CAN CANADA AVOID ARCTIC MILITARIZATION?

A Monograph

by

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Global warming effects are expected to make the Arctic’s natural resources and navigable sea lines of communications more accessible. The Arctic presents outstanding economic development opportunities and thus, there are many countries that hold ambitions to claim those future resources for themselves. Who owns the Arctic is currently a diplomatic, academic and legal debate. Nonetheless, the potential for future disputes is real and palpable. All the Arctic nations publicly oppose militarization. However, examination of the Arctic nations’ strategies and recent military actions might suggest otherwise. Concurrently, nations not bordering the Arctic Ocean have demonstrated a keen interest in Arctic geopolitics and economic development. As an Arctic nation, Canada has been loudly reaffirming its sovereign Arctic claims. However, the question for Canadian policymakers is whether to place confidence in diplomacy to avoid militarization or to take actions to counter the perceived steps by other nations to militarize the Arctic. Can Canada avoid militarization of the Arctic?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
In the next few decades, global warming effects and the melting glaciers are expected to make the Arctic’s natural resources and navigable sea lines of communications more accessible. The Arctic presents outstanding economic development opportunities and thus, there are many countries that hold ambitions to claim those future resources for themselves. Who owns the Arctic is currently a diplomatic, academic and legal debate. Nonetheless, the potential for future disputes is real and palpable. As the ice cover shrinks, the tension and competitive atmosphere could possibly develop into military conflicts. All the Arctic nations including Russia publicly oppose militarization. However, examination of the Arctic nations’ strategies and recent military actions might suggest otherwise. Concurrently, nations not bordering the Arctic Ocean, particularly China, have demonstrated a keen interest in Arctic geopolitics and economic development. As an Arctic nation, Canada has been loudly reaffirming its sovereign Arctic claims. However, the question for Canadian policymakers is whether to place confidence in diplomacy to avoid militarization or to take actions to counter the perceived steps by other nations to militarize the Arctic. Can Canada avoid militarization of the Arctic?

Four main arguments have been brought forth to justify why Canada should militarize the Arctic. To demonstrate that Canada can avoid militarizing the Arctic, it was necessary to investigate each of the four arguments to identify specific conditions, capabilities, actions or relationships that could motivate military competition. Both Arctic and non-Arctic actors have diplomatically declared that they want to avoid militarization and conflicts in the Arctic. The sincerity of those statements can be determined by comparing the diplomatic initiatives with the military preparations and actions. Consequently, this paper initially analyzes the Northwest Passage dispute to show that the concerns do not justify a need for militarization. Subsequently, the current and potential future Arctic claims are reviewed. These territorial disputes are unlikely to lead to military conflict. Next, Russia’s strategy and actions are examined to determine if Russia is sincere when it states that it wants to develop the Arctic peacefully and avoid militarization. Then, China’s actions are assessed to determine if the claim for militarization is justified. Finally, Arctic sovereignty and security is analyzed from a Canadian perspective. Examining the evidence used to support these four arguments leads to the conclusion that these arguments are without merit. Canada can uphold its sovereign claims and develop the Arctic without militarization.
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INTRODUCTION

Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this Government intends to use it. Because Canada’s Arctic is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it represents the tremendous potential of our future.” … “In defending our nation’s sovereignty, nothing is as fundamental as protecting Canada’s territorial integrity; our borders, our airspace and our waters.

—Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada

In recent years, the Arctic has become a constant subject of discussion and debate within political, journalistic and academic circles in Canada and around the world. Along with global warming, the Arctic is currently transforming. The glaciers are melting faster than originally predicted creating the possibility of a summer Arctic Ocean ice-free as early as 2020. As a result, new navigable sea lines of communications will become available for global shipping and natural resources extraction. In hydrocarbons alone, the United States Geological Survey estimates that there are approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids currently undiscovered in the Arctic, with 84 percent lying in offshore areas. This geopolitical transformation of the Arctic presents outstanding economic development opportunities for many generations to come and therefore, there are many countries that hold the ambition to claim those future resources for themselves.

The Arctic Ocean is incredibly vast, with more than 14 million square kilometers. It is an area about five times the size of the Mediterranean Sea. With the exception of a few disputes, the

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territorial and exclusive economic zone of each Arctic littoral country is well defined and generally accepted. However, each Arctic littoral country is preparing a claim to extend its rights in the Arctic Ocean beyond their exclusive economic zone. Many non-Arctic countries, such as China, oppose the new claims. Who owns the Arctic is currently a diplomatic, academic and legal debate. Nonetheless, the potential for future disputes is real and palpable and is often raised by politicians, journalist and academics. As the ice cover shrinks, sea lines of communications open and access to resources becomes available. The tension and competitive atmosphere could possibly develop into military conflicts.

The Arctic Council, created after the Cold War, has provided a good forum for dialogue and collaboration between Arctic countries and six international organizations representing Arctic indigenous people. Nevertheless, the Arctic Council has been ignoring actions that threaten to militarize the region. Likewise, the recent announcement that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will not get involved in the Arctic demonstrates a common desire among NATO members to avoid militarization of the Arctic. All the Arctic nations, including Russia, publicly oppose militarization. However, examination of the Arctic nations’ strategies and actions might be perceived otherwise. For example, the United States’ recent increase of ballistic missile interceptors in Alaska to deter North Korea and Russia’s permanent reoccupation of old Soviet military sites in the Arctic has the potential of resurfacing old suspicions and distrust between the two most dominant military powers in the World. Concurrently, nations not bordering the Arctic Ocean have demonstrated a keen interest in Arctic geopolitics and economic development.

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7 Huebert, “It’s Time to Talk About Arctic Militarization.”
Representatives from China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore have recently joined the Arctic Council as observers.  

The narratives concerning the Arctic in the Canadian media have been mixed. On one hand, there is a call for international cooperation in order to develop the Arctic economically, socially and environmentally in a responsible and peaceful manner. On the other hand, there is fear in Canada that it will lose its sovereign rights to the Arctic and some Canadians perceive the need to militarize it to protect those rights. As an Arctic nation, Canada has been loudly reaffirming its Arctic sovereign claims. However, the question for Canadian policymakers is whether to place confidence in diplomacy to avoid the militarization or to take actions to counter the perceived steps by other nations to militarize the Arctic. Is there a military challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty? Can Canada avoid militarization of the Arctic?

Four main arguments have been brought forth to justify why Canada should militarize the Arctic. The first argument involves the recognition of the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal water. The second argument focuses on countering current and potential future territorial disputes over Arctic claims. The third argument involves a response to the increased military posture of littoral nations in the Arctic, particularly Russia. Lastly, proponents argue that non-Arctic actors, more specifically China, who continue to rise both economically and militarily will challenge

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10The Webster dictionary define militarization as: “To put weapons and military forces in (an area).” For the purpose of this monograph, militarization of the Arctic means: the act of keeping military capability in readiness in the Arctic region.
Canadian Arctic claims. These arguments shape the rhetoric that has been used over and over in the media to justify Canadian militarization of the Arctic. However, by examining the evidences used to support these arguments, it is possible to demonstrate that there is no need for Canada to militarize the Arctic.

To demonstrate that Canada can avoid militarizing the Arctic, it was necessary to investigate each of the above arguments to identify specific conditions, capabilities, actions or relationships that could motivate military competition among the Arctic nations. In addition, it was essential to expand the research’s focus to assess the tendencies of potential competitors (nations and organizations) outside the Arctic nations that could affect Arctic militarization. Both Arctic and non-Arctic actors have diplomatically declared that they want to avoid militarization and conflicts in the Arctic. The sincerity of those statements can be determined by comparing the diplomatic initiatives with the military preparations and actions. Consequently, this paper initially reviews the status of the Northwest Passage and analyzes the Northwest Passage debate to show that the concerns do not justify a need for militarization. Subsequently, the current and potential future Arctic claims are reviewed to illustrate that possible territorial disputes are unlikely to lead towards military conflict. Next, Russia’s strategy and actions are examined to determine if Russia is sincere when it states that it wants to develop the Arctic peacefully and avoid militarization. Then, China is assessed to determine if the claim for militarization is justified considering China’s rise and proven interest in the Arctic. Finally, the Arctic sovereignty and security is analyzed from a Canadian perspective. Canadian strategy, military capabilities and its historical approach to defense must be weighed against potential threats in order to determine if Canada can avoid militarization of the Arctic.

THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE

One of the most common reasons stated in the media and by politicians to justify militarization of the Canadian Arctic is the Northwest Passage. From the Canadian perspective, there are two major concerns regarding the Northwest Passage. The first is the need to obtain the international recognition of the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal water way. The second concern arises from the potential security, environmental, social and safety impacts associated with using the Northwest Passage as a new high density sea route replacing traditional global maritime shipping lanes. The ice cover has provided Canadians the luxury of keeping the Northwest Passage issue confined to the discussion forum. However, with the ice melting away, the issue has resurfaced and now needs to be dealt with.

In recent years, the Arctic has seen an increase in maritime traffic. From 2012 to 2013, the Northern Sea Route, along the Russian Arctic coast, has seen a maritime traffic increase of 19 percent.12 Similarly, the Canadian Arctic has also experienced an increase in maritime shipping as well.13 Every time that the sea ice extent reaches a record low, expectations flare up that the opening of new Arctic sea lanes will replace traditional maritime shipping routes. The logic behind these expectations is that the Arctic sea lanes provide diversification and shorter routes and thus, are cheaper than the established routes between Europe and Asian trading giants using the Strait of Malacca and Suez Canal.14

However, the high expectations might not be justified. As clearly depicted in a recent study on the subject, opening the Arctic to greater shipping will have a negligible effect on the

14Malt Humpert, The Future of Arctic Shipping – A New Silk Road for China (Washington: The Arctic Institute, 2013), 4.
global maritime shipping routes. Actually, it is estimated that the trade between Northern Europe, the most relevant region for Arctic shipping, and China will only represent 2.9 percent of China’s international trade. Moreover, it is estimated that the majority of the shipping will be transiting through the Northern Sea Route and not the Northwest Passage.\textsuperscript{15} In fact, the Russian Northern Sea Route is shorter and less risky than the Canadian Northwest Passage.\textsuperscript{16} Russia is developing its northern coast into a major maritime trade route. In 2011, President Putin declared: “I want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes in service fees, security and quality.”\textsuperscript{17} Consequently, to support its vision, Russia has 16 deep-water ports in the Arctic and a large fleet of icebreaker ships, including nuclear icebreakers. In addition, Russia is establishing 10 search-and-rescue stations with their own ship and aircraft to support transit through the Northern Sea Route.\textsuperscript{18} As a result, the International Maritime Organization Secretary General declared, “In the forthcoming five years, the Northern Sea Route will be the main shipping lane for navigation in the Arctic.”\textsuperscript{19}

Conversely, Canadian Northwest Passage development as a main shipping lane is lagging far behind the Russian Northern Sea Route. With only one deep-water Arctic port located nearly 2000 km South of the Northwest Passage, no search-and-rescue capability located in the Arctic and a limited fleet of older diesel icebreakers, a significant increase in maritime traffic is not materializing. In fact, the small increase in trans-Arctic shipping has occurred on the Northern Sea Route.\textsuperscript{20} However as the ice retreats, it is expected that the Northwest Passage will see an increase of maritime traffic related to natural resources extraction activities and niche trans-Arctic

\textsuperscript{15}Malt Humpert, 4.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20}Michael Byers, “The (Russian) Arctic is Open For Business.”
maritime transportation. An increase in cruise ships carrying Arctic tourists and naval traffic related to commercial activities caused by Arctic expansion and development is also expected to be a part of the additional maritime traffic that the Canadian Arctic might see.\textsuperscript{21} To support this increased level of maritime activities, Canada is already planning to invest in new capabilities including a deep-water port, a new polar icebreaker, new patrol ships capable of sustained operations in first-year ice and additional space based wide area surveillance using RADARSAT II.\textsuperscript{22} However, supporting this increase in maritime activities is mainly the responsibility of the Canadian Coast Guard.\textsuperscript{23} The Canadian Armed Forces responsibilities will be to support to the Coast Guard and other government agencies. In summary, the increase of maritime traffic anticipated in the Northwest Passage will not be as high as expected and will not require military forces to support the traffic.

The other, more contentious issue, is the legal status of the Northwest Passage. For many years, Canada has been arguing that the Northwest Passage is a part of Canada’s internal waters and that Canada has the right to control its access. On the other hand, other foreign nations including Canada’s nearest ally, the United States, do not agree with Canada and assert that the Northwest Passage as an international strait through which ships from all countries have a right of passage as per the Law of the Sea.\textsuperscript{24}

The Northwest Passage issue has been Canada’s upmost Arctic sovereignty concern for decades. Because the Northwest Passage’s status has been framed as a challenge to sovereignty

\textsuperscript{24}Roger Howard, \textit{The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources} (London: Continuum, 2009), 50-52.
by the United States, Canadians have demonstrated a genuine passion in support of Canada’s rights. The transit of the Northwest Passage in 1969 by the United States tanker S.S. Manhattan and in 1985 by the United States icebreaker CGS Polar Sea, without prior authorization from Canada, only reinforced the Canadians perception that the United States challenged Canadian sovereignty. Those events led to a Canada-United States bilateral agreement in 1988 that stipulated that both countries would cooperate on matters regarding the Northwest Passage and they affirmed that the two countries agree to disagree about the status of the Passage.

From an American point of view, the Northwest Passage is considered an international strait because it joins two high-seas areas used for international navigations. Geography is the key to the United States’ legal argument for the Northwest Passage. However, what motivates the disagreement is not the fear that Canada will obstruct freedom of navigation within the passage. The United States recognizes and appreciates its excellent relationship with Canada. The United States is worried that recognizing the Northwest Passage as Canada’s internal waters will create an international precedent for other contested international straits in the world such as the Strait of Hormuz, where the freedom of navigation is contested by Iran. Considering the importance of freedom of navigation to the American economy, the United States is unlikely to change its position because for the United States the implications are global.

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28Franklyn Griffiths, 110-1.
As suggested by Franklyn Griffiths, a respected Canadian veteran of Arctic issues, a possible solution might be for Canada to accept and recognize that the Northwest Passage is an international strait. As such, he solidly argues that even if Canada can gain acceptance of its claim that the Northwest Passage comprises Canadian internal waters, Canada cannot by itself prevent entry and transit of the Northwest Passage archipelago by foreign ships, particularly nuclear submarines. Conversely, he argues that by recognizing the Northwest Passage as an international strait, Canada can simplify its security dilemma by exercising the right to dictate the sea lanes that foreign ships must utilize while transiting. Moreover, transiting ships must transit using a continuous and expeditious route while respecting the Law of the Sea. Such a policy prevents activities that threaten the sovereignty, integrity or political independence of the bordering state. Furthermore, ships transiting through must respect international standards and bordering-state regulations related to environmental pollution and safety at sea. In addition, he proposed that Canada should develop bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the United States and other Arctic countries to reinforce surveillance and control of the Arctic, including the Canadian Northwest Passage. He concludes by affirming that the only viable option for Canada to accept the Northwest Passage as an international strait and developing agreements with other Arctic nations and organizations to reinforce Canadian control.

Concerning the Canadian sovereignty concerns, Griffiths clearly demonstrated that no one is actually challenging Canada’s possession of the waters surrounding Canada’s Arctic Islands, including the Northwest Passage. As he concisely summarized “Sovereignty conflicts often come down to a struggle for possession. But not where the Northwest Passage is concerned. When we consider the legalities, our dispute with the United States and other maritime powers is about terms of transit, not about ownership or possession, which is assured under the Law of the Sea.”

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31Ibid, 127-128.
Sea.” The same message was given by President G.W. Bush during his closing speech at a North American Summit in 2007 “There are differences on the Northwest Passage. We believe it's a international passageway. Having said that, the United States does not question Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic islands and the United States supports Canadian investments that have been made to exercise it's sovereignty.”

In summary, the current dispute regarding the recognition status of the Northwest Passage and the expectations for increased maritime traffic does not require militarization of the Arctic. The Canadian Coast Guard should be the principal agency to manage the increased maritime traffic in the Northwest Passage, which is anticipated to be lower than originally expected. The Canadian Armed Forces should be employed in a supporting role to other government agencies and civilian authorities as they do elsewhere in the country. Nonetheless, the Canadian Armed Forces will need the capability, capacity and resources necessary to train for missions in support of the Canadian the Canadian Coast Guard and other government agencies. The framing of the Northwest Passage as a sovereignty issue has been misunderstood by Canadians for decades. There is no challenge to ownership of the Northwest Passage, only disagreement about the right of passage. Regardless, if Canada and the United States come to an agreement or continue to ‘agree to disagree’ as they do currently concerning the recognition status of the Northwest Passage, the divergence of opinion will not lead to conflict.

32 Franklyn Griffiths, 111.
ARCTIC CLAIMS AND POTENTIAL DISPUTE

One of the most common reasons cited in the media to justify militarization of the Arctic is the current and potential future territorial claims disputes by Arctic Costal nations. With resources becoming increasingly accessible and cost-effective to retrieve, the transformation of the Arctic has been depicted as a new gold rush race that could lead to a resource war between nations. A consequence of the implementation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Laws Of the Sea (UNCLOS) was an increase in the number of maritime territorial disputes around the world, including the Arctic. From a Canadian perspective, there are currently three ongoing Arctic territorial claims and the potential for other disputes when Canada submits its final maritime claim defining the full extent of its continental shelf beyond the actual 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone.

Two of the three current Canadian territorial disputes are with Denmark. One of them is concerning a small portion of the Lincoln Sea and the other one is concerning Hans Island; the only disputed portion of land in the entire Arctic circle. Both disagreements have their origin from 1973 negotiations between Canada and Denmark on dividing the maritime border between Greenland and Canada’s Arctic archipelago. Even though an agreement was reached between the two countries, two small exceptions were set aside for future negotiations in order to avoid delay in the signing of the entire 2685 kilometers long maritime border agreement. These two exceptions, Lincoln Sea and Hans Island, still constitute today unresolved Canadian territorial


Of both disputes, it is without a doubt Hans Island that has attracted the most media attention. Measuring only about a mile in diameter, this tiny inhabited island sitting equidistant from Greenland and Canada’s Ellesmere Island has generated disproportionate international dispute. As such, politicians and military forces from both countries have been subsequently taking turns at planting national flags on the Island to stake claim while in response, the other country issues diplomatic notes of protest. However, the dispute between the two NATO countries has always stayed within the diplomatic realm and with a touch of humor, both sides leave bottles of national alcoholic beverages and welcome notes behind to await the return of their adversary. In fact, the Hans Island dispute has no impact on the Canadian and Danish maritime borders. As stated by Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia and an expert on Arctic affairs, “The sensationalized report played directly into the hands of politicians, who were happy to take advantage of a risk-free Arctic sovereignty dispute for domestic electoral purposes.” Canada and Denmark are still trying to find an acceptable solution regarding Hans Island, that might entail splitting the Island in two. Likewise, Canada and Denmark jointly announced in November 2012 that they have reached a tentative agreement concerning the remaining maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea. As such, the territorial war rhetoric surrounding the two disputes are unfounded. Moreover, as mentioned by Roger Howard, the Hans Island dispute “perfectly illustrates how irrational and exaggerated such speculation of a ‘resource war’ really is.”

38Michael Byers, “Creative thinking on sovereignty.”
40Roger Howard, 20.
The third territorial dispute that Canada is currently facing in the Arctic is with the United States regarding the maritime border in the Beaufort Sea. Canada claims that the maritime border in the Beaufort Sea should follow the 141st meridian as a continuation of the land border between the two countries. Canada’s claim is based on the interpretation of a 19th century treaty when the border was established between Alaska and the Yukon. From its perspective, the United States asserts that the treaty only covers the land border between the two countries and not the Arctic ocean. The United States argues that the maritime border should be defined by using the principle of equidistance, “the tracing of a line at equal distance from the closest land point of each state, which reflects more closely the direction of the respective coastlines.” At stake is a triangular area of about 7,000 square nautical miles that presumably contains an important quantity of natural resources. The dispute has been going on for decades but has seen positive development lately. Driven by necessity to map the seabed together, due to the lack of icebreakers, both countries have been working hand in hand in recent years to refine hydrocarbon estimates and prepare for future claims. As a consequence, it was realized that when considering the potential future claims for the extended continental shelf and the geographic layout of the coastlines, the Americans’ equidistance proposed method would actually benefit Canada. In fact, the future potential claim area beyond the 200 nautical miles exclusive economical zone in both the Central and Northern Beaufort Sea is three to four times larger than the current area in the Southern Beaufort Sea with a potentially greater amount of resources. This

42Roger Howard, 54.
new development provides an opportunity for both countries to negotiate a win-win solution and drive their collaboration.45

With the dialogue and collaboration currently ongoing to resolve the maritime border in the Beaufort Sea, a possible settlement is on the horizon. Conversely, a disagreement between the two NATO countries would not lead to conflict.46 Canada and the United States as neighboring countries have learned throughout the years to compartmentalize issues and focus on important national interests. In fact, there are other border issues between Canada and the United States, such as the Machias Seal Island on the Atlantic Coast, the mouth of the Juan de Fuca Strait and the Dixon Entrance on the Pacific Coast.47 Agree to disagree has become the norm for Canada and the United States on many issues between these neighbors.48 Moreover, during their disagreement in the Beaufort Sea, Canada and the United States were able to make progress concerning the defense of the Arctic. As such, the 2006 renewal of the joint Canada-United States North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) bilateral agreement added maritime surveillance to NORAD’s mission.49 To recapitulate, both countries are close allies and share common defense interests through NATO and NORAD, including the defense of North America and the Arctic. Resolved or not, the Beaufort Sea territorial dispute between Canada and the United States will not lead to conflict. Hence, there is no need for military action to resolve this issue. In fact, it will be pointless for Canada to use the military to influence this border dispute considering the strength of the United States’ military versus Canada’s.

45Randy Boswell, “Canada Non-Committal over U.S. Position on Beaufort Sea Dispute.”
What uncertainty there is arises from potential claims based upon the extent of the continental shelf. Under UNCLOS Article 76, every coastal nation can request the control of the resources on the seabed and in the subsoil for up to 150 nautical miles beyond the 200 nautical miles of their exclusive economic zone. The claim must be based on scientific proof that the area is a part of their extended continental shelf. As a result, every Arctic coastal nation has decided to exercise this right in order to position itself for the possible natural resources extractions when it becomes accessible. From the five Arctic coastal states, only Norway has completed its claim for the extended continental shelf, an area located farther South than the other four nations. The remaining four, Canada, United States, Denmark and Russia are at different stages in submitting their claims and working on gathering enough scientific evidence to substantiate their claims. It is important to note that the United States has not signed or ratified UNCLOS yet. This important step will have to be done prior to the United States submitting a claim. Nevertheless, it is predicted that the extended continental shelf claims from Canada, Russia and Denmark will overlap and possibly result in dispute. As such, the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range, is considered by all three sides to be an extension of their continental shelf. If this is to be true, Canada will have to negotiate new extended continental shelf maritime border with both Denmark and Russia. The negotiations between Canada and Denmark are not expected to be a problem. Considering that the principle of equidistance was used to reach agreement on the Lincoln Sea dispute, it is expected that the overlap, located near the North Pole just above the old dispute, will be divided by a prolongation of the same maritime boundary using the same

principle. Conversely, the outcome is expected to be different with the Russians, where tension is projected to rise.

However, Russia’s actions in recent years have been portrayed as a reason for Canada to militarize the Arctic. In particular, the planting of a Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole was highly publicized and criticized in Canada. In 2007, Arthur Chilingarov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma and a famous Polar scientist, directed a submarine expedition to the North Pole and planted a Russian flag at the North Pole to bolster Russia’s claim to the North Pole while declaring “The Arctic is ours, and we should demonstrate our presence.”

Canadian Foreign Minister Peter McKay interpreted the Russian symbolic action as a challenge. Minister MacKay declared, “This isn’t the 15th century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags to claim territory.” In fact, politicians and media from both nations overstressed the event for a while to maintain the sovereignty narrative on the domestic side were. As explained by Chivers, planting the flag was a domestic publicity stunt and not a serious claim to the Arctic Pole. Russia was only taking geological and water samples at the North Pole as part of a survey in support of the resubmission of their Arctic claim. A claim that was initially rejected in 2001 due to the lack of scientific evidence.

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59Ibid.
Pole. There are concrete scientific methods for this. As such, Russia seems to support the process within UNCLOS that sets the rules for determining claims based on scientific data.

Similarly, the signing of the Ilulisat Declaration on 28 May 2008 clearly set the tone for future relationships in the Arctic for the five coastal nations. The main achievement of this declaration is the agreement by all five nations to utilize UNCLOS to resolve the delimitation of the Arctic Ocean. In addition, they acknowledged that there is no need to create another comprehensive legal framework to govern the Arctic Ocean. They agreed to collaborate on several issues including navigation safety, environmental protection, scientific research, search and rescue, and protection of the unique Arctic ecosystem and its inhabitants. Furthermore, they recognized and supported the collaboration by other international organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization, the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, on the responsible Arctic Ocean development. Even though this is only a declaration, Ilulissat provided a solid foundation for future collaboration and mitigates many potential disputes over maritime border claims.

The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept reinforce Russia’s intention to follow UNCLOS by stating that, “In accordance with the international law, Russia intends to establish the boundaries of its continental shelf, thus expanding opportunities for exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources.” By signing the Ilussat declaration, Russia demonstrated a second time its adherence to UNCLOS by concrete actions. Russia surprised many observers in 2010 by ending its 40 years maritime dispute in the Barents Sea with Norway. Initiated in the 1970s, the dispute was initially about fish but was extended to include reserves of oil and gas in the Barents Sea. The treaty divides the area, about the size of Germany, into two equal portion.

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60 C.J. Chivers, “Russia Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed.”
62 Ariel Cohen, 17.
As stated by the Kremlin, “This is a practical illustration of the principle that all disputes in the Arctic must be tackled by the Arctic nations themselves by way of talks and on the basis of international law.”63 Another example of Russia’s adherence to UNCLOS was its actions in read to claims in the Sea of Okhotsk. After submitting an UNCLOS claim in 2001, Russia waited 13 years before receiving a favorable judgment. Motivated by this announcement, Sergei Donskoi, Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, declared, “The work with the UN Commission has enabled us to establish constructive relations with our partners. We plan to file a relevant application involving the Arctic Shelf this autumn. There is much work to do, and this work is of great importance for this country because the Arctic shelf is rich in minerals and bio-resources.”64 These two examples clearly demonstrate that Russia is willing to negotiate and find peaceful solutions under international laws to solve its maritime territorial dispute. In addition, Russia’s intentions concerning its extended shelf claim are clearly described in the summary of the Russian Arctic Strategy;

Closely intertwined with the importance of the region to Russia are the country's efforts to delimitate outer limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean region, defined as a top priority task to be accomplished by 2015. The Russian government is clear that the process has to be carried out entirely within the framework of international law. The document defines as a strategic priority development of cooperation with other polar states on maritime boundary delimitation.65

Russia’s intentions and actions distinctly demonstrate that it wants to resolve their Arctic claims peacefully in collaboration with Arctic neighbors and in accordance with international laws.

In summary, the current and potentially future territorial claims disputes between Canada and other Arctic coastal nation neighbors do not justify the militarization of the Arctic. As demonstrated, the current disputes between Canada with Denmark and the United States have no potential for military escalation. Furthermore, the signature of the Ilulissat Declaration by the five Arctic coastal nations clearly demonstrates their intent to resolve the delimitation of the Arctic Ocean peacefully by using UNCLOS. In addition, Russia’s stated intentions and actions distinctly demonstrate its desire to resolve their Arctic claims peacefully in accordance with international laws. Once more, the media and politicians have exaggerated the situation concerning territorial dispute to rationalize a potential need for militarization of the Arctic by Canada. There is no need for Canada to militarize the Arctic to assert its territorial claims.

RUSSIA, FRIEND OR FOE

Out of all the Arctic countries, it is without a doubt Russia that has generated the most concern with regard to militarization. From a Canadian standpoint, Russia might be perceived as a potential military challenger when compared with the other three Arctic littoral nations who are NATO allies. The mistrust remaining from the Cold War and media rhetoric are significant factors that affect Canadian’ opinion regarding the need to militarize the Arctic to defend Canada’s sovereignty against Russia. However, the reality is that the main driving factor concerning the militarization of the Arctic is directly related to the relationship between Russia and the United States.66

On one hand, Russia’s actions make Canada ponder the need for militarization. In recent years, Russia has improved its military capabilities in the Arctic and the fresh events in Ukraine

makes Canadian decision-makers wary of Russian motives. This climate of uncertainty makes it hard to believe that Russia could be a credible and reliable partner in the Arctic. On the other hand, Russia has also demonstrated its ability to be a key and peaceful partner. As one of the founders of the Arctic Council, Russia has been an active member in the council since and even before its inception. As such, Russia collaborated in several working groups, expert groups and task forces to coordinate Arctic policies regarding the environment, biodiversity, emergency response and safety, business, socio-economic and sustainable development. In addition to producing several studies, the Arctic Council has been able to develop and approve the legally-binding Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Nevertheless, the Arctic Council scope is limited and is not authorized to “deal with matters related to military security.” Overall, Russia’s conflicting actions make it harder to clearly determine its intent.

From a Russian’s perspective, the Arctic region has an enormous significance to the Russian economy and to safeguarding Russia’s great power status. In fact, Moscow identifies its success in the High North as critical to its future as an energy great power and to the well-being of the Russian economy. As mentioned in Russia’s official energy strategy, “energy security is

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72 Ibid, 64.
the most important element in Russia’s national security.”73 Currently, about 20 percent of
Russia’s Gross Domestic Product is coming from the production of oil and gas in the Arctic.74
Furthermore, it is estimated that about 80 percent of Russian gas and 90 percent of hydrocarbon
deposits are located in the Arctic, of which 66.5 percent are located offshore in the Barents and
Kara Seas.75 These new energy fields located in the Arctic are seen as crucial for replacing the
current oil and gas production in Western Siberia, which is expected to decline between 2015 and
2030.76 Considering that the energy sector accounts for about half of Russia’s national income
and 65% of its export earnings, Moscow cannot afford to let its Arctic hydrocarbons’ enterprise fail.77

The problem that Russia presents as an energy hegemon does not depend on the size of
its reserves, but rather on its capability to exploit them.78 Initially, Russia tried to develop its oil
and gas resources in the Arctic independently through the two government controlled oil
companies, Gazprom and Rosneft. However, Russia has quickly realized, after a deep recession
in 2008, that it could not do it on its own and that it absolutely needed foreign investments and
technical expertise to exploit hydrocarbons in the Arctic.79 Given the high price and risk
associated with hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the Arctic, Russia has been seeking
collaborators. In fact, the Russian State owned oil company Rosneft has established a partnership
with the United States company Exxon Mobil for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the

74 Michael Byers, “The (Russian) Arctic is Open for Business,” The Globe and Mail, August 12,
March 17, 2014).
75 Katarzyna Zysk, 97.
76 Katarzyna Zysk, 97.
77 Roger Howard, 144.
78 Ibid, 143.
79 Ariel Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic: Challenges to U.S. Energy and Geopolitics in the High
North” in Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
Similarly, the other hydrocarbon Russian state-owned giant, Gazprom, has established a framework agreement with the Anglo-Dutch energy giant Royal Dutch Shell for the development of hydrocarbons in the Russian Arctic. These facts demonstrate that Russia needs financial and technical cooperation in the Arctic in order to extract its natural resources. As mentioned, by then Prime Minister Putin, in 2010: “It is well known that, if you stand alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic. It is very important to maintain the Arctic as a region of peace and cooperation.”

Russia’s interest in the Arctic is both economic and geostrategic. During the Cold War, the Arctic theatre was strategically important and considered the Soviet’s bastion of the nuclear fleet. The Cold War is over but Russia still sees the need to maintain a military presence in order to preserve its security in the Arctic region; not only to counter and influence other Arctic nations, but also to balance the rise of Asian powers, particularly China. The 2009 Russian Arctic Strategy mentions that to secure national interests in various military and political situations, there is a need to maintain the necessary combat potential, including special Arctic military formations. As pointed out by Ariel Cohen, military conflict in the Arctic is a scenario

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83Katarzyna Zysk, 92.
that Russia deems possible. In addition, the 2008 Russian National Security Policy identifies the protection and maintenance of its nuclear deterrence capability as a priority.

As part of its strategy, Russia has steadily increased its military resources and forces since 2007 in the Arctic. As such, Russia has resurrected the old Soviet habit of patrolling the Arctic from the air, on the sea and under the sea, which includes routine testing of its Arctic neighbor defenses. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the increase in military capabilities and actions in the Arctic by Russia were accomplished in a transparent manner and in accordance with international laws. Of all the Arctic nations, Russia has the largest military force in the High North. With eleven naval bases and many other land based facilities and capabilities, the most effective component of the Russian Armed Forces in the Arctic is the Northern Fleet, which includes about two-thirds of all Russian naval power. Most of Russia’s military forces are located in the western Arctic around the Kola Peninsula, near Norway. However, the Northern Fleet has experienced major difficulties in modernizing. Several naval construction projects were delayed by the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Regardless of the impressive combat power that Russia has in the Arctic, overall the United States still has superior military capabilities, especially with regards to naval and air arms. The military capabilities of the United States Arctic littoral NATO Allies include an additional four destroyers, 30 frigates and 11 submarines, all trained to conduct warfare in the Arctic region. It is evident that Russian military capabilities do not challenge the

86 Ariel Cohen, 20.
88 Ariel Cohen, 21.
89 Ariel Cohen, 21.
91 Marlène Laruelle, 83.
capabilities of the four Arctic littoral NATO countries. Russia has only one advantage; it owns more icebreakers and is the only country that possesses nuclear icebreakers.

The traditional Russian approach to strengthening its northern border is to use military forces. It is a normal Russian practice and part of their National Security Strategy. The melting of the ice in the Arctic will open new sea approaches to the Russian North Coast and Russia, therefore, feels the need to strengthen its security and defense on that front. The key aspect about the militarization of High North by Russia, is that the Russian military build up has been done in a transparent and predictable manner and not directed against any other Arctic nation. Russia has repeatedly stated that they are not militarizing the Arctic region and wants to avoid escalation. The Russian position was particularly obvious when NATO, at Norway’s request, contemplated the possibility of including the Arctic as a part of NATO’s region of interest. In contrast, Canada opposed NATO’s involvement in the polar region in order to avoid a Russian military response and also to avoid the incursion of non-artic nations into Arctic affairs. As a result, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced, “At this present time, NATO has no intention of raising its presence and activities in the High North. The Arctic is a harsh environment. It rewards cooperation, not confrontation. I trust we’ll continue to see cooperation.” Nonetheless, whether NATO includes the Arctic as a region of interest or not, it

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92 Alexandr’ Golts, 57-58.
93 Ariel Cohen, 23.
94 Ibid, 18-22.
does not prohibit the invocation of the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by a NATO Arctic
country if Russia attacks. From a Russian perspective, Russia feels surrounded by NATO.
Because all the other Arctic coastal nations are part of NATO, Russia sees the necessity to defend
its Arctic territories, which are vital to Russia’s economy and security.

Recent events in Ukraine and Crimea have certainly undermined the trust Western
nations have had in Russia’s commitment to respect the sovereignty of other countries and
international laws. Ultimately actions in the Ukraine will bring Western nations to question
Russia’s commitments to develop the Arctic peacefully and in collaboration. However, the
Arctic and Ukraine are two different things. From a Russian point of view, the rapprochement
between the Ukraine and the European Union and NATO is unacceptable. As stated by specialists
on Russian Security, “The latter [Russia] has accepted, although unwillingly, NATO and EU
enlargements, but the participation of Ukraine and Georgia in the western security architecture
constitutes a red line for Russia. Moscow considers the membership of the said countries in
NATO a violation of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence and a Western attempt to put into
practice the idea of Russia’s strategic encirclement.” From a Russian perspective, the West’s
retention of NATO, the organization put in place to fight the feud Soviet Union, even though the
Cold War enemy threat was gone signals continued hostility toward Russia. More and more the

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official_texts_17120.htm (accessed September 19, 2013). Article 5 states that: “The Parties agree that an
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.”

100 Rob Hubert, “How Russia’s Move into Crimea Upended Canada’s Arctic Strategy,” The Globe

101 Sophia Dimitrakopoulou and Andrew Liaropoulos, “Russia’s National Security to 2020: A
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 4, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 36-7,
old Western rivals were getting closer to Russia by absorbing in the European Union and NATO previous Soviet bloc countries.\textsuperscript{102} The West crossed Russia’s red line with Georgia in 2008 and did it again recently in the Ukraine.\textsuperscript{103}

However, capturing Crimea was not free for Russia. It has earmarked $7 billion for Crimean economic aid and the investor exodus has already cost Russia $51 billion and reduced estimated economic growth from 2.5 to 1 percent. Overall, the former Russian finance minister, Alexi Kudrin, projected that the Ukraine crisis will cost Russia about $160 billion. Nevertheless, Russia has extensive foreign currency reserves estimated to be approximately $400 billion. The foreign currency reserves allow Moscow to absorb the current projected costs related to the crisis. However, if the Ukraine conflict persists and further sanctions are applied, Russia’s cash reserve might evaporate quickly.\textsuperscript{104}

The fact that Russia came to the table early to negotiate a peace plan for Eastern Ukraine demonstrated that Russia cannot and does not want to push much further for economic reasons; a financial loss that Russia’s economy can not absorb over an extended period.\textsuperscript{105} Russia needs foreign investments in order to carry on with Arctic development and it cannot afford to be isolated. It does not mean Western nations can trust Russia. Russia will only be faithful to itself, but it does mean that Russia cannot afford conflict in the Arctic and does need outside collaboration and investments to achieve its goal. With the clock ticking and the need to replace the income generated from the Western Siberian hydrocarbon sales by developing new energy

\textsuperscript{102}Sophia Dimitrakopoulou and Andrew Liaropoulous, 36.


fields in the Arctic, Russia cannot and does not want its Arctic strategy to be delayed. Its recent participation during the Ukraine crisis at the Arctic Council is a clear example.\textsuperscript{106} The near complete dependence of Russia’s economy on hydrocarbon is the weakness that needs to be exploited to avoid militarization of the Arctic.\textsuperscript{107}

Make no mistake, Russia will defend its interests and will use military forces if required as was demonstrated in Georgia and Ukraine. Similarly in the Arctic, Russia will take the steps necessary to protect its Arctic territories and resources. However, unless directly provoked, it is illogical and unlikely that Russia will pursue military confrontation in the Arctic. The main purpose of Russian Arctic military forces is to protect itself, assist in security, assist in socio-economic development of the region and provide strategic deterrence through its presence and nuclear capability.\textsuperscript{108} The announcement by President Putin about increasing military presence in the Arctic in response of Canada’s intention to claim the North Pole is a clear example of the Russian protectionism.\textsuperscript{109} This is why Arctic countries, in particular the United States, need to proceed carefully to avoid military escalation in the Arctic.

One of the key driving factors regarding whether Russia might step up militarizing the Arctic is the way the United States implements its own Arctic Strategy. The United States understands risks associated with militarization of the Arctic, spurred by media rhetoric and perceived military aggression approach. The 2013 United States Department of Defense Arctic Strategy clearly articulates those risks. “Political rhetoric and press reporting about boundary

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Zysk12}Katarzyna Zysk, 112-3.
\end{thebibliography}
disputes and competition for resources may inflame regional tensions.”110 “Being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may create the conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could materialize.”111 As such, the narrative in this recent strategic document recognizes the need to avoid raising militarization concerns and escalation by other nations, particularly Russia.112

The goal of the 2013 United States National Arctic Strategy is similar to that of other Arctic countries, “an Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of indigenous peoples.”113 First guiding principle of the strategy is to “safeguard peace and stability by working to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested parties.”114 The strategy also mentions the desire for the United States to accede to the Law of the Sea Convention.115 The common message from all Arctic countries, including Russia, is to cooperate.116

At the moment, Russian militarization of the Arctic is described in the public Russia Strategy and remains transparent. Militarization of the Arctic by other NATO coastal nations, in particular the United States, will only drive the Russians to militarize further.117 As such, the American and Canadian military strategy approach and strategic communication plan has to be

111Ibid.
112Ibid.
114Ibid, 10.
115Ibid, 9.
116Ibid.
carefully managed. On many occasions, Russia has commented on the increase of military capabilities by the other Arctic littoral nations and has remarked that these actions create a security problem in the region. With today’s technologies and power projection capabilities, the need for permanent military forces located in the Arctic is not as relevant as was during the Cold War. Bilateral and multilateral agreements, strategic installations and ready military forces protect the Arctic. As such, it will be counter-productive for Canada to add additional military forces to the Arctic. The current plan, modest when compared with Russia’s efforts, seeks to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces has the capabilities to operate in the Arctic. Force readiness is maintained through frequent exercises and increased surveillance. These preparations are the right level of military involvement for Canada. However, the messaging contained in strategic communications about these efforts need to be less aggressive if a Russian over-reaction is to be avoided.

In summary, Russia depends upon peaceful cooperative development of its Arctic interests. It cannot afford economically and militarily to do otherwise. Russia’s economy is largely dependent on its hydrocarbon industry and cannot afford to be isolated. Economic interdependence along with Russia’s needs for outside investments and technical assistance will continue to restrain any Russian tendency toward aggression until Russia has replaced the declining continental oil and gas field with hydrocarbon fields in the Arctic. Militarily, Russia clearly has the largest military force in the Arctic region. However, Russia is not powerful enough to attack the United States or any other NATO Arctic littoral nation, who might invoke article 5 of the NATO treaty. Russia is building its military forces principally to defend its vital interests, to maintain influence in the Arctic region and support strategic deterrence. As long as Russian military buildup is transparent, not targeted against someone and not postured to threaten

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118 Katarzyna Zysk, 111.
119 Katarzyna Zysk, 111.
the United States, the situation is manageable. With the crisis in Ukraine, trust in Russia is at its lowest point since the end of the Cold War. It will take time to rebuild that trust but collaboration regarding the Arctic is critical for Russia. By militarizing the Arctic, Canada will only entice Russia to militarize further in response. Canada should adopt a more tactful approach, one similar to the United States. Canada can and should avoid militarizing the Arctic in response to the Russian Arctic Strategy and should work to reinforce bilateral agreements with the United States and multilaterals with other Arctic countries, including Russia. Cooperation, competition and rivalry will remain the constant between Russia and its Arctic nation partners.

CHINA, THE ARCTIC DRAGON

With the ice melting, several non-Arctic nations have demonstrated a keen interest in the transformation of the High North. As a result, twelve non-Arctic countries have already been granted observer status in the Arctic Council. The country observers list includes several European nations, such as, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and also distant Asian countries, such as, India, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.\textsuperscript{120} However, of all the non-Arctic nation observers, it is without a doubt China that attracts the most attention and alarms. China’s interest in the Arctic region has generated attention among journalistic, academia and political realms. They speculate about Chinese motives.\textsuperscript{121} Probably the most famous comment made by a Chinese official was that made by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo stated, “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the

world as no nation has sovereignty over it … China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world's population.” Such a strong comment represents the type of discussion currently occurring in Beijing.122 From a Canadian perspective, the unexpected and undetected arrival of the Chinese ice breaker Xue Long in Tuktoyaktuk in the Canadian Arctic in 1999, was probably the first wake up call for Canadians, generating speculation about China’s interest in the Arctic.123 It is clear that China has international ambitions for the Arctic. What is less obvious is whether China will try to attain these ambitions peacefully.124 China’s rise as an economic and military power, combined with the territorial friction with its’ neighbors in the South and East China Seas has generated Canadian concerns about China’s real intentions are regarding the Arctic. In particular, media coverage alluding to China as a possible threat in the Arctic has puzzled many Canadians. As such, China’s interest in the Arctic has been used to support militarization rhetoric.

While eager to be a dominant actor in the Arctic, Chinese officials are normally cautious when articulating China’s interests in the High North. Conscious of its status as a rising global power, China has adopted “a wait-and-see” strategy in order to avoid raising alarm in Arctic countries.125 Beijing stresses that China’s interests in the Arctic are primarily oriented toward scientific research related to climatic and environmental changes. Besides the scientific interest, the Chinese have shown a noticeable interest in the transformation of the Arctic.126

124 Kit Dawnay.
126 Lynda Jackobson.
Seeing itself as a “near Arctic state” or an “Arctic stakeholder,” China’s investment in Arctic scientific research has been significant. In 1981, the Chinese government created the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration to look after its Arctic interests. Thereafter, in 1984, China founded the Polar Research Institute in Shanghai. The conversion in 1994 of an Ukrainian cargo ship into the world’s largest non-nuclear icebreaker, the Xue Long (meaning Snow Dragon), enabled China to conduct polar research. Between 1999 and 2012, Xue Long conducted five polar research missions, including a trip across the Arctic utilizing the Northern Sea Route in 2012. In addition, China is currently designing a new $613 million modern icebreaker for field research, which is expected to be built before 2016. Furthermore, China also established an Arctic research facility on Svalbaard Island, the most Northern part of Norway. However, China’s real motives for making these huge research investments are not clear and are not expressed in policies. As articulated by Frederic Laserre, “China faces the challenge of making the transition from growth driven by foreign investment to growth that is sustainable from the social, economical, ecological, and environmental points of view. Innovation has been identified by the Chinese government as a main engine for this new growth model, and Beijing has launched a national strategy to build an innovation-driven economy and society by 2020.” In fact, Laserre argues that China’s scientific interests in the Arctic are directly related to its economic development and are a definite reflection of China’s ambitions to become a global power.

In recent years, China’s established diplomatic and economic ties with Arctic countries in order to ensure that China is well positioned to benefit from the Arctic gold rush when the time

127 Kit Dawnay.
128 Ibid.
130 Kit Dawnay.
131 Frederic Laserre, 4.
132 Frederic Laserre, 4.
comes. Accordingly, China concluded a $270 billion deal with the Russian state owned oil company giant Rosneft for doubling oil supplies to China over the next 25 years. From that deal, $60 Billion was paid upfront in order to permit Rosneft to develop new Arctic oil fields.\footnote{“Rosneft Signs $270 Billion Deal with China,” Petro Weekly – News, June 24, 2013, \url{http://www.petroweekly.com/rosneft-signs-270-billion-deal-with-china/} (accessed March 20, 2014).} China needs to diversify its energy sources to provide an alternative to the Malaccan Strait route. The Strait of Malacca is considered a strategic vulnerability by China.\footnote{Banyan, “Snow Dragons,” \textit{The Economist}, September 1, 2012, \url{http://www.economist.com/node/21561891} (accessed September 19, 2013).} The Russian opening of the Arctic to China will permit the China National Petroleum Corporation to join Rosneft in the exploration for oil in three Russian offshore Arctic areas.\footnote{Rakteem Katakey and Will Kennedy, “Russia Lets China into Arctic Rush as Energy Giants Embrace,” \textit{Bloomberg}, March 25, 2013, \url{http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-25/russia-cuts-china-into-arctic-oil-rush-as-energy-giants-embrace.html} (accessed March 20, 2014).} As pointed out by Stephen Blank, “This indebtedness and the size of the planned oil deliveries from Rosneft will give China substantial leverage in the region.”\footnote{Stephen Blank, “China’s Arctic Strategy,” \textit{The Diplomat}, June 20, 2013, \url{http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/chinas-arctic-strategy/} (accessed March 20, 2014).} In addition, China’s state owned companies have several major mining projects seeking iron-ore, copper and gold in Greenland. Furthermore, China has established strong economical links with Iceland by building a giant embassy for 500 people in Reykjavik. China and Iceland have signed a free-trade agreement and China has been granted partnership rights to explore oil-fields off shores.\footnote{Nathan Vanderklippe, “For China, North is the New Way to Go West,” \textit{The Globe and Mail}, January 19, 2014, \url{http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-north/for-china-north-is-a-new-way-to-go-west/article16402962/} (accessed March 20, 2014).} Moreover, as the world’s major importer of natural resources and largest exporter of fabricated goods, China sees enormous potential in the new global maritime short cut through the Arctic.\footnote{Kit Dawnay.} With the increased use of the Northern Sea Route, there is an anticipation that China might try to create with Iceland a maritime shipping node similar to Singapore.\footnote{Kit Dawnay.} On the Canadian side, Chinese investments in the
Arctic are minimal with only a few minor mining operations. As mentioned by Qu Tanzhou, director of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, “I personally feel that cooperation and communication between Canada and China is comparatively less than others. If one day the Canadian government welcomes us to cooperate on developing our scientific research over there, we would be very happy to join.”

China’s economic and diplomatic ties in the Arctic are both evident and significant.

With its recent ascension to observer status in the Arctic Council, China made it clear that it intends to have a real voice and influence on the outcome of the proceedings. China perceives the Arctic Council as the perfect place to influence Arctic policies and to avoid being marginalized. Considering that China does not have an official policy on the Arctic and that the constant Chinese narrative that the Arctic belongs to everyone, there are some concerns among Arctic coastal states about the possibility of China challenging their sovereignty claims. However, to become an observer, China had to agree to certain conditions, including the recognition of Arctic nation sovereignty and UNCLOS. Nonetheless, China’s behavior with its’ Asian neighbors concerning maritime border disputes in both the East China Sea and South China Sea, cast a cloud of doubt over Chinese sincerity. In contrast to those current maritime border disputes, China has no border in the Arctic and as such it has very limited rights under international laws. Moreover, considering the Chinese long-standing principle of respect of internal affairs and sovereignty of other countries, Lynda Jackobson a long time expert on Chinese Foreign Policy, concluded, “China can be expected to continue to persistently, yet

140Nathan Vanderklippe.
141Stephen Blank, “China’s Arctic Strategy.”
142Banyan, “Snow Dragons.”
quietly and unobtrusively, push for the Arctic in spirit being accessible to all.” Furthermore, China cannot impose itself militarily in the Arctic without challenging the Arctic coastal nations, which include the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark. Regardless of Chinese military investments in recent years, China does not have the strength to impose itself militarily against Arctic coastal nations. In addition, China’s economic and diplomatic ties with the Arctic coastal nations are too important to break them. As stated in the Economist, “There is no suggestion that China wants to use the Arctic to challenge UNCLOS, which it has ratified, as have all the Arctic Council’s members apart from America. China has too many maritime disputes elsewhere to want to appear an utter outlaw. Nor does it have expertise in drilling and mining in extreme conditions. It will need to cooperate with the Arctic countries.” As a non-Arctic state, China will rely on diplomatic and economic influence to impose itself as a major player in the Arctic.

In summary, China’s intent is economically driven and is not threatening. China’s interests in the Arctic are driven more by economics than science. However, there is no indication that China intents to use military power to influence Arctic affairs. As demonstrated previously, China is using diplomatic and financial instruments to position itself in the Arctic. China’s behavior in the Arctic is similar to its behavior in many other parts of the world. China is extending its giant appetite for natural resources and influence through its economic power. By gaining the status of observer at the Arctic Council, China will certainly use its influence to shape Arctic international policies. Canada should view China’s interests in polar affairs not as a threat.

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146 Banyan, “Snow Dragons.”
but as an opportunity to assist in the costly development of the Arctic.\textsuperscript{148} China’s interests in the Arctic does not justify a Canadian military response in the Arctic.

\textbf{A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE}

In the past, the preservation of sea ice protected Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and the way of life of its Inuit inhabitants. Even though slowing down climate change might still be the best solution, the predicted future looks different. At the center of the Arctic transformation are its inhabitants, who have been criticizing Canada’s approach to the transformation of the Arctic.\textsuperscript{149} Their shared perception of Canada’s current response is well summarized by a past President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada: “Instead of aggressively facing climate change and becoming an influential international leader, however, Canada has decided that the best way to defend its sovereignty from foreign ships running the passage is with military and icebreakers.”\textsuperscript{150} The concept of Arctic sovereignty is often intertwined with the concept of Arctic security. However, what does Arctic sovereignty and security really mean for Canada? As briefly summarized by Professor Rob Huebert, a Canadian expert on Arctic affairs,

\begin{quote}
Canadian policy makers need to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty in order to provide for Canadian Arctic security. The Canadian Government needs to have control over its north so that it can take action to protect against a wide number of threats that will be increasingly coming from beyond Canadian northern boundaries. As it is impossible to protect Canadian Arctic security without protecting its Arctic sovereignty and vice versa, the two concepts are completely interlinked.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{149}While extremely important, the Arctic complex and unique human dimension of the Inuit culture, social and economic development are beyond the scope of this paper. For more information, \textit{Northern Exposure} contains several good articles about this subject. \textit{Northern Exposure: Peoples, Powers and Prospects in Canada’s North} (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2009).


\textsuperscript{151}Rob Huebert, \textit{Canadian Arctic Security: Understanding and Responding to the Coming Storm}, Preliminary Paper Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, (Canadian International Council: June 2010), 3.
Although Arctic sovereignty and security are linked, the importance for Canada is to have the necessary control over the Canadian Arctic against emerging threats. However, as previously demonstrated the emerging threats in the Arctic are not against Canada’s territorial integrity and are not military related. As caricaturized by Canada’s former Chief of Defence Staff, Walter Natynczyk, “If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.”\(^{152}\) As pointed out by Huebert, the developing of threats in the Arctic are criminally related as well as economic, environmental, societal and cultural.\(^ {153}\) Preserving sovereignty and security in the Arctic does not equate to military force. As is true in the rest of Canada, the control of the Arctic is primarily a responsibility of federal, provincial, and local government agencies using law enforcement agencies such as the Canadian Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to reinforce security. As is done everywhere else in Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces role in enforcing security and control in Canada is one of assistance to law enforcement and government agencies. However, in order to perform this important assistance role, the Canadian Armed Forces needs the right equipment and training to operate in the Arctic.

Currently, the Canadian Armed Forces permanent presence in the Arctic is the Canadian Forces Station Alert. The force is very limited and not combat-oriented. Situated at 817 kilometers from the North Pole on the North Eastern tip of Ellesmere Island Canadian Forces Station Alert is the most northerly permanent inhabited location in the World. Established in the early 1950s, the Departments of National Defence and Environment share the facility, which houses approximately 55 military and civilian personnel who have the role of maintaining signal


\(^{153}\)Rob Huebert, \textit{Canadian Arctic Security: Understanding and Responding to the Coming Storm}, 3.
intelligence equipment and providing environmental scientific data. The second permanent presence is the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre located in Resolute Bay, Nunavut. Officially opened on August 15, 2013, the new training facility is an extension of an already existing infrastructure of the Department of National Resources Canada. The training facility can accommodate up to 140 people and is also used to store vehicle and equipment with a view to reduce long term transportation costs for the Canadian Army. Lastly, the last permanent presence in the Arctic is the Canadian Rangers, a sub-component of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve. Formed into small patrol detachments of local inhabitants, mainly aboriginals, they are located throughout the North in isolated communities. Often portrayed as the eyes and ears of the Canadian military in the Arctic, the roles of the Canadian Rangers is mainly surveillance and assistance to federal, provincial and local government agencies, including search and rescue and local communities support. The Canadian Rangers are very useful but it is important to note that they are not combat-oriented forces. The day to day defense of the the Arctic, it is provided in partnership with the United States through NORAD. As a bi-national organization, NORAD provides aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning in the defense of North America including the Arctic. In addition, the Canadian Joint Operations Center is responsible for the command and control of all continental operations to ensure the defense of Canada. As such, military capabilities of the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air

Force can be deployed on short notice to the Arctic if required.\textsuperscript{158} Released in 2008, Canada First Defence Strategy clearly indicates the vital role of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic and the necessity for the capabilities and resources required to operate in this challenging environment\textsuperscript{159} In line with the Canada First Defence Strategy, the Canadian Armed Forces in Canada’s North Directive, issued in April 2011, provides more details about Canada’s military approach in the Arctic. As such, the document identifies five specific objectives: exercise Canada’s sovereignty through three major annual exercises, demonstrate visible presence throughout the North, support other government departments, maintain 24/7 search and rescue capabilities and build defense relationships in the region. In addition, the document mentions enhancements in defense capabilities such as increase in situational awareness, sustainment, increasing capabilities, space capabilities and cultural awareness training for key personnel.\textsuperscript{160} Overall, the current Canadian military approach is satisfactory for the threats that Canada is facing and the role portrayed for the Canadian Armed Forces. However, the schedule for developing and implementing some of these new Arctic capabilities has been delayed and the resources required to train in the Arctic have become more expensive than anticipated. For example, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships forecasted for delivery in 2013 are now delayed until 2017 and those ships will be less capable than originally planned due to the increase in procurement costs.\textsuperscript{161} Also Canadian Army Program Assessment 2013-14 noted, “Recent northern exercises and operations highlight the fact that conduct of these activities can cost from

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, May 2008).
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\end{footnotesize}
five to seven times more than if they were conducted in Southern Canada . . . The Army will have to limit/reduce the scope of its activities in the North, thus directly impacting on Canada’s ability to exercise Arctic sovereignty.”

No model can predict with accuracy the disappearance of the ice. However, one fact is certain that activities in the Arctic have increased and the Canadian Government needs to be ready to control it from the beginning. As Michael Byers is alleging, a surplus budget is a very important element of the current Canadian Government’s political platform but this objective should not be achieve on the back of future defense procurement including Arctic related projects.

Canada has an adequate military strategy for the Arctic. However, the resourcing of this strategy needs to remain a priority and implementation timelines need to be respected in order to be ready when the time come. To develop new capabilities and operate in the Arctic is expensive but in the end, these long term investments will pay off for generations.

As demonstrated previously, Arctic states and other stakeholders will both compete and collaborate for the Arctic resources. However, the economic development in the Canadian Arctic has been slower than anticipated. Since 2006, no offshore drilling has occurred in the Canadian Arctic due to the lack of adequate infrastructure, such as ports, roads, pipelines and the capacity to cope with a major spill.

Furthermore, disappointing hydrocarbons exploration permit auctions is clear evidence that oil companies are not ready yet to invest the huge amounts of

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money required to extract those hard to get resources.\textsuperscript{165} As explained by Terry Fenge, the four main factors affecting the economic development of the Arctic are: demand and prices for hydrocarbons and minerals, supportive infrastructures, stable political and public environment and, educated, skilled and motivated workforce.\textsuperscript{166} With the possibility of Iranian oil flowing again in the global market and the evolution of new fracking technology for the extraction of shale hydrocarbons, the development of the Canadian Arctic might not happen as early as expected.\textsuperscript{167} The harsh environment and high cost of operating in the Arctic will force countries and the private sector to collaborate with each other.\textsuperscript{168}

As a consequence of geography, the defense and security of Canada and the United States are tied to each other. As such, the Canadian Arctic transformation equation needs to include the United States. From an historical perspective, Canada and the United States, as neighbors, have developed very close relationships throughout the years, particularly concerning the defense of the North American continent. Illustrated by Michael Neiberg, History Professor at the United States Army War College,

As demonstrated by the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements, America proved more than willing to play the role of volunteer firefighter, assuming for itself an active role in guaranteeing Canadian security. In large part, this American willingness represented a self-interested forward strategy of its own, of course, but it also reflected a common


understanding of the symbiotic and synergistic links between American strategy and Canadian strategy.\textsuperscript{169}

As such, the United States cannot let North America, including the Canadian Arctic, be under direct military threat. The recent inclusion of maritime monitoring in the Arctic as a part of NORAD is a move in the right direction. As long as the United States remains the world military hegemon, no other country will challenge Canada’s Arctic sovereignty militarily. The old, but still valid, United States nuclear deterrent will keep the Russian and Chinese away from military intervention into the ‘North American’ Arctic. As such, Canada does not need to militarize the Arctic. Canada needs to develop and maintain its military capability and capacity to operate in the High North but does not need to permanently militarize the Arctic, which will only contribute to militarization escalation, particularly by Russia. To defend its own country, Canada needs to look at its historical past and keep reinforcing its bilateral defense arrangements with the United States, which will ensure the defense of North America and de facto Canada and its Arctic territory.\textsuperscript{170}

The most probable risk for military escalation in the Arctic is misinterpretation of intentions and actions by others nations.\textsuperscript{171} Russia’s hard response to Canada’s announcement that it might intend to claim the North Pole as part of its final extended continental shelf claim is a concrete example. Less than a week after the Canadian Foreign Minister, John Baird, announced that he had asked Canadian scientists to include the North Pole in the Canadian Arctic final UNCLOS claim, Russian President Vladimir Putin told his defense’s chiefs to increase


\textsuperscript{170}Michael S. Neiberg.

military presence in the region.\textsuperscript{172} As explained by Michael Byers, the decision by the Canadian Government to claim the North Pole was driven by domestic politics and not by scientific evidence. He argued that the current government does not want to be perceived as ceding this idyllic location and that by following UNCLOS, the North Pole cannot belong to Canada. As stated by Byers,

\begin{quote}
[Harper] does not want to be the prime minister seen publicly as having surrendered the north pole, even if the scientific facts don't support a Canadian claim … What he's essentially doing here is holding this place, standing up for Canadian sovereignty, while in private he knows full well that position is untenable … We're talking about the center of a large, inhospitable ocean that is in total darkness for three months each year, thousands of miles from any port … The water in the north pole is 12,000ft deep and will always be covered by sea ice in the winter. It's not a place where anyone is going to be drilling for oil and gas. So it's not about economic stakes, it's about domestic politics.\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}

Politicians and media have the tendency to inflate situation for their own advantages, which in return creates the risk of misperception.

The ‘use it or lose it’ political rhetoric designed for the domestic audience has been misinterpreted internationally. Misperceived as unilateralism and provocative, Canada’s hard sovereignty narrative and actions have created tension with its Arctic neighbors, including the perceived need for militarization of the Arctic.\textsuperscript{174} As mentioned by Andrew Foxall, Director of the Russian Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society, “It's often said that the Russians act with their Arctic policy in an aggressive, nationalistic and unilateral way. The same thing can be said about the Canadians.”\textsuperscript{175} Furthermore, the international perception of Canada’s approach in the Arctic is well summarized by United States Navy Captain James Kraska,

\begin{quote}
Likewise, Canada is under the unilateralist spell of oceans sovereignty, going it alone in the Arctic Ocean in a vain attempt to grasp a future of stability and security amidst a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{173}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{175}Luke Harding.
rapidly changing geophysical Arctic climate and unsettling and dynamic Arctic politics. Canada has resurrected “sovereignty” patrols, loudly trumpeted plans to construct ice-strengthened patrol vessels to enforce unilateral rules in the Northwest Passage, and retreated behind the mythos of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. The storyline is recycled by the government–media–academic complex to obtain the approval—or at least the acquiescence—of the international community, especially the United States. The hard line sovereignty domestic narrative has been detrimental to fostering good relationships with Arctic nation neighbors. However, as pointed out by Michael Byers, “The Obama administration seems to understand that Harper`s Arctic rhetoric has always been directed at Canadian voters and not at foreign governments.” Byers also pointed out, “To be fair, Harper was necessarily in constant campaign mode during five years of minority governments, and this made risky any steps that could be portrayed as possible sellouts of Canadian Arctic sovereignty including ordinary diplomatic discussions of long-standing disputes.” As such, Byers recommended that it is time for Canada to develop closer Arctic bilateral arrangements with the United States by resolving their Northwest Passage dispute. Canada needs to avoid being perceived as isolationist and provocative while reaching out to its Arctic partners, in particular its closest ally the United States. By assuming the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council for 2013-15, Canada has a great opportunity to shape future Arctic relations, policies, and economic development. Bilateral and multilateral collaboration and cooperation are necessary for Canada to develop the Arctic.

In summary, Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic are interlinked. However, the threats are not military oriented and as such Canada does not need to militarize the Arctic.

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179 Michael Byers, “Time to Negotiate the Northwest Passage with the United States,” 71.
Nonetheless, the Canadian Armed Forces have an important role to play in the Arctic by assisting in providing security and by supporting other government and law enforcement agencies. The Canadian Armed Forces military strategy is adequate but needs to be adequately resourced to accomplish it. However, Canada cannot do it alone. Canada needs partners to develop the Arctic economically. Canada and the United States past and future are intertwined and will need to collaborate. Resolving the two current Arctic disputes between the two North American countries is key to fostering that crucial relationship. As current Chair of the Arctic Council, Canada has a golden opportunity to shape future Arctic policies and economic development by reinforcing and expanding the existing collaboration, cooperation and communications. It is time for Canada to modify its approach and reach out to build these important relationships that will ensure a stable and peaceful Arctic transformation.

CONCLUSION

In the next decades, global warming effects and the glaciers melt are expected to make the Arctic’s natural resources and navigable sea lines of communications more accessible. The Arctic presents outstanding economic development opportunities, and, thus, there are many countries that hold ambitions to claim those future resources for themselves. Who owns the Arctic is currently a diplomatic, academic, and legal debate. Nonetheless, the potential for future disputes is real and palpable. As the ice cover shrinks, the tension and competitive atmosphere could possibly develop into military conflicts. All the Artic nations, including Russia, publicly oppose militarization. Concurrently, nations not bordering the Arctic Ocean, particularly China, have demonstrated a keen interest in Arctic geopolitics and economic development. As an Arctic nation, Canada has been loudly reaffirming its Arctic sovereign claims. However, the question for Canadian policymakers is whether to place confidence in diplomacy to avoid the militarization or to take actions to counter the perceived steps by other nations to militarize the Arctic.
Four main arguments have been brought forth in the media to justify why Canada should militarize the Arctic. To demonstrate that Canada can avoid militarizing the Arctic, it was necessary to investigate each of the four arguments, which are the Northwest Passage, Arctic territorial claims, and Russian and Chinese threats. The evidence presented here does not support those arguments. Consequently, Canada does not need to militarize the Arctic.

Nonetheless, there is a requirement for Canada to monitor, control and respond to emergency situations in the Arctic. However, there is no indication that a state on state military threat exists in the Arctic and as such, militarization of the Arctic is not necessary. There are military roles in the Arctic including reinforcing and supporting law enforcement agencies and other government agencies but these roles do not require militarization of the Arctic. To fulfill these military roles the Canadian Armed Forces must obtain the right equipment and train to operate in the Arctic. The Canadian Government will must ensure that the military receives the resources necessary to achieve their mandate.

Many nations, including Canada, are currently developing military capabilities for operations in the Arctic. However, building Arctic military capabilities does not mean that there is an intent to use it offensively. As seen previously, Arctic nations such as Russia are building these capabilities for defense purposes and to assist in the development of their portion of the Arctic. Additionally, non-Arctic nations such as China are developing Arctic capabilities for economic and geopolitical influence purposes. Without an intent and a purpose, developing military capabilities does not equate to a threat.

In the unlikely event that one day the Canadian Arctic is under real military threat or attacked, then defense treaties such as NORAD and NATO will come into play, as Canada has done several times in the past to support its allies in international conflicts. Canada does not have the resources to adequately militarize the Arctic for deterrence and control purposes against other larger military forces such as Russia, China or the United States. For Canada, to militarize the
Arctic would be futile. Furthermore, militarization of the Arctic will only escalate the tension and
oblige other nations to do the same in order to balance power, particularly Russia. To have a
replay of the Cold War tensions is not to any one’s advantage. The Arctic is a treacherous
environment that requires collaboration and cooperation to develop, not militarization.

The constant alarmist messaging about Arctic militarization in the media has created
the perception of tension and concern for security and sovereignty. This erroneous perception is a
fallacy that has been wrongly exploited in the media and by self-serving elected and non-elected
officials. Loose talk is probably the most dangerous threat driving military escalation in the
Arctic. Canada needs to avoid being perceived as isolationist and provocative while reaching out
to its Arctic and non-Arctic partners, in particular its closest ally the United States. Developing
these relationships and working together are key for all Arctic and non-Arctic states.
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