American and British officers. Much had to be learned through trial and error, but with FM 101-

\footnote{Ray W. Barker, interviewed by Dr. Macklyn Burg, July 15, 1972, Ray W. Barker Papers, 1942-1946, Eisenhower Library, Box 1.}

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{For more information on Prisoner of War Administration see: War Department, \textit{FSR Administration}, FM 100-10 (Washington, DC: 1943), 137-146.}

\footnote{Pogue, \textit{Supreme Command}, 62. Smith directed the flow of correspondence into his office and cut down the number of direct contacts between the Supreme Commander and the SHAEF deputies and staff members.}

\footnote{Ray W. Barker, Increase in Personnel, G1 Division, Memorandum from Barker to Smith, dated 11 May 1944, approved by Smith on 12 May 1944. DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32.}
5. *Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders* and Gale’s guidance, the structural requirements for G1 were available.\(^{107}\) Smith’s approval of Barker’s POW branch enabled Barker to provide the necessary maintenance and evacuation of some two million prisoners.\(^{108}\) Thus, G1 functions like personnel management and POW accountability arguably contributed to the tempo and operational reach for SHAEF during the execution of Operation OVERLORD.\(^{109}\)

**Adjutant General Division**

When gaps were identified in personnel processes, the capable officers selected by Eisenhower and Smith adapted their structures by borrowing manpower from elsewhere, to include AFHQ. Staffed largely with American officers, the Adjutant General Division established principles of organization in accordance with US doctrine.\(^{110}\) With Davis’ assignment to SHAEF, he brought the AG structure from AFHQ and the lessons learned to conduct casualty reporting and awards processing. The AG served as the proponent for policy and initiated policy to cover areas where it did not exist.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{108}\) Ray W. Barker, Revision of T/O (U.S.) for Prisoner of War Branch, SHAEF, dated 5 June 1944, Memorandum, Major General Barker to Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith thru Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey M. Gale, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32. This memorandum provided a detail analysis of the manpower required to structure the SHAEF G1 POW Branch.

\(^{109}\) Ray W. Barker, Revision of War Establishment (British) for Prisoner of War Branch, dated 1 June 1944. TAB “A,” Prisoner of War Branch, SHAEF, Memorandum from Barker to Smith thru Gale, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 32. This TAB provided the specific tasks and requirements for the POW Branch.

\(^{110}\) Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 91.

The AG’s primary purpose was to synchronize correspondence and communication across the Supreme Headquarters so support senior leader decision-making. This reduced the workload for the general staff and allowed these staff sections to focus on other requirements. The structure of the AFHQ AG retained more responsibilities than the SHAEF AG. As Figure 3 displays, the AFHQ AG had a number of responsibilities that provided personnel services and processes to the AFHQ. This structure is how Smith originally envisioned the SHAEF AG to organize. The responsibility for POWs eventually transferred to the SHAEF G1. However, casualty responsibilities executed by the AFHQ AG were not originally a requirement for the SHAEF AG. Smith later assigned casualty responsibilities to the SHAEF AG and reorganized it from a casualty branch to a casualty division in February 1944. This reorganization ensured the AG had the structure to better facilitate casualty reporting operations. The AG essentially complemented the G1 with processes consisting of non-combat orders and was responsible for maintaining all records and correspondence for SHAEF.

\[112\] Thomas J. Davis, Establishment of the Adjutant General Division, dated 1 February 1944, Memorandum to the Secretary General Staff from Brigadier General Davis, Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Adjutant General, Standing Operating Procedure, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 31. This memorandum provided the necessary requirement to structure an efficient SHAEF AG.
In February 1944, Davis’ greatest challenge as the Adjutant was his approach to expanding responsibilities and increasing manpower for the AG structure.\(^{113}\) When he initially set up the AG, Davis based the structure of his staff on the standing operating procedures from AFHQ, which aligned with Field Manual 101-5.\(^{114}\) Davis’ conceptual organizational structure brought from AFHQ was not adequate. Thus, immediate planning began to establish a more

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\(^{113}\) Thomas J. Davis, Establishment of the Adjutant General Division dated 1 February 1944, Memorandum to the Secretary General Staff from Brigadier General Davis, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 31.

\(^{114}\) Thomas J. Davis, Establishment of the Adjutant General Division, dated 1 February 1944, Memorandum to the Secretary General Staff from Brigadier General Davis, Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Adjutant General, Standing Operating Procedure, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 31. These Standing Operating Procedures provided the requirements and procedures for personnel processes executed by the SHAEF AG.
efficient AG staff. The outcome emphasized the need for an addition of the reorganized AG Division. This completed the initial organizational structure of SHAEF personnel management divisions prior to Operation OVERLORD.

**ETOUSA**

The organizational structure for ETOUSA served to support only American forces. ETOUSA consisted of a combination of ETOUSA and SOS staffs. Eisenhower combined these two staffs due to the limited number of officers in ETO to have two separate American headquarters. ETOUSA was responsible for controlling American supply and administration, which often caused friction because of the lack of unity of effort and Lee’s tendency to request personnel only to fill his staff’s vacancies. Lee and his staff at times felt that SHAEF was attempting to control operation in ETOUSA, but ultimately ETOUSA worked for SHAEF. This lead to Smith drafting an order June 6, 1944 stating, “General Eisenhower would use US members of the SHAEF staff only in those purely US matter which remained under his direct control.” This order ensured that matters pertaining to personnel were managed by SHAEF before being forwarded to the War Department. Lee argued for a reduction in the role of SHAEF, an end to the practice of “doubling in brass” with administrative processes. Lee’s argument came from the initial authority he received to take all measures regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding, and

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115 Thomas J. Davis, Establishment of the Adjutant General Division, dated 1 February 1944, Memorandum to the Secretary General Staff from Brigadier General Davis, Allied Force Headquarters, Office of the Adjutant General, Standing Operating Procedure. DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 31.


However, the directive that Eisenhower delivered on D-Day provided clear guidance that countered those responsibilities that Lee assumed he controlled. Historian Forrest C. Pogue, described in his book *The Supreme Command*, “General Eisenhower’s dual role of Supreme Commander and US Theater Commander was accompanied by some complications in the handling of US administrative and supply matters on the Continent in 1944-1945.”

**Organization Summary**

As demonstrated, the incorporation of talented leaders provided organizations with the capacity to adapt and execute personnel processes for Operation OVERLORD. The AG division incorporated the pre-existing structure from AFHQ and applied it to the SHAEF AG to ensure multinational partners received efficient personnel services. Although the structure of the personnel divisions for SHAEF were not developed until early 1944, the SHAEF G1 and AG remained focused on expanding responsibilities and increasing manpower to shape efficient personnel organizations.

**DOCTRINE**

Doctrine provides guidance on how to conduct military operations and structure organizations. As historian Jay Luvaas explained in his article in the 1986 *Military Review, Some Vagrant Thoughts on Doctrine*, “Doctrine can be a servant or a master. It can provide a useful context for studying past or present military operations, or it can narrow our vision by dictating the questions and forming the basis for judgment as we view military developments elsewhere.”

This means that doctrine either constrains operations or provides a method to

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120 Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 267.
conduct operations, but leaves space to adapt when necessary. There are many tasks and operations that doctrine does not cover. When doctrine fails to provide guidance on how to conduct operations leaders depend on their own ingenuity and informal practice in serving the nation’s interest.\textsuperscript{122} The 1940 Field Manual 101-5, made it clear that it is a “compilations of information and data to be used as a guide for the operations in the field of the general staff or a similar staff group of all units in peace and war.”\textsuperscript{123} A number of other manuals during this period illustrate the same concept, reinforcing, defining, and listing ways to structure the G1 and AG. Although doctrine existed during the 1940s, it lacked guidance on how to integrate desired personnel processes for joint and multinational partners. Current US doctrine provides a methodology to address personnel support for multinational operations by recommending the establishment of memorandums of understanding and agreement to create mutual understanding for multinational partners serving under a multinational force.\textsuperscript{124}

This section explains the application and adaptation of 1940’s US Army doctrine to incorporate the complexity of planning and preparation for Operation OVERLORD. This section encompasses three parts in reference to 1940’s doctrine. First sub-section describes existing doctrine that was available in the 1940’s for personnel processes. The second sub-section analyzes how doctrine was changed/modified as the personnel systems tempo and operational reach expanded. Finally, the third sub-section addresses the doctrine/processes created when

\textsuperscript{122}Walter E. Kretchik, \textit{US Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror} (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 25.

\textsuperscript{123}US War Department, \textit{Staff Officers’ Field Manual}, FM 101-5 (Washington, DC: 1940), II.

\textsuperscript{124}CICS, \textit{Multinational Operations}, JP 3-16 (Washington, DC: 2013), xvii. According to JP 3-16, “Personnel support for multinational operations remains a national responsibility; however, combatant commanders and subordinate Joint Force Commands (JFC) operating as part of an Multinational Force (MNF) should establish a status of forces agreement (SOFA), memorandum of agreement, and/or memorandum of understanding regarding personnel support between members of any alliance and/or coalition prior to the onset of operations that clearly define JFC command authority (operational control, tactical control, etc.) over MNF personnel, command relationships, and reporting channels.”
contemporary doctrine lacked to provide a recommendation. Existing doctrine provided a frame of reference for SHAEF’s leaders to use for operations. Doctrine changed/modified presents how SHAEF’s leaders adjusted to the operational environment and made necessary changes. Doctrine/processes created describes the adaptation of doctrine because leaders had to come up with a procedure to efficiently execute personnel processes for awards and decorations, personnel replacements, casualties, and EPWs when doctrine failed to provide a recommendation. An examination of the application and adaptation of US Army doctrine will demonstrate the complex issues of the development of personnel processes used to compliment the gaps in 1940’s doctrine.

**Existing Doctrine**

In August 1940, the War Department published FM 101-5, *Staff Officers’ Field Manual, the Staff and Combat Orders*, which provided basic principles and concepts of the responsibilities for the sections of a general staff.¹²⁵ For Barker and Boehnke, this doctrine listed the specifics for G1 and AG operations, but failed to recommend how these staffs should operate in a multinational headquarters. Based on FM 101-5, the personnel divisions had similar personnel processes. This doctrine provided a list of tasks for the G1 and AG, which provided Smith with recommendation on how these two staffs could organize. However, for Operation OVERLORD, awards and decorations, personnel replacements, casualties, and EPWs were essential personnel processes required for the execution of Operation OVERLORD.

In December 1940, Field Manual 100-10, *Field Service Regulation Administration* changed the requirement of the personnel replacement system because it failed to address the requirements to train and equip replacements so that they were ready for combat.¹²⁶ On November 15, 1943, the War Department produced another FM 100-10 *Field Service Regulations*

¹²⁵ US War Department, *Staff Officers’ Field Manual*, FM 101-5 (Washington, DC: 1940), II.

¹²⁶ US War Department, *FSR Administration*, FM 100-10 (Washington, DC: 1940), 1.
Administration, which superseded the December 9, 1940 version, but retained the same concepts changed in the 1940’s rendition.\footnote{US War Department, \textit{FSR Administration}, 1943 FM 100-10 (Washington, DC: 1943), cover page.} However, the 1943 edition of FM 100-10 provided doctrinal definitions for staff operations, but did not change what FM 101-5 had already illustrated for the G1 and AG. Instead, the 1943 FM 100-10 explained a way to address personnel processes by definition, but lacked the specifics for implementation for integrating American and Commonwealth nations.\footnote{Ibid., III, IV.} Consequently, the G1 and AG had to improvise to ensure SHAEF personnel processes were efficient to support operations not addressed in published doctrine.

As such, there were multiple doctrinal manuals during the 1940s, but the army lacked a single manual that collectively consolidates the processes for the G1 and AG. In 1955, the Army published Field Manual 101-1 \textit{Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The G1 Manual}, which served as a “compilation of principles, procedures, and techniques to be used as a guide for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, at echelons below the Department of the Army. It is supplementary to FM 100-10 and FM 101-5.”\footnote{US War Department, \textit{Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The G1 Manual}, FM 101-1 (Washington, DC: 1955), 3.} Because this manual did not exist in the 1940’s for the G1, procedures and techniques not addresses in FM 100-10 and FM 101-5 provided the personnel staffs with the flexibility to adapt processes to support operations in the ETO.

Most doctrine governing the G1 and AG remained in manuals that incorporated other staff functions and operations within an army headquarters. For SHAEF in 1944, FM 101-5 provided the guideline for forming its organizational structures, but the lessons learned in AFHQ provided an example for how to more effectively structure and organize the G1 and AG. Applying and adapting doctrinally recommendations served as a starting point for the personnel staffs. However, the unique organizational structure of an Allied G1 and AG were not a part of
US doctrine. Therefore, AFHQ served as a model to integrating Commonwealth nations for SHAEF. Thus, the SHAEF G1 and AG had to apply and adapt American doctrinal guidance to formulate processes and procedures for its multinational partners.

**Doctrine Changed / Modified**

Smith’s experience with multinational processes at the AFHQ enabled the G1 and AG to apply and adapt personnel process where he saw fit. As historian Peter J. Schifferle explained in his book, *America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II*, “Departure from prescribed methods is at times necessary. A thorough knowledge of the principles of war and their application enables the leader to decide when such departure should be made and to determine what methods bring success.” This describes how leaders must adapt to complex problems when doctrine does not provide a solution or recommendation. In addition, US Army 1940’s doctrine provided the recommended organization structure for higher headquarters; however, contemporary doctrine failed to provide any guidance on structuring a multinational headquarters. Therefore, Smith developed the policy for incorporating Commonwealth nations personnel processes when doctrine failed. Smith’s policies directed how to integrate and coordinate personnel processes for Commonwealth nations by creating a memorandum of understanding and agreement addressed to senior American and British leaders.

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130 Peter J. Schifferle, *America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 49.

Since doctrine did not exist to address multinational personnel processes, Smith ensured these functions received the attention needed before Operation OVERLORD by addressing, preparing, and outlining administrative plans for future American and Commonwealth nations operations. This included coordinating policy on inter-service and inter-allied awards and decorations, personnel replacements, casualties, and POWs. Through Smith’s guidance and administrative approach, he provided a solution to addressing Commonwealth nations personnel processes.

**Doctrine / Processes Created**

SHAEC personnel officers determined existing doctrine did not cover the actions required for multinational personnel processes for awards and decorations, personnel replacements, casualties, and POWs. Therefore, the SHAEF G1 and AG had to create new processes and procedures to coordinate and integrate with multinational partners. With Operation OVERLORD already amongst American and Commonwealth nations, SHAEF personnel officers ensured personnel processes were available. However, there were four essential personnel processes for the personnel systems in preparation for Operation OVERLORD: 1) awards to honor Allies for their efforts, 2) replacements in order to maintain troop strength, 3) accountability of casualties, and 4) processing of EPW and accountability of friendly POWs.

First, the simplification of the awards process. Smith implemented a policy for addressing award procedures for American and Commonwealth nations. In fact, ensuring that SHAEF forces received recognition for their valorous acts and achievements during combat operations were necessary for morale. However, processing American awards for Commonwealth nations

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required direct communication with the senior leadership of the Commonwealth nations to
determine their award criteria and requirements. Although contemporary doctrine only illustrated
how to process US awards, procedures to recognize Commonwealth nations provided clarity on
the requirements to receive approval from each respective nation. Thus, SHAEF personnel
officers developed and modified an awards system to ensure Commonwealth nations received
recognition for their efforts in Operation OVERLORD. To ensure these individuals received the
deserved recognition, Smith communicated these requests through memoranda to the awards
approval authorities in each Commonwealth nation.  

Based on receiving approval from Commonwealth nations the G1 and AG staffs prepared
memoranda and policies explaining the processes for awards and decorations for American and
Commonwealth nations. Barker and Boehnke had to address any new procedural requirements
from Commonwealth nations before the submission of awards for Operation OVERLORD.

Eisenhower’s previous experience as a commander allowed him to understand the importance of
recognizing individuals and units for their service, achievements, and heroism. For example, on
February 17, 1944 Eisenhower presented the European-African-Middle Eastern Service Ribbon
to King George VI and his ranking British officers in London.  

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133 Thomas J. Davis, Unit Citation date 7 December 1944, Memorandum from Davis to Allied
Naval Commander Expeditionary Force; Unit Citation dated 16 December 1944, Memorandum Davis to
Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army, DDE Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 14. These
memorandums requested the authorization to award Unit Citation for Commonwealth nations.

134 Thomas J. Davis, Presentation of Service Ribbons to King and Ranking British officers 17
February 1944, Journal of the Adjutant General, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 16
January to 31 May 1944, General Thomas Jefferson Davis, Report of the Adjutant General Allied Force
Headquarters North Africa to Special Awards, Eisenhower Library, Box 3. On this date, Eisenhower
recognized British forces for their efforts in the ETO. This demonstrates the importance of recognizing
Commonwealth nations and their strategic leadership.
To facilitate the timeliness of the awards process, Army commanders received the authorization to make limited immediate combat awards to the Commonwealth nations that did not require Eisenhower approval. However, foreign awards recommended for US forces required Congressional approval before presenting to the recipient. Eisenhower understood the importance of recognizing personnel for their achievements and acts in combat. Therefore, Eisenhower supported the initiative to create awards processes for American and Commonwealth nations in ETO. This ultimately led to the creation of an Awards and Decoration board to facilitate the processes for recognizing various American and Commonwealth nations.135

The Awards and Decoration Board determined whether all documentation were correctly prepared and submitted in order to insure prompt action by higher headquarters. These boards were composed of senior leaders with proven sound judgment and experience to determine whether the recipient deserved the award. In addition, a G1 representative was included on this board, but later commands wanted to initiate their recommendations independently without G1 input. Therefore, commanders no longer required a G1 representative in the board process enabling the G1 to act independently in generating recommendations for approval or disapproval. The coordination between American and Commonwealth nations leadership ensured that the criteria for awards and decorations were in accordance with the corresponding policy and Commonwealth nations requirements.136

Second, for personnel replacements, 1943 Field Manual 100-10, Field Service Regulations Administration stated, “The replacement system for officer and enlisted personnel is designed to assure dependable and timely arrival of properly qualified replacements at troop units


as required." Synchronizing efforts from the lowest to the highest echelon was essential to ensuring that replacements arrived properly trained, clothed, and equipped. Depicted in Figure 4, US personnel replacements began first by a unit identifying the personnel requirement needed and forwarding those requirements through the personnel system for requisitioning and authentication to the War Department. US doctrine provided the guidance on personnel replacements for US forces but did not address Commonwealth nations replacements. Therefore, similar to the award and decorations process, communication for Commonwealth nations replacements came through the respective nation.

Figure 4. Flow of US Replacement Requisitions

Source: War Department, FM 100-10, FSR Administration (Washington, DC: 1943), 125.

For the US, accountability of forces continued through the Machine Records Unit (MRU), an asset that has been in the ETO since 1942. MRUs provided a daily consolidated report on personnel status received from the division level forwarded through Army Corps and then onto

\[^{137}\text{US War Department, FSR Administration, FM 100-10 (Washington, DC: 1943), 123.}\]
to ETOUSA. ETOUSA then forwarded this report to the War Department through SHAEF.\textsuperscript{138}

This concept for personnel replacements lacked the integration of Allies. However, Commonwealth nations did retain sets of personnel statistics processes through their respective nation.\textsuperscript{139} For US forces the MRU’s proved sufficient to communicate statuses to ETOUSA, SHAEF and War Department daily in order to receive replacements. These units not only created reports for replacements, but maintained accountability of casualties as well.\textsuperscript{140}

Third, casualties reporting and accountability ensured that individuals received the awards they deserved and provided the data for units to submit the requirements to replace these casualties. The casualties during Operation OVERLORD required the personnel systems to rapidly request replacements to sustain tempo and operational reach. This was because all casualties sustained in combat were considered battle casualties regardless if they were categorized as physical or mental.\textsuperscript{141} Casualty statuses removed individuals from the frontlines. However, this was not the case initially because the War Department encountered inaccurate casualty reports as a result of direct MRU submission to Washington, DC. The timing of the reports submitted did not provide accurate accountability of casualties sustain in combat and delayed replacements being received from the War Department. As described in Robert S. Rush’s book, \textit{Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment}, the accuracy of the statuses provided on punch cards “were woefully out of date in most cases.” This was because by the time it took to process, authenticate, and forward the report to the War


\textsuperscript{139}US War Department, \textit{History of AFHQ Part I}, vii.

\textsuperscript{140}R. B. Patterson and H. J. Johnson, \textit{Machine Records}, 6-10.

Department the statuses had changed. The MRUs provided the technology to process casualty reports as soon as the data was received from lower echelons. Therefore, the accuracy of the reports was only as good as the date the punch card authentication was completed. As Eisenhower’s punch card reveals in Figure 5, the punch cards provided by MRU’s list a detailed narrative of each individual’s daily status. Punch cards provided the War Department with a clear, concise, and accurate status of each individual in ETO. Since the authorizations for MRUs did not exist prior to US operations in Europe in the 1940’s, these units developed categories to depict the number of US personnel and their statuses on the battlefield.

Although doctrine did not exist in 1944 to describe the purpose of MRUs, the lessons learned by adapting to the operational environment, and using some of the requirements of for personnel accounting in 1940’s doctrine, provided the MRU with the framework to track accountability for replacements, casualties, and prisoners of war. The MRU lessons learned in WWII led to the development of 1947s Tactical Manual (TM) 12-305, *Machine Records Operation Personnel Accounting and Record Keeping*. TM 12-305 explains the purpose of the MRUs to act as a reservoir of personnel data in relation to personnel reports, statistics, and records as required. Through the application of this system and the lessons learned by MRUs created a personnel process that provided efficient services.

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Finally, the G1 POW branch for SHAEF was responsible for overseeing the handling and processing of captured EPWs, and accountably of captured friendly POWs. Prisoner accountability for enemy and friendly forces required weekly updates by all subordinate commands for G1 consolidation and submission to Smith. At the time there was no doctrinal reference available to annotate how to structure a POW branch to handle EPWs. Therefore, the G1 developed a template to shape and structure an organization to support this requirement for Operation OVERLORD.146

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146 Ray W. Barker, Revision of War Establishment (British) for Prisoner of War Branch, dated 1 June 1944. TAB “A,” Prisoner of War Branch, SHAEF, Memorandum from Barker to Smith thru Gale, DDE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45, Eisenhower Library, Box 31. Barker worked to increase the Prisoner of War Branch for G1 requesting an increase in both American and British manpower, but mostly British. Correspondence for this increase went through Gale since he was the Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief Administrative Officer.
Additionally, Field Manual 100-10 explained that prisoners of war captured or interned in the theater of operations remain in custody of the theater commander until released on parole, repatriated, or evacuated.”\textsuperscript{147} To compliment FM 100-10, FM 27-10, \textit{Basic Field Manual: Rules of Land Warfare} governed the handling of POWs.\textsuperscript{148} Combined, both of these manuals provided the doctrinal guidance for POW administration. However, they failed to address how to structure a POW branch and the requirements for Commonwealth nations handling of EPWs. With Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander, the policy for EPWs remained that of US doctrine.

\textbf{Doctrine Summary}

This section explained the application and adaptation of US Army doctrine to incorporate the complexity of planning and preparation for Operation OVERLORD. The G1 was able to apply doctrine to execute personnel replacements and POW accountability, adapt to the gaps that doctrine failed to cover, and allowed leaders to make the necessary adjustments when required through experiences and lessons learned. The AG applied current doctrine and Smith’s administrative policy to address awards and decorations to ensure Commonwealth nations received recognition for their efforts in combat. The lessons learned by applying and adapting current doctrine enabled the personnel staffs to reinforce Smith’s administrative policy and procedures to accommodate both the general staff and subordinate units in ETO. Therefore, through the establishment of Smith’s policy the personnel divisions were able to create efficient personnel processes in preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

\textsuperscript{147}US War Department, \textit{FSR Administration}, FM 100-10 (Washington, DC: 1943), 137.

CONCLUSION

As discussed, the planning and preparation for Operation OVERLORD created significant challenges for SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group personnel systems. Establishing a methodology to develop personnel systems to overcome the challenges between American and British forces illustrated the capacity and ability of executing efficient personnel processes. This study utilized a combination of primary and secondary evidence/literature to develop an understanding of how the personnel systems facilitated the concepts of personnel processes by answering the primary question of what factors enabled the development of the American and Commonwealth nations personnel systems in Europe during the preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

This study argued how the personnel systems within the ETO developed through experienced leadership, competent organizational structures, and the application and adaption of doctrine enabled the successful personnel processes in preparation for Operation OVERLORD. These three factors served as the centralized argument for this study and arguably set the conditions for a successful assault into Normandy. Through the identification, selection and empowerment of competent leaders the personnel system had experienced leadership to structure efficient organizations to support American and Commonwealth nations in the ETO. Applying and adapting doctrine enabled the implementation of operational art through tempo and operational reach. Through tempo, the expanding of personnel status from the Corps level to ETOUSA and then onto SHAEF and the War Department provided strategic leaders with a visual depiction of troop strength in the ETO. By doing so, this provided American and Commonwealth nations with the manning to extend its operational reach through the lodgment of forces once ashore in Normandy.
The first section of this study explored the identification, selection, and empowerment of leadership throughout the American and Commonwealth nations staffs. The selection of these competent leaders provided strategic leaders and Eisenhower with the assurance that the employment of the best qualified leaders was available. The second section analyzed the development of competent US personnel organizational structures consisting of the reorganization, refinement, and synchronization of personnel processes (duties and responsibilities) within the personnel system. These systems and processes managed by competent leaders provided American and Commonwealth nations with the necessary requirements to conduct operations in the ETO. The third section exposed the application and adaptation of US Army doctrine to incorporate the complexity of planning and eventually the execution of Operation OVERLORD. Although doctrine lacked to recommend a course of action for all processes, leaders were able to adapt concepts to enable effective processes to accommodate the personnel systems. Finally, the fourth section concluded with explaining the relevance of personnel processes through tempo, operational reach, and the influence of personnel systems to develop personnel processes for Operation OVERLORD based on contemporary US Army doctrine.

The development of personnel systems and personnel processes enabled the efficiency of American and Commonwealth nations in Europe in 1944. Having the capacity and ability to execute efficient personnel processes were necessary to set the conditions for Operation OVERLORD. The leaders of SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 21st Army Group required personnel systems that were efficient and supported the development of awards and decorations, personnel replacements, casualty accountability, EPW accountability. Smith addresses all of these processes by providing a memorandum of understanding and agreement to ensure American and Commonwealth nations understood the requirements for processes in Europe. For awards and decorations, the appropriate protocol required the synchronization between American and
Commonwealth nations to ensure requirements for approval met the standard of that nation. Personnel replacements provided dependable and timely arrival of personnel into the ETO. In addition, accurate casualty accountability provided the War Department with the data for next of kin notification for fallen comrades, which also facilities personnel replacements into the ETO. The EPW processing enabled accurate accountability of enemy forces captured during operations. For the purposes of this study, these four personnel processes provided the evidence for this narrative.

The lessons learned from the progress made preparing for Operation OVERLORD facilitated current US Army personnel doctrine. For Army personnel operations Field Manual 1-0, Human Resources Support, provides guidance on how to conduct personnel process at the tactical and operational level. Additionally, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures No. 1-0.1, S-1 Operations 2011, further describes in detail the requirements for tactical level personnel processes. Current personnel doctrine describes in further detail the processes that FM 101-5 and FM 100-10 provided for the SHAEF G1 and AG in 1944. Additionally, today’s doctrine provides guidance on joint and multinational personnel processes, which did not exist in 1944. Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, and Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, provides and explains the processes for supporting joint and multinational personnel processes and operations, which did not exist in 1944. Hence, these doctrinal publications offer a method to conduct personnel processes in a multinational headquarters like SHAEF through the establishment of memorandums of understanding and agreement where doctrine lacks a recommendation.¹⁴⁹

Additionally, this study focused on how personnel systems and personnel process worked at the operational level in Europe. However, this study demonstrated that many of the practices used in 1944 are still applicable more than sixty years later. Doctrine can never keep up with the pace of military operations and the trend of challenges and issues that existed in the past are just as relevant in the present. The way to resolve them is by ensuring that those systems and processes that prove to be effective remain in doctrine to serve as a template for operations. This approach allows the application and adaptation of doctrine when required for military operations.
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