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**THESIS**

**TOWARD A BETTER UNION: IMPROVING THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN POLICIES**

by

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June 2014

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**TOWARD A BETTER UNION: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
FOREIGN POLICIES**

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## **ABSTRACT**

A fundamental characteristic of state-state interaction in a globalized system is the explicitness with which states communicate their foreign policies to each other.

In order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy explicitness in the global foreign policy system, I first created a simple mesh model of the actors and institutions that form the U.S. foreign policy system. By optimizing this model with various systems engineering concepts, I discovered that foreign policy explicitness plays an important role in improving the effectiveness of the foreign policy system as a whole. I then applied this result to an analysis of U.S.-China foreign policy relations since 1949 in order to determine how foreign policy explicitness has affected real-world state-state relations. By following the development of U.S.-China relations, I found that increases in foreign policy explicitness have been the precursor to many of the most important bilaterally beneficial developments in the U.S.-China relationship. Finally, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. I discovered that the U.S. is actively undertaking many initiatives that are increasing U.S. foreign policy explicitness; however, more can be done to focus this process.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| ADIZ  | air defense identification zone                  |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations           |
| CBM   | confidence-building measures                     |
| CCP   | Chinese communist party                          |
| CRS   | congressional research service                   |
| CTBT  | comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty            |
| DOD   | Department of Defense                            |
| DOS   | Department of State                              |
| ECS   | East China Sea                                   |
| EMMI  | energy, matter, material wealth, and information |
| EPIC  | electronic policy improvement capability         |
| FAA   | federal aviation administration                  |
| FAO   | foreign area officer                             |
| FDR   | Franklin Delano Roosevelt                        |
| FPS   | foreign policy system                            |
| FSO   | foreign service officer                          |
| FYP   | fiscal year plan                                 |
| GAO   | Government Accountability Office                 |
| GATT  | general agreement on tariffs and trade           |
| GDP   | gross domestic product                           |
| GPA   | government procurement agreement                 |
| IPR   | intellectual property rights                     |
| IR    | international relations                          |
| JCCT  | Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade           |
| KMT   | Kuomintang                                       |
| MFA   | Ministry of foreign Affairs                      |
| MFN   | most-favored nation                              |
| MOE   | measure of effectiveness                         |

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| NPS    | Naval Postgraduate School                                |
| NSC    | national security council                                |
| OMB    | office of the management and budget                      |
| PACOM  | United States Pacific Command                            |
| PD-MAP | public diplomacy model for the assessment of performance |
| PDF    | portable document format                                 |
| PLA    | People's Liberation Army                                 |
| POLAD  | political adviser  |
| PRC    | People's Republic of China                               |
| QDR    | Quadrennial Defense Review                               |
| S&ED   | strategic and economic dialogue                          |
| TPP    | Trans-Pacific Partnership                                |
| TRA    | Taiwan Relations Act                                     |
| U.N.   | United Nations   |
| UNCLOS | United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea          |
| URL    | uniform resource locator                                 |
| USAID  | United States Agency for International Development       |
| USG    | United States government                                 |
| UTA    | University of Texas at Austin                            |
| WTO    | World Trade Organization                                 |
| WWI    | World War I  |
| WWII   | World War II   |

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A fundamental characteristic of state-state interaction in a globalized system is the explicitness with which states communicate their foreign policies to each other; however, it remains unclear how explicitly states should communicate their foreign policy intent, or what means of communication they should use. Each foreign policy communication method within the full array of options a state has falls along a spectrum of foreign policy explicitness that ranges from low explicitness to high explicitness.

On the low end of the spectrum, a state's precise foreign policy objectives are difficult for foreign entities to discern. For example, military force deployments without any accompanying explanation, while certainly a strong show of resolve, do not clearly communicate precise foreign policy intent. On the higher end of the spectrum, a state's foreign policy objectives are clearly communicated, and foreign entities can respond more explicitly in return. For example, the deployment of military force is much higher on the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness when it is preceded by explicit public statements of foreign policy intent, concurrence on the validity of the foreign policy by a united multi-national coalition, and broad domestic support. While this is an ideal case, it is clearly not always a viable option for states participating in the complexities of the global environment. In return for such a high level of explicitness, a more precise determination of the cause and effect relationship between foreign policy communication and foreign entity response can be drawn. Understood in this sense as a feedback loop, there should theoretically exist some way to maximize foreign policy explicitness, and thereby also help states maximize the effectiveness of their foreign policies. In this thesis, I explored the concept of foreign policy explicitness in a few different ways.

First, in order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy explicitness in the global foreign policy system, I created a simple mesh model of the actors and institutions that comprise the United States (U.S.) foreign policy system. The field of systems engineering provided an inspirational, fresh perspective in this regard. From a systems perspective, foreign policies can be modeled as discrete systemic units, which can then be further broken down into their elements in order to understand the

procedural realities of the foreign policy system. By analyzing the lifecycle of a single foreign policy, it becomes easier to see the role that explicitness plays in making a single foreign policy maximally effective and fit for purpose. A brief example of the foreign policy lifecycle flow helps to visualize the foreign policy system. In both democratic and meritocratic political systems, as domestic support for a particular foreign policy increases to some threshold level of legitimacy, a state begins the process of communicating that foreign policy to external entities. This foreign policy communication takes some form, and in aggregate can be positioned somewhere along the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness. In receipt of such foreign policy communication, foreign entities then respond in whatever way they deem appropriate, thereby providing foreign policy feedback into the original state's domestic environment. As a complete system, these and other intermediate steps form a foreign policy feedback loop that is continuously operating. By optimizing my foreign policy system mesh model through a supply chain analysis using various systems engineering concepts like currency, modularity, and uniqueness, I discovered that increasing foreign policy explicitness also increases foreign policy effectiveness. Yet, while this is certainly an interesting theoretical idea, does it match with reality? I explore the answer to this question through an analysis of U.S.-China relations.

As a second approach at understanding the importance of explicitness in the foreign policy system, and building upon the results of my foreign policy systems model optimization, I conducted an analysis of U.S.-China foreign policy relations since 1949 in order to understand the role that foreign policy explicitness has played in real-world state-state relations. By following the development of U.S.-China relations, I discovered that increases in foreign policy explicitness have been the precursor to many of the most important bilaterally beneficial developments in the U.S.-China relationship. Both the United States and China communicate foreign policies across the full spectrum of foreign policy explicitness, but I argue that it was only upon a foundation of increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness that each successive step in the improvement of U.S.-China relations was made possible. Looking at how the post-Korean War diplomatic stalemate between the U.S. and China in 1970 thawed into secret diplomatic talks, and talks turned

into official Communiques, and bilateral agreements grew into complex multi-national trade frameworks, it is evident that there is a correlation between the explicitness of foreign policy communication and new levels of foreign policy system stability, effectiveness, and mutual benefit. To restate, my analysis indicates that increasingly explicit foreign policy communication can be positively correlated with increasing levels of mutually beneficial positive feedback, which in turn forms a foundation for future mutually beneficial iterations of the foreign policy systemic feedback loop. These results have intriguing implications. For example, the results imply that before improvements in the foreign relations of countries can occur, some party in the foreign policy system must increase explicitness first. Accordingly, an important question is whether the United States is moving to increase or decrease the explicitness of its foreign policies. I explored the answer to this question by looking at a few recent developments in the U.S. foreign policy system.

For my third and final look at the importance of explicitness in the foreign policy system, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. Accordingly, I conducted a brief analysis of the U.S. Department of Defense's Foreign Area Officer program, the Department of State's Foreign Service Officer program, the concept of Three Diplomatic Tracks, and the current state of the art of foreign policy metrics. In so doing, I discovered that the U.S. is actively undertaking many initiatives that are increasing U.S. foreign policy explicitness; however, more can be done to focus and optimize this process within the United States, and more should be done to encourage other states to follow suit. In my concluding section, I provide a few concrete recommendations for how the United States can proceed in augmenting its foreign policy system to make it more effective.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND BACKGROUND

Does increasing the explicitness<sup>1</sup> of foreign policies also increase their effectiveness?

States communicate their foreign policy objectives to other states in a variety of ways. For example, a state can signal its intent to attack another state in many ways: amassing military forces on its borders, passing domestic legislation that leads to a war resolution, or sending an explicit written statement of hostile intent through its foreign emissaries. Similarly, a state can signal an intent to cooperate in a variety of ways as well: reducing provocative military maneuvers, drafting domestic legislation that removes barriers to trade, or signing bilateral executive agreements. The difference between each of these methods of communication can be found in the explicitness with which they communicate intent. On the low end of the *foreign policy explicitness spectrum*, military movements without an accompanying explicit diplomatic explanation can lead to miscalculation and a corresponding decrease in state-to-state trust.<sup>2</sup> On the higher end of the explicitness spectrum, a state's intent is made perfectly clear in black and white, with a corresponding increase in state-to-state trust. Going one step further, notwithstanding the possibility of defection that is more likely in single iteration interactions between states, increasing the amount of trust between two states through multiple confidence-building measures (CBM) increases the stability of their relationship

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<sup>1</sup> The usage here of the word "explicit" is semantically closer to the meaning of "quantized," as opposed to "verbalized." In such a very narrow sense of the word, when foreign policies are made "explicit" through "quantization," they are codified in a written form that explicates the qualities and characteristics of specific foreign policies in a discrete, line-item by line-item manner, leaving little to no room for confusion about a given country's stated foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis a particular issue.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this thesis, I make reference to "Trust" in one of two ways, but it is my opinion that both uses are fundamentally the same. In one sense, Trust means "predictability" in that some amount of trust is a necessary prerequisite to complex, mutually beneficial interaction, and an increase in state-to-state trust raises the foundation for increasingly complex and mutually beneficial relations between states. Trust (T) is also used to indicate "legitimacy." For example, when citizens in representative governments vote on their leaders or decide not to overthrow their governments, they are providing legitimacy into the policy systems of their governments in the form of trust. In the latter part of this thesis, I use T as a variable to describe the flow of trust/legitimacy through the foreign policy system.

and likelihood of mutually beneficial relations.<sup>3</sup> Altogether, I argue that increasing the explicitness of foreign policies leads to increasing stability and profitability in the international system. I analyzed the role of foreign policy explicitness in international relations from a few perspectives.

First, in order to understand the role and the importance of foreign policy explicitness in the global foreign policy system, I created a simple mesh model of the actors and institutions that form the U.S. foreign policy system and optimized the model with a supply chain analysis. My supply chain analysis uses Trust (T) as a currency of analysis,<sup>4</sup> and uses the systems engineering concepts of currency, modularity, and uniqueness to treat a single foreign policy as a discrete, meshed system of interacting elements.<sup>5</sup> The results of my supply chain analysis show that inefficiencies and breakdowns in foreign policy communications between nodes in the foreign policy system degrade the system as a whole, and efforts at increasing foreign policy explicitness and thereby maximize T have the potential to improve the effectiveness of the system as a whole. Yet, while this is certainly an interesting theoretical idea, does it match with reality? I explore the answer to this question through an analysis of U.S.-China relations.

As a second approach at understanding the importance of explicitness in real-world state-state relations, and building upon the results of the optimization of my foreign policy systems model, I conducted an analysis of U.S.-China foreign relations since 1949. Compared to the pre-rapprochement years before Nixon visited China in 1972, relations between the United States and China have greatly improved in many subjective measures

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<sup>3</sup> Bruce Russett, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 100. Institutional constraints make it hard to go to war, and especially hard to plan surprise attacks.

<sup>4</sup> Whereas trust can be used as a subjective measurement of the stability of a relationship like that of the U.S. and China, Trust as a variable T can also be used as an objective measurement of the same relationship from a systemic, quantitative perspective.

<sup>5</sup> Gary Langford, *Toward A General Theory of Systems Integration: Research in the Context of Systems Engineering* (South Australia, AU: University of South Australia, 2012), 147–148. Similar to how the entirety of a state's foreign policy can be broken down into explicit and discrete objects that apply only to particular countries, systems engineering literature advises engineers to quantize complex systems into fundamental, modular systemic units and explicitly define the relationships between them.

like effectiveness and stability, and also improved in many objective measures like interdependence and productivity. Before rapprochement, U.S.-China relations were largely based on tacit understandings of each other's policies and indirect reporting of capabilities and intent.<sup>6</sup> There were few official avenues through which the U.S. and China could make explicit expressions of foreign policy to each other, leading to correspondingly low levels of state-state trust. Since rapprochement, the number of signed bilateral and multilateral policy agreements between the U.S. and China—through both direct diplomatic efforts and multilateral institutions—has increased in tandem with the mutual profitability and levels of trust in the relationship. This relationship between foreign policy explicitness and mutual profitability is either correlative or coincidental. While I do not rule out the possibility of other co-traveling variables, it is likely that a correlation exists, and that further increases in the explicitness of U.S. and Chinese foreign policies toward each other will lead to further improvements in U.S.-China relations. Indeed, the process of further increasing explicitness within the U.S.-China foreign policy system is already underway, and the results are apparent in a few key developments within the U.S. foreign policy system.

For my third and final look at the importance of explicitness in the foreign policy system, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness. Efforts at increasing explicitness within the U.S. foreign policy system can be found in many places: the expansion of U.S.-China foreign policy communication from a single track in 1972 to the three separate tracks of diplomacy that are now used,<sup>7</sup> the recent revitalization of the U.S. Navy's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, and the increasing role that digitization has played in forcing institutions to explicitly define the semantic relationships between their policies, actions, and results. I show that each of these and other examples, in one way or another, increases the explicitness of the foreign policies that flow in a cyclical manner through

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<sup>6</sup> William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War—A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 106.

<sup>7</sup> Diana Chigas, "Track Two (Citizen) Diplomacy, Beyond Intractability," last accessed Dec. 3, 2013, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy>.

the United States' relationships with foreign countries, and thereby improves those relationships overall.

In my concluding section, I provide a few concrete recommendations for how the United States can proceed in augmenting its foreign policy system to make it more effective.

## **B. SCOPE**

To scope this investigation, it is necessary to identify the range of possible cause and effect relationships vis-à-vis increases and decreases in foreign policy explicitness. It is important to clarify, however, that for the purposes of this thesis a mutually beneficial “improvement” in a state-state relationship is necessarily dependent upon the positive-sum satisfaction of the national interests of the two states in the relationship pair, rather than simply the unilateral satisfaction of a single party's national interests. Scoped as such, the following are four possible cause-effect relationships between foreign policy explicitness and foreign relations between two states:

1. An increase of explicitness improves relations
2. A decrease of explicitness worsens relations
3. An increase of explicitness worsens relations
4. A decrease of explicitness improves relations

Many real-world examples of each of these situations readily come to mind in which one side or the other in state-state relations unilaterally benefitted from a change in foreign policy explicitness; however, this thesis focuses on cause-effect relationships in which both parties benefit. My entering argument is that only possibility #1 has proven to most consistently lead to mutually beneficial results, and possibility #2 has typically led to worse relations. Therefore, while it is not my intent to invalidate through omission the potential value in exploring possibilities #3 and #4, I focus on possibilities #1 and #2.

Finally, there are clearly many coherent, well-trod counterarguments to my assertions above. Much of realist IR theory is unsupportive of the stabilizing role of trust and iterated interactions in the international system, and there is no doubt that secrecy plays an important and well-documented role in the conduct of diplomacy. Additionally,

there are legitimate concerns that making foreign policy too explicit can constrain a state or political party's freedom to urgently act contrary to its stated policies if the need were to arise. I will address these and other concerns in the body of my thesis. It should be noted, though, that inherent in the underlying assumptions in this study are the liberal and constructivist beliefs that conflict can be avoided if it is proven to be in the best interests of both parties;<sup>8</sup> the more explicit, quantized, frequent, and productive ideational policy interactions are between two states like the U.S. and China, the more likely it is that states can find common purpose for cooperation and conflict avoidance.<sup>9</sup> While still being mindful of the *realpolitik* forces at work in the world, within reasonable bounds and taken in aggregate, in my opinion the act of codifying, updating, and making public and transparent the entire body of a state's foreign policy is inherently stabilizing in the world of foreign relations, and is in keeping with the principles upon which both the United States' and China's representative governance systems are founded.

### C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

The first fundamental problem I address (Chapter II) is whether the U.S. foreign policy system can be modeled using systems engineering principles, and whether such a model can provide insight into the role that foreign policy explicitness plays in the foreign policy system. In approaching this problem, it is necessary to examine by what means foreign policy is crafted and communicated, and in what forms foreign policies are received by each counter-party; because of the complexity of the modern U.S. foreign policy system, this was not an easy task. The post-2000 foreign policy and diplomacy literature attests to this complexity.<sup>10</sup> That being said, I hypothesize that by codifying and

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<sup>8</sup> Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy* no. 145 (November/December 2004), 30, 60; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 42.

<sup>9</sup> On how ideas reduce uncertainty, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security* 53, no. 3 (Winter) (2000), 10.

<sup>10</sup> For example, see Barry Fulton and Richard Burt and Olin Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1998). Also see Charles Wolf and Brian Rosen, *Public Diplomacy: How to Think about and Improve it* (Washington, DC: RAND, 2004), and see Wilson Dizard, *Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

making explicit individual foreign policies and putting them at the center of their respective foreign policy systems,<sup>11</sup> states can dramatically improve the efficiency with which Trust (T) flows through the overall foreign policy system in an international relationship, and thereby also improve the effectiveness of their foreign policies.<sup>12</sup>

The second fundamental problem I address (Chapter III) is whether the presence of explicit expressions of foreign policy has had a positive effect on U.S.-China foreign relations. The rise of China and the appearance of a relative decline in the power of the United States has led some IR theorists to assume that, per historical precedent, conflict between the two states is inevitable;<sup>13</sup> however, diplomatic activity between the two states since U.S.-China rapprochement has tended to be conflict-averse, suggesting that such a conflict has not been in the national interest of either state up to this point.<sup>14</sup> Future Chinese intentions notwithstanding, foreign relations between the U.S. and China have matured effectively over the years to reflect a seemingly implicit desire for non-violent cooperation. Have explicit foreign policy statements contributed to this stability? I hypothesize that from the ashes of a near complete lack of diplomatic communication, the U.S. and China have systematically grown a web of explicit foreign policy declarations that has led to the higher levels of stability and predictability that both countries enjoy in U.S.-China relations today.

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<sup>11</sup> See Lynn Sandra Kahn, *Twenty-First Century Governance: Ten Strategies for Success* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Simons Center, 2013), 1, for an excellent explanation of how a systems model of governance in which national goals are the framework around which groups cluster to solve problems, and the role that metrics play as the feedback mechanism. Also see Robert Litan and Andrew Wyckoff and Kaye Husbands Fealing, *Capturing Change in Science, Technology, and Innovation: Improving Indicators to Inform Policy* (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 2013), xiii, for how metrics and indicators provide a framework through which decision-makers can make informed decisions.

<sup>12</sup> See Thomas Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command From World War II to Today* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 457, for how Iraqis and Afghans play the U.S. system of rotating generals on 1-year deployments by slow rolling them and waiting for change, and how one reason why this is possible is because there is no consistent policy or strategy framework from which military leaders can operate, leading them “reinvent the wheel” on every tour.

<sup>13</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 29.

<sup>14</sup> Adam Lowther et. al., “Chinese-US Relations: Moving Toward Greater Cooperation or Conflict?” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (Winter) (2013), 25.

The third and final fundamental problem I address (Chapter IV), is whether developments in the U.S. foreign policy system reflect a trend away from or toward increasing the explicitness U.S. foreign policies. I hypothesize that the increased use of the Three Diplomatic Tracks, the revival of the Navy's Foreign Area Officer community, and the digital consolidation of foreign policy metrics are indicative of a trend toward increasing the explicitness of U.S. foreign policies, and assert that this trend should continue in other areas as well.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

The creation of a mesh model of foreign policy systems involved a review of systems engineering and supply management literatures, as well as consultation with a leading systems engineering scholar.

Building on this work, through an in-depth literature review<sup>15</sup> focused on discovering examples of either the positive or negative influence of explicitness in foreign policies, I examined key inflection points in the relationship between the U.S. and China to determine if the explicitness of foreign policy messaging was a causal factor in the evolution of U.S.-China relations.

Finally, I sought out literature describing recent advances in the U.S. foreign policy system that appeared germane to the stance that the U.S. takes vis-à-vis the explicitness of its foreign policies.

For my research, I focused primarily on existing literature sources. I did not do any fieldwork, interviews, or human subject research outside of discussions with my thesis advisors.

#### **E. IMPORTANCE**

Senator Arthur Vandenberg once said, “In the face of any foreign policy problem, our unity is as important as our atom bombs. . . . This is our best available insurance for

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<sup>15</sup> See Jeffrey Knopf, *Doing a Literature Review* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006) for an excellent resource on how to conduct a literature review.

peace.”<sup>16</sup> The unity of the relationship between the U.S. and China has never been more important to the stability of the international system. While by almost any measure it is clear that this relationship has improved since the 1970s, an analysis of the foreign policy systemic factors that led to this improvement can potentially inform future efforts at further deepening the productivity of ties between the U.S. and China.

In 2013, the senior FAO in the Navy’s FAO community, RADM Douglas Venlet, expressed a need for the fledgling FAO community to define its purpose<sup>17</sup> and improve its effectiveness. Measurements of effectiveness (MOE), as they apply to the FAO community, are still inadequately defined. Since 2006, the U.S. Navy has realized the importance of FAOs at the strategic level of foreign policy execution and correspondingly revitalized the community;<sup>18</sup> however, the FAO communities of all U.S. military forces still struggle to clearly define their importance and why they are in increasingly high demand. An improved vision of where FAOs fit into the broader context of the foreign policy systemic picture, specifically vis-à-vis relationships with countries like China, may help to provide some clarity to the FAO community as it moves forward.

Additionally, my interest in this topic was also motivated by a perceived disconnect between how the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) approach the execution of foreign policies.<sup>19</sup> A harmonized approach to whole-of-government engagement activities like the relationship between the U.S. and China, if informed by common U.S. national foreign policies and using agreed-upon strategies, operations, and tactics, may help the DOS and DOD act more like the two

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<sup>16</sup> Cecil Crabb, Glenn Antizzo and Leila Sarieedine, *Congress and the Foreign Policy Process: Modes of Legislative Behavior* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 81.

<sup>17</sup> Also see Robert Rubel, *National Policy and the Post-Systemic Navy* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Review, 2013), 11 for a call to military organizations to clearly define their strategic purpose in order to deserve the resources of society.

<sup>18</sup> Amy Alrich and Joseph Adams and Claudio Biltoc, *The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2013), v.

<sup>19</sup> Francisco Wong-Diaz, *Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013), 65.

inseparable members of the single nation that they are.<sup>20</sup> While this thesis is by no means exhaustive, it will have succeeded if it incites discussion or action toward a more holistic, systemic approach to how governments think about foreign policy.

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<sup>20</sup> Hillary Clinton, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010), 6.

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## II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLICITNESS

*I know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.*

—Thomas Jefferson  
in a letter to William Charles Jarvis

In contrast to the traditional *qualitative* perspective that many people have toward foreign policies, a systems engineering perspective on foreign policy analysis is naturally focused on the *quantitative* aspects of the creation, execution, and evaluation processes that are integral to a properly functioning foreign policy system.

As an example of this difference in perspectives, consider the development of the printing press and the spread of the printed word. From a qualitative perspective, books became a medium for the exchange of ideas. From the systemic perspective, Benedict Anderson holds that the advent of the printing press in Europe unified the minds of citizens under common national identities through the creation of “unified fields of exchange” that increased what he called “fixity.”<sup>21</sup> In other words, books became modular, fixed nodes around which debates about the concept of nationality could occur. Systemically, books increased the explicitness of ideas, made them more prevalent, and longer-lasting.

Further improvements in technology, like the invention of the computer and network server, have produced similar systemic effects; however, the power of mass inclusion brings with it a new difficulty: finding consensus in an increasingly chaotic, inclusive environment. Perhaps more than ever, participants in networks and nations around the globe expect to have a say in how they are governed. Rather than rely

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<sup>21</sup> Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Identity in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26.

completely on blind faith that leaders always adequately represent the will of their citizens, laws are institutionalized to establish systemic predictability. Rather than allow themselves to be ruled by fiat, citizens now demand that leaders abide by contractual agreements in the form of explicit laws, rules, and norms.<sup>22</sup> Within this context, from a *qualitative* perspective, governance by representation requires trust on the part of the governed. In order to represent trust as a *quantitative* variable in a systems engineering analysis of the processes that drive the foreign policy systems of a representative government, I introduce a new variable called Trust (T).<sup>23</sup> Just as increasing levels of citizen-to-government trust have formed the foundation of modern developed countries, increasing the value of T within the foreign policy system increases both the effectiveness of the government that represents its citizens and the foreign policies that the government is trusted to execute.

#### **A. FOREIGN POLICIES: WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY LIVE, AND HOW THEY WORK**

Foreign policies are complex systems of multiple interacting elements, and exist as a subset of the entire range of policies that represent a state's national interest. With the understanding that policies are representative of the will of the governed, it is reasonable to ask what exactly determines whether a state's foreign policies can be considered effective. There are two parts to this first question. The first has to do with identifying

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<sup>22</sup> The method by which the interests of the governed are represented in government varies by country, but institutionalization of rules-based governance unites all developed countries to varying degrees. For example, thus far, Americans tend to prefer multi-party democracy, and the Chinese still find enough legitimacy within their single-party meritocracy that they have not overthrown the government. See Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002), 39–41 for an interesting discussion of the prerequisites for being considered a democracy. Schedler's "Chain of Democratic Choice" chronicles the path and inhibitions to open democracy, from citizens being able to choose leaders to being able to live with the results of elections and repeat the election process again. His core principles are: 1. Empowerment, 2. Free Supply, 3. Free Demand, 4. Inclusion, 5. Insulation, 6. Integrity, and 7. Irreversibility; elections are only democratic if they satisfy all seven of these requirements.

<sup>23</sup> My choice of the word "trust" over others in establishing this variable is based mostly on intuition, but there is literature to support the importance of trust as an organizing element of complex bureaucracies. Namely, see David Sniffen, *The Dynamics and Value of "Trust" in the Military* (Small Wars Journal, 2014), 1 for how trust is the most organic organizing concept that binds together militaries and the citizens of the countries they represent.

what exactly a foreign policy is, and the second has to do with what exactly “effectiveness” is. Both concepts are subject to widespread variety in their use.

### 1. What Is a Foreign Policy?

A foreign policy is a discrete unit of intent that describes an entity's *objectives* with regard to its interactions with other entities.<sup>24</sup> A foreign policy could also be described as a *goal*, an ideal, or the characterization of an intended course of action. While there is no shortage of academic perspectives on how foreign policies are crafted and shaped, rarely does any author directly define what exactly a “foreign policy” is.

In forming my own definition above, it was helpful to look at a wide variety of examples of foreign policies. *Diplomacy*, for example, is a strategy, not a foreign policy per se; diplomacy is merely a subset of the types of activities that are undertaken by state representatives in the execution of particular foreign policies. Diplomacy, in and of itself, however, also represents a certain kind of foreign policy—that of the intent to use diplomatic means to achieve foreign policy objectives. Thus, even in the absence of diplomacy—Harold Nicolson holds that diplomacy in its current form didn't really emerge until the Italian States started permanently assigning ambassadors to foreign countries in the 15th century<sup>25</sup>—states have always found a wide variety of ways to communicate intent to other states. Naturally, sometimes the communication of foreign policies can be violent. Carl von Clausewitz clearly defines war as being a political instrument that results from the execution of a particular foreign policy, and he defines

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<sup>24</sup> These entities are most commonly thought of as being states, and indeed this thesis is focused on states in this regard, but see George Haynal, *Corporate Statecraft* (Germany: Transatlantic Academy, 2013), 14 for how corporations and other entities also have foreign policies.

<sup>25</sup> Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963), 26. Also see Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 21 and 236 for how the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, a result of the Thirty Years' War, codified the current system of sovereignty and domestic non-interference that we have today. The purpose of the Treaty of Westphalia was to separate domestic from foreign policy and to separate the region inside a country from the influence of that which might try to come from outside.

strategy as the means by which a state intends to execute its foreign policies.<sup>26</sup> In reference to Chinese foreign policy, Fraser Cameron refers to China's trade-focused foreign policies as being a “weapons.”<sup>27</sup> In reference to foreign policy communication, the invention of the printing press in the 15th century started the systematic processes of spreading printed state propaganda to foreign publics.<sup>28</sup> Thus, whether through diplomacy or war or trade or propaganda, foreign policy can be communicated via a wide array of methods. As discrete units of a state's intent, however, foreign policies themselves are fairly simple.

Countless illustrations of foreign policy exist in the world and throughout history, but I will provide a few examples here. Rachel Kleinfeld notes that “improving the rule of law” in all countries around the world is a common foreign policy goal of many Western countries.<sup>29</sup> As another example, the Eisenhower administration's Solarium Project can be viewed as an attempt by the U.S. to formulate a coherent foreign policy to stop the advance of Communism from the Soviet Union.<sup>30</sup> Piers Macksey notes that King George III's foreign policy of maintaining all of his empire and colonies was the real source of the crown's loss in the U.S. War for Independence.<sup>31</sup> President Truman's decision to put the 7th Fleet between Formosa and Mainland China in the lead-up to the

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<sup>26</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88, and John Fishel, “Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night,” *Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.* 4, no. 3 (Winter) (1995). Also see Daniel Sukman, *Strategic Speed* (smallwarsjournal.com: Small Wars Journal, 2013), 1, for an interesting look at “strategic speed,” which is defined as how fast the upper echelons of government achieve their objectives.

<sup>27</sup> Fraser Cameron, *China's Foreign Policy under the New Leadership – More Continuity than Change* (Brussels, BE: Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, 2013), 12; see also Jan Melissen and Donna Lee and Paul Shard, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (Houndmills, GB: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 89 for China's use of “strategic public diplomacy,” and *Ibid.*, 92 for how China hired a world class PR firm called Hill & Knowlton to improve its public image after the Tiananmen Square Massacre.

<sup>28</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 3.

<sup>29</sup> Rachel Kleinfeld, *How to Advance the Rule of Law Abroad* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 2.

<sup>30</sup> Tyler Nottberg, “Once and Future Policy Planning: Solarium for Today,” The Eisenhower Institute, last modified: 2014, last accessed: 2014-03-07, [http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living\\_history/solarium\\_for\\_today.dot](http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot).

<sup>31</sup> Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783* (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1993), 542. This example also shows that when a policy is untenable, no strategy can win.

Korean War was also a foreign policy that potentially controlled the spread of Communism, but also re-engaged the U.S. in the Chinese civil war.<sup>32</sup> When the U.S. recalled reservists and deployed carriers after the USS Pueblo was hijacked by North Korea in 1968, it was inexplicitly communicating a developing foreign policy toward North Korea.<sup>33</sup> Even from these simple examples it can be drawn that, fundamentally, a good foreign policy decision takes into account the national interest, but must also be communicated properly.<sup>34</sup> From Henry Kissinger's<sup>35</sup> perspective, "the central task of American foreign policy is to analyze anew the current international environment and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable order."<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Kenneth Waltz holds that foreign policies are how a state speaks with a single voice in order to send clear signals to the outside world.<sup>37</sup> So, while it may now be clear *what* a foreign policy is, what makes some foreign policies more effective than others? To answer this, it is necessary to examine what exactly the word *effectiveness* means.

## 2. Effectiveness in Foreign Policies: Satisfaction of the National Interest

Foreign policies are goal-oriented systems that seek to satisfy a state's national interests vis-à-vis its external environment. I reviewed academic literature on effectiveness in order to better understand how states can determine if their foreign

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<sup>32</sup> Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 33.

<sup>33</sup> Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), 63. A valid question, though, is whether the U.S. was demonstrating its intent to be prepared for war, or simply revealing a lack of preparation. The inexplicitness of foreign policy messaging can lead to such confusion.

<sup>34</sup> Russ Berkoff, "Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy Decision-Making" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1997), 2.

<sup>35</sup> Of note, I refer many times in this thesis to the works of Henry Kissinger. It is important to note that, as in Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), he is sometimes perceived as a controversial historical figure; however, I leveraged his work greatly in developing this thesis simply because he is one of the most prolific and astute writers on U.S. foreign policy that I have discovered.

<sup>36</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 91.

<sup>37</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959), 179. To Waltz, antagonisms in the outside world also provide a forceful feedback loop that improves the singularity of this national voice.

policies—whether explicitly or implicitly communicated—are effectively accomplishing their foreign policy objectives. As it relates to how well states like the U.S. and China establish, implement, and alter their foreign policy objectives, “effectiveness” is a subjective but important quantity to measure. Unfortunately, effectiveness is also a tricky concept. The frustrated tone that pervades the academic literature on effectiveness theories is evidence of this. Kim Cameron and David Whetten provide general overviews of existing organizational effectiveness theories, and note that because effectiveness is so subjective, effectiveness is fundamentally an “unknowable quantity.”<sup>38</sup> To paraphrase their conclusion, the perfectly effective foreign policy is unknowable because every stakeholder in a foreign policy system has a different perspective on what defines effectiveness. Tying this to U.S.-China relations, this is akin to the fundamental question of whether one should measure the effectiveness of bilateral relations from the perspective of the balance of trade, or through the accomplishment of explicitly stated U.S. and Chinese foreign policies, or from any of a number of other perspectives. From China's perspective, for example, an effective foreign policy is one that allows it to focus on “domestic stability and economic growth.”<sup>39</sup> From the U.S. perspective, an effective foreign policy toward China would bring about improvements in human rights within China.<sup>40</sup> The theoretical futility of finding nation-wide stakeholder consensus on metrics of foreign policy effectiveness has grave implications for those trying to define whether the relationship between two states is improving or worsening as a result of particular foreign policies.

Fortunately, a combination of Cameron and Whetten’s “Goal Model”<sup>41</sup> and systems engineering principles provides a starting place. When viewed as discrete state

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<sup>38</sup> Kim Cameron and David Whetten, “Organizational Effectiveness and Quality: The Second Generation,” *Agathon Press* 11, no. 1 (1996), 266.

<sup>39</sup> Cameron, *China's Foreign Policy under the New*, 13.

<sup>40</sup> Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 95. The U.S. claims that its Jackson-Vanik Amendment is a higher authority than the World Trade Organization (WTO) Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status, and reserves the right to refuse MFN to any state that does not live up to a high human rights bar.

<sup>41</sup> Kim Cameron and David Whetten and et. al, *Organizational Effectiveness: A Comparison of Multiple Models* (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1983), 8.

objectives that represent a quorum of the national interest in a representative government, individual foreign policies can be understood to be goals that the entire constituency of a state is working toward with various levels of coordination and effort. Therefore, the efficiency with which a state develops and executes its foreign policies has direct bearing upon how effective the foreign policies are. The challenge in quantifying the level of effectiveness with which a state is achieving its foreign policy goals, then, is simply a matter of applying appropriate metrics to the systemic processes that are engaged in developing and executing specific foreign policies. The challenge in doing this, though, is that the act of emphasizing some metrics over others is also a subjective judgment that requires consensus from the entire constituency of stakeholders as well. A foreign policy and its appropriate metrics form a system, and while it is not theoretically impossible to gather input from every citizen in a country on every foreign policy and every valid measure of effectiveness<sup>42</sup> of each foreign policy, it clearly represents a communication challenge. Fortunately, thanks to the Internet and social networking, improvements in the aggregation of focused citizen communication have been made in recent years.<sup>43</sup> Integrating foreign policies in some way into these more advanced communication systems would seemingly provide some promise for improving the measurement of the effectiveness of foreign policies. At face value, the digital systemization of foreign policies would appear to be a fairly straightforward process that would help improve their effectiveness, but states like the U.S. and China have not traditionally structured the

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<sup>42</sup> See David Goldfein, *Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I-14 for a delineation between Measures of Performance (MoP) in Civil-Military Operations (CMO) (i.e., tracking how much materiel is supplied, how much integration there is) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) (i.e., tracking how much violence is being curbed, how well services are being restored, how well the materiel being supplied is actually causing positive change).

<sup>43</sup> The study of the dynamic aggregation of metrics, big data, and raw communication is still in its infancy, and still highly controversial. See Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, *Aggregating Governance Indicators* (New York, NY: World Bank, 1999), 1 for how, when studying complex abstract concepts that have measurable, related components, aggregating those metrics in some way can produce broad groupings; though imprecise, such aggregate metrics can be useful in detecting trends or generalizations. Also see *Ibid.*, 27 for the caveat that even though aggregation does not produce a precise measurement of aggregate indicators, the method of using a “linear unobserved components model” to combine indicators represents a systematic and scalable means of creating composite indicators from a variety of source data.

communication of their foreign policies in such a way as to make the digital transition simple.

### **3. Dead Trees: Where Foreign Policies Go to Die**

With an understanding of what foreign policies are and what makes them effective, it is reasonable to ask where they go after they are decided upon. In the U.S., after consensus has been built around specific foreign policies and the president has approved them, they are communicated in a variety of ways. Traditionally, foreign policies quickly find their final resting places in official hard-copy paper documents that provide reference points in the footnotes of other official paper documents, but which remain difficult for citizens to quickly find and evaluate for themselves.<sup>44</sup> In light of how easily citizens can now discover things on the Internet, the historic difficulty of finding printed material emblazoned with official U.S. foreign policy may seem quaint, but the importance of the mere existence of these documents is difficult to overstate.<sup>45</sup>

A key democratic tenet of the League of Nations, survived by its successor institution the United Nations (U.N.), was that no treaty could be valid if it were not published.<sup>46</sup> This was an important development because it finally gave domestic audiences the opportunity to read the contracts that their diplomatic emissaries were signing them up for and thereafter have a focused domestic debate about specific agreed upon line items. The resistance of states to do even this much stems from traditional diplomatic practice. Until 1919, it would have been considered of bad faith for a country to go against the promises of its diplomats by, upon domestic review of the contents of

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<sup>44</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 49 for how the problem of which level of analysis to examine the world is solved by giving the investigator the choice to examine the world at whatever level they choose. In other words, the freedom for all citizens to evaluate the foreign policy system at any level of analysis they choose improves the aggregate assessment of national security in an anarchical system.

<sup>45</sup> To a certain extent, even the Internet has not made it easier to find U.S. foreign policy.

<sup>46</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 86.

foreign treaties, refusing to domestically ratify the treaty and turn it into domestic law.<sup>47</sup> In order to avoid international embarrassment, states have a history of hiding their foreign policies from the view of their citizens.

One would hope that time and the improvement of democratic processes would have improved this situation and made a definitive collection of official U.S. foreign policy easier to find, but this is not the case. While many books on foreign policy describe the presidential foreign policy decision-making process or other aspects of the foreign policy system, they do not go so far as to describe *where* or even *if* to publish foreign policies once they have been decided upon. If a U.S. citizen, or a citizen of any other country for that matter, wanted to find all U.S. foreign policies toward China, it is not clear where they would need to look. Instead of consolidation and clarity, the U.S. government often opts to publish broad, national level strategic documents and sprinkle frequently-updated foreign policy ideas throughout a dizzying variety of semi-authoritative sources: the news media, magazine interviews, domestic legislation, comments by legislators in obscure party-affiliated blogs, rapid-fire and high-stress television (TV) interviews by moderators with a political agenda, tell-all autobiographies, Twitter, Facebook, and many others. The ambiguity of official state foreign policies leaves the public with little recourse for debate on specific foreign policies.<sup>48</sup> Thus, the stubborn refusal by most, if not all governments, to consolidate their foreign policy into a single coherent and authoritative living document<sup>49</sup> is intriguing; perhaps states perceive some logic in choosing ambiguity over explicitness.

There is good reason to believe that codifying foreign policies will make them more difficult to change. Policies in complex decision-making environments become

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 87. Also see Michael John Garcia, *International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law*, CRS Report RL32528 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014) for a useful summary of the difference between self-executing international agreements and non-self-executing ones. Self-Executing international agreements have the force of law in the U.S. without the need for Congress to enact further domestic implementing legislation.

<sup>48</sup> George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign*, xiv.

<sup>49</sup> See Catherine Dale, *National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report R43174 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 20 for how the current means of publishing U.S. strategic guidance is no longer fast enough to keep up with the real world.

difficult to change once they are decided upon, because the pain of the formalization process can lead policy-makers to dread the idea of making changes.<sup>50</sup> This is not an unattractive explanation; however, in the same breath as he mentioned the previous sentence, Henry Kissinger also asserts that foreign policy speeches function as an inflection point that marks the end of internal government debate and allows government to move on to new issues because public statements cannot be taken back.<sup>51</sup> For both the merits of citizen oversight and government focus, there is value in fixing foreign policies in place. The Chinese government has come to similar conclusions.

Even a governing body like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), commonly perceived to be part of a closed and non-democratic system, understands the importance of updating and broadcasting changes to government policies. The Chinese government broadcasts its policies via websites, white papers, magazines, and Track Two academic fora.<sup>52</sup> The State Council Information Office, China's official mouthpiece, uses white papers to make its policies and practices explicitly known to both foreign and domestic audiences;<sup>53</sup> under Zhao Qizheng's leadership, China worked diligently to “explain China's official positions and policies on issues more fully to foreigners.”<sup>54</sup> From the outside looking in, though, it is not clear where U.S. citizens should look to find all Chinese foreign policy positions toward the U.S. It would seem that such explicitness would be helpful in both understanding what China's foreign policies are, and evaluating how well China abides by them.

At this point it is important to confirm that the simple act of publishing foreign policies is not enough to get states or their citizens to abide by them; however, it is also important to realize that foreign policies are guideposts by which to evaluate a state's foreign policy execution. As Henry Kissinger so eloquently put it, “(t)o set forth

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<sup>50</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 20.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>52</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 93.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 99. He used a computer during a presentation to show how the information in the Cox Report that accused China of stealing secrets could all be freely found on the Internet by anyone.

principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.”<sup>55</sup> Properly published foreign policies do more than simply inform the public of the reasoning behind a government's actions abroad; they allow people to confirm that governments are following their own foreign policies. Governments have a long way to go in order to transition from the old, disaggregated ways of communicating foreign policy toward the benefits of a more consolidated system that allows all the elements of the foreign policy system to interact in more efficient, and therefore effective, ways. Rather than searching blindly for potential efficiencies in the foreign policy system, though, it is important to examine the basic elements that comprise the system first.

#### **4. The Foreign Policy Network: A System of Elements**

The content of foreign policies is influenced by a wide variety of both domestic and international actors, but foreign policies have at their foundation the support of the citizens whose interests the foreign policies represent. The content of foreign policies is influenced by the opinions of a wide variety of sources, including media, political parties, interest groups, and others,<sup>56</sup> and their quality is increased through public discourse.<sup>57</sup> From an overall systemic perspective, foreign policies are developed domestically by national leaders taking into consideration external, societal, governmental, financial, and personal factors, and are modified based on detectable reactions to the implementation of those policies.<sup>58</sup>

##### ***a. The Role of the People: The Supply Source***

The consent of the governed is the primary source of legitimacy and Trust (T) in any foreign policy system. All the steps between the citizen consensus-finding stage and the execution stage in the foreign policy system are a degradation of T in the system.

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<sup>55</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 153.

<sup>56</sup> Eugene Wittkopf and James McCormick, *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 9.

<sup>57</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 95.

<sup>58</sup> Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 7.

While there is certainly a history of state leaders successfully acting unilaterally in the interest of their citizens, such actions fundamentally represent a departure from the ideal state of governed systems in which the legitimacy of leaders is dependent upon the continued perception of legitimacy on the part of their citizens. Indeed, legitimacy is appropriately a chief concern of many countries.<sup>59</sup> Of significant interest, then, is whether citizens of any given country are an engaged, informed, and participative element in the creation of foreign policies.

In the United States in particular, the American people have historically not been particularly concerned about foreign policy, but this does not indicate an abdication of their right to be the final arbiter of the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy decisions. It was only after World War I (WWI) that American citizens first became keenly interested in foreign diplomacy and foreign policy, a result of the public beginning to perceive the effects that a state's foreign policy decisions and agreements with foreign powers could have on local circumstances.<sup>60</sup> WWI marked a turning point in American wars because war was no longer solely the realm of soldiers; the American public “realized that a country might be committed (without its full knowledge, deliberation and approval) to policies involving definite pledges to foreign Powers,” which began to tax upon every citizen.<sup>61</sup> This interest in foreign policies on the part of the American people only increased when body bags started coming back from Korea and Vietnam. Where the American public had previously been apathetic toward foreign policy, it took a large deviation from the public interest to bring foreign policy into the forefront of public discourse<sup>62</sup> and highlight the dangers of opaque foreign policies. When foreign policies are not even transparent to American citizens, the public (and sometimes even the

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<sup>59</sup> See Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 44 for how, perhaps more so than other states, China's domestic and foreign policies are linked because of the reliance of the CCP on internal legitimacy in order to continue operations.

<sup>60</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 10.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>62</sup> Brigitte Nacos and Robert Shapiro and Pierangelo Isernia, *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 95.

Congress) has no basis by which to evaluate foreign actions, and this has proven capable of threatening the legitimacy of the government acting on their behalf.<sup>63</sup> American citizens are the sole legitimate source of American foreign policy, and America as a whole is better off when its leaders are constrained by public opinion.<sup>64</sup> Naturally, there are reasonable counter-arguments to this point.

Though leaders may sometimes like to think that the foreign policy issues they deal with are beyond the comprehension of their citizens, the complexities of the modern world have endangered the ability of any limited cabal of individuals to make effective foreign policy decisions.<sup>65</sup> It is certainly true that, in an electoral democracy, the public implicitly cedes some of its decision-making authority to its elected leaders,<sup>66</sup> but global systems are becoming increasingly complex, beyond the point where individual leaders in isolation can expect to make coherent decisions about the full range of issues they face. A small adjustment in the policy of a single actor within a global geopolitical system can produce outcomes of untold magnitude.<sup>67</sup> Accordingly, since the global system is too complex to be entrusted to decision-making by the intuition of individual leaders, foreign policy decision-making should be institutionalized and spread out amongst a team of actors.<sup>68</sup> While allowing the public to deliberate directly on foreign policy issues would at first seem to be overly disaggregated and difficult to focus, complex systems have a way of self-organizing;<sup>69</sup> fundamentally, there is good reason to believe that the inclusion

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<sup>63</sup> Francis Wilcox and Richard Frank, *The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy: An Inquiry by a Panel of the American Society of International Law* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1976), 61. Also see Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign*, 18-19 for Henry Kissinger's view that the American public's lack of concern about foreign policy issues has a tendency to lure American politicians into a false sense of security about the importance of economics in solving all problems; Kissinger warns that we must focus more on the "political, cultural, and spiritual impact" of America's rise.

<sup>64</sup> Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 4. Immanuel Kant asserted that democracies were inherently less warlike because their leaders were subject to public opinion.

<sup>65</sup> See George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign*, 96 for how the problems of conformity (groupthink) and small-group pressure arise when a nation's foreign policy is decided by a small group of individuals.

<sup>66</sup> Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, 68.

<sup>67</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 15.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>69</sup> Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, 67.

of a variety of ideas and public debate improves the ultimate outcomes of decisions, and the accountability of results,<sup>70</sup> and the absence of public debate leads to “inferior” foreign policies being implemented.<sup>71</sup> For better or for worse, from a foreign policy systemic perspective, the primary source of foreign policy legitimacy lies within the consent of the governed, and the starting value of T in the foreign policy system is based on the quality and cohesiveness of citizen input into the foreign policy system. To determine whether the public opinion on particular foreign policies is a well-informed one, one must examine the sources of information upon which the people are basing their opinions.<sup>72</sup>

***b. The Role of the Media: A Lens and Conduit***

The media provides information and a sense of focus to the public that helps citizens form opinions about the shaping and execution of foreign policies that the media considers to be worth “air time.” As a moniker used to describe the media, the phrase “fourth estate” came about during the French Revolution when the press became an important factor in managing public opinion.<sup>73</sup> The relationship between the media and the government that executes foreign policies can be quite complicated. In the Roosevelt administration, Secretary State Cordell Hull's daily meeting with the press was the only avenue through which the public was made aware of U.S. foreign policy developments.<sup>74</sup> Growing from there, the increasing speed and reach of the media has had both negative and positive foreign policy impacts. For example, the secret U.S. plan to invade the Bay of Pigs likely failed because the plans for the operation were leaked to the press and made public.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, Warren Strobel notes that U.S. leaders use American news

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>72</sup> Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 244. Also see Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 87 for how the ability of the American people to easily understand the danger emanating from the Soviet Union provided the foundation for broad foreign policy consensus toward the Soviet Union that existed during the Cold War.

<sup>73</sup> Bloomfield, *The Foreign Policy Process*, 123.

<sup>74</sup> Dizard, *Digital Diplomacy*, 22.

<sup>75</sup> Melvin Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 111.

media to communicate messages to foreign leaders when other lines of communication may be cut off.<sup>76</sup> For example, Madeleine Albright used the media to convey her foreign policies during the U.S. response to the massacres in Sarajevo.<sup>77</sup> The media, therefore, can be both a useful and a harmful tool for providing information and educating the public, but at times can also be slave to political agendas that influence the media's narrative.

Neither the U.S. nor China has a media that is completely outside the influence of political agendas. In an ideal world, Robert Entman asserts that the modern media should work to fill in the perceived gaps of government policy.<sup>78</sup> In America, where the media is largely understood to have free rein to report on anything, Entman notes that because elites can manipulate polling data, it is not enough for polling data to mirror government policy because he is pessimistic that a news media can be crafted that is completely outside the control of government elites.<sup>79</sup> This problem is also particularly acute in China. For example, satellite dishes were first allowed into China during Nixon's visit in 1972 in order for China to show a favorable face to the world.<sup>80</sup> After Nixon left China, though, China then purchased those satellite dishes and used them to control access to international information sources.<sup>81</sup> The difference in how America and China approach the media is reflected in the states' different views of how the media fits into the foreign policy system. Whereas the *pluralist* view holds that the media aggregates public opinion and plays a checking role against government, the *elitist* view holds that the media is just a mouthpiece for the political elite.<sup>82</sup> Either way, the end result is a public that is either fully informed, or informed in ways that are shaped by those in charge of the media, based on the content, issues, and perspectives that are given "air time." From a systemic

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<sup>76</sup> U.S. Department of State, *The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, 2000), 37.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>78</sup> Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 25.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>80</sup> Dizard, *Digital Diplomacy*, 91.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>82</sup> Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 8.

perspective, when the media is used to communicate foreign policy, it introduces varying amounts of bias that obscure the public's view of a state's real foreign policies. A system that corrects for this bias by allowing the public to interact directly with the shaping of the full spectrum of their state's foreign policies would help to remove this distorting factor<sup>83</sup> and increase T within the foreign policy system as a whole.

*c. The Role of Political Parties: Shaping Focus*

As institutions that consolidate ideological perspectives for the convenience of the citizens in representative governments, political parties shape foreign policies through the simple act of consolidating public opinion.<sup>84</sup> In the 1890s, the U.S. was somewhat unique in that its foreign policies were often clearly being influenced by domestic politics.<sup>85</sup> Over the course of the century since then, this influence has only increased, and the extent to which foreign policy decisions are purely representative of the national interest is debatable. In determining whether public opinion has an effect on the issues political parties focus on, Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay tried to determine whether political elites are properly interpreting public opinion. Not only did they find that political elites misperceive public opinion frequently,<sup>86</sup> but they found that politicians rarely poll on foreign policy-related issues because foreign policy “doesn't win elections.”<sup>87</sup> Additionally, they discovered that politicians' perceptions of public opinion tend to be formed by the vocal majority, rather than a fully representative majority of their constituents.<sup>88</sup> Thus, unfortunately, when it comes to foreign policy, politics no longer stops “at the water's edge.”<sup>89</sup> To the extent that they define the overall makeup of the

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<sup>83</sup> Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 19.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 228.

<sup>85</sup> Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy*, 27.

<sup>86</sup> Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 97.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>89</sup> Paul Peterson, *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 74; also see Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 117, where Miroslav Nincic holds that “stopping at the water's edge no longer reflects a reasonable reality anymore.”

Legislative Branch of the U.S. government, political parties shape, and at times distort, the range of foreign policy issues that are eventually debated and legislated upon by the Congress. Because political parties introduce a bias into the foreign policy system, allowing citizens to bypass them and participate more directly in shaping a more non-partisan foreign policy may help to increase T and thereby improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the foreign policy system overall.

***d. The Role of the Congress: Legislating and Balancing the Executive***

The U.S. Congress fulfills two primary functions in the foreign policy system: 1. formally codifying into Legislation the ground rules by which U.S. foreign policy is executed, and 2. as a proxy for the constituents the members of Congress represent, ensuring that the Executive Branch's actions in executing foreign policies are in line with U.S. national interests. Before George Washington took office in 1789, Congress was the only foreign policy decision-making body in the U.S.<sup>90</sup> Over time, as the Executive Branch has taken over most of that role, the U.S. Congress has, appropriately, continued to demand a say in foreign policy;<sup>91</sup> however, its tools are limited. For example, the Congress controls the budget that the Executive Branch can bring to bear on the execution of foreign policies.<sup>92</sup> Congress can also use domestic legislation to both try to influence foreign countries,<sup>93</sup> and strengthen the national resolve behind foreign policies, as was seen in the Taiwan Relations Act.<sup>94</sup> Congress has also been known to variously

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<sup>90</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 16.

<sup>91</sup> See *Ibid.*, 2 for how the U.S. House of Representatives has only been seeking foreign policy equality with the Senate since the end of the two World Wars.

<sup>92</sup> See Peterson, *The President, the Congress*, 176 for how the Congress only became more assertive over the budgeting process for defense after the Vietnam War; also see Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 43 for an explanation of how the Congress can use the “power of the purse” to curtail the Executive Branch's freedom of action in executing its foreign policy goals.

<sup>93</sup> See Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign*, 252 for the absurd statement by Nancy Pelosi: “Hopefully at the end of this 12 months, if there is freedom of the press in China and the other human rights conditions are met, then we can begin to solve some of the other problems that members of Congress have.”

<sup>94</sup> State, *The Making of U.S.*, 16, contains an interesting statement by Joseph Biden with regard to Congressional support of foreign policies.

use its powers of oversight and confirmation to influence foreign policy as well.<sup>95</sup> While Congressional members may be acting on behalf of the American people with the tools they have available,<sup>96</sup> they are not necessarily in a position of power over the president and the Executive Branch.

Once the Executive Office of the President has set its mind on a particular foreign policy, there is little evidence to show that the Congress can do anything to change it.<sup>97</sup> Since its founding, the Congress has typically rolled over and acquiesced to strong Executive Branch foreign policy positions. A few examples can be found in the Louisiana Purchase under President Jefferson, the Panama Canal under President Theodore Roosevelt, the Lend-Lease program under Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), and the Vietnam War under multiple presidents.<sup>98</sup> There are good reasons why the president is given such executive authority, and why the Congress is generally powerless to intervene. Through an analysis of case history, Paul Peterson notes that the Congress has *de facto* acquiesced to the predominance of executive discretion as it relates to foreign policy crafting and execution.<sup>99</sup> He also asserts that because the anarchical nature of the international system likely limits the choices available to the U.S., the president's judgment is given priority over Congress' because of the Executive Branch's ability to operate in secret, and do so with vigor and without hesitation.<sup>100</sup> Congressional power over the implementation of foreign policy is also curtailed by the ambiguity of legislation like the War Powers

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<sup>95</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 4–5, highlights that the Congressional power of “oversight” is Congress' powerful mandate to investigate problems in existing government programs as part of its law-making function. Apparently Congressional inquests are scary. Also see *Ibid.*, 7 for the Senate's utilization of its confirmation powers to shape foreign policy.

<sup>96</sup> See Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 297 for how even though public opinion polls may show strong public consensus on an issue, this does not always sway policy-makers to change national policies. Also see 啓貴渡邊 (Hirotaka Watanabe), “外交力強化のためのシンクタンクのあり方 (Think Tanks and the Strengthening of Foreign Relations),” *Nippon.com*, last accessed Aug. 11, 2013, <http://www.nippon.com/ja/currents/d10007/> for Hirotaka Watanabe's perspective that Japanese foreign policy thinking has changed little in the last 60 years, and does not go much beyond maintaining the status quo, leading to a lack of knowledge or care on the part of Japanese citizens.

<sup>97</sup> Paul Peterson, *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 21, 49.

<sup>98</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 53.

<sup>99</sup> Peterson, *The President, the Congress*, 45.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 21 and 49.

Resolution, which gives the president considerable leeway in deciding how to interpret his War Powers.<sup>101</sup> Finally, Congress has never proven it has the ability to decisively deter the Executive branch from pursuing a foreign policy it really wants to pursue,<sup>102</sup> and the American public is not supportive of greater Legislative Branch foreign policy decision-making influence either.<sup>103</sup> In sum, the Congress can be helpful in that it increases the explicitness of foreign policies through formal legislation, but for the most part it remains a hapless institution in terms of representing the full array of its constituents' interests in an unbiased way, and in terms of its inability to influence the execution of specific foreign policies. A more streamlined system that allows the full array of Congress's constituents (the American people) to consolidate their opinions aligned along specific, explicit foreign policies would help make it a less biased, stronger, more effective institution and increase T within the foreign policy system.

*e. The Role of the President: The Nexus of Supply and Execution*

As leader of the Executive Branch of the U.S. government, the president is at the nexus between the supply side of the foreign policy system and the execution side. Being at the center of this nexus, the president is accordingly embroiled in a balancing act between domestic politics and the powers and responsibilities associated with the execution of foreign policies.<sup>104</sup> The domestic political conflict inherent in the U.S. foreign policy-making system is defined by the Constitution's "invitation to struggle;" since its inception, the U.S. has continuously reaffirmed that no single power in government should be given sole authority over decision-making.<sup>105</sup> Accordingly, political dissent over foreign policies can be found as far back as the "War Hawks" and

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<sup>101</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 49.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>104</sup> In Peterson, *The President, the Congress*, 101 Aaron Wildavsky (1966) coined the term "two-presidencies" as they separately relate to the president's activities toward domestic and foreign politics.

<sup>105</sup> Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 10.

their unity around particular policies in the lead up to the War of 1812.<sup>106</sup> Taking advantage of fundamental disagreements about war powers existed between presidents Jefferson and Madison and the Congress, the War Hawks were able to steamroll two pacifist presidents into war.<sup>107</sup> Managing this potential for chaos and presenting a united foreign policy front to the world is the president's job, and is at times more or less cooperative. The Marshall Plan is heralded as an example of successful and substantive collaboration between the Legislative and Executive branch on foreign policy. Indeed, for Truman, the program was too big to leave Congress out of the conversation.<sup>108</sup> Yet, modern foreign policy distrust between the Executive and Legislative branches was sown after the President may have misled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the results of his actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965.<sup>109</sup> Thus, while both Congress and the president are elected members of government, the issue of which side is truly representing the national interest is at question.<sup>110</sup>

Presidents have significant unilateral power to decide upon and execute foreign policies. This can sometimes create conflict between the president, Congress, and the

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<sup>106</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 27. Also see Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 155 for how the U.S. Congress decided to go to war from 1789 to 1950, but all wars since have seen the President leading the battle cry.

<sup>107</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 28. Also see *Ibid.*, 27 for how Congress held the war debate in secret from anti-war naysayers, and were able to quickly push a war decision through, and *Ibid.*, 29 for how Congressmen sowed dissent and confusion about U.S. foreign policy while on diplomatic mission in Britain.

<sup>108</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 96.

<sup>109</sup> Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, v.

<sup>110</sup> See Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 23 and *Ibid.*, 122 for the question of whether elections influence both the timing and substance of foreign policy changes. Miroslav Nincic contends that Presidents and presidential candidates often take elections into account when crafting foreign policies.

American public.<sup>111</sup> In terms of how presidents approach the consolidation of issue-specific foreign policies, Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs group U.S. presidents into those that “lead” public opinion, and those that “follow” it. They classify most presidents from Truman to Clinton as “leaders,”<sup>112</sup> but it is only since President Roosevelt’s administration that this has been the case.<sup>113</sup> The Legislative-Executive disagreement over the threat imposed by the Axis powers in World War II (WWII) is the classic example of a situation where the president’s leadership cut through a foggy political situation and avoided what might have been a tragic end to WWII.<sup>114</sup> As opposed to Congress, the president has so much real-time responsibility for the well-being of the nation that it would be irresponsible to follow radical movements in popular opinion amongst factions in the Legislature.<sup>115</sup> That being said, Melvin Small highlighted the dangers of an Executive Branch that “leads” more than it “follows” when he said, “Acheson and Kissinger may have committed more blunders when they tried to operate secretly and in an undemocratic fashion than when they produced programs that were influenced by and acceptable to the wide variety of often insular groups outside the state Department, the Oval Office, and the National Security Council.”<sup>116</sup> Thus, while at a certain point the president must make decisions a timely manner, the foreign policy decision-making process should most certainly take into account the opinions of

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<sup>111</sup> See Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, 127 for how the use of Executive Agreements by the President is essentially ungoverned and without limitation, notwithstanding the power of precedent. From 1789-1945: ~900-1000 treaties and 200 executive agreements were signed by the President. From 1946-1971 those numbers had reversed to ~361 treaties and 5,559 executive agreements. Also see *Ibid.*, 4 for a report that recommends that even though the President can unilaterally make agreements (not treaties) with foreign powers, that ability should be limited further and kept in better check by Congressional deliberation. To reinforce that point, see Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 5 for how agreements with foreign powers have shied away from “treaties,” favoring instead to use “executive agreements;” an example of this is the U.S. commitment to Israeli state security. Of note, however, *Ibid.*, 6 also brings forth the opinion that because executive agreements do not have Congressional oversight, sometimes Congress encourages them to get the job done.

<sup>112</sup> Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 230.

<sup>113</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 39.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

<sup>115</sup> Peterson, *The President, the Congress*, 92.

<sup>116</sup> Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy*, 170.

Congress and the American public.<sup>117</sup> Deciding whether a predominance of leadership or followership is called for makes the president's job the most difficult in the foreign policy system.

Fortunately, in times of need, the president has the power of the bully pulpit, and there are few places where foreign policies are made more explicit than on camera in front of the world. Just as Deng Xiaopeng's "open-door policy" was all the invitation that some people needed to start interacting with China,<sup>118</sup> the finality of the president's word can be effectively used to communicate foreign policy and consolidate public opinion. Indeed, radio and television, and now computers, have made it a lot easier for presidents to bypass normal policy filtering channels by addressing the public directly.<sup>119</sup> Provided the power is not abused, increasing the president's direct access to the people is a good thing. In sum, the President is a critical and irreplaceable nexus between the supply side of the foreign policy system, and its executive side. Any improvements that streamline the process by which the President's specific foreign policies get to the American people and the rest of his Executive Branch in a more pure and unadulterated way increases T within the foreign policy system as a whole.

*f. The Role of the DOS and DOD: Foreign Executors*

After public consensus is transformed and codified into foreign policy executive instructions, two departments of the Executive Branch take the lead on executing U.S. foreign policy: the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). Though seemingly straightforward on the surface, this statement is overly simplistic and

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<sup>117</sup> George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign*, 1.

<sup>118</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 92.

<sup>119</sup> Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy*.

not without controversy.<sup>120</sup> On paper, the Secretary of State is president's principal foreign policy advisor.<sup>121</sup> In practice, though, it is the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) as a unit that must find consensus on foreign policy direction and function as the highest foreign policy-making body in the U.S. government.<sup>122</sup> The NSC, established in 1947 in order to coordinate the activities of the DOD and DOS, began what turned out to be a long-standing tradition of boiling down long-winded DOS memorandums into bullet points and sending both documents up to the president for review; naturally, the shorter reports were more likely to be read by the president and influence actual policy direction.<sup>123</sup> To limit the potential for conflict that might arise from this situation, agreement between the DOS and DOD on foreign policy issues often occurs at the Joint Staff level, the primary Joint military office subordinate to the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>124</sup> Typically, conflicts that arise have to do with a difference of opinions about the pace and content of foreign policy responses to external indicators. Whereas the State Department generally tries to slow the development of issues down and allow situations to cool off in order to avoid conflict, the instant foreign policy response that the military can offer is attractive to political leaders that demand solutions immediately.<sup>125</sup> In theory, the primary document that serves to unify the foreign policies that provide direction to both the DOS and the DOD is the president's National Security Strategy (NSS).<sup>126</sup> In practice, however, a lot more could be done to make the President's

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<sup>120</sup> See Kristin Lord, "The DoS, Not the Pentagon, Should Lead America's Public Diplomacy Efforts," The Brookings Institution, last modified: 2009, last accessed: 2013-08-11, [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1029\\_public\\_diplomacy\\_lord.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1029_public_diplomacy_lord.aspx), and U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, GAO Report GAO-09-679SP (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009), and Kennon Weed, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues*, CRS Report R40989 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009). I also affirm that many organizations besides the DOS and DOD have important roles to play in the U.S. foreign policy system

<sup>121</sup> Hillary Clinton, *A Citizen's Guide to Foreign Affairs* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), 7.

<sup>122</sup> State, *The Making of U.S.*, 5.

<sup>123</sup> Bloomfield, *The Foreign Policy Process*, 50.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>126</sup> State, *The Making of U.S.*, 11.

top-level foreign policies more explicit and useful as foundational guidance to the strategies, operations, and tactics for which the president's foreign policies provide justification.<sup>127</sup> Foreign partners would also find such explicit guidance equally helpful.<sup>128</sup> Any systemic improvements that make the U.S. government's foreign policy-related actions more transparent and predictable, less threatening, and easier to cooperate with along the full spectrum of strategies, operations, and tactics can lead to an increase in T within the foreign policy system as a whole.<sup>129</sup>

***g. The Role of Foreign Entities: Feedback Mechanisms for Global Effectiveness***

Whereas U.S. citizens provide the primary source of national foreign policy consensus and Trust (T) that legitimizes the foreign policies the president authorizes, actors in foreign countries provide an important feedback mechanism that helps the U.S. adjust its policies to be more effective within the international community. The opinions and needs of citizens of foreign countries now matter more to the U.S. and other nations than was thought possible just 25-30 years ago, and the shape of interactions between states has changed accordingly.<sup>130</sup> This transition took a while to take root. World War I heralded the beginnings of the concept of “power over opinion,” which in turn was the

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<sup>127</sup> There is no shortage of think-tank studies on how to better structure the U.S. military planning construct. See, for example, Mark Gunzinger, *Shaping America's Future Military Toward a New Force Planning Construct* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgeting Assessments, 2013). Also see Anthony Sampson, “Prioritizing Efforts to Improve Foreign Public Opinion of America: Applying a Business Model to Discover and Create Customer Value” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 2 for the critique that the NSS is traditionally less-than-useful because it does not prioritize its objectives. For a positive example, though, see United States Government, *National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2013), ii for how it states how it fits in with other strategic documents; however, it is difficult to identify how important it is within the larger context of all other Navy guiding documents.

<sup>128</sup> See Curtis Scaparrotti, *Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2013), I-4 for how publicly available U.S. joint military guidance can help multinational partners understand how they fit into the larger flow of U.S. strategic guidance.

<sup>129</sup> See U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Views on the Progress and Plans for Addressing Government-wide Management Challenges*, GAO Report GAO-14-436T (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), 9-10 for how the key to getting agencies to cooperate effectively is clearly defining roles and responsibilities, assigning accountable parties, consolidating accounting and resources, and developing metrics by which to evaluate outcomes.

<sup>130</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, xvii.

precursor to Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power."<sup>131</sup> The bifurcation between traditional diplomacy, with its focus on connections between state leaders, and public diplomacy, with its focus on establishing state-to-state connections directly between citizens, is symbolic of this new focus on soft power.<sup>132</sup> Whereas traditional hard power, in the form of warships and nuclear bombs, brought an end to WWII, the goal of soft power is to allow states to resolve policy differences prior to the onset of physical hostilities. While soft power remains a controversial idea amongst international relations scholars, a key component to the effective execution of soft power foreign policies is the explicit communication of foreign policies to foreign actors. In return, the feedback received from foreign actors is indicative of their receptiveness to such policies. The Internet has helped speed up this feedback loop.

The creation and growth of the Internet has been integral to the reduction of the costs of citizen-to-citizen interaction; the new public diplomacy emerging between mature states because of this has transformed diplomacy from a one-way propaganda information dissemination program into more of an engagement in active dialogue with foreign publics.<sup>133</sup> Not every country is keen on this reduction in sovereign control over the hearts and minds of their citizens. Both China and Russia have expressed concern over the lack of ideological content control on the Internet. As a means of U.S. foreign policy transmission, the Internet has also facilitated the slow merger of the field of public diplomacy with the field of public relations, in that the primary focus of both fields is now the facilitation of the exchange of information between domestic and foreign entities.<sup>134</sup> The increased focus on this type of public diplomacy is in many ways a response to the increasing political power and leverage of individuals and small groups not only in the U.S., but in many other countries as well.<sup>135</sup> As nice as this may sound,

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>132</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 5. Also see United States Department of State, *Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 1999) for a DOS perspective on public diplomacy.

<sup>133</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 13.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 24.

there are risks in tying public diplomacy too intimately to domestic foreign policy processes; by subjecting the target audience too intimately to the vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics, public diplomacy risks alienating foreign publics. Public diplomacy should be treated first and foremost as an information feedback loop and self-adjustment tool, not as a tactic for injecting foreign policy vectors.<sup>136</sup>

The importance of creating foreign policy feedback loops with foreign entities can also be seen in the public diplomacy failures of China. The lack of consideration for a foreign public's perception of a state's actions can lead to what some advertisers might call an “image problem.” Strobe Talbott argues that globalization is leading to the “end of foreign policy,” in that every action a state takes abroad eventually echoes back into the domestic environment.<sup>137</sup> This feedback loop has led many countries to fall in line with international norms in order to participate in the benefits of globalization,<sup>138</sup> but countries like China that lack such feedback loops are unable to develop the domestic momentum to create such change. As a direct result of its unwillingness to open its domestic environment to full-scale private actor involvement in its foreign policy system, and its refusal to allow feedback from foreign entities to influence Chinese foreign policies, China is only comfortable conducting public diplomacy at the state-to-state, strategic level.<sup>139</sup> Also, because it creates a more controlled feedback loop, China prefers to target specific foreign policy messages to specific regions of the world, shunning the word “diplomacy” for a more preferable description of its activities as “external publicity.”<sup>140</sup> This is not to say that China is incapable of soft power, though. Indeed, China has proven highly effective at economic diplomacy in Africa, South America, and other regions.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 15.

<sup>137</sup> Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 204.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>139</sup> Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 89.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>141</sup> For China's economic activities in Africa, see Marc Lanteigne, *Moving Beyond Asia: China's Cross-Regional Diplomacy* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 136; For South America, Pieter Bottelier, “China, the Financial Crisis, and Sino-American Relations,” *Asia Policy* no. 9 (2010).

What China's reluctance to open its foreign policies to increased explicitness and foreign actor feedback does represent, however, is how the interconnectedness of the international system as a whole constrains policy choices.<sup>142</sup> States do not typically abide losing freedom of action, but it is increasingly necessary in order to participate in the international system. No state can exist in isolation in the world anymore, and the better a state can align its foreign policies to build shared prosperity within the international system, the higher the value of T will be after it makes its return trip from abroad in the foreign policy system.

*h. The Role of Secrets: Explicitly, Behind Closed Doors*

While a key theme of this thesis is the importance of increasing the quantity and explicitness of public expressions of a state's foreign policy, there is still an important role for the secret communication of explicit foreign policies via non-transparent diplomatic channels. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville disparaged the inability of democracies to skillfully develop and execute foreign policies; democracies, he noted, lack prudence, patience, and the ability to keep secrets, all of which foreign affairs sometimes requires.<sup>143</sup> In this point, he clearly expressed a dilemma that still persists in the creation and execution of foreign policies: the need for openness in the creation of foreign policies, and some measure of secrecy and professionalism in their execution.<sup>144</sup> Until 1918, many monarchs fancied themselves to be their own best foreign diplomat.<sup>145</sup> In response to such an old-fashioned perspective, to which Klemens von Metternich might have agreed that it is dangerous for the public to have knowledge of foreign policy,

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<sup>142</sup> Robert Axelrod, *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 29.

<sup>143</sup> Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy*, xi.

<sup>144</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 12. See *Ibid.*, 246 for how foreign policy should never be secret to a domestic audience, but foreign negotiation (diplomacy) should be. Within democracies, this dilemma is symbolized in the difference between procedural democracy and substantive democracy; whereas procedural democracy relies on elected individuals to represent the national interest in whatever way they see fit, substantive democracy demands that the public have a direct say in policies, i.e., Nacos, *Decisionmaking in a Glass*, 223.

<sup>145</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 65.

George Canning posits that public opinion can be a tool more powerful than armies.<sup>146</sup> In practice, both opinions have a role to play. There are many circumstances in which the content of negotiations that lead to the establishment of consensus over foreign policies should remain confidential.<sup>147</sup> That being said, even though there is definitely a case for treaties to be negotiated behind closed doors, those the doors should be opened wide once consensus transforms into a mutually agreeable treaty.<sup>148</sup> Secrecy can have both positive and negative effects on T in the foreign policy system.

*i. The Role of Node Connections in the Foreign Policy System: Degradation of Intent*

The final element of the foreign policy system that I explored in depth is one which has little academic literature from which to draw vis-à-vis the foreign policy system, but which has great detrimental impact on the foreign policy system as a whole: the connections between elemental nodes in the foreign policy system. Conceptually, the existence of these node connections is obvious once they are pointed out, but their effects can be hidden and quite heinous. Each nodal element in the foreign policy system needs to be able to communicate with other nodes in some way. For example, in non-dictatorial, representative governments, citizens communicate with their representative leaders in a variety of ways: through votes in democratic elections, political demonstrations in the streets, non-violent resistance, letter-writing, *et cetera*. Government representatives like the President of the United States then decide upon foreign policies that satisfy the balance of domestic and foreign demand signals, and then publish those foreign policies for action to their subordinates. Those subordinates, in turn, create bureaucratic administrative and operational structures that can translate the President's foreign policies into the subordinate, detailed instructions required to satisfactorily execute the President's

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>147</sup> Thomas Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 101.

<sup>148</sup> Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy*, 170. Also see Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, 1 for how a line should be drawn between keeping the public informed and keeping negotiations with foreign governments secret, and see Ibid., 6 for how secrets form an inevitable part of democracy and how Constitutions should provide for checks and balances.

stated foreign policy objectives. While each step in this process sounds reasonable to those that are accustomed to such a hierarchical system, each method of communication contains some measure of inefficiency at transmitting the foreign policy intent of the governed to those that are executing the operations and tactics at the pointy end of the foreign policy system (i.e., DOS Foreign Service Officers, or DOD Foreign Area Officers). Anyone that has ever played the game “telephone” with 15 elementary school first graders knows how quickly a message can degrade when it passes through multiple nodes in such a communication system.<sup>149</sup> This degradation can be improved in two ways: 1. reduce the number of nodes between the first and the last student, and 2. allow the students to write the message down. While most great powers are better at communicating amongst themselves than first graders, where inefficiencies exist there is always room for improvement.

Fundamentally, the problem of optimizing the communication of foreign policies between nodes in the foreign policy system has to do with the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi explore the optimization of the knowledge transfer process in great detail in their 1995 book “The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation.” The authors argue that Japanese companies have historically succeeded because they have good organizational knowledge creation processes and are good at sharing knowledge internally.<sup>150</sup> They define two types of knowledge:

1. Explicit Knowledge: that knowledge which is articulated in formal language and can be shared between individuals easily<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> In the game “telephone,” an initial (somewhat complex) statement is given to the person at the front of a line of participants and is instructed to memorize the statement they heard, word-for-word, and repeat it to the person standing behind them. After each person has transferred the message and it reaches the end of the line, the last person shares the message that they received with the whole group. Inevitably, comedy ensues.

<sup>150</sup> Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, *The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), viii. Also see James Womack and Daniel Jones and Daniel Roos, *The Machine that Changed the World* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991), 63.

<sup>151</sup> Nonaka, *The Knowledge-Creating Company*, viii.

2. Tacit Knowledge: intangible experience, beliefs, and perspectives that are difficult to codify<sup>152</sup>

From within knowledge-creating systems, they argue, new knowledge is always created by the individual,<sup>153</sup> and is matured and made more explicit by group feedback mechanisms.<sup>154</sup> The resulting knowledge creation feedback loop improves the explicitness of the shared ideas, the strength of the consensus built around them,<sup>155</sup> and the ability for individual actors to pursue their functional goals autonomously within the autopoietic system, yet within the functional boundaries defined by the larger system.<sup>156</sup> The authors go so far as to find corollaries to this autopoietic system in the U.S. military; they note how the U.S. military is bureaucratic in peacetime but function-oriented through task forces in wartime.<sup>157</sup> Bureaucratic organizational structures work fine when conditions are stable, but task forces function well in dynamic situations.<sup>158</sup> The key to the success of function-oriented task forces is their ability to operate autonomously based on simple, explicit instructions before a situation occurs. By making their policies clear in the form of a set of explicit orders, a commander enables their subordinates to act freely within certain constraints.

This concept of improving the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge so as to enable more nodes in the system to act autonomously is fundamental to the improvement of the transfer of foreign policies between nodes in the foreign policy system. In order for all nodes in the foreign policy system to act in concert, foreign policies must be made explicit. Also, by making foreign policies explicit, all nodes in the system can interact with foreign policies more directly, removing the distortional effects of intermediary nodes that get between citizens and their foreign policy executive agents.

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Nonaka, *The Knowledge-Creating Company*, 13 and 239.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 161.

The net effect of improving the quality of node connections and reducing the quantity of required nodes between foreign policy decision and foreign policy action is to increase the amount of T present in the foreign policy system at the point of execution.

*j. The Elements in Summary: A System of Communicating Nodes*

If states focus on identifying, publishing openly, and fine-tuning the full spectrum of foreign policies that guide their actions, they can dramatically improve the effectiveness of the execution of their foreign policies. Each of the elements of the foreign policy system described in depth above plays a key role in the successful functioning of the system as a whole, but each element can only perform as well as the nodes can communicate with each other. In order to improve the efficiency of the foreign policy system and thereby improve its effectiveness, hierarchical control over foreign policy decision-making should be replaced by “distributed decision-making, delegated authority, and bureaucratic streamlining.”<sup>159</sup> Improving the efficiency with which all nodes in the foreign policy system can act in harmonic execution of common foreign policies also opens up the system to safe, focused, and effective participation by a wider variety of well-intentioned stakeholders, like NGOs, businesses, international organizations, and individual citizens.<sup>160</sup> When each of those actors helps to carry foreign policy messages and action to foreign entities, the amount of T brought to bear in the execution of foreign policies is increased. The pitfalls of not doing so are clear. In China, Hainan Province unilaterally issued controversial passports that contained a graphic that explicitly showed Chinese claims to the South China Sea; the national government moved quickly to withdraw them.<sup>161</sup> In the U.S., after China announced its East China Sea (ECS) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in late 2013, the apparent

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<sup>159</sup> Fulton, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information*, xiii.

<sup>160</sup> Cameron, *China's Foreign Policy under the New*, xiv and xv.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

contradiction between the initial responses of the DOS and DOD,<sup>162</sup> and that of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) required amplifying remarks to smooth over confusion on the part of Japan and others. Both of these mistakes could have been avoided. Large, complex systems need both efficient and accurate methods of communication.<sup>163</sup> With the overall structure of the foreign policy system thus defined at great length in this subsection, I will now consolidate them into a generalized flow structure.

## **5. Section Conclusion: Trusted Emissaries, Effective Foreign Policies**

With all of the elements of the foreign policy system described in depth above, in the rest of this chapter I will model the U.S. foreign policy system as it exists today, and then streamline that model with a supply chain analysis by discovering systemic inefficiencies.

### **B. CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM FLOW MODEL: HIGH LOSS OF T THROUGH FILTERS**

Though it contains the inefficiencies described above, there is a definable path from U.S. citizens to the boots and wingtips on the ground executing U.S. foreign policy. What follows is a step-by-step systemic flow walkthrough of a single U.S. foreign policy. The focus of this flow analysis is to determine where Trust (T) is lost as it flows through the system.

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<sup>162</sup> See Tom Shanker, "U.S. Sends Two B-52 Bombers Into Air Zone Claimed by China," *New York Times*, accessed: Nov. 30, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/world/asia/us-flies-b-52s-into-chinas-expanded-air-defense-zone.html?partner=rss&emc=rss> for how the DOD sent B-52s through the declared ADIZ to send a message. See Leslie Wroughton and Manuel Mogato, "Kerry plays down tension with China in maritime disputes," Reuters, accessed Dec. 20, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-philippines-usa-china-idUSBRE9BG0CH20131217> for how Secretary of State Kerry played down the tension of the situation. See Paul Joseph Watson, "Our Warships Rival U.S. Navy, Brags Chinese PLA," Infowars, accessed July 12, 2013, <http://www.infowars.com/our-warships-rival-u-s-navy-brags-chinese-pla/> for the confusion that followed. Also see Sourabh Gupta, "Resolving the Phony Battle of the Competing ADIZs," East Asia Forum, accessed Dec. 12, 2013, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/12/22/resolving-the-phony-battle-of-the-competing-adizs/> for further discussion.

<sup>163</sup> Fulton, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information*, 1.

### **1. Step 1 (Node): U.S. Citizens (T-Max)**

As stakeholders in the success of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. citizens build up legitimacy for foreign policies in a variety of ways: voting, tweeting, protesting, writing their Congressmen, lobbying, complaining on national TV, etc. The end result of this back-and-forth debate with leaders is either a strong enough consensus on foreign policies to keep those leaders in office, the failure of those leaders in the following election, or the forcible impeachment of those leaders.<sup>164</sup> Here, T is at its maximum value.

### **2. Step 1.5 (Connection): Filtered Connections to Leaders (T-Loss)**

Based on the medium that citizens use to transmit foreign policy opinions to their leaders, there is significant loss in the transmission of citizen intent to their leaders. The translation of citizen demands into their corresponding national foreign policy equivalents is currently an imprecise process because citizens *en masse* have no way to target their messaging at in-common, specific, explicitly defined foreign policies. Congressional lobbyists are better at targeting their messages because they understand the inner workings of how policies can be influenced.

### **3. Step 2 (Node): National Leadership (T-Loss)**

Both the Congress and the president try their best to listen to the American public, but at times the messages they receive are filtered through their own political biases and agendas. The foreign policies that get turned into reality may or may not be exactly representative of the national consensus, no matter how good political polling may be. A T-Loss occurs here, due to the personal biases of national leaders themselves.

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<sup>164</sup> See Eline Severs, Alexander Mattelaer, *A Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy? It's about Legitimation, Stupid!* (Brussels, BE: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, 2014), 2 for how governments can only continue to survive if they have the support of their citizens.

**4. Step 2.5 (Connection): Filtered Policies and Disaggregated Guidance (T-Loss)**

National leadership does their best to codify U.S. foreign policy in a variety of ways: acts of Congress, public statements to the media, broad and sweeping national policy documents that provide guidance to Executive Department forces, *et cetera*. Taken as a whole, this disaggregated guidance serves as the full body of U.S. foreign policy, but it is likely impossible for anyone to keep track of it all or reference it to assure themselves and others of the justification for their own U.S. foreign policy-related actions.

**5. Step 3 (Node): Domestic Executors and Foreign Actors (T-Loss)**

Both domestic and foreign actors receive the tidbits of U.S. foreign policy that are directed most pointedly at them, and thereafter attempt to respond appropriately under the assumption that what they are receiving is official U.S. foreign policy. Both sides begin the process of attempting to respond to the foreign policy signaling they receive, but the results of their deliberation receive little feedback from the general public, and is thus subject to the personal biases and filters of the unelected members of the Executive Branch. Thus, a T-Loss occurs here.

**6. Step 3.5 (Connection): Domestic Executors Transform Foreign Policies into Action (T-Loss)**

Through various chains of command, actors in the Executive Department like the DOS and DOD scour existing policy documents, take directives from meetings with superiors, engage in communication via email, and do many other things to help clarify for themselves what the foreign policies are that they need to plan to execute. Executive Department actors then transform this policy guidance into the strategies, operations, and tactics used to satisfy the nation's policy objectives. Unfortunately, members of the Executive Department are trying to do so with twice-filtered, disaggregated foreign policies as a starting point. Also, the U.S. public has little-to-no opportunity to provide

input on the development of these strategies, operations, and tactics.<sup>165</sup> After deciding upon courses of action by which to execute foreign policies, domestic executors transmit words and action to foreign actors.

#### **7. Step 4 (Node): Foreign Actors**

Foreign actors listen for as many tidbits of twice-filtered, disaggregated foreign policies as they can and try to “read the tea leaves” in order to understand the *real* message the U.S. is sending them. Messages to foreign governments often take the form of American media statements, domestic American legislation, military deployments, or DOS messaging.

#### **8. Step 4.5 (Connection): Foreign Actors Respond through Filtered Connections (T-Loss)**

Without a way to accurately target their return messaging, foreign actors respond to U.S. actions with actions that fall somewhere along the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness, but it is frequently unclear to what specific U.S. foreign policies they are responding.

#### **9. Step 5 (Node): Domestic Actors**

Provided they are paying close enough attention to the outside world and know how to recognize the foreign policy signaling they are being sent by foreign actors, domestic actors receive some amount of feedback response vis-à-vis their actions. As an example of what this and the next step entail, the DOS recently started to use social networks like Twitter to digitally monitor foreign actor response and associate it as feedback to particular U.S. foreign policies.<sup>166</sup> Such semantic association of foreign policy to feedback is a great step in the right direction, and is emblematic of the types of

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<sup>165</sup> Only in particularly egregious, isolated cases like Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay does the public get to have a say, but this is often after damage has been done.

<sup>166</sup> Matthew Wallin, “Tara Sonenshine on Measuring the Effectiveness of Public Diplomacy,” The American Security Project, accessed Aug. 5, 2013, <http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/tara-sonenshine-on-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-public-diplomacy/>.

communication efficiency gains that can be had by having explicit foreign policies around which to organize digital foreign policy networks.<sup>167</sup>

**10. Step 5.5 (Connection): Domestic Actors Filter the Feedback in a Variety of Ways (T-Loss)**

Taking the foreign actor feedback that they detected, domestic actors then try to figure out what the signals from the outside world *mean*, and, after making assumptions that are certainly the product of bias filters, associate the feedback with particular foreign policies to which they believe the foreign actors are responding. Domestic actors like the government and the media then turn this messaging around and inform the American public through a wide variety of communication channels. Bias is introduced when the government and the media decide what external feedback is important enough to report to the American people.

**11. Step 6 (Node): U.S. Citizens (T-Min)**

Finally, after having gone through so many distortional nodes and connections, U.S. citizens receive filtered feedback from the outside world (via biased domestic sources) in response to the foreign policies for which they provided the original source of legitimacy. U.S. citizens then have the opportunity to adjust their opinions and support for particular foreign policies again, restarting the feedback loop to Step 1.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> See Serge Abiteboul et. al., *Web Data Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) for a fantastic overview of how extensible and semantic data management frameworks like XML form the backbone of the semantic web on the Internet. Also see Bernard Lunn, "RDFa Support: How Do Google, Facebook & Twitter Compare? And How Will This Impact Their Position In The Semantic Search Engine Market?," *Semantic Web*, accessed Oct. 10, 2013, [http://semanticweb.com/rdfa-support-how-do-google-facebook-twitter-compare-and-how-will-this-impact-their-position-in-the-semantic-search-engine-market\\_b672](http://semanticweb.com/rdfa-support-how-do-google-facebook-twitter-compare-and-how-will-this-impact-their-position-in-the-semantic-search-engine-market_b672) for a great explanation of the current battle over semantic web frameworks in which RDFa is currently in the lead.

<sup>168</sup> See Jonathan Pinkus, "Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide," *Journal of Strategic Security* 7, no. 1 (2013), 33 for the argument that intelligence assessments should be released to the public directly by intelligence organizations, rather than being filtered through political institutions first.

## Current Foreign Policy System Flow Model

**Weaknesses:**

- Lack of consensus on content of existing foreign policy
- High Loss of T through filters between system elements
- Unfocused feedback from foreign states




Figure 1. Current Foreign Policy System Flow Model<sup>169</sup>

### C. FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The weaknesses in the systemic flow above are fairly obvious, but not insurmountable. A common weakness in all the connective steps is that both foreign and domestic actors are forced to dig through every public statement that they can get their hands on in order to get a holistic picture of U.S. foreign policy. As it stands, there is no integrative framework that can consolidate U.S. foreign policy and remove the effects of the various filtering mechanisms. As Henry Kissinger has aptly noted, consultation with foreign powers on policy issues is difficult without “an integrating over-all framework” that makes it clear what the central issues under discussion are.<sup>170</sup> Systems engineering

<sup>169</sup> All graphics in this thesis were created by the author.

<sup>170</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 74.

can provide some clarity to how foreign policies could be presented under such a framework.

### **1. Basic Systems Engineering Principles: Modularity, Uniqueness, and Exchange**

The systems engineering principles of modularity, uniqueness, and exchange are the foundations upon which strong systems are formed.<sup>171</sup> I reviewed systems engineering literature in search of a way to remove inefficiencies in foreign policy systems and quantitatively validate whether making foreign policies more explicit actually improves the relationship between two states. In describing systems that have been engineered with multiple stakeholders in mind, Gary Langford notes that strategies should be aligned “toward a common goal” from the outset in order to improve outcomes. The resulting level of integration of the elements of the system is only as good as the level to which it reflects stakeholder requirements.<sup>172</sup> Integrated systems are made up of parts that create a complete system: relations, characteristics, and unity.<sup>173</sup> In his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis “The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work,” Olav Schram Stokke also shows that there is still difficulty in defining the nature of the connections between independent nodes in an institutional interplay taxonomy. A system that visualizes this taxonomy but is flexible enough to change the values of its node connections is the best foundation from which to start explicitly defining the value of relationships (concurrency and non-concurrency) on specific issues.<sup>174</sup> In other words, the U.S.-China relationship is best served when the

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<sup>171</sup> Hereafter I use “modularity” and “uniqueness” synonymously with term “explicitness” that I have used previously in this thesis. I do so in order to avoid confusion with standard systems engineering terminology. Additionally, it is actually a combination of the meanings behind the concepts of modularity and uniqueness are closest to the meaning of explicitness as I have used it thus far.

<sup>172</sup> Langford, *Toward A General Theory*, 12. Additionally, also see Dennis Buede, *The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 182 for how, even though MOEs are generally measured from outside a system, the further outside the system MOEs are measured, the more noise they are subjected to. Translated into context, the domestic stakeholders in a foreign policy system are the best judges of the system's effectiveness.

<sup>173</sup> Langford, *Toward A General Theory*, 60.

<sup>174</sup> Olav Schram Stokke, *The Interplay of International Regimes: Putting Effectiveness Theory to Work* (Lysaker, Norway: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2001), 23.

policies of both parties are made explicit and the relationships between each others' policies are made clear. The importance of explicitly-stated policies is most visible in the agreements that states must sign in order to participate in international institutions; these agreements, like the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), form the nodes around which networks of both action and international discussion are built.

While Professor Langford describes the fundamental units of exchange between nodes in a system as being Energy, Matter, Material wealth, and Information (EMMI), his study does not explicitly apply EMMI to the operation and behavior of a foreign policy system. Further discussions with Professor Langford as an advisor on this thesis have led to the conclusion that the concept of EMMI is extensible to foreign policy systems.<sup>175</sup> Based on Russ Berkoff's NPS thesis on "Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,"<sup>176</sup> the aforementioned work by Stokke, and work by Leon Fuerth and Evan Farber,<sup>177</sup> I posit that individual foreign policies are the fundamental, independent systemic nodes in the foreign policy system, and can therefore benefit from being modular and unique.

## **2. Applying Systems Engineering Principles to Foreign Policies: Building Blocks**

A foreign policy that is both modular and unique has a few key characteristics that make it compatible not only with one state's foreign policy, but has the potential to help all states' foreign policies more compatibly interact. A foreign policy that is modular, like

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<sup>175</sup> NPS thesis advisor meeting, Oct. 31, 2013.

<sup>176</sup> Berkoff, *Artificial Intelligence and Foreign*, 162.

<sup>177</sup> Leon Fuerth and Evan Faber, *Anticipatory Governance: Winning the Future* (Bethesda, MD: The Futurist, 2013).

“Build Security Globally,”<sup>178</sup> is a discrete, explicit statement of foreign policy. Its modularity allows it to be pointed to as a reference node not only by subordinate foreign policies, but also by strategies devised to enable its achievement, operations undertaken to achieve strategic effects, and tactics used in particular operations. At each step, modular nodes in this chain should ideally have the ability to trace their origin of legitimacy back to “Build Security Globally.” The benefits of such modularity are numerous. Provided the “Build Security Globally” foreign policy is advertised widely enough as official, top-level U.S. foreign policy, domestic actors like NGOs and corporations that would not normally align their actions with U.S. foreign policy may rally around such a common national policy, focus their actions in its pursuit, and appropriately report achievement metrics in a way that can provide feedback into the system. As it stands, though, “Build Security Globally” as a potentially modular and universally acceptable foreign policy is trapped inside the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), tainted somewhat by its primary association to the U.S. military. Finding foreign policy consensus between two states can be challenging,<sup>179</sup> but a singular collection of modular foreign policies like “Build Security Globally” that can be referenced by both subordinate U.S. organizations like the DOS and DOD and foreign

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<sup>178</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014: Fact Sheet* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014). Per Max Stier, Lloyd Howell, *Building the Enterprise: Nine Strategies for a More Integrated, Effective Government* (Washington, DC: Booz Allen Hamilton Partnership for Public Service, 2013), 4, this is an example of a cross-cutting goal that single federal agencies are incapable of addressing alone. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Results-Oriented Government: Practices that can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies*, GAO Report GAO-06-15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004), 10 for how the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) asserts that the definition of “common outcomes” and “compatible policies” is the top key to creating collaboration between federal agencies.

<sup>179</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 12.

countries alike has the potential to unify a great deal of global effort around a set of common objectives.<sup>180</sup>

Uniqueness is a principle that has come to the forefront of systems engineering in the past few decades as a primary means of organization in the field of Internet data management, but it is also directly compatible with the concept of modularity. Within digital systems, uniqueness allows individual entities to be targeted directly. For example, each Uniform Resource Locator (URL) on the internet is a unique address for the content that lies behind it.<sup>181</sup> As a complementary example, in Twitter, each hashtag (#) label like “#Diplomacy”, “#ForeignPolicy”, and “#Russia” serves as a unique digital reference at which individual tweets can be targeted, and around which a chaotic and global conversation on those topics can be aggregated. In the midst of chaotic systems, uniqueness provides a framework around which to build organized systems. A similar usage of uniqueness is readily applicable to foreign policies that have been made modular, broadcast publicly, and made digitally accessible. Not only can subordinate strategies, operations, and tactics in the foreign policy system be sourced through linked chains back to the uniquely identified policy “Build Security Globally,” a whole host of other aspects of the foreign policy system can be directly linked as well. For example, all the metrics identified as being germane to the effective execution of “Build Security Globally” can be easily aggregated digitally and used to evaluate the performance of the

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<sup>180</sup> See 三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング (Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting), 諸外国における業績目標の達成度の把握に関する調査研究 (*Research into Understanding the Measurement of Effectiveness in Foreign Businesses*) (Japanese Government: 日本総務省 (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), 2005) for an analysis of the different ways that different countries assess the effectiveness of their foreign diplomacy programs. The report specifically analyzes the differing methods of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and Canada. Some countries call them “Strategic Objectives”, or “Outcomes”, or “Effectiveness of Contributions to Outcomes”, but they are all attempting to measure the same thing: whether the government's actions are contributing effectively to the government's goals.

<sup>181</sup> Lunn, *RDFa Support*, 2:00.

foreign policy system as a whole.<sup>182</sup> The same could be done for the budgeting that is applied to the full spectrum of U.S. activities undertaken in support of “Build Security Globally.” The two fundamental systems engineering concepts of modularity and uniqueness form the foundation of an optimized foreign policy system.

#### **D. FLOW OPTIMIZATION: THE FOREIGN POLICY SUPPLY CHAIN**

With the fundamental systems engineering principles of modularity and uniqueness thus defined, I will describe the supply chain model that will form the basis for the development of an improved foreign policy system flow.

##### **1. The Supply Chain: A Tool for System Flow Analysis**

Many organizations use supply chain modeling to determine how effective they are at utilizing resources toward the execution of their organizational mandate;<sup>183</sup> supply chain modeling can similarly be used to discover whether the U.S. is using its foreign policy system resources, namely legitimacy in the form of Trust (T), in the most effective way possible. Within industry, supply chain modeling is made fairly simple by the

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<sup>182</sup> See Fiorenzo Franceschini and Maurizio Galetto and Domenico Maisano, *Management by Measurement: Designing Key Indicators and Performance Measurement Systems* (New York, NY: Springer, 2007), 8 for how every metric should have a specific target for which it is being measured; without a target, there is no reason for something to be measured. Also see Kaufmann, *Aggregating Governance Indicators* for the methods and usefulness of creating aggregate indicators. Also see George Yee, *The State and Scientific Basis of Cyber Security Metrics: Including Canadian Perspectives* (Ottawa, CR: Defence R&D Canada, 2012), 1 for how a metric should be capable of being represented as a point in time progressing either toward or away from a goal.

<sup>183</sup> See Steve New, *Supply Chains: Construction and Legitimation* (UK: Oxford University, 2004) and Jeremy Shapiro, *Modeling the Supply Chain* (Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury, 2004) and Christopher Tang and Chung-Piaw Teo and Kwok Kee Wei, *Supply Chain Analysis: A Handbook on the Interaction of Information, System and Optimization* (Stanford, CA: Springer, 2008) and Larry Klapper et. al., *Supply Chain Management: A Recommended Performance Measurement Scorecard* (McLean, VA: Logistics Management Institute, 1999) and Douglas Lambert, *Supply Chain Management: Processes, Partnerships, Performance* (Sarasota, FL: Supply Chain Management Institute, 2008) and Marc Goetschalckx, *Supply Chain Engineering* (New York, NY: Springer, 2011) for an explanation of supply chain engineering. I chose to use a supply chain model because, similar to logistics management systems, I understand foreign policies as systems of legitimacy that contain a flow of resources between nodes in the system. Additionally, *Ibid.*, 13 explains that the resources that flow through the a supply chain system can be “materials,” “information,” or “monetary,” among likely many other things. This turned out to be fundamentally compatible with the systems engineering concept of EMMI explicated in Langford, *Toward A General Theory*.

existence of obvious performance metrics.<sup>184</sup> Companies manufacture products for one price, and attempt to distribute and sell products for a higher price. Any reductions in profitability that result from the supply chain between production and sale are reduced in order to maximize profitability. Publicly-traded corporations also benefit from an external valuation of supply chain effectiveness in the form of stock prices. The net result of having a currency by which to evaluate system effectiveness is an increase in the ease with which the efficiency of the system can be visualized and optimized in a variety of ways. A corporation that is sourcing materials from two companies may try to consolidate their orders toward a single source in order to achieve economies of scale and better prices. A factory that discovers certain employees can be made redundant because of process improvements may certainly consider relocating those employees elsewhere. As a corollary to the use of money as a currency in business systems, I propose that Trust (T) can be used as a currency to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign policy systems.

## **2. The “Stuff” That Flows: Trust (T)**

I have thus far made passing mention to Trust (T) and "T-Loss" in this thesis, but have not yet provided an explanation of its function as a currency in foreign policy systems. I am not the first person to consider the use of trust as a currency. Though it serves as a somewhat trite example, Harold Nicolson asserts that trust was the currency of pre-1918 old diplomacy, but believes that it has been replaced as valid “coinage” by the willingness of diplomats to brazenly lie to achieve state objectives.<sup>185</sup> I use T in a somewhat different, but not incompatible sense. Within the foreign policy system, T is built up primarily by the citizens of a country that, through participation with their representatives in government, provide legitimacy to the foreign policies that are decided upon and executed by agents of the state. The measurement of some precise value of T by some combination of relative or direct metrics is not consequential for the purposes of

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<sup>184</sup> See Carl Hoffmann and Eric Lesser and Tim Ringo, *Calculating Success: How the New Workplace Analytics Will Revitalize Your Organization* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012), 1 for how strategic vision must be balanced against the resources required to achieve it, and how metrics are used to ensure an organization is using resources effectively.

<sup>185</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 245.

this study, but would nevertheless make for an interesting study. In measuring the effectiveness of the foreign policy system, it is only necessary to focus on how T degrades as it passes through the system and eventually finds its way back to its source where it can be recharged. As shown in the model of the existing U.S. foreign policy system above, the value of T is degraded in a variety of ways at each step of the foreign policy supply chain. Using the value of T as a feedback mechanism, it is now easier to see where foreign policy system efficiencies can be discovered. Just as corporations seek to maximize profit, states should seek to maximize T in their foreign policies. Taking into consideration the systems engineering principles of modularity and uniqueness explored above, in the next section I provide an example of how the U.S. foreign policy system could be structured in order to maximize T.

#### **E. MAXIMIZING T: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN POLICIES**

In order to maximize T, all foreign policies should be consolidated into a single, authoritative, publicly accessible repository. The reason for this is that it focuses the foreign policy system as a whole on specific and common objectives, from initial debate to foreign policy execution. Various aspects of the foreign policy “Build Security Globally” can be achieved in an unimaginable variety of ways. So many possibilities exist, in fact, that centralized planning of all the potentially positive activities to be undertaken in support of this objective could never hope to define them all.<sup>186</sup> Foreign policy objectives can be achieved in a wide variety of ways by a wide variety of actors, but the foreign policies themselves must first be consolidated and agreed upon before they can form the foundation of such a network.

In comparison to the less effective foreign policy system flow described above, a more efficient and effective path exists between U.S. citizens and the boots and wingtips

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<sup>186</sup> The occasional utility of disaggregation does not imply that there will ever come a day when the usefulness of the effects brought about by DOS or DOD efforts toward accomplishing “Build Global Security” will ever be eclipsed by non-government actors, but the described system at least provides a context within which broader participation can occur in line with the national interest, and in line with a more harmonized DOS and DOD effort as well.

on the ground executing U.S. foreign policy. What follows is a step-by-step walkthrough of a streamlined U.S. foreign policy systemic flow. The focus of this flow analysis is to show where Trust (T) that was lost in the previous system can be regained as it flows through this system. Of note, inherent in the background of this streamlined system flow is the existence of a robust implementation of the afore-described consolidated system of foreign policies built on systems engineering principles; I generically call this system the Foreign Policy System (FPS).

***a. Step 1 (Node): U.S. Citizens. (T-Max)***

Within the context of existing social networking tools that have created systems compatible and integrated with the U.S. FPS, U.S. citizens participate in ongoing discussions about the merits of specific foreign policies. Much of this discussion is noise, but occasionally specific and well-reasoned recommendations bubble up from places like academia and gain traction.

***b. Step 2 (Node): National Leadership.***

Through automated systems of their own, both Congress and the president monitor the consolidated feedback targeted at the FPS by every social network of significance. Thus informed by fluctuations and trends in the national interest, national leaders begin conversations on how to adapt specific foreign policies and their execution to better satisfy the national interest. Because citizens are providing feedback on every foreign policy in the FPS all at once, and doing so directly within context, the T-Loss in the previous system flow's Step 1.5 is mitigated. The previous T-Loss incurred by the biases of national leaders is also better mitigated by the improved citizen oversight capability brought about by increased foreign policy explicitness.

***c. Step 3 (Node): Domestic and Foreign Actors.***

As soon as an official change to U.S. foreign policy is registered to the FPS, both domestic and foreign actors are notified of the change immediately. Domestic actors with the U.S. Executive Branch, like the DOS and DOD can immediately begin adjusting all subordinate strategies, operations, and tactics to fall in line with the new foreign policy

realities. Foreign actors will have to wait for the results of these domestic adjustments, but at the very least they have an official, updated U.S. foreign policy to which they can reorient their own state's foreign policies. Because both domestic and foreign actors are reorienting based on a single source of U.S. foreign policy, the T-Loss in the previous system flow's Step 2.5 is mitigated.

*d. Step 4 (Node): Foreign Actors.*

In receipt of both U.S. foreign policy statements and action after U.S. actors have completed adjusting to the new foreign policy and begun to implement strategies, operations, and tactics based on it, foreign actors have a chance to provide feedback on the full spectrum of U.S. actions associated with the foreign policy. Their feedback is targeted not into the “void,” but digitally at the U.S. FPS. Because foreign actors are targeting feedback at specific U.S. foreign policies in the FPS, the T-Loss in the previous system flow's Step 3.5 is mitigated.

*e. Step 5 (Node): U.S. Citizens.*

Within the context of the specific foreign policies that they are interested in, and within their social networks of choice, U.S. citizens receive direct and official responses from foreign countries to the foreign policies they are interested in. Because the filtering and explaining role of the U.S. domestic government and media can be bypassed, the T-Loss in the previous system flow's Steps 4.5, 5, and 5.5 are mitigated.

## Idealized Foreign Policy System Flow Model

### Strengths:

- All elements share consensus on content of existing foreign policy
- Loss of T mitigated by removing filtered access to foreign policy content
- Foreign states respond to same foreign policy content as domestic elements




Figure 2. Idealized Foreign Policy System Flow Model

With all foreign policies thus aggregated in a modular and digitally targetable format with unique identifiers, domestic and global actors can begin to digitally link specific strategies, operations, tactics, metrics, budgeting, and other associated entities to their appropriate foreign policies.<sup>187</sup> The spontaneous growth that such a system should expect would have been scarcely imaginable a few decades ago, but such so-called

<sup>187</sup> See Patrick Sweeney, *A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2013), 11 for how the APEX national security strategy planning system was designed specifically to allow viewers of strategic objectives to drill all the way down into supporting tactical activities, providing a complete semantic linkage. All the system is missing is the policies that inform the top-level strategies. Also see Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 5-0: Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), ix for how strategic direction focuses the whole national security system: “Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, JFCs, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force.”

“network effects” are increasingly studied to determine commonalities and associated externalities.<sup>188</sup> The end result of this thought experiment is a potentially very agile and responsive global foreign policy network. There is ample cause for concern about the realities that implementing various aspects of this system would bring about, but the fact that it reduces T, leading to a theoretical increase in the effectiveness of the system as a whole, is clear. In order to determine whether such a system is truly benign, a robust network of associated metrics will need to be attached to it.

## **F. UP NEXT: APPLICABILITY TO U.S.-CHINA FOREIGN RELATIONS**

The discovery of communication-based weaknesses in generalized foreign policy systems is highly germane to the failures and successes of U.S.-China foreign relations since 1949. In a recent piece reported on by the Korea Herald, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Locklear stressed the importance of explicit foreign policy signaling and communication when he highlighted “. . .the need to establish a key military communication channel with China.” He said, “I don’t have the ability to pick up a phone and talk directly to a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy admiral or general at the time of a crisis. And we need to work on that.”<sup>189</sup> There is great risk in silence, and even greater risk in the misinterpretation of inexplicit foreign policy actions. The only way to mitigate this risk is to communicate foreign policy intent better by doing so more explicitly, and consequently more efficiently and more effectively. Though the results of my analysis of foreign policy systems from a systems engineering perspective in this chapter seem to assert that increasing foreign policy explicitness improves the stability and effectiveness of the foreign policy system as a whole, it remains to be seen how the concept of foreign policy explicitness functions in reality; for this, we need an empirical example, and the U.S.-China relationship since 1949 provides the perfect opportunity to examine a state-state dyad from the ground-up. When the U.S. and China had no paths

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<sup>188</sup> See Vern Clark, Michael Haggee, *FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2005), 5 for how Vern Clark and Michael Haggee imagined that the usefulness of FORCEnet network services would exponentially increase as the number of users increased.

<sup>189</sup> The Korea Herald, “U.S. Updating N.K. Contingency Plans: Pacific Commander,” The Korea Herald, accessed Feb. 14, 2014, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140124000473>.

for diplomatic communication, the Korean War was a result. Once national leaders were communicating, the foundation for future growth was established. Finally, once particular political and economic policies were made explicit enough to allow disaggregated collaboration by a large array of national actors, the stability and mutual productivity of the U.S.-China relationship began to reach the point where it is now. I explore the role of foreign policy explicitness in shaping these realities in the next chapter.

#### **G. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CONCLUSION: INCREASE MODULARITY AND UNIQUENESS**

In this chapter I explored foreign policies from a systems engineering perspective and discovered that there are potentially highly beneficial gains to be made by increasing the explicitness of foreign policies. Within the systems engineering context, explicitness takes the form of modularity and uniqueness, and when properly implemented these properties can mitigate some of the inefficiencies that can arise in the connections between nodes in the foreign policy system. A digital foreign policy system built upon these principles has the potential to greatly streamline the feedback loop between citizens, their national leaders, and interested foreign actors vis-à-vis specific foreign policies,<sup>190</sup> and thereby improve the effectiveness of those foreign policies. The next chapter is focused on the history of U.S.-China relations since 1949 and the role that foreign policy explicitness has played in shaping that relationship's growth.

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<sup>190</sup> See Sheila Ronis, *Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex Future* (Carlisle, PA: The United States Army War College, 2013), 16 for how policies can only be improved through a systematic feedback loop that directly associates metrics to policies so that stakeholders can agree on how to measure and periodically reassess what their government is trying to execute. Such a system will also likely be more resilient and robust than the traditional system, and loosen the influence coupling of any particular individual or institution. See Scott Hatch, "Managing the "Reliability Cycle": An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure," *Studies in Intelligence* 57, no. 2 (2013), 35 for a discussion of the perils of "tight coupling."

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### III. THE INCREASING EXPLICITNESS OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

In this chapter I examine key inflection points in U.S.-China relations since the founding of the People's Republic of China and determine the role that the explicitness of foreign policies played in the improvement of U.S.-China relations.<sup>191</sup> A key fundamental question that it helps to keep in mind at each step in this investigation is “by what means are the U.S. and China communicating, and where does that communication fall on the *foreign policy explicitness spectrum*?” In the midst of a hurricane of domestic and international events, crafting and transmitting foreign policy is not easy. An important thing to remember is that from the perspective of a state, foreign policy is crafted to satisfy the “national interest,” and despite each state's unique internal complexities, foreign policies present a state as a unitary whole to the world. Domestically, actors, institutions, and history all play key roles in shaping how a state's national interest is defined. A key step in the creation of foreign policy, therefore, is the conversion of domestic, tacit, inexplicit national interest into explicit, coherent foreign policy output targeted effectively at foreign audiences. The explicitness of this foreign policy output can vary widely as states choose the types of foreign policy messages and methods to communicate their foreign policy objectives.

As mentioned, all state-to-state foreign policy communication falls somewhere along a *foreign policy explicitness spectrum*. On the low end of the spectrum, foreign policy intent is inexplicit, unclear, and open to miscalculation. On the high end of the spectrum, foreign policy intent is highly explicit, clear, and helps foreign states shape their expectations and foreign policy responses. Deploying warships to operating areas off the coast of another country without any attempt at diplomatic explanation leaves more room for miscalculation than if such a deployment were accompanied by some kind

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<sup>191</sup> Note the basic and very firm assertion that, yes, U.S.-China relations have improved on multiple fronts since 1949. See Michael Swaine and Alastair Iain Johnston, *China Joins the World* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 90 for the view that the U.S. and China, along with much of the rest of the international community, have expressed a basic desire for peace and security, and the intent to avoid arms races that might destabilize efforts toward achieving that goal.

of statement. The explicitness of the foreign policy that led to the deployment of military warships could also be increased a little with statements in domestic media, increased further by domestic legislation, and increased even further by some kind of bilateral understanding about the deployment of the warships. Unilateral, unexplained foreign policy actions<sup>192</sup> are low on the spectrum, encourage miscalculation, and often lead to counter-productive conflict or long-term consequences to a state's international image; multilateral, agreed-upon foreign policy actions are higher on the spectrum and encourage cooperation in the spirit of shared national interests. In analyzing the growth of the U.S.-China relationship, the explicitness spectrum is a useful analysis tool.

In order to determine the role that foreign policy explicitness has played in U.S.-China relations, I reviewed historical literature and identified key inflection points in U.S.-China relations. In the decades following the miserable depths of U.S.-China foreign policy communication prior to the U.S. crossing the 38th Parallel into North Korea in the Korean War,<sup>193</sup> American and Chinese leaders progressively made increasingly explicit overtures toward rapprochement. Building on a mutual understanding that improved U.S.-China relations could help bring balance to the Asia-Pacific region in the Cold War, the U.S. and China passed through a series of trust-building wickets: the Chinese government invited a U.S. table tennis team to China in April of 1971, President Nixon went to China in 1972, and both countries signed the first bilateral Communique the same year. Were such increasingly explicit declarations the necessary precursors to improved U.S.-China relations afterwards? The answer to that question has played out multiple times in the period between 1972 and now. Wang Jisi,<sup>194</sup> Wu Xinbo,<sup>195</sup> and Michael Chase<sup>196</sup> all show separately that, whether through the proxies of citizen-to-citizen

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<sup>192</sup> Consider the actions taken by Russia during the early-2014 crises in Ukraine.

<sup>193</sup> Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 106.

<sup>194</sup> Wang Jisi, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2011), 3.

<sup>195</sup> Wu Xinbo, *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 374.

<sup>196</sup> Michael Chase, "China's Search for a 'New Type of Great Power Relationship,'" *China Brief* 12, no. 17 (2012).

interaction or multilateral engagement, the simple act of explicit and constructive engagement on foreign policy between the U.S. and China has led to improvements in bilateral relations. In spite of mixed signaling and the absence of an officially blessed conduit for diplomacy, Jeffrey Bader also notes that informal or multilateral feedback loops have allowed the U.S. and China to successfully weather bilateral crises of conscience like the Tiananmen Square Massacre.<sup>197</sup> These and other examples tend to show causation between explicit constructive engagement on foreign policy matters and improvements in U.S.-China bilateral foreign relations. Fundamentally, regardless of the source of the impetus to change relations between two countries, if the desire to change foreign policy is not made explicit in some way, nothing can change. Just as the systems engineering analysis in the previous chapter showed, increasing explicitness leads to more effective foreign policy systems.

#### **A. THE DANGERS OF SILENCE: THE KOREAN WAR**

Chinese involvement in the Korean War might have been precluded if better channels for foreign policy communication had existed between the fledgling government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States.<sup>198</sup> After a great deal of diplomatic wrangling in the aftermath of Mao Zedong's victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) and subsequent founding of the PRC in 1949, U.S.-China diplomatic relations descended into a dark period. In April of 1950, the U.S. Consul General to Beijing, O. Edmund Clubb, was recalled to the U.S. after being treated harshly by the PRC government, leaving only indirect communication lines available between the two governments. Even the indirect channel, however, was actually the Indian Ambassador, who "was considered by the West to be an unreliable reporter."<sup>199</sup> This pitiful condition of state-to-state communications persisted, and on the 25th of June in 1950, North

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<sup>197</sup> Jeffrey Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 78.

<sup>198</sup> See Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 260 for just one example of a broader literature that shows that China's involvement in the Korean War was a product of miscommunication and mutual miscalculation and could have been avoided; the same reference also asserts that such a perspective on the Korean War has not filtered out to the broader U.S. public.

<sup>199</sup> Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*.

Korean artillery started the Korean War. After months of fighting between North Korean troops and a coalition of American, South Korean, and United Nations troops—which at times did not appear to be going well for the coalition—General MacArthur's bold invasion at Inchon on the 15th of September, 1950 reversed the tide of the war. After gaining the upper hand, the U.S. had a choice to make: whether to stop its northward advance at the 38th Parallel and end the Korean War at the pre-war status quo, or to continue north and try to unify the peninsula under non-Communist South Korean rule. This decision was a key turning point, and would lead to three more years of war.

In the early stages of the U.S. Cold War with the Soviet Union, pushing back the boundaries of the Communist sphere of influence to the Northern borders of the Korean peninsula was a very attractive foreign policy option for the U.S.; conversely, the idea of living without a buffer state between the itself and democracy on the Korean peninsula frightened the PRC. Under pressure from both North Korea and the Soviet Union to intervene in the Korean War on the 1st of October in 1950, Mao warned the United States not to cross North of the 38th Parallel; he did so, however, through a string of proxies. On the 2nd of October, Mao had his foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, relay the following foreign policy to the U.S. through the only diplomatic channel he had available, the “unreliable” Indian ambassador K. M. Panikkar: China did not care if South Korean soldiers invaded North Korea, but China would get directly involved in the war if Americans crossed the 38th Parallel.<sup>200</sup> The United States ignored this warning, and MacArthur ordered American and coalition troops to cross the 38th Parallel on the 8th of October, 1950. The effects of this decision have been hotly debated by historians ever since.

Blame for the escalation of the Korean War can be placed on both the United States and China. While the decision to escalate was ultimately made by Mao, Henry Kissinger holds that a diplomatic option was never considered by any of the parties in the lead up to Chinese involvement in the Korean War.<sup>201</sup> Lu Ning argues that, up until the

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<sup>200</sup> Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 18.

<sup>201</sup> Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 143.

28th of September, Mao held out hope that he might not have to intervene.<sup>202</sup> Michael Yahuda concurs that “the decision to intervene was not an easy one,” noting also that “there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese leadership was divided over the question.”<sup>203</sup> Zhang Qingmin blames Truman for breaking his promise and getting involved in the civil conflict in China, specifically referring to Truman's decision to put the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait at the outbreak of the Korean War.<sup>204</sup> William Stueck places blame on the sense of obligation the Chinese felt toward North Korea as a result of the support that North Korean soldiers gave to Mao's revolution.<sup>205</sup> Chen Jian blames the U.S. for emboldening the Soviet Union by excluding Korea from America's Western Pacific Defense Perimeter, and blames China and North Korea's boldness on the implicit and explicit overtures of support they were receiving from the Soviet Union.<sup>206</sup> Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Thomas Christensen asserts that “. . . while friendship between China and the United States was precluded by their ideological differences, peace between the two nations was not.”<sup>207</sup> As such, while more than enough blame has already been thrown around, it is clear that a root cause exists.

I blame the escalation of the Korean War on a failure by both the U.S. and China to communicate their foreign policies at a high enough level of explicitness. A path to avoid violence existed in early 1950, but both the United States and China failed to maintain communications and failed to make clear the foreign policy objectives that were guiding their actions. Based on the information that both states had about each other's intent, the U.S. and China were acting rationally from the perspective of realist IR theory; however, if both sides had better communicated their underlying national interest, the

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<sup>202</sup> Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 89.

<sup>203</sup> Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (United Kingdom: Croom Helm, 1977), 54.

<sup>204</sup> Zhang Qingmin, *The Taiwan Issue in China's Foreign Relations* (Singapore, SG: Cengage Learning Asia, 2009), 321.

<sup>205</sup> Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 108.

<sup>206</sup> Chen Jian, *Mao's China & The Cold War* (Raleigh, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 53-61.

<sup>207</sup> Thomas Christensen, *The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

range of rational actions might have been constrained in a way that precluded war. There was more to be gained through U.S.-Chinese cooperation than there was through war, but in the absence of explicit foreign policies, ideology obscured opportunity. Debate about what paths forward might have led the U.S. and China to lean more toward each other in 1950 is a never-ending exercise in conjecture, but the trappings of low foreign policy explicitness are clear. From the systems engineering perspective, the lack of a connection between American and Chinese foreign policies toward each other led to both systems ineffectively responding in the best interests of both countries. The absence of external feedback produces ineffective foreign policy systems. It would take two decades for the national interest of both U.S. and China to align again, but an increase in the explicitness of foreign policy communication in the 1970s created a foundation for deeper and more mutually beneficial cooperation.



Figure 3. U.S. China Foreign Policy Communication before the Korean War

## **B. BREAKING THE ICE: THE FIRST AGREED-UPON FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS**

The fundamental key to the improvements in the U.S.-China relationship in the 1970s was the increasing explicitness of the foreign policies expressed by both countries.<sup>208</sup> As the relationship emerged from almost complete silence after the Korean War, increasingly detailed and sometimes secretive communications allowed common ground to be discovered. Starting with the Shanghai Communique in 1972 and concluding with the Joint Communique of 1982, increasingly explicit foreign policy declarations broke the ice between the U.S. and China and created the foundation upon which all modern mutually beneficial U.S.-China activity is based.<sup>209</sup>

### **1. The Shanghai Communique of 1972: Building Trust from Silence**

In 1970, the U.S. and China's official foreign policies toward each other existed only tacitly in the heads of a few American and Chinese elites; it would take a decade for the intricate complexities of the national interest of both countries to be balanced appropriately with correspondingly intricate semantics in the form of four explicit declarations of bilateral, agreed-upon foreign policy. The first of such foreign policy agreements, the Shanghai Communique of 1972, was the product of a long and winding road of secretive diplomacy between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon, and struck a very careful semantic balance indicative of the international complexities of the time.

#### ***a. Step One. Is it in the National Interest? If yes, continue.***

Various historians point to various genesis points for the U.S.-China path to rapprochement, but the key point for the purposes of this thesis is that rapprochement was the product of increasingly explicit expressions of foreign policy objectives. From the

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<sup>208</sup> Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign*, 140 shows how the U.S. and China came together in 1971 not out of ideological optimism, but because of a common threat from the Soviet Union. The explicitly expressed fear of a common enemy is just as unifying as any other increase in foreign policy explicitness.

<sup>209</sup> He Di, *The Great Powers in East Asia - 1953-1960* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990), 244.

U.S. side, President Nixon was viewed by many as being a hard-liner toward China, but even before his Presidency he was dropping subtle hints at the need to improve U.S. relations with China.<sup>210</sup> From China's side, Chairman Mao was a pragmatist with a history of anti-U.S. sentiment, but was dropping his own hints toward *rapprochement* in the early '70s.<sup>211</sup> Both sides needed each other,<sup>212</sup> but lacked a normalized framework through which to communicate. Regardless of where the initial impetus for *rapprochement* came from, the geopolitical realities of the time and compatible national interests made it “kismet.”<sup>213</sup> The question, then, was not *whether*, but *how* to improve U.S.-China relations; in order to ensure both sides could save face, bilateral improvement without domestic risk to self led the leaders of both countries to conduct diplomacy in secret.<sup>214</sup>

***b. Step Two. Communicating Diplomatic Intent: A Sometimes Secretive Path***

When Nixon stepped off the plane as the first U.S. president to visit the PRC, his primary goal was to secure some kind of explicit agreement from China that could serve as the foundation for further U.S.-China cooperation. Getting to the tarmac in Shanghai, though, was not easy. In the face of difficult domestic political environments, both Nixon and Mao knew that the failure of *rapprochement* was entirely possible, and that the loss

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<sup>210</sup> See Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 91-95 for Nixon's 1967 Foreign Affairs article about avoiding the creation of another USSR-type enemy in China and how Nixon removed travel restrictions to China; see Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969 - From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American *Rapprochement*,” *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (1999), 21 for the usefulness to Mao of Nixon's tempered response to the Zhenbao Incident; see Jian, *Mao's China & The Cold* for Nixon's effect on Mao with his inaugural address about developing relations with all countries.

<sup>211</sup> See James Mann, *About Face* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2000), 29 for how Zhou Enlai helped Mao play “ping pong diplomacy.”

<sup>212</sup> See Jian, *Mao's China & The Cold*, 243 for the U.S. and Chinese need for a “Balance of Threat” strategy against Russia; also see Kuisong, *The Sino-Soviet Border Clash*, 49 for the role the Zhenbao Incident played in helping Mao shift his weight toward the U.S. in the aftermath of the worst existential threat the PRC had ever experienced.

<sup>213</sup> Jian, *Mao's China & The Cold*, 256.

<sup>214</sup> Diplomatic cables sent on “non-paper” are communications between countries that lack official letterhead or other identifying marks, in essence making them deniable; see Bloomfield, *The Foreign Policy Process*, 142 for how Nixon and China used this method to communicate in the early stages of *rapprochement*.

of face incurred from trying and failing to find common ground might endanger any future attempts at *rapprochement* as well.<sup>215</sup> Thus, as representatives of their countries, Nixon and Mao decided to initially use back channels to communicate their foreign policy intent to improve relations. On Nixon's side, Henry Kissinger served as the vessel of this message;<sup>216</sup> on Mao's side, Zhou Enlai served the same purpose.<sup>217</sup> Without the ability to communicate in some way, *rapprochement* might never have happened. Indeed, initial *rapprochement* talks were conducted so secretly that when Nixon announced his intent to travel to China, a shockwave ran through the world.<sup>218</sup> Nevertheless, the secrecy of the tender initial stages of *rapprochement* were important because they served as an “elaboration” of “shared purposes,” which proved to be an integral key to breaking the ice between the U.S. and China.<sup>219</sup> After establishing the initial lines of communication and creating the diplomatic context through which to find consensus on a way forward, the all-important semantics of the Shanghai Communique still needed to be discovered, and that was no easy task.

*c. Step Three. Finding Agreeable Language: Careful Wording*

The Shanghai Communique of 1972 is renowned for the subtleties of its language, but without a clever way to move beyond the Taiwan Question, U.S.-China cooperation on any issue might not have been possible. Ever since Mao scared the U.S.-backed KMT off mainland China during his consolidation of power over China, the question of Taiwan's status with regard to China has colored much of U.S.-China relations. On the

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<sup>215</sup> See Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, 49–51, for the view that it is unlikely that the PRC would have consented to opening negotiations with the U.S. in early 1971 if the U.S. hadn't promised secrecy; if the negotiations failed, the Chinese would have lost face. This view was backed up by Justice Potter Stewart in his review of the Pentagon Papers when he said that the Executive Branch has a constitutional duty to protect the secrecy of its operations in the areas of international relations and national defense.

<sup>216</sup> Robert Ross, *The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle - 1972-1989* (Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University Press, 2002), 85.

<sup>217</sup> Mann, *About Face*, 29.

<sup>218</sup> For Japan's surprise, see Ross, *The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan*.

<sup>219</sup> See Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011), 528 for Henry Kissinger's perspective on the “elaboration” of “shared purposes,” and Wilcox, *The Constitution and the Conduct*, 1 for a look at the role of secrecy in diplomacy.

one hand, in 1972 the government of Taiwan claimed that the KMT had a legitimate claim to rule all of a unified China that included both mainland China and Taiwan, a position which at the time the U.S. still supported. On the other hand, mainland China held that the PRC was the rightful ruler of both the mainland and Taiwan. Finding a diplomatic middle ground between these two completely incompatible positions was the crowning achievement of the Shanghai Communique; quoted in full, “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position.”<sup>220</sup> This single, controversial, “agree to disagree” statement formed the foundation that allowed the U.S.-China relationship to move forward toward further refinements of the national interest of both sides. Additionally, the Communique formalized assurances that neither the U.S. nor China would “seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region,” and that, “each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony;” this, in essence, functionally allied both countries against the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia.<sup>221</sup> From a systems engineering perspective, the 1972 Shanghai Communique provided the first agreed-upon declarations by which to evaluate the future progress of the U.S.-China relationship.

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<sup>220</sup> U.S. Government and Chinese Government, *1972 Shanghai Communique* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1972), 301.

<sup>221</sup> Jian, *Mao's China & The Cold*, 275.

## U.S.-China Foreign Policy Communication after 1972 Rapprochement




Figure 4. U.S.-China Foreign Policy Communication after 1972  
*Rapprochement*

### 2. Expanding Foreign Policy Inclusion: Bringing in the Domestic Interest

While the 1972 Shanghai Communique was certainly a shining example of successful Track One diplomacy and it helped to connect the broken connections between the U.S. and China’s foreign policy systems, as the systems engineering chapter clearly showed, domestic feedback is an integral element of foreign policy systems.

#### *a. The Joint Communique of 1978: Normalization of Diplomatic Relations*

While the Shanghai Communique successfully broke the ice in U.S.-China diplomatic relations, a great deal of domestic “national interest finding” was necessary in the United States in order for the country as a whole to legally move forward with deeper U.S.-China cooperation. In 1972, the U.S. still did not have an embassy in mainland

China, and, still at the height of the Cold War, remained deeply divided about the benefits of cooperating with a Communist country at the potential cost of Taiwan as an ally. Nevertheless, in 1978, the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China” reaffirmed the Shanghai Communiqué, and “recognize(d) the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China,” very carefully (and cleverly) not going so far as to say that Taiwan was a part of *that* China. This communiqué also formally promised the establishment of embassies in both countries on March 1, 1979.<sup>222</sup> Almost seven years after the signing of the 1972 Communiqué, the 1978 Communiqué was perhaps even more controversial in that it explicitly formalized the slow withdrawal of United States support from the full spectrum of Taiwan's national interests. The injustice some perceived after the 1978 Communiqué would lead to another round of domestic feedback and lobbying in the U.S. Congress in order to increase the domestic legitimacy of the U.S. foreign policies vis-à-vis both China and Taiwan.

***b. The Taiwan Relations Act: Finding Domestic Balance***

In the aftermath of the 1978 Joint Communiqué, the U.S. once again looked inward for a refinement of its foreign policy toward China and Taiwan; the result of this national interest-finding was the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which would clarify that there was room in U.S. foreign policy for productive relations with both the PRC and Taiwan.<sup>223</sup> When President Carter first reluctantly, and controversially,<sup>224</sup> announced that he would allow Congress to participate in ongoing negotiations with China on the continued expansion of U.S.-China relations, Congress' primary goal was to provide diplomatic support for the President in achieving the fundamental aims of normalization, but the Congress also sought to make the bill more representative of U.S. national

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<sup>222</sup> U.S. Government and Chinese Government, *1978 Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1978), 1.

<sup>223</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 152.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

interests.<sup>225</sup> Thus, when Congress embarked upon the task of drafting the TRA, its attention to detail was specifically to make sure that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) became a strong legal basis for U.S. ties with both the PRC and Taiwan.<sup>226</sup> Both U.S. and PRC interests when entering into negotiations were clear. The United States' explicit demands included: 1. continued unofficial ties with Taiwan, 2. the termination of the existing defense treaty with Taiwan, 3. continued sales of weapons to Taiwan, 4. continued trade with Taiwan, and 5. assurances that any future efforts toward unification between China and Taiwan would be peaceful.<sup>227</sup> China, on the other hand, explicitly demanded: 1. existing defense treaties with Taiwan be terminated, and 2. a reduction in U.S. naval presence.<sup>228</sup> The implications and outcomes of this debate process were subtle, and ended up satisfying both sides to the highest extent that might have been possible at the time.<sup>229</sup> For example, China did not favor the complete U.S. withdrawal of its forces from Asia, because it still needed U.S. presence to balance against the Soviet Union.<sup>230</sup> The United States, in turn, gained the legislative approval it needed to move full steam ahead in the expansion of diplomatic and economic ties with the PRC.

The explicit inclusion of a broader base of public approval into the TRA made it a stronger representation of U.S. foreign policy toward China. The necessity of this domestic feedback process in the U.S. does not exist in the same form in the one-party system that rules China,<sup>231</sup> but domestic feedback is an integral part of ensuring that U.S.

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>226</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 107.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., 104.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

<sup>229</sup> U.S. Government, *Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1978).

<sup>230</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 104.

<sup>231</sup> Within the U.S., domestic feedback comes in many imperfect forms. The addition and removal of appropriate and inappropriate members of the Legislative and Executive Branches of government is one way. Also see Ronald Pestritto, Taylor Kempema, *The Birth of Direct Democracy: What Progressivism Did to the States* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2014) for how many American cities use a more progressive approach to refining rules and representing the public interest. In either case, within a representative democracy, the many forms of domestic feedback ensure that government is in line with the interests of the citizenry.

foreign policy is legitimately representative of the full spectrum of interests within the United States. Whereas the president of the United States has an electoral and Constitutional mandate to execute the foreign policy of the United States, and in most cases he can do so unilaterally, the commitments of the United States are strengthened by bipartisan support of specific foreign policies, which thereby transforms single-administration foreign policies into stable, long-term, multi-administration foreign policies. In fact, the Congress specifically included provisions in the TRA to ensure that a future president could not take any further unilateral action to jeopardize the independence of Taiwan.<sup>232</sup> The foreign policy stability<sup>233</sup> that resulted from this process benefitted not only the U.S., but China as well. To be sure, while the U.S. was mired in negotiations around the TRA, China was already receiving a bump in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the 1978 agreement.<sup>234</sup> The “legal framework” that the TRA provided to the U.S., however, was necessary to cement the change in U.S. foreign policy toward China,<sup>235</sup> and played a foundational role in the growth that would follow. The United States and China both benefitted<sup>236</sup> from the increased U.S. foreign policy explicitness that came as a result of the TRA being turned into U.S. Public Law 96-8.

***c. The Joint Communique of 1982: Three's Company, Four's a Crowd***

In 1982, the third and final communique between the U.S. and China clarified the United States' position on arms sales to Taiwan and marked the end of the usefulness of communiqués as an institution through which to conduct U.S.-China diplomacy. The

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<sup>232</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 108.

<sup>233</sup> In this context, the word stability is used in the systems engineering sense. The existence of stability implies the existence of instability and the existence of procedures to respond to new information within the environment and adjust the system to reach higher levels of stability. Within the U.S. Congress, successfully passing legislation implies that requisite levels of public support were attained, and certain laws and concepts have been stabilized beyond simple alteration.

<sup>234</sup> Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski and Xiaodong Zhu, *International Dimensions of China's Long Boom* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 19.

<sup>235</sup> Crabb, *Congress and the Foreign*, 102, 107.

<sup>236</sup> Though the PRC was naturally resistant to the TRA, its existence stabilized official U.S. public opinion on the status of both the PRC and Taiwan, and paved the way for broader diplomatic and economic engagement with the region as a whole. In this sense, the U.S., PRC, and Taiwan have all benefitted from the political stability that the TRA provided.

Joint Communiqué of 1982, by that point a formality that had taken root in high-level exchanges between the U.S. and China, made several small but important U.S. foreign policies increasingly explicit. The communiqué: 1. reaffirmed the tenets of the 1979 Joint Communiqué, 2. clarified that China and the U.S. had never come to an agreement about the U.S. supplying defensive arms to Taiwan, 3. reaffirmed the importance of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and 4. committed the U.S. to abiding by a defensive arms ceiling in its arms sale to Taiwan, as defined by the level of arms sales to Taiwan at the beginning of normalized relations between China and the U.S., with a further caveat that the U.S. did intend to reduce those sales over time towards a final resolution.<sup>237</sup> This was the third and final communiqué because, while the U.S. clearly gained and lost some freedom of action by increasing the explicitness of its policies vis-à-vis arms sales to Taiwan, and the U.S.-China relationship certainly benefitted by removing these ambiguities, China felt it had little to gain from further communiqués.<sup>238</sup> Though this would prove to be the final “ice-breaker communiqué” between the U.S. and China, the communiqué as a tool to explicitly communicate foreign policies would be replaced by more mature and explicit institutions in the form of the United Nations and World Trade Organization.

### **3. Summary: In Case of Emergency, Break Ice**

Simply based on the U.S.-China experience in the Korean War and the progressive improvement of relations with each successive bilateral agreement, it is clear that there may be a correlation between the explicitness with which a state communicates its foreign policy objectives and the absence of hard power conflict in its relations with other states. There are still too many other co-traveling variables to be able to make such an assertion definitively, though, and it is still unclear whether explicitness in itself is an inherent good, or if there is such a thing as a “bad explicitness,” and whether bad explicitness is corrected for systemically. In the sections to follow, I will explore some

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<sup>237</sup> U.S. Government and Chinese Government, *1982 Joint Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1982).

<sup>238</sup> Taken from notes during the 2013-02-11 convening of the Naval Postgraduate School's NS3667 class on Chinese Foreign Policy, as taught by Professor Michael Glosny.

cases where foreign policy explicitness led to retrenchment and engaged a self-correcting foreign policy mechanism. For example, the tendency of U.S. presidents in particular to “flip-flop” in their policies toward China is well documented by James Mann.<sup>239</sup> Additionally, we have yet to explore the obviously germane arguments that IR Theory has to offer. At this point, however, it is perhaps appropriate at the end of this section to quote Henry Kissinger when he describes the most beneficial possible relationship between the U.S. and China not as being a “partnership,” but as being a “co-evolution,” wherein both countries should “pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict.”<sup>240</sup>

### **C. POLITICAL EXPLICITNESS: BUILDING RULES-BASED INTERACTIONS IN THE MIDST OF ANARCHY**

With the diplomatic building blocks to allow them to interact with each other officially on the world stage thus in place, the U.S. and China began to develop a checkered relationship within the confines of the United Nations' rules-based institutions. Despite being newer to the organization than the U.S., by moving some of its foreign policy communications higher along the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness, China has successfully kept some of its domestic and foreign policies inexplicit. Participation in the U.N.'s rules-based institutions, though, inevitably leads states to slowly increase the explicitness of their policies. When the People's Republic of China joined the United Nations in October of 1971, it was not at the behest of the United States;<sup>241</sup> however, its participation in the international decision-making body has produced numerous positive results for the U.S. over the decades of its membership. Over the course of the twenty years between 1950 and 1970, the PRC went from being a pariah (to some) in the international community to being a fully-vested permanent member of the U.N. Security

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<sup>239</sup> This is phenomenon is mentioned in the various chapters of Mann, *About Face*, and is the obvious source of the book's title; the point is echoed in Bader, *Obama and China's Rise*.

<sup>240</sup> Kissinger, *On China*, 526.

<sup>241</sup> Taken from notes during the 2013-02-04 convening of the Naval Postgraduate School's NS3667 class on Chinese Foreign Policy, as taught by Professor Michael Glosny; however, see also Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy*, 225 for how, in 1968, there was great reluctance to continue to allow a nuclear-enabled Communist China to stay outside the U.N.; China refused to join the U.N. unless on its own terms.

Council. From a political perspective, China's enmeshment in the U.N. has kept it from acting out of turn.<sup>242</sup> Samuel Kim asserts that three things in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy have changed because of participation in the U.N. and other multilateral institutions: 1. China responds in the form of white papers to criticism it receives during U.N.-sponsored conferences, 2. China's domestic and international politics have become “inevitably linked,” and 3. socialization effects have produced “nontrivial positive” policy and behavioral change, like China becoming signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.<sup>243</sup> In short, in order to derive benefit from participation in the international community, China is forced to make its foreign policies increasingly explicit. This is not to imply, however, that China always acts in concert with the U.S. or U.N. interests; to the contrary, China acts in its own national interests at the U.N. table, and can be uncooperative at times as well.<sup>244</sup>

### **1. Explicit Distraction: Horse-trading for the Status Quo**

China understands that some of its domestic and foreign policies are distasteful to the international community, and in order to maintain its domestic status quo China has proven skillful at obfuscating the inexplicitness of some of its policies by increasing its explicitness on other policies. In critiquing China's historical role in the U.N., Marc Lanteigne notes that China bandwagons (free-rides) when it feels it is in its best interest, like in the 2001 war on terror, international trade issues, international law issues, and transnational crime.<sup>245</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston follows that “China's position as a U.N. Security Council veto power allows it to extract international strategic rents for acquiescing to actions that the United States would like to undertake multilaterally, like it

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<sup>242</sup> Zhu Feng, *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 36.

<sup>243</sup> Samuel Kim, *Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 24-26; but China did not sign without a bit of kicking and screaming, as described in Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 151.

<sup>244</sup> For an interesting look at the futility of buying votes in the U.N., see Brett Schaefer and Anthony Kim, *Thirty Years of Voting in the U.N. General Assembly: The U.S. Is Nearly Always in the Minority* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2013), 3, for how U.S. foreign aid dollars to foreign countries does not correlate well with voting in line with U.S. interests.

<sup>245</sup> Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, 32.

does in the area of peace-keeping operations.”<sup>246</sup> As one example, China was able to leverage its position on the U.N. Security Council in 1990 to lift sanctions imposed upon it after the Tiananmen Square Massacre by agreeing to bandwagon with President George Bush's push to sanction Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.<sup>247</sup> The international community can be a precarious place for states that have issues they consider to be off-limits to public discussion, but China has proven very adept at maintaining low levels of foreign policy explicitness on certain issues. In effect, whereas the WTO provides a market within which the U.S. and China can barter and trade economic policy, the U.N. provides a similar market for bartering in foreign policies. It is only the explicitness of policies that allows this to happen, and while political horse-trading is not unique to the U.N., its complexity has increased consistently with the increasing complexity of global interactions within which states are enmeshed. The existence of such a market also highlights the hazards of living in a glass house; whereas China still retains low levels of policy explicitness for the time being that it can trade for bilateral progress in transparency and increased explicitness, the U.S. bartered away its low levels of foreign policy explicitness with the TRA. This fundamentally different approach to societal transparency strikes at the core of the ideological differences between the U.S. and China.

Fundamentally, the U.S. and China have different perspectives on what policy issues should be exposed to a United Nation's international relations feedback loop that inevitably leads to increased foreign policy explicitness rather than vice-versa. For example, China's perspective on the inviolability of domestic policy issues leads it to refuse to allow issues of sovereignty to be brought before the U.N.<sup>248</sup> Liselotte Odgaard highlights the difference in U.S. and Chinese opinions about where explicitness can and

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<sup>246</sup> David Bachman, *China and the World - Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 55. It is also worthwhile to note that, as can be found in Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, “Ripples of Change in Chinese Foreign Policy? Evidence from Recent Approaches to Nontraditional Waterborne Security,” *Asia Policy* no. 17 (2014), 105, China is now the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops and police forces to the U.N.

<sup>247</sup> Jia Qingguo, “Learning to Live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China’s Policy Toward the US Since the End of the Cold War,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 44 (2005), 398.

<sup>248</sup> See Qingmin, *The Taiwan Issue in China's*, 321 for how China refuses to allow the Taiwan question to be brought before the U.N.; recent questions of the sovereignty of islands in the South China Sea are also germane as well.

cannot be expected. Whereas the U.S. envisions a global liberal democratic order, the Chinese seek a future based on coexistence by different domestic political environments in an environment that allows for certain levels of non-interference.<sup>249</sup> The U.S. tends to push integration over coexistence, alliances over the U.N. system, common values (ideology) over common interests (economics), and cooperation over coordination.<sup>250</sup> In a world where reputation and trust are used as a currency by states to purchase influence outside their borders,<sup>251</sup> China has purchased freedom of domestic action with increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness. This is not necessarily a bad thing; in a way it represents the democratic process. Just as intractability happens in U.S. domestic politics, it happens in the U.N. as well. The paths around such obstructions, however, tend to only reveal themselves when the full spectrum of possible areas for cooperation and confidence building are made explicit to all parties involved. In specific reference to *rapprochement* and cooperation, Henry Kissinger emphasized the importance of taking advantage of the “opportunity to increase cooperation where interests were congruent and to mitigate differences where they existed.”<sup>252</sup> From a systems engineering perspective, even if near-term foreign policy interests do not align, multiple iterations of a multinational foreign policy system with basic levels of explicitness can lead to further increases in beneficial foreign policy explicitness. Simply being a contributing member of multilateral institutions produces opportunities to cooperate toward common interests. A lack of such systemic connections reduces explicitness and thus the opportunities for cooperation. International Relations (IR) theorists have different perspectives on the utility (or perhaps futility) of such cooperation, though.

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<sup>249</sup> Liselotte Odgaard, *Between Integration and Coexistence: US-Chinese Strategies of International Order* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2012), 21.

<sup>250</sup> Odgaard, *Between Integration and Coexistence*, 25.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>252</sup> Kissinger, *On China*, 274.

## 2. Explicit Cooperation: Realism and Constructivism

There is room on the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness for both realist and constructivist IR theories. As much as the realists would like to consider the *stick* to be the most important factor in influencing the direction of state-to-state interactions, when communicated properly, a combination of the *carrot*, the *stick*, and explicit declarations of foreign policy objectives can form the most effective foreign policies amidst the complexity of modern international relations. I reviewed IR theories in search of theoretical positions on whether tacit or explicit messaging is more effective at facilitating constructive foreign relations. Jack Snyder holds that IR theories help to explain the assumptions that exist behind the things that politicians say, and that all countries bring theoretical priors to their foreign relations.<sup>253</sup> Realists like John Mearsheimer believe that no quantity of repeated constructive interaction can prevent conflict from eventually arising between rising and hegemon states.<sup>254</sup> Realists also tend to rely on tacit expressions of relative power through hard power buildup in order to passively regulate relations between states, but do not necessarily exclude the use of active hard power messaging to achieve desired results. What the realists miss, though, is that hard power can be augmented well with explicit, non-hard foreign policy messaging. Constructivists like Alexander Wendt, believe that relations can improve through the sharing of ideas, provided the context of the interaction is properly focused.<sup>255</sup> While constructivists do not rule out the usefulness of tacit messaging through hard power buildup, their primary relationship-shaping tool is the explicit expression and exchange of ideas. Both theories are fundamentally compatible, and differ only in the explicitness with which foreign policies are communicated. In this sense, increasing predictability and reducing the perception of threat is also a key component of both theories. In describing the differences between Mearsheimer, Wendt, and others' views on U.S.-China relations, Aaron Friedberg asserts that while theoretical preconceptions are unavoidable, explicit

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<sup>253</sup> Snyder, *One World, Rival Theories*, 55.

<sup>254</sup> John Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History* 105, no. 690 (2006), 160.

<sup>255</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring) (1992), 397.

communication of theoretical priors is key to reducing the perception of threat.<sup>256</sup> By communicating foreign policies at higher levels of explicitness, states help other states reduce confusion about the reasoning behind their actions.<sup>257</sup> From a systems engineering perspective, increasing foreign policy explicitness allows foreign actors to see more transparently into the decision-making process of other states, and thereby better evaluate the threat posed by those states.

The fundamental compatibility of realist and constructivist messaging approaches can be seen in a recent article from official Chinese channels describing the new ability of Chinese nuclear ballistic missile submarines to attack West Coast U.S. cities.<sup>258</sup> In realist terms, the tacit buildup of a submarine-based nuclear strike capability should lead to an increase in bilateral tensions and a security dilemma. However, the Chinese article made explicit the point that the weapons were deployed as a strategic deterrent. This type of explicit messaging, whether honest or not, helps to constrain and focus the range of interpretations that the U.S. can make about Chinese military intent.<sup>259</sup> It also provides the U.S. another explicit data point by which to evaluate the how well China's words and actions align. Constructive expressions of foreign policy are inherently stabilizing because, at their core, they can signal the intent to cooperate peacefully and demonstrate that each side's policies are fundamentally peaceful, even if those policies are backed with hard power. In summary, the delta between what two states desire for their relationship and how they both try to achieve their desired objectives can vary widely,

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<sup>256</sup> Aaron Friedberg and Robert Ross, "Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?," *The National Interest* no. 103 (2009).

<sup>257</sup> See The Brookings Institution, *The United States and the Middle East: Avoiding Miscalculation and Preparing for Conflict* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013), 5 for how many foreign countries are confused by U.S. foreign policy because it appears to inconsistent and arbitrary from the outside. Also see *Ibid.*, 8 for how foreign policies should be accompanied by clear goals and end states and strategies.

<sup>258</sup> "China Reveals its Ability to Nuke the U.S.: Government Boasts About New Submarine Fleet Capable of Launching Warheads at Cities Across the Nation," *Daily Mail*, accessed Nov. 27, 2013, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2484334/China-boasts-new-submarine-fleet-capable-launching-nuclear-warheads-cities-United-States.html#ixzz2ldeweXwD>.

<sup>259</sup> In terms of the interpretability of intent, see Rebecca Heinrichs, *China's Strategic Capabilities and Intent* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2013), 1 for how defense hawks from many countries like to accuse other countries of offensive intent through the omission of benign intent.

but the explicit back-and-forth communication of ideas can help make a traditionally inexplicit realist world a little more explicit, predictable, and easier to monitor.

### 3. Whether to Agree, Agree to Disagree, or Say Nothing at All?

While it is unlikely that any simple increase in foreign policy explicitness can solve the sovereignty disputes in the South and East China Seas, the explicitly expressed desire to maintain economic ties in the region has likely kept the Asia-Pacific stable for the time being. Few problems in international relations are more vexing than those that deal with sovereignty, and there is certainly no one-size-fits-all solution that can solve every type of outstanding sovereignty dispute. There are times when making a state's claims as administratively explicit as possible is the best path, which is the approach that the Philippines is currently taking in the South China Sea. There are also times when it is in a state's best interest to keep its claims administratively ambiguous and inexplicit, while at the same time enforcing its claims with military movements, as China is doing in the South China Sea. There are even times when the simple act of acknowledging the existence of a dispute would be counter-productive, as is the case with Japan and China's posturing over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In each case, all participant states are acting rationally and in their own best interests given the full range of military and diplomatic tools at their disposal, but a solution does not appear imminent in any of the disputes. Proposing a solution to these problems is not within the scope of this thesis, but such intractable problems are familiar to history. When U.S.-China *rapprochement* was still unthinkable, increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness lit a path forward. Henry Kissinger called this process “co-evolution,” and described its three key components thus: 1. high level discussions that can mitigate crises, 2. increasingly comprehensive issue-focused frameworks, and 3. the creation of a “Pacific Community.”<sup>260</sup> The most important thing states can focus on, he asserts, is “elaboration” of “shared purposes.”<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Kissinger, *On China*, 527-528.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, 528. Also see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 14 for how discussions between the U.S. and China move along better when discussants focus on specific issues and forget about the larger context of the relationship.

Indeed, in all the sovereignty cases above, common economic purpose may be the only thing that has kept the region from descending into violence. From a systems engineering perspective, increasing foreign policy explicitness in one part of the foreign policy system also stabilizes other parts of the system as well. In the next section, I explore the important stabilizing economic effects of the WTO and other economic institutions, and how they likely receive such pacifying power from the contractual explicitness that is an inherent aspect of trade agreements.

#### **D. ECONOMIC EXPLICITNESS: THE WTO AND LENGTHENING THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE THROUGH BETTER CONTRACTING**

Building on their increasing importance to each other, the U.S. and China struggled in the 1990s to find a way to more productively interact with each other in light of China's behavior during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. Relations between the U.S. and China in the WTO have been no less controversial than those in the U.N., but the more explicit and contractual nature of WTO agreements has led it to produce more absolute progress than the zero-sum political horse-trading that appears to dominate U.N. negotiation processes. Economic ties form an integral part of the U.S.-China relationship,<sup>262</sup> but trade between them has not always been as robust and valuable as it is now. After the U.S. restored Most-Favored Nation (MFN) trade status to China in 1979, the U.S. gradually reduced trade restrictions until China was a “friendly, non-allied” trading partner by 1983.<sup>263</sup> At the time, though, China was still not a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the premier global trade organization during the 1980s and early '90s. China spent much of the 1990s trying to join the GATT and its successor the WTO, but was hampered by reform demands the U.S. imposed as prerequisite to China's entry.<sup>264</sup> Chief among U.S. demands was the improvement of

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<sup>262</sup> See Hayat Alvi and Brent Boston, *Major Actors in the Global Environment: States, Globalization, and IGOs* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2011), 12 for how the U.S. Department of Defense defines the full scope of national power as consisting of “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. . . The acronym DIME is often used to refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic powers generally available to governments.”

<sup>263</sup> Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 87.

<sup>264</sup> Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, 62.

human rights enforcement in China.<sup>265</sup> At times, the restrictions seemed onerous to China and unfairly imposed, but the explicitness of the demands made it clear what was expected. Thus, despite aggressive demands, China did its best to play along, knowing full well that being “in the club” was more important than sitting in time-out.<sup>266</sup> China made many of the changes that were required, and became a member of the WTO in 2001. While some concerns still linger, the feedback loop created around explicit U.S. foreign policy demands led directly to improvements in China's trade practices before and after accession into the WTO.

Since 2001, U.S.-China interactions within the confines of the WTO have largely been productive, and issues that have arisen have mostly been resolved through the rules-based functions of the WTO.<sup>267</sup> Because of how enmeshed both the U.S. and China are in the global economy, both states realize that they must be a part of the system without disrupting it.<sup>268</sup> Samuel Kim asserts that multilateral economic institutions (MEIs) have socialized China to the demands of participation in the global economy.<sup>269</sup> John Ravenhill conducted an analysis of data from the first four years after China's entry into the WTO and determined that China's participation had largely produced benign economic effects.<sup>270</sup> Wu Xinbo asserts that the WTO is helping improve relations between the U.S. and China because it acts as a soft balancing proxy between the two.<sup>271</sup> While these things sound nice, Chinese intransigence at the WTO takes many forms.

At times China breaks rules it has explicitly agreed to, and at times it avoids enmeshing itself in WTO organizations that would limit its freedom of action. As an

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<sup>265</sup> Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, 95.

<sup>266</sup> Brandt, *International Dimensions of China's*, 44.

<sup>267</sup> See Wayne Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, CRS Report RL33536 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 40 for how the latest USTR report in 2013-12 showed that China still had areas of concern.

<sup>268</sup> Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34.

<sup>269</sup> Kim, *Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory*, 26.

<sup>270</sup> John Ravenhill, *China's Rise* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). See Axel Berger, *Investment Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements* (Bonn, DE: German Development Institute, 2013), 1 for how China has extracted benefit from the WTO.

<sup>271</sup> Xinbo, *Tangled Titans*, 378.

example of the former issue, despite agreeing to not force technology transfer on foreign firms as a prerequisite to doing business in China when it joined the WTO in 2001, it is still a common practice in China.<sup>272</sup> As an example of the latter, China has avoided participating in the establishment of explicit norms for operating in cyberspace, despite the need for them.<sup>273</sup> Additionally, China is not party to the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which the United States wants China to join because it will force China to report its government spending and help to formally monitor China's state involvement in its economy.<sup>274</sup> The U.S. response to China's intransigence at the WTO has not been without controversy either. For example, the U.S. has attempted to influence Chinese currency policies by passing domestic legislation that compels China through trade restrictions, which some U.S. policy-makers contend is a violation of WTO obligations.<sup>275</sup> Despite the complexity of all these issues, though, the forced policy explicitness that has accompanied China's participation in the WTO<sup>276</sup> has mostly had positive effects.<sup>277</sup> By both states being party to the WTO, the U.S. and China can bring formal disputes against each other. In fact, 9 of 14 disputes raised by the U.S. toward China have been satisfactorily resolved.<sup>278</sup> These are issues that might not have been resolved outside of the explicit demands of the WTO framework. Thus, despite a few persistent difficulties, the foreign policy explicitness mandated by participation in rules-based organizations like the WTO has increased the mutual benefit of U.S.-China relations by moving the relationship further to the right along the foreign policy explicitness spectrum. From a systems engineering perspective, the positive meshing of

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<sup>272</sup> Wayne Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, CRS Report RL33536 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 36. *Ibid.*, 37 elaborates on China's position that it allows businesses to negotiate technology transfers independently, and that the government does not mandate transfer.

<sup>273</sup> See Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, 38 for Tom Donilon's statement on the need for norms in cyberspace.

<sup>274</sup> Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, 44.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>277</sup> Naturally, one can only speculate in this sense based on the short history of both the U.S. and China's participation in the WTO. The future may hold a different interpretation in hindsight.

<sup>278</sup> Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, 40.

the economic interests of a wide swath of domestic actors in both the U.S. and China has also iterated the foreign policy systems in both countries toward a system that can stably sustain those domestic interests.

**E. TAKING A FIX: WHERE ON THE SPECTRUM OF FOREIGN POLICY EXPLICITNESS U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS NOW STAND**

After decades of increasingly explicit interactions through a variety of institutions, U.S.-China relations are now at a much more stable place than they were in 1972, and new institutions are in place to continue this progress. As institutions, the three U.S.-China Communiqués, the TRA, the U.N., and the WTO have all either served their purpose or matured. Now, the development of more modern foreign policy explicitness trade institutions in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is evidence of a continued drive by both countries toward the codification of increasing levels of foreign policy explicitness. The dangers of failing to continue to make progress became apparent when, in November of 2013, without notice China unilaterally announced a brand new Air Defense Interrogation Zone (ADIZ) and started enforcing it. Inevitably, in response to the inexplicit means by which the Chinese communicated their new foreign policy, the U.S. was forced to respond by sending two B-52 bombers through the new ADIZ, marking “the most worrying strategic escalation between the two countries since 1996, when China’s then president, Jiang Zemin, ordered a number of exclusion zones for missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, leading America to send two aircraft-carriers there.”<sup>279</sup> The stakes are high in U.S.-China relations; it is important to look holistically at where U.S. foreign policy toward China is currently written down, and how the S&ED and TPP are influencing the direction of the relationship.

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<sup>279</sup> The Economist, “China’s New Air-Defence Zone Suggests a Worrying New Approach in the Region,” The Economist, last modified: 2013, last accessed: 2013-12-03, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590930-chinas-new-air-defence-zone-suggests-worrying-new-approach-region-face>. Also see Agence France-Presse, “US, Chinese warships nearly collide in South China Sea,” Channel News Asia, last modified: 2013, last accessed: 2013-12-15, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/us-chinese-warships/922122.html> for a more recent run-in between U.S. and Chinese warships.

## 1. Inexplicitness through Inaccessibility: Where are Foreign Policies Written Down?

U.S. foreign policies toward China are not consolidated in any single place, and it is unclear whether China even knows what the United States' foreign policies toward China are. Within the U.S., a common maxim is that “transparency improves government accountability.”<sup>280</sup> This section touches on a subject that is discussed in greater depth in other parts of this thesis, but authoritative domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy toward China are surprisingly difficult to find. The most explicit, formal policy agreements and legislation that constrain U.S. actions toward China are spread widely across official documents from the U.N., WTO, and U.S. Congressional Legislation. Inexplicit and informal policy declarations, like those made verbally by U.S. leaders through various media outlets, are even more difficult to consolidate. A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report determined that only *seven* pieces of legislation form the backbone of the United States' foreign policy toward China.<sup>281</sup> As such, it appears there is very little explicit direction by which the U.S. holds itself accountable in its foreign policy activity toward China.<sup>282</sup> To be sure, formalized agreements in the WTO and U.N. allow

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<sup>280</sup> Clinton, *Leading Through Civilian Power*, 91; for a statement about the importance of organizational transparency in the Department of State and how organizational opacity makes it difficult to engage with partners, see comments from former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>281</sup> See Shirley Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress*, CRS Report RL32496 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013). The seven pieces of legislation are: 1. the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: P.L. 87-195, Section 620(f)(1) prohibits assistance to any Communist country, and specifically lists the PRC as a Communist country for purposes of that subsection; 2. the aforementioned Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979: P.L. 96-8; 3. the Tiananmen Sanctions section of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991: P.L. 101-246, Section 902 “prohibits arms sales to China, among other stipulations, in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989;” 4. the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000: P.L. 106-65, Section 1201 restricts “inappropriate exposure” of certain operational areas to the PLA and requires annual reports on any U.S. Government contacts with the PLA; 5. the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: P.L. 109-163, Section 1211 prohibits the use of any “Communist Chinese military company” in the procurement of goods and services on the Munitions List, “with exceptions for U.S. military ship or aircraft visits to the PRC, testing, and intelligence-collection; as well as waiver authority for the Secretary of Defense;” 6. an amendment to P.L. 106-65: P.L. 111-84, increasing the reporting requirements to include cooperative--not just adverse--elements in the relationship, as well as a detailed report on mil-to-mil contacts and the U.S. military strategy for increasing such contacts; 7. P.L. 112-239, which increased the details required in annual reports on the PRC, to include areas like intelligence gaps, PRC cyber capabilities, and other areas of concern.

<sup>282</sup> Notably, the existence of legislative branch intervention in the first place is also possibly an indication of the Legislative Branch's desire to restrict the Executive Branch's fiat in determining U.S. foreign policy.

both the U.S. and other countries to hold the U.S. accountable for its foreign policies, but nowhere are all U.S. obligations vis-à-vis its relationship with China, both formal and informal, consolidated in a single and easily accessible place. While transparency has long been an ideological mainstay in U.S. domestic politics, transparency is missing in U.S. foreign policy because of its inaccessibility; in an increasingly connected digital world, inaccessibility is perceived as being equivalent to opacity.<sup>283</sup> In the recently published “Open Government Partnership: Second Open Government National Action Plan for The United States of America,” the White House states that it views the broader American public as a “strategic partner” capable of contributing constructively to solutions on America's hardest problems, and making best-practice metrics available is an integral part of this effort.<sup>284</sup> Indeed, the focus of performance.gov is to improve the linkage between *national goals* and the metrics used to measure the performance of government.<sup>285</sup> By not consolidating its foreign policies in a single place, it is difficult to tell what the United States' “national goals” with regard to China are. For this reason, U.S. foreign policies toward China remain lower on the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness than they could be.

China is no less administratively inaccessible, especially from outside the Communist Party of China. While Wayne Morrison notes that China's Five-Year Plans (FYP) provide broad policy transparency and explicitness such that the whole of government and civilian actors can coordinate activity toward common goals,<sup>286</sup> Shirley Kan highlights the frustration that U.S. actors feel toward China. Specifically, the U.S.

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<sup>283</sup> In United States Government Accountability Office, *Federal Data Transparency: Opportunities Remain to Incorporate Lessons Learned as Availability of Spending Data Increases*, GAO Report GAO-13-758 (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2013), 24, the GAO notes that in order to harmonize reporting by various agencies, it was important for a central requirements authority (the OMB in this case) to publish reporting requirements on a publicly facing accessible repository; also see *Ibid.*, Summary, for the GAO's recommendation that data standards be used when increasing data transparency because the public is the end recipient of the transparency data, and should therefore be able to get it in a way they can consolidate easily.

<sup>284</sup> United States Government, *The Open Government Partnership: Second Open Government National Action Plan for The United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2013), 2.

<sup>285</sup> Government, *The Open Government Partnership*, 9.

<sup>286</sup> Wayne Morrison, *China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States*, CRS Report RL33534 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 35.

stresses the lack of Chinese foreign policy transparency when it comes to the intent of China's military development; speaking about China on June 13th of 2007, Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless testified to the House Armed Services Committee that “in the absence of adequate explanation for capabilities which are growing dynamically, both in terms of pace and scope, we are put in the position of having to assume the most dangerous intent a capability offers.”<sup>287</sup> China, on the other hand, uses political warfare as a coercive tool,<sup>288</sup> and is unwilling to increase the transparency of its military development without first developing deeper levels of trust toward the U.S. This reality strikes at conundrum in U.S.-China relations that can only be solved by increased foreign policy explicitness: whereas the U.S. sees transparency as a necessary pre-requisite for trust, but China sees trust as a necessary pre-requisite for transparency.<sup>289</sup> The Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are efforts to toward finding solutions to this conundrum, and both involve increasing explicitness in both strategic and economic foreign policies.

## **2. The S&ED: Recognizing the Importance of Strategic Explicitness**

U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is an attempt to push beyond economic improvements and reach a new level of strategic foreign policy explicitness between the U.S. and China; it remains an ambitious and potentially valuable institution, but its implementation has thus far seen mixed success.<sup>290</sup> Thanks to the WTO and countless other bi- and multi-lateral trade agreements, global economic policy explicitness has been continually increasing for the last few decades. As a follow-on to the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) that was established in 1983 as an economic policy discussion forum for the U.S. and China, the S&ED was established in

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<sup>287</sup> Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts*, 3.

<sup>288</sup> Mark Stokes, Russell Hsiao, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics* (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2013), 5.

<sup>289</sup> Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts*, 25.

<sup>290</sup> See Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign*, 149 for Henry Kissinger's opinion that, between the U.S. and China: “A permanent dialogue is needed as the best means to create a more stable world or, at a minimum, to demonstrate to the American people and America's allies why it is not possible.”

2009 to increase the scope of the JCCT's agenda to include strategic issues as well.<sup>291</sup> While the existence of the S&ED as a forum for discussion is a positive development that allows both sides to explicitly express their positions on a wide range of issues, its implementation has thus far not been without its flaws. As Wayne Morrison notes, the S&ED has thus far produced few concrete results, become overrun with ceremony, remains too focused on short-term deliverables, and lacks solid metrics.<sup>292</sup> Similarly, the GAO notes that though a multitude of potentially positive agreements have come out of the S&ED, “no single document is used to track implementation,” and while both the U.S. and China have been called upon to identify metrics, neither has done so.<sup>293</sup> The primary output product of the S&ED is a “fact sheet” which both parties are expected to implement that contains a list of “cooperative activities.” On the U.S. side, this fact sheet is apparently never made public, despite its existence within the full scope of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>294</sup> Naturally, some level of diplomatic secrecy is germane to high-level strategic discussions, as was apparent in the initial stages of U.S.-China *rapprochement*, but complete opacity prevents participatory and collaborative public action along multiple diplomatic tracks. Without public exposure, accountability and action on specific deliverables is less likely to lead to actual resource allocation.<sup>295</sup> Within reason, both the U.S. and China need to improve the transparency of the foreign policy agreements that come out of the S&ED.

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<sup>291</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S.-China Trade: United States Has Secured Commitments in Key Bilateral Dialogues, but U.S. Agency Reporting on Status Should Be Improved*, GAO Report GAO-14-102 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), 4.

<sup>292</sup> Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, 47-50.

<sup>293</sup> Office, *U.S.-China Trade*, Summary.

<sup>294</sup> See Office, *U.S.-China Trade*, 12 for how intra-Executive Branch communication on S&ED deliverables is hampered because each agency tracks their own metrics for policy implementation and no single document fuses them all together.

<sup>295</sup> See Bill Gates, “3 Myths That Block Progress for the Poor,” The Gates Foundation, last modified: 2014, last accessed: 2014-01-27, [http://annualletter.gatesfoundation.org/?cid=bg\\_fb\\_po0\\_012103/#section=home](http://annualletter.gatesfoundation.org/?cid=bg_fb_po0_012103/#section=home) for Bill Gates' assertion that transparency improves resource allocation: “The Internet is making it easier for citizens to know what their government should be delivering—like how much money their health clinic should get—so they can hold officials accountable. As public knowledge goes up, corruption goes down, and more money goes where it’s supposed to.”

### 3. The TPP: Augmenting the WTO with a New Rules-Based Trade Agreement

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a broad, multi-lateral trade agreement that attempts to bring rules-based interactions to a new range of trade activities that have previously gone unregulated and proven resistant to increased explicitness within the WTO. For a country like the U.S., which happens to be the most ardent advocate of the TPP, increased transparency and explicitness across the full spectrum of foreign trade policy issues is an attractive deal. For China, which would likely suffer in the near term while domestically implementing sweeping trade restrictions, participation in the TPP will take some convincing; however, similar to how the lack of explicitness in S&ED is preventing collective action in the areas of accountability and metric-creation, the U.S. struggles to change China's mind about its trade policies because it lacks the metrics to show that it would be in China's best interest to do things like allow its currency to appreciate and improve intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement.<sup>296</sup> That being said, China is not averse to joining the TPP, as long as it does so at an “appropriate time” and of its “own accord.”<sup>297</sup> Perhaps China's openness to participation in TPP talks may surprise some, but China's historical preference for trade communities is likely based on its preference for contract-based agreements over carte-blanche security treaties; China has tended to resist the idea that it might be beholden outside of its perceived contractual bounds to do things at the behest of a partner.<sup>298</sup> Provided the ice can be broken in the right way, the TPP represents an attractive opportunity for cooperation to both the U.S. and China.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> Morrison, *China-U.S. Trade Issues*, 51.

<sup>297</sup> Li Luosha, “Joining TPP at an Appropriate Time and of Our Own Accord Serves China’s Strategic Interests,” *China-US Focus*, last modified: 2013, last accessed: 2013-11-20, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/joining-tpp-at-an-appropriate-time-and-of-our-own-accord-serves-chinas-strategic-interests/>.

<sup>298</sup> Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy*.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*

#### 4. Chinese Nationalism: Balancing Legitimacy with Transparency

While it is clear that the U.S. has a few areas where it can domestically improve its foreign policy system, China's challenges in increasing the explicitness of its foreign policy system are far more complex. Chinese nationalism cannot be ignored in any discussion of increasing transparency and foreign policy explicitness in China.<sup>300</sup> There are legitimate Chinese concerns about the complexities of opening up Chinese foreign policy to public opinion when the system has been so closed for so long. In China, whereas smaller groups of leaders make pragmatic decisions, large groups tend to become nationalistic and make irrational decisions.<sup>301</sup> Chinese leaders most fear multiple discontented classes in China finding common ground and rising up against the government's legitimacy.<sup>302</sup> As multiple anti-Japanese protests in recent memory can attest to, the long history of the CCP's artificial inflation of Chinese nationalism can sometimes operate counter to Chinese national interests.<sup>303</sup> There is evidence that the Chinese government is trying to pragmatically break free of the bonds of this self-imposed nationalism, though. For example, Susan Shirk sees the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three as a backdoor financial infrastructure that China and Japan use to circumvent nationalist anti-Japan or anti-China sentiments.<sup>304</sup> Suisheng Zhao asserts that even though nationalist voices are louder than ever, the CCP does a good job of filtering those voices into pragmatic policy; after all, the quest for wealth makes all Chinese pragmatic, both its citizens and leaders.<sup>305</sup> From a strategic

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<sup>300</sup> See Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreigner*, 146 for Henry Kissinger's view that Chinese nationalism is more dangerous to the U.S. than Chinese Communism is.

<sup>301</sup> Shirk, *China*, 77.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>303</sup> Shirk, *China*, 258; also see Suisheng Zhao, *Between Rhetoric and Pragmatism: Nationalism as a Driving Force of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2009) for Suisheng Zhao's presentation of the different faces and aspects of nationalism in China. There are nativists that believe imperialism brought China down, and anti-traditionalists that feel there is more to be learned from outside than from within. These groups can be divided into pragmatic and emotional nationalists. Zhao feels that, for the time being, pragmatic nationalism has a strong foothold because of the economic interests of both private citizens and national leaders.

<sup>304</sup> Shirk, *China*, 119.

<sup>305</sup> Zhao, *Between Rhetoric and Pragmatism*, 241-242.

perspective, Chinese leaders were very pragmatic in accepting Colin Powell's "very sorry" apology in the wake of EP-3 incident in April of 2001.<sup>306</sup> Provided the upsides are made explicit enough, the potential for pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy is clear.

In light of the apparent ability for the CCP to pragmatically manage the execution side of its foreign policies outside its own borders, the question of how China could increase domestic participation in its foreign policy system is an important one. Managing public opinion and preventing a coup attempt against the legitimacy of the Chinese government is one thing, taking the opinions of one's citizenry into account when crafting foreign policy, as the U.S. was forced to do in the creation of the TRA, brings an entirely different set of challenges. As an example, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the equivalent of the U.S. Department of State, is decidedly missing a domestic feedback loop. Though the MFA stares out at the world and broadcasts internally to domestic audiences, no Chinese institution exists to listen for helpful domestic opinions on Chinese Foreign Policy. Some have suggested the reason for this is that because all domestic communication is along the party-line, no opinion not already corrupted by the CCP party line could possibly come back.<sup>307</sup> A potential in-route from the public to government foreign policy decision-makers has developed lately in the form of academic institutions and foreign policy think tanks. Pascal Abb explored the world of Chinese think tanks and evaluated them based on how academic they are, how focused they are on advising government, and how interested they are in public relations. Most Chinese think tanks appear to shun the lime light, and their internally opaque processes make it difficult to understand how they influence government, but Chinese think tanks are receiving increasing media visibility and are absorbing the lion's share of the Chinese public's increasing interest in foreign policy issues. This public

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<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 250.

<sup>307</sup> See Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy*, 127 for how the Chinese news agencies, particularly the Xinhua News Agency, produce a domestic echo chamber of official state policy. Also see Shinji Yamaguchi, "Is China's Social Unrest the Source of Its Foreign Policy? A Preliminary Study on the Impact of Domestic Instability on External Relations," *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo (NIDS Security Studies)* 15, no. 1 (2012) for a great review of the academic positions on how much domestic Chinese public opinion influences Chinese foreign policy.

window into the words that shape Chinese foreign policy seems to provide hope at increased transparency in the future.

In summary, Chinese foreign policy is no longer a completely black box, but China has a lot of potentially productive space in which to expand the explicitness of its foreign policies to levels more commensurate and compatible with that to be found within the United States and other great powers. From a systems engineering perspective, progressive increases in the explicitness of Chinese foreign policy have improved the transparency with which the U.S. and other countries can evaluate Chinese interactions with the world outside its borders, thereby improving the effectiveness with which they can interact with China's foreign policy systems.




Figure 5. U.S.-China Foreign Policy Communication under Present Conditions

## F. CONCLUSION

This chapter has travelled over a great deal of space and time, but its message is simple and is congruent to the results of my systems engineering analysis: increasing the explicitness of foreign policies produces positive results in both domestic and foreign affairs, and lays a foundation for increasing levels of cooperation. Increasing levels of explicitness broke through the post-Korean War diplomatic ice and created the foundation for U.S.-China *rapprochement* and all the economic and geo-strategic benefits that have followed. Institutions like the U.N., WTO, S&ED, and TPP have all contributed positively since then, and as I have shown, the source of that institutional progress rests on a backbone of increased foreign policy explicitness. In a sense, such systems are both democratic and meritocratic, ensuring that only the most mutually-productive and stabilizing foreign policies persist through repeated rounds of open negotiations. Bi- and multi-lateral agreements that consist of individual, explicit line item agreements are easy for a broad base of concerned constituents to monitor, and make it difficult to hide non-compliance and defection;<sup>308</sup> this is especially true if the metrics and means by which to evaluate performance are also explicitly defined and universally accessible.<sup>309</sup> Since it appears unlikely that a common political or economic system can bring all of Asia together, explicit ideas in the form of foreign policies have to foot the bill.

Looking back at the systems engineering chapter, it is possible to see how all of the elements that comprise an effective foreign policy system have been explored within the empirical context of the U.S.-China relationship: 1. the development of domestic legitimacy for specific policies, 2. the implementation of policies in ways that fall somewhere along the spectrum of foreign policy explicitness, and 3. monitoring the

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<sup>308</sup> See Madeleine Albright and Richard Williamson, *The United States and R2P: From Words to Action* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013), 9, for how the U.N. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) policy requires constant self-monitoring by the global community for incidents of genocide and crimes against humanity. Naturally, identification is only the first step toward effective intervention.

<sup>309</sup> See Linton Wells II et. al., *Sharing to Succeed: Lessons from Open Information-sharing Projects in Afghanistan* (Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC: National Defense University, 2013), 9, for the three key principles to information sharing: sharers must see immediate positive results, contributors of data must be able to get their information back and see visible improvements to it, and contributors must be able to see products that use their information as a derivative source (sense of contribution/pride).

external environment for feedback. As the systems engineering chapter showed, the currency that flows through the foreign policy system, as built up by domestic legitimacy and discharged by implementation, is Trust (T), and when T is maximized, foreign policies are at their most effective. In the next chapter, I examined the U.S. foreign policy system in order to better understand the current state of U.S. foreign policy explicitness.

## IV. THE EVOLVING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM

While the previous chapters have made it clear in numerous ways that increasing foreign policy explicitness has a net positive effect on foreign policy systems, this is not an entirely new concept. In many ways, transformations in the U.S. foreign policy system that increase the explicitness of foreign policy exchange are already underway. These changes are sometimes subtle, but in aggregate they represent a significant new approach to foreign policy execution. For example, within the last decade the U.S. Navy has dramatically revitalized its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community. Additionally, the diplomatic connections between the U.S. and China have expanded to the point where three robust diplomatic tracks are helping to stabilize the relationship. Perhaps most important, though, is the increasing recognition within many governments that metrics play a critical role in evaluating the effectiveness of policy implementation. Alone, each of these three developments would be significant; together, they represent a revolution in the field of foreign policy.

### A. FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS: IMPROVING FOREIGN POLICY EXPLICITNESS AND EXCHANGE

As an epistemic community, Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) across all four military services in the DOD and their Foreign Service Officer (FSO) brethren in the DOS represent key components of the executive arm of the U.S. foreign policy system. FAOs and FSOs sit at an important nexus between civilian, military, and international communities.<sup>310</sup> Fundamentally, the FAO converts tacit knowledge from both sides of a

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<sup>310</sup> See Dave Baiocchi et. al., *Increasing Flexibility and Agility at the National Reconnaissance Office: Lessons from Modular Design, Occupational Surprise, and Commercial Research and Development Processes* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 41 for how the Foreign Service Officer and Ambassador are high chaos, long response time jobs that exist in the strategic realm of decision-making. Also see Justin Vaisse, *Transformational Diplomacy* (Brussels, BE: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 8 for why, within the en-vogue context of “transformational diplomacy,” both diplomats and members of the military need to reexamine their roles. Also see Kennon Nakamura and Susan Epstein, *Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy*, CRS Report RL34141 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007) for further discussion on transformational diplomacy.

foreign policy exchange between two countries into explicit knowledge that can be understood by both sides.<sup>311</sup>

I reviewed literature on the strategic value of FAOs in order to validate one of the many ways that the U.S. appears to perceive value in increasing the explicitness of its foreign policy messaging toward China. In improving the relationship between the U.S. and China, FAOs are an example of the arbiter at the tactical end of the foreign policy execution chain that closes the edges of the foreign policy messaging feedback loop. The Institute for Defense Analyses recently conducted a study on “The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers” and came to the same conclusion about the strategic value added by FAOs.<sup>312</sup> Amongst the other useful functions they perform, FAOs are local experts that execute foreign policy, and provide feedback on needed changes and new metrics at the critical outer edges of the national foreign policy network.<sup>313</sup> FAOs are integral to the continued improvement of relations between the U.S. and China because they increase the explicitness of U.S. foreign policies and help to convey Chinese foreign policies back to the U.S. in more explicit ways as well. From a systems engineering perspective, FAOs improve the quality of the connections in the feedback loop between U.S. and Chinese foreign policy systems in order to preclude misunderstanding and miscalculation.

The roots of the functional role that FAOs play extend into the domestic side of the U.S. foreign policy system as well. Since the days of General Eisenhower and President Roosevelt, DOS political advisors (POLADs) have provided the official

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<sup>311</sup> See Robert Ellsworth Elder, *The Policy Machine: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1960), 93 for how this is similar to how Congressional Liaisons exist to facilitate communication between Congress and DOS, translating both sides' foreign languages into a coherent conversation (ideally).

<sup>312</sup> Alrich, *The Strategic Value of Foreign*, 48. Also see Jesse Grano, "Analysis of the United States Navy Foreign Area Officer Program" (Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 14 for the perspective that, pre-Navy FAO revival, putting non-regional specialists into regional specialist jobs in overseas locations degrades “the implementation of U.S. policy.”

<sup>313</sup> See Ronis, *Forging an American Grand*, 71 for a very interesting perspective on using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) to assign FAOs with specific personality types to specific mission types they are suited for. For example, an FAO with high empathy levels would perhaps be more ideal in delivering bad news to a foreign ally than someone without that personality trait.

mouthpiece for State Department advice to senior military and political leaders.<sup>314</sup> There are currently 90 FSOs serving as POLADs within the DOD, and there is a demand signal for more.<sup>315</sup> POLAD FSOs provide bureaucratic enmeshment, and a formalized linkage between DOS, DOD, and the embassy country team at all levels of the chain of command.<sup>316</sup> Indeed, some of the most interesting and productive exchanges between POLADs and members of the military have been at the very junior, O-1 to O-2 level, the very edges of DOS and DOD interaction.<sup>317</sup> Taken in aggregate, FAOs and FSOs form a single community of regional experts that bridge the old gaps between the traditionally stove-piped communities of the DOS, DOD, and foreign military and diplomatic institutions. They facilitate interaction because, at a very granular and local level, they communicate explicit policies back and forth between nodes in disparate foreign policy systems.

There is room to improve the functionality of the FSO and FAO programs by improving the coordination of their efforts as a community of regional experts. In the past, such cross-disciplinary communities of interest have been referred to as “epistemic communities,” which is an apt description of the joint FAO and FSO community. Mai’a David Cross recently published a retrospective on the topic. Epistemic communities are communities of experts that can advise professionally and authoritatively on policy-relevant issues,<sup>318</sup> and are growing in importance because of internationalization and the increasing complexity of transnational issues.<sup>319</sup> Though traditionally confined to civilian academic institutions, epistemic communities don't necessarily need to be confined only to the academic realm; they can be formed within communities of diplomats, judges, and

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<sup>314</sup> American Foreign Service Association, *The Foreign Policy Advisor Program* (Washington, DC: American Foreign Service Association, 2013), 3.

<sup>315</sup> Association, *The Foreign Policy Advisor*, 6.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>318</sup> Mai'a Davis Cross, “Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later,” *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 1 (2013), 137.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

members of the military as well.<sup>320</sup> Mai'a Cross notes that “specific groups of high-ranking military officials who interact transnationally have the potential to form epistemic communities by virtue of their shared professional norms and expertise, as long as they seek collective policy goals as a result of these qualities.”<sup>321</sup> While it is clear that the potential exists to create a joint FAO and FSO epistemic community, it still remains difficult to unify the work of both career tracks without a common set of foreign policies by which to facilitate cohesive discussion.

In order to build a more cohesive epistemic community amongst FAOs, FSOs and the broader foreign policy executive community, the U.S. government needs to define a common set of foreign policies from which both the DOS and DOD define and coordinate their missions. The development and growth of the FAO and FSO communities is a direct result of the institutional understanding that foreign policies need to be communicated more explicitly. Increased foreign policy explicitness at the whole-of-government level can not only help the FAO and FSO communities be more effective, it can also help to solidify both communities into a more cohesive team as well.

## **B. FOREIGN POLICY HARMONIZATION: FUSING THE THREE DIPLOMATIC TRACKS**

Increased foreign policy explicitness can improve the coordination of foreign policy activity across all three diplomatic tracks.<sup>322</sup> While traditionally foreign diplomacy has taken place primarily at the Track One level, like that which broke the ice between the U.S. and China in 1972,<sup>323</sup> there is room for greater collaboration between the three diplomatic tracks. I reviewed literature on the different tracks of diplomacy in order to

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<sup>320</sup> Ibid., 155.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>322</sup> See Gene Dodaro, *Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits*, GAO Report GAO-13-496T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 2 for the different types of systemic inefficiencies that occur from a lack of interagency coordination. The report specifically identifies 1. fragmentation (multiple federal agencies are working on the same broad national need), 2. overlap (multiple federal agencies have the same goals and are working from the same perspective to try to achieve them, and 3. duplication (multiple federal agencies are doing the same activities as another agency).

<sup>323</sup> Wittkopf, *The Domestic Sources of American*, 179.

understand how the explicitness of the foreign policy interactions between states at different levels affects the overall relationship between those states. In 1981, William Davidson and Joseph Montville grouped national policy interactions between states into two “tracks.” Track One diplomacy consists of official state-to-state interactions. Track Two diplomacy consists of unofficial contacts between academics or NGOs in two states that seek to improve bilateral relations.<sup>324</sup> Though these two tracks are useful in explaining constructive interactions by informed actors that are aware of each state’s policy stances, they do not incorporate the grass-roots interactions of businesses, drunken fishermen, tourists, or angry rioters that can also have a big impact on relations between two states like the U.S. and China. Diana Chigas groups these uninformed, grass-roots actors into a third track.<sup>325</sup> The importance of all three tracks on the overall bilateral relationship between two states lies in how explicitly states communicate the full complexity of their foreign policies to all three tracks on both sides of an international relationship.<sup>326</sup> For example, whereas Track One and Track Two actors may be in agreement that continued Sino-Japanese trade is important, Track Three Chinese citizens that are in receipt of mixed Chinese government domestic messaging have proven capable of acting counter to the national interest by rioting and senselessly destroying Japanese businesses.<sup>327</sup>

Naturally, this also plays out in the way that U.S. and China interact with each other on a variety of levels. Jeffrey Bader shows that Chinese provocations by their direct representatives, be they the Foreign Minister or a drunken fisherman, have harmful effects on China’s image; China forced to publicly defend its image, but also tends to

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<sup>324</sup> William Davidson and Joseph Montville, “Foreign Policy According to Freud,” *Foreign Policy* no. 45 (Winter) (1981), 155.

<sup>325</sup> Chigas, *Track Two (Citizen) Diplomacy*.

<sup>326</sup> See Jeri Jensen, *Toward a New Paradigm of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Partnership for Growth* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 12 for how development is a three-way negotiation between the private sector, the U.S. Government (USG), and the host country.

<sup>327</sup> It is also reasonable to consider the possibility that the Chinese government had a hand in crafting these riots by hiring or urging the participants to riot.

slowly back away from its more brazen diplomatic missteps.<sup>328</sup> China's recent policy emphasis on a "new type of great power relationship"<sup>329</sup> is an excellent example of a foreign policy that attempts to merge all three tracks toward agreement: the CCP needs continued legitimacy, and citizens want the freedom to do business. Some, like John Mearsheimer, see China's focus on the "new type of great power relationship" as an intentional distraction from military buildup, but more fundamentally the policy shift is likely just an explicit attempt to preclude the type of conflict that typically occurs between rising and hegemon powers.

The U.S. is not immune to uncoordinated messaging. In the U.S., disparate Track One messaging over the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea prevents all three diplomatic tracks from acting in harmony.<sup>330</sup> On the other hand, though, explicit and coordinated messaging like Robert Zoellick's "responsible stakeholder" policy has found resonance and consensus across all three tracks.<sup>331</sup> In aggregate, the U.S. has honed an admirably subtle but deft hand at executing foreign policy across the full array of three-track diplomacy, but there is certainly still room for growth.

In summary, the domestic unity of messaging and action between all three tracks of diplomacy has a direct effect on how constructively two states can interact. Accordingly, it is clear that three-track consensus may also improve the effectiveness with which a state can implement and communicate its policies. From a systems engineering perspective, the key to this improvement is the increase of foreign policy explicitness that can enable such three-track coordination of effort.

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<sup>328</sup> Bader, *Obama and China's Rise*, 108.

<sup>329</sup> Chase, *China's Search for a New*.

<sup>330</sup> Eric McVadon, "The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea," *China Security* 5, no. 2 (Spring) (2009).

<sup>331</sup> Thomas Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2011), 2.

## C. FOREIGN POLICY FEEDBACK: FOSTERING A CULTURE OF MEASUREMENT AND SHARING

In order to validate the effectiveness of foreign policies, one must establish metrics by which to observe change within the foreign policy system, and provide the general international public full and easy access to the resulting datasets.<sup>332</sup> This idea is no longer a novel one within the foreign policy system or U.S. Executive Branch.<sup>333</sup> In recent years, the DOS has taken very interesting steps toward improving its metrics. To continue making progress at the whole of government level, though, these same best practices must be established from the top of the Executive Department and spread downward throughout the entirety of the foreign policy system. Indeed, this process is in progress, but should be reinforced.

### 1. Metric Creation: Measuring to Improve

A common maxim is that one can only improve what one can measure,<sup>334</sup> but oftentimes the qualitative realities of the foreign policy system defy quantitative measurement; this is not entirely insurmountable. I searched for existing literature on quantitatively measuring foreign policy effectiveness in order to understand how to

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<sup>332</sup> See Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Open v. Closed: Media, Government and Social Organization in the Information Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2012), 14 for how data must not only be published by governments, but it must be published in a useable form and using open protocols so that the data can be easily ingested and cross-correlated to existing databases in other countries. See The OpenTheGovernment.org Group, *Secrecy Report 2013: Indicators of Secrecy in the Federal Government* (Washington, DC: OpenTheGovernment.org, 2014) for a listing of characteristics that an open government data policy should have. See James Manyika et. al., *Open Data: Unlocking Innovation and Performance with Liquid Information* (Washington, DC: The McKinsey Global Institute, 2013) for a description of the characteristics of “data liquidity.”

<sup>333</sup> See Information Sharing Environment, *Information Sharing Environment 2013 Annual Report to the Congress: National Security Through Responsible Information Sharing* (Washington, DC: ISE.gov, 2013). Also see Intelligence and National Security Alliance, *Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE): Doing in Common what is Commonly Done* (Arlington, VA: Intelligence and National Security Alliance, 2013) for an explanation of the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE) and the IC’s push toward the Joint Information Environment (JIE).

<sup>334</sup> This is a paraphrasing of a quote from Lord Kelvin. See World Bank, *A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance* (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction, 2006), 3. Also see, however, John Bleigh and Justin Hufnagel and Curt Snider, “Institutional Challenges to Developing Metrics of Success in Irregular Warfare” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 3 for the caveat that the metrics that organizations use to track success can inherently change the behavior of the people whose effectiveness is being tracked.

quantitatively validate whether explicit foreign policies are better than tacit ones. With the foreign policy systems infrastructure described above, I have shown that it is theoretically possible to quantitatively validate whether increased foreign policy explicitness has been a causal or at least correlate-able<sup>335</sup> factor in the steady improvement in relations between the U.S. and China. Though the development of algorithms and actual measurement are beyond the scope of this thesis, general interest in the quantification of foreign policy effectiveness is growing and the field is not without its priors.

In 2010, the DOS commissioned a study to create a framework to measure the effectiveness of its foreign diplomacy. In response, the University of Texas at Austin (UTA) created a framework called the Public Diplomacy Model for the Assessment of Performance (PD-MAP) that attempted to merge all DOS foreign diplomacy analytics so that DOS can better adapt<sup>336</sup> itself and make decisions in a global information environment.<sup>337</sup> While I have not used this framework directly in this thesis, an important contribution of the UTA study was to show that foreign policy metrics need to be

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<sup>335</sup> See Stuart Peach, *Military Strategy in an Unpredictable World* (London, UK: Chatham House, 2013), 4 for how, fundamentally, big data necessitates a shift from clean to messy data analysis, and from a causal system of analysis to a correlational system of analysis. This is much like the 5.9 sigma level of confidence on the Higgs Boson analysis, in that there is no black and white answer to modern large problems, just probabilities. See National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office, *NMIO Technical Bulletin* (Suitland, MD: National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office, 2014), 13 for how semantic translational networks like GINA can help facilitate the sharing of EMMI amongst disparate nodes in a system that may talk different languages, but the concepts of which can be translated to produce interoperability in Web Services and data streams that utilize semantic syntaxes like XML.

<sup>336</sup> See James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (London, UK: Yale University Press, 1999), 352 for a discussion of the concept of “metis;” the author calls for the creation of institutions that don’t rely on rules of thumb, but are built to flexibly apply appropriate, well-considered responses in any given situation that arises.

<sup>337</sup> The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy: The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2010). See Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges*, GAO Report GAO-06-535 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2006) for a scathing look at the DoS engagement with Muslim audiences.

systemically tied to the foreign policies they measure.<sup>338</sup> My own conclusions appear to be consistent UTA's concepts. For example, since the DOS desires the ability to adapt its foreign policies and messaging toward China based on the wide variety of feedback it receives from social networks and internet traffic, UTA designed a system of unique identifiers that allows those metrics to be associated directly with the foreign policies they measure, allowing the DoS to dynamically analyze the changes in its relationship with China. This focus was echoed in the recent DOS Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).<sup>339</sup> The DOS wishes to use "data-driven crisis forecasting" in order to "measure the effectiveness of our civilian responders and implementing partners." As they have been proposed, systemic concepts like PD-MAP have the potential to allow organizations like DOS to accomplish such lofty goals, and I concur with their approach;<sup>340</sup> however, increasing the explicitness of U.S. foreign policies at the national level is a key first step to implementing such systems effectively.

## **2. Policies First: Making the Horse Pull the Cart**

Many organizations within the U.S. government are beginning to develop metrics at the policy level in order to monitor the overall health of their systems. Doing so is important. Henry Kissinger links many historical foreign policy failures to U.S. policy-makers not clearly defining objectives, the preferable means to achieve those objectives, and following up with the public to ensure they are willing to pay the resources necessary to achieve the objectives over the necessary time span.<sup>341</sup> A recent DOS report made an admirable attempt at doing this. The report breaks the overall DOS mission down into key policies like "achieving peace and security" and into further sub-categories like

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<sup>338</sup> See Oxford Martin Commission, *Now for the Long Term: The Report of the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations* (Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, 2013), 59 for the important point that social media is a good means to conduct discussions, but without a consolidating policy framework, the discussion risks being fragmented across a variety of services.

<sup>339</sup> Clinton, *Leading Through Civilian Power*, 51.

<sup>340</sup> See Sotirios Petropoulos, "Public Diplomacy: An Alternative Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs' Issues. Greek Public Diplomacy: Capabilities and Perspectives" (Master's thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011) for an unsupportive perspective.

<sup>341</sup> Fulton, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information*, 30.

“transnational crime.”<sup>342</sup> Building upon that, the report then makes it clear that within “achieving peace and security,” there are 29 indicators that make up DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) performance ratings, which helps to further identify whether those indicators are “above target,” or “improved, but target not met,” *et cetera*.<sup>343</sup> As another positive example, the White House Office of the Management and Budget (OMB) asked all Executive Departments to identify high-priority performance goals (HPPGs) as part of the President's performance agenda development process.<sup>344</sup> The best example of an implementation of such metrics that I have found can be seen at Performance.gov, a U.S. government website that provides clear “Priority Goals” and assigns metrics to track their progress.<sup>345</sup> All of these examples are very exciting developments; the focus of top U.S. foreign policy makers should be to craft a strong foundation for the foreign policy system and allow its participants to innovate.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

Through its increased focus on improving FAO programs, multi-track diplomacy, and quantitative analysis of the foreign policy system, the United States is definitely moving in the right direction by continuing to improve its foreign policy system. These efforts are also clear evidence that the U.S. has intuitively learned the importance of foreign explicitness and is seeking more of it. In the next and final chapter, I will provide some key takeaways, make a few recommendations on how to better focus future foreign policy developments, and conclude this thesis.

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<sup>342</sup> Clinton, *A Citizen's Guide to Foreign*, 3.

<sup>343</sup> *Ibid.*, 4. Of note, “achieving peace and security” does not appear to be fundamentally incompatible with “build security globally.” It would perhaps be helpful to coalesce both policies into a single foreign policy in order to remove ambiguity or redundancy.

<sup>344</sup> Clinton, *A Citizen's Guide to Foreign*, 5.

<sup>345</sup> United States government, “Using Goals to Improve Performance and Accountability,” Performance.gov, accessed Dec. 16, 2013, [http://goals.performance.gov/goals\\_2013](http://goals.performance.gov/goals_2013).

## V. KEY TAKEAWAYS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Based on my findings from the systems engineering analysis foreign policy systems in Chapter II, the empirical analysis of the role of foreign policy explicitness within the context of U.S.-China relations in Chapter III, and the real-world examples provided in Chapter IV, I have crafted a few specific steps by which states can improve the explicitness of their foreign policies, and thereby improve the stability and effectiveness of their relations with other states. These recommendations are targeted at senior U.S. government officials in particular, but are likely germane to other state governments as well.

### A. TAKEAWAYS

If there could be only one key takeaway from this thesis, it would be that those empowered to officially define foreign policies within states should consider the potential benefits of explicitly codifying the entire body of their state's foreign policies in a public and digitally accessible way, and encourage other states to follow suit. Such a system, properly engineered and managed, could dramatically stabilize relations between states in the same way that U.S.-China relations have greatly stabilized since their low point in the Korean War. Foreign policies set the tone for how states should engage with “foreign nations and sets standards of interaction for its organizations, corporations and individual citizens.”<sup>346</sup> As most states' foreign policy systems exist today, it is difficult to tell what any given state's foreign policies are on particular issues or toward particular partner states. Foreign policies change at every press conference, and with every subtle interpretation of every official statement. At present, perhaps only a President really knows what their state's foreign policies are. It seems unlikely that this state of ambiguity is sustainable in a world that demands ever higher levels of transparency and

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<sup>346</sup> Wikimedia Foundation, “Foreign policy of the United States,” *Wikipedia*, accessed Feb. 15, 2014, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign\\_policy\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_States](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States). The Wikipedia reference is used here not as an authoritative source on foreign relations, but simply because I liked the quote.

efficiency.<sup>347</sup> There are at least a few concrete steps that leaders in the U.S. can take toward increasing the explicitness of their foreign policies.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

What follows is a curated list of specific actions that various organizations within states can take to improve the explicitness and functioning of their foreign policy systems. Though these recommendations are targeted specifically at the U.S. government, they have broad applicability to any state interested in improving the effectiveness of their foreign policies.

### **1. Modular and Unique: Codify all Foreign Policies**

The U.S. Executive Branch should identify and make explicit every major U.S. foreign policy. All non-secret U.S. foreign policy positions should be consolidated and written down in a single, publicly and digitally accessible place, and updated as necessary to reflect the changing realities of U.S. positions toward foreign entities.<sup>348</sup> Codifying all of U.S. foreign policy is likely not as daunting a task as it sounds. U.S. foreign policy currently exists scattered throughout multiple treaties and signed Executive Agreements. The first step to consolidating U.S. foreign policy into one place is pulling all of these existing explicit foreign policies into a single place. The next step is to fill in the gaps. The final step is to ensure that any future U.S. foreign policy developments are codified and inserted into or updated within the context of the same framework. It is my opinion that, if the U.S. establishes a single authoritative source for U.S. foreign policy, “they will come,” so to speak.<sup>349</sup> A “Foreign Policy Explicitness Task Force” could be established

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<sup>347</sup> See Bill McCollum and Matthew Broaddus, *Leader-Imposed Stress* (*Small Wars Journal*, 2013), 7 for how a lack of rules in a military environment can be “distressful,” rather than “eustressful.”

<sup>348</sup> It is worthwhile to note that, per Thomas Waldhauser, Joint Doctrine Note 2-13: Commander's Communication Synchronization (Washington, DC: United States Government, 2013), III-13, the DOS INFOCENTRAL provides a centralized place for senior leaders to see “blessed” strategic messages, but it is hidden behind a login. In a separate vein, the creation of a consolidated organizational framework of unique identifiers for all past and future foreign policies is not so hard as it sounds; consider Ethereum Group, “Ethereum,” Ethereum, last modified: 2014, last accessed: 2014-02-15, <http://www.ethereum.org/> for a recent attempt called “Ethereum” at creating such a system capable of uniquely categorizing disparate types of data into a single consolidated framework.

<sup>349</sup> Yes, a cheesy reference to “Field of Dreams.” If you have not seen it, go watch it.

for this purpose. The net, long-term result of this process will be a USG that operates and adapts faster to changing global realities than the competition.<sup>350</sup>

## 2. Smaller Semantic Pieces: Improve the Publication Format of Official Government Documents

The existing method of publishing official U.S. government documents in Portable Document Format (PDF) format is inhibiting the ability for specific government policies and directives to grow digitally into an internally cohesive network.<sup>351</sup> Rather than managing “documents,” individuals should be managing pieces of information on a shared platform, an information-centric approach that allows individual pieces of information to be tagged, mashed up, secured, and reused in a variety of ways.<sup>352</sup> The

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<sup>350</sup> For a discussion of the importance of bureaucratic speed, see Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” *Strategic Studies Institute* 36, no. 1 (2006), 97. Though mentioned originally in reference to the concept of “Net Assessment,” the concept is germane within the context of this thesis because the U.S. has a chance to dramatically change its bureaucratic dynamics in a way that makes it fundamentally more competitive than any other nation, and puts it years ahead of other nations being able to undertake nation-scale unified action.

<sup>351</sup> This is beginning to improve, but there is still a lot of work to be done. See Zachary Bastian, “The Power of Hackathons: A Roadmap for Sustainable Open Innovation,” *The Wilson Center* 3, no. 1 (2013), 5 for how the use of innovative hackathons focused on solving government-specific problems in innovative ways requires the government to open its data to the public in an easily consumed, web-ready way. See The Executive Office of the President of the United States, “Common Core Metadata Schema,” Github, last modified: 2014, last accessed: 2013-08-10, <http://project-open-data.github.io/schema/> for how the Common Core Metadata Schema is attempting to solve the problem, and see Barack Obama, *Executive Order -- Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for Government Information* (Washington, DC: Whitehouse.gov, 2013), and White House, *Open Data Policy: Managing Information as an Asset* (Washington, DC: Whitehouse.gov, 2014), and Peter Orszag, *Open Government Directive* (Washington, DC: Whitehouse.gov, 2009) for official government publications on the subject. See O'Reilly Radar, “OpenGov Foundation Open Sources House Oversight's Crowdsourced Legislation Platform,” O'Reilly Radar, accessed Oct. 20, 2013, <http://oreillyradar.tumblr.com/post/31407101909/opengov-foundation-open-sources-house-oversights> and Nick Judd, “A New Tool to Crowdsourc Legislative Markup Comes From the U.S. House,” Tech President, last modified: 2011, last accessed: 2013-10-20, <http://techpresident.com/blog-entry/new-tool-crowdsourc-legislative-markup-comes-us-house> for the recent move to crowdsourc legislative markup. See National Institute of Standards and Technology, *Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity* (Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014), 1 for an example of a framework that successfully establishes a set of guidelines and common practices in order to consolidate domestic and government efforts.

<sup>352</sup> White House, *Digital Government: Building a 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the American People* (Washington, DC: White House, 2014), 5. Also see Yejun Wu, “Strengthening Intelligence Education with Information-Processing and Knowledge-Organization Competencies,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 3 (Fall) (2013), 20 for how existing IC metric analysis tools don't have the right digital resolution to support the IC decision-making process properly; they are document libraries, when they need to be Knowledge-Organizing Systems (KOS) with relationship models that help analysts synthesize information during analysis.

need for a more parsable publication format is also highlighted by the need to create tools like the Electronic Policy Improvement Capability (EPIC) in order to get a holistic view of the policy system created by the existing plethora of policy documents published by the USG.<sup>353</sup> The previously-addressed failure of the JCCT and S&ED to properly track performance metrics also highlights the connectivity weaknesses in the current system.<sup>354</sup> While the visualization of a new government document publication format will necessarily require the development of new software, it would be more productive for government resources to focus solely on codifying the nodes and connective tissue of its foreign policy system in existing open source and extensible common data formats, and allow the software development community to focus on visualization and standardization of interactive systems. The existence of an authoritative data layer created by interconnecting policy nodes is likely more important than the visualization.

### **3. Diplomats Unite: Encourage the Creation of a Joint FAO and FSO Epistemic Community**

While the codification of all U.S. foreign policy will dramatically sharpen the focus of the departments executing U.S. foreign policy, the Joint FAO and FSO epistemic community needs a way to communicate deeper ideas to each other and improve the USG-internal communication of foreign policy ideas. The community needs a collective journal,<sup>355</sup> or some other way to report complex feedback from the front lines to each

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<sup>353</sup> See Carolyn Wong et. al., *Using EPIC to Find Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Gaps in Department of Defense Policies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013) and Carolyn Wong, Daniel Gonzales, *Authority to Issue Interoperability Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014) for details about EPIC. EPIC is a tool developed by the RAND Corporation for the automatic parsing of U.S. Government policy documents in order to better show semantically the responsibilities of specific actors that are spread across a wide variety of loosely-connected publications. The output results in a collection of semantic relationships in the form of “Actor --(executes)--> Action --(results in)--> Product. Impressively, the EPIC tool correctly found 94 percent of Program Manager Roles and Responsibilities statements in 21 policy documents. The need for such a tool as EPIC, though, highlights the poor framework that is currently being used to collect and organize the responsibilities that are expected of certain actors within USG.

<sup>354</sup> Office, *U.S.-China Trade*. Also see Phedon Nicolaides, “Economics of Policy Errors and Learning in the European Union,” *European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe* no. 31 (2013), 18 for a discussion of the importance of publishing one's failures as well as successes.

<sup>355</sup> Of note, the Foreign Area Officer Association does publish a journal.

other. Just like “Googlers” publish their work,<sup>356</sup> it would potentially be productive for FAOs and FSOs to publish their findings as well. Such a journal could accept articles and theses from both FAOs and FSOs actively working abroad, and FAOs and FSOs in the training pipeline at academic institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School. If well-advertised and linked or merged with other such professional publications within the U.S. Executive Department, it would likely provide not only a point of inspiration, but also a point of cohesion and discussion for the diplomatic community as a whole.

### **C. CONCLUSION**

Does increasing the explicitness of foreign policies also increase their effectiveness? Yes. By modeling a foreign policy from a systems engineering perspective, and through an empirical analysis of U.S.-China relations since the founding of the PRC in 1949, I have shown that increasing the explicitness of a foreign policy also increases the effectiveness that foreign policy. It is likely that by improving upon the disaggregated and ambiguous nature of present foreign policy systems, the international community as a whole can focus more effectively on discovering an equilibrium more satisfying to both domestic and foreign stakeholders. Codifying and making explicit all of a state's foreign policies will allow the primacy and lasting nature of ideas to be lifted above the temporary nature of those individuals or organizations that espouse them. States began to make explicit their highest ideals in the form of Constitutions for exactly the same reason. The ambiguity of existing state foreign policy systems is likely preventing the world from establishing a better union. The challenges the world now faces are too complex and transnational for any government to tackle them alone, and the world shows no signs of becoming less complex. A more perfect union is the only way for representative governance to defeat the challenges to global peace and security that are to come.

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<sup>356</sup> See <http://research.google.com/> for the latest work that Googlers are publishing.

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