A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH THROUGH INTERAGENCY PARTNER DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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**Title:** A Whole of Government Approach Through Interagency Partner Development: National Security Professional Development

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**Abstract:**

The Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) required the United States Armed forces to establish a joint approach to better utilize the full capability of the US military. GNA has been steadily refined over 28 years and proven to be an integral part of military planning and action. In 2007, President Bush signed Executive Order (EO) 13434 creating National Security Professional Development. The EO was created and executed based on lessons learned from the Department of Defense (DOD) in operations around Iraq and Afghanistan where experts were required from non-DOD agencies to support nation-building efforts. Though experts were in non-DOD agencies, most were not prepared to work with the DOD much less work in the military environment. EO 13434 was the first step in formalizing a recognized need to prepare non-DOD civilian agencies to work alongside the DOD. The process of developing National Security Professionals (NSP) across the vast non-DOD agencies has proven challenging and met with little success. As GNA has produced joint military education across the armed services, there are only fractions of education and development processes that are needed to produce a NSP from a non-DOD agency thus leaving a void for NSPD inside non-DOD agencies. GNA serves as a template for the development process of NSPD.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) required the United States Armed forces to establish a joint approach to better utilize the full capability of the US military. GNA has been steadily refined over 28 years and proven to be an integral part of military planning and action. In 2007, President Bush signed Executive Order (EO) 13434 creating National Security Professional Development. The EO was created and executed based on lessons learned from the Department of Defense (DOD) in operations around Iraq and Afghanistan where experts were required from non-DOD agencies to support nation-building efforts. Though experts were in non-DOD agencies, most were not prepared to work with the DOD much less work in the military environment. EO 13434 was the first step in formalizing a recognized need to prepare non-DOD civilian agencies to work alongside the DOD. The process of developing National Security Professionals (NSP) across the vast non-DOD agencies has proven challenging and met with little success. As GNA has produced joint military education across the armed services, there are only fractions of education and development processes that are needed to produce a NSP from a non-DOD agency thus leaving a void for NSPD inside non-DOD agencies. GNA serves as a template for the development process of NSPD.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols Act</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Northern Command</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Professional Development</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Research</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A CONSENT FORM</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Goldwater Nichols Act</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Northern Command</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

Page

Table 1. Criteria Comparison Chart.................................................................15

Table 2. Completed Criteria Comparison Chart .................................................38
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

Goldwater-Nichols…proves its value as a model for improving integration among disparate but related organizations that share a common goal. DOD’s experience in implementing Goldwater-Nichols provides us with particular insights into challenges ahead, as we seek to expand that success throughout the federal government.

— Admiral Edmund Giambastiani,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 4, 2006.

President Bush’s Executive Order (EO) 13434 called for National Security Professional Development (NSPD) in order to support a whole of government approach, meaning not only the traditional agencies provide security for the nation, but all agencies have a part. The order initiated multiple non-Defense (DOD) agencies meeting and beginning the process of structuring NSPD. There was an absence of detailed funding, requirements, and organized central leadership to structure NSPD. The only agency to date taken a formalized approach is the Department of State (DOS). Under Secretary of State Colin Powell, DOS created positions to satisfy the NSPD order and in turn used those positions to support staff rotations into DOD Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. Since Powell’s departure emphasis has slowly begun to fade away inside the DOS.

Agencies have seen the value in NSPD, but do not have the staffing or resources to continually support the program; other agencies have been only able to support sporadically. Congressionally there has not been much visible focus. However,
congressional research is available indicating questions have been asked by members to understand more about the program and the need for a whole of government approach.

As of November 2013, Congress had not allocated resources to agencies for the purpose of NSPD or enacted any legislation. In addition, EO 13434 was not funded. The National Security Strategy specifies the need for a whole of government approach recognizing a void where lead agencies need the expertise of another in order to complete a task or provide assistance.¹ Currently there are few, if any, formalized programs inside non-DOD agencies that support the recognized void for NSPD. How can a whole of government approach be developed for interagency partners similar to that of the joint operational requirements stated in the Goldwater Nichols Act? Can the U.S. Government (USG) emphasize enough importance to ensure the leadership of Non-DOD agencies support a whole of government approach through interagency programs? Can Congressional leaders provide funding requirements to support agencies through “fenced” funds that in turn supporting non-DOD agency leadership?

Immediately after EO 13434 is signed, much was written and reported on the topic of National Security Professional Development (NSPD). Peter J. Roman captured main themes and cited some past success of pre-NSPD programs before it was formalized.² In addition, Roman cited agencies that would lead and have key input. The Congressional Research Office also began to respond to questions from Congressional


Leaders. “Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security” produced in 2008 states “there is an outdated superstructure of the 20th century” and cites the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as a workable model to organize the USG.\(^3\) The Congressional Research Office also cited many publications pre-EO 13434 that referred to a NSPD process but did not elaborate on what the process looked like, only a need. Also, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in his testimony during the April 15, 2008, House Armed Services Committee hearing, “Building Partnership Capacity and Development of the Interagency Process,” challenges “cannot be overcome by military means alone and they extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or department.”\(^4\)

Prior to the signing of EO 13434 dating back to the National Security Act of 1947, 1949 Amendment called for action “to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States,” including “the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.”\(^5\) The publication Joint Forces Quarterly published an article by a


\(^5\)National Security Act of 1947, 1949 Amendment.
naval officer on institutionalizing the interagency process.\textsuperscript{6} Documentation can also be found in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 with the integration of 22 agencies.\textsuperscript{7}

Understanding there is an EO, extensive research has been and was completed before and after the signing, little is formalized by non-DOD departments and their agencies to embrace the interagency effort to support NSPD. This document will explain the challenges non-DOD departments supporting the initiative have and provide examples where some agencies have been successful providing interagency personnel.

This document will not discuss or defend the importance of NSPD among the non-DOD agencies. This document will take the position that a whole of government approach is essential and identify the challenges and needs to support the initiative through citing feasibility and sustainability issues. The results of this document will support solutions to processes and requirements needed to establish an interagency development program for a whole of government approach and advance NSPD.


CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this research is to answer the question: can a whole of government approach be developed for interagency partners similar to that of the joint operational requirements stated in the Goldwater Nichols Act?

Most of the documents written on the subject are of two categories. The documents either cite disconnects that demonstrate lack of development or tell of successes around individual events. Few documents present solutions that would assist in establishing a more formalized program. However, through the information provided by the various documents potential solutions to develop a whole of government approach lie within.

The May 1, 2012 National Security Strategy is required by law and produced by the White House every two years. It reflects the security interests of the United States in order to protect the resources required to sustain the country.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for 2010, which is required by law and reviews its own strategies and priorities, points to the need of strengthening interagency partnerships to create new and more responsive mechanisms for security assistance. In all, the document uses the word interagency over 30 times in efforts to be more effective.

The DOS’ Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) for 2010 also supports interagency development. “The QDDR provides a blueprint for elevating American "civilian power" to better advance our national interests and to be a better partner to the U.S. military. Leading through civilian power means directing and coordinating the resources of all America's civilian agencies to prevent and resolve
conflicts.”

EO 13434, May 2007 established National Security Professional Development. The EO by President Bush called on executive departments and agencies to establish national security positions and a National Strategy for a Professional Development program with access to education and training. It also identified the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Advisor, as a key position in the strategy development.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 Section 1107 states: “use a whole-of-Government approach in order for the United States Government to operate in the most effective and efficient manner.” The NDAA Section also established a Committee in the Executive Office on National Security Personnel with members including DOD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Assistant to the President on National Security, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and DOS. Additionally, it provides the authority for agencies to begin interagency rotations exclusionary of intelligence agencies. Last, it calls for the establishment of Interagency Communities of Interest whereas departments or agencies have common ground and rely on the expertise of another in order to achieve maximum efficiency. The major missing component is funding the interagency rotational assignments as most agencies cannot “plug and play” their members into another organization. However, it does design the framework for department heads to begin developing and planning.

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“Security Professionals For 21st Century Threats”, July 19, 2007 is an article written by Peter J. Roman of the Stimson Center that promoted interagency development. The article captures the overall NSPD program as it was first envisioned as an EO. It outlines requirements for each agency and the time it will take to implement. In addition, the article identifies several shortcomings of the program.

“Building National Security through Interagency Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges” in the compilation of papers presented to the Third International Transformation Conference and Workshop on Leader Development, Changing Mindsets to Transform Security, by Ralph O. Doughty and Ralph M. Erwin, argues that “the security of the United States depends on the combined efforts of our military and interagency partners within the Federal Government.” Moving through historical examples of interagency successes to assessing the current state, the paper defines three key elements to achieve success: “1) interagency education with partner departments; 2) interagency training and real-world experience with partner departments; and 3) acculturation of all partners through immersion in these interagency partner developments.”

Also in the compilation, Elizabeth A. Yeomans and John W. Stull present in “Taking the Next Step in Transforming Comprehensive Approach: Designing a Functional International Operations Response Framework” that “Gaps and Stovepipes” are why “each agency does well within its own purview, but does not have the mechanism for crossing into another agency’s “swim lane” making it difficult for interagency cooperation.
From the Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security”, by Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, Pat Towell in 2008 provides background on NSPD and restates many observations. It does move one step further than most documents and provides large vague solutions citing the need for financing and some failed proposed bills in Congress. The proposals include a need for a National Security System or the need to combine initiatives by separate agencies into one.

Catherine Dale in 2011 through the (CRS) again writes in “National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress” about the same difficulties with the title capturing the information contained. One specific item in the research is the creation of positions in agencies that identify individuals as National Security Professionals drawing on studies by Jim Locher III who led a congressionally mandated study on interagency reform, Forging a New Shield 2008 which is reviewed shortly. The research refers to documents that support a GNA approach in establishing a Joint Qualified Officer for non-DOD agencies with rotational assignments and special training, but cites lack of oversight from the non-DOD agencies with lack of centralized control.⁹

The testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on April 15, 2008 tells the validity of NSPD by stating the need to build partnership capacity. However, elements are not described to create the partnership.

Another document that begins to provide a road map for interagency development is the presentation by John Morton at the February 2013 AFCEA Homeland Security Conference, “Next-Generation Homeland Security-The Intergovernmental Dimension.” The presentation uses the framework of establishing a network through the Department of Homeland Security by using the federal government’s constitutional authority to resource and facilitate intergovernmental administration of national preparedness activities. He also calls to reflect on the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 for lessons learned around joint assignments. Last, the presentation points out a need for an appropriation of funds to achieve success.

Lieutenant General Leonard D. Holder and Williamson Murray in their article “Prospects for Military Education” provide a complete overview of Joint Professional Military Education from a historical framework that includes Prussia and the Napoleonic Age to the current state. Interestingly enough, Holder and Williams state there is still a challenge getting the best officers from each branch, especially the Navy, to attend joint schools. The article moves into the details of the selection process, the education, and the proposal that top performers in joint military education should be recognized and receive choice assignments.

Additional information supporting a whole of government approach can be found in the National Security Act of 1947, to include its 1949 Amendment and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. These three acts do not designate funding or a centralized office for interagency development in regards to a whole of government approach. The Homeland Security Act moves closer by combining over 22 agencies under one department, but still leaves a void from a NSPD perspective that would provide for interagency development.
A project spearheaded by the USG moving NSPD to the forefront and producing a tremendous amount of data supporting not only the need, but the approach to developing interagency coordination was the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). PNSR was started by the Bush administration in 2006 and concluded in 2011. During that time, the talents of the group produced studies and publications that caught the attention of department and agency heads as well as lawmakers bringing us forward to the progress we see today. Information on the publications can be found at www.pnsr.org.

In the December 2005 staff trip report to the Foreign Relations committee it stated the difficulty and willingness of sending experienced personnel from the DOS to Iraq. It was reported that most were concerned about security and careers. It aludes to the fact that only highly motivated inexperienced individuals were willing to volunteer and the leadership allowed it. Also, the report makes reference to overcoming joint relationship challenges previously experienced in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Finally, it states several criteria for success in Iraq; one key ingredient being, “top notch US civilian personnel.”

With mounting interagency work required in Afghanistan and Iraq, the need for cooperation was at an all-time high. Prior to the publication of EO 13434, National Security Presidential Directive 44 signed by President George W. Bush in December 2005 establishes the Department of State as the lead agency for using the resources of all agencies to support stabilizing and reconstructing areas and countries. It directs other agencies to support the Department of State and established the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction as a member of the then National Security Council.
Presidential Directive 44 provided the leadership and power needed for a single agency to call upon the resources of others.

The literature available is vast concerning the need for further interagency development; however, except for PNSR documents there is little work that offers solutions to prepare non-DOD civilian agencies for interagency development. While there are authorities in place, the formal structuring to support is missing or loosely held together by agreements. Until a recognition that the interagency development system for non-DOD civilians is broken, there will be few documents citing solutions.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to answer the question: “Can an effective whole of government approach be developed for interagency partners similar to that of the joint operational requirements stated in the Goldwater Nichols Act?” This chapter is organized by an overview of the research material gathered, explanation of the evaluation criteria, the relevance, and credibility of sources.

Data collection is from a combination of Congressional Research, Legislative Acts, prior research, publications, and interviews. There are documents that focus on larger subjects that promote the success and the need for interagency development. These documents, however, do contain information on interagency challenges and successes that point to potential shortfalls that need addressing, but do not provide solutions.

The amount of material published citing support for a whole of government approach is extensive. Research required filtering of data in order to focus on the ability for the U.S. Government (USG) to support an interagency approach similar to GNA. The bulk of the material published has a focus on successes, but not solutions. Though successes are referenced, the information researched focuses on the challenges and solutions to assist interagency partners in establishing and maintaining a system supporting continual interagency involvement in NSPD similar to that of GNA.

There is difficulty trying to avoid research that cites just success, as most material argues for interagency development. Material providing detailed solutions was thoroughly reviewed in order to identify the universality of a solution as it applies or
would apply across various USG agencies. It is difficult to find a one-size-fits all solution.

Interviews were completed with permission from the college. Individuals selected for interviews are experienced in interagency challenges. The interview questions focused on current challenges and solutions in a discussion style format. Each interview signed an “informed consent” statement as shown on Appendix A.

For this research, a qualitative approach was taken through the reviews of particular examples in history that point to their success or failure and using supporting documentation to identify gaps in non-DOD civilian agencies that would support a GNA type of approach. Data collection, excluding interviews, required the examination of missing components in the obtained research that would assist in making an interagency process successful. Identified components were also vetted against known systems. For example, if there is a component missing that identifies required training, then what systems are already in place inside an agency that functions correctly and systems that do not function correctly?

The examples were vetted against the following six criteria, the first five being derived from PNSR Case Studies Working Group. ¹⁰

1. “Interagency Culture: Did different agency and department cultures, including leadership styles and behavior, reinforce competition or collaboration among organizations?” “Departments and agencies have strong, dominant cultures reflective of

their legislative mandates, and this tends to trump interagency culture and the ability to work effectively in a collaborative fashion.”¹¹

2. “Shared Values: Did existing organizational cultures and personnel systems value and reward individual agency performance over U.S. government unity of purpose and effort?” “For an organization to reach maximum effectiveness and efficiency, there must be a shared vision of what is to be accomplished.”¹²

3. “Mission: Were civilian agencies unprepared to apply their expertise rapidly in a risky overseas environment?” Agencies and departments are providers of expert capabilities, but those capabilities can be required and must be prepared to work in undesirable locations.

4. Mandates: Were authorities in place to allow agencies to support their core mandate in addition to broader national interests?¹³ Authorities are required to provide parameters for agencies and departments to work within. Without proper authorities or the education of those authorities’ programs it is difficult to sustain broader interests.

5. Expeditionary Mindset: Did civilian agencies lack a culture that embraces operational activities; that is, making success in the field as important as success in Washington or the U.S.?

6. Funding: Was there funding in place to continue the core mission while supporting the broader interest?


¹²Ibid.

The six criteria against the examples provided will indicated a “+” if present and a “-“ if absent.

The qualitative case study filtering approach above provides a balanced approach of research materials that lead to the answer if a whole of government approach can be achieved among non-DOD interagency partners in order to develop NSPD similar to that of GNA.

Table 1. Criteria Comparison Chart

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

How can a whole of government approach be developed for interagency partners similar to that of the joint operational requirements stated in the Goldwater Nichols Act?

This document has demonstrated that interagency cooperation is not a new concept. The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in 1949 (American legislation), indicate the intent if not the resources or mechanism that the USG has implemented to move in this direction. Other governments’ efforts to coordinate interagency cooperation, Great Britain for instance, are well documented. “The British Foreign Service excelled in working hand-in-hand with its partner British Diplomatic Service in conducting professional cooperative actions as part of the Victorian Civil Service…that led to the successful application of diplomacy in the nineteenth century.”

For the U.S., interagency cooperation has been inconsistent through history making it difficult to retain lessons learned.

“Interagency partnerships have been attempted in the United States since the Revolutionary War and continued during the Civil War;” some successful, some challenging. In the early 20th Century, interagency cooperation can be witnessed in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) program which provided work for millions of unemployed trained by both military and

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15Ibid., 250.
civilian agencies. Many mark the National Security Act of 1947 as the beginning of interagency cooperation as it provided the platform. While the act did provide the platform, it also allowed for the evolution of interagency development. There are four examples in this chapter that are compared against the evaluation criteria delineated in Chapter 3 that demonstrate efforts at interagency development and assist in answering the question: How can a whole of government approach be developed for interagency partners similar to that of the joint operational requirements stated in the Goldwater Nichols Act?

**Goldwater-Nichols Act**

The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) established the requirement for military officers to obtain joint accreditation to be promoted to General Officer or 0-7. Requirements for accreditation include two levels of joint professional military education and an assignment in a joint position. Not until these requirements are met is a military officer considered to be a joint qualified officer. The establishment of these requirements was initially viewed by military leaders as burdensome and distracting. After more than 25 years, military leaders view joint qualification as invaluable to the success of our modern day military, as most operations around the world require components of the different services.  

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17GNA.
Through the lens of hindsight, GNA is viewed as successful, but it still has its challenges. Professional Military Education (PME) provides an excellent example of one current challenge to the system. Joint PME Level 1 is the first step for an officer to obtain joint qualifications, completed at a joint school such as the US Army’s Command General Staff College or the US Air Force’s Air War College. Every service within the DOD loudly proclaims its advocacy of PME. Yet, there is still difficulty among some career paths inside various branches of the military that view joint schools as an unaffordable diversion from the development and implementation of key competencies. For example, the Navy is a very technical organization and has a unique mission with sea duty; schooling is seen as a distraction from its main focus. The Air Force, however, sees the benefit of the cross cultural PME and sends its top officers to sister service educational institutions. The Air Force recognizes its interdependence to support and be supported by other services. For career purposes in the Air Force, attendance is viewed as a major performance report achievement. The different priorities the services place on PME reflect an uneven application of GNA.

Despite the example above, however, it is apparent that the culture inside the DOD has been transformed to think jointly. ‘Jointness’ establishes the whole of armed forces approach. There are still interservice rivalries today that help maintain healthy competitiveness. However, there is an understanding during planning and execution that one service is probably better suited to carry out a portion of the plan than another. This institutionalization of a Joint culture has taken over 25 years and arguably America’s

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armed services have worked together better than ever before over the last decade. Is this system perfect? No. Are there areas for improvement? The answer is, yes.

GNA has been successful for two reasons, it was a law and because it was resourced. Though met with resistance by many of the General Officer Corps in the early stages, it slowly began to take shape and be understood. One of the cultural advantages DOD has over many other agencies is its ability to move forward on issues. The DOD’s rank structure among its uniformed service members operates very efficiently when given a direct task. Merely assigning a task doesn’t mean the DOD will not ask critical questions, research, and apply appropriate methods. In fact, the DOD is probably one of the most innovative organizations in problem solving, when given a task, the DOD will accomplish it. Thus, in the case with GNA and despite initial resistance, a Joint transformation, was accomplished and is one of the reasons the DOD has the world’s most efficient and capable military capacity.

GNA gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff (CJCS) more power. It created a central focus for the branches of the armed services. In short, it put someone in charge of the Joint Force. Many politicians and political think tanks viewed the military branches as a hollow force that had not achieved the desired results of a conflict in decades. In order to achieve the full capabilities of the armed forces, someone had to be in charge and truly make the efforts joint by creating unity of command.19

Finally, as mentioned previously, the law required completion of joint PME to be eligible for promotion to a flag officer position. In short, if military officers did not

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receive joint PME education and serve in a joint position they were not going to be eligible to serve at the most senior levels. These major aspects of GNA set the conditions for our present day military to not only comply with GNA, but truly embrace it to become the most effective military force in the world.

Many experts in the civilian government service role outside the DOD do not understand the inner workings of the U.S. military, making it difficult to apply their expertise in an operational environment. It is a complex environment that has many moving parts that all work in synchronization. In those moving parts are many experts across many career fields. The U.S. military is designed to receive a task, interpret the policies around that task and complete it with the force given. This sounds very simple, but pushing the highest level of information to the lowest level of command is extremely difficult, as any large organization can attest. Now, place that process in a hostile environment. The complexity increases and the tasks began to multiply in degree of difficulty. “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.”

Reviewing the six criteria set forth in chapter 3, how does GNA compare? GNA was enacted to force a cooperative inter-service culture among the services. The services prior to GNA not only had distinct roles but enforced competition against each other. Through leadership, services competed to obtain a foothold in the next warfighting domain without communicating or collaborating with the other. In addition, prior to GNA, it was not in a service member’s best interest to serve in a role outside the normal

20 Karl von Clausewitz
career progression - that is, serving in a cross-service or joint role was not career enhancing. GNA created a central focus that in order for the US to have the most effective fighting force in the world a service member had to be well rounded and understand the other services. GNA created a personnel system that rewarded unity of purpose and effort. The third criterion is quite simple for the DOD in regards to GNA, they were prepared to apply their expertise rapidly and in risky environments. However, the argument can be made prior to GNA that the services were unprepared to coordinate their expertise in a unified effort. Examples include, Vietnam and the Iranian Hostage rescue in April 1980 where interservice coordination was lacking resulting in poor execution. Though it took some years for GNA to truly embed itself in the culture, GNA was itself the mandate that allowed the services to not only support their core function, but the broader national interests as well. From the fifth criteria, an expeditionary mindset is valued, because the personnel system requires not only staff time, but leadership in the field as well. There is a clear progression for a career officer to move into and out of staff positions and back to the field units. Finally, GNA was a funded priority because the DOD was legally compelled to recognize the authorities. Funding allowed for joint training and assignments to be accomplished while adhering to the law. Without funding, it would be nearly impossible to achieve the requirements set forth in GNA.

**Iraq and Afghanistan**

Over the last decade, the U.S. military has fought in two very complex environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. When the U.S. military completed the warfighting phases in both countries, the real challenge began. America’s military was ready to go home, but could not because more was required of them. The national infrastructure from
local governments to basic utilities needed to be reestablished in Iraq and a functioning central government needed to be established in Afghanistan. The warfighting tasks began to morph into nation building tasks.

In Iraq with the Ba’ath Party removed, all the government experts were gone. Imagine an organization losing all of its experts overnight! All basic services began to deteriorate immediately from police to utilities. In Afghanistan, oppressed tribal leaders began to emerge and lead their tribes, looking for the next handout from whomever would give it to them, a mentality left over from wars past in the region. The U.S. military has some expertise in these areas, but does not carry the intellectual bandwidth to instantly change from warfighter to nation builder, even though it has the preponderance of assets to achieve results as a nation builder, many of the experts lie within non-DOD agencies. The DOD called on the Department of State (DOS) to supply experts to assist with nation building. The DOS was running at full capacity and expanding as rapidly as it was able while calling in additional experts from the Department of Energy (DOE), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), and more.

The US military is trained to mobilize quickly and carry out given tasks. Once those tasks are complete the US military in effect wants to goes home. In both the Iraq and Afghanistan efforts, the tasks morphed and became a nation building effort. As the US military realized the tasks were changing, it called upon the various non-DOD agencies that had expertise in the areas required. This was problematic because most of the non-DOD agencies are not designed to quickly mobilize and provide experts, nor do they have the funding to do so. Also, most civilians in non-DOD agencies are not trained
to work with military units and vice versa. From the Congressional Research excerpt below the tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan were many calling upon non-DOD agencies to support the DOD.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan may be considered a type of task force. These teams—which have consisted of 20 to 100 members—were first formed in Afghanistan in 2002, and then were established in Iraq in 2005. Members were drawn largely from DOD, the State Department, and USAID. The original concept was for the PRTs to be mixed civilian-military teams that would operate in Afghanistan’s provinces, coordinating U.S. government support from civilian agencies to local authorities and providing a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. PRTs were stood up first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Their purpose was to build basic infrastructure and to provide assistance, advice, and mentoring to provincial and local government and officials in a wide range of areas, including governance, political and economic development, rule of law, education and culture, and public health.21

Reviewing the six criteria established in Chapter 3, the interagency culture existed only by virtue of strong collaboration with the DOD leading the way due to its disproportional representation and robust resourcing.22 Even though many federal agencies shared the same zeal to achieve results in these provinces, it required non-DOD civilians to become familiar with DOD activities because there was no non-DOD agency that acted as a single point of contact. Non-DOD agencies were not prepared to apply their expertise in the environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. PRTs often lacked the physical presence of the civilian agency because the environment was too risky, living

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22 Ibid., 43.
conditions were not suitable, or the agency did not have enough personnel. Mandates were not codified through formal arrangements, leaving confusion of who worked for whom in the absence of command and control. The expeditionary mindset did not exist in the culture. With the DOS primarily supporting the PRTs, the agency encouraged volunteers for these assignments by offering the prospect of career enhancement accelerated promotion. The volunteers ended up being young, inexperienced individuals that not only had difficulty applying their skill, but were the least able to understand the inner workings of the U.S. military. Those more experienced DOS employees understood the best career path was to stay in Washington where in-sight was in-mind for career progression. Finally, funding was made available to the DOS from the DOD. If funding had not been available from the DOD source, non-DOD agencies would not have been able to support the missions.

Fighting in two very complex environments, the U.S. military began their largest challenge transitioning to a nation building force. With the DOD’s large presentation and robust resourcing, it was able to work persistently through the DOS to obtain needed non-DOD civilian agency experts to establish an interagency culture with a shared mission.


24 Dale, Serafino and Towell, Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad, 44.

25 Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
US Northern Command

US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is integrated and woven tightly with many USG agencies, and works in concert to defend against threats to the United States in the lower 48 states, Caribbean, Canada, Mexico, and Alaska. NORTHCOM was developed out of necessity from the attacks of September 11, 2001 and is one of the most interagency-dependent organizations in the government; it truly represents the best of a whole of government approach. However, the key word is necessity.

On September 10, 2001, the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established the Domestic Events Network (DEN) in order to quickly transmit vital information to multiple agencies. It started in the FAA’s Air Traffic System Command Center as a simple conference call every FAA facility was dialed into. As other agencies realized the nation-wide information shared on the DEN, more requested access. Today, it is an established network that operates 24 hours a day and one that every agency is connected to or can be brought online with a phone call. The DEN is a vital component of NORTHCOM that serves as a real time information source where the right agencies have the right information as soon as it is known. The example of the DEN is one of many components that have come together based on a recognized need to support NORTHCOM and its mission. However, many of the supporting agencies have only become key contributors just by experience. There is little formal training to understand how the other agencies operate, so it is learned through experience. In spite of that constraint, NORTHCOM continues to be at the forefront of interagency interoperability working and building a whole-of-government approach domestically.
This demonstrates once again that the DOD is leading the effort for NSPD and interagency development is currently managed through experience only.

The interagency effort in NORTHCOM has been an exercise in collaboration and understanding the requirements of each agency, as well as their capabilities and expertise. The mission of NORTHCOM is easily understood as “USNORTHCOM partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests” in concert with DHS’ vision “to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.” The mission clearly demonstrates shared values. While NORTHCOM has a clear mandate, some of its interagency members of the partnership are less clear in their understanding. For example, non-DOD civilian liaisons have been placed at various levels inside the NORTHCOM to support the defense of the homeland. However as budgets are drawn down and 9/11 becomes more of a memory, managers are reverting back to their core mandate at the expense of the broader national interests.

Due to funding constraints, the FAA recently recalled its liaison to the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC) with no identified backfill. This liaison plays a vital role in the establishment of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) inside the U.S. that is a vital component in the protection of the US’ borders and disaster response. The NORTHCOM expeditionary mindset is evidenced by the number of liaisons supporting the operational activities. Most liaisons inside NORTHCOM are directly connected to


their main offices in Washington, DC creating a direct line to leadership and, in turn, creating a career enhancing opportunity.

Reviewing the criteria in Chapter 3, non-DOD agencies have supported NORTHCOM and created the liaison positions to support a shared mission, but remain in jeopardy as they may not support the primary mission of that agency and possibly the first cut from the budget. Though the DOD is experiencing large budget cuts, the DHS is attempting to fill that potential void by increasing its footprint as its budget is expected to grow by $369M in FY2015 and 2,000 new Customs and Border Patrol officers that will integrate with NORTHCOM.28 Last, the NORTHCOM example maintains a strong interagency culture with many non-DOD agencies recognizing their role in homeland security.

National Security Professional Development

As the U.S. Military slowly embraced GNA and became the most effective defense force in the world, the leadership of the US also recognized the need for a whole of government approach that calls upon non-DOD agency experts to assist the US Military in achieving post conflict objectives. As indicated earlier, the military is of the mindset that once the objective is seized and secured, its mission is complete, but the real challenges begin in nation building type roles. Executive Order (EO) 13434 was an initial step to enhance national security by promoting training, education, and experience to respond to, prevent, and protect against natural and manmade disasters. Also, prior to EO 13434, the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) was established in September of 2011.

2006 to create an innovative system that used all elements of national power. The lead was James Locher III who was a key architect of GNA. With an EO and a group such as PNSR advocating for national security reform through a collaborative approach enabling all elements of national power, DOD began working with other non-DOD agencies identifying solutions and establishing agreements. The DOD recognized the need and, because they had preponderance of assets to train and educate, took the lead.

With DOD in the lead to establish a network of National Security Professionals (NSP), there is little support from non-DOD agencies excluding DOS, as its mission in diplomacy and nation building has been in step with the DOD for the last decade. The DOD has used not only its assets, but has also used its cultural advantage to move forward on given tasks. It has been observed that the U.S. military, a task oriented organization, can make a decision in a few hours and prepare to move forward whereas non-DOD agencies would take 10 days just to discuss the task.

One advantage the DOS has is its understanding of the environment. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, with his experience in the military and as the National Security Advisor, understood the need for a whole of government approach. When Secretary Powell assumed his duties, he queried the status of his Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account, a human capital account used inside DOD to allow for long term PME, training, and changes of station. His staff informed him that civilian agencies, including the DOS, did not staff with that approach.\textsuperscript{29} Secretary Powell did establish

positions to support NSPD, but since his departure, those positions have not received the priority they enjoyed during his tenure. As more work is completed by government agencies to support NSPD, the DOD has found itself consistently in the lead and soliciting non-DOD agencies to send non-DOD civilians to its schools for training and, conversely, the DOD sending their young field grade officers to other government agencies in lieu of traditional PME for what is commonly called an interagency fellowship. The fellowship provides an interagency experience for the officer; learning the capabilities of that agency and imparting knowledge to the gaining agency about the DOD all while meeting the requirements for Joint PME.\textsuperscript{30} Many of the non-DOD agencies are not consistently able to support the exchange due to funding and staffing. The funding is self-explanatory. There are no funds obligated to non-DOD agencies for NSPD. However, the staffing and prioritization issues are more complex.

As then Secretary Powell discovered, non-DOD agencies do not staff to cover employees in transition, training, or long term assignments. As the DOD began to ask for expertise from other agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, non-DOD agencies were unable to meet the demands and supply the appropriate amount of civilian expertise needed. In turn, supply and demand is the problem in training NSPs to support a whole of government approach. At present, in order for non-DOD agencies to train NSPs, the non-DOD agencies must reduce their staffing in an office in order for the civilian to assist the DOD as requested or attend training to be able to assist in the future. Meanwhile, in the condition of personnel deficit caused by allowing the employee to pursue professional

\textsuperscript{30}Ralph O. Doughty, Interagency Chair, Command General Staff College, Interview by author, September 25, 2013.
development, the supporting manager must continue to operate the office with reduced staffing and is supporting a requirement that does not align with their own agency’s. Also, civilians receive this type of training or experience, they are usually promoted out of the office and while the training benefit is not lost to the agency, it is lost to the office. It is very difficult for the DOD to find support when the request means the non-DOD manager will have to reduce staffing, maintain the same workload, and the manager will most likely lose a top performer through promotion or transfer. From a managerial position, it is a hard sell.

GNA has taken decades of work to be where it is today. The US military has an established joint professional military education that is understood and career progression through that process is expected. In order for non-DOD agencies to support a whole-of-government approach, one would think a GNA type approach for civilian government agencies would be needed. When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established, it combined 22 agencies under one department. Today, ten plus years after the formation, DHS is still working to bring the department together as one culture. Looking across all of the USG departments using DHS’s formation as an example, it would take an incredible amount of effort and resources to develop a culture that would be willing to devote time and resources to a requirement that does not meet that agency’s primary objective.\(^\text{31}\)

In order to establish support for NSPD in non-DOD agencies, it would require an understanding across every government agency. The Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) has been working on NSPD since EO 13434 required it to be the lead; they established an NSPD office and have worked diligently to further the EO’s objectives. Emblematic of the entire conundrum of this thesis, it is ironic to note that, there is no official NSPD office at OPM. All the individuals who work, and have worked, in the NSPD office since 2007 have been taken from other offices inside OPM as borrowed staffing.\textsuperscript{32} Despite these efforts inside OPM, there is still little understanding of a whole of government approach at the second and third manager level and each of their office’s role in the National Security Strategy (NSS). Excluding a few components of other departments and agencies, most managers do not understand their role in the NSS. Most are so far detached from it, the connection cannot be made. However, the expertise of individuals needed for a whole of government approach to develop NSPs lie within that level.

There have been attempts to establish a GNA type of approach for non-DOD agencies. The most recent law is Section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2013. The 2013 NDAA Section 1107 established a “Goldwater Nichols Act Light” for federal employees - Interagency Personnel Rotations. The law states the need for the executive branch to use personnel to achieve a whole of government approach for increasing the effectiveness of government on national security issues home and abroad. It also requires a committee to be formed on National Security Personnel including: designees of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the Assistant to the President for National Security

\textsuperscript{32}Gerald Talbot, Director OPM NSPD Office, Telephone interview by author, October 23 2013.
Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security (one member to be designated by each); and such other members as the President shall designate. The committee is required to develop a Human National Security Capital Strategy to include policies, procedures, and policies for interagency personnel rotations. Sec 1107 is similar to EO 13434, but re-emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach even though it is in a defense bill and it also continues to establish authorities.

A key member is the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or more commonly known as the National Security Advisor. The National Security Advisor has no specific enumerated duties and is used in various roles throughout different presidencies. Some have had more responsibilities and advising roles than others, based on Presidential preference. What has remained true about the position is the understanding that all facets of the government are key components to national security. The National Security Advisor answers only to the President and does not require confirmation from the Senate. With the National Security Advisor in a key position to speak with all departments, understanding national security, and in direct communication with the President, it would appear that a GNA approach to non-DOD agencies would stem from conversation at National Security Staff meetings. However, with the National Security Advisor’s ever changing role from presidency to presidency to include the capabilities based on staff size, the tasking for NSPD continues to fall to each individual department.

The National Security Advisor has no authority to direct departments and agencies. For example, as previously mentioned, OPM NSPD office was created out of
other offices with no official standing staff. The DOD has MOUs with multiple non-DOD agencies so the DOD can fulfill its requirement to support its interagency mission. These MOUs are created and crafted to assist with civilians receiving training at DOD facilities and similarly for uniformed military completing fellowships with civilian agencies with little participation. Most managers in non-DOD agencies do not even know these MOUs exist and they cannot be substituted for effective legislation. The present structure of the programs lacks the ability to rely on consistent leadership and messaging. This presents those who understand the need for NSPD as it relates to the NSS with not only a difficult environment to operate in, but also a needed structure to expand in order to meet the requirements of the EO and NDAA Sec 1107.

DOD advocates are establishing relationships with other agencies actively promoting the idea of what is commonly referred to as an Interagency Leadership Exchange (ILE). These advocates are learning other agencies’ structures in efforts to find correct points of contact to begin presenting ILE. From the mining of organizational structures, a network of individuals working under little-known authorities are educating managers and their leadership that NSPD is a career enhancing development opportunity. These managers and leadership normally have difficulty understanding how NSPD will support their mission and how they will incorporate a uniformed officer into their staff through an exchange. After the exchange is complete, most managers are extremely impressed with not only the contribution the uniformed officer made, but also the education and development of their own staff. For example, OMB was impressed and

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Ibid.
lauded the work completed by their 2013 Army Fellow. Also, The Office of the Secretary of Transportation Security Division utilized a 2013 Army Fellow and established a link between the FAA and the US Army’s Command General Staff College (CGSC). This link in turn created an exchange with the US Air Force’s CGSC element’s Air Support to Homeland Security class and local FAA facilities providing insight to aviation security. This illustrates that ILE is not only developing the individual, but also the organization’s leadership.

Establishing a career path across all departments and their agencies for NSPD will continue to prove challenging. The U.S. Military has spent decades building the joint military environment and DHS is still building its culture after combining 22 agencies. GNA was established as law and funded, but the real problem with NSPD is it is not funded. With all the emphasis and effort put forth from EO 13434, PNSR, and NDAA of 2013, if a more well-crafted law is not put together and funding is not put in place, NSPD will slowly lose visibility. GNA was established from years of experiences from operations such as Vietnam, Dominican Republic, and Eagle Claw. The USG recognized the need to diffuse inter-service rivalry and build a more streamlined chain of command through the CJCS. A whole of government approach across all departments needs to be viewed identically to GNA development.

The key factor of this entire argument is that the whole of government approach has not been formalized. Specifically, there is not a formal career path or a designator for non-DOD civilian employees to develop and support interagency efforts. Not only do DOD agencies have their own training programs that are much different from each other, Doughty, Interview.
non-DOD agencies have vastly different development and training programs. The DOD has accomplished an understanding of joint PME from GNA. A component that can easily be identified as a key to its success is leadership.

With GNA giving the CJCS more power and the Secretary of Defense as the organization leader, there is little room for the DOD to deviate from its established joint environment. For non-DOD agencies there are multiple agency leads. This creates a difficult barrier for OPM to develop and establish NSPD; there are no consequences for non-compliance. With multiple training and development programs and leaders at over 475 plus federal department and agencies, according to USA.GOV August 22, 2012 listing, it proves to be a monumental task to understand each. OPMs NSPD office continues to educate and create relationships with no funding or formal agreements, but without a recognized authority the program will continue to move at its current pace.

Reviewing the interagency culture established thus far by NSPD, the leadership styles and behaviors in agencies and departments do not reinforce collaboration unless it is in their best interest. The PRTs in Iraq were in the best interest of the DOS to support, however when an agency or department was called upon that did not have a direct connection it was difficult to obtain the appropriate talent. Fortunately these requests were made in a time where support was easily visible in response to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as major incidents move into the past leadership cultures are beginning to find it difficult to collaborate.

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Shared values for NSPD are not yet instilled permanently inside non-DOD civilian agencies. Lower level managers are beginning to recall their personnel that are in support of a larger whole of government approach without understanding the impacts to the larger mission. There is a gap between non-DOD civilian leadership and many field level managers. The gap is created by the lack of a message from leadership inside those agencies that promotes U.S. government unity of purpose and effort vs individual agency performance.

The mission of most non-DOD civilian agencies does not provide the structure for its personnel to be prepared to apply their expertise overseas. This lack of expeditionary focus is mainly exposed by not having a pool of individuals to draw upon, leaving many portions of a given organization short staffed to fulfill their primary mission, which directly correlates to the fourth criteria around mandates. Finally, there is little incentive for most of the non-DOD civilian agency personnel to deploy to undesirable locations. Most opportunities are seen by peers and some leadership as an unnecessary hindrance to their organization. This unsupportive environment makes it difficult for a manager to place their top individuals in NSPD programs or the individual to want to participate for fear of limited promotion opportunities. Finally, there is no funding in place for NSPD. Agencies cannot backfill in order to even attempt to prepare their organizations to be a part of an interagency culture in the interest of national security much less continually support it. As the NSPD example demonstrates, NSPD is one of the first items a manager curtails in order to support their own agency’s interest, normally without even being aware they are curtailing this support. The inability of an agency to fulfill these criteria
creates an environment where only the most supportive of managers can participate in a whole of government approach.

   The four examples provide a cross section of the various capacities non-DOD civilian agencies have and are expected to serve in a whole of government approach. GNA demonstrates a template that is deemed successful for those non-DOD civilian agencies inside a large department. Large independent branches came together inside the DOD by law that established processes and leadership in order to exercise their role to achieve maximum capability. Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be lessons learned that experts from non-DOD civilian agencies can be called upon to support the DOD extending its ability to use all instruments of power. Inside the continental US, NORTHCOM demonstrates shared values with the integration of two large organizations, DOD and DHS, with their supporting agencies. Finally, the current NSPD process demonstrates that a lack of structure, leadership, and funding creates an environment that struggles to maintain momentum for shared values, education of mission and mandates, and above all, to date, it is not placing US government unity of purpose and effort over individual agency performance.
Table 2. Completed Criteria Comparison Chart

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<tr>
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<th>Goldwater-Nichols Act</th>
<th>Iraq/Afghanistan</th>
<th>NORTHCOM</th>
<th>National Security Professional Development</th>
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<td>Funding</td>
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Note: The six criteria against the examples provided indicated a “+” if present and a “-” if absent.

*Source:* Created by author
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

How can a whole of government approach be developed for interagency partners similar to that of the joint operational requirements stated in the Goldwater Nichols Act? Can the U.S. Government (USG) emphasize enough importance to ensure the leadership of Non-DOD agencies support a whole of government approach through interagency programs? Can Congressional leaders provide funding requirements to support agencies through “fenced” funds that in turn support non-DOD agency leadership?

Findings

Joint operational requirements similar to that of GNA cannot be developed for interagency partners, because each non-DOD department or agency is designed to perform a larger primary function making NSPD a secondary or lesser function. Establishing a joint requirement, similar to that of GNA for non-DOD civilian agency personnel, would prove not only inefficient, but extremely difficult without relief from the primary mission.

Reviewing the Iraq and Afghanistan PRT examples, one must recognize that, in order to acquire the needed expertise, the DOS had to be placed as the primary agency using DOD funds allocated for the two regions. Thus demonstrating that both leadership and funding are required to support operations of this magnitude. If an agency were to maintain a joint requirement like GNA in order to be prepared for an expeditionary mandate, it would require a dedicated and legislatively mandated funding source and a defined leadership structure. Whereas NORTHCOM exemplifies how shared values,
mission, and its mandates to create an interagency culture, smaller non-DOD agencies that maintain a small role that is only understood by a core group threatens to leave more vital civilian positions inside NORTHCOM vacant as agencies began to return to their core mandate. Without a larger mandate that is fiscally supported, new leadership is not sharing the mission and values thus the interagency culture is slowly dissolving.

Structurally, GNA established streamlined leadership for the DOD; for non-DOD civilian agencies to complete a similar structure would be inefficient. The NORTHCOM example also proves that agencies with shared values, missions, mandates, and interagency culture can work well together. Establishing a large leadership structure for the purpose of a whole of government approach in support of NSPD that is a small fraction of the departments’ or agencies’ day to day business is not fiscally responsible.

The continued current approach of agreements and MOUs to support interagency development cannot be maintained without funding that is fenced to ensure use only for the purposes intended. While some departments and agencies are experiencing growth in some areas, most are experiencing reduced funding streams due to declining budgets. If there is not dedicated fenced funding to support NSPD, it will be the first item suspended as observed through the DOT/FAA example. The structure established by GNA placed and empowered leadership through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attempting to apply the same concept across the numerous departments and agencies in the USG is not feasible due to that vast differences in core missions compared to that of the DOD.

**Recommendations**

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) recommended an Integrated National Security Professional (INSP) Board to administrate NSPD, but creating another
component of government is not the correct answer.\textsuperscript{36} It is in the best interest under our current government system, to create an approach where each agency takes ownership of NSPD through its training programs. This approach can only be accomplished through a legislative act and many will point to authorities already in place. The wording contained in each authority is not strong or detailed enough and does not require a commitment from each agency. These current authorities leave too much power in the hands of uninformed managers who do not understand the need to support NSPD because training and interagency exchanges do not align with their core mandate. In addition, most authorities point to OPM and the National Security Advisor for leadership. While OPM has attempted, and made some progress toward NSPD, the National Security Advisor position does not maintain the bandwidth to administer a program of this size. Finally, and most importantly, these authorities do not provide a fenced funding source.

To address this problem, it is recommended that legislation be introduced and passed that requires each non-DOD agency to allocate a fractional percentage of their training funds to be fenced for NSPD. Each non-DOD agency should be required to identify and annually send employees to schools that are identified by agencies as national security developing; primarily those identified by the DOD as joint military education. This process would create the opportunity for the interagency students to study alongside joint-service military student to create an acculturation process in which both the DOD and non-DOD personnel gain an understanding of the processes and cultures of their partner departments and agencies.

The legislation should be written as to have OPM administer the personnel system to maintain the program, and have OMB ensure funds are properly allocated and used for the program in accordance with the legislative act and reported upon annually. In addition, it is believed to be in the best fiscal interest of the USG not to establish any additional schools for the purpose of NSPD. DOD joint schools’ curricula are, by nature of the joint atmosphere created by GNA, interagency focused and already provide the needed education and development for a NSP. Though the DOD maintains the preponderance of educational and development assets for NSPD, it is not to infer that those non-DOD civilian agencies with already established education programs should eliminate them or stop development of their current programs in support of NSPD, as some are necessary for unique missions or provide value to interagency development. In support of expeditionary requirements, operations that require NSPs should have funds allocated as part of the overall operation and be considered early in the operational planning phase.

Non-DOD civilian agencies’ leadership should be made more aware of their role in the security of the U.S. Bi-annually, second level managers and above in non-DOD agencies should be required to review their role in NSPD through computer-managed instruction produced by OPM. A more informed leadership will understand the opportunity interagency development brings to their organizations. The professional development obtained in NSPD not only brings added talent back to an agency, but also increases the needed support to the overall National Security Strategy. It is a win-win for all agencies.
Professionally, as GNA requirements are indicated complete in a uniformed person’s record, so should legislation include that OPM establish an indicator on each non-DOD civilian’s record showing who has completed training qualifying them as an NSP and their availability. This record should only act as an indicator and not override in labor law or conditions of employment. This will allow OPM, when called upon, to identify all those available and able to serve in an NSP role.

Additional Research

Further research should be completed around the OPM NSPD office and OMB to identify potential areas of improvement and solutions to the NSPD process in efforts to better understand the leadership role each office should take. Also, additional research should be conducted to better understand the authorities of current executive orders and proposed and passed legislative acts supporting NSPD to identifying their lack of funding and leadership.

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

Similar to the early beginnings of the National Security Act and GNA, NSPD has a long way to go. With example after example of interagency success across the DOD, it was law that finally forced the services to build a structure that emphasized joint education, training, and operations. With the proper funding and growing pains, GNA provided the platform to the US Military to increase its capability. While the GNA template will not fit for non-DOD civilian agencies, it is time for legislation to be passed that calls upon each agency, regardless of how large or small their role in national
security may be, to establish and properly fund interagency development in support of the creation and training of the nation’s National Security Professional.
APPENDIX A

CONSENT FORM

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: ____________________________ or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 4508, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, ______________________, participated in an oral history interview conducted by
__________________________, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science Degree Program, on the following date [s]: ___________ concerning the following topic:
__________________________________________________________________________.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

_____ None       _____ Other: __________________________________________

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

__________________________________  ____________________________  __________
Name of Interviewee  Signature  Date

__________________________________  ____________________________  __________
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by  Date


Doughty, Ralph O., Interagency Chair, Command General Staff College. Interview by author. September 25, 2013.


Jones, David C. “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff must change.” *Armed Forces Journal International* 119, no. 7 (March 1982): 62-72.

McHugh, Pete. Telephone interview by author. February 22, 2104.


