Evidence of the decline of the traditional Westphalian nation-state, resulting from the rise of loosely monitored borders and non-governmental actors, has caused concern among Western strategic policy makers who view the preservation of national sovereignty as paramount to the preservation of global stability. Current policy in both the defense and diplomatic realms indicate that the U.S. will have a vested interest in directly supporting regional stability efforts for the foreseeable future. A critical gap in civilian regional security assistance planning and coordination currently exists between Washington D.C. and the country team. The organizational structure, which supports theater security cooperation and security capacity building, is misaligned. The civilian led inter-agency has a critical gap at the regional level that acts to cripple their operational planning to accomplish their Title 22 mission. A regional civilian Theater Security Coordinator working with each Geographic Combatant Command would provide the needed operational planning and oversight link so desperately needed.
Better Results Through Effective Regional Coordination: The Case for a Civilian Theater Security Coordinator at the GCC

by

Doug Patrick

Special Agent, U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

15 May 2014
## Contents Page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy, Funding, and Organizational Structure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Argument</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civilian Theater Coordinator Position</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurdles to Implementation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Bibliography</td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidence of the decline of the traditional Westphalian nation-state, resulting from the rise of loosely monitored borders and non-governmental actors, has caused concern among Western strategic policy makers who view the preservation of national sovereignty as paramount to the preservation of global stability. Current policy in both the defense and diplomatic realms indicate that the U.S. will have a vested interest in directly supporting regional stability efforts for the foreseeable future. A critical gap in civilian regional security assistance planning and coordination currently exists between Washington D.C. and the country team. The organizational structure, which supports theater security cooperation and security capacity building, is misaligned. The civilian led inter-agency has a critical gap at the regional level that acts to cripple their operational planning to accomplish their Title 22 mission. A regional civilian Theater Security Coordinator working with each Geographic Combatant Command would provide the needed operational planning and oversight link so desperately needed.

---


INTRODUCTION

The Maghreb and Sahel regions of Northern Africa exemplify the growing instability in under-governed regions due to disruptive and potentially powerful non-state actors such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), local criminal syndicates, and increasingly transnational criminal organizations. Such groups threaten the very existence of effective regional governance due to reduction in international tourism and business, which eliminates desperately needed income to maintain security and infrastructure. Evidence of the decline of the traditional Westphalian nation-state, resulting from the rise of loosely monitored borders and non-governmental actors, has caused an unavoidable paradigm shift among Western strategic policy makers who view the strengthening of national sovereignty as paramount to the preservation of global stability.

As the U.S. led large scale conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan recede into our nation’s collective memory, engagement of a different kind must fill the void in a world that is no less complicated or unstable than it was on September 10, 2001. Under-governed areas and increasingly permeable global boundaries cause the U.S. to have a vested interest in fostering effective government throughout the world. Echoing the 2010 National Security Directive, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reiterated “Building Security Globally” as one of three pillars of Department of Defense Strategy. Set amongst stark reminders of fiscal belt tightening, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in his introduction to the QDR,

---

“Innovation – within our own Department and in our interagency and international partnerships – is a central line of effort.” Tools must be developed to address the challenge made to the U.S. governmental security establishment by the National Security Strategy (2010), the QDR, and the U.S. Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Each reiterates the importance of theater security cooperation and security capacity building to the U.S. global security strategy of encouraging global peace, governance, and stability. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) currently conducts operational planning for theater security assistance programs at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). No corresponding regional planning capacity exists for corresponding civilian programs. An urgent need exists for a truly joint understanding of a nation’s region’s security capacity in both the civilian and military realm. A whole government view of regional security capacity building efforts is currently difficult to attain due to the simple mathematics of proximity. A regional civilian Theater Security Coordinator working with each Geographic Combatant Command would provide a civilian operational planning and oversight element at the regional level that is co-located with defense counterparts.

**POLICY, FUNDING, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

A government’s ability to provide security and effective governance to its people is vital to maintaining stability. It is widely recognized that robust security cooperation is necessary to aid in the stability of underdeveloped regions and prevent them from becoming

---


havens for transnational terror and criminal organizations. Beginning in 2006, the QDR began to focus on security cooperation as a key to establishing and maintaining regional stability. The 2010 National Security Strategy echoed that belief and stressed greater interagency security cooperation. This was further reflected in the 2010 QDR and the previously mentioned 2014 QDR. The 2010 QDDR similarly touts the benefits of increased interagency cooperation and the need for the Department of State (DOS) to become a more effective partner to DOD in providing global stability and governance support.  

Upon the launching of the 2014 QDDR, Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated the urgent need for action when he stated, “the world is witnessing this explosion of sectarianism, religious extremism, radical ideologies, and frankly too many failed states and failing states – a vast challenge to governance”. Current policy in both the defense and diplomacy realms indicate that the U.S. will have a vested interest in directly supporting regional stability efforts for the foreseeable future. Theater security cooperation efforts directed at host nations via U.S. Embassy country teams, operating under Chief of Mission authority, is the chief operational mechanism by which the U.S. can engage to foster that stability. The financial mechanisms to provide engagement and support, however, are anything but unified. 

Funding for theater security cooperation programs come primarily from funding authorities falling under U.S. Codes, Title 10 and Title 22. Title 22 covers foreign relations

---

and intercourse, and is governed by the U.S. Department of State.\textsuperscript{13} Title 10 funding concerns the Armed Services role and is primarily administered by the Department of Defense with oversight provided by the State Department. Title 22 includes funding for many types of law enforcement and civilian security capacity building in addition to financing for foreign militaries and foreign military education. Title 22 funds are generally tied to specific programs and cannot be reallocated based on needs. They are also typically country specific allocations. Title 10 funds are primarily sources for combatant commanders and, though slightly more adaptable, fifty percent of utilized funds must legally be allocated directly towards U.S. military forces.\textsuperscript{14}

Various, often temporary, initiatives have attempted to make certain types of funding more flexible to address specific needs. Section 1206, Global Train and Equip, funds were created as an emergency fund to address specific partner military counter terrorism capabilities.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1207, created the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) for a four-year period. The program is jointly administered by DOD and the Department of State; with the State Department acting as the fiduciary caretaker and program lead. GSCF seeks to provide security and stabilization funds to meet pressing partner nation needs through rule of law, security, and counter terrorism training. GSCF does not address non-emergency situations.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, looming over all training that seeks to improve host nation police capabilities, is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 660 (as amended in 1973) that prohibits U.S. involvement in

\textsuperscript{13} Lesley Anne Warner, \textit{Capacity-Building Key to Africom's Mission}, (Feb. 5, 2013), \url{http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12689/capacity-building-key-to-africoms-mission}.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.


foreign police training unless a specific waiver is granted by Congress. Such waivers have occurred for cases such as Afghanistan, but Section 660 presents a formidable barrier when addressing nations that are potentially unstable and under governed, such as many in the Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa.17

The complexity of the web of funding and associated legal complexities is systematic and unlikely to completely change due to the need for such changes to be legislated. The inherent intricacies involved often result in a parochial environment that is interagency in name only. The primary effects of such a system are felt most keenly at the local or operational level. Thus, the most workable solutions must come at the local and regional level.18

The organizational structure, which currently manages the origination and application of theater security assistance programs, can be divided into three levels. The Executive Branch policy makers, including the Department of Defense and the Department of State, represent the strategic level of planning and financial resource acquisition. Together with Congress, they play the critical role in aligning resources to strategy as expressed in the National Security Policy and supporting strategic doctrines. The regional level or operational levels are dominated by the Department of State as the foreign policy and foreign affairs lead and the Department of Defense in the role of national security and defense lead. The State Department’s regional bureaus, with personnel located primarily in Washington D.C. at State Department Headquarters in Foggy Bottom, focus on policy, program, and management

18 Ibid.
issues and are the direct link to embassies and ambassadors. The State Department has no in-theater regional presence to support embassy country teams at an operational level. Furthermore, the State Department functional bureaus such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), which typically manage security assistance programs, are not geographically aligned.

Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC’s) are the regional operational planning and execution platforms for the Department of Defense. GCC’s are ideally located in theater, with the notable exceptions of AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and CENTCOM, which are respectively located in Germany and Florida. The GCC’s act as a regional gate keeper directing operational resources and manpower to embassy country team as needed to accomplish the regional security assistance goals, which are nested within the regional and global security strategies.

At the tactical level, the first sign of true interagency cooperation arises via embassy country teams made up of the multitude of agencies present at a particular embassy. The country team at large and various working groups, act to coordinate security assistance training at the operational and/or tactical level. Within the country team, civilian representatives from various government agencies, and military representatives from the Defense Attachés Office (DAO) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) office (typically known as the Office of Defense Cooperation [ODC] or some derivative), work closely due to common interests and geographic co-location. Working groups, such as the Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG), and the EAC (Emergency Action

---

20 Ibid., 1-7.
21 Ibid., 1-7.
Committee), encourage group action to accomplish country specific operational goals as derived from national strategic directives. These often include program coordination that provides a more effective whole-government solution.22

The longstanding working relationship between DSCA and the State Departments’ Bureau of Political Military Affairs (POL/MIL) shows the potential effectiveness of a top-down interagency effort regarding security cooperation. At a strategic level, the DSCA-POL/MIL partnership has begun to effectively utilize the opportunities of GSFC flexibility to address urgent security needs. With a DOS Political Advisor (POLAD) sitting at the GCC, it is also the only consistent regional level coordination that takes place between State and DOD. This collaboration is limited however, as the partnership is traditionally focused on military materiel and platforms, and less on security capacity building.23 A greater regional view, taking into account all aspects of civilian security assistance programs from the interagency environment, is severely lacking. The result is a civilian effort that features multiple agencies operating in a regional vacuum to attain the goals of their specific organization, often willfully ignorant of parallel efforts by other agencies and the DOD.24

Interagency collaboration at the country team has proven to be an effective tool to increase the country level effectiveness of U.S. government security assistance efforts but lacks a regional perspective. Civilian strategic level efforts are effective but compartmentalized at the Washington D.C. level and no regional, operational planning level exists. Security cooperation efforts supporting theater strategy using GCC’s provide an

excellent working example of the potential to attain more effective civilian security support from a regional platform. The military is adept at working on a theater level; nesting tactical, operational and strategic goals to achieve the desired end state. The operational planning process utilized at the GCC level uses a true planning process to involve all theater/command aspects to achieve theater strategic goals.\textsuperscript{25}

The need to utilize scarce foreign security assistance funds in prudent and efficient ways is critical. Africa in general, and Kenya in particular, are glaring examples of this necessity as it applies to fragile or failing states. Due to its geographic proximity to the Horn of Africa and Somalia, Kenya has faced severe security issues in recent years with the Westgate Mall incident of September 21, 2013 acting as a stark example. The police counterterrorism response was widely regarded as lackluster despite receiving anti-terrorism funding that makes it among the top recipients of U.S. State Department anti-terror funds in the world. It’s operations costs are terminally underfunded, and it relies primarily on U.S. government funding for training and equipment.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, Kenya’s critical anti-terrorism capability to counter the corrosive regional influence of al-Shabab relies primarily on U.S. funding and training. Corruption, lack of proper resource allocation, and low police pay were blamed for the failure. Equipment and tactical training alone is not the answer. A coordinated whole government approach is needed to combat a problem that has its roots regionally. It is critical that we execute security support missions like Kenya efficiently with operational planning that takes place at a regional level to support regional stability.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} Tom Odula. \textit{Kenyan police must stop another terror attack in Nairobi on monthly budget of $735} (March 15, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/03/15/kenyan-police-must-stop-terror-hits-on-tiny-budget.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
 MAIN ARGUMENT

A critical gap in civilian regional security assistance planning and coordination currently exists between Washington D.C. and the country team. The organizational structure that supports theater security cooperation and security capacity building is misaligned. The civilian led interagency has a critical gap at the regional level that acts to cripple their operational planning to accomplish their Title 22 mission. In order to undertake their Title 10 responsibilities, the DOD views the world from a theater-centric perspective with the regional GCC acting as the critical operational piece uniting the D.C. strategic with the tactical/execution teams at the Embassy/country level.28 A regional civilian Theater Security Coordinator working with each Geographic Combatant Command would provide the needed operational planning and oversight link so desperately needed.

A civilian Theater Security Coordinator (TSC) at the GCC could provide a variety of services currently missing under the existing structure. Oversight of regional efforts and maintaining program records that cut across all boundaries would be essential in areas of cultural and political overlap such as the Maghreb and Sahel. A diplomatic presence in fostering regional partnerships and training through the region would be helpful to all U.S. security assistance providers in a region.29 A regionally focused Theater Security Coordinator would facilitate the education of the interagency on historical programs, issues, and perceptions affecting not only the individual country, but also the region. Such regional accountability and communication at the operational planning level could have the effect of uniting the various interagency tribes and breaking the split loyalties that are endemic in an

interagency environment. The regional coordinator would act as a conduit to the strategic level interagency in Washington giving a clear-eyed, yet local, view of the situation on the ground, while giving ambassadors and country teams a valuable advocacy tool. Better communication between the policy makers and the implementers of that policy will encourage better resource utilization and prompt identification of critical needs. Thus, resources can be applied to the need in a more timely and effective manner.\textsuperscript{30}

A primary mission of a robust civilian theater security coordination presence at the regional level would be to promote efficiency and work with country teams to prevent duplication of effort. The need to eliminate training redundancy, and unintentional waste, fraud, and abuse is critical in the current environment of fiscal constraint. Furthermore, an additional communication link to the country team promoting the civilian aspects of security capacity building would give the Combatant Commander at the GCC an invaluable perspective supplementing the defense attachés and defense cooperation attachés already on the country teams.\textsuperscript{31}

Standard rotations are a constant strain on program continuity. Without a permanent civilian security coordination presence at the GCC, who is required to maintain continuity and oversight of interagency coordination as a way to proven effectiveness, valuable lessons can be lost. This was the case in Ukraine when a successful security cooperation-working group at EUCOM established an extremely effective operational planning and strategic execution relationship with Embassy Ukraine. When normal personnel rotation took place, however, the valuable lessons were lost as they were based on relationships and not a

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 3-14.
formalized and monitored coordination structure. An established civilian Theater Security Coordinator could prevent such institutional memory loss through mandated record keeping of the interagency process regarding security cooperation.

Threats to regional governance and stability come about for a multitude of reasons and derive from both stable and unstable countries alike. Familiarity with host government personnel and institutions that derive from effective cooperation helps in all cases. DOD and civilian interagency capabilities must be weighed with regional realities and the need to regionally coordinate with various country team programs. In other words, no potential tools in providing security assistance can be discounted. All tools such as a civilian Regional Security Coordinator should be attempted in the effort to optimize civilian-military cooperation.

Coordination between the civilian and military tools of government is not new. The Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) initiative in Vietnam proved to be successful due to its integration of accountability, multiple level planning cooperation, and joint decision-making. Unfortunately, those lessons were victims of an unpopular war and lost until recently. The benefits of permanently re-learning these difficult lessons are critical as U.S. government security cooperation programs enter new fiscal territory as budgets draw down following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the end, the purpose of theater security cooperation is to prevent small problems from turning into large and costly ones. A civilian Security Cooperation Coordinator would aid in this process

32 Ibid., 11-12.
by providing much need regional perspective concerning security assistance progress and shortcomings. Barring the creation of regionally located diplomatic coordination centers; the GCC provides the best venue for such a position.\(^{36}\)

**THE CIVILIAN THEATER SECURITY COORDINATOR POSITION**

Using the example of AFRICOM, the Civilian Theater Security Coordinator (TSC) position would reside in the Special Staff area of the GCC command structure. There, the TSC would be in the position to be independent from, but work closely with, the civilian Foreign Policy Advisor. The TSC would work closely with each of the directorates as needed but particularly with the J-5, J-7, and J-9.\(^ {37}\) Also, in addition to the country teams within the region, the TSC would correspond directly with Department of State functional and regional bureaus as needed. Finally, the TSC could act in an organizing and planning role in communicating the regional strategy to various agencies outside of DOS and DOD who maintain a presence in the region. This would be done to assist the country teams in building unity and preventing agency colloquialism from causing problems.\(^ {38}\)

The TSC staff structure would be lead by the coordinator, who would preferably be of Minister Counselor (MC) or Counselor (OC) rank (equivalent to the military rank of 0-7 and 0-8, respectively). The rank should roughly be on par with the POLAD to ensure parity and proper access. A robust interagency staff consisting of military liaison officers and Foreign Service personnel from appropriate bureaus would assist the coordinator. Staff members from other agencies may also be selected depending on the


country team structure of the region. The staff would be structured to be able to work seamlessly across tribal and interagency boundaries.  

The role of the civilian TSC staff will vary based on regional needs. In developed regions, the TSC will focus on cooperation, relationship building, and support. The TSC will play a secondary role as regional emergency action planning intermediary to the GCC, and regional information resource for country teams. The TSC can additionally retain all security cooperation and regional emergency action records and procedures while acting as an advisor and resource for regional issues. In underdeveloped areas prone to instability, the TSC could execute a more robust training synchronization role in addition to providing the same services to the country team that would be offered in more stable regions. The TSC staff would focus on a nation’s actual ability to respond to an incident and less on equipment and military sales, which is already adequately coordinated through the established DSCA-POL/MIL relationship. The TSC will primarily monitor the effectiveness of Theater Security Cooperation programs designed to increase a country’s security capacity.

HURDLES TO IMPLEMENTATION

Adding one relatively small staff to an already robust GCC headquarters appears on the surface to be a small initiative. There are, however, many procedural, legal, fiscal, and cultural barriers that would need to be bested to allow for the successful implementation of the civilian TSC.

Though a regional presence like a TSC would greatly assist in navigating the existing patchwork of legislative authorities that enormously complicate theater security cooperation

---

41 Ibid., 57.
at the country team level, reform would greatly help. The primary problem is the
ambassador’s inability to shift security assistance funds to address pressing needs. A
permanent method of pooling funds among the interagency would help. Increasing funding
flexibility to empower the ambassador to utilize funding as they (and their country team
advisors) see fit, would be an obvious answer. The ambassador should have be the final
authorization on how to apply U.S. resources to the greatest affect.42

As discussed previously, the GSCF shows great potential as a model mechanism that
provides some level of flexibility. It focuses on the security assistance need and not the
agency that performs the function. For instance, it offers support for the services that execute
specific functions such as maritime security, narcotics deterrence, border control, and counter
terrorism but does not specify the type of service that can be used. This gives great
flexibility to DOD and DOS planners at the strategic level. A similar tool should be granted
to the ambassador and country team to address urgent and non-crisis situations.43

Though the GSFC could potentially provide a template for future legislative attempts
to provide legal and fiscal flexibility to diplomatic and military actors, it does not address the
prohibition on police training that is presented by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Section 660 should be amended to allow country teams to promptly address growing crisis in
failing states. The current waiver process presents an unnecessary barrier to providing
security assistance to failing states and accomplishing the goals outlined in the National
Security Strategy.44

42 Terrence K. Kelley, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, and Charlotte
Lynch, Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success, (Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation 2010), 3-22.
43 Nina M. Serafina, Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview, (Congressional
44 Thomas K. Livingstone, “Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security
From an organizational cultural perspective, certain tribes within the State Department could reject the idea of a TSC. They could argue that the country team is an effective method for coordination and training synchronization and they can rely on the respective agency headquarters to relay important information to the pertinent Geographic Combatant Command. Though DSCA does coordinate effectively with POL/MIL at a strategic level in Washington D.C., no civilian theater security coordination takes place at the regional level at all. In a time before the GCC, a lack of regional coordination may have been acceptable, but the current global security environment requires greater coordination to meet the goals of the National Security Strategy.\footnote{Office of the President of the U.S., \textit{National Security Strategy} (May 2010), \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf}.}

Finally, the criticality of the lack of geographic regional realignment must be addressed. Currently, the State Department and the Department of Defense maintain differing global geographic alignments, which affect their force structure, geo-strategic doctrine, and fiscal distributions. This must be corrected by interagency collaboration in order for the TSC or any truly interagency collaboration to occur. Due to the growth of GCC’s, this issue is quite serious and will likely require political intervention for resolution.\footnote{U.S. Government Accountability Office, \textit{GAO-11-776R, Interagency Collaboration: Implications of a Common Alignment of World Regions Among Select Federal Agencies}, \textit{(July 11, 2011)}, \url{http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97629.html}.}

CONCLUSIONS

In a time of fiscal restraint, more efficient methods must be created in order to achieve the expected results. Though a greater regional, in theater, State Department presence such as a Regional Diplomatic Center is eventually required; a Civilian Theater Security Coordinator at the GCC would be a relatively quick and legislation-free method to
increase communication and training effectiveness in a short time. The use of the GCC platform for DOS regional programs is the most cost effective way to move forward and bring greater alignment to U.S. foreign policy implementation.\textsuperscript{47}

A whole-of-government approach with alignment at all three levels (national [D.C.], regional, and local) of organization is critical. Though legal, financial, doctrinal, and cultural issues need to be overcome to make security capacity building more efficient and productive, the end goal of greater global stability is worth it. All policy instruments from Congress to the Executive branch have stated the same need. The issue is how to get there. A civilian Theater Security Coordinator would help to finesse the regional changes needed and manage the results. A civilian TSC would provide direct synchronization support for legal, financial, global regional alignment, and program issues between the country team, GCC, and Washington D.C.\textsuperscript{48}

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

A civilian regional view of policy and security assistance is missing, consequently allowing and often forcing, DOD to respond in its absence. This gap is destabilizing and confusing to both the trainers and trainees. To some in the global community, the military appears to dominate the foreign policy execution of the United States. We tend to send the wrong, though well-intentioned, message that despite our stated beliefs in a civilian-led government we really expect the DOD to lead foreign policy issues. If this is the case, problems such as Mali, where the U.S. trained future coup backers, may be the tip of the iceberg. It appears that foreign policy execution may need to be realigned. Though the establishment of a civilian Regional Security Coordinator would just be one piece to a much


\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., 7-9.
larger, State Department led, re-engagement at the regional level to align with the GCC, it would be one that would have an immediately positive outcome. The most robust solution would eventually involve the creation of the previously mentioned U.S. regional diplomatic centers that would co-locate with the GCC. Given that this would involve a major change in the status quo, as well as a massive amount of congressional support and funding, it is unlikely in the near term. As a result, “innovation” as Secretary Hagel stated, must provide the answer. A civilian Theater Security Coordinator at the GCC would be one small, but valuable portion of that answer.  

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


