AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINAL CHANGES THAT THE PERUVIAN ARMY IMPLEMENTED FIGHTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SENDERO LUMINOSO INSURGENCY SINCE 2001

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT


In 1980 the Sendero Luminoso insurgency led by Abimael Guzman Reynoso initiated its armed struggle in the Andes of the Peruvian rural areas. From 1980 to 1999 the Sendero Luminoso generated chaos and violence in the country utilizing different procedures and tactics. Abimael Guzman was captured in 1992 and Sendero Luminoso’s influence began to decrease. After 1999 the Sendero Luminoso withdrew to remote areas and Comrade Victor Quispe Palomino took the lead with new tactics, techniques, and procedures and providing security to the drug cartels. The Peruvian Army trained to conventional warfare in the 80’s began its counterinsurgency operations with some mistakes learning counterinsurgency tactics in response to the advance of insurgents attacks. In 2001 the interim government of Agustin Paniagua deactivated the Peruvian National Intelligence System, and moved the counterinsurgency military bases to the cities concluding that the Sendero Luminoso was close to defeat. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the counterinsurgency doctrinal changes that the Peruvian Army learned from the Sendero Luminoso insurgency from 2001 to 2013.
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improved Explosives Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCAFP</td>
<td>Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JISOC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence and Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Peruvian National Police</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Peasant Rounds</td>
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<td>RVAEM</td>
<td>River–Valleys Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro</td>
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<td>RVH</td>
<td>River–Valley of Huallaga</td>
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<td>SL</td>
<td>Sendero Luminoso Insurgency</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>Wolf Brigade</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgency and the Peruvian Army implemented from 2001 to the present day. It is necessary to understand and study the development of both organizations from the beginning of the SL insurgency in Peru in 1980. This chapter provides general information on the development of SL tactics, techniques, and procedures from 1980 until its withdrawal to the river-valley of Huallaga (RVH) and the river-valleys of Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro (RVAEM) in 1999. Information is also provided about the development of the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations by the Peruvian Army and the Peruvian National Police (PNP) against the SL from 1983 to 2001.

The SL Insurgency, 1980-2001

Abimael Guzman Reynoso, a former philosophy professor, founded the SL insurgency in 1969. It was based on the communist ideologies of Mao, Marx, and Lenin. The group commemorates 17 May 1980 as the beginning of its armed struggle.¹ Its purpose was to capture the government’s power, destroy the democratic system, and implant communism in Peru.² The SL insurgency began at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho in central Peru where Abimael Guzman was an instructor. Guzman and the


²Peruvian Army, TE 41-7-A, Revolutionary War-Subversion (Lima, Peru: Peruvian Army, 2006), 67.
SL insurgency members dominated the university faculty and student organizations. They indoctrinated the predominantly indigenous faculty with a Maoist ideology that highlighted the disparity in the distribution of wealth in Peru.\(^3\)

The SL organization was very well structured with command and control mechanisms. The SL units were decentralized at the tactical level without the control of the central committee. This required extreme discipline for the cells to accomplish all that the SL central committee ordered. The deep indoctrination of their followers and its hierarchic organization allowed the SL to launch a devastating campaign of violence and terrorism against the Peruvian government.\(^4\) The “Final Report” of the Peruvian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation identified five periods of the SL insurgency that occurred between 1980 and 2001:

1. The armed violence beginning (from May 1980 to December 1982): from the first violent action in Chuschi, Cangallo, on 17 May 1980 until the Peruvian president’s removal in December 1982. That triggered in the entry of the Peruvian military into the COIN war in Ayacucho.


3. The national violence deployment (June 1986 to March 1989): this is the period that runs from the penitentiary killings in June 1986 until 27 March 1989. This was the date of the insurgency attack of the Peruvian Police post in Uchiza in the department of San Martin in the north central part of Peru.


\(^3\)Peruvian Army, TE-41-7-A, 220.

and ends with the capture of Abimael Guzman Reynoso and some of the principal
leaders of the organization by the Special Intelligence Police Group.

5. Decline of the insurgency action, authoritarianism, and corruption (September
1992 to November 2000): this period begins with the capture of Abimael Guzman
Reynoso and other insurgent leaders and extends until the end of the presidency
of Alberto Fujimori.\(^5\)

During these periods, the SL insurgency applied the following tactics, techniques,
and procedures:

1. Rural guerrilla warfare: the rural guerrilla’s sought to destroy the Peruvian
state’s presence in the rural hinterland. In seeking to establish liberated zones it
employed extreme brutality against the indigenous communities that did not
support them, alienating those that might otherwise have offered support,
conducting hit–and–run attacks involving smaller numbers, or coming together
to conduct larger ambushes.\(^6\)

2. SL’s propaganda was facilitated through radio broadcasts, graffiti and pamphlet
campaigns, and supportive publications on websites.

3. Urban terrorism: in the late 1980s, the SL focused on urban terrorism,
especially in Lima, Peru’s capital city. They used bombings,\(^7\) high explosives,
and violence–related activities like assassinations, kidnappings, raids, and
attacks on military and civilian facilities.

\(^5\)Communication and Public Impact Office, Truth and Reconciliation

\(^6\)Jane’s IHS.

\(^7\)Carlos De Izcue, “Peru’s Shining Path Sendero Luminoso and MRTA Analyzed
with the Manwaring Paradigm,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 12, no. 2
4. SL targeted almost every institution in Peru, including critical infrastructure, foreign business, humanitarian projects, and diplomatic missions of many countries.\(^8\)

The information in table 1 lists the different types of major events that the SL insurgency conducted in Peru from 1980 to 2001. Those events demonstrate the brutality of their acts, the direct and indirect attacks on the private and public Peruvian infrastructure that harmed the development of the villages, towns, and cities affecting the economic development of the country. The table also shows the different procedures and tactics that SL employed in their violent attacks like ambushes on military and police patrols, bombing public and private infrastructure, the release of SL prisoners from jails, kidnappings, disruption of the election campaigns, and recruiting campaigns. However, the SL did not gain the support of the population. As a consequence, the population remained opposed to SL activities.

\(^8\)Jane’s IHS.
Table 1. SL Major Events, 1980-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>In its first year of violence, centered on the departments of Lima and Ayacucho, the SL conducted 240 attacks.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Operations continued at a rate of over 40 per month. Targets ranged from banks to mines to government and police buildings.</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>150 guerrillas effected the release of 300 prisoners from Ayacucho jail.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>The rate of kidnap increased and the practice of severe punishment (mutilation and death) of collaborators and local government officials became more common.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>An SL bomb on a tourist train driving to the Inca ruins at Machu Picchu killed seven and wounded 40.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The SL attempted to disrupt the elections with a campaign of bombing and looting. In December, a large prospecting camp belonging to Mobil Oil sub-contractors was destroyed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>President Fujimori suspended the constitution and instituted an aggressive counter-insurgency campaign. Guzmán and three fellow politburo members were arrested; they were followed by other leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>SL factions were responsible for the assassination of 20 candidates campaigning in local elections, and the mutilation and death of over 50 Amazonian Indians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The Repentance Law, under which the government claimed up to 5,000 guerrillas surrendered their weapons, was repealed. The government claimed that the SL had been crushed and there was relatively little SL activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Evidence mounted that the Guzmán faction of the SL was recruiting once more.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>SL factions restarted large-scale operations with bombings and actions involving up to 200 guerrillas targeting the security forces, government and commercial facilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>In November, Peruvian security sources privately admitted that guerrillas in Ayacucho were killing at least one member of the security forces every two weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>On 28 May, SL rebels killed five peasants in remote Amazonian villages, accusing them of collaborating with security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>In May, SL rebels shot and decapitated four members of a militia in a village in the central Andes mountain region. In July, the military arrested Oscar Ramirez Durand (alias Comrade Feliciano). In October, approximately 60 SL guerrillas killed nine troops and two rebels in an ambush on an army patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>On 3 February, SL rebels executed three park rangers in the Ayacucho region. On 21 February, a grenade attack on Naranjal village killed one civilian and wounded six others. In February, President Fujimori admitted that the government had been communicating with SL guerrillas in Valle del Êne before the October 2000 deaths of four army officers in a helicopter crash.</td>
</tr>
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The SL insurgency lost influence after the Peruvian military captured Oscar Ramirez Durand (alias Comrade Feliciano) in July 1999. After this capture, the SL reorganized into two separate branches located in two different areas. The followers of Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, called Comrade “Artemio,” the leader of SL’s Huallaga Regional Committee, operated in the RVH. Security forces in the Tocache province captured Artemio and some important leaders of his Regional Committee in early February 2012. The followers of Victor Quispe Palomino, called Comrade “Jose,” the leader of SL’s Main Central Regional Committee, reorganized and began operations in the RVAEM region where they continue the SL insurgency today. The focus of this thesis is the SL insurgency actions and Peruvian Army operations developed in these areas.

The Peruvian Army and the National Police, 1980-2001

The Peruvian Army has fought against the SL insurgency since June 1983 when the military-political command was installed in the city of Ayacucho under the command of General Roberto Clemente Noel Moran. Prior to 1983, Peruvian Army training was oriented on conventional war, not COIN. After some initial problems, the Peruvian Army initiated a more balanced COIN plan and became better equipped to deal with the insurgency through the integration of lethal military measures with development in the

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9 Jane’s IHS.

10 Ibid.

11 Burgoyne, 6.

areas of security and popular support.\textsuperscript{13} The COIN tactics that were designed to destroy the SL insurgency were classified into three groups: actions against the political-administrative organization, actions against the armed elements of the SL, and actions to assist the population.

Figure 1 demonstrates how the Peruvian Army organized to fight against the SL insurgency. First, political-administrative organization actions were aimed at capturing the political and administrative leaders of the SL organization. Second, actions against armed elements of the SL were conducted by patrolling rural and urban areas where the SL was present. Third, activities to gain favor with the population included civic actions, special development programs for rural areas, and countrymen patrols that consisted of providing weapons to small towns and rural villages to provide self-defense against armed elements of the SL.

\textsuperscript{13}Burgoyne, 4.
Political—Administrative Organization COIN Actions

To destroy the SL organization it was necessary to eliminate or capture its leaders. This would stop the development of the insurgency. The Peruvian Army felt that a detailed plan was required to capture them. “This plan would: (1) identify the SL insurgency leaders and organization; (2) infiltrate training elements from the intelligence system through their command and control structure to reach the SL leaders; and
(3) conduct psychological operations to make the insurgency ideology unpopular which would limit the logistics resources to the development of the insurgency.”

Intelligence was very important in fighting the SL insurgency. For this reason, in March 1990, the Special Intelligence Police Group was created. The Special Intelligence Police Group was part of the Police Counterinsurgency Direction. The Special Intelligence Police Group worked exclusively on the development of covert intelligence operations (monitoring and surveillance) oriented on the capture of the SL insurgency leaders. This resulted in the capture of the SL leader, Abimael Guzman Reynoso, in April 1992.

**Operations against the Armed Elements**

At the tactical level, the Peruvian Army determined that to neutralize or destroy the insurgents it was necessary to locate them, develop an information system based on informants, and establish an information center against the insurgency in charge of processing and evaluating all the information that would led to execution of the operations.

There were preventive actions established to gain support from the population. One example was organization of the *Rondas Campesinas* or Peasant Rounds (PR) in every town and small city near military posts in most parts of Peruvian territory. This helped organize the population for self-defense. Once a PR was created, it was easy to

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16 Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 41-7, 53.
establish efficient systems of information gathering in these areas. The Peruvian Army provided support to civil authorities who organized civic activities. Detachments, brigades, battalions and special companies organized civic actions providing medical and dental support, legal assistance, haircuts, and musical concerts just to name a few. In coordination with other Peruvian ministries, they provided meals and technical guidance. The Special Project of the Huallaga river-valley is one example. It provided assistance in the form of rural roads maintenance and essential services like water and irrigation systems.

The Peruvian Army organized repressive actions against the SL insurgency by planning carefully. The training and equipment had to be refined to match the characteristics of the areas. For example, the Non-Conventional Warfare–Lince course was compulsory for all Peruvian Army subordinate officers, cadets, warrant officers, and noncommissioned students.

The Lince course prepared them in individual weapons selective instinctive shooting, collective use of weapons (rocket propelled grenades, machine guns, and multiple grenade launchers), basic medical treatment, basic radio operations, combat swimming, patrol watercourse passages, procedures to intervene in urban and rural COIN operations, COIN patrol organization and operations, and ambush and counter ambush techniques, among other things. The Lince course trained subordinate officers, cadets, warrant officers, noncommissioned students, and enlisted personnel.

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17 Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 41-7, 54.

warrant officers, and noncommissioned students in the high mountains of the Andes and the river-valleys of the jungle. “The Second Infantry Brigade closed down the Jungle Operations Tactic Course Lince . . . It allowed the specialization of military personnel with the purpose of being employed in reconnaissance and combat patrols in the RVAEM.”

On the military bases at the company and battalion levels, it was important to have an informant network that provided intelligence from within the population. This allowed the Peruvian Army to locate insurgents, isolate parts of the towns, establish travel routes, and develop assault plans. The information that was obtained had to be complemented with COIN operations characterized by decisive action.

The procedures for decisive action or military insurgent intervention were to first establish a blocking position, then establish an outer rim to prevent the entry of unauthorized personnel to the area, then establish an inner rim to avoid the exit of undocumented personal. The next step was to establish contact with the informants in an inconspicuous way to orientate the decisive action on a specific target area. Once in the target area, forces began the interrogation of suspects to gather information to aid in locating the insurgency cell. Finally, there was strict control of weapons and explosives in the area.

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20 Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 41-7, 57.

21 Ibid., 58.
Psychological operations were also important. The psychological themes were oriented on the systematic failures of the SL insurgency against the population and intended to deny popular support to the SL insurgency.²²

The SL insurgency constantly sabotaged public and private infrastructure, destroying roads, railways, airports, bridges, telecommunication stations, energy power plants, public essential services, industry, and agricultural production.²³ The SL insurgency used dynamite, gunpowder, liquid phosphorous, and aluminum powder. For this reason, the Peruvian Army established active and passive counter sabotage procedures:

Preventive Measures:

1. Determine the sabotage objectives.
2. Strict access control to the installations.
3. Determine “forbidden” areas inside the installation.
4. Access control and vehicle registration.
5. Permanent surveillance to the sabotage objectives (SSOO).
6. Dispose of fireproof material.
7. Dispose of alarm systems.
8. Realign counter sabotage assessment to determine methods, modus operandi, and security failures. To learn from the experience and increase preventive measures.

Active Security Measures:

1. Counter with an immediate reaction group, trained and equipped to eliminate or capture saboteurs, before, during, and after the sabotage act.

²²Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 41-7, 62.

²³Ibid., 59.
2. Counter with means and equipment necessary to neutralize the sabotage effects.
3. Install a permanent alarm system.
4. Formulate and rehearse counter sabotage plans.
5. Coordinate the responsibilities of the SSOO.  

**Actions Supporting the Population**

The objective of the actions to gain the support of the population was to control the people and provide security for troops, military installations, main towns and communication networks. All military units fighting in COIN operations had to be in contact with the population in their area of responsibility. The control measures established were a joint effort between the military and civilians. Some essential tasks for controlling the population were:

1. Establishment of control posts and permanent patrols in the city or town.
2. Search and seizure operations.
3. Seize the insurgency supporters.
4. Avoid illegal and unauthorized political meetings.
5. Census of all the population to control them.
7. Control of the broadcast and written journals of the city.
8. Control of all the movements.
9. Control of production and storage areas.
10. Curfew.
11. Control of the essential services.
12. Control of the ammunition and explosives locations.  

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24 Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 41-7, 57.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the government implemented the COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures described above. By 2001, the SL insurgency had almost disintegrated. In 2001, the interim Peruvian government of Agustín Paniagua began to dismantle the intelligence agencies in response to atrocities committed during the government of Alberto Fujimori. Therefore, many military bases that controlled the SL insurgency in the Andes and jungles of Peru transitioned into garrison units. After 2001, there was a gap in controlling the SL insurgency by the Peruvian Army and the PNP in the RVH and RVAEM areas. Because of that, the SL branches operating in the RVAEM and RVH reorganized and planned the continuation of the communist insurgency. The SL used a different approach to reorganize and plan its future considering the population as key to its future success.

Because of these events, it is important to answer the question: What are the doctrinal changes that the Peruvian Army implemented during COIN operations against the SL beginning in 2001? In answering this question, it is necessary to address the following: (1) What are the relationships, tactics, techniques, and procedures that the SL insurgent organization has used since 2001? (2) What are the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Peruvian Army has implemented to fight against the SL insurgency since 2001?

In order to improve the understanding of this research, there are key concepts, acronyms, and phrases that are important. These terms are identified below.

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25 Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 41-7, 81.

26 Burgoyne, 5.
Galil Rifle: The Galil rifle is designed to serve as the basic weapon for the infantry. The rifle is lightweight; air cooled, gas operated and fed by a magazine. The Galil is a very robust weapon with high reliability in adverse and extreme conditions.27 This rifle is used by the Peruvian Military and the SL insurgency as a personal weapon.

Local Work Stoppage: The act of stopping or the condition of being stopped.28 An act of intimidation by the insurgents to impose their influence over the population.

Peasant Rounds (Rondas Campesinas): The ronda campesina is a type of rural or peasant patrol active in various parts of Peru. “In December 1982, the Peruvian Army took the lead in COIN operations in Ayacucho . . . One of its measures was to organize the peasants in Defense Committees.”29 Local Defenses are viewed by many COIN strategists as an essential element in defeating an insurgency. Providing a population with a local defense organization will greatly aid the government’s strategy of extending its security and control over the rural areas affected by insurgent organizations.30

Pioneers: The little Pioneeritos or Pioneers are the children recruited and indoctrinated by the SL in the RVAEM area. The SL provides them indoctrination according to Mao Tse-tung ideology, communist ideology, and teaches them to handle


different types of weapons. They also participate in the SL ambushes on military patrols in the RVAEM area and have constituted a key element in the SL reorganization since 2001.

**RVAEM**: Valleys of the rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro. This area is located in the departments of Junin, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, and Huancavelica in the jungle of Peru. It is a militarized zone where illegal coca crops occupy thousands of hectares. To eliminate this threat, the Peruvian government provides social programs, and the Peruvian military fights against the coca producers who are linked to the SL.

**RVH**: River in central and northern Peru. It rises in the Andes Mountains just south of Cerro de Pasco and descends north northeastward past Huánuco and Tingo María. The Huallaga emerges into the Amazon River. Since the 1980s, the primary coca growing and drug trafficking activities in Peru have been in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

This chapter provided a historical introduction that narrates various events and activities developed by the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Military from 1980 to 2001. The primary focus of this thesis is to relate events of the Peruvian Military and SL insurgency from 2001 to the present day. These events will then be analyzed in chapter 4.

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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides information about the literature addressing the two sides of the insurgency conflict in Peru. The first section of the chapter covers research on the history, improvements, and development of the SL organization from 1980 to 2013. The second section reviews research on the development of Peruvian Army COIN operations from 1983 to 2008. This chapter also provides details on the development and improvements in the military operations led by the RVAEM Special Command that have taken place in the RVAEM.

SL Insurgency Research

There are numerous resources on the history of the SL. Hopefully, with this vast information, the analysis and varying points of view will yield an accurate understanding of this organization. Their history begins with the formation of the basis of SL in the department of Ayacucho in the Andes of Peru in 1980. Some of these resources will focus on the branch of SL that was created by Victor Quispe Palomino. Following the military capture of Oscar Ramirez Durand (alias Comrade Feliciano) in July 1999, this branch remained active and conducted military operations in the RVAEM.

Jane’s Information Group is a British company specializing in military topics. Jane’s has a complete analysis of the SL insurgency in Peru from 1980 to 2013. This research reviews the information from Jane’s on the history of the SL and the major activities of the SL and the Peruvian Military.
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s “Final Report” analyzed the internal violence during the fight against the SL insurgency from 1980 to 2000. It is a complete analysis of the causes and consequences of the violence generated by the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Military, including all the actors who participated in this armed conflict. Chapter 1 of this report provides information on the SL insurgency between 1980 and 2001. The “Final Report” of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides information about the different periods of internal armed conflict.\textsuperscript{35}

Carlos De Izcue wrote a great analysis covering the SL insurgency from 1980 to 2002 titled “Peru’s Shining Path Sendero Luminoso and MRTA Analyzed with the Manwaring Paradigm.” This source provides information on the spread of urban terrorism procedures by the SL insurgency, especially in the city of Lima, which is the capital of Peru.

The SL strategic analysis, the \textit{Black Book of the Sendro Luminoso Insurgency} (commonly referred to as the \textit{Black Book}), is the most important source for analyzing the development of the SL insurgent organization from 2001 to 2008. This book studies the SL’s first military and political campaign against the Peruvian Army and government. This counter campaign refers to the popular resistance against the anti-imperialist yanqui democracy.\textsuperscript{36} The book provides accurate information on the SL strategy, policy, tactics, information operations campaign, military operations, and other areas. It provides information on the SL political will. It suggest that the Peruvian government is privatized...

\textsuperscript{35}Communication and Public Impact Office, “Final Report.”

and a puppet of the yanqui imperialism. They also mention the interference of the United States Southern Command in RVAEM military operations. On 14 July 1999, the RAVEM SL branch separated from the original SL central committee guided by Abimael Guzman Reynoso (commonly called the Gonzalo president). On this day, the RVAEM SL separated from the SL organization that was founded by Mariategui who was the first communist leader in Peru in 1929.

The SL Black Book specifically mentions the SL tactics. The SL ways of fighting are ambushes, assaults, selective annihilation, and propaganda. The selective annihilation is only meant for the military forces and those civilians proven to be from the intelligence services. This book provides information on how they plan the ambushes. The Tintaypuncu ambush was well planned and well prepared. The book also analyzes the military’s counter ambush actions. “The Tintaypuncu ambush is a routine mistake, you only can take the little tiger entering to their den, we faced them and confiscated eighteen rifles.” The RVAEM SL branch says that their strategy and tactics have changed:

We fight when we can win, and retreat when we cannot. Our support are the high conscience revolutionary popular mass. We have our own methods for fighting. When you want to attack us, we do not allow you to not even find us. But when we attack you, just hit in the bullet, we strike you with accurate strikes and

37 Joreno.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
annihilate you. When we can annihilate, we make it with decision, when we cannot annihilate, we do not let you annihilate us.\footnote{Joreno.}

The \textit{Black Book} also provides information on their logistics support. “Our meals support is based on our own forces and the popular mass. The logistic and support of our weapons and ammunition are based on the military and police forces decomposition.”\footnote{Ibid.}

They also say that the SL has changed. “Our fortress is the Party, the Revolutionary Army, and our Unit Democratic Front policy.”\footnote{Ibid.} They ensure that they do not take any income from the population. “All that we get is by our effort, nobody gives a cent, we invest all that we have in the people interests and in the revolution.”\footnote{Ibid.} They are organized into two main detachments. “We are a (the) combat detachment and a production detachment. We (The RVAEM SL understood that they) need the support of everybody, even the support of the governments, and all the national and international organizations, but we do not depend on them.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The \textit{Black Book} also analyzes the geography of the RVAEM area. The SL occupies the RVAEM area and guarantees that just and correct policies are applied to the population. Vizcatan is part of a Democratic Revolutionary Support Base. It is one of the entrances and exits to the RVAEM in the Huachocolpa and Ayahuanco areas where
anyone can travel, and comrades and fighters welcome them with respect and attend to their needs.47

They mention aspects of their method of indoctrination. The Peruvian Caretas magazine report on the RVAEM children.48 On 6 October 2010, during an intervention at an SL base, one military patrol discovered a digital camera with more than 100 photos of leaders or Mandos of the RVAEM SL, showing women and children between five and 16 years of age with AKM and Galil rifles.49 Some of the children were photographed reading Mao Tse-tung and doing daily chores. This article also states that in 2009 these children were filmed by a Peruvian television program which showed that Comrade Jose had 17 children in one of the platoons. They are called Pioneros or the little pioneers.50 Many of these children are recruited from the RVAEM towns and villages and are indoctrinated according to the SL rules. This is important because it provides information about the recruiting procedures of the RVAEM SL insurgency.

The SL has joined forces with drug producers and drug cartels in the RVAEM region in the jungle of Peru. For this reason, it is also necessary to analyze the relationship between SL and the drug cartels. In 2009, a Congressional Research Service Report by Maureen Morales-Taft titled Peru: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations, analyzed the Peruvian situation. In the chapter on terrorism, it provided information about the strong relationship between the RVAEM SL insurgents and the drug traffickers:

47 Joreno.

48 Zambrano, “The RVAEM Children.”

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.
Thwarted bomb attacks in Lima in 2007 indicated that the Sendero Luminoso maintains a limited presence and guerrilla capacity in urban areas. But the government and other analysts believe that the guerrilla movement has shifted its primary bases to remote drug producing areas, and funds its activities through drug production and providing protection to drug traffickers. It is not currently considered a threat to national security, but appears to be growing in size and influence.\textsuperscript{51}

**Peruvian Army and RVAEM Special Command Research**

The other portion of this research covers the development of the Peruvian Army COIN operations. The presence of the Peruvian military in the RVAEM began with the establishment of the RVAEM Special Command in 2008. The organization of this command is comprised of the Peruvian Army, Air Force, Navy, and the PNP conducting COIN operations. This research attempts to show the interaction between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in fighting COIN operations in the RVAEM.

*Targeting Terrorist Leaders: The Peruvian Untouchable Experience* provides accurate information about the capture of the SL leader “Presidente Gonzalo” (Abimael Guzman Reynoso). The human intelligence procedures used by the PNP Special Intelligence Group led to the capture of the SL leader which resulted in the downfall of the SL organization in 1992. This is important because the Joint Intelligence Special Operation Group is now taking the lead in the fight against the SL and must learn the procedures used by the PNP Special Intelligence Group. These procedures are producing good results in COIN operations in the RVAEM area:

In 1990, the Chief of Investigations Police General PNP Fernando Reyes appointed Commander PNP Benedicto Jimenez, who had been working in the directorate for eight years, with his final assignment: to be commander of Delta

Group 5, a unit specializing in the capture of SL’s leaders. For this purpose Jimenez was authorized to ask for the necessary personnel from the directorate. Jimenez started with a captain, two ensigns, and a corporal from the police, and a navy intelligence NCO, and ended up in 1993 with eighty-two agents, including three women. The unit was supposed to report to the DINCOTE director according to the formal chain of command, but it reported directly to the Police Investigations Chief General Fernando Reyes.52

The Latin American edition of the U.S. Army Military Review provides information about the Latin American threats. An important article was written by U.S. Army Officer Michael Burgoyne who analyzed the lessons that Peru learned fighting against SL. Actually, after a period of relative peace, there is concern about the resurgence of SL in the RVH and the RVAEM. On 9 April 2009, SL insurgents ambushed two patrols from the Peruvian Army in the RVAEM.53

There are many manuals that regulate the COIN operations in the Peruvian Army. The second part of Peruvian Army ME 41-7-A, Manual of Unconventional Warfare, regulates the COIN procedures, defense of homeland, countersabotage operations, combat operations at the tactical level and its procedures, patrol planning, operations for controlling the population in insurgency areas, COIN units (brigade, battalion, and company level), COIN in populated areas, civil affairs, communications, and legal aspects in COIN operations. These tactics and procedures learned from 1980 to 2001 fighting against the SL, were used until 2008 when the Peruvian Army Center Region, in charge of conducting military operations in the RVAEM changed and the RVAEM Special Command took charge of fighting the SL.


53Burgoyne, 7.
CG 35-51-11 manual, *The RVAEM Operational Experiences*, analyzes the lessons learned fighting against the SL in the RVAEM area. It is the latest guide for military bases, battalion, and brigade commanders. The purpose of this manual is to understand the new SL insurgency environment and how to mitigate risks operating in the RVAEM. Chapter two of this handbook provides information on the organization, tactics, procedures, and techniques that the SL is using in the RVAEM. They have a specific procedure for insurgents and wounded. The Local Force evacuate killed and wounded to the Base Force, the Principal Force and Local Force deploy to different places, and the Base Force continues with daily activities.\(^{54}\) It also provides information about females and their role in the SL insurgency. Inside the combatant groups there are females who use short hair, personal weapons, and are used to seduce new combatants.\(^{55}\) This shows the improvement the SL has made in different combat tactics and procedures like:

1. They are constantly watching the military bases, and the children have the responsibility of killing off the wounded military personnel in the ambushes. When entering a town they use children as advanced elements.

2. In clashes they recover their dead and wounded to avoid them being identified and make them appear to be missing. Then they report the missing to the Human Rights Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs).

3. They divide their military columns in short groups and locate them in exit routes of drug delivery to control the drug traffic and to provide false information which is transmitted to the military forces.

4. During a clash they do not withdraw immediately. They wait for the helicopters to rescue the wounded soldiers and attack the helicopters.


\(^{55}\)Ibid., 2-5.
5. The military base harassment is developed by small groups located near the military bases. They are watching the movements permanently. They use Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) around the military bases. They wait for adequate opportunities to wound or kill soldiers, essentially during routine distributions or meetings.

6. They constantly use IEDs. They select precise places where the military patrols deploy constantly. They use IEDs in towns accesses, trails that connect the military base with its military checkpoints, places near their posts, or near fruit trees.

7. They implemented procedures to ambush the military patrols. They plan and prepare ambushes days prior, sometimes they live in the area for more than seven days. The ambush area oscillates between 100 and 200 meters long. They ambush military patrols to recover weapons and generate the maximum personnel losses.

8. They know that helicopters deploy for administrative activities like sustainment and evacuating the wounded. They can generate a wounded evacuation by harassing military bases. Once they know about a helicopter deployment, they plan a helicopter ambush locating their machine guns near the military base heliport.

9. They have communication equipment such as the YAESU radios, satellite telephones, cell phones, messengers, and have the capability to intercept military communications. They have developed an excellent communication code and dominate it perfectly, and they vary radio frequencies constantly. The towns have informants, they act on behalf of the SL, they also can be authorities or PR members. They have control over the population and over the merchants to avoid infiltration by military intelligence personnel.

10. They get sustainment from their own farms, drug trafficking in the provinces of Huanta, La Mar, Satipo, and Junin; illegal timber trade payments, and they store their food in high elevations. They cook meals in the dense forest. They buy everything and pay more than the normal price for a product to gain the support of the population.

11. Their Information Operations campaign is oriented to “not killing farmers and PR members, and are in support of the coca leaf cultivation.” The fact of having resources produced a great approach with the RVAEM population, developing in some opportunities civic actions. If they have killed during an attack, they made believe that their personnel died because of accidents or diseases.

12. Alliance between drug trafficking and insurgency. Ninety percent of the RVAEM population cultivates coca leaf, this product goes to the drug trafficking. The SL insurgent provides security and produces drugs. For these reasons the
military forces do not fix into this organization and there is no popular support to the military forces.56

Chapter three of CG 35-51-11 provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures learned by the Peruvian Armed Forces based on the latest SL attacks, ambushes, and harassment of military bases and patrols. The RVAEM Special Command applies these tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been learned in the last few years. The most important changes in tactics, procedures, and techniques learned from the SL insurgency are:

1. When planning operations it is important to include the officers in charge of the patrols and the helicopter crew involved in the operation.

2. The National Police and trusted authorities should also be part of the planning process to avoid interference from the population during operations.

3. After counterinsurgency operations it is important to write patrol reports and send it to the intelligence experts. There should be a meeting with the officer that lead the patrol, helicopter crew, and the staff officers with the purpose of avoiding future mistakes. The staff officers should enhance conversations and communication with the officers that lead the patrols to have a better understanding of the terrain, enemy, and situation.

4. If the enemy plans in detail the ambushes against the military patrols. The patrols should deny, distort, and change its deployments permanently.

5. During deployments, the advanced elements should bring weapons with silencers, bullet proof vets, and helmets. Minimum deployments during the day almost all the deployments during the night. When establishing patrol bases (stops) test communication with the command post. The initiation hour for a deployment should vary permanently and should be secret. Never use the same route when returning the military base. When entering a town the patrol should have a general information about the number of people in the area, authorities’ names, develop interrogation of children and elder men, access to an area should be made using different access routes.

56Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-5 to 2-10.
6. If a helicopter is attacked and crashes, the survivors should escape and avoid enemy action. They should also take the helicopter machine guns with them or dismantle them.

7. All the soldiers who will fight in the RVAEM must understand that they will face a hostile terrain and climate, an enemy adapted to these environment mixed with the drug trafficking that has the population as their efficient contributors.

8. The intelligence, the common sense, the sixth sense, and the fighter smell should be taken into consideration. Even during a clash the fighter should appreciate the situation (enemy, terrain, friend troops) and initiate the counterattack based on the collective weapons, fixing the enemy by their flank, and looking at its rearguard. For these actions the communication signals and codes between soldiers should be practiced constantly.

9. It is necessary for the troops to understand the enemy tactics, their improvement in techniques and procedures using IEDs, their snipers’ employment during attacks, and the employment of modern weapons with better characteristics.

10. Some important aspects to consider and that must be transmitted to the new combatants should be: Obtain intelligence information to prevent the enemy actions, deny and distort information to the enemy changing rutinary actions permanently, train and work with teams until achieve excellence, know how to survive in the jungle without resources, and enhance relationship with authorities and PR without trusting them totally.

11. The maps must be actualized and everybody should have the same maps when initiating operations. The brigade staffs should reinforce the maps with detailed sandboxes, videos, air photos, and other means.

12. The brigade intelligence staff should diffuse intelligence (SL leaders and their peculiarities in their area of operations, SL column deployments, places where the SL columns are operating, actualized photos, new trails and routes, photograph albums of SL children, important dates and festivities of the nearby towns).

13. When patrolling the patrols should provide record coordinates of new routes, farms, caves, possible camps, towns, brooks, streams, or other important characteristics assigning them specific names.

14. Counterintelligence should be oriented to determine enemy infiltration during conscript basic training.

15. Enhance coordination measures between the patrols and the helicopters providing both the same objectives and maps.
16. Some measures implemented for improved security in a military base are: Employment of dogs, and built at least two or three heliports in coordination with the helicopter’s crew.  

To reinforce the research of this thesis, there are also reports by journalists from the most important Peruvian newspapers that provide the latest information about the SL organization. Those considered for this research are:

1. *La Republica* Peruvian Digital Newspaper provides detailed information about SL activities and the RVAEM Special Command operations ambush on Comrade William by combined PNP and Peruvian Army patrols on 12 September 2012. The death of Comrade William was a powerful blow against the SL according to specialists.  

2. *Gestion* Digital Newspaper is an economic newspaper that provides information about the Peruvian Government Acquisitions. The government prioritizes equipment for the RVAEM.  

3. *Expreso Digital* Newspaper provides details of an interview with the former Peruvian Joint Chief of Staff Francisco Contreras Rivas that analyzed President

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57 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-1 to 3-10.  


Alejandro Toledo’s strategy to defeat the SL in the RVAEM. Toledo significantly degraded the National Defense.  

4. Peru 21 Digital Newspaper gives information and details about President Toledo’s release of SL prisoners. More than 3,400 insurgents were liberated in previous years.  

5. The Radioprogramas del Peru radio is the biggest radio chain in Peru. It has national coverage in the majority of city and rural areas in Peru. It provides permanent information about the RVAEM area. The RVAEM militarized area is part of the departments of Cusco, Apurimac, Junin, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho.  

6. The Mira quien habla television program is a TV program conducted by Cecilia Valenzuela that criticizes the development of the strategy to defeat the SL, inviting SL analysts and specialists to its program. For this study, it provided information about details of the killing of the SL Comrade Williams and the targeting of the SL leaders Alipio and Gabriel. The fall of Comrades Alipio and Gabriel was a strong hit to SL.  

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62Radioprogramas del Peru.  

7. The *Caretas* magazine is a weekly magazine and it is dedicated to investigation. This is a great source of information for details about the SL developments, attacks, ambushes. “The SL Children Rescue and its Risks” provided detailed information about the indoctrination procedures of SL children or Pioneers.64

Sources from public institutions were also reviewed for this thesis. The web page of Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas del Peru or Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Peru (JCAFP) offers Official Statements to the public. These Official Statements provide information and details of the RVAEM Special Command operations. Every official statement gives names of the SL personnel captured, names of soldiers killed or wounded, and information on SL harassment, attacks, and ambushes on military bases or patrols.

The official web page of the Peruvian government provides information about President Ollanta Humala Tasso’s speech to the Peruvian Congress in 2013 entitled “Message to the Nation from the Republic President, Ollanta Humala Tasso, on the 191st Anniversary of the Peruvian independence.” This article provides information on the advances in the SL fight in the RVAEM and all the measures taken at the strategic level to improve the condition for the Peruvian military to fight the SL insurgency.65

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64Zambrano, “The RVAEM Children.”

The Minister of Defense web page also provides information about the RVAEM. For this research, only military acquisitions by the Minister of Defense in the RVAEM area were considered. The Minister of Defense, Jaime Thorne, officially delivered two recently acquired MI-35 attack helicopters with powerful weaponry, to the Air Force General Commander who will immediately arrange for them to be delivered to the RVAEM.66

Sources from various important web pages were used to clarify some specific concepts about the SL insurgency and Peruvian military organizations: Encyclopedia Britannica, the Peruvian Radioprogramas radio, the Caretas Magazine, the Drug Library Organization, the RVH Special Project, the Israel Weapon Industries, and the U.S. Embassy in Peru which provided a picture of the RVH and RVAEM areas in Peru. These concepts and figures are described in detail at the end of chapter 1 and are trusted sources.

There is no access to information or documents on the Joint Intelligence and Special Operations Group (JISOC) commonly called the Wolf Brigade (WB) by the press. This special group which was established in 2010 is in charge of the JCAFP and is directly led by the executive branch of the Peruvian government. The majority of the information about the WB detailed in this research came from the opinions of specialists and reports of journalists.

The previous chapter was a review of the literature that assisted in answering the thesis question. The research focused on two types of sources: research obtained from foreign books, magazines, journals, and web pages that provide a broad opinion about what happened with the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Military COIN operations in Peru since 2001; and research obtained from Peruvian books, magazines, journals, and web pages focused on specific events. Internal sources have detailed information on specific events like ambushes, attacks, and kidnappings. This includes the Peruvian Army COIN manuals and booklets that provide information on specific military operations against the SL insurgency.

This chapter contains the methodology used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. This study will use qualitative data to attempt to understand the opinions, points of view, tactics, procedures, and techniques used by the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Army since 2001.

The research study will be an in-depth examination of the changes that the Peruvian Army has made fighting against the SL insurgency since 2001. The specific research question being posed is: What are the doctrinal changes that the Peruvian Army has implemented during COIN operations against the SL since 2001? The secondary research questions are: What are the relationships, tactics, techniques, and procedures that the SL insurgent organization has used since 2001? What are the coordinations, tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Peruvian Army has implemented fighting against the SL insurgency since 2001?
The most significant limitation in this research is that Peruvian Military documentation is classified. The JCAFP addresses the military operations in the RVAEM, and it is impossible to access patrol reports that would give a better understanding of the advances made in fighting in COIN operations against the SL insurgency.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Terrain Analysis of the RVAEM Area

The RVAEM area has approximately 12,000 square kilometers and is located in the central eastern Andes Mountains within the borders of the departments of Cusco, Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Junin. This is where the SL insurgency retreated in 1999 and currently continue their operations. The military considers it an isolated area with a lack of supply lines. The RVAEM SL insurgents insure that this sparsely populated area of RVAEM are governed by a just and correct SL party. This means there both the SL insurgency and illegal producers of coca are located in the RVAEM area. The Vizcatan area inside the RVAEM is part of a democratic revolutionary support base. It is one of the entrances and exits to the RVAEM area where many travel, and comrades and fighters welcome them with respect and attend to their needs.

Figure 2 shows the location of the RVAEM area. The insurgency has the advantage of the terrain. The RVAEM area is characterized by an absence of supply lines. There are almost no roads in this area. The river currents are strong and most parts of the river are dangerous to navigate. The weather conditions are unfavorable due to constant rain and fog which restricts helicopter employment. These valleys are also characterized by their abundant coca and drug production that provides economic support

67 Joreno.

68 Ibid.
for the SL insurgents. Currently, the SL insurgency continues their operations in these areas, particularly in the RVAEM.

Figure 2. The SL Area of Operations

Development of the SL Insurgency, 2001 to 2013

After the SL retreat to the RVAEM in 1999, the SL insurgency made a five-year assessment of their failures. As stated in *Andean 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region* by the Council on Foreign Relations, from 1999 to 2004 the SL reorganized and formed a union with the drug traffickers. “Membership is unknown but estimated to be 400 to 500 armed militants. SL’s strength has been vastly diminished by arrests and desertions but appears to be growing again, possibly due to involvement in narcotrafficking.”

The SL leaders wrote an analysis of this reorganization. The SL *Black Book* is the analysis of the first SL political-military counter campaign of the popular democratic war of national resistance of the yanqui imperialism. Their final report resulted in the new SL strategy. In this document the SL abandoned many of their previous practices including killings, local work stoppages, kidnappings, blackmails, and extrajudicial occupation of houses. This suggests that the SL has the capability to assess their failures and reorganize their structure. The SL also determined that the population is its center of gravity. The SL insurgents will try to keep the population on their side at all costs. The SL concluded that violence against the people was a critical failure in the insurgency.

For the insurgents, Operation Plan Excellence 2008 resulted in the defeat of the RVAEM Special Command. During these counterattacks, the SL killed 72 military personnel.

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70 Joreno.

71 Burgoyne, 6.
personnel and confiscated 19 Galil rifles for their cause. They also know and recognize that the United States Southern Command has been advising the RVAEM Special Command. This analysis shows that they have experienced fighters and have increased their numbers of weapons. They also have the confidence to say that the six military bases in the Vizcatan area, located inside the RVAEM, are vulnerable and easy to attack. They qualify the military civic actions as charity from the government and tell the population that it is not enough for economic success in this region. For them it means that the civic actions provided by the government are useless for the economic development of these areas and the population will gain nothing from them. The former Director of Strategic Policy of the Peruvian Ministry of Defense Admiral Jorge Cochela Maldonado said “The civic actions does not replace the development of the RVAEM itself, but they substitute it temporarily.”

According to Michael Burgouyne, who has studied the shift in approach of the SL insurgency, the leaders of SL decided to change tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to gain the support of the population in their areas of influence:

As it is said now, they provide potable water, built sport centers, and paint schools to gain the population support. Victor Quispe Palomino, the RVAEM leader affirmed that “the SL won’t attack transnational business or civilian organizations, in its place, only will attack to the Armed Forces, the National Police, and all that take part in the called counterinsurgency fight and drugs trafficking. These affirmations by the SL insurgency and the attacks in great scale to the Peruvian Army units and the Peruvian National Police point to the belief that SL has transformed into an element to secure the cocaine production, was incorrect. The SL continues to be a communist insurgency organization. And now

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72 Joreno.

have adopted a strategy similar than the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (RAFC). They utilize the earnings that come from the drug trafficking to pay their fighters and gain the population support.⁷⁴

After 1999, the SL target was not the population. The SL concluded that violence against the population was the most critical failure of the insurgency.⁷⁵ Therefore, the SL focused on attacking the PNP and Peruvian Military bases, patrols, and helicopters as shown in table 2 on next page. Knowledge of the terrain in the RVAEM area characterized by a lack of roads, isolated populations, interandean valleys, and high mountains with steep slopes, gave them a great advantage. The permanent insurgent attacks on police and military units gave them the experience to face the PNP and Peruvian military patrols.

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⁷⁴Burgoyne, 6.
⁷⁵Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>On 18 February, SL guerrillas opened fire on an army helicopter killing one soldier and wounding an officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>In June, suspected SL guerrillas kidnapped 71 gas pipeline workers in the Andean region of Ayacucho; all hostages were released in less than 36 hours. On 14 July, SL rebels ambushed a government patrol, killing seven in Ayacucho.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>On 20 February, SL rebels killed three police officers in an ambush in RVH. On 20 December, SL guerrillas ambushed and killed eight Peruvian policemen in a coca-growing region of the Andes mountains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>On 3 April, the SL distributed flier boycotting the 9 April general election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Security forces in Lima defused five explosive devices on 20 May. On 14 November, four police officers were killed and two others were wounded in a firefight with 30 suspected SL rebels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>On 9 October, the SL was blamed for the murder of 14 people—12 soldiers and two civilians—attack on a military convoy in the district of Tintaypunto, RVAEM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>On 9 April, SL militants killed 14 soldiers in Ayacucho. On 1 September, an ambush on a military patrol in the RVAEM region which left three soldiers wounded. When a helicopter arrived to evacuate these soldiers on 2 September it was shot down by the group, killing two more soldiers. On 25 October, SL militants attacked the Union Mantaro military outpost in the RVAEM region and wounded three soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>On 5 October, an army captain was killed during an armed clash in the RVAEM. On 23 November, two soldiers were killed and seven wounded when they triggered several IEDs emplaced by SL militants in the San Martin de Pangoa area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>On 5 June, five soldiers were killed when SL militants ambushed a security patrol in the Vilcabamba district of Cusco. On 19 July, two soldiers were killed when suspected SL militants ambushed a security patrol in the Llochegua district of Peru’s Ayacucho department. On 14 September, two soldiers were killed in an attack by SL militants near San Martin de Pangoa RVAEM. SL militants then opened fire on the helicopter sent to retrieve the unit, killing the pilot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>On 27 April, three security force personnel were killed in an area of the RVAEM. On 4 July, soldier was killed by SL militants opened fire in the Canayre RVAEM. On 15 August, five soldiers were killed and suspected SL militants in Mazangaro in Junin in the RVAE wounded another five in a small-arms attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>On 5 April, a soldier was killed and another was wounded when suspected SL militant snipers opened fire on counter-terrorism forces in Echarate RVAEM area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SL continues with their armed actions to defeat the Peruvian Military and the PNP with well-planned ambushes oriented to a win only situation, attacking only when there are high probabilities of success, killing only military personnel, police personnel, and civilian informants. The SL utilized IEDs, and land mines with the purpose of recovering weapons for their insurgency. They improved procedures by attacking helicopters with greater success, and using snipers to attack military bases to kill officers. Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru official statements have warned that the RVAEM SL is looking for attacking helicopters and that the SL use snipers to avoid the helicopters movements in their areas.\textsuperscript{76}

The SL Information Operations (IO) changed drastically and were oriented to erase the past violent image of the insurgency. They gave interviews to national and international programs, distributed pamphlets and fliers during national events, and prepared graffiti campaigns in their area of influence.\textsuperscript{77}

Their kidnapping procedures changed also. Now those are meant to call attention to the press as part of their IO campaign to reinforce the perception to the population that the SL is still present. They also execute temporary kidnappings of the employees of the company that runs the natural gas located in the RVAEM area. They learned that every time this happens, the Peruvian Military and the PNP would send patrols to this area. In


terms of the military and the PNP their purpose is to ambush the military and police patrols to recover weapons for their insurgency.\(^{78}\)

The SL actions for gaining the will and support of the population have changed totally. No government authority died and public infrastructure was damaged as a result of an SL insurgent action since 1999. The SL constantly attacks or interdicts the natural gas pipeline with the purpose of attracting international attention.\(^{79}\)

The SL actions for their support had changed too. Currently, they are linked with the coca farmers and drug cartels providing them security to export drugs to the United States and the European Union. Every time that the military patrols, combined with National Police patrols, enter to some areas of the RVAEM, the SL insurgents ambush the patrols. As a consequence, they delay the advance of narcotraffic operations in that area. In different occasions, Peruvian Army and National Police helicopters that tried to enter the Vizcatan area (RVAEM) and were repelled by the insurgents. Another patrols were also ambushed.\(^{80}\)

The SL has been recruiting children to become insurgents since 1999. They are the new armed insurgents that have been attacking the military forces since 2005.\(^{81}\)

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\(^{79}\)Ibid.


Changes in SL Insurgency Military Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The SL Black Book analysis of their strategy since 2001 mainly refers to the Peruvian Military Operation Plan Excelencia executed in 2008. The SL analysis of their military actions gives them a hope for victory. “In the battlefield, we annihilated 72 military, confiscated 19 rifles, and attacked seven helicopters, all of them had bullet holes, four of them are not operative and one is useless.”

In regards to attack helicopters, the SL has improved procedures for attacking helicopters with snipers and long-range weapons.

They know that helicopters deploy for administrative activities like sustainment and to evacuate the wounded. They attack a military base and this results in wounded soldiers. This creates an emergency situation and helicopters will come to evacuate the wounded. Once they know about a helicopter deployment, they plan a helicopter ambush by locating their machine guns near the military base heliport.

They have also learned attack helicopter procedures when ambushing patrols for the purpose of killing or wounding soldiers. They know that a helicopter will come to these areas to evacuate them. This is when they ambush or attack the helicopter. The SL destroyed one MI 17 helicopter in the RVAEM in 2009. In the past, the SL insurgents immediately withdrew in the face of an engagement with a military patrol. Now, they do

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83 Joreno.

84 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-7.
not withdraw when they encounter military patrols. They wait for the helicopters to rescue the wounded soldiers and attack the helicopter.85

Their attacks are well planned and their ambushes are productive. Most of the time the insurgents recover weapons and ammunition for their own use. They implemented procedures to ambush the military patrols. They plan and prepare ambushes for days prior; sometimes they live in the area for more than seven days. The ambush area oscillates between 100 and 200 meters long. Successful ambushes improve the morale of the insurgent fighters. For the military and the Peruvian society, it looked like the military in the RVAEM was losing. This was the general perception of the population until 2012 when the situation began to change due to the first results of the Wolf Brigade (WB) as mentioned earlier.

One substantial change in the SL tactics is the use of snipers. Comrade “Williams” Rolando Cabezas Figueroa a retired Peruvian Army sergeant specializing in the use of military weapons left the Army to join the SL insurgency in the RVAEM. Comrade Williams was promoted and became part of the SL Central Committee because of his military expertise and his success killing military personnel. According to the SL Black Book, Comrade Williams killed more than twenty two Peruvian Army soldiers and eleven National Police members,86 and was the main element in guiding attacks on the Peruvian military. Combined Peruvian Army and National Police members killed

85 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-5 to 2-10.

Williams on 5 September 2012. The SL acquired this capability because of William’s experience learned in the Peruvian Army. These techniques were taught to their comrades.

According to the RVAEM operational experience manual, the procedures for harassing a military base are: “It is developed by small groups located near the military bases. They are watching the movements permanently. They use IEDs around the military bases. They wait for adequate opportunities to wound or kill soldiers, essentially during routine distributions or meetings.” These accurate attacks on military bases is new in comparison to the simple attacks by SL combatants before 2001.

What did the SL insurgency learn from Comrade William? First, the SL fighters learned not to fear the military forces. Second, they learned how to move into strategic positions to shoot at military bases. Third, they learned to identify the patrol leaders or the most important elements of the patrol and be patient enough to shoot to kill. Finally, the insurgents learned procedures to observe military bases without being seen by military elements. They are constantly watching the military bases, and the children have the responsibility of killing military personnel wounded in the ambushes. When entering a town, they use children as advance elements.

The insurgents also learned deception. They divide their military columns in short groups and locate them in drug delivery exit routes to control the drug traffic and to

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87 La Republica, “Death of Comrade William a Blow to Sendero Luminoso.”
88 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-5 to 2-10.
89 Ibid., 2-5 to 2-6.
90 Ibid., 2-5.
provide false information which is transmitted to the military forces. This gives their deployments advantages because the false information provided to the military patrols confuses the patrols and the brigade staff that plans operations.

The use of IEDs has been a constant since 2001. In its Official Statements, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru (JCAFP) provides information about SL captures and mentions great quantities of dynamite and explosives also captured. They steal or buy these materials with the purpose of ambushing military patrols. “They constantly use IEDs. They select precise places where the military patrols deploy constantly. They use IEDs in towns access, trails that connect the military base with its military checkpoints, places near their posts, or near fruit trees.”

Changes in SL Insurgency IO Campaign

The SL considers the IO campaign an important element. They employ psychological operations element. They misrepresent the reality in the RVAEM area by saying that the military and police are unsuccessful and that the government manages the national, regional, and local press. They analyze the expert opinions and discredit them with facts. They provide interviews to the national and international press to promote

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91Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-5 to 2-10.


94Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-8.

95Joreno.
their reason for fighting. They work hand-in-hand with the authorities in the RVAEM areas where there is no military presence. Instead of killing authorities who assist the military patrols as before, they encourage them to accept the presence of the military patrols. Therefore, when a military patrol arrives in a district, town, or village, some of the authorities welcome the military, but do no provide them with truthful information. They say that the SL is not in the area. This means that the SL IO networks are successful in denying the military patrols access to information.

The SL have learned to manipulate the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in their favor. If an encounter has unfavorable conditions for them, they complain to the NGOs; not as insurgents, but as poor civilians. If the SL are wounded, they pretend to the NGO authorities that they are civilians. In clashes, they recover their dead and wounded to avoid them being identified and then report them as missing people. Then, the SL insurgents, now posing as civilians, report the missing or wounded people to the Human Rights NGOs. This creates a huge legal problem because the officer responsible for the patrol is always held accountable by the justice system.

Changes in the SL Relationship with the Population

The SL Central Committee also says that the SL has changed. “Our fortress is the Party, the Revolutionary Army, and our Unit Democratic Front policy.” They ensure that they do not take any income from the population. “All that we get is by our effort,

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96 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-8
97 Ibid., 2-5, 3-3, and 4-2.
98 Joreno.
nobody gives a cent, we invest all that we have in the people interests and in the revolution.”

They mention aspects of their method of indoctrination. “We the communists educate the population, in our support bases it is forbidden to smoke, there is organization, and discipline. The population is quiet without the presence of the military. Vizcatan has at least 50 exits and every exit divides into two or more exits.”

Their IO campaign is oriented to not killing farmers and Peasant Rounds (PR) members, and is in support of the coca leaf cultivation. Drug production and trafficking has been a great benefit not only to the SL but also to the RVAEM population. Nowadays, the SL members pay for what they use or eat, in coordination with local authorities build basic infrastructure for isolated towns, and develop civic actions in some situations. “If they have members killed during an attack, they make believe that they died because of accidents or diseases.”

Analyzing these procedures, the SL will no longer act against the population or the government authorities in the RVAEM and are always producing propaganda with the objective of keeping the people of the RVAEM on their side. The drug trafficking and their own crops and cattle make them independent. They no longer disturb the population requesting meals for the SL as they did prior to 2001. In some isolated towns, they provide assistance to the population; this is another

99Joreno.

100Ibid.


102Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-8.
recent development. With all these procedures and techniques, the isolated RVAEM population has taken their side,\(^{103}\) considering that there is no government presence in these areas, and patrols rarely pass through.\(^{104}\)

SL support to the population has improved. As a result, when the Peruvian Army patrols an area or town, it is more difficult for them to obtain information from the people. The SL has organized the population, including the Peasant Rounds and the local authorities, on their behalf. The towns have informants who act for the SL who sometimes are authorities or PR members. They have control over the population and the merchants to avoid infiltration by military intelligence personnel.\(^{105}\)

**Changes in SL Support Activities**

As part of the operational environment it is necessary to analyze the changes in the RVAEM SL support. First, they buy everything that they need with money that comes from providing security to the drug trafficking business. They also have their own crops, along with cattle and sheep through the RVAEM area. Therefore, they do not take anything from the population. “Our meals support is based on our own forces and the popular mass.”\(^{106}\) The majority of the population in this area is involved in the coca and drug producing industry. “They get sustainment from their own farms, drug trafficking


\(^{105}\)Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-7.

\(^{106}\)Joreno.
in the provinces of Huanta, La Mar, Satipo, and Junin; and illegal timber trade payments. When buying they are willing to pay more than the normal price of a product to gain the support of the population.”

Second, the RVAEM weapons and ammunition comes from the illegal weapons business and weapons recovered during their ambushes on police and military patrols. Because of the support from drug producers, they are able to buy ammunition from civilian areas outside the RVAEM. These weapons come from criminal activities in the cities, and in some instances, they have corrupt military personnel providing them with considerable amounts of money to buy ammunition and weapons from the military. “The support of our weapons and ammunition are based on the military and police force breakdown.”

Third, for medical support they utilize the Minister of Health facilities along the RVAEM area. “In Vizcatan, the one who has money provides money, the one who has grain provides grain, the one who has nothing provides nothing; it is not compulsory. Everything goes to the popular health, education, feeding, and free housing.”

Fourth, the SL has developed an excellent communication network. They have experts in communication codes and they vary radio frequencies constantly. They have

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107 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-9 to 2-10.

108 Joreno.


110 Joreno.

111 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-8.
communication equipment such as the YAESU radios, satellite telephones, cell phones, messengers, and have the capability to intercept military communications. These communication procedures had been working very well for the insurgents, but with the improvement in electronic intelligence operations conducted in cooperation between the PNP antinarcotics division and counterterrorism division equipment and the Peruvian Special Forces, the SL communications have been intercepted and decoded and actually provide excellent intelligence.112

They also are very well organized. They are organized in two main detachments: the combat detachment and the sustainment detachment. “We need the support of everybody, even the support of the governments, and all the national and international organizations, but we do not depend on them.”113 The support detachment is in charge of obtaining revenues for their organization and coordinating social projects in agreement with the local authorities such as soccer fields, civic and school parades, small irrigation projects, and many others.114

The SL Alliance with Drug Traffickers

The alliance between the SL and drug traffickers provides all of their income: “90% of the RVAEM population cultivates coca leaf, this product goes to the drug traffickers. The SL insurgent provides security and produces drugs. For this reason there

113 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-8.
114 Ibid., 2-11.
is not popular support for the military forces.”\textsuperscript{115} This is the way the SL is gaining popular support. It brings income or revenue and supports the insurgents. The people in the RVAEM who produce coca and cocaine feel secure when SL insurgents protect their illegal cultivations and business. The government has taken actions in conjunction with other ministers to provide different solutions to these problems. The counterdrug policies have improved since 2011, attacking not only the drug producers, but also the chemicals required to make the coca that are transported from the capital to the RVAEM. Now there is much more control in these aspects and there is holistic work including health, education, economy, mines, interior, and defense ministers to solve these problems at the strategic level.\textsuperscript{116}

The Peruvian government has noticed that there is a strong relationship between the SL and drug trafficking since 2007. This means that the SL is located where there are drugs to provide protection to their producers and also to produce revenue cultivating coca and producing drugs. The RVAEM Special Command constantly considers this variable and how the coca area of production develops in other valleys surrounding the RVAEM, because if drug production expands to other areas, there is a probability that the SL will expand to those areas too.

Thwarted bomb attacks in Lima in 2007 indicated that the Sendero Luminoso maintains a limited presence and guerrilla capacity in urban areas. But the government and other analysts believe that the guerrilla movement has shifted its primary bases to remote drug producing areas, and funds its activities through

\textsuperscript{115}Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-5 to 2-10.

drug production and providing protection to drug traffickers. It is not currently considered a threat to national security, but appears to be growing in size and influence.  

Changes in SL Indoctrination and Leadership Development

The SL insurgents no longer cover their faces. On 6 October 2010 during a search of an SL base a military patrol discovered a digital camera with more than 100 photos showing the leaders or Mandos of the RVAEM SL with women and children between five and 16 years of age with AKM and Galil rifles.  

Many of these children are recruited from the RVAEM towns and villages and are indoctrinated according to the SL rules. This also means that the SL has a system to recruit personnel, and if they recruit children, they are going to indoctrinate in their concepts. These types of insurgents will probably never change their minds. Considering that they have been indoctrinating and recruiting children since 1999, these children would now be 25 to 30 years old. They are accustomed to living in the jungle, utilizing few resources to live, and living only for the revolution. They have also learned to handle different types weapons and are experts in their use. The military tactics, techniques, and procedures are taught to them by the SL leaders who have experience in these fights. These recruits have been facing the military forces since 2005 with good


118 Zambrano, “The RVAEM Children.”


results. Their ambushes, selective attacks, killings, and harassment of military bases provide day-to-day experience. As time goes by though, it will be more difficult to fight against these insurgents because of their experience and knowledge of the terrain and weather conditions.

**Peruvian Army Fight Against the SL Insurgency, 2001-2013**

This section explores the changes in the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Peruvian Army made while fighting against the SL insurgency. This is despite the government’s refusal to maintain and continue the COIN operations against the SL insurgency since 2001:

In 2001 the government withdrew 68 military bases located in the RVAEM area. Not happy with this the government of Alejandro Toledo dismantled the Intelligence Service and left the Peruvian Armed Forces without an operating budget. Contreras also said that during the government of former President Alberto Fujimori the Minister of Defense budget was 14.27%, and with President Toledo the budget diminished to the 5.85%, in 2003 [translated from Spanish to English by author].

In November 2001, following renewed SL attacks, Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo Manrique decided to re-establish several military bases and special COIN units in the Junin, Ayacucho, and San Martin departments but diminished the budget of the Minister of Defense from 2001 to 2006. This means that during this period the Peruvian military had to fight the insurgency with less resources. The equipment and weapons were not well maintained, the flight hours for helicopters diminished, the

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121 Navea.

122 Jane’s IHS.

123 Peru21.
conscripts were not well paid, and there were no incentives for the officers and warrant officers deployed in the RVAEM area. Experience in conducting military operations was lost because there were almost no clashes between the Peruvian Army patrols and the SL insurgents between 1999 and 2004.

In the interim government of Valentin Paniagua and the government of Alejandro Toledo Manrique, many insurgents were liberated from jail. Over 500 SL insurgents were liberated in the transition government and more than 2,300 in Alejandro Toledo’s government. Many of the liberated insurgents returned to the SL organization. This helped the SL insurgency to reorganize, this time in alliance with the drug producers and cartels in the jungles of Peru focusing their operations in the RVAEM.

Until 2008, the Peruvian Army had a detachment in the RVAEM area where each service (Peruvian Air Force, Navy, and Army) had an area of responsibility. There was almost no coordination between them, with a lack of unity of command. Each service managed their own intelligence units, and the COIN operations were the same as those employed from 1983 to 2001. This RVAEM detachments did not have adequate budget, human resources, and logistics support.

Since April 2008, the Peruvian military has constituted the RVAEM Special Command, and General Raymundo Flores Cardenas was put in charge of leading the

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124 Peru21.


126 Ibid.
operations against the remaining SL insurgents in this area. The RVAEM was organized with two Peruvian Army divisions, one special forces command with elements of all the services, Peruvian Air Force units, and the Peruvian Navy units in charge of patrolling the rivers in this area. The creation of the RVAEM Special Command meant unity of command, coordination between units and services, one joint staff for planning COIN operations. The RVAEM Special Command was in charge of the intelligence and military operations and depended directly on the Joint Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Military. It facilitated the coordination with the superior echelon and the service commanders. The PNP in charge of fighting the drug trafficking and the insurgency coordinated with the RVAEM Special Command, but these units were not subordinate to the RVAEM Special Command. They reported directly to the Minister of the Interior.

Since 2011, Peruvian President Ollanta Humala Tasso, has improved the Peruvian military capabilities to fight against the SL insurgency in the RVAEM Special Command. The government is improving the logistics, equipment, and personnel aspects in the RVAEM. The government is emphasizing the presence of professional military personnel for operations and incorporating new COIN bases in strategic areas. The new military bases have been built by contractors and have 360 degree security, modern security cameras, reinforced buildings, and recreational areas. The personnel that operate in the

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127 Peruvian Armed Forces, “Peruvian Military Creates the RVAE Command.”

128 Ommati.

129 Ollanta.
RVAEM area receive an extra amount of money for fighting against the SL. These aspects increase the satisfaction of the soldiers operating in these areas.\textsuperscript{130}

The organizational structure at the operational level in the RVAEM also improved. The RVAEM Special Command has authority over the PNP units operating in these areas. It includes the COIN and counterdrugs special units. The Peruvian military intelligence (Navy, Air Force, and Army) and the PNP intelligence (COIN and counterdrugs directions) share information and work under the lead of the RVAEM Special Command. These new command and control structures are creating synergy when fighting against the SL insurgency resulting in the capture of comrades Artemio and Williams.\textsuperscript{131} The Joint Intelligence and Special Operations Command (JSIOC) killed comrades Gabriel, Alfonso, and Alipio, all who were members of the RVAEM SL central committee.

Table 3 shows the most important actions and operations of the Peruvian military against the SL insurgency from 2001 to 2013. From 2001 to 2006 the Peruvian military operations did not have much success because they operated with procedures learned between 1983 and 2001. After the creation of the RVAEM Special Command in 2008, the situation began to change, and the RVAEM Special Command began to capture important SL leaders. The situation in the River-Valley of Huallaga (RVH) was different.


In this area, the PNP were in charge and the Peruvian Army units supported them. The Counterinsurgency PNP Direction captured the River-Valley of Huallaga SL Central Committee as shown in table 3.

Table 3. Peruvian Military Actions against the SL, 2001-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>In November, following renewed SL attacks, President Toledo decided to re-establish several military bases and special counter-insurgency units in the Junín, Ayacucho, and San Martín departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>In June, police captured three of five SL suspects allegedly responsible for the March bomb attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>In June, suspected SL guerrillas kidnapped 71 gas pipeline workers in the Andean region of Ayacucho; all hostages were released in under 36 hours, but government claims that they were rescued by the armed forces were contested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>On 19 February, an SL commander, Hector Aponte—believed to have been responsible for an ambush in which eight police officers were killed in December 2005—died in a shootout with Peruvian authorities in the Huallaga Valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>On 1 May, senior SL militant Alejo Teodosio Maylle Tolentino (alias Comrade Rocky), described as the second-in-command of an SL unit that operates in the Alto Huallaga Valley, was arrested in the Aucayacu area of Huanuco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>On 19 February, security forces in the capital Lima detained two suspected senior SL militants. Comrade Saul or Comrade Santiago, was alleged to be a member of the group’s regional metropolitan committee. On 29 April, security forces in the Huancarama area of Apurimac region killed three SL militants. On 18 October, an alleged former Huallaga Regional Committee member, identified as Teodoro Penadillo Carmen (alias Comrade Rayo), was arrested in Lima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>On 15 November, two allegedly senior SL militants, identified by security sources as Felipe Maiz and Giovanni Castillo, were detained by security forces in two separate counter-terrorism operations in Peru’s capital Lima and in the town of Aucayacu in Huanuco province respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>On 9 February, SL faction leader Comrade Artemio was shot and wounded during an armed clash in an unverified area of the River Valley of Huallaga. On 12 February, Artemio was captured, alive but wounded, near the Misholla River in Tocache province. On 3 March, the alleged new leader of the SL faction operating in the Huallaga Valley, identified as Walter Diaz Vega (alias Freddy), was detained by security forces during a counter-terrorism operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 shows the capture of Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala “Comrade Artemio,” the political and military leader of the RVH SL area. This capture was the result of coordination between the intelligence units of the PNP and the Peruvian Army units that operated in the RVH area. Comrade Artemio was captured in 2012 by a Peruvian Army patrol in the Tocache province in the RVH area. This capture represents the defeat of this branch of the SL operating in the RVH area at the hands of the PNP and Peruvian Army patrols because of an intense human intelligence infiltration plan. During these years most of the RVH SL Central Committee organization was dismantled.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ComradeArtemio.jpg}
\caption{Comrade Artemio Captured by the Peruvian Military and the PNP}
\end{figure}


Changes in Peruvian Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Until 2009, the Peruvian Army had been using the same tactics, techniques, and procedures learned from 1980 to 2001 as explained in detail in the introduction chapter. Due to the SL improvements in tactics, techniques and procedures from 1999 to 2009 the Peruvian Army had to make some changes.

The Peruvian Army brigades operating in the RVAEM special command had been improving planning procedures for COIN operations. The brigade staff learned that for planning operations it is important to have the patrol commander officers (subordinate officers) and the helicopter crew involved in the operation be part of the planning process. The National Police and trusted authorities should also be part of the planning process to avoid the interference of the population during operations.\textsuperscript{133} The patrol commander officers are normally lieutenants, sublieutenants, and captains and their presence when planning the COIN operations provides accurate information about the terrain, routes, time for patrols movement from point A to B, information about the population in the area, and the towns of the area of operations because they are constantly patrolling and have experience on the ground. As a consequence, the brigade staff, that normally knows the area by air or maps, will plan the operation efficiently.

The presence of the helicopter pilots is important because they will provide the staff information about the number of personnel that can be transported according to the altitude and climate in the area of operations. The presence of the National Police members during planning operations is helpful because they provide information about the characteristics of the population and their relationship with the drug traffickers. Since

\textsuperscript{133}Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-3.
2011, the National Police NCOs have occasionally been included in some Peruvian Army patrols in the RVAEM. This improves the capability of the patrol acting not only against insurgents, but also providing support in counterdrug procedures.\(^{134}\)

Finally, the presence of trusted government authorities during planning operations is important because they can provide resources and information on the population. The authorities have to be trustworthy because in some cases they are working together with the SL insurgents as previously described in this chapter. A great example of this was the lessons learned in the Tintayapunco case study. This was an ambush on a civilian vehicle which was transporting military personnel. The Tintayapunco town authorities invited the military base personnel located inside their border to participate in a public ceremony and parade offering a truck for patrol transportation for two days. Then they delayed the military patrol as long as possible. Finally, when returning to the base, these patrols were ambushed and the SL insurgents killed 10 soldiers and recovered 12 Galil rifles.\(^{135}\)

Now every isolated military base has two or three heliports, due to constant harassment of military bases, helicopter attacks during evacuations or logistics support to a military base, and SL mining of nearby roads in the military base security posts. This diminishes the probability of helicopter attacks. Also the presence of dogs in the military bases prevent SL insurgents deployments or movements near a military base. “Some measures implemented for improving the security in a military base are: Employment of

\(^{134}\)Ommati.

\(^{135}\)Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 4-1 to 4-2.
dogs, and the building of at least two or three heliports in coordination with the helicopter’s crew.”

The communication and coordination between the helicopter crew, military bases, and operating patrols has improved. Helicopter thermal imaging infrared cameras and night operations capability had to be implemented with new procedures to avoid accidents during military operations. When conducting night operations, strong coordination between the helicopter and patrols on the ground is necessary. Providing them with the same maps and objectives improved this coordination.

The after action reviews are also important. After COIN operations it is vital to write patrol reports and send them to intelligence experts. Something that has improved is the interaction between the staff officers and the patrol command officers which resulted in a better understanding of the terrain, enemy, and situation. The patrol reports are analyzed by the staff at the brigade and higher levels. This enhanced understanding the environmental situation, SL activities and changes.

Currently, at the tactical level, a deception plan is used for every patrol from military bases, not only oriented on the population but also including the NCOs and conscripts inside the military bases. As discussed previously the SL plans their ambushes in detail and constantly observes the military bases. As a countermeasure the patrols attempt to deny information and change their deployments. These measures were not

\footnote{Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 2-5 to 2-10.}

\footnote{Ibid., 3-4.}

\footnote{Ibid., 3-5.}

\footnote{Ibid., 3-6.}
used before and it is important to transmit them to every new patrol commander officer in every military base.

Through unfortunate experiences, the soldiers learned that if one helicopter crashes it is important to retrieve or dismantle the helicopter’s long-range weapons and machine guns. The insurgents have been attacking helicopters since 1999 with the purpose of recovering long-range weapons and then attacking other helicopters with them. If a helicopter is attacked and crashes to the ground the survivors should escape and avoid enemy action. They should also take the helicopter machine guns with them or dismantle them.\textsuperscript{140}

**Changes in RVAEM Special Command Patrols**

In addition to the new equipment and weapons purchased by the Peruvian government since 2010, some organizational changes were also made. The patrols are important in COIN operations. They reduce the freedom of action of the insurgency and weaken the insurgency’s influence over the population. The combat patrols for COIN operations move on foot because of the high Andes Mountains, intraandean valleys, and the jungle.

The Peruvian Army patrols that operated in the RVAEM area were organized in the assault, support, and security groups, all of them members of the Peruvian Army. Table 4 shows the common patrol organization learned in COIN operations experiences from 1980 to 2001. The Peruvian *Non-Conventional Warfare* handbook shows in detail

\textsuperscript{140}Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-5.
the quantity and functions of every patrol member. The number of members in a patrol is based on the transportation capability of the MI-17 Russian helicopter.

Table 4. COIN Patrol Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Patrol Leader</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Adjunct (Leader “A” Team)</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Communication Operator</td>
<td>Warrant Officer/Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Rifleman 1</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Rifleman 2</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Rifleman 3</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Explosives expert</td>
<td>Cabe/Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Rifleman 4</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>RPG Launcher</td>
<td>Soldier/Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Medic Adjunct</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Adjunct (Leader “B” Team)</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Communication Operator</td>
<td>Cabe/Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Rifleman 5</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rifleman 6</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Rifleman 7</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Explosives expert</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Rifleman 8</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rifleman 9</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sanitary</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tirador Amet MAG</td>
<td>Cabe/Soldier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The SL insurgents have increased the numbers of ambushes on the Peruvian military patrols and they are using IEDs on a regular basis. The SL Center Regional Committee that operates in the RVAEM has increased the use of IEDs, developing sophisticated mines and power chargers, that are cleverly buried. 141 The Peruvian Army

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141 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-9.
added a mine-clearing element to the patrol organization to prevent possible SL ambushes.\textsuperscript{142} These change have increased the patrol’s security.

Another important change at the tactical level is the integration of elements of the PNP inside the organization of the Peruvian Army patrols operating in the RVAEM. Occasionally, to avoid confusion with Human Rights NGOs working in the area, the RVAEM Special Command includes the presence of a prosecutor inside a patrol organization.\textsuperscript{143} Adding these new elements to a military patrol give transparency to the military operations in the RVAEM. This is important because it improves the image not only of the RVAEM Special Command, but also the image of the Peruvian Army and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru and sends a message to the population that the military operations are in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The Army found that it is the best way to preserve the respect of human rights in this area. Within the framework of the new strategy established by the Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru, on 15 February 2014, the RVAEM Special Command executed integrated operations with Peruvian military personnel, PNP, and members of the Public Ministry (prosecutors).\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{142} Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-11.


\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
Changes in Peruvian Army Training and Indoctrination

As detailed in the introduction chapter the COIN “Lince” course is taken by the Chorrillos Military Academy cadets and the Army NCOs Technical School students during the development of their careers. Both are the main source for new officers and NCOs in the Peruvian Army. These courses take place in the jungle school in Tarapoto. The instructors who have COIN experience train the cadets and NCO students with actual COIN procedures learned through years of experience. In addition to these courses, when an officer or NCO is designated to work in the RVAEM area, they must attend another special COIN course oriented to retrain them in the latest COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures executed in the RVAEM area. This course has Special Forces instructors with extensive COIN experience. These courses develop personal skills intended to adapt to the RVAEM geography and extreme patrol conditions. In this manner the Peruvian Army and the RVAEM Special Command guarantee an adequate level of training for operating in this area. This course also includes military doctors, lawyers, and nurses.

All the soldiers who will fight in the RVAEM must understand that will face a hostile terrain and climate, an enemy adapted to these environment mixed with the drug trafficking that has the population as their efficient contributors. Even during a clash the fighter should appreciate the situation (enemy, terrain, friend troops) and initiate the counterattack based on the collective weapons, fixing the enemy by their flank, and looking its rearguard. For these actions the communication using signals and codes between soldiers should be practiced constantly. ¹⁴⁵

Now that the close relationship between the SL insurgents and drug trafficking is known, these courses also provide training on procedures to follow when patrols discover drugs or other illegal activities in the area. It is difficult to create expert soldiers in COIN

¹⁴⁵Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-3.
operations in these three-month courses, but the Peruvian Army, with the RVAEM Special Command, does their best to prepare the troops for this difficult environment.

**Improvements in RVAEM Special Command Intelligence Procedures**

Some intelligence procedures have been improved since 2008. At the brigade level, the intelligence staff plans operations with members of the PNP. This coordination results in providing accurate intelligence to the subordinate units (battalions, companies, military bases, and patrols). This is a positive action not completely executed before. This means that the patrol commanders now have a better understanding of the environment, the SL members and their relationship with drug trafficking, and are able to execute punctual operations with accurate intelligence that prevents ambushes and SL attacks.

“The brigade intelligence staff should diffuse intelligence (SL leaders and their peculiarities in their area of operations, SL column deployments, places where the SL columns are operating, photos, new trails and routes, photograph albums of SL children, important dates and festivities of the nearby towns).”

Other responsibilities were also added to the patrol commanders. They are also in charge of using a Global Positioning System to record coordinates of the locations, roads, trails, and important characteristics of places. This provides the brigade and upper level staff with more information about the complex geography in the RVAEM. “When patrolling, the patrols should record coordinates of new routes, farms, caves, possible camps, towns, brooks, streams, or other important characteristics assigning them specific names.”

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146 Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-7.

147 Ibid., 3-7.
The counterintelligence is now focused on finding possible conscripts or soldiers who occasionally enroll in the military but belong to the SL insurgency. They complete their basic training course in three months, and when deployed to the military bases, escape from the base stealing their personal weapons and taking them to the insurgency side.

**Changes in Peruvian Army Support Activities**

The capabilities of military patrols have improved since 2010. The government has prioritized buying equipment and weapons for the RVAEM due to the advance of the SL insurgency and their experience in this area. The former Minister of Defense Rafael Rey declared in 2009: “The government will prioritize the purchase of equipment for the RVAEM. The challenge for the management is to buy advanced equipment for the Armed Forces and to get an adequate legal protection for the military in the RVAEM.”

Currently, the Peruvian Army patrols use silencers for weapons, bullet proof vests, helmets, internal communication with Ultra High Frequency radios, night vision equipment, thermal viewers, and other tools. The military patrols had to learn techniques to improve their night operations capability and now are able to conduct night operations that diminish the probability of SL ambushes. This equipment also improves the capability for providing security inside the military bases (security posts) and avoiding harassment of the military bases by the SL insurgents. Operating with this new equipment provides more confidence, protection, and increases the morale of the soldiers who

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148 Gestion.
participate in these operations. The improvement in the SL attacks, military base harassment, and ambushes on the Peruvian Army patrols obligated them take action to improve the patrol capabilities as expressed in the RVAEM *Operational Experiences* manual:

During deployments, the advanced elements should bring weapons with silencers, bullet proof vets, and helmets. Minimun deployments during the day almost all the deployments during the night. When establishing patrol bases (stops) test communication with the command post. The initiation hour for a deployment should vary permanently and should be secret. Never use the same rout when returning the military base. When entering a town the patrol should have a general information about the number of people in the area, authorities names, develop interrogations to children and elder men, to enter a population there should be made by different access routes.

The advanced patrol elements operate with more security using the silencers. They have more capabilities to perceive SL insurgents (using night and thermal vision) and attack them without being noticed.

The SL attacks on MI 17 helicopters generated an urgency to buy attack helicopters. The Minister of Defense purchased two Russian MI 35s for the RVAEM Special Command. The Minister of Defense posted information about this acquisition on its web page. Minister of Defense Jaime Thorne, officially delivered two recently acquired MI 35 attack helicopters with strong weaponry, to the Air Force General Commander who immediately delivered them to the RVAEM.\(^{151}\) MI 35 and MI 17

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\(^{150}\)Education and Doctrine Command Peruvian Army, CG 35-51-10, 3-3.

\(^{151}\)Minister of Defense Information and Telecommunication Office.
helicopters, with reinforced protection and infrared systems, improved the capability to conduct night operations. It is easier now to identify insurgents in the area of operations. The patrols can be inserted and evacuated at any time during the day. The MI 35 helicopters provide security to patrols’ transportation. Some procedures had to be established to employ these helicopters and ground patrols to operate in the RVAEM.

This new equipment, along with the improvement in patrolling procedures has diminished the number of RVAEM Special Command personnel killed and wounded in 2013 and 2014 as shown in table 5. The Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru Information Operation office publishes official statements on its web page every time there are results of operations in the RVAEM Special Command. Table 5 shows the details of the frequency of the SL ambushes, harassment of military bases, helicopter attacks, and clashes that resulted in killed or wounded members of the Peruvian military operating in the RVAEM Special Command from 2008, when the command was created, to April 2014. It does not include clashes, ambushes, or harassment of military bases that did not result in casualties.
Table 5. RVAEM Special Command Attacks and Casualties since 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Clashes</th>
<th>SL Ambush</th>
<th>SL Harassment of Military Bases</th>
<th>Helicopter Attacks</th>
<th>RVAEM Killed in Action</th>
<th>RVAEM Wounded in Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 (1 fall down)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The RVAEM Special Command units are also showing good results as shown in table 6. This is due to changes in organization, tactics, procedures for night operations, attack helicopter support, and other things. Table 6 also shows the SL recovered weapons, and killed and captured personnel between 2008 and April 2014. Note that all the probable SL insurgents captured are at the disposal of the Peruvian Justice System and the Public Minister or prosecutors according to international regulations. This procedure is important to avoid human rights judicial complaints against military officers.
### Table 6. RVAEM Special Command Results in COIN Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Rifles Seized from SL</th>
<th>Pistols Seized from SL</th>
<th>Comm Systems Seized from SL</th>
<th>SL Killed</th>
<th>Presumed SL Captured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The preceding sections analyzed the improvements in tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the Peruvian Army units operating in the RVAEM Special Command. The next section analyzes the Joint Intelligence and Special Operations Command organization, improvements in tactics, techniques, and procedures that operate with highly specialized personnel who belong to the Joint Command of the Armed Forces Peru.

**Development of the JISOC**

In the television program, “Mira Quien Habla,” Cecilia Valenzuela interviewed Ruben Vargas, a specialist in SL studies, and analyzed the Peruvian military strategy to
defeat the SL from 2006 to 2011. The Peruvian government’s military strategy with respect to the SL insurgency between 2006 and 2011 focused on executing surveillance patrols, bombing actions, and establishing territorial presence in the RVAEM region with military bases in the area. This strategy proved to be wrong because during these years the insurgency IO activities and attacks on patrols, helicopters, and military bases increased, resulting in many casualties and diminished personnel morale. Due to the improvements in SL attacks in 2008, 2009, and 2010, the Peruvian government understood that it was necessary to make some changes at the operational level (changes in organization, planning and executing operations procedures in the RVAEM Special Command and the JCAFP).

After 2011, President Ollanta Humala Tasso made the decision to create a combined group with the Peruvian Army Special Forces and the PNP antinarcotics forces and counterinsurgency forces. This combined group or WB has a direct command and control structure including the Peruvian President.

The JISOC relearned the procedures utilized to locate and capture Abimael Guzman Reynoso in 1992:

In 1990, the Chief of Investigations Police General PNP Fernando Reyes appointed Commander PNP Benedicto Jimenez, who had been working in the directorate for eight years, with his final assignment: to be commander of Delta

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153 Minister of Defense Information and Telecommunication Office.

154 Ruben.

155 Ibid.
Group 5, a unit specializing in the capture of SL’s leaders. For this purpose Jimenez was authorized to ask for the necessary personnel from the directorate. Jimenez started with a captain, two ensigns, and a corporal from the police, and a navy intelligence NCO, and ended up in 1993 with eighty-two agents, including three women. The unit was supposed to report to the counter-terrorism forces director according to the formal chain of command, but it reported directly to the Police Investigations Chief General Fernando Reyes.156

According to the citation, the JISOC used intelligence experts in COIN operations for its organization, the organization has only one chain of command, and JISOC is led by an experienced leader who is in direct contact with the Peruvian President who authorizes an operation and assumes the political risks. The JISOC incorporated human intelligence with contributors and undercover agents, electronic intelligence from the antinarcotic direction and counterterrorism direction of the PNP, with the Peruvian Army Special Forces in the RVAEM and the RVH rural areas.157 The JISOC results were not immediate. There had to be patience with intelligence infiltration. Since 2012, the JISOC has been providing results with surgical and punctual strikes. One of its first results was the ambush and killing of Comrade “Williams” Rolando Cabezas Figueroa in the Camaleon operation on 5 August 2012.158 The JISOC’s most important result was the ambush and killing of comrades “Alipio” Alejandro Borda Casafranca, number two of the SL organization and number one of the military organization; and Comrade “Gabriel”

156 Oliva, 23.


Marco Quispe Palomino, number four of SL and brother of the leader of SL in the RVAEM.\textsuperscript{159}

The details of the operation remain secret. However, according to the media information the JISOC has the capability to infiltrate in remote areas of the jungle and conduct night operations.\textsuperscript{160} It also proves that the technique of employing human intelligence undercover agents takes time, but is ultimately successful in COIN operations. The command and control structure and connections between the President, the deputy Minister of Interior, the antinarcotics direction and counterinsurgency direction PNP intelligence, the JCAFPeruvian Army Special Forces, proved to be efficient and are protected from the interruption of drug influences and corruption.

The JISOC began their intelligence collection by capturing desertering SL insurgents in the RVAEM and infiltrating them into the SL organization through their link with the drug cartels in the area.\textsuperscript{161} Another key thing in COIN operations is that the Peruvian government, Peruvian Army Special Forces, and PNP elements of the JISOC learned to work together as a close group. This little group learned to create synergy between them. The only way to defeat SL insurgents is to work in experienced groups.

This chapter analyzed different opinions, concepts, and facts about the development of the RVAEM SL insurgency from 1999 when Comrade Victor Quispe Palomino took the lead; then analyzed the military operations that took place in the RVAEM area. From 2001 to 2008, the Peruvian Army led operations in the RVAEM

\textsuperscript{159}Valenzuela.

\textsuperscript{160}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{161}Ibid.
area. In 2008 the RVAEM Special Command was formed and took charge. This analysis provides information on aspects that finally changed some tactics, procedures, and techniques during these years. The analysis also includes the JISOC of WB created in 2010 with the purpose of dismantling the SL organization based on punctual intelligence. This analysis resulted in some conclusions and recommendations noted in the following chapter.
Conclusions

The SL in the RVAEM area is an organization that has developed the capability to analyze and improve its military tactics, techniques, and procedures. The SL is an organization that learns quickly; for every military success, the SL response is immediate. Those proved to be effective when attacking the Peruvian Army patrols, bases, and helicopters in the RVAEM area due to the well-planned actions from 2008 to 2012. The ambushes of Tyntaypunco, Sanabamba, and the Simaycocha helicopter attack in 2009 confirm this.\(^{162}\)

The SL is permanently changing its military tactics, techniques, and procedures according to the situation and the advances of the RVAEM Special Command operations. This is due to the SL Central Committee structure, their leaders’ experiences, their permanent presence in the RVAEM area, and the fact that the SL combatants mature and acquire experience-products of the clashes, harassments, and attacks on military patrols, helicopters, and bases.

The SL has a good indoctrination system that has allowed them to replenish their leaders for more than 33 years. The SL changed their procedures for recruiting personnel. The recruitment of children and their process of indoctrination through permanent education in communist ideology have given this organization good results. From 1999 to

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2008, these children became the present and if not interrupted, will be the future of this organization. They are now in charge of the SL ambushes, attacks, and harassment of military bases and patrols. This process continues and will be permanent. This is the biggest threat that the RVAEM Special Command has to face.

Since 1999, the SL in the RVAEM improved its sustainment procedures. The result is a self-sufficient organization that does not require the support of the population. This is due to their direct link with the narcotraffic in the RVAEM area, the SL’s own production of coca and drugs, and the SL growing their own food on isolated farms. As a consequence, they gained the support of the RVAEM population which is directly related to the coca production. The SL can pay a salary to the combatants and members of their organization. The SL is able to buy equipment, weapons, and use ammunition with no restrictions for attacking the military patrols and bases. They have satellite telephones and modern communications equipment.

The SL procedures for approaching the population proved to be efficient. The isolated towns in the RVAEM support the SL organization. The population protects the SL deployments, and together with the SL have organized security networks against the RVAEM Special Command forces. This support is due to the protection from the government counterdrug interventions. It guarantees the population income from the coca production. The support is also due to the fact that the SL is no longer the enemy of the population. The SL is now an organization that supports the population (especially small towns and isolated areas) with civic actions, permanent presence, small infrastructure works, and Peasant Rounds activities.
From 2001 to 2010, the Peruvian Army, in charge of fighting the SL insurgency in the RVAEM, used the same tactics, techniques, and procedures learned from the SL organization from 1980 to 2000. Reconnaissance patrols, the presence of military bases in strategic areas for controlling the territory, and bombardment in some areas proved to be inefficient when fighting against the SL organization in the RVAEM. It took time and the lives of courageous soldiers to learn that the SL changed.

The changes in the military patrol organization generated more capabilities and elevated the morale of the RVAEM Special Command soldiers. The presence of the PNP members, who dominate counterdrug procedures, allow the military patrols to be more confident and avoid drug organization traps. A prosecutor sometimes accompanies the military patrols. When a military patrol captures an SL insurgent, they turn them over to the police to stand trial. This diminishes problems and leads to less interference from the human rights NGOs. This elevates the morale of the patrol commanders and allows them to continue leading this insurgency fight. The addition of an individual who can detect IEDs improved the security of the patrol and helped in avoiding ambushes from the SL insurgents.

The RVAEM Special Command changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures executed since 2010 proved to be efficient for fighting the SL insurgency. However, this took a lot of time and many unfortunate experiences to realize that the SL had changed. The capability to conduct night operations with imaging devices for patrols and helicopters changed some procedures for operating in the RVAEM and increased the number of SL casualties. The improvement with new equipment, weapons, and
communication systems in the RVAEM has also changed procedures for conducting operations. These acquisitions proved to be efficient in fighting against the SL.

The authority of the RVAEM Special Command over the PNP units operating in the RVAEM created synergy and positive results. The coordination and cooperation between the PNP (counterdrug and counterterrorism intelligence) groups and the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence elements in the RVAEM area provides a clear understanding of the environment in the RVAEM and improves the quality of planning for military operations. This allows planning and execution of operations with better intelligence of the insurgents and the drug organizations in the RVAEM.

The procedures and techniques of the JISOC, commonly called the WB, are providing positive results in fighting the SL organization. The employment of human intelligence through a large process of infiltration in the SL command and control structure, and the electronic intelligence dedicated to decoding the SL leaders’ communications and location proved to be efficient in the capture or killing of the SL leaders. The killing of the Comrades Williams, Alipio, Raul, and Gabriel disrupted the military leadership of the SL in the RVAEM.163

The permanent COIN courses that take place in the Peruvian Military Academy “Francisco Bolognesi” and the NCOs Technical School prepare the majority of officers and NCOs for COIN operations with the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures learned in the RVAEM Special Command. This proved to be an efficient way to prepare them for unconventional warfare. These courses are reinforced when the military personnel are designated to work in the RVAEM, with the COIN courses being taught by experienced

163Ommati.
special forces instructors who are in the RVAEM Special Command. All of these courses demonstrate the concern of the Peruvian Army Command to qualify the personnel for these operations. This is the best way to counteract the experience and knowledge of the terrain that SL fighters have.

Finally, government support in COIN operations is important. Since 2011, President Ollanta Humala has committed to fighting the SL insurgency in the RVAEM and assumes the political risk. Due to government concern about the RVAEM, there is new equipment, weapons, helicopters, and human resources support. The government is also planning to purchase more equipment for COIN in the RVAEM. This contributes to increasing the satisfaction of the personnel in the RVAEM Special Command.

**Recommendations**

The JISOC or WB should continue with its successful operations in the RVAEM area. The experiences in human intelligence, electronic intelligence, and procedures for targeting leaders should be analyzed and included in the Peruvian Army and Joint Command of the Armed Forces doctrine. It would be important to seek cooperation from experts in COIN procedures in other militaries, such as the Colombian Army and the US SOUTHCOM Special Forces.

The RVAEM Special Command should intensify After Action Reviews after conducting operations and clashes with SL insurgents. The Peruvian Army should designate, inside the RVAEM Special Command staff, a group of experts from the Doctrine Division with the purpose of updating the COIN doctrine. This group should observe the SL advances in tactics, techniques, and procedures to avoid future SL attacks.
and expedite the COIN doctrine production process. This will diminish the time needed to generate changes in Peruvian Army doctrine.

The RVAEM Special Command, together with specialized government institutions should develop and refine procedures to rehabilitate the SL children or “Pioneers” captured. The children who were indoctrinated in communist ideology during long periods should have an opportunity to reintegrate into the Peruvian society.

The RVAEM Special Command should take the lead and create procedures such as reinforcing the Peasant Rounds, increasing civic actions, and providing alternative crops to regain the support of the population, together with other Peruvian government institutions. The Peruvian government programs implemented currently proved to be efficient, but these programs should become permanent to reduce poverty and provide other alternatives to stopping the coca production in the area.

There should be a procedure to select the best and most experienced instructors for the COIN operations courses taught in the Peruvian Army and the RVAEM Special Command. This will maintain the training level in COIN operations and will pass on to future generations the experiences learned in the RVAEM area of operations.

The patrol procedures learned to avoid SL ambushes in the RVAEM should be included in the COIN courses at the Colonel Francisco Bolognesi Military Academy, the NCOs school, soldiers’ basic training, and the COIN training courses before deploying to the RVAEM Special Command. These procedures should also be taught at all levels of the Peruvian Air Force and the Peruvian Navy training schools.

It is important to make sure the equipment is operative and in good condition. The sustainment elements, units, and staffs should be aware, and permanently take care
of the maintenance of this equipment. The RVAEM Special Command should include in
their budget an adequate amount of money to preserve these capabilities.

The conclusions and copies of the patrol reports should be sent to the Peruvian
Army Education and Doctrine Command and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces
Peru (JCAFP) Doctrine Department to provide real-time information about the SL
insurgency and serve as a permanent source for updating the Peruvian manuals or
publications.

Finally, the policies adopted by the government of President Ollanta Humala
Tasso should continue and be improved by the future government. This will provide
permanent support to the RVAEM area and will not create a gap that can be easily taken
advantage of by the SL insurgents, as happened in 2001, when the government
diminished the military presence in the RVAEM and dismantled the Peruvian intelligence
systems.
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