Lighting the Eclipse: Comparing the Planning for the Occupations of Germany and Iraq

A Monograph
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**Lighting the Eclipse: Comparing the Planning for the Occupations of Germany and Iraq**

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Abstract


Effective execution of mission command and unified action was apparent in the occupation planning of World War II and not in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Both conflicts had various agencies conducting planning and both received vague policy guidance from national leaders. Likewise, both conflicts predicted rapid timelines for transitions from military to civilian rule and the shift from occupation duties to redeployment. The major difference between World War II and OIF was that in World War II, products flowed to the operational planners at SHAPE who were writing ECLIPSE. During the planning for OIF, due to interagency and bureaucratic considerations and interests, planning products remained compartmented and generally not forwarded to CFLCC operational planners. While all of the various efforts by the Department of Defense, Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and various other organizations were produced in the spirit of forwarding America’s strategic interests in Iraq and the region, no policy was constructed that would establish a central focal point for their consideration. Additionally, the differences in the planning approaches between ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II are what fueled their initial outcomes. These differences in planning included the time dedicated to the planning process for ECLIPSE and the level of detail that the additional time entailed. Another difference was the occupation philosophy of the planning staff as well as their respective commanders based on their experiences. In ECLIPSE, occupation was the key, in ECLIPSE II, peace enforcement over occupation was the paradigm.
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Introduction

As the command structure of World War II evolved, the associated planning efforts likewise evolved to encompass not only the return to continental Europe, but also the occupation of Germany after the success of Operation OVERLORD; this plan eventually became known as ECLIPSE. In the hopes of echoing this success in 2003, operational planners would name their occupation plan ECLIPSE II. In the case of ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II, the differences and commonalities between the two plans offers the operational artist a case study to draw from in examining how to think about and plan for future post-conflict operations.

The key differences in planning between ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II included the time dedicated to the planning processes and the level of detail that the additional time entailed for ECLIPSE; all directly linked to the unified action and unity of effort not only of the military planning efforts, but also the interagency inputs. A qualitative difference was the frame of reference or mindset between the two planning efforts. ECLIPSE, was an “occupation” planning mindset while OIF planners viewed ECLIPSE II through a “peace-enforcement” lens.1

A commonality between both wars was the involvement of a multitude of agencies and a lack of clear policy guidance. The difference in incorporating the volumes of input in both circumstances was that in World War II, key strategic planning products that eventually influenced occupation planning went to the operational planners at the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) levels. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, all of the separate planning efforts, for one reason or another, were compartmented, and generally not forwarded to CFLCC operational planners.

1 U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 8 November 2010, amended 15 July 2011), page 271 defines peace enforcement as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
The operational planners whom rely upon these volumes of information and planning products are the key in ensuring the development of a consolidated plan that incorporates an understanding of the environment as well as the strategic goals not only of the conflict itself, but also what will happen after the war. The post-conflict phase of any operation is essential to consolidating military gains and meeting the stated strategic goals of a campaign. Professional planners must ensure that they learn the proper lessons in planning an occupation so they can better utilize the military’s portion of the effort of any post-conflict campaign and include interagency support to achieve true unified action.

**Planning for the Occupation of Germany**

The planning for the occupation of Germany was an iterative process that actually began well before the American entry into World War II and carried through until after the formal cessation of hostilities in May 1945. This iterative planning process had its roots in the American experience of occupying Germany after World War I and evolved with the political landscape of Europe and the United States throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Tactical lessons learned from soldiers on the ground as well as the personal and political motivations of the civilian leaders deciding policy influenced planners at all levels. As directives, guidance, and good ideas continued to influence the planners, there was never doubt that the SHAEF planners in General Eisenhower’s staff would be the focal point for this guidance and all information flowed to this planning nexus.

In 1920, Colonel Irwin Hunt, who served as the American Military Governor of Occupied Germany from 1918-1920, published a report documenting the need for post-war preparation for government authority. He based his lessons learned on the difficulties he faced in
governing an occupied territory that contained over a million people. Colonel Hunt’s first and most important lesson learned regarding occupation duties was that to exercise governmental authority, even over a defeated enemy, extensive training and preparation was required. He understood the importance of incorporating occupation planning and duties into the planning and preparations for war and not as an afterthought. Hunt urged in his 1920 report that the Army should not wait until the assignment of an occupation task, but should develop competence in civil administration among its officers during peacetime. This report fell into obscurity in the 1920s and early 1930s as official U.S. Government policy stated that neither the Army nor the U.S. Government would accept control of the governance of an occupied area as a legitimate military function. This directly contradicted the history of how the United States had concluded its wars up to and including World War I. The U.S. Army had conducted military government operations in Mexico, the Confederate States during Reconstruction, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Rhineland of Germany at the conclusion of each conflict in these countries and regions.

The curriculum of the U.S. Army War College kept the “Hunt Report” from falling into oblivion as part of its Civil Affairs course on the administration of occupied territories. As war clouds soon turned into full-fledged conflict on the European continent and in the Pacific Rim, planning committees from the War College looked at the Hunt Report in a new light and began to advocate the establishment of policy and doctrine for occupation. In 1939, Major General Allen Guillion, Judge Advocate General, utilizing the Hunt Report in coordination with the Army G-3

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3 Ziemke, 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
and the Army War College, began formulating doctrine for occupation. The result of his work was the publication of FM 27-5, *Military Government*, in 30 July 1940. This document, in conjunction with FM 27-10, *The Rules of Land Warfare*, established for the Army the doctrine, policies, and procedures for military occupation and administration of a country.⁶

Well prior to the United States’ entry into World War II, planners at the strategic level were already in consultation with our Allies on the conduct of warfare. The work of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and his “Plan Dog” influenced the United States’ standpoint and its discussions on how to wage World War II at the strategic level.⁷ This plan established that the United States would conduct offensive operations in the Atlantic in conjunction with the British with the eventual goal of invading Continental Europe. The Pacific theater of operation would be a secondary effort.⁸ President Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall approved the use of “Plan Dog” at the January 1941 planning conference with the British and Canadians. Plan Dog then formed the foundation of the American-British-Canadian Plan-1, ABC-1.⁹ ABC-1 would then serve as the foundational document for Joint Rainbow Plan-5, which placed Germany as the focal point for the Allied war effort and the basis for all subsequent war planning, to include occupation duties.¹⁰

Immediately after the United States formally entered World War II, the Army’s War Plans Division, under the leadership of Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower, came to the realization

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⁶ Ziemke, 4.


⁸ Ibid.


¹⁰ Lacey, 825.
that the Army was the only force manned to execute occupation duties.\textsuperscript{11} As Colonel Eisenhower quickly rose through the ranks to become the Supreme Allied Commander, this fact would bear on his decisions and guidance. The U.S. Army’s role in enacting post-war occupation policy in Europe in general and Germany in particular was a specific focus for the guidance he sought from Washington.

Planners at the strategic level, both in the War Plans Division in Washington as well as forward in COSSAC, and later SHAEF, were navigating seldom-charted waters in terms of occupation planning. As the Allies in general and the U.S. Army in particular began to seize territories formerly occupied by Axis powers, the need for more detailed planning, guidance, and resources was discovered. Planners paid close attention to the lessons learned from Operation Husky in July 1943 for needed adjustments to how the military would administer countries under American and Allied control. The initial guidance given by the President was that governance of occupied territories would be administered by a State Department representative subordinate to a military commander, but accountable to the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{12} The realities on the ground in Sicily and Italy soon overcame this guidance as the State Department civilians on the ground, the Army’s Civil Affairs Division, and the commanders in charge soon discovered that the Army was the only organization manned to administer occupation duties. The Army established military governments in lieu of State Department administered governments until civilian control was reestablished.\textsuperscript{13} As a direct result of occupation lessons learned after Operation Husky, President Roosevelt established a policy in November 1943 that the U.S. Army would carry the initial


\textsuperscript{12} Ziemke, 21.

\textsuperscript{13} Ziemke, 22.
responsibility for occupation in all liberated areas. This guidance, along with the expanding base of knowledge from the Army’s Civil Affairs Division, would feed into the next iterative process for war planners to update the Army’s plans for occupation. President’s Roosevelt’s policy also drove the guidance given by commanders, including the outgoing commander of Operation Husky, General Eisenhower.

Concurrent to the planning and execution of Operation Husky and its associated execution of occupation duties, in April 1943, an organization of British and American staff officers began to plan the invasion of continental Europe. This combined staff, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan whom was the Chief of Staff-Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) not only began planning the invasion, but also the subsequent occupation of a defeated Germany. Recognizing a lack of knowledge for occupation planning on his staff, Lieutenant General Morgan formally requested on 28 July 1943 the formation of a civil affairs planning cell on his staff to prepare for and administer military governance to liberated countries, to include Germany. This civil affairs planning staff, in coordination with COSSAC operational planners began to formulate Operation RANKIN; a series of contingency plans addressing the occupation of Germany under a various set of scenarios. The most important contingency plan,

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14 Ibid., 22. “On 10 November, the President acknowledged this state of affairs in a letter to Stimson in which he stated, “Although other agencies are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connection with relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained, the Army will have to assume the initial burden.” Continuing, he assigned to the Army the planning and execution of civil relief and rehabilitation “until civilian agencies are prepared to carry out the longer range program.” (Ltr, President to the Secretary of War, 10 Nov 43, in SHAEF G-5, 10.04.). After nearly a year of uncertainty, the Army at last had a clear, if temporary mandate.”

15 Ziemke, 26.

16 Ibid., 27.

17 Ibid. (1) Sir Frederick E. Morgan, Overture to OVERLORD (London: Hodder, 1950), p. 118. (2) Ltr, COSSAC to Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Office, 13 Aug 43, in SHAEF G-5, 11.02. Planning for RANKIN enabled the formulation of a dedicated planning staff for planning the peace. Major General C.A. West, Deputy G-3 of COSSAC, told his staff “We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems.”
RANKIN-C would eventually evolve into Operation ECLIPSE, detailing the occupation of Germany after a successful Allied cross-channel invasion and the subsequent destruction of the Nazi army and government.\(^{18}\)

The lack of strategic planning and policy guidance regarding occupation responsibilities and actions as well as the planning staff’s own collective lack of experience hampered the planning efforts placed towards RANKIN-C in late 1943.\(^{19}\) It was not until the receipt of President Roosevelt’s previously described occupation guidance in November 1943, as well as the arrival in December 1943 of General Eisenhower, the new commander of SHAEF, that the COSSAC staff could truly begin the work of putting detail to their occupation plans.\(^{20}\)

Based on his experience as the War Plans Chief and his experience as commander of Operation Husky, Eisenhower understood the difficulties before him in issuing guidance for occupation planning. He knew that given the scale of the conflict to come on the European continent, post-conflict operations to restore stability to Europe would be a protracted event. He understood that the failure to properly plan, resource, and execute post-war planning after World War II was a critical factor in the success or failure of post-war reconstruction.

His list of concerns that had no policy precedence or guidance included armistice terms, disarmament, displaced persons, prisoner of war care and repatriation, martial law in occupied zones, disposal of captured war material, and coordination of movement and transportation. Major General C.A. West, Memorandum, 14 January 1944, subject: “Operation RANKIN-C,” quoted in Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation*, 36.

\(^{18}\) Ziemke, 27. RANKIN-A would apply in the event of the rapid collapse of Germany, RANKIN-B would apply in the event of the contraction of German forces to their pre-war borders and RANKIN-C envisioned the systematic occupation of all of Germany.


\(^{20}\) In August 1943, LTG Morgan “requested that the British and United States governments, as a matter of urgency, lay down policy on military government in enemy territory and civil affairs in liberated territory and provide resources with which to execute such policy.” Ziemke, 27.
War I had planted the seeds for World War II and he was determined not to make the same mistakes.  

Over the course of the year 1944, occupation planning for Germany would continue to evolve as the realities of a cross-channel invasion plan began to materialize. In London, as well as Washington, both military and civilian staffs were developing occupation plans regarding the economic and government tasks to accomplish. On 28 April 1944, Eisenhower received the first direct guidance from these efforts. Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) Directive 551 directed that SHAEF would establish a military government in the portions of Germany that it occupied. These military governments, under the command of Eisenhower would serve as the nucleus of the executive, judicial, and legislative arms of government in the occupied territories. The CCS granted authorization to Eisenhower to delegate this authority in the manner that he best saw fit with the constraint that the administration of the military government was to be equal-handed throughout occupied Germany.  

In addition to this directive, CCS 551 gave political guidance on the administration of the occupation government. CCS 551 stated that the governments would be "firm; at the same time just and humane with regard to the civilian population as far as consistent with strict military requirements." The objective of this seemingly nebulous guidance was to destroy the roots of Nazism and fascism in the occupied zones, maintain law and order, and to restore the population to normalcy as soon as possible. 

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21 Kiefer, 3. The author’s conclusion was that if the U.S. had entered Iraq with the right amount of force to accomplish both the invasion and subsequent occupation tasks, as in World War II, perhaps our occupation would have only lasted four years or less, as in post-war Germany, versus the then current sixth year of occupation.  

22 Ziemke, 75. Quoted in the original source document: Analysis Sheet, SHAEF G-5, Hist Sec, sub: Directive for MG in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 6 May 44, in SHAEF G-5, 1-A.  

23 Ibid. Quoted in Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) 69/5 [CCS 551], Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 28 Apr 44, in CCS 383.21 (2-22-44), sec. 1.
Issued on 31 May 1944, economic guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, at the
direction of the governments in London and Washington, outlined the financial administration of
Germany. The first portion of the economic guidance given to SHAEF stated that to control the
banking and currency value in the occupied zone, the common form of currency would be a
common Allied occupation military mark. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union would
redeem these marks to their own governments for their national currency. Germany would
exchange the Reichsmark for the Allied currency and vice versa.24

The second portion of the economic guidance gave direction towards the administration
of Germany’s post conflict industry. With this authorization, Eisenhower expected to take full
control of German industrial production. The Allied governments then directed that German
industry would refocus toward the war effort against Japan. Restitution and reparations would
come from peacetime production. The objective of this policy was the eventual integration of the
German economy into the European and world economies.

Eisenhower and his staff finally received the required guidance for administering relief in
the occupied zones. SHAEF would only give enough relief support to the Germans to prevent
disease and civil unrest and redistribute any German food surpluses to liberated countries to aid in
their relief. In the event of food shortages throughout the continent, Germany would be the last in
priority to receive relief and would receive, as the enemy country, the lesser share.25

On the eve of D-Day in June 1944, the occupation plan for Germany was a living
document, which grew from three major influences. The first was the Allied governments’

24 Ziemke, 60. The U.S., in anticipation of this need, had begun to print occupation currency in
early 1944. Additionally, the USSR demanded their own set of printing plates to print so as to ensure a
constant supply of occupation currency. Ziemke referenced the original source document: Minutes, CCAC,
27th Meeting (1 Apr 44) and 28th Meeting (13 Apr 44), 1 and 15 Apr 44, in SHAEF G-5, 3-A.

25 Ibid. Quoted in CCAC 69/8, Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or
Surrender, 31 May 44, in CCS 383.21 (2-22-44), sec. 1, Memo, Dir, CAD, sub: Civilian Relief in
Germany, 19 Jul 44, in SHAEF G-5, 3-A, and Cable, CCS to SHAEF, 19 Aug 44, in CCS 383.21 (2-22-
44), sec. 2.
strategic guidance, next was Eisenhower’s own experience and education, and finally the lessons learned from the Allied operations in the Mediterranean. To incorporate these lessons and guidance, no less than seventy-two staff studies were underway between SHAEF and the Allied governments to refine occupation planning.  

The next major iteration of planning for the occupation of Germany occurred in August 1944. As the Allies began to edge out of the hedgerows of Normandy, Operation TALISMAN emerged. This was the merging of the three variants of the RANKIN plan as well as the continuing strategic guidance from the Allied governments. Less than a month later, the execution of Operation TALISMAN began with the seizure by the U.S. VII Corps of the first German city, Roetgen, on 12 September 1944.

At this point, Eisenhower issued his first directives as an occupation commander as well as a strategic and operational commander. The immediate tasks for the U.S. troops and commanders were security oriented as they gathered weapons, identified local leaders, emplaced curfews, and banned gatherings of five or more civilians. This occurred simultaneously with the posting of the rules of occupation, the emplacement of trained civil affairs units to administer a military government, and the maneuvering of tactical formations to continue offensive operations further into Germany. The second task for the military governments involved was the execution

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27 Ziemke, 100. Quoted in SHAEF G-3 memorandum to all Staff Divisions, Subject: Operation TALISMAN, 6 Aug 44, in SHAEF G-5, 115.25c, Jacket 1.

28 “Allied Military Government is established in the theater under my command to exercise in occupied territory the supreme authority vested in me as the Supreme Commander.” Glahn, Gerhard, *The Occupation of Enemy Territory...A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 42-44.
of the initial stages of infrastructure and political reconstruction under the direction of Division, Corps, and Army commanders acting within SHAEF directives.29

The military and civilian leadership in Washington and London paid close attention to the execution of this initial occupation effort. This was immediately evident on 10 September 1944 when the prepared occupation proclamations were withdrawn due to “objections to the language” by civilian leadership in Washington D.C.30 The main objection came from SHAEF’s guidance stating that returning the German people to a state of normalcy should be the objective. Elements in Washington D.C., led by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, advocated a much harsher peace condition for Germany. This was a microcosm of the tension between the civilian leadership, General Eisenhower, and the SHAEF planning staff regarding occupation duties.

As of September 1944, there still was not a clear strategic policy regarding German occupation at the conclusion of hostilities.31 Without clear strategic objectives outlined, the SHAEF Chief of Staff, Major General Bedell Smith, and G-3, Major General Harold Bull, kept planning efforts as close to the military lines of operation as possible. As early as 30 June 1944, they had issued the following memorandum:

“I strongly feel that the lack of coordination in the Supreme Headquarters staff on post-hostilities planning beyond purely military requirements will continue in spite of our desires until political directives are received or improvised. I cannot get enthusiastic over attempts to improvise with all the lost effort of busy staffs based on such guesses. My thought is that work on (1) governing the German people, (2) perfecting their

29 Ziemke, 133-136.
31 McCreedy, 16. Quoted in the original source Letter, HQ, ETOUSA, 20 June 1944, subj: "Posthostilities Planning" to JCS transmitting memo by SCAEF, 19 June 1944, subj: 'Short-Term Posthostilities Responsibilities and Planning". "It is assumed that the Supreme Commander must be prepared to initiate the occupation and control of west Germany immediately after the cessation of hostilities and furthermore that his responsibilities may be extended to cover an indeterminate period thereafter."
economic future, (3) controlling their educational system, etc., is not part of the Supreme Headquarters staff function now.\textsuperscript{32}

To assist the SHAEF planners in linking the tactical and operational occupation tasks to the Allied strategic occupation objectives, President Roosevelt directed a coordinating committee on 2 September 1944. The Secretaries of War (Henry Stimson), Treasury (Henry Morgenthau), State (Cordell Hull), and the Navy (James Forrestall) formed the post-war planning committee known as the Cabinet Committee on Germany, later the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).\textsuperscript{33} The task of this Cabinet Committee was to develop America’s post-war policy towards Germany as well as the ways and means to achieve the policy objectives. Two key products emerged from the Committee; the first of which was the “Morgenthau Plan” and the second was the basis from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 would emerge. The guidance derived from the Cabinet Committee on Germany would feed into the American position at the second Quebec Conference in October 1944. The agreements reached at the Quebec Conference would further serve to clarify for the SHAEF planners the end state and objectives for their occupation plan.

Secretary Morgenthau finalized the “Morgenthau Plan” while serving as a part of the Cabinet Committee on Germany. His plan called for the partitioning of Germany into six separate zones under Allied control, the dismantling of its entire industrial capacity, and the reduction of Germany to an agrarian society.\textsuperscript{34} This harsh treatment of Germany set off a firestorm of internal

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. Quoted in the original source Ltr, SHAEF, 6-3 (Ops) Division, 30 June 1944, subj: "Posthostilities Planning," to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, 6-3; MG Bull's concerns were justified. In August 1944, President Roosevelt directed Ambassador Winant in the European Advisory Council to discontinue post-conflict planning in that body because "I dislike making plans for a country which we do not yet occupy."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} Ziemke, 101, 131.

\textsuperscript{34} Henry Morgenthau, Germany is our Problem (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing, 1945), 1-4.
dissent within the committee between Morgenthau and Secretary of War Henry Stimson as well as between President Roosevelt, members of his Cabinet, and Winston Churchill at the Quebec Conference; Churchill advocated a more moderate approach towards post-war Germany. Additionally, the Nazi German government used the Morgenthau Plan as a propaganda tool showing the German people what their future would be if they surrendered to the Allies. Due to domestic political pressure and British objections to the Morgenthau Plan, a compromise emerged between the Morgenthau and Stimson camps in the form of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive (JCS) 1067. Germany would receive a just punishment through the restructuring of the German government, economy, and society to prevent the conditions from emerging for a resurgent, militaristic Germany.

Eisenhower and the SHAEF planners received their first draft of JCS 1067 in September 1944 for comment and feedback. Simultaneously, feedback from the October Quebec strategic conference incorporated the British input and TALISMAN was renamed ECLIPSE. What the SHAEF staff received in September 1944 in the draft form of JCS 1067 was a “proper military directive giving the theater commander workable instructions on which to base detailed planning.”

The evolution of TALISMAN to Plan ECLIPSE was necessary for two reasons. The first reason was the compromise of the TALISMAN code word and its purpose to the Germans, the

35 Ziemke, 101-104.
36 Ibid.,103. “On the 17th, although Morgenthau had by then apparently prevailed with the President and the Prime Minister at the OCTAGON Conference in Quebec, Stimson decided, nevertheless, to submit a memorandum he had written two days earlier. In it, he condemned the philosophy of the plan. "We cannot," he wrote to the President, "reduce a nation of seventy million who have been outstanding for years in the arts and sciences and highly industrialized to poverty. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate on their victims—it would be a crime against civilization itself." Memo, Stimson for the President, 15 Sep 44, in ASW, 370.8. (2) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 578.
37 Ziemke, 104.
second reason was the differing conditions for occupation. Under TALISMAN and RANKIN, various conditions for the surrender of Germany, as previously outlined, defined the conditions for the end state of the European campaign. ECLIPSE replaced the “German surrender” assumption with an end state defined by occupation after a “last stand and then surrender” by the German Army after an Allied invasion, i.e. Operation OVERLORD. SHAEF distributed the ECLIPSE first draft outlines or warning orders to subordinate units on 10 November 1944.

As originally envisioned, ECLIPSE would become a sequential operation after the culmination of OVERLORD. Operation ECLIPSE assumed the collapse or unconditional surrender of Germany after a rapid, deep advance into the German heartland and the destruction of her armed forces. What actually occurred was a rolling transition to occupation duties in all theaters of operation after the completion of tactical actions. While SHAEF desired a clear-cut transition from OVERLORD to ECLIPSE, they understood that they would be executing a series of branch plans beginning in September 1944 through the completion of the war.

According to the Operation ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, dated 10 November 1944, ECLIPSE would be a two-phase operation based on the accomplishment of prioritized tasks. The primary phase called for Allied forces to move rapidly “to secure especially important strategic areas deep inside Germany, including Berlin” and was seen as the “consummation of

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39 Ziemke, 164.


41 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation “Eclipse”; Appreciation and Outline Plan (SHAEF 44-34), 5.

42 U.S. Army, Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 26 March 2010), page 2-5, paragraph 2-30 defines a sequel as a “major operation that follows the current major operation. Normally, executing a sequel begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Branches and sequels are tied to execution criteria. Commanders carefully review them before execution and update them based on assessment of current operations.”
'OVERLORD.' It was at this point that the SHAEF planners understood there would be an overlap between OVERLORD and ECLIPSE and a rolling transition similar to the one they were experiencing in Roetgen and western Germany would occur. It seems that they understood the complexities of this transition from combat operations to occupation and that confusion on the battlefield regarding responsibilities and objectives would exist. To help mitigate this confusion, the planners delineated tasks by priority between the “primary” and “secondary” phases based on events on the ground and gave instructions to subordinate commanders to execute both phases simultaneously as conditions presented themselves. To mitigate potential confusion, the existing OVERLORD command and control structures would remain in place until relieved by the appropriate Tripartite Government control.

As the situation in the occupied areas stabilized, SHAEF envisioned a sequential or simultaneous transition based on the successful completion of the primary tasks assigned to its subordinate units. In the secondary phase of the plan, SHAEF tasked its subordinates to solidify their control of occupied areas by continuing the disarmament of German forces. Other key tasks to accomplish in the secondary phase was the enforcement of surrender terms, occupation of key areas not in Allied control, establishment of law and order, and redistribution of Allied forces into designated national zones of occupation. Finally, ECLIPSE specifically addressed the relief and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons.

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43 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation “Eclipse”; Appreciation and Outline Plan (SHAEF 44-34), 5.

44 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation “Eclipse”; Appreciation and Outline Plan (SHAEF 44-34), 10.


46 Ibid., 10.

47 Ibid., 8.
ECLIPSE further outlined the areas of responsibility for the occupation. The plan called for the 21st Army Group (U.K.) to assume responsibility for the designated British zone of occupation in the north, and the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups (U.S.) for the American zone of occupation. The army groups were to establish two U.S. and four British military districts in each zone to set the conditions for transition to Tripartite Control. Eisenhower would designate a commander to preside over Berlin as a separate district in coordination with the other Allies occupying Berlin. The plan also anticipated a requirement for redeployment of "surplus American and British forces not required for occupational duties in Germany."  

Thus, as of November 1944, Eisenhower and his staff had a document in the form of ECLIPSE and the draft of JCS 1067 that they could execute, but they were still missing the key component of a strategic end state. The SHAEF planning staff requested further guidance from the Yalta Conference in January 1945 so that they could refine ECLIPSE and incorporate a strategic end state. At the Yalta Conference, the Soviets, British, and Americans agreed to a postwar policy. The proclamation by the Allies stated that it was their "inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world." The ways that the Allied governments envisioned using were the complete disarmament of Germany, the demilitarization of German industry, and the prosecution of war criminals. They also proclaimed their intention for Germany to pay reparations to the countries they had invaded throughout World War II. Finally, with the staff input from SHAEF

48 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation “Eclipse”; Appreciation and Outline Plan (SHAEF 44-34), 12.
49 Ibid., 15.
50 Ibid., 13.
and strategic guidance from the Yalta Conference, General Eisenhower had a vision for the end state after the war that he could base his occupation planning around; linking operational tasks in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic end.

Issued on 14 May 1945, Eisenhower and SHAEF received the official version of JCS 1067 that included inputs from all parties involved and approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. What JCS 1067 lacked, however, was a plan for the administration of a conquered Germany; once again, a vacuum that Eisenhower and the SHAEF planners would be required to fill. The intention of the directive was never to be a strategic policy directive and was “not intended to be an ultimate statement of policies of this Government concerning the treatment of Germany in the post-war world.” Its object was to establish a "stern, all-powerful military administration of a conquered country, based on its unconditional surrender, impressing the Germans with their military defeat and the futility of any further aggression." The objectives laid out in JCS 1067 were the dissolution of the Nazi party; demilitarization; controls over communications, press, propaganda, and education; reparation for those countries wanting it; and decentralization of the German governmental structure. However, it did not specifically state a policy towards partitioning Germany.

The lack of a strategic policy objective regarding the end state for an occupied Germany was also a leading cause for the lack of interagency planning at the operational level. Despite the fact that the Army in general and Eisenhower in particular sought to hand pick responsible and

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52 Ziemke, 214.
trained individuals to administer the military government, they made little effort to bring in experts from their civilian counterparts. This would prove detrimental in the later stages of planning in determining the ways to achieve the stated strategic ends. Whether this was a conscious decision by Eisenhower based on a lack of confidence in the Departments of State and Treasury, the abundance of talent within SHAEF and the War Department due to degree of expertise drafted into operating the wartime staff, or a combination is irrelevant. What is important is that true interagency planning for ECLIPSE did not occur. This lack of an interagency planning approach directly influenced the choice of who would administer the Military Government of Germany.

Chosen in early 1945 by General Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Lucius Clay served as the Deputy Military Governor of Germany and oversaw military government operations in Europe.\(^{56}\) Lieutenant General Clay would state in his memoirs after the occupation of Germany that prior to departing for his position on the SHAEF staff, he had only met with the Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, and the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, to receive their intent for the postwar occupation of Germany. He further stated that from Secretary Stimson to General Eisenhower and the SHAEF staff, no one defined for him the State Department’s role in the occupation or their command relationship to the military government. He further deduced that he did not receive this guidance because no one had thought it through.\(^{57}\) Due to the robust staff and manning at the tactical levels, SHAEF was wholly prepared to execute its occupation duties.

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\(^{56}\) Ziemke, 224. In March 1945, GEN Eisenhower wrote the Army's G-1, Brehon Somervell: "I have heard a rumor that Lucius Clay may become available for assignment to a theater. If it should develop that this is so, I have a very urgent need for him .... My idea is that he would be the Herbert Hoover of this war and would have the job of handling civil affairs in Germany.” Eisenhower to Somervell, March 14, 1945, in The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower. The War Years, vol IV, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2528.

\(^{57}\) Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1950), 6.
However, due to the known tasks of redistributing troops to the Pacific theater as well as demobilization requirements, Eisenhower sought a rapid transition to civilian control.58

After the Allied victory in Europe in May 1945, the State Department, either through interagency rivalry with the War Department, or through a lack of communication between the War and State Departments, did not move to assume responsibility for establishing civilian control over the military government in Germany. General Eisenhower recommended to President Truman that the transition to civilian control be 1 June 1946. The president approved this date without consulting with the State Department. When the new Secretary of State, James Byrnes received this directive, he actively sought to delay the transition date and succeeded. Secretary Byrnes believed that the State Department was a policy-making organization and not an operational one and that the War Department was the only organization staffed to carry out occupation government duties. This reinforced SHAEF’s views of 1943 and 1944 that the War Department was the only national asset capable of planning and executing an occupation.59

The actual execution of Operation ECLIPSE is beyond the scope of this monograph; however, conditions on the ground in occupied Germany dictated adjustments to Operation ECLIPSE after May 1945.60 In the immediate aftermath of victory in Europe, conditions existed for confusion and disorganization within Germany. The combination of occupation, demobilization, and redeployment to the Pacific had reduced the Army footprint in May 1945 from 61 down to 10 divisions and several independent regiments. These remaining forces were responsible for the occupation of an area that encompassed 19 million civilians. While this force

58 Ibid.


60 In April 1945, LTG Lucius Clay wrote that “the people in Washington who had prepared policies for the occupation of Germany did not anticipate the conditions observed in Europe.” John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-194, 1.
was capable of executing its tasks, organizational problems were not lessoned until only Third Army remained, establishing a clear unity of command and consistent occupation policy with the military government under Lieutenant General Clay. The Army quickly outstretched the capabilities of its school house trained military government detachments and had to task organize, rapidly train, and redeploy provisional detachments formed from anti-aircraft, field artillery, and signal units at the tactical level. Maneuver units remained focused on the demilitarization and security of their respective zones.

Produced in the refinements of ECLIPSE were two documents for the execution of the occupation, *The Handbook of Military Occupation* and *The Handbook of Military Government*. Issued at the battalion level, *The Handbook for Military Occupation* served as a single source of information in executing occupation duties and the specified tasks from JCS 1067 and Operation ECLIPSE. Issued at the division level and above, *The Handbook of Military Government* had specific instructions for the administration of occupation government. These duties included law, and ordnances. Additionally, checklists were included to cover civil administration, de-Nazification, finance and property control, legal, public health, labor, education, religious affairs, food distribution, industry, communications, and transportation. Established at the Potsdam Conference from 16 July 1945 until 2 August 1945, the Allied governments reached an

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61 Kiefer, 16.

62 Ziemke, 224.

agreement on the procedures regarding the final designation of occupation zones, relationships between the occupation military governments, and denazification procedures.\textsuperscript{64}

The final transition from tactical control to military government occurred on 1 January 1946 when Clay assumed complete control of the military government as the Commanding General, Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS).\textsuperscript{65} With security established, occupation control centralized under the OMGUS, and a clear unity of effort and command established there was a clear transition from occupation to nation building and the reestablishment of a democratically elected German government that was acceptable to the Allied Governments.

In looking at the planning efforts associated with Operation ECLIPSE, it is important to remember that despite the friction between the Allied Governments as well as within the broader American war effort, all organizations contributed to the overall occupation planning and policymaking. Operation ECLIPSE was an iterative planning process that represented a combination of collaborative and parallel planning efforts that did not work towards isolated end states. There was never doubt in the different planning efforts that the ultimate consumer would be SHAEF and later United States Forces European Theater (USFET) planners whom would be placing these policies and directives into an operational format. These efforts worked either to resolve rising issues or to force policy makers to fill vacuums vital for operational planning. The policy decisions these planners sought to clarify was the vague or nonexistent guidance that gave strategic leadership flexibility up to the end of formal hostilities and the Potsdam Conference immediately after the end of war.

\textsuperscript{64} Ziemke, Chapter XIX.
\textsuperscript{65} Ziemke, 425.
Planning for the Occupation of Iraq

With the conclusion of the United States’ military involvement in Iraq in December 2011, it is important to look at the initial Phase IV and V planning for our ground experience in Iraq.66 Contrary to popular opinion both inside and outside military planner circles, there was an occupation plan for Iraq. The methodology for developing the occupation plan of Iraq is what created confusion in the efforts from the strategic to tactical level. The mindset of planners vacillated between occupation planning within a hostile environment and planning for a more benign peacekeeping environment. Additionally, isolated planning with no focal point to receive consolidated guidance defined the planning environment. This was perhaps the greatest difference between World War II occupation planning for Germany and occupation planning for Iraq. There was a lack of a true central point for interagency planning products for receipt, processing, and incorporation or discarding. In World War II, this structure was the SHAEF occupation planning staff. For Iraq, no similar relationship existed between the strategic planners in Washington and the operational planners in Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), whom were often planning in isolation.

From late in 2002 until the beginning of hostilities, revisions of the standing 1003V CENTCOM campaign plan regarding the defeat of Iraqi forces in the region had been ongoing.

66U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: 11August 2011), page xxiv defines Phase IV and V operations as “Stabilize (Phase IV). The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/ contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. Enable Civil Authority (Phase V). This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region.”
As President Bush refined his guidance and made clear his intentions of regime change in Iraq, 1003V evolved into operational plan COBRA II. As hostilities became a foregone conclusion, President Bush articulated that the goals of American operations against Iraq were to “disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.” He would further refine this guidance in the light of the perceived lessons learned from the occupations of World War II. In February 2003, President Bush stated that the objective of U.S. actions in Iraq was the establishment of a “free and peaceful Iraq.” In defending this objective, he highlighted how the former World War II Axis powers, after American occupation, had re-emerged with “responsible, reform-minded local leaders whom could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.”

As President Bush was stating his objectives in Iraq as well as conveying his intent to the U.S. public and the world community, military planning staffs at numerous levels were focusing on revising their plans for the defeat of the Iraqi military and the Hussein regime. These planning efforts generated the question of both what a post-invasion Iraq would look like as well as who would plan and execute this undertaking. These issues would remain even after the invasion began in March 2003. No less than five separate major planning efforts for the administration of Iraq after Saddam, both from military and civilian staffs, grew from this question. From the

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68 PresidentialRhetoric.com, George W. Bush, American Enterprise Institute (The Future of Iraq), (speech given regarding his vision of a future Iraq on 26 February 2003, accessed 1 December 2011): available from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.26.03.html. After the war, in his speech on the USS Lincoln, the President sounded the same themes that echoed U.S. influence in the post-World War II world: “We're helping to rebuild Iraq, and we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort.” PresidentialRhetoric.com, George W. Bush, End of Major Combat in Iraq, (speech given aboard the USS Lincoln regarding the end of major combat operations in Iraq on 1 May 2003): available from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.01.03.html (accessed 1 December 2011).
military perspective, the CENTCOM and CFLCC staffs as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had different planning efforts for this phase of the operation. Civilian agencies, to include the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency also were planning for a new Iraq, its administration, as well as various factors affecting the new government. These disparate planning efforts lacked focus and their products lacked a true link to an overall occupation plan, creating an environment fraught with fog and friction.

Simultaneous to the planning staffs’ efforts, was a flurry of guidance at the different levels of command that added further confusion to the ongoing planning. From August through December 2002, General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, based his guidance on the assumption that other organizations would lead the occupation planning and CENTCOM assets would be, at best, temporary caretakers. As early as August 2002, he informed the CENTCOM staff that the State Department would lead the planning efforts.69 His staff however conducted prudent planning for Phase IV operations under the assumption that they would indeed be temporary caretakers of the plan and that there would be a hand-off to an unnamed administering agency. A key factor that the CENTCOM staff was missing was policy guidance on who would administer Iraq after Saddam’s fall.70

One factor that influenced Franks’ intent to have other organizations execute the majority of the planning and execution of a post-Saddam Iraq seems to stem from his own inexperience. Franks had a wealth of knowledge in the employment of fires and maneuver throughout his career; however, he had a decided lack of experience in the realm of occupation planning. Throughout the peak years of U.S. involvement in the Balkans, Franks was serving in other key positions throughout the Army. He shepherded the Army’s Force XXI organization into creation

70 Ibid.
as well as served in Korea as the Second Infantry Division Commander, and later as a Lieutenant General in command of the Third U.S. Army, responsible for U.S. military land forces in the Middle East, in 1999. This lack of occupation planning experience coupled with a planning staff that was comfortable in planning for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations from their own Balkans experience arguably led to a mindset and set of assumptions that, without proper policy guidance, negatively affected the planning. To reinforce this mindset, General Franks was quoted in official Army histories as telling the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of”. This statement was in reference to the planning for the shape, deter, seize the initiative, and dominate phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom versus stabilization and the enabling of civil authority.

None of this is to say that Franks completely neglected post-hostilities planning. What it does reflect however is the level of priority in planning that he placed upon a Phase VI and Phase V Iraq. General Eisenhower envisioned the occupation planning for Germany as a separate action from the decisive phases of destroying the German Army and dedicated staff elements exclusively to the design of the occupation. General Franks and his planners initially saw Phase IV of the CENTCOM campaign plan 1003V as another phase of the operation and required no more effort than the rest of the plan. Franks, in his autobiography American Soldier stated that,

“We discussed Phase IV-”The Day After.” A postwar Iraq might be modeled on post-WWII Japan or Germany. We considered the pros and cons of Senior US Army or Marine Corps officers and British military commanders working with Iraqi tribal sheiks all across the country. And we studied the feasibility of an interim government in Iraq formed with international support, along the lines of Hamid Karzai’s administration in Afghanistan.”


73 Franks, 419.
Furthermore, Franks recognized and assumed that humanitarian assistance and reconstruction would become the main effort of whatever organization assumed responsibility for this phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. CENTCOM military capabilities would be responsible for security once combat operations ended. The CENTCOM staff’s planning assumption was that we would “guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military and paramilitary security force drawn from the better units of the defeated regular army.” It would be incumbent on these reconstituted Iraqi units to restore order and prevent clashes among the religious and ethnic factions and large numbers of Iraqis would accomplish reconstruction in “New Deal” style public works projects. Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban Pashtun oppositions groups forming a new Afghan National Army in the still early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom provided this model. 74

In late 2002, Franks and his CENTCOM planning staff made a key assumption in the absence of guidance that would have profound impacts on Phase IV planning. The primary assumption that Franks and his staff made was that Third Army’s CFLCC involvement in the planning and actions as the lead agency for occupation duties would be temporary. CENTCOM leadership and staff felt that once a transition between combat operations had occurred, a Corps level Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) would execute the more complex reconstruction and stabilization tasks in support of an external civilian agency. 75 This was a reflection of the President and Secretary Rumsfeld’s policy that the U.S. military was not suited for and should not execute nation building. The Department of Defense advised CENTCOM planners in August

74 Franks, 393. In his discussions with the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Franks stated, "We will have to stand up a new Iraqi Army, and create a constabulary that includes a representative tribal, religious, and ethnic mix. It will take time. And well-designed and well-funded reconstruction projects that put large numbers of Iraqis to work and quickly meet community needs-and expectations-will be the keys to our success in Phase IV."

75 Wright and Reese, 27-28.
2002 that they would not be the lead agency for Iraq’s occupation and that “others in the
government would assume the principal responsibility for Phase IV.” For six months however,
planners could not locate these interagency planners nor identify the lead agency.76

Without clear policy guidance or the designation of a lead agency, planning efforts
continued unabated within the combatant headquarters. Franks and the CENTCOM staff, upon
tasking CFLCC with initial planning for Phase IV, gave guidance that reflected this policy
vacuum. Planning staffs often lacked the time and personnel to focus on the final phase of the
campaign and thus left it under-developed. Because of the emphasis on combat operations and
lack of time, personnel, and planning resources, CENTCOM and CFLCC campaign planners
allowed Phase IV planning to develop with much less focus than combat planning. This hindered
the establishment of the critical linkages and transitions between combat and post-combat
operations.77 Guidance given by General Franks and Lieutenant General McKiernan reflected a
lack of focus on Phase IV operations. An example of this came from General Franks in
responding to requests for information regarding troop numbers to plan for in Phase IV,

“We don't know what the force needs to look like for PH IV, so we can't and we
won't design a force of 250k or 350k people. What we will do is we will begin to move
forces into the region and when we reach the point where that force is sufficient to
remove Saddam Hussein, we will just start running.”78

Against the backdrop of vague guidance, the development of operational plans and force
deployment lists, and coordinating with CENTCOM planners on campaign plan revisions and
briefings for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the CFLCC staff was simply
overstretched. Planners and senior CFLCC leaders had little manpower to execute these tasks and
to refine a plan for Phase IV. In January 2003, this led to a request by the CFLCC Phase IV

76 Gordon and Trainor, 139.
77 Wright and Reese, 66.
78 Ibid., 67.
Operational Planning Team (OPT) lead, Colonel Kevin Benson, for additional planners from the School of Advanced Military Studies in Fort Leavenworth.79

Simultaneous to the CENTCOM and CFLCC Phase IV planning in late 2002, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were conducting their own Phase IV planning efforts. The name of the planning effort and its subsequent war game was PROMINENT HAMMER II. Ordering the planning was the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General John Abizaid, and led by Brigadier General Steve Hawkins. From the start, the plans produced by Brigadier General Hawkins and his staff were not utilized and their work resulted in several findings that were never given credence. The first finding was that separation between planning for Phase IV from the combat planning for OIF was necessary and that the headquarters should be a Corps headquarters and staff. The second major finding the PROMINENT HAMMER II staff reported was that this Corps headquarters would require heavy interagency augmentation and that they would need to be in place and fully mission capable prior to the commencement of hostilities.80 However, due to the constraints of the organization of the JCS within the U.S. government framework, there was no command and support relationship between the JCS and CENTCOM and CFLCC. The results of this were that the PROMINENT HAMMER II findings had no impact on CFLCC Phase IV planning and by April 2003, the JCS PROMINENT HAMMER II staffers had disbanded.81

Likewise, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency were conducting their own planning efforts for a post-Saddam Iraq. As early as March 2002, the Department of State under Secretary Colin Powell had begun the “Future of Iraq” project to plan for a post Saddam Iraq. This planning group consisted of 16 sub-groups of Iraqi exiles headed by the State

80 Gordon and Trainor, 140.
81 Wright and Reese, 70.
Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs under Thomas S. Warrick. The study they produced addressed the sectarian nature of the society, the infrastructure problems related to ten years of sanctions and Saddam’s methods for distributing largesse to favored portions of society, as well as the justice system. The Department of State study determined that the ability to address the chaos of this dysfunctional human and physical infrastructure would require an expensive and long-term American commitment. The operational planners at CFLCC and CENTCOM, for numerous reasons, never used this planning product.82

Similar to State Department efforts, the CIA held a planning and wargaming session in May 2002 to assist in developing plans for the occupation of Iraq. The results of the wargame showed that there would be disorder after the regime collapsed along sectarian lines and security would be a required precursor to creating a workable Iraqi government given “that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow.” James Fallows in The Atlantic reported that representatives from the Defense Department initially participated in the planning and wargame. They would later receive reprimands and told not to participate further by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.83 Once again, an example of a planning effort that was sequestered and the results not passed to the operational planners. In both cases outlined above, whether because of bureaucratic infighting or due to a lack of policy placing an overall agency in charge of

82 Journalist George Packer states that the decision to stop contact with Thomas Warrick, the director of the “Future of Iraq” project, was made by DoD planners. This was an order from Secretary Rumsfeld, who alluded to the fact that the order came from such a high level that he could not say no. George Packer. “Letter From Baghdad: War After the War—What Washington doesn’t see in Iraq.” The New Yorker. November 24, 2003, available from http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/11/24/031124fa_fact1?currentPage=all (accessed on 2 November 2011).

planning and execution, their efforts were wasted with no structure similar to the occupation planning cell at SHAEF in World War II.

The separate Phase IV planning between the different elements of the Department of Defense, the State Department, and other government agencies with no focal point and no agency in charge was finally resolved in January 2003. President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSDP) 24, Post-War Iraq Reconstruction, on 20 January 2003. President Bush, at the request of Secretary Rumsfeld, delegated responsibility for the planning of post-hostilities operations in Iraq to the Department of Defense with interagency support.84

After the signing of NSDP 24, one of the first actions that Secretary Rumsfeld took was the establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, ORHA. Leading ORHA was retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, the former commander for the humanitarian relief mission supporting the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991. Under the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, two organizations would lead the Phase IV planning and occupation execution in Iraq. ORHA was the civilian organization charged with humanitarian relief, governance, and reconstruction while CFLCC would provide security and train Iraqi security forces.85 ORHA and the Post War Planning Office under Garner were to be a temporary organization until another interim organization could assume control prior to a complete hand-over of responsibility to the Iraqis.86

Organizationally, ORHA was to be subordinate to CENTCOM, however there was little contact between CFLCC and ORHA; Garner and his staff did not arrive into Kuwait until 1 March 2003, three days prior to the commencement of hostilities. This physical and planning

85 Gordon and Trainor, 141.
86 Ibid., 152.
separation directly interdicted the unity of command and efforts that NSDP 24 was supposed to foster. In fact, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks stated that his guidance from Secretary Rumsfeld regarding Jay Garner was that “he’ll be your subordinate, but he’ll be my man in Iraq.” This type of organizational structure for ORHA concerned Franks not only due to the ambiguity as to who was the subordinate, but also due to ORHA’s lack of staff support given the mission ahead of them, ORHA’s lack of a substantial budget, and lack of a clear mission that truly encompassed their tasks.

Garner assembled a team of 200 former military, Foreign Service, academic, and corporate personnel and began developing plans. Notionally, Garner’s organization was supposed to be the focal point where the various instruments of national power were going to coalesce and function. They were additionally tasked to be fully capable within the few short weeks before combat operations would began; neither occurred. ORHA’s work on humanitarian assistance was in-depth and reflected the concerns of the United Nations and its predictions of thousands of refugees as well as shortages of food and water after the conclusion of hostilities. However, similar to the situation that General Eisenhower and the SHAEF occupation planning staff faced, guidance for the establishment of civil administration and reconstruction was vague.

88 Franks, 423.
89 Ibid., 524-528.
90 The composition of the leadership team at ORHA represented various backgrounds. Tim Carney, former ambassador to the Sudan was named to head the Ministry of Interior, Kenneth Keith, former ambassador to Qatar, would lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Robin Raphel, former ambassador to Tunisia, would direct the Ministry of Trade. In addition, regional supervisors were named to direct regional humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. These were directed by General (ret.) Bruce Moore in the North, General (Ret.) Buck Walters in the South, and Barbara Bodine, former ambassador to Yemen in the central part of Iraq, including Baghdad. Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad.” available from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/01/blind-into-baghdad/2860/ (accessed on 15 December 2011).
ORHA reflected this when it conducted a rehearsal at Fort McNair in late February 2003. One observer reported, “I got the sense that the humanitarian stuff was pretty well in place, but the rest of it was flying blind.”

According to George Packer, writing for *The New Yorker* from Iraq in November 2003, his interviews revealed that Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith’s planning expressly excluded Pentagon officials with experience in postwar occupation planning. He reported that the fear was that these officials would continue to echo senior Army official’s concerns of insurgency and would challenge Rumsfeld’s policy against using troops as peacekeepers and nation builders. In an interview with former Secretary of the Army, Thomas E. White, Packer quoted the former Secretary as saying, “You got the impression in this exercise that we didn’t harness the best and brightest minds in a concerted effort.” Secretary White went on to say, “with the Department of Defense the first issue was ‘We’ve got to control this thing’—so everyone else was suspect.” Feith’s planning team, he said, “had the mind-set that this would be a relatively straightforward, manageable task, because this would be a war of liberation and therefore the reconstruction would be short-lived.” This planning assumption was one of the few planning factors that was seemingly shared across the majority of the planning efforts after January 2003. It was a view held by Iraqi exiles in the Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by

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91 On 21 February 2003, some two hundred officials gathered in an auditorium at the National Defense University, in Washington, for a rehearsal of the plans at this point. The drill struck some participants as ominous. One ORHA member, continuing the quote cited above further said that, “A lot of it was after hearing from Jay Garner, ‘We don’t have any resources to do this.’ ” Plans for running the country’s ministries were simplistic; ORHA apparently had done little research. At Douglas Feith’s insistence, his former law partner Michael Mobbs was named the head of the civil-administration team. According to Garner and others, Mobbs never gelled with his new colleagues. Yet this “pillar” would turn out to be the one that mattered most. Packer, “Letter From Baghdad” available from http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/11/24/031124fa_fact1?currentPage=all (accessed on 2 November 2011).

92 Incidentally, Secretary White was fired in April 2003 for his stance on troop levels in Iraq as well as several other issues. This may have colored his after the fact analysis of the planning efforts regarding the occupation of Iraq, however it does confirm the general trend of the compartmentalized nature of planning and “turf wars” going on in 2002 and 2003 during the planning. Ibid.
Ahmad Chalabi and propagated by the INC when they told President Bush that Iraqis would receive their liberators with “sweets and flowers.” This feedback led policymakers, contrary to the CIA and State Department findings, to assume that Iraqi soldiers and police officers would transfer their loyalty to Coalition forces, providing a ready-made security force. The problem with the INC’s assessment was that they had not been a part of Iraq for as long as 20 years and the generational evolution of Iraqi society had changed the human terrain on the ground. In an interview with Barham Salih, the Prime Minister of the Iraqi Kurdish administration and a strong advocate for the overthrow of Saddam, “there was a mistaken notion in certain circles in Washington that the Iraqi civil service would remain intact. This is not the N.Y.P.D. It’s the Iraqi police. The minute the first cruise missile arrives in Baghdad, the police force degenerates and everybody goes home.”

As the isolated planning and bureaucratic infighting continued in Washington in early 2003, CFLCC operational planners continued the process of refining all phases of COBRA II. Colonel Kevin Benson, as noted previously, was the CFLCC lead planner for the Phase IV execution of COBRA II. Colonel Benson and his team arrived at the conclusion in March 2003 that the wargaming of Phase IV had achieved a level of complexity that required a true sequential operation versus a continuation of a new phase for COBRA II. Lieutenant General McKiernan, CFLCC commander, agreed with Benson’s assessment and ordered his deputy-commanding general, Major General Albert Whitley of the British Army, to command the Phase IV planning for CFLCC. Benson’s team was to coordinate with ORHA and Garner, Joint Task Force-IV, the

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94 Ibid.
JCS planning team from PROMINENT HAMMER II, V Corps, whom was the assumed Phase IV military headquarters, and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). 95

Major General Whitley, known as McKiernan’s “British minder,” served with the CFLCC commander in the Balkans in the 1990s. 96 It is significant to note the mental paradigm of the commanders and planners at the operational level. There never was a question of the practical and operational importance of planning for Phase IV and resourcing it correctly. However, the “peace keeping” or “peace enforcement” mindset that the commanders had experienced in the 1990s seems to have affected the amount of attention and resources given to Whitley, Benson, and the rest of the CFLCC planning staff. This view was reinforced by the assumptions of “sweets and flowers” for the American liberators fed by policy makers in Washington.

With the additional support from the CFLCC commander, the CFLCC planning staff began to work with what they felt to be six necessary assumptions to continue planning. These assumptions were necessary to establish a progression of operations after the cessation of major hostilities and necessary to determine the resources required to stabilize the country. The first three assumptions where based on the CFLCC situation at the end of Phase III. These assumptions where organized into stages reflecting the end state for COBRA II. Stage 1 was that CFLCC would position forces across Iraq and begin working with ORHA to establish foundations of a stable environment in Iraq. In stage 2, CFLCC would focus fully on stability and support operations while allowing ORHA to emerge as the lead Coalition authority for post-invasion operations. Finally, in stage three, CFLCC would transition its authority for military

95 Benson, 62.
96 Ibid.
operations to CJTF-Iraq and redeploy most of its forces. ORHA would remain the lead Coalition agency providing direction to CJTF Iraq and its units.97

The remaining three assumptions involved the status of Iraqi forces at the end of COBRA II. Linking these assumptions was the access to the Iraqi labor resources predicted to be on hand for CFLCC, CJTF-Iraq, and ORHA to be able to draw upon for reconstruction and security. CFLCC assumed that they would be able to recall the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi governmental bureaucracy. The planners acknowledged that policy guidance would change over time in regards to the administration of Iraq, and the removal of Ba’ath party members would be limited to senior-level bureaucrats and officers. These assumptions where presented to and approved by senior CFLCC leaders as well as senior joint and Army staff general officers when they visited during January and February 2003. One issue emerged from this set of assumptions in March 2003 when the policy of the U.S. government regarding de-Ba’athification came into question. The issue was the unanswered question of how deep into the Iraqi bureaucracy this process would dig. This issue was not resolved until much later in the war when the Coalition Provisional Authority replaced ORHA.98

As Benson and the CFLCC planning team continued their efforts, Major General Whitley actively began to secure the resources from the interagency and international community to facilitate Phase IV. Lieutenant General McKiernan had issued guidance early on in COBRA II planning that land forces would “control as we go.”99 In the spirit of this guidance, Whitley worked with the Kuwaiti Government on constructing a fresh-water pipeline into southern Iraq.

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97 Wright and Reese, 71-75.
98 Benson, 62.
99 Ibid.
focusing on the Umm Qasr and Basrah region. He also coordinated the delivery of relief supplies into Iraq and arranged to receive international agencies and the U.N. back into Iraq.100

With planning and resourcing going at full steam and CENTCOM dedicating more resources in the form of staff and time to occupation planning, Phase IV of COBRA II transitioned to “ECLIPSE II.” The logic behind this name had little to do with the German occupation plan but more to do with unit history. COBRA II reflected Third Army’s participation in the campaign to break out of Normandy in World War II; likewise, ECLIPSE II reflected their last campaign in World War II, the ECLIPSE occupation of Germany. 101

Similar to World War II, execution of elements of ECLIPSE II occurred simultaneously with COBRA II Phase III offensive operations. Against this backdrop, the CFLCC planners in conjunction with V Corps and I MEF planners reviewed data on the ethnic makeup of the country. The staffs were identifying potential ethnic flashpoints, tribal areas, and regions in which Saddam’s ethnic cleansing had taken place, in effect, identifying the human terrain. In April 2003, as Coalition forces entered Baghdad and CFLCC established a forward headquarters in the capital, Benson and CFLCC planning staff turned ECLIPSE II over to the staff sections that would refine and execute his plan. By the end of April, the CFLCC ECLIPSE II team then focused on transition criteria for handover of the mission to an undesignated follow-on headquarters.102 ECLIPSE II, unlike its predecessor, would have a short life. The plan as written essentially ended on June 15, 2003 when CFLCC transitioned responsibility for the occupation of Iraq with V Corps, who became Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). At that point, CJTF-7

100 Benson, 62.
101 Ibid., 68.
102 Ibid., 63.
commander Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez directed his planners to write a new plan based on the realities of the emerging insurgency and reconstruction requirements.103

Changes to ECLIPSE II and the military command structure were not the only evolution occurring in Iraq from April through June 2003. ORHA, under Garner, was also undergoing a drastic overhaul due to its performance to date. From its inception in January 2003 until May 2003, ORHA’s record of accomplishment and impact on occupation planning and ECLIPSE II was minimal at best. Research in this area has documented the clear lack of interagency coordination between ORHA, the Department of State, and even within the Department of Defense.

As much as the lack of occupation planning and the Balkan experience influenced military planners, Garner’s experience in planning and executing humanitarian relief operations shaped his assumptions. In building his organization, he assumed that the U.S. would repair combat damage, the reality on the ground however was an infrastructure that was dilapidated and barely above Third World standards. One example was the problem of electrical power. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers supporting ORHA, who were experienced in running America’s hydroelectric power grid, were not prepared for the oil-fueled power plants of Iraq.104

In drawing operational boundaries to administer Iraq, Garner and ORHA decided to divide the country into four administrative zones. In the isolated planning environment of Washington and the Hilton Hotel in Kuwait City, this made sense given Garner’s focus on saving...
lives, however his division bore no resemblance to the 18 districts of Iraq and the existing local governments and constabularies.\textsuperscript{105}

Garner also assumed that with CFLCC ensuring security, homeless civilians and refugees would be his immediate problem. He would rely on the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Government to deal with this issue. However, with a budget capable of employing only 600,000 public sector workers, he could not have maintained the 300,000 soldiers of the Iraqi Army as well as the remaining 1.4 million other government employees.\textsuperscript{106} The repercussions of this became apparent when the Iraqi government and army evaporated, public utilities failed, and insurgency took root. Garner then inherited the problem he was not equipped to deal with, violence and security.

ORHA assumed that security was the responsibility of CFLCC, and CFLCC planners waited for a plan from ORHA to resource and implement a security plan. In an interview, former USAID contractor Albert Cavellos related a story from early in the war when he was discussing security in Iraq with a group of Civil Affairs officers on the Iraq-Kuwait border. One of the officers asked Cavellos, “What’s the plan for policing?” Cavellos, a human rights specialist stated that he responded with “I thought you knew the plan.” The Civil Affairs officer then responded back with, “No, we thought you knew.” As the discussion continued, Cavellos asked if they had talked to ORHA and they responded “no.” Cavellos stated at this point that he wanted to “run away” and that “it was like a Laurel and Hardy routine. What happened to the plans? This is like the million-dollar question that I can’t figure out.”\textsuperscript{107}


\textsuperscript{106} Gordon and Trainor, 	extit{Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq}, 153.

These types of conversations not only reflected the isolated planning of the various organizations, but also coordination with the Iraqis themselves. In the last week of April, American officials met with 350 Iraqis in the Baghdad Convention Center to discuss the country’s future. When asked by a tribal sheikh, “Who’s in charge of our politics?” Garner responded with “you’re in charge.” Reportedly, the audience gasped and an American who was present said, “I later realized they were losing faith in us by the second.”

If confidence from the Iraqis and the members of ORHA was flagging, CENTCOM and CFLCC’s confidence in ORHA was likewise lackluster. Major General Whitley provided feedback to McKiernan in the early days of the war that ORHA had no real plan, was not ready to execute even the most basic plan that they did have, and that they did not understand the culture, politics, or internal issues within Iraq. He further noted that Garner and ORHA had yet to delineate responsibilities between CFLCC and ORHA, there was no clear funding for ORHA to run reconstruction, the United Nations had yet to issue a resolution on post-war Iraq, and finally, Garner and ORHA was almost totally dependent on CFLCC for logistical support. Major General Whitley conveyed that if CFLCC wanted ORHA to control Phase IV as envisioned in ECLIPSE II, they would be sorely disappointed. At the CENTCOM level, General Franks was concerned that Jay Garner and ORHA in Phase IV was understaffed, under-budgeted, had no clear mission, and they had missed the bubble on employing the Iraqi army.

With the convergence of these confidence issues as well as a lack of policy, planning, and execution of capability, on 24 April 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld notified Garner that Ambassador

109 Gordon and Trainor, 156.
110 Ibid.
111 Franks, 524-528.
L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) would replace ORHA effective 13 May 2003 on an accelerated timeline. Ironically, this was on the same day that Garner arrived in Baghdad and signaled a clear shift in policy that the United States would assume full responsibility for the occupation of Iraq under the Geneva and Hague conventions. At last, there was a central decision making authority and a focal point of planning for occupation, as evidenced by the two most long reaching decisions that the CPA made on 16 May 2003 and 23 May 2003 with CPA Order No. 1, “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society” and CPA Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities.”

As the occupation formally began in May 2003, there was at last a feasible solution to the isolated planning processes, lack of a central focal point for staff actions, and lack of coordination amongst the Department of Defense and the interagency world of the U.S. government. However, the damage had been done and the seeds planted for what would become an occupation that would not end until December 2011. An occupation that would have none of the finality of results that emerged from SHAEF and ECLIPSE.

Comparison of the planning for ECLIPSE I and ECLIPSE II and Conclusions

The comparisons of the planning for the occupation and resolution of both conflicts clearly reflect the impact of mission command and unified action and their implications for planners. Paraphrasing U.S. Army Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command is defined as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of

112 Wright and Reese, 152-153.
113 Ibid., 26-27. Bremer’s de-Baathification order put at least thirty-five thousand civil servants to include engineers, professors, and civic managers out of work. The employees were fired based on rank, not conduct, and, inevitably, qualified Iraqis lost their jobs just when their expertise was needed most.
full spectrum operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. Through mission command, commanders initiate all actions and integrate all military functions toward a common goal, mission accomplishment.114

During the planning for ECLIPSE, it can be inferred that despite the vague policy up until the Potsdam Conference, both President Roosevelt and President Truman’s intent was clear to the U.S. government agencies participating in the occupation planning for Germany. They expected that all organizations, both civilian and military, would work within their respective expertise to produce a plan that would achieve a lasting peace in Europe and set conditions for the global security situation that would follow. During Phase IV planning for Iraq, agencies throughout the U.S. government conducted planning and preparation, however execution of the principles of mission command was lacking. Of the six principles, the lack of cohesive interagency teams built upon mutual trust, the creation of shared understanding, and the exercise of disciplined initiative to integrate military and civilian functions at the strategic and operational levels directly influenced the execution of ECLIPSE II.115

The absence of clear policy guidance seems to have been more disruptive to the CENTCOM staff in 2002 and 2003 than the SHAEF staff in 1944. The lack of guidance effected both staffs’ planning efforts and their assumptions; however, the staffs planning for OIF coupled this lack of policy with the perceived micromanagement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Based on the research conducted in this study, the lack of policy guidance during the


115 Ibid., paragraph 1-10 defines the six principles as: Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. The author has added the interagency and civilian aspects to reflect the level at which mission command failed; the strategic and operational level of planning.
planning for ECLIPSE created vacuums that the SHAEF operational planners could fill with what they knew of the situation in Europe as it evolved. For OIF planners who faced constant revisions to their plans regarding troop levels and war termination criteria directly from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, filling the vacuum created by a lack of policy guidance occurred in a different manner. When not given clear guidance, they made assumptions based on what they predicted emergent policy would be and not on the conditions on the ground in Iraq.  

Linked to mission command and its influence was the impact of unified action on both planning efforts. Joint Publication 1-02 defines unified action as the “synchronization, coordination, and the integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” In accordance with Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, effective unified action “requires Army leaders who can understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners.” Operational planners depended upon joint and interagency partners for capabilities that did not reside within their organizations in planning for ECLIPSE II. Likewise, government agencies outside the Department of Defense possessed the knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success in the planning and integration of interagency partners, allowing leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses. Continuing the guidelines set in ADP 3-0:

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\text{it is only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force—a key element of mission command—can Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own operations.}\]

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116 This is a conclusion by the author based on the breadth of the research conducted for this monograph.

117 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C., Headquarters: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 November 2010), 376.


119 Ibid.
If the outcome of both ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II was the building of the partner capacity of both Germany and Iraq, then interagency efforts to build the capacity to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions to protect common security interests was required. In both cases, building partner capacity was the outcome of comprehensive and focused interagency activities, programs, and engagements. As this study has shown, this unified action at the strategic and operational level differed drastically.\textsuperscript{120}

Unified action was not just a catchphrase during ECLIPSE planning; active vetting of all staff actions and higher headquarters directives to the SHAEF staff for coordination and consideration during the planning for Germany’s occupation was the norm. During Phase IV planning for OIF, the various agencies involved felt they were contributing to a unified action and unity of effort. However, with no overarching directive designating a SHAEF-like entity to receive staff actions and to act as the main planning effort, an overly compartmented planning environment existed. This was an environmental framework compounded by interagency friction and redundant planning efforts. In effect, suffocation of unified action and unity of effort occurred in this planning environment.

Planners facing difficult decisions in developing an operational approach should pause to define their concerns, especially in planning for what will occur after the war; taking into consideration what changes are occurring in the environment around them. They should take precautions to avoid the wrong historical lessons learned in developing solutions to the myriad of issues that emerge when the current form of decisive active action has transitioned to another or is occurring simultaneously; such as blindly comparing the planning efforts behind ECLIPSE and

\textsuperscript{120} It is important to note, that this paragraph is an application of current ADP 3-0 doctrine in evaluating the planning efforts between ECLIPSE and ECPLIPSE II. Whereas ADP 3-0 doctrine is written under U.S. Army terms, the author has expanded this view to include an operational planners perspective.
They should however, see their concerns in a historical context, asking what major trends are relevant and what specifics in the political and strategic context bear on the question of “what’s next?” In defining this, the planner should ask the questions of what is the story, trace the operational problem’s timeline back to its beginning, answer the who, when, where, and why of the issue, and use the appropriate approach to illuminate present conditions and future options. Only by effectively identifying these options and their associated risks and benefits, can the operational planner avoid the pitfalls of a lack of unified action and mission command that befell ECLIPSE II and recreate the success achieved in ECLIPSE.

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121 United States Army, *Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011), page 5 defines decisive action as the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment.

122 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time, The Uses of History for Decision Makers.* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 132. This work provides a quality framework and systematic process for planners and leaders to use in applying historical lessons learned. Using historical case study analysis as well as evaluation of the processes of civilian leaders, the authors developed a process theory for applying historical lessons to present problems.
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