IMPROVING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS BY DEFINING INFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

A Monograph

by

MAJ Steven D. Santa Maria
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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### Title and Subtitle

**IMPROVING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS BY DEFINING INFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS**

### Author(s)

Steven D. Santa Maria

### Abstract

For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will continue to protect U.S. interests and project power within areas rife with internal conflicts and faltering states. Conditions within such operating environments require land forces to influence populations, adversaries, and other regional or global audiences. However, land forces struggle to operationalize influence, and U.S. influence operations face increasing scrutiny and criticism. This is unsurprising given that U.S. military doctrine lacks a single, official definition for either influence or influence operations. This doctrinal gap causes confusion among both influence practitioners and non-practitioners, and leads to increasingly ineffective influence operations. By asking how influence operations can become more effective, this monograph determines a definition for influence in a military context, an operationally useful definition of influence operations, and the knowledge, skills, abilities, and education of an influence operations planner. Incorporation of these definitions within doctrine will enable more effective landpower projection into unstable areas.

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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Steven D. Santa Maria

Monograph Title: IMPROVING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS BY DEFINING INFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

Approved by:

__________________________________________, Monograph Director
Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Seminar Leader
John M. Paganini, COL, Infantry

__________________________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL, Infantry

Accepted this 31st day of October 2013 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

IMPROVING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS BY DEFINING INFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS, by MAJ Steven D. Santa Maria, 50 pages.

For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will continue to protect U.S. interests and project power within areas rife with internal conflicts and faltering states. Conditions within such operating environments require land forces to influence populations, adversaries, and other regional or global audiences. However, land forces struggle to operationalize influence, and U.S. influence operations face increasing scrutiny and criticism. This is unsurprising given that U.S. military doctrine lacks a single, official definition for either influence or influence operations. This doctrinal gap causes confusion among both influence practitioners and non-practitioners, and leads to increasingly ineffective influence operations. By asking how influence operations can become more effective, this monograph determines a definition for influence in a military context, an operationally useful definition of influence operations, and the knowledge, skills, abilities, and education of an influence operations planner. Incorporation of these definitions within doctrine will enable more effective landpower projection into unstable areas.
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of influencing the will or behavior of adversaries or potential adversaries is not new. In a sense, the concept is as old as warfare itself, and was a significant aspect of war for theorists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. However, with the end of the Cold War and the explosion of information technologies, the concept of influencing became much more focused on information.¹ Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. military began developing its ability to conduct so-called influence operations in earnest.² Now, after numerous interventions in Europe and Africa, and twelve-years of conflict in the Middle East, the military still struggles with this capability and the effectiveness of so-called influence operations is questionable at best.³ Therefore, this monograph examines the important, and simultaneously loaded question: How can

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²Published in 1996, Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, was the Army’s first manual to describe what are often referred to as influence operations. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, followed this in 1998. The influence focus at that time was primarily on adversary command and control information systems, though they also targeted all aspects of the information environment.

³The criticisms are many. Some examples include the remarks by Army COL Paul Yingling, who served three tours in Iraq between 2003 and 2009, including as an information operations specialist, and referred to U.S. military Information Operations as "almost gimmicky." COL Yingling was particularly critical of posters, fliers and radio ads, describing them as "unserious." Tom Vanden Brook and Ray Locker, “U.S. 'info Ops' Programs Dubious, Costly,” USA Today, February 29, 2012, accessed June 18, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-02-29/afghanistan-iraq-military-information-operations-usa-today-investigation/53295472/1. See also: Arturo Munoz, U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010 (Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012); and Joseph L. Cox, “Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong?” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2010); and finally, in 2009 the U.S. Army commissioned RAND to provide a study entitled Foundations of Effective Influence Operations, which was designed to assist the Army in understanding what influence operations are, and how to do them effectively.
influence operations be more effective? It finds that the first critical steps are to define the term “influence” within a military context, and to define “influence operations” for incorporation into doctrine.

**Why This Matters**

Developing such definitions, and thereby improving the U.S. military’s ability to conduct influence operations, is important for two critical reasons. First, the strategic and operational environments, within which land forces operate, continue to increase in complexity. As noted U.S. Army War College analysts Steven Metz and Raymond Millen note, “the interconnectedness between states, their permeability, the globalization of economies, the transparency arising from information technology, and the intermixing of peoples and cultures around the world give every conflict both regional and global repercussions.” In short, the world is becoming a smaller and more interconnected place. As a result, solving conflicts under such increasingly complex conditions becomes equally more complex. No amount of over-the-horizon missile or airstrikes can end a conflict within an unstable or otherwise failing state. Ultimately, it takes men and women on the ground to address the human-oriented political, social, or economic problems that cause conflict. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. will continue to protect its interests in areas rife with internal conflicts and faltering states such as the Middle East, Africa, and the Far

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4A loaded question is defined as: the rhetorical trick of asking a question that cannot be answered without admitting a presupposition that may be false. The Free Dictionary, s.v. “loaded question.” (Farlex, Inc. 2013), Accessed on September 1, 2013, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Loaded+question.

East/Asia. The conditions found in these regions will likely increase the need for U.S. landpower projection in order to stabilize conflict-ridden states.\(^6\)

Second, in considering how to employ the aforementioned men and women, land forces now recognize that “combat power overmatch is insufficient for achieving success” within the operational environments of at-risk or otherwise failing, states.\(^7\) In such cases, the destruction of an adversarial force does not decide the ultimate outcome. Instead, U.S. land forces must influence adversaries (states or transnational organizations), people (adversarial, neutral, and friendly), and events, to behave in ways favorable to U.S. interests, often within completely alien and complex environments. This requires knowledge and understanding that goes beyond nominal tactical or operational intelligence. The recently created Strategic Landpower Task Force points out that the U.S. military has “time and again,” neglected to consider fully the physical, cultural and social systems that exist within the overall human environment.\(^8\) Yet, as the last decade of conflict has again proven, “competition and conflict are about people.”\(^9\) For the foreseeable future, this is not only unlikely to change, but likely to increase with continued U.S. involvement in the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East/Asia. Future conflicts will continue to be human-centric: fought among populations, with decisions made and actions taken by people.\(^10\)

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\(^6\)Ibid., 41.


\(^8\)Ibid., 2.

\(^9\)Ibid., 2.

\(^10\)During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and to a certain degree, the U.S., used satellite intelligence and computer assessment to assist in the decision-making process. For an excellent summary of early information operations history and doctrine, see: Christopher Lowe “From ‘battle’ to the ‘battle of Ideas’: The Meaning and Misunderstanding of Information Operations”
Therefore, land forces require the capability to alter behaviors in areas where “human objectives are the core strategic focus” and overwhelming firepower is inappropriate. This is likely where effectively executing something called influence operations will make a tremendous impact. However, there is a problem.

No Such Thing

Asking how influence operations can be more effective is a loaded question because influence operations do not officially exist. Despite being the subject of many studies as well as the term’s frequent usage in common parlance, influence operations do not exist in land forces’ doctrine. Joint, Army, or Marine Corps doctrine neither define nor mention influence operations. Querying the term “influence operation” in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) online Dictionary of Military Terms returns only three results: Information Operations (IO), Civil Affairs (CA), and Synchronization. While IO and CA are often associated with influence operations in common parlance, their appearance here is likely a function of the DoD search engine returning results based upon the word influence, which appears within the definitions of IO and CA. A further query using the term “operations” produces over 1000 results defining more than one hundred and forty-one discrete types of operations. There was no reference to influence operations. A

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11Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, Strategic Landpower, 2.


13The DoD search mechanism likely encompasses all words within the database. For example, the word influence appears in the second meaning of synchronization: “2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support.”

14Department of Defense: Dictionary of Military Terms, s.v. “operations.”
final search of Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, failed to produce a definition for influence operations as well. While the Air Force does define influence operations, neither Joint doctrine nor any branch of service actually defines the word influence itself.

This lack of official definitions leads to a lack of intersubjectivity among military personnel and interagency partners. For example, how many readers of this monograph, upon seeing the term “influence operations,” assumed the topic to actually mean what many personnel commonly conceive of as IO or perhaps even so-called strategic communications (SC)? How many other readers assumed the topic to mean Military Information Support Operations (MISO) tied to some type of maneuver or deception operation?

The situation described above is indicative of an influence-lexicon that is broken to the point of being meaningless. Think again about the relatively well-defined term Information Operations. When used in common parlance, people seem to know exactly what is meant regardless of what definition the term may or may not have. As alluded to above, IO is often


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15 Intersubjectivity: shared agreement among relevant individuals with respect to, (1) events or phenomenon encompassed by a concept, and (2) the relationship between concepts specified by one or more statements. Paul Davidson Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction* (Boston: Pearson, 2006), 14.


17 This represents the personal experience of the author, who is a practicing U.S. Army Information Operations officer (Functional Area 30) with over 3-years of experience at the division-level, including one operational deployment to Afghanistan. The author observed a
taken as a synonym for influence operations. But do those with that view know that IO is “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own”?18 Or, are those same personnel actually referring to functions better described as SC, or better stated, as public relations?19 Are those personnel aware of the Air Force’s definition, which states, influence operations are “the employment of capabilities to affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary decision cycle, which aligns with the commander’s objectives.”20 The Air Force further clarifies that, “influence operations are most successful through the seamless integration of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. Influence operations may be supported and enhanced by physical attack to create or

distinct lack of understanding of influence among senior leaders and staff both within the operational force as well as the officer education system, which is likely a symptom of ever changing definitions and practices.

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18The point here is that Information Operations is, and always has been, an adversary focused capability, regardless of the environment. U.S. Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication, 1-02. Washington, DC, November 2010 (as Amended Through 15 April 2013). 135.

19SC is defined in Joint and Army doctrine as “focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” JP 1-02, 267. The definition of Public Relations is: “a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics.” “What Is Public Relations? PRSA's Widely Accepted Definition,” PRSA.org, http://www.prsa.org/AboutPRSA/PublicRelationsDefined (accessed June 1, 2013)

Interestingly, while the definitions are somewhat different in wording, the Joint, Army and Air Force definitions of IO clearly imply an adversary focus, which may include physical attack or destruction as a method of influence. Yet, many military personnel and civilian scholars increasingly view IO—and by extension, influence operations—as purely non-kinetic, or more to the point, non-lethal communications, and ostensibly synonymous with strategic communications. Emerging doctrine reflects this trend. Past versions of both Joint and Army doctrine specifically referenced physical destruction or attack of adversary capabilities as a means of influence. However, the most recent Joint and Army influence-oriented publications omit or rescind the term physical destruction respectively. Furthermore, JP 3-13 no longer references any kind of physical attack, while FM 3-13 continues to recognize the capability’s ability to influence. But how or why did this confusion start?

The answer may lie within the literature. For example, the RAND Corporation published a study in 2009 entitled, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations*. Commissioned by the U.S. Army, the study had four purposes: “provide a definition of influence operations in an

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21Ibid., 15.

22Joint doctrine as of the 2008 version of JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, did list physical attack as a Supporting Capability, and also contained tables in Appendix B that provide a capabilities crosswalk featuring both physical attack and physical destruction, B-2. Army doctrine refers to physical attack as a means commanders can leverage to support inform and influence efforts, FM 3-13 (2013), 3-1. However, the DoD removed all such references within the 2012 version of JP 3-13, and the 2013 version of FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, lists physical destruction as rescinded, vi.

23See FM 3-13 (2013), 3-1, and 3-6.

24Eric Larson, Richard Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell Schwartz, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities* (Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh: RAND Arroyo Center, 2009), 1-201. Dr. Larson is a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He has studied and reported on information/influence operations, strategic communications, and other security policy topics. Prior to joining RAND, he worked as a policy and systems analyst for the National Security Council.
operationally useful way, review the scholarly literature related to influence operations, describe
the elements of a general model for effective influence operations and provide a framework for
integrating influence operations into military campaigns, and to provide a description and critique
of available approaches, methodologies, and tools that might assist in planning, executing, and
assessing influence operations.”

For these researchers, the term influence operations describes “efforts to influence a target audience, whether an individual leader, members of a decision-making group, military organizations and personnel, specific population subgroups, or mass publics.” They recognized the lack of a joint or Army definition for the term, so they developed one appropriate for the study. Their definition states, “Influence operations are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences that further U.S. interests and objectives.”

Going a step further, the researchers suggest their definition “has some resemblance” to the joint definition of strategic communication. Therefore, “readers may wish to consider influence operations as being more or less synonymous with strategic communication as defined in the world of joint operations.”

While the study contains several promising aspects, such as an overview of influence strategies that included an examination of agent-based rational choice models, e.g. expected utility modeling, there are several glaring issues with their description and definition. First, in

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25Ibid., 6-7.

26Ibid., 2.

27Ibid., 3.

28Ibid., 46-51. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita developed the expected utility model in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has been useful for both direct and indirect influencing strategies. See the following for more on his model: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, *Forecasting Political Events: the Future of Hong Kong* (Yale University Press, 1988),
describing the purpose of influence operations to “influence a target audience, whether an
individual leader, members of a decision-making group, military organizations and personnel,
specific population subgroups, or mass publics,” they are effectively including everyone. This
gives influence operations a decidedly strategic flavor, which may not be useful for most land
force operations. Second, their definition is also very strategic and extremely broad. According to
their definition, influence operations seem to encompass the entirety of U.S. foreign policy
actions. In short, influence operations are everything the U.S. does in the world, and is probably
not useful for more focused land force operations. Third, the researchers never indicate how they
developed their definition of influence operations. Interestingly, they do briefly address the more
concise Air Force definition and its use of both physical and informational means, but only in a
footnote. The researchers address their divergence by stating that their study was only concerned
with the informational, but did recognize occasions when the informational might need to be
integrated with the physical “as part of larger influence strategies.” In short, the researchers
injected and justified their own bias. Fourth and finally, in declaring influence operations as
synonymous with strategic communication, they further confuse the issue by characterizing
influence as a discrete communication function.

RAND propagated their broad, communications-centric definition in a follow-on study
entitled, *Understanding Commanders’ Information Needs for Influence Operations*, also
published in 2009. Oriented toward the situation facing U.S. forces in Iraq, Larson et al. concoct
an extraordinarily broad definition of influence operations. For their study, the researchers use the

19–48.


30Eric Larson, Richard Darilek, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Forrest Morgan, Brian Nichiporuk,
Diana Dunham-Scott, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Kristin Leuschner, *Understanding
Commanders’ Information Needs for Influence Operations* (Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh:
RAND Arroyo Center, 2009), 1-133.
term influence operations as an umbrella term that “subsumes or subordinates” everything associated with IO, and again state that influence operations are synonymous with strategic communication. Larson et al. go on to conclude several potentially useful things, such as the need to prevent the “stovepiping” of influence operations into discrete, often unsynchronized actions that do not help to achieve the objectives of combined arms, joint, and combined operations. However, the problem here is that those who struggle to understand influence and influence operations will fixate on the definition. In short, no matter what else the study may say, those who read the definition will view influence operations as discrete and communications-centric.

Social scientist Christopher Paul struggles with definitions in his 2008 reference book, *Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice*. Ostensibly focused on providing an explanation of current doctrine and practice of Information Operations, Paul runs afoul of Air Force doctrine, which diverges from the joint doctrine, when he writes:

> The focus on adversary decision-making and information superiority parallels the joint doctrine. However, the description of IO capabilities as “influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network warfare operations” differs from the joint presentation. Finally, in the introduction the USAF doctrine openly demands the integration of kinetic, non-kinetic, and information capabilities into a comprehensive set of tools. This unmistakably follows a principle that has emerged in writing and thinking on IO outside of doctrine, and is only hinted at in the joint doctrine.

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31Ibid., xiv.

32Ibid., 61.


34Ibid., 32. While the USAF updated their doctrine since Dr. Paul wrote this, the definition and focus on fully integrating kinetic, non-kinetic, air, space, and information capabilities remains largely unchanged. See also, U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Information Operations*, Air Force Doctrine Document, 3-13 (Washington, DC, 2015, incorporating Change 1, 28 July 2011), 1.
Here Paul is suggesting the presence of an internal debate among practitioners, but does not elaborate further. In fleshing out where information operations fit within the spectrum of conflict, Paul places them, or their increased usage or value, toward the non-combat end of the spectrum. To exemplify this, he interestingly quotes a U.S. Army Major, who defined influence operations as “those operations designed to change the behavior of a target audience. In major combat operations, influence operations are primarily against military forces. In stability operations, influence operations are primarily aimed at influencing non-military persons to comply with US (or coalition) instructions or in the case of Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to influence the populace to support US operations.”[sic]35

This is interesting for two reasons. First, Paul is making the point that IO is ideally suited for influencing non-combatants and civilians, and uses a quote inferring that IO are synonymous with influence operations. This proliferates the conceptualization of influence operations as communication and the use of a jointly undefined term, and ignores the USAF conceptualization that clearly includes the possibility of kinetic actions. Second, the definition Paul chose is an unsubstantiated assertion of its author.36 While the definition may represent a professional opinion, it is still only an opinion without explanation.

This brief review of the literature points out the current flaw in U.S. land forces’ doctrine and lexicon. Without proper doctrinal definitions, the meaning people ascribe to a term is based purely upon how they personally define it, and the resulting intersubjectivity leads to other problems. Take for example, the ever-present concern that U.S. land forces may be perceived as,

35Ibid., 46.

36Joseph L. Cox, “Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong?” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2010), 2. Cox does not explain the reasoning by which he concludes this, nor does he cite any sources that agree with his assertion.
or actually determined to be, influencing U.S. citizens, inadvertently or otherwise. This concern makes the topics of influence and influence operations difficult to discuss outside of official channels. Just using the word, “influence,” with regard to anything remotely informational—let alone in conjunction with the term “psychological operations”—can conjure up fears of being manipulated or deceived within all intended or unintended audiences. Of course, the use of such tactics by U.S. military personnel against U.S. citizens is illegal, and their practitioners learn early in their training that “influence is limited to foreign audiences.” Yet, despite these precautions, Americans’ general distrust of government, combined with for-profit media-spun stories, can cause a potential loss of confidence in the military. In short, “influence is a laden term, often viewed negatively, and must be approached thoughtfully, deliberately and carefully.” Given this apprehension, the aforementioned lack of definition, and media-spun uncertainty, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attempted to reduce the stigma of one aspect of influence operations in 2010, when he mandated the change of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to the nomenclature Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Clearly, the lack of official definitions and the resulting irresponsible use of terminology is a problem.

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So, how can influence operations be more effective? The U.S. military must settle the definition issue regarding influence and influence operations. To accomplish this, first define the word “influence” in a military context, and as a byproduct, improve understanding of influence in general. To be fair, the U.S. military and government undertook several costly and controversial measures to improve understanding and execution of influence efforts over the last decade.  

During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army expanded the requirements and authorizations for Functional Area 30 (FA30) Information Operations officers. The purpose of this expansion was to ensure that all deploying formations (Brigade Combat Teams and higher) had resident specialists who could integrate influential messages, and the capabilities required to transmit them, into all plans and operations from inception. However, in the rush to provide these officers, the Army accessioned younger, less experienced officers, many of whom never commanded nor were involved extensively with planning and executing operations. Moreover, the training curriculum and baseline doctrine for FA30 varied greatly since the publishing of Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, in 1996. Since the creation of FA30, both practitioners and non-practitioners have debated and manipulated training and education requirements necessary to produce competent Information Operations Officers. To be fair, from

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41 In this context, the military and government likely understand influence to mean information operations or strategic communication for reasons already noted.

42 Functional Area 30 officers, also known as “IO officers,” are the subject matter experts for both U.S. Army and Joint forces. They ensure integration and synchronization of psychological operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and interagency physical and informational influence efforts during all operations. Originally, FA30 started with 10 officers, all graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) program. Over time, the number increased to over 300, however SAMS was no longer required. Precise data for manning number increases requested from the U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and the FA30 career manager, at U.S. Army Human Resources Command, June 2013.

43 Over the last decade, the FA30 qualification course went from zero-weeks, to four-weeks, to four months. The needs of deployed commanders large drove the change in both training and doctrine. Yet, the actual job of an FA30 remains in question, so much so, that the IO proponency began conducting surveys of FA30s in 2012 to determine what aspects of IO are
2003 onward, the incessant deployments to Afghanistan and especially Iraq fueled much of this debate and change. By extension, the doctrine, which was first published in 1996 with updates in 2003 and 2013, became largely inadequate due to the pace of changing requirements and employment techniques.

Concurrently, both the U.S. government and the military branches spent hundreds of millions of dollars on advertising and marketing schemes between both Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{44} Developed in concert with contracted public relations firms, the intention was to sway popular opinion toward the newly created host-nation governments, and to support or otherwise not interfere with U.S. efforts. Yet, despite the great expenditure of financial, intellectual, and human resources, these so-called influence efforts have at times been very ineffectual.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, defining influence will enable much greater understanding and effectiveness. Moreover, without first understanding what influence means to the military, any definition of influence operations would be useless.


This leads to the next step; define the term “influence operations.” By doing so, Joint and land forces will eliminate confusion among military and interagency personnel. Moreover, such a definition will enable influence operations to become a well-clarified operational approach for commanders operating within highly complex environments where human decision-making and behavior are the focus, and principle reliance upon firepower and maneuver are inappropriate.46

Third, land forces must build a cadre of influence operations planners. These planners will act as subject matter experts of influence and influence operations. They will advise the commander and staff, conduct analysis of the complex relationships and behaviors of humans within the systems present in the operational environment, lead design efforts to determine the key problems, and ultimately plan influence operations intended to achieve the strategic end state. Finally, this cadre will fix the broken influence lexicon by educating peers, commanders, and interagency partners. However, their initial focus must be current and future maneuver leaders, in order to build intersubjectivity within the cortile of officers that represent future battalion, brigade and division commanders.

Thus, in order to begin answering how influence operations can be made more effective, this monograph will define influence and influence operations, describe the personnel, education, and training necessary to create a cadre of influence professionals, and a method for educating the force with regard to influence and influence operations.

WHAT IS INFLUENCE?

As noted earlier, U.S. military doctrine lacks a single, official definition of military-influence, though three contextual expressions do exist in several different publications. As a result, the military’s usage of the word influence within common parlance can vary. In fact, even usage by researchers, and scholars can vary. Thus, in order to understand an ultimately define military-influence, this monograph examines colloquial usage, doctrinal expressions and dictionary definitions in order to extrapolate a definition that is operationally useful.

Colloquial Usage and Common Parlance

In common parlance, personnel use the word influence a great deal, often without the speaker or speakers genuinely understanding the term. In many ways, the usage of the word influence is similar to the use of the word pornography. The definition seems nebulous, yet people seem to know it when they see it.47 However, within military-related colloquial usage, it is fair to say that there are essentially two general meanings.

First, in what might be called the classical military sense, military influence implies the threat or actual use of armed force.48 It is the knowledge of a potential or latent violence that

47Reference to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s quote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=378&invol=184, accessed on February 15, 2010.

influences an adversary’s choices.\textsuperscript{49} Should the adversary remain at odds with the policy objective, force is actively applied in order to gain compliance.\textsuperscript{50} This contextual meaning of influence is classical in that the meaning stems from classical military and political theory. In particular, this meaning draws upon the theories of famous sociologist Max Weber, who first reasoned the concept of a state’s legitimate monopoly over the use of force and violence, and of Carl von Clausewitz’s well-reasoned theory of war that postulates the use of force as a continuation of policy by violent means.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, within this classical military context, the threat or use of force becomes the ultimate form of influence. Directly tied to a political objective, this form of influence is the focus of American operational art, the process whereby U.S. land forces locate, destroy, or otherwise disable an adversary’s final means to resist U.S. policy or will. This meaning is reflected, though not defined as such, in U.S. military doctrine. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, \textit{Joint Operations Planning}, contains the following example: “Just as a combined arms approach is often the best way to attack an enemy field force in the military system, attacking several vulnerable points in other systems may offer an effective method to influence an enemy Center Of Gravity.”\textsuperscript{52} JP 3-07, \textit{Stability Operations}, contains a similar example, for when adversary leadership refuses to believe their interests are best served through an approved

\textsuperscript{49}Schelling, \textit{Arms and Influence}, 3.


political settlement, “the use of military force can influence and alter the political dynamics, which may remove the barriers to any accommodation.”

In the second, more contemporary meaning, influence implies attempts to sway attitudes and behaviors through communicative, but not violent or otherwise forceful means. While not a new meaning for influence in general, this is contemporary within the military context because U.S. land forces began pursuing non-violent effects relatively recently. This meaning is likely a product of several phenomena, such as the need for restraint during peacekeeping operations, a recognition that all information is influential on some level, a belief that the principles and practices of the advertising and marketing disciplines could be applied to operations, and the advent of the digital revolution and information age. Accordingly, the word influence is heavily associated with and often used as a synonym for the activities of IO, MISO (formerly psychological operations), public affairs, and SC. This meaning is also reflected in U.S. military doctrine within the concept of Stability Mechanisms, and Inform and Influence Activities (IIA).

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54Lowe, Battle of Ideas, 1-64.

55As noted by MAJ Christopher Lowe, “1990s peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo would profoundly alter the US Army’s interpretation of Information Operations. Following these operations, the Army would no longer primarily view IO as a means to achieve a relative C2 advantage. Instead, the Army would view IO as a means to win a battle of ideas.” Lowe, 38. See also: Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Arlington, VA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2007).

56According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07, Stability, “A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. The four stability mechanisms are: compel, control, influence, and support.” U.S. Department of the Army, Stability Operations, Army Doctrine Reference Publication, 3-07 (Washington, DC, 2012), 4-9. In this context, influence represents engagement and communication with local populations. Inform and Influence Activities represents the most recent attempt by the U.S. Army to understand and employ both information and influence. In this context, influence is purely communicative.
These two conflicting colloquial meanings form a dichotomy. On the one hand, influence is the use of military force to alter behavior, and on the other, it is non-forceful and uses various forms of communication in an attempt to alter attitudes and behavior. This dichotomy indicates a lack of intersubjectivity within the military and leaves room for wildly varying interpretation and application by non-practitioners and practitioners alike. For example, the targeted killing of adversary leadership is thought to have influential effects on adversary networks. Yet those networks can, and often do, regenerate rapidly and remain largely unaffected by such action. Other times, what many people refer to as influence, or even an influence operation, is actually nothing more than an exercise in public relations.57

Doctrinal Definitions

Compounding the lack of intersubjectivity regarding influence is the lack of a single, official definition within doctrine. A query of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) online Dictionary of Military Terms using the term “influence” produces 30 results.58 While the word appears within each result, none of the 30 results provides a definition of the word itself. Further, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which is the DoD’s printed, comprehensive glossary for joint military terminology, does not

57The definition of Public Relations is: “a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics.” “What Is Public Relations? PRSA’s Widely Accepted Definition,” PRSA.org, http://www.prsa.org/AboutPRSA/PublicRelationsDefined (accessed June 1, 2013); see also: CPT Leonardo Flor, who in trying to define his role as a battalion “IO” officer in Afghanistan, conflates his largely public relations tasks as falling under or actually being part of information operations. CPT Leonardo J. Flor, USA, “Harnessing Information Operations’ Potential Energy,” Military Review XC, no. 3 (May-Jun 2010): 59. Also cited in, Christopher Lowe “From ‘battle’ to the ‘battle of Ideas’: The Meaning and Misunderstanding of Information Operations” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2010), 1-64.

contain a definition for influence either. However, various other joint and service branch publications do provide contextual expressions of influence.

Table 1 contains the various expressions of influence found within numerous U.S. Joint and Army publications. Neither the U.S Air Force nor the Marine Corps define influence within their respective doctrine. Marine Corps information operations doctrine uses the word influence heavily and in every conceivable context. However, it never actually defines the term, apparently assuming an implicit understanding based upon the context. Air Force doctrine also seems to assume an understanding, but based upon their definition of influence operations (which will be addressed later), that understanding is likely with regard to the effects generated by kinetic weapons employment.

Table 1. Doctrinal Expressions of Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning (2011)         | “To alter the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population through IO, presence, and conduct.”


| JP 3-13, Information Operations (2012)           | “The act or power to produce a desired outcome.”


| ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (2012)          | “Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct.”

61This definition is specific to the Army’s version of Stability Mechanisms. U.S. Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP), 3-0 (Washington, DC, 2012), 2-10.
An examination of Table 1 indicates several things. First, the expressions found in JP 5-0, ADRP 3-0, ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-07 (Change 1) are essentially the same and specifically refer to influence as one part of the Stability Mechanism framework. Second, the remaining two dissimilar expressions found within JP 3-13 and FM 3-53, are much more general in nature and do not address methods. Third, JP 3-13 and FM 3-53 are functional publications written by and for influence practitioners. The JP 3-13 entry is clearly very general, and does not address opinions, attitudes or behaviors, but only the ability to produce desired outcomes. The FM 3-53

| Source: Created by author. |

“Within the Stability Mechanism framework, which is designed for peacekeeping, counterinsurgency or other stability type operations where the use of force is either inappropriate or unnecessary, the purpose of influence is specifically “non-lethal,” and in practice amounts to a public relations effort conducted in concert with the other three stability mechanisms. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Taken together, compel, control, and influence seem to represent the combination of the classical and contemporary meanings of influence. ADRP 3-07, Stability, 4-9.”

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65 Within the Stability Mechanism framework, which is designed for peacekeeping, counterinsurgency or other stability type operations where the use of force is either inappropriate or unnecessary, the purpose of influence is specifically “non-lethal,” and in practice amounts to a public relations effort conducted in concert with the other three stability mechanisms. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Taken together, compel, control, and influence seem to represent the combination of the classical and contemporary meanings of influence. ADRP 3-07, Stability, 4-9.
version is also very general, and does indicate that influence causes behavior that provides the army with an advantage, though the method remains unaddressed. While these general expressions provide for a broad approach, they do not truly inform U.S. military personnel as to the nature and practice of military-influence.

**Dictionary Definitions**

For many people, including military personnel, influence is a word that tends to be understood by the context of its usage. For example, a recent issue of Harvard Business Review focused upon how to attain and use influence.\(^6^6\) While influence was the primary topic of the issue and individual essays, neither the editors nor any of the authors actually defined or clarified the word. All of the writers seemed to assume that readers would innately understand the word via context and usage. However, for the purpose of military doctrine, such an important concept requires a definition to ensure clarity. To that end, there are several definitions found in various dictionaries. Table 2 provides a survey of dictionary definitions.\(^6^7\) Note that while several are similar to each other, no two are exactly the same (except as noted), and there is no reference to a particular context such as political-influence or military-influence.

**Table 2. Dictionary definition comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dictionary</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Random House College – Revised Ed (1984)</td>
<td>“The capacity or power to produce effects on others by intangible or indirect means,” or “the action or process of producing effects on others by intangible or indirect means.”(^6^8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^6^7\) The year of publication is included for hardcopy books. Online versions are assumed to represent current definitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Oxford English 2nd Edition (1989)</td>
<td>“The exertion of action of which the operation is unseen or insensible (or perceived only in its effect), by one person or thing upon another; the action thus exercised,” or “The capacity or faculty of producing effects by insensible or invisible means, without the employment of material force, or the exercise of formal authority; ascendancy of a person or social group; Moral power over or with a person; Ascendancy, sway, control, or authority not formally or overtly expressed.”[^69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oxford American Dictionary of Current English (1999)</td>
<td>“The effect a person or thing as on another,” or “moral ascendancy or power,” or “a thing or person exercising such power.”[^70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Oxford American Dictionary (2005) and; Oxford (online)</td>
<td>“The capacity to have an effect on the character, development, or behavior of someone or something, or the effect itself,” or “the power to shape policy or ensure favourable treatment from someone, especially through status, contacts, or wealth,” or “a person or thing with the capacity to have an influence on someone or something.”[^71]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Heritage (online) and; The Free Dictionary</td>
<td>“A power affecting a person, thing, or course of events, especially one that operates without any direct or apparent effort,” or “Power to sway or affect based on prestige, wealth, ability, or position.”[^72]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Created by author.</th>
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</table>

An examination of Table 2 indicates several relevant aspects of influence. First, the word has a dual purpose. It can be used to describe the process, or to describe the effect itself. Second, collectively, the definitions indicate a fine line between influencing, manipulating, and compelling. The older definitions, such as Random House’s and especially the Oxford English’s, seems to point toward a view of influence as manipulation. In a military context, effecting people or events by indirect, unseen, and insensible means without authority or force, sounds very much

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like a definition for manipulation, which is defined as: “to control or play upon by artful, unfair, or insidious means especially to one's own advantage.”\textsuperscript{77} Also, the Dictionary.com definition specifically uses the word “compelling” to describe the effect.\textsuperscript{78} This leads to the conclusion that elements of manipulation and compulsion are present within influence, probably more so in the context of military-influence. Third, only two of the definitions state that influence is an effect created without the use of force or formal authority. Fourth, all but one of the definitions describes influence as being some kind of power, which is exercised over someone or something. Here, the definitions refer to two different perpetrators of influence: an actor (person, group, or organization), or a thing (weather or other naturally occurring event). For the purposes of defining military-influence, influential things are not relevant, whereas power emanating from an actor is. Fifth, because military-influence is actor-based, influencing is therefore a deliberate act. Sixth, actor power can be moral, or based upon wealth or status, position or contacts, prestige, or ability. Of these, wealth or status, and position or contacts must be viewed as compelling forms of influence. This is because influence derived from such power is only seemly indirect. In all likelihood, people do what the wealthy or those in other high positions ask of them because of two consciously or unconsciously expected outcomes: a potential reward, or a latent threat of punishment or retaliation. Finally, regardless of the type of power exercised, the effect generated must change someone (people) or something (objects or events). Changes to people could be behavioral, attitudinal, or some other aspect of their cognition or decision-making capacity. Changes to objects can be their physical destruction, altering their appearance, or their removal.


from the environment. Changes to events can be an outcome other than the one expected, including the prevention of an event.

**Extrapolation**

A definition of military-influence must consider the two colloquial meanings, doctrinal expressions, and dictionary definitions. Currently, the two colloquial meanings are mutually exclusive. The classical one views the threat or use of force as influence, while the contemporary excludes force in favor of marketing and advertising approaches via media engagement and the development of relationships. However, choosing one over the other, particularly in a stability or counterinsurgency environment, transforms practitioners into “one dimensional players in a three dimensional game.”\(^{79}\) For example, commanders who only use a kinetic approach, or those who withhold kinetic methods and only apply engagement are not using the full measure of their capabilities. Given the complex nature of conflicts and other problems military forces are expected to either solve or mitigate, their capacity to influence must reflect the full power and capacity of the military. Therefore, in all practicality, any definition of military-influence must account for both the classical and contemporary meanings.

With regard to the classical military view, it is important to reiterate the purpose or raison d’être of U.S. land forces. According to United States Code, Title X, Subtitle B, Part 1, Chapter 307, § 3062, land forces exist to: (1) preserve the peace and security, and provide for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) support the national policies; (3) implement the national objectives; and (4) overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

\(^{79}\text{Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 5.}\)
States. Because of this fact, it is undeniable and certainly not worth pretending that the threat or use of force is not a factor in all that land forces do. In fact, it is critical to recognize and understand that demonstrations of force, or the use of kinetic capabilities produce crucial persuasive elements and implications. In other words, as counter-terrorism scholar Joshua Geltzer found, “direct actions are also influencing actions.” In fact, the very presence of uniformed and armed U.S. land forces anywhere in the world forms an action that suggests the possibility of force to all who observe them.

When U.S. land forces engage with nations, institutions, and peoples around the world through the conduct of security force assistance, humanitarian exercises, and disaster recovery and relief operations, they wear a uniform and carry weapons. Whether intentional or not, the potential of military force influences other countries, their governments, and their people, ostensibly by the harm it could do them. Moreover, as retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege writes, “military actions may change physical facts, they also change moral facts [such] as perceptions, attitudes, and subsequent behaviors. Actions speak.” This is where

80Policy; composition; organized peace establishment, codified at U.S. Code 10 (1956), § 3062.


82Ibid. 195.

83Note that U.S. land forces went to great lengths to explain no hostile intent to the Haitian people during Operation Unified Response. (Source: Presentation by USAF Special Operations Combat Controllers to SAMS Class 13-02) The U.S. military conducted similar messaging to the Pakistani people during flood relief operations in 2010. (Source: Personal experience of the author, who assisted in this endeavor.)

84Schelling, Arms and Influence, xiv; and, Furlong, Utility. 1.

the classical and contemporary meanings become intertwined. While the threat or use of force clearly influences, the messages sent by kinetic or non-kinetic physical actions may be misunderstood. Communication, in the form of actual spoken or printed messaging, reinforces the kinetic or non-kinetic meaning. For example, the use of a consistent narrative, proactive messaging, personal engagement, financial incentives, and the non-combat actions of all units (particularly maneuver and civil affairs units) can impact perspectives, expectations, resolve uncertainties, and reinforce desired behaviors or mitigate undesired messages sent by physical actions. These approaches leverage influential elements such as U.S. prestige and its just-cause. Conversely, kinetic or non-kinetic actions send messages that reinforce spoken or printed communication.

Given the above, influence must include the threat or use of force, combined with other communicative actions or programs. Yet, in order to develop fully a single, official definition, extrapolation of relevant elements from both doctrine and the dictionaries must occur. A review of Tables 1 and 2 produces several key aspects of military-influence. Table 3 contains these terms and their meaning within a military context.

Table 3. Extrapolated elements relevant to military-influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influential Element (stated or implied)</th>
<th>Meaning within a military context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td><em>Military application of political, informational, and economic elements of power; combat forces for fighting, the direct or indirect imposition of will, creation of order, dissemination of information, negotiation, provision of sustenance and medical care, or basic services construction.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

McKeldin (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 313. Quinn makes it very clear that the nature and conduct of an operation is, in and of itself, an information (influence) operation, meaning that actions send an important and influential message.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity, Ability</td>
<td>Military capabilities of rapid deployment, massed and precision firepower, broadcast technology, media engagement, diplomatic engagement, technology manipulation, psychological manipulation, financial resources (funds to address civil shortcomings or emergencies). Also, industrial production and economic might.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige</td>
<td>National reputation or the reputation of the forces involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Universally or internally justified, righteous cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

These elements have the ability, by individual and varying degrees, to generate effects upon the decision-making and behavior of people, the existence or nature of objects, or the outcome of events. As noted earlier, their application is deliberate. **Power** and **capacity** were resident in nearly every dictionary definition and in the JP 3-13 expression. Along with the lesser-used words, **ability** and **position**, these form the essential element of influence, without which influence cannot happen. **Power** represents the military replication and application of the elements of national power to achieve strategic objectives. **Capacity** and **ability** represent all of the capabilities that a military force brings to bear. This includes national level resources in as much as they bear upon the military’s ability to deploy, resupply, and continue operations.

**Prestige** represents the nation’s **wealth**, **status**, and to a certain extent, **ability**. Thought wealth is a form of power, it also adds greatly to a nation’s prestige and is reflected in the equipping and training of its armed forces. **Prestige** can also apply to units with well-known battle records.

**Moral**, which is also a form of power, refers to an ascendancy achieved by thorough justification.

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of the nation’s cause. This ascendancy transfers by extension to the nation’s military. Preferably, the cause receives recognition by the international community, however the cause may only be perceived as justified internally. *Effect* is the outcome of influence, whether by individual attempt or a series of attempts, such as an operation or campaign.

Given this extrapolation, a single, operationally useful definition of military-influence is:

*The deliberate, direct or indirect, threat or actual use of all U.S. military power and capability to produce desired behaviors within adversaries and affected populations. Military-influence leverages the reputation of the U.S. and the individual services, and the cause for which they are employed to achieve the desired effect.*

This definition recognizes both the classical military and contemporary meanings of influence, and incorporates relevant and repetitive aspects of dictionary definitions and doctrinal expressions. More importantly, this definition describes the nature and purpose of military-influence, and is general enough to provide commanders latitude in the development of operational frameworks. In fact, this demarcation of military-influence enables the definition of influence operations.
WHAT ARE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS?

The definition determined in the last section enables commanders and staffs to develop operational approaches. But, what kind of approach? Based upon the definition provided above, the approach leverages all military power and capability to affect a behavioral change. This is an influence operation, but how are they defined? This monograph takes the definition produced in the last section and combines it with the definition of an operation to produce a one that is functional and useful to commanders and staffs. Therefore, an influence operations is: A deliberately planned and synchronized series of actions designed to produce desired behaviors within adversaries and affected populations through the direct or indirect, threat or actual use of all U.S. military power and capabilities in order to achieve a relative advantage or desired end state.

Within this definition, “all U.S. military power and capabilities” refers to all physical (kinetic and non-kinetic), and informational capabilities that a joint or land force commander and interagency partners have at their disposal for the purpose of affecting a target’s cognition. Implicit within this definition is the notion that, in addition to land force communications efforts, all actions (both kinetic and non-kinetic) send messages. Influence is achieved via a concert of all actions taken within the operation. Moreover, it delineates influence operations from other types of operations. They are deliberately intended and planned to influence behavior, as opposed to achieving a purely military objective, such as the destruction of an enemy force.

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87 The doctrinal definitions of an “operation” are: JP 1-02: A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. ADRP 3-0: For Army forces, an operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part.

88 Contextually, the “destruction of an enemy force” refers to the purely military objective of eliminating a nation’s ability to resist militarily. However, the destruction of an enemy force can be part of an influence operation if that destruction is acting in concert with other actions and directly tied to the influence objective.
The definition offered above clearly contradicts the contemporary and all too common conception of influence operations as a discrete, communicative function that is grounded within western principles of marketing and advertising—otherwise known as attitudinal messaging.\(^{89}\) Such an approach separates the physical from the informational, potentially creating two separate messages, one created by one or more physical acts, and one created by one or more attempts to communicate. Thus, the contemporary approach to influence operations lacks integrated planning and synchronization and becomes highly reactive to adversary actions.\(^{90}\)

This monograph asks readers to consider the notion that separating physical and informational capabilities, such as that exemplified by RAND’s *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations* study, is a major factor leading to ineffective influence operations. This is so for three reasons. First, there is an inherent threat of force associated with militaries, whose soldiers are seen wearing uniforms, battle armor, and carrying weapons regardless of the type of operation being conducted. Influence operations must account for and should exploit this fact. Second, influence operations, as conceptualized both by this monograph and in its contemporary meaning, take place during armed conflicts where violence is certainly present, often in the

\(^{89}\)Mackay, Tatham, and Rowland, 4-6. According to Mackay, attitudinal messaging is the basis for western advertising and marketing. The underlying assumption is that all consumers will eventually purchase something. Thus, attitudinal messaging seeks to shape what consumers ultimately purchase. (These principles form the basis of current Information Operations Officer training.) He argues that there is no linkage between attitudes and behavior. Therefore, such principles are unlikely to change behaviors in a counterinsurgency environment. This assertion is well founded and studied by Fishbein and Ajzen, who found: “…there is little evidence for a systematic relation between these two variables. Although a person’s attitude toward an object should be related to the totality of his behaviors with respect to the object, it not necessarily related to any given behavior.” Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, *Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: an Introduction to Theory and Research* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub (Sd), 1975), 335. Also studied by LaPiere, who found no linkage between attitude and actual behavior. Richard LaPiere, “Attitudes Vs. Actions,” *Social Forces* 13, no. 2 (December, 1934): 230-37.

Because of the inherent threat of force soldiers and their employment bring within violent conflicts, there is an inescapable relationship between the threat, or actual use, of violence and other non-kinetic but communicative, psychological, or otherwise observable activities (e.g. Civil Affairs, USAID efforts, etc.). Moreover, kinetic forms of physical activities (firepower and maneuver) exert considerable influence in their own right. Third, separating the physical from the informational leads to a reactionary mode where influence operations are ancillary operations, often seen as a support mechanism for a conventional approach to war. Therefore, a more effective influence operation is one that, by design, combines and synchronizes physical and informational capabilities, including the threat or use of violent force, and in a very real sense, leads with the message.

**Support from the literature**

This is not a radical conceptualization nor pure assertion. In a 2008 article entitled, “Rethinking IO,” retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege pointed out many flaws within land forces’ influence thinking, particularly with regard to the “segregated staff processes and doctrinal insistence on IO as a separate Logical Line of Operations (LOO).” This is a “stovepipe” approach, where influence practitioners were all placed within the same section and their efforts treated as a separate part of the overall campaign. He suggested that the “dogma” of IO—as a separate communications LOO—led to “fuzzy thinking among IO practitioners” who

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91The focus of this monograph is the pursuit of influence operations by land forces during conflicts. However, they can also take place prior to and after armed conflict.


93Ibid., 1-4.

94Wass de Czege, *Rethinking IO*, 19. At the time Wass de Czege wrote this article (2008), IO was a separate LOO. (The author’s personal experience indicates that this remained the case through 2010.)
believe that IO capabilities, synonymously referred to as influence operations, “are the only means commanders have to influence human behavior.” Wass de Czege points out the unpredictability of human behavior and that at some point, inevitably, land forces must take “concrete actions designed to force choices.” Instead, he argued for a holistic approach that “focuses on the intended results and the unique way they are achieved.” BG Wass de Czege referred to this conceptualization as “PSYWAR” – an approach that “encompasses both the art of conveying threats and rewards and the art of combining [them] with actions intended to force choices.”

In a more recent study published in 2011 and entitled, *The History of Influence in Counterinsurgency*, researchers from the contracting firm of Booz Allen Hamilton recognized the role played by the threat or use of force in influencing behavior. As in the other scholarly works, they too acknowledged the Air Force’s definition of influence operations and its conceptualization as the integration of kinetic, non-kinetic, and informational capabilities. However rather than struggling with, or brushing this notion aside, they found it helpful and instructive, specifically with delineating between what is and what is not an influence operation. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-13 (AFDD 3-13), *Information Operations*, explains that informational and physical efforts must act together upon the cognitive domain of the target. In basic terms, humans require more than attitudinal messaging to be convinced or persuaded to behave a certain way. They must also see and experience the reasons why a change in behavior is

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95Ibid., 20.

96Ibid., 20.

97Rob Levinson, Marcia Frazho, and David Regan, *The History of Influence in Counterinsurgency* (McLean, Virginia: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2011)

98Ibid., 3; and AFDD 3-13, 1-3.
necessary. Sometimes that requires the threat or use of force.\textsuperscript{99} The Air Force conceptualization also recognizes a difference between influence targets and purely military targets. As the Booz Allen Hamilton researchers concluded, the difference is one of intent. Influence operations must be deliberately designed to affect and shape how people think and behave.\textsuperscript{100} As Levinson, et al, point out, “kinetic actions are considered part of influence operations when the primary intent is to send a message to a target audience rather than simply to degrade the enemy’s capabilities or to seize key terrain.”\textsuperscript{101} For example, dropping bombs to reinforce other messaging, or killing a terrorist leader in order to frighten other terrorists into inaction or relocation, all work to affect the thinking and behavior of an influence target. However, performing either of those physical attacks for the purpose of degrading the adversary’s capability fulfills only a military objective, not an influence objective. Therefore, they would not be part of an influence operation.\textsuperscript{102} The researchers concluded that influence operations “should be defined and evaluated by the ends produced rather than the means used.”\textsuperscript{103} This is significant for land forces in that this conclusion recognizes the influential nature of all actions taken by land forces. It suggests that influence is not solely synonymous with strategic communication, but with every physical action taken and every word spoken or printed in an area of operations that is either observed or otherwise communicated to an audience.\textsuperscript{104}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[99]Wass de Czege, \textit{Rethinking IO}, 20.
\item[100]Levinson, et al, \textit{History of Influence}, 3.
\item[101]Ibid., 150.
\item[102]Ibid., 3; and AFDD 3-13, 16.
\item[103]Ibid., 3
\item[104]While targeting influence to a “target audience” is intuitive and understood, land forces must recognize that non-targeted audiences will also receive messages (physical or informational), even when no message was intended. For example, a local farmer looks up to see a pair of UH-60s flying by. What message did that send? “Ah… good, the Americans are here.”
\end{footnotes}
Interestingly, one aspect of current land force doctrine resembles the conceptualization of influence operations as offered by this monograph and potentially as envisioned by Wass de Czege. The U.S. Army’s ADRP 3-07, *Stability*, describes stability and defeat mechanisms that offer the conceptual means to frame and solve complex problems.\(^{105}\) According to ADRP 3-07, defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate and represent an approach to adversarial forces.\(^{106}\) Stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support, and represent an approach to affecting civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting and stable peace.\(^{107}\) This doctrine states that, “by combining the mechanisms, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat.”\(^{108}\) Importantly, ADRP 3-07 also points out that “combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help shape the human dimension of operational environments more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation.” This is important because ADRP 3-07 is suggesting that influence is achieved through the application of both physical and informational efforts, not just one or the other. In short, ADRP 3-07 provides a rudimentary framework for influence operations very similar to the one conceptualized by this monograph. By deliberately integrating the functionality of the disparate mechanisms and synchronizing their tactical actions (both physical and informational) in space

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\(^{105}\) ADRP 3-07, 4-10.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 4-10.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 4-9. As noted in Section 1 of this monograph, within the context of stability mechanisms, influence refers to the use of strategic communications, psychological operations and IO capabilities to inform and influence affected populations within a given unstable environment.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 4-10.
and time, a command could call such an operation an influence operation for the purpose of stabilizing an area—as long as behavioral change is the goal of tactical actions.

**Going Forward**

The definitions of influence and influence operations, as determined by this monograph, suggest a change in thinking with regard to influence operations. The definitions offer recognition of the influential nature of both physical and informational actions, as well as the need for both to be integrated and synchronized within operations specifically intended to achieve an influence objective. However, adopting these definitions creates new problems. For example, who will assist commanders in planning such operations?
BUILD A CADRE, EDUCATE THE FORCE

Because commanders cannot do or know everything themselves, staff officers and noncommissioned officers assist them throughout the operations process.\textsuperscript{109} Much like any specialized operation, influence operations require a resident specialist. For example, air assault operations require personnel specifically educated and trained in both air and ground operations to plan and execute them. Therefore, it is important to ask what types of knowledge, skills, and abilities an influence practitioner should possess in order to assist the commander with designing, planning, resourcing, and synchronizing influence operations? Furthermore, it is important to ask what level of influence education non-practitioners require, and at what point in the Officer Education System (OES) should such education should occur?

Knowledge, Skills, Abilities of Influence Planners

The definition of influence operations provided in the previous section forms the basis for determining the specific knowledge, skills and abilities required by influence practitioners. Based upon that definition, practitioners must possess, or be capable of the following. First, practitioners must be able to visualize and describe a relative advantage or desired end state within the context of behavioral change. Second, the practitioner must be able to plan the use of all military power and capabilities. Third, the practitioner must understand how the direct or indirect threat or use of all military power and capability will affect the decision-making capacity of adversaries and populations. Finally, the practitioner must be able to plan and synchronize operations, and function well within a staff environment.

\textsuperscript{109}The operations process is the Army’s overarching framework within which commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command. U.S. Department of the Army, \textit{Commander and Staff Officer Guide}, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP), 5-0.1 (Washington, DC, 2011), 1-2.
Visualizing and describing a relative advantage, or desired end state, within the context of behavioral change requires the combination of two separate skills. First, visualizing and describing conditions within complex environments, which contain equally complex systems, requires in-depth analysis of that environment. This process is often referred to as conceptual planning or design. Design provides a holistic understanding of the current and future environments, and of the problems in-between.\textsuperscript{110} Currently, U.S. military officers attain this skill by graduating from one of the military’s advanced warfighting schools, such as the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, or the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) at Quantico, VA. Second, because the envisioned advantage or end state is in the context of a behavioral change, the influence operations planner requires understanding of human behavior. As retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Wass de Czege points out, “Adopting a rigorously holistic approach to war will have profound implications for military education. Deep expertise in human psychology will be necessary.”\textsuperscript{111} Therefore, in order to ensure the best possible analysis, practitioners require education and training in a human behavior discipline, such as the social or behavioral sciences.\textsuperscript{112} These two skills enable influence planners to conceptualize the current environment, future environment, and determine an initial set of behavior targets for further analysis.

\textsuperscript{110}Steven D. Santa Maria, “Understanding Army Design Methodology” (Design and Operational Art Paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 2013), 1; Stefan Banach, \textit{Art of Design, Student Text 2.0} (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College), 26.

\textsuperscript{111}Wass de Czege, \textit{Rethinking IO}, 20.

\textsuperscript{112}According to Merriam-Webster, social science is a branch of science that deals with the institutions and functioning of human society and with the interpersonal relationships of individuals as members of society, and behavioral science is a branch of science (such as psychology, sociology, or anthropology) that deals primarily with human action and often seeks to generalize about human behavior in society. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “social science.” (Copyright 2013) Accessed on September 05, 2013, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20science.
The goal of influence operations is to alter an adversary’s behavior to achieve a relative advantage or desired end state. Therefore, intuitively, the practitioner must develop an in-depth understanding of behavior targets and then determine the right combination of direct or indirect threat or use of all military power and capability that will affect the decision-making capacity of adversaries and populations in a manner that achieves the desired behavior. This requires in depth analysis of individuals, military and governmental organizations, and social groups. This analysis must account for the roles of culture, society, politics, economics, religion, and history, and how each affects the target’s decision-making. This type of analysis is generally known as target audience analysis (TAA).\textsuperscript{113} TAA accomplishes two things. First, it determines the degree of specificity required. This is a determination of what demographic variables are important, based upon the commander’s influence intent. For example, TAA helps to determine whether to segment the males of a population into sub-audiences, such as those of old age, of military age, and of school age. Second, and of greater significance, TAA provides analysis of personality constructs, cultural, societal, and historical norms, and other factors that cause individuals, organizations, and groups to make decisions under certain circumstances, and what messages (physical or informational) will cause them to exhibit desired behavior. This requires knowledge and understanding of human psychology, culture, and linguistics.

As noted earlier, military power and capabilities refers to all physical (kinetic and non-kinetic), and informational capabilities that a Joint or land force commander and interagency

\textsuperscript{113}The explanation of TAA provided by this monograph is a more general approach than what is found in doctrine. According to Field Manual 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, TAA “is a detailed, systematic examination of PSYOP-relevant information to select TAs that can accomplish a given SPO (supporting PSYOP objective).” FM 3-05.301, 5-1. In other words, MISO soldiers seek to achieve a behavior change in a predetermined micro-segment of a population. Therefore, they perform TAA upon that micro-segment only. Conversely, an influence operations planner determines the desired behaviors, target audiences (macro and micro) and then recommends the operation desired to achieve the change.
partners have at their disposal. This implies that an influence operations planner must possess at least a working knowledge of military and interagency capabilities and the effects each one can produce. This is not to say that the practitioner must be an expert in the specifics of each aspect of military power and capability. However, they must possess a fundamental understanding of military power and capabilities, how they are employed, and what effects each one is intended to produce. This includes understanding the extant authorities to act and what actions are acceptable within those authorities, the capabilities of weapons systems, maneuver formations, communication processes and systems (including psychological operations), and logistical functions, specifically the art and science of contracting. Furthermore, they must also understand the potential each element of power or capability has for unintended consequences in a given situation. Currently, officers attain this knowledge in two ways. First, officers trained and developed within certain branches, such as those within the Maneuver, Fires, and Effects category learn through exposure and first hand experience. Second, all officers receive education in the employment of Joint warfighting capabilities during the common core of Intermediate Level Education (ILE) courses.

Finally, the practitioner must be able to plan and synchronize operations. While influence operations certainly require the specialized training and knowledge described above, they are still operations. Therefore, practitioners must possess education and experience in general operations planning, preparing orders, monitoring and controlling operations, providing estimates, and

\[114\] There are various types of authorities that delineate what commanders can and cannot do within a theater of operations. Execution, Deployment, and Operations orders can contain authorities pertaining to the scope, nature, and limitations of psychological operations. Sometimes these are compartmentalized. All must be thoroughly reviewed and understood both by commanders and influence operations planners. For more, see Field Manual, 3-53, 2-1.

\[115\] U.S. Army ILE requires officers to list Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, Navy, and interagency capabilities with a matrix, and to employ those capabilities within a planning exercise.
continuously assessing operations. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC), or other service branch equivalent, is an example of the education necessary to prepare influence operations officers for service within battalion, brigade, and division staffs. CGSOC educates and develops leaders for joint, interagency and multinational operations, and successful graduates “lead teams to solve complex problems throughout the spectrum of operations.”

In terms of experience, all staff officers receive exposure to many facets of the operations process. However, officers groomed through years of maneuver schools and training possess the most experience in this skill area. For example, infantry and armor officers begin receiving such training in their officer basic course, then receive more in-depth operations training at the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC), and then still more during ILE. In between each of these schools, the maneuver officer gains practical experience and mentorship from accomplished superiors. Moreover, the maneuver officer understands the influential nature of physical actions within an environment, particularly if they served as combat advisors or platoon leaders in combat. For example, U.S. Marine Corp Major E. Lawson Quinn found through experience as an advisor in Iraq that the characteristics of a physical operation send a message. According to Major Quinn’s experience, characteristics such as the make up of the force conducting the operation, the types of targets or target sets, and the manner in which the operation is conducted all bear upon the who is influenced and how. Such personal experience demonstrates to the officer how actions resonate among both adversaries and populations.

In summary, an influence operations practitioner must receive education and training in operational design, human behavior disciplines such as psychology and anthropology, culture,

116 ATTP 5-1.0, 1-3.


118 Quinn, ed., West Rashid, 313.
linguistics, and operations planning. With these skills, the influence practitioner becomes a highly capable analyst, advisor, and a planner prepared to assist commanders in understanding and overcoming the complexities of modern human conflict. However, the education and training requirements as described above, represent a challenge for the development of this competency. Within the context of general-purpose land forces, there is currently no career field that mandates training within all of these areas. Even career fields currently associated with influence do not receive training in all of these areas. For example, Information Operations officers (FA30) graduate from a three and a half-month long course, which provides a brief overview of the information environment, advertising and marketing principles, and the employment of information related capabilities (IRC). Officers designated into the Psychological Operations (PO) career field graduate from the nine to eleven-month long psychological operations qualification course, which varies in length depending upon the language in which they receive training.¹¹⁹ Both FA30s and PO branched officers can volunteer to attend an advanced warfighting school such as SAMS, but have no requirement to do so. Moreover, these influence practitioners’ train at different locations, as there is no centralized influence program or school.

Educating the Force

Creating an influence operations planner is only part of the equation. No single planner conceives and plans an operation by themselves. Various other staff sections play an integral role within operations planning. Moreover, the platoon, company and battalion-level officers and commanders, who actually execute operations, require the same level of understanding. Therefore, all non-practitioner officers require education regarding influence and influence

operations. However, the non-practitioner does not require the same level of education as the practitioner. In order for influence operations to be successful, non-practitioners must possess a fundamental understanding of influence and the basic construct of an influence operation. Given the current professional military education system, there are three opportunities to inject such understanding; officer basic courses, Captains Career Courses (or service branch equivalent), and CGSOC/ILE (or service branch equivalent). Beginning with the basic courses, practitioners can employ a scaled approach, one that imparts essential fundamentals to the entry-level officers. Then, the captain level courses build upon the fundamentals by combining them with the officers’ experience and classroom practical application. At the field grade level, the officers receive much more in depth education and application during CGSOC. Well-written influence doctrine reinforces this fundamental level education across the force.
CONCLUSION

This monograph highlighted a definitional gap within land force doctrine—the lack of definitions for influence and influence operations. But why does this matter? The relevancy of influence is clear, particularly in light of the past twelve years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subject of countless journal articles, think-tank reports, and lessons-learned publications, the U.S. military, and land forces in particular, have struggled to understand and operationalize influence in order to resolve extremely volatile conflicts within highly complex environments where purely military means are inappropriate. This struggle continues for two reasons.

First, the U.S. land forces continue to maintain their traditional reliance upon firepower and maneuver for the achievement of effects and objectives, regardless of environmental conditions. Generals Odierno and Amos, and Admiral McRaven allude to this in their Strategic Landpower essay in describing land forces failure to consider fully the physical, cultural, and social environments in nearly every conflict for the last fifty years.120 Retired General David Petraeus recognized this condition in the late 1980s, and wrote that “people-centric operations, with unclear or poorly-defined victory conditions, make proponents of high-intensity methods deeply uncomfortable, and reinforces the strong preference for the use of overwhelming force in order to bring military involvement to a rapid conclusion.”121 It is therefore unsurprising that, after twelve years of conflict, maneuver remains prime and the inclusion of other influence-effect generating assets, often referred to as enablers, is merely a support or amplification mechanism for firepower and maneuver. This reliance goes beyond actions in combat. Incorporating influence within land force training has been extremely challenging, particularly for the Army.

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120 One has only to examine our military interventions over the last 50 years in Vietnam, Bosnia and Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, to see the evidence and costs of this oversight. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, Strategic Landpower 2.

West Chester University history professor Robert Kodosky refers to the lack of incorporation as the “Rodney Dangerfield effect”—it “don’t get no respect.”122 This effect becomes evident during operations planning, especially during the Mission Analysis portion of the Military Decision Making Process. Nominally dominated by a maneuver officer, the inclusion of informational aspects is at best a slide at the end of the brief, or at worst, no inclusion at all.123 Clearly, maneuverists tend to conceive of influence operations as merely secondary support mechanisms.124

Second, the broken lexicon described earlier perpetuates a lack of understanding and learning.125 If not repaired, personnel will continue to operate with terms based upon how they personally define them. Over time, continued misuse of terms eventually renders them meaningless, and increases the difficulty of fixing doctrine and practice. This was a central concern for retired BG Wass de Czege as he grappled with the many problems associated with Information Operations. He points out that once the meaning of a term, such as “IO,” becomes so diffuse that normative descriptions become disconnected from doctrine, “it becomes impossible

123Personal experience of the author (2009 – 2012), and many other influence practitioners. This occurs during both MDMP exercises held in officer education schools, unit level training, and actual operations.
125A classic indicator of self or socially defined terms is the use of phrases like, “IO message,” or “IO campaign.” These phrases don’t exist in doctrine, nor is their implied meaning accurate. Yet, usage continues, even among practitioners who struggle to find a common language with non-practitioners. In an effort to curb such usage, the latest FM 3-13 (2013) makes the statement, “There are no IIA or information operations themes and messages, although MISO and public affairs have themes and messages to support their operations.” Field Manual 3-13, 1-4.
to fix IO while working within the confines of the current understanding of IO.”126 Thus, in the case of influence operations, the lack of doctrinal definitions leads to a lack of clarity. The lack of clarity leads to ill-defined intensions, poor planning, and inefficient execution. This in turn leads to the creation of undesired effects and outcomes.

Defining the terms influence and influence operations is an important and necessary first step toward ending part of land forces’ struggles with influence. By defining these terms in an operationally useful way, this monograph provides an opportunity to fill the doctrinal gap, fix the broken lexicon, and facilitate further thinking with regard to U.S. land force’s approach to conflict intervention and operational art. As conceptualized above, influence operations represent a way to combat adversaries that goes beyond the supporting communication currently employed. Instead, influence operations not only strike at the adversary’s forces, but also his ability to command and control them. They disrupt, corrupt, usurp, or destroy the adversary’s and ability to sell his cause to affected populations and the world, and ultimately strike at his psyche—the very essence of what he thinks and believes, and his will to fight. Moreover, influence operations actively convince populations to support policies and regulation they may not naturally support. These characteristics make influence operations vital for a complex world rife with conflict. In light of the past twelve years, during which the U.S. military fought against trans-national terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, and the proxy forces of certain adversaries, all while operating among seemingly alien cultures, improving the effectiveness of influence operations is a desirable objective, and one that can enable more effective landpower projection.

126Wass de Czege, Rethinking IO, 15. Other examples of this is phenomenon are the word strategy, which Hue Strachan claims has lost all meaning due to overuse and misuse, and the term operational art, which Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan argue “is a term whose original context has been lost, and its meaning has been consequently stretched beyond useful limits.” See: Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, Survival 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 33-54; Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, “Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 1-2.
However, this monograph also highlights five challenges to adoption that form areas for further research and study. The first area lies within U.S. military staff organization. In the contemporary conceptualization of influence, a separate staff section maintains responsibility for planning, integrating, synchronizing, and executing influence within land force formations. Within Joint doctrine, this section is the J-39. Within Army doctrine, this is the G/S-7. At the division level and above, the G-7 is often aligned with the other two operations-oriented staff sections into a G-3/5/7 configuration. Further research should focus on determining the utility of two critical points. First, what is the utility of a stand-alone influence section, such as the G/S-7, versus integrating influence planners within the other staff sections? There are likely benefits and flaws within each organizational approach. For example, within the current configuration, influence planners have direct access to the Chief of Staff and potentially the commander, which practitioners view as a benefit. However, the current configuration can cause confusion within other staff sections regarding the G/S-7’s role as an integrator. Second, what is the utility of an influence planner at each echelon of maneuver formations (corps, division, brigade, and battalion)? Future research must determine a configuration that best facilitates effective influence operations by echelon—corps, division, brigade, and battalion.

The second area is the impact to the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and those of the individual service branches. Currently, influence tasks fall under several categories such as Information Operations or Stability Operations. Future research must determine a centralized task list for influence practitioners. Such a list will assist the broader force to understand what influence practitioners must accomplish. Moreover, research on this topic should include methodologies for training these tasks.

The third area lies within personnel or human relations. The question here is whether or not any officer can be educated and trained to perform as an influence operations officer? Further research should determine if an officer’s undergraduate education and service experience form
critical factors for selection as an influence operations planner. Moreover, and potentially more important, future research should determine if the officer’s personality plays a role in exceptional performance as an influence practitioner. If so, subjective selection criteria may require development.

The fourth area is the question of centralized training. Future research should determine the utility of centralized training for influence practitioners. Should they be centrally trained only during their initial qualification training, or throughout their development? If research determines the latter, there will be implications for funding and facilities as the influence training seeks to replicate the advanced warfighting school program.

Finally, future research should focus on the implications for American operational art. As retired British BG Andrew Mackay points out, “influence cannot be regarded as an add-on to military planning, it needs to be in the heart of every commander’s thinking.” If influence moves to the fore, what implications does this have for the various warfighting functions and how each contributes to mission accomplishment? Will commanders view each warfighting function and enabler equally as part of an overall menu of effects generating tools for conducting influence operations?

In order to execute more effective influence operations, this monograph demonstrates the need to define influence and influence operations, and offers such definitions for adoption. By doing so, Joint and land forces can resolve long standing confusion, misunderstanding and misuse of terminology and ineffective use of physical and informational actions. However, to do so represents a shift away from the current, contemporary conception of influence. Such a change will impact areas of the U.S. Army’s model for assessing capabilities and managing change such

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as in doctrine, organization, training, education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Moreover, adoption will necessitate fresh thinking with regard to American operational art.\textsuperscript{128}

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