THE U.S. ZONE CONSTABULARY, 1946-1952: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

A Monograph

by

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**Title:** The U.S. Zone Constabulary, 1946-1952: Organizational Change in Occupied Germany

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**Abstract:** In 1945, senior American commanders and staff officers in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) conceived the U.S. Zone Constabulary to maintain order and security in occupied Germany. Equivalent in size to a U.S. corps and on the active rolls for only six years, the organization’s service was tumultuous and characterized by change, transition, and adaptation driven by the operating environment. International and national policies, the conditions found in war torn Germany, post-war U.S. Army demobilization and reorganization, and Cold War tensions all shaped and guided the Constabulary in some fashion. Within this context, the Constabulary successfully accomplished its assigned tasks in spite of two major changes in its mission and no less than four significant changes in organization, which affected Constabulary units from brigade through platoon level. The Constabulary is a significant example of a corps-level formation coping with change effectively. As such, examining the Constabulary’s transitions, and moreover how it enabled those transitions, has much to offer the historian and the contemporary operational artist.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

In 1945, senior American commanders and staff officers in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) conceived the U.S. Zone Constabulary to maintain order and security in occupied Germany. Equivalent in size to a U.S. corps and on the active rolls for only six years, the organization’s service was tumultuous and characterized by change, transition, and adaptation driven by the operating environment. International and national policies, the conditions found in war torn Germany, post-war U.S. Army demobilization and reorganization, and Cold War tensions all shaped and guided the Constabulary in some fashion. Within this context, the Constabulary successfully accomplished its assigned tasks in spite of two major changes in its mission and no less than four significant changes in organization, which affected Constabulary units from brigade through platoon level. The Constabulary is a significant example of a corps-level formation coping with change effectively. As such, examining the Constabulary’s transitions, and moreover how it enabled those transitions, has much to offer the historian and the contemporary operational artist.

To cope with change and transitions the Constabulary developed structures that roughly fall into five categories. The first was development of a clear vision for the organization. Second was the use of focused planning efforts that resulted in detailed training plans and guidance. Third, was the organization of Constabulary run schools to develop the knowledge and skills required for the Constabulary’s unique mission and organization. Fourth was the use of doctrine tailored to the organization’s distinct mission set to formalize techniques and procedures. The final structure was the use of units as “test beds” to develop lessons learned and best practices before the application of changes across the entire Constabulary.

In general, the Constabulary experience provides useful insights for organizations required to make significant changes. Narrowing the focus, there are three transitions the contemporary U.S. Army faces that can be made more effectively by applying structures used by the Constabulary. First, with the conclusion of operations in Iraq and the reduction of troops committed to Afghanistan, U.S. Army units will be returning to a training focus that includes core competencies that have been largely neglected for the past ten years. Second, with the introduction of the regionally-aligned forces (RAF) concept, divisions and brigades will need to develop training programs unique to their mission, likely without significant aid from the U.S. Army’s institutional component. Finally, the U.S. Army’s announcement to restructure infantry and armored brigade combat teams with the introduction of additional maneuver, engineer, and field artillery assets will require a deliberate process to develop and integrate these new units.
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Allied Control Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACR-L</td>
<td>Armored Cavalry Regiment-Light</td>
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<td>AIB</td>
<td>Armored Infantry Battalion</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CFM</td>
<td>Council of Foreign Ministers</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DPs</td>
<td>Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>ETOUSA</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
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<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army Europe</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officers</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSC 68</td>
<td>National Security Council Memorandum Number 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Forces</td>
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<td>TO/E</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of Military Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
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<td>USFET</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The 6th Armored Infantry Battalion (AIB) entered World War II with the 1st Armored Division in Tunisia in 1943. From there, the “Regulars” crossed the Mediterranean Sea and fought their way through Italy, seeing combat in the Naples-Foggia, North Apennines, Po Valley, and Rome-Arno campaigns. By August 1945, the men of the 6th AIB had reached Salzburg, Austria, and with the victory in Europe inherited an uncertain future. 1 Deactivation, occupation duty, or redeployment to the Pacific were all possibilities. A theater wide conference in February 1946, decided the battalion’s future. It would join the U.S. Zone Constabulary, a formation conceived to secure the American occupied zone of Germany. From there, things developed quickly. On March 20, 1946 the battalion was re-flagged as the 12th Constabulary Squadron and fell under control of the 1st Constabulary Regiment in the state of Hesse, Germany. The 1st Regiment having itself been recently organized on February 15, 1946, used the 11th Armored Group as its core. 2 Three months later, the battalion, now formed and trained as a Constabulary squadron, was fully operational and conducting missions designed to promote security and stability in post-war Germany. To reach this point the formation had made wholesale changes in its designation, location, organization and mission. 3 The 6th Armored Infantry Battalion’s


experience is not unique among units transferred to the Constabulary. It is just one example that highlights the fast pace and significant scope of adaptation and change made during the Constabulary’s formation. How did units undergoing this transformation cope with these rapid changes? What structures enabled them to transition effectively? The answer to these questions remained important long after the 12th Squadron assumed its mission on July 1, 1946. For, unbeknownst to the officers and troopers of the nascent Constabulary, change and transition remained enduring themes throughout its history. For the contemporary United States Army the answer is important as well. The Constabulary is a significant example of a corps-level formation coping with change effectively. As such, studying the Constabulary’s transitions, and moreover, how it enabled those transitions has much to offer the historian and contemporary operational artist.

The U.S. Zone Constabulary and its subordinate units operated in the American controlled area of occupied Germany from 1946 to 1952. Conceived as an economy of force mission to reduce the troop strength needed to maintain order and security in occupied Germany, the organization’s history can be roughly divided into two periods. The first occurred from approximately 1946 to 1948. In this period, the Constabulary formed, and conducted stability operations in occupied Germany, using an active patrol system to enforce laws and regulations across a wide range of peoples and communities. These included the occupied German people, U.S. Soldiers, and foreign nationals recently liberated from their fate as forced labor and concentration camp victims. The second period began in 1948 and concluded with deactivation of the last two Constabulary Squadrons in 1952. During the second period, the Constabulary

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4By employing a police-type security force, the U.S. Army estimated it could accomplish the security mission in Germany with 81,000 fewer troops. See Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-46 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1975), 81.

5The 15th and 24th Constabulary Squadrons were the last Constabulary units in active service. Both were deactivated on December 15, 1952. See William E. Stacy, U.S. Army Border
reoriented itself on the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. To accomplish this change in focus, the Constabulary reorganized and adapted its subordinate formations from the platoon through brigade level. These changes in organization were accompanied by changes in mission and training needed to transform the Constabulary into a credible deterrent force. Dividing the Constabulary history into these periods highlights the acute transitions the organization made, and the short timeframe in which these changes took place. This did not occur in a vacuum. As such, the conditions in which the Constabulary operated are a defining component of the unit’s history.

Central to this story of change and transition are the circumstances in which the Constabulary operated. U.S. and Allied plans developed at the tri-partite conferences involving the executive leaders of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union, and policies such as U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067) established the basic framework under which the Constabulary operated. Added to this were a host of physical conditions found in post-war Germany, which had been devastated by years of strategic bombing and the ground combat that marked the closing months of the war. Shortages in food, fuel and shelter characterized daily life in post-war Germany. Competing with German citizens for these scarce resources was a displaced persons population numbering over a half million. Factors internal to the U.S. Army contributed to this rich operating environment as well. The requirement to reduce troop strength in Europe was a consistent factor in Constabulary organization and operations. Coupled with a general lack of personnel, there was also a decline in the readiness and discipline of U.S. troops in Europe. Lastly, the relationship with the United States’ wartime ally, the Soviet Union, began to sour at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Tensions continued to increase after the conference, and were punctuated by events such as the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the formation of the


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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. All these factors combined to shape the Constabulary throughout its operational history, creating a unique organization that to date has garnered limited attention.

Why study the U.S. Zone Constabulary? The organization’s operational life span was brief when presented against the backdrop of U.S. Army history, ultimately only being active for six years. Moreover, it is a formation that operated in peacetime conditions. Thus, the Constabulary occupies a far less glamorous position in history than its WWII predecessors or units that fought in Korea, Vietnam, or even Iraq. However, for the operational artist and the historian, it is an intriguing organization for several reasons. First, the Constabulary was a large formation, a corps-level equivalent, which was organized, trained and equipped in an exceptionally short period. From gaining control of its assigned units to assuming its mission took only three months. This is no small feat considering that down to the individual trooper, each person had to think and act uniformly if the Constabulary was to gain the respect and confidence of the German people. Second, the Constabulary executed significant transitions in mission and organization in relatively short time spans, and was able to carry out these adaptations successfully. As mentioned above, in its first phase of organization, the force was formed over a three-month period. Then, in March 1947, after operating as a security force conducting stability operations for approximately nine months, the Constabulary started the first in a series of major reorganizations that culminated in 1948. Whether due to emerging circumstances or the Constabulary’s higher headquarters dictating the changes, clearly this was an organization constantly adapting, and doing it effectively. The final reason the Constabulary should garner more attention than it has, was the organization’s ability to reshape itself while accomplishing its assigned tasks and missions.

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6Hofmann, Through Mobility We Conquer, 397-456.
As an organization, the Constabulary was largely effective in accomplishing both of its significant missions. By 1948, it had all but worked itself out of a job; security in Germany had improved to such a degree that the Constabulary could transition from police-type operations to training for combat exclusively. In this role, it was also largely successful. While proving the effectiveness of deterrent capability is extremely difficult, the Constabulary was a significant component of U.S. deterrence in western Germany until supplanted by the 1950 build-up of forces in Europe. Diverse elements ranging from the U.S. Congress to one of the most prominent U.S. military figures in occupied Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, acknowledged its contribution to the stability of post-war Germany. The Eighty-first Congress recognized the Constabulary in the 1950 Congressional Record, describing it as “probably the keenest, most vigilant eye we possess” and General Clay credited the Constabulary with winning “the respect and admiration of all, including the German population.” Lieutenant General Ernest N. Harmon reinforced General Clay’s assessment in relating the story of his departure from Germany after relinquishing his position as the first commander of the Constabulary. By 1947, his troopers had made such an impact in returning Germany to normalcy that the German citizens of Heidelberg lined the streets to bid him a fond farewell. Franklin M. Davis Jr, in his history of occupied Germany, *Come as a Conqueror*, states “the Constabulary more than any other Army organization contributed the most to the sturdy platform needed to launch the new Germany.” For the operational artist and the historian, the Constabulary provides an example of a corps-level

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8Hofmann, *Through Mobility We Conquer*, 454-455.


10Franklin M. Davis Jr., *Come as Conqueror: The United States Army’s Occupation of Germany, 1945-49* (New York: Macmillan), 174.
organization successfully accomplishing its assigned tasks. In doing so, it was also adapting to changes prompted by the operational environment.

In accepting the premise that the Constabulary was successful in accomplishing its mission, and therefore successful at adapting to meet the exigencies of the operating environment, a series of questions become apparent. How did the Constabulary facilitate these transitions; how did it successfully adapt to meet the challenges present? What tools did the Constabulary develop to reorient the formation as it entered tumultuous periods in its history? How did it lead subordinates through change? Moreover, how did the Constabulary ensure that when transitions were complete the organization’s members thought and acted uniformly? In considering the problems contemplated above, two propositions emerge. First, that the Constabulary formed a series of structures to enable effective and uniform change throughout the formation. Second, that many of these structures were unique, and that they were not developed by the institutional Army, but by the Constabulary to suit its particular requirements.

If the Constabulary was a unique organization shaped by the context in which it operated, and the structures it developed were unique to the institution, how can its study apply to the current challenges facing the U.S. Army? Three recent developments in particular establish parallels between the contemporary American Army experience and the Constabulary. First, with completion of the U.S. Army’s operations in Iraq, and the drawdown of troop strength committed to Afghanistan, American units will be turning their attention back to skills needed to conduct conventional combat operations. Second, with the emergence of the U.S. Army’s regionally-aligned forces concept, it is likely brigade and division-size formations will be required to develop training programs uniquely suited to their region and mission of assignment. Third, on


12U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation
June 25, 2013, General Raymond Odierno announced U.S. Army plans to reorganize U.S. Brigade Combat Teams by increasing field artillery strength, creating brigade engineer battalions, and adding a third maneuver (infantry or combined arms) battalion to each brigade.\textsuperscript{13} Useful analogies, comparisons, and lessons learned can be drawn between these planned reorganizations and the Constabulary’s transitions in both 1946 and 1948.

The Constabulary was an organization consistently in flux. Much like current Army formations, the men and units making up the Constabulary transitioned between diverse mission sets over a limited period. First, the formation focused itself, as a police-type security force, on stability operations. It then transitioned to the other end of the spectrum of conflict by training to meet a potential Soviet conventional attack while making wholesale changes in organization and structure. Like many military organizations, the context in which it operated shaped and drove the organizational changes the Constabulary experienced. While some organizations stagnate and fail to adapt, the Constabulary was able to assume the mantle of each new mission as it emerged. If faced with the daunting task of transitioning an organization of 38,000 men and women to meet operationally significant requirements, the Constabulary experience provides many useful insights and techniques to emulate.

**OCCUPATION GERMANY, THE CONSTABULARY’S CONTEXT**

Political, economic, social, and military events occurring during its formation and operations shaped and guided the Constabulary’s development. A host of problems confronted the United States occupation forces in 1946 when the Constabulary was formed. What national and international policies would guide the actions of American leaders and soldiers in post war

Germany? What approach, if any, would U.S. occupation forces take to alleviate the devastation found in post-war Germany? How would American forces feed and repatriate the half million displaced persons located throughout the country? How would the U.S. Army redeploy over three million service members while maintaining order and security in Germany? How would U.S. political and senior military leaders handle the increasingly obstinate and threatening former ally found in the Soviet Union? U.S. policy decisions and plans sought to answer these questions while delimiting and guiding the political and military actions Americans took in post-war Germany. Internationally, the U.S. worked with its allies, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union (and later France), to make a series of decisions and plans that set the tone for the occupation and further established the bounds American occupation leaders and forces operated within.

**Allied and U.S. Occupation Policies and Planning**

Many of the strategic decisions that affected the Constabulary’s operating environment were developed at a series of conferences in which President Theodore Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin met to discuss the conduct of WWII as well as the post-war occupation. The first crucial decision occurred at the Casablanca conference when Roosevelt and Churchill set unconditional surrender as the Allied war objective for Germany, Italy and Japan. Not present at Casablanca, Stalin subsequently agreed to the objectives. When all three leaders met in Tehran, Iran in 1943 their discussions revolved around Allied strategy for winning the war but also touched on post-war Germany. It was agreed that Germany must know defeat; blame for the war and its outcome must fall squarely on the German people, their politicians, and their armed forces.14

The Allied leaders met two more times to discuss the future of Europe and Germany, first

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at Yalta in February 1945 and then at Potsdam in July 1945. Major decisions arrived at Yalta were approval of the recommendation to divide Germany into four occupation zones and the inclusion of France as an occupying power both physically and as a member of the overarching occupation control machinery. However, divisions in Allied policy began to develop centering on reparations and the Soviet actions in “liberated” Poland. These disagreements surfaced again at Potsdam, but some key agreements were made as well. Included among these were that: (1) Germany would be treated as one economic unit, (2) a Council of Foreign Ministers would be formed to develop peace treaties with the defeated axis nations, and (3) a central German government would be formed at some unidentified point in the future. At the conclusion of the Potsdam conference, the Soviets were still concerned over reparations; conversely, the western governments were concerned over the Soviet establishment of pro-Communist governments in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. The high-level conferences held by the “Big 3” charted the course for the occupation policies U.S. forces followed, and perhaps more importantly laid the groundwork for future confrontations with the Soviet Union.15

The Allies recognized that planning needed to occur at a tripartite level beyond the decisions made by the national leaders at conferences such as Potsdam and Yalta. To this end, the Allied Nations formed the European Advisory Committee (EAC), a multi-national organization composed of U.S., British and Soviet representatives, with a charter to study and make recommendations for how the Allies would administer all of postwar Europe. The EAC made three major contributions to the post-war planning and administration of Germany. These included development of the draft terms of surrender, agreement on the composition of the allied commission that controlled post-war Germany, and agreement on the boundaries outlining the

area each power occupied.\textsuperscript{16} However, the first two items had little impact on the Constabulary. When accepting the German surrender on May 7, 1945, Eisenhower used a document developed by his staff, not the EAC terms.\textsuperscript{17} The second item formed the basis for the Allied Control Council (ACC), the supreme ruling authority in Germany from 1945 to 1948, which was composed of the senior military commanders from the four occupying powers. The ACC developed broad policy for governing Germany’s occupation; however, the respective senior military commanders had supreme authority in their zone and answered to their countries’ political leadership, not the Control Council.\textsuperscript{18} The final item, the division of Germany into occupation zones had the greatest effect on the Constabulary.

Original plans called for dividing Germany into three parts, with the eastern section of Germany controlled by the Russians, the northern section controlled by the British and the southern section controlled by the Americans. A later provision carved out a portion of the British and U.S. zones for France. In the end, the American zone consisted of the German L\text{\text{"a}}nder of Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Bavaria as well as a district containing the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the U.S. sector in Berlin.\textsuperscript{19} This encompassed an area of approximately 47,000 square miles that was generally devoid of industry, relying economically on farming and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16}Oliver J. Frederiksen, \textit{The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953} (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, USAREUR, 1953), 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}Ziemke, \textit{Occupation of Germany}, 257-258.
  \item \textsuperscript{18}Smyser, \textit{From Yalta to Berlin}, 11-77.
  \item \textsuperscript{19}A German Land was roughly equivalent to a State in the U.S governmental system, see A. F. Irzyk, “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice: A Saga of the Constabulary,” \textit{Military Review} 26, no. 12 (March 1947), 16. Two of the three L\text{\text{"a}}nder in the U.S. Zone were developed by joining pre-war German States. Hesse was formed by combing Greater Hesse with Hesse-Nasau, and Wuerttemberg-Baden was formed by the amalgamation of the northern sections of Wuerttembuerg and Baden, the southern sections being located in the French zone, see Ziemke, \textit{Occupation of Germany}, 311-312.
\end{itemize}
forestry.\textsuperscript{20} For the Constabulary, this set the physical boundaries in which the unit operated. A critical component missing from the agreement on zones was the identification of U.S. access points connecting the American Zone with Berlin, which came into play later as the Soviets worked to force the Allies out of the city.\textsuperscript{21} International agreements and institutions set the course for many of the larger issues facing post-war Germany; added to this were U.S. policy decisions that affected the American zone.

One of the most important pieces of American policy concerning the occupation was JCS 1067. Issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in its final form on May 10, 1945 to Eisenhower and his staff, the document set an aloof and detached tone, squarely placing the blame for the war in Europe on the German people.\textsuperscript{22} Included in JCS 1067 were provisions for the demilitarization of the German armed forces and industry, de-Nazification of the people, decentralization of the German government, and control over key pieces of German society such as the press and education system. In some aspects JCS 1067 reflected the view of Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, on the occupation. He believed Germany should be stripped of its industrial capacity and become a pastoral nation. In this vein, it forbade the U.S. military occupation authorities from taking steps to rehabilitate the German economy, leaving Germans to maintain their own economic controls. Finally, JCS 1067 discouraged the provision of relief supplies to the German people except when required to prevent unrest and famine.\textsuperscript{23} JCS 1067’s policies had a direct effect on the Constabulary mission by creating conditions that encouraged black marketeering, demonstrations over the food supply, and general discontent in the early days

\textsuperscript{20}Frederiksen, \textit{The American Military Occupation of Germany}, 13.

\textsuperscript{21}Davis, \textit{Come as Conqueror}, 70-89.

\textsuperscript{22}Ziemke, \textit{Occupation of Germany}, 214.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 104-108.
of the occupation. Ultimately, the policy proved to be unworkable; if Europe were to recover economically, Germany would have to be part of that recovery. Moreover, if the United States was going to counter Soviet aggression in western Europe it would need to develop a strong, democratic partner in West Germany.  

Turmoil and Turbulence in Occupied Germany

The occupation planning and policies came to full use on May 8, 1945 with Germany’s unconditional surrender. Tasks confronting the American forces in Europe were monumental and revolved around several external and internal factors. Externally, the U.S. Army needed to maintain security and simultaneously meet the objectives established in JCS 1067. Compounding an already difficult situation, relations with the Soviet Union progressively deteriorated until concerns over potential Soviet domination of Europe became the United States’ primary focus. Internally, several factors were pulling the United States Army in multiple directions. The troop requirements to bring the war in the Pacific to a close, and after VJ Day, the need to reduce the Army’s end strength rapidly, resulted in massive personnel turbulence in the theater. Additionally, after the successful conclusion of the war, discipline and readiness began to falter, and the U.S. Army lost the cutting edge it had developed over three years of combat operations. All of these factors figured into the Constabulary’s operations and later spur its transition from a security force oriented on stability operations to one oriented on defensive operations. However, the immediate problem facing occupation authorities were the conditions in Germany.

On VE Day, Germany as an economic, political, and social unit was shattered. In the U.S. Zone of occupation, many of the large cities were fifty to seventy-five percent destroyed and secondary cities were as much as ninety percent destroyed. Frankfurt, where U.S. Army Europe eventually established its headquarters, was sixty percent destroyed. Throughout the U.S. Zone,

\[24\text{Ibid., 445.}\]
German government institutions were non-existent above the local level. There were critical shortages in fuel, food reserves, and seeds needed for agriculture. The basic services required for modern living and sanitation, such as sewer, gas, power and trash collection were not available. German banking, commerce and industrial institutions were closed or not functioning. These conditions contributed to the civil unrest and criminal activity that the Constabulary confronted in its early years.

Adding to these concerns were a significant number of displaced persons (DPs) brought to Germany by the Nazis to serve as forced labor. DPs compounded the problems facing the U.S. Army in that they required the same basic resources for living, such as food and housing, which were already in short supply. Some of the recently freed victims, bent on retribution, contributed to security concerns by stealing from or assaulting German citizens. After hostilities ceased, U.S. forces consolidated the DPs in camps, which concentrated them for the provision of basic services such as food and shelter. However, it also created centers for illegal activities, such as weapons smuggling and black marketeering, which the Constabulary helped regulate as part of their law and order mission. In November of 1945, there were over a half-million displaced persons in Germany; it ultimately took four years to repatriate all of them. Relieving human suffering was only one of many tasks the U.S. occupation forces faced after VE day. Other activities associated with demilitarizing Germany were another significant function that required immediate attention.

A primary concern within the Allied Nations was ensuring Germany did not rise again to threaten peace on the continent. To this end, American occupation forces took a number of measures, including: the process of de-Nazification, destroying captured German munitions and


26Davis, *Come as Conqueror*, 178-185.
fortifications, disarming and dissolving German military organizations, and the apprehension of
selected German service members for war crimes. Apprehension and trial of war criminals
directly involved the Constabulary, as one of its duties was to ferret out and detain accused
personnel for further processing by the military justice system. One year after the start of the
occupation American forces had apprehended and brought 1,672 German war criminals before
the U.S. Army court in Ludwigsburg.27 Carrying out the provisions of JCS 1067 in the conditions
found in post-war Germany was a difficult problem unto itself. Compounding this already
difficult task was the upheaval created as the U.S. Army in Europe transitioned its organization
from a wartime footing to occupation duty.

Senior Army headquarters in Europe remained in a state of transition for a number of
years during the occupation period. The first monumental hurdle to overcome was separating the
British and American components of Eisenhower’s combined command, the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Since assuming command of SHAEF,
Eisenhower had also commanded European Theater of Operations, United States Army
(ETOUSA). However, it had never really functioned as an independent organization satisfying
Eisenhower’s planning and operations requirements. Over the course of approximately two years,
ETOUSA separated from SHAEF and was re-designated United States Forces European Theater
(USFET). Then, through a series of amalgamations and structural changes, USFET ultimately
transformed into a unified U.S. command in Germany known as European Command (EUCOM)
in 1947.28

An important feature of EUCOM was the separation of occupation or tactical forces from
the military government. This arrangement developed over time as the military government stood

27Ibid., 178-184.

28Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 32.
up and as Germans were gradually entrusted with more governmental responsibilities. For tactical units this resulted in a corresponding decrease in governmental requirements. Ultimately, when EUCOM was fully formed, it consisted of two branches under the EUCOM commander: the Headquarters European Command with responsibility for the Army’s occupation and tactical units and the Office of Military Government (OMGUS) with responsibility for administering Germany. The distinction is an important one for the Constabulary. Without tactical units falling under its purview, OMGUS needed an organization dedicated to establishing the security and order required for effective governance. The Constabulary fulfilled this requirement while tactical units maintained static security or slowly transitioned their focus to external defense and readiness.29

Within EUCOM and OMGUS, a series of consolidations and reorganizations occurred as well. For tactical units, the two American Army Groups that were in Germany on May 8, 1945 deactivated and so did the numerous army and corps headquarters. By March 1946, all that remained in Germany between EUCOM and the tactical units was the Third Army headquarters. Likewise military government and OMGUS made transitions as well, going from two military districts, one encompassing Bavaria and the other the remaining portions of the U.S. zone, to three military government areas, one for each Land within the U.S. occupation zone.30 The consistent shifting and reorganization had significant effects on the Constabulary, especially as the occupation and drawdown progressed. As senior operational headquarters were dissolved, the Constabulary commander assumed administrative and training responsibilities for non-Constabulary units in its operating area. Theater reorganization impacted the Constabulary to a degree; however, a more significant issue faced was the transfer of troops out of Europe

29Ibid., 30.

30Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 29-42.
The greatest source of turbulence for the U.S. Army in Europe in the first year of the occupation was the requirement to re-deploy troops from the theater. Initially, the need to transfer combat power to the Pacific, where forces were needed for the final push to defeat Japan, created this demand. Subsequently, on VJ Day, this transitioned to redeployment to the United States as part of a general downsizing of the U.S. Army. Complaints from the home front for faster redeployment, found in letters to congressmen from mothers and service members, added urgency to the redeployment process. Consequently, the mission of redeploying troops from the theater was the top priority for U.S. forces in Europe for the first year of occupation. In the thirteen-month period from May 12, 1945 to June 30, 1946, a total of 3,044,985 individuals or 99.2 percent of the European Theater’s strength redeployed. The drain on personnel was coupled with the fact that much of the rolling stock and equipment left in Europe was second rate as the newer and better equipment had left theater for the Pacific; once gone it did not return. This rapid demobilization affected the Constabulary as it vied to establish itself as an elite organization, searching out quality personnel and equipment amidst the turbulence of redeployment while also losing many of its combat veterans. Ultimately, the rapid reduction of U.S. forces in Europe not only led to decreased readiness but also affected the morale and discipline of those units and individuals not selected for demobilization or redeployment.

Discipline problems plagued the U.S. Army occupation forces for several years. A number of factors beyond personal concerns over redeployment were responsible for the

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32 Davis, *Come as Conqueror*, 132-133.


developing problem. These included a very low tempo for training and operations characterized by less than glamorous missions such as guarding prisoners, static security, and patrolling. Quality training, generally considered a remedy for discipline issues, was tough to execute due to unit and personnel turbulence caused by the demobilization and restructuring in the theater. Additionally, the quality of replacements decreased. In the summer of 1946, fourteen percent of white soldiers and forty-nine percent of African-American replacements held an Army General Classification Test score lower than seventy, indicating mental aptitude and standards lower than those required for successful service in the Army.  

Indicators of indiscipline manifested themselves in U.S. soldier participation in the German black market and in violence directed at German civilians. One example serves to highlight the problem; in a five-day period in the village of Boblingen, soldiers attacked two civilians, broke windows, and stole watches and money from four Germans. Attacks were not restricted to civilians; one German police chief complained to U.S. authorities that soldiers had “emptied several clips of ammunition at him at various times.” Accident rates and criminal activity rose dramatically; in a five-month period from August 1945 to January 1946, crime rates for U.S. service members climbed from 3.7 to 11.1 per 10,000 men. From January 1, 1945 to 

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35 The Army General Classification Test (AGCT) was a mental aptitude test developed in 1940 and used by the U.S. Army to assess a new recruit’s ability to learn and predict “how well they could function as a soldier.” Based on their AGCT score a recruit could be singled out for specialist or officer training. See Thomas W. Harrell, “Some History on the Army General Classification Test,” Journal of Applied Psychology 77, no. 6 (December 1992): 875-877. In April 1946, the U.S. Army adopted an additional test, the R1. The test was composed of fifty questions from the AGCT, and was used as a screening tool for acceptance in the non-conscript Army. The minimum standard score of 70 was established at this time. See J.E. Uhaner and Daniel J. Bolanovich, Development of the Armed Forces Qualification Test and Predecessor Army Screening Tests, 1946-1950, PRS Report 976, (Washington D.C.: Personnel Records Section, Personnel Research and Procedures Branch, The Adjutant General’s Office, Department of the Army, 1952), 6-7. See Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 50. for figures concerning the quality of Army replacements received in Europe in 1946.

36 Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 421.
November 30, 1945, there were over 200,000 troops hospitalized for non-battle injuries, the equivalent of fourteen infantry divisions. The Constabulary played a role in this as well, holding jurisdiction over all American, allied personnel, and Germans in their area of operations. As such, Constabulary troopers were responsible for cracking down on the incidents of indiscipline mentioned above. The readiness and discipline of American troops stationed in Europe became a very real concern as tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union grew.

The Developing Soviet Threat

At the Potsdam Conference, the Allies established a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), which jointly negotiated peace treaties with the defeated axis nations. While successful in developing treaties with some of the smaller axis powers, the series of meetings deepened the divide between the Soviets and the West. Soviets actions in the CFM meetings generally centered on two demands: first, the desire for full payment of reparations, and second, demands to establish the Ruhr industrial area as a special economic zone controlled by the four powers. American representatives did not agree to either. The U.S. raised concerns over the lack of progress made towards uniting the country economically and the dearth of food shipments from the Soviet controlled zone. Historically, providing subsistence had been eastern Germany’s role in the greater German economy. Issues like these needed to be solved before Germany could be united and a peace treaty signed. Lack of progress at the CFM meetings led to actions by the Western Allied Powers that exacerbated the situation. Following unsuccessful attempts to join Germany economically, the U.S. created a bi-zonal economic unit with the U.K. in September 1946. This was followed by a speech made by Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, in which he altered U.S. economic and security policy towards Germany; the U.S. would stay and help to rebuild and defend the country for the long term. Finally, after four unsuccessful CFM

conferences, the Western powers convened a Six Power Conference in June, 1948 to decide how best to proceed in Germany. Several key decisions were made including the intention to unify West Germany economically and politically under a federal form of government and to make the western German states eligible for Marshall Plan benefits. Until this point, the Soviets had verbally condemned western actions but had taken no concrete steps against the West. Movement on the decisions made at the Six Power Conference served as the impetus to change this.

The confrontation reached new heights when the Soviets blockaded ground movement of all people and goods into Berlin starting on June 24, 1948, resulting in the highly successful Berlin Airlift. Encounters such as the Berlin blockade coupled with Soviet actions installing pro-Communist governments in Poland, and other Russian occupied sections of Eastern Europe signaled the requirement for a definitive shift in how the U.S. Army and other Western European nations viewed their security obligations in western Germany. George F. Kennan, head of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow introduced views like these with his influential “Long Telegram”, which portrayed Soviet intentions in an aggressive and negative tone. His thoughts formed the

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38 The foreign ministers represented by the Six Power Agreement included; the United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. See Smyser, Yalta to Berlin, 73.

39 The Marshall Plan was an economic stimulus program that disbursed $13 billion from 1948-1952 to facilitate economic recovery, relieve human suffering, and inhibit socialist and communist growth in post-war Europe. In return for U.S. economic stimulus European countries were encouraged to develop mixed economic systems, develop balanced budgets, and embrace multilateral trade. Additionally, European nations receiving benefits had to accept the integration of West Germany into the European economic system and France was required to abandon its designs for annexing the Ruhr industrial area. Originally intended only for Europe, Marshall Plan benefits were extended to Nationalist China as well. See George Herring, From Colony to Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 617-620.

40 Smyser, Yalta to Berlin, 27-76.

41 Davis, Come as Conqueror, 199-210.

42 George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” was sent in February 1946 in response to a U.S. State Department request for his views on the post-war Soviet government. Kennan’s eight-
basis for America’s policy of communist containment published in 1950 as National Security Council Memorandum Number 68 (NSC 68). The Soviet sponsored invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans served to increase the tension in Europe and strengthen Western resolve to resist Soviet aggression which had already been codified with the formation of the NATO on August 24, 1949. American assessments and Soviet actions, coupled with their acquisition of nuclear capability, served to fundamentally alter how the U.S. viewed the security situation in Germany with a concomitant change in the focus of the Constabulary to one of external defense and border security.

From its formation to its deactivation six years later the Constabulary operated in a dynamic environment. In post-war Germany, a host of problems confronted the occupation forces, ranging from the economic and physical devastation wrought by the war to the difficulties of cooperating with wartime allies whose policies no longer coincided with American views. Added to this was turbulence driven by internal Army factors including the reorganization of forces in Europe, the ever-increasing rush to demobilize following victory over Japan, and a growing lack of discipline and readiness. Problems associated with the occupation of Germany soon gave way to growing concerns over the threat the Soviet Union posed to a stable and free thousand word response portrayed the Soviet Union as dedicated to destroying the American way of life and unwilling to accept the existence of the current U.S. governmental system. The “Long Telegram” was extremely influential in the development of U.S. Cold War policy, including the policy of containment. See Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 604-605.

NSC 68 was developed in 1950 under the Truman administration in response to America’s loss of its nuclear monopoly. NSC 68 posited that if the Soviet Union was able to gain control of additional territory no coalition would be capable of stopping them. As such it advocated that to maintain freedom and defend the American homeland required the defense of freedom around the world. Additionally, NSC 68 proposed the use of military and economic assistance, increased defense spending, covert, and psychological operations to combat Soviet expansion. Fully implemented after the start of the Korean War, NSC 68 was responsible for “a huge military buildup, economic mobilization, and U.S. global commitments” during the early stages of the Cold War. See Ibid., 638-639.

Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 62-107.
Western Europe. All these strategic and operational factors affected how the Constabulary was organized, manned, equipped and trained.

CONSTABULARY FORMATION AND TRAINING

As the U.S. Army conducted analysis on the anticipated conditions of post-war Germany, many of the challenges occupation forces faced were identified and the planners began to look for solutions to those issues. In the planning process, ideas began to surface for a police type occupation force to maintain security throughout the American zone. If a force of this type were to be organized, planners needed to address a number of questions and considerations. Who would command the unit? How would it be organized and equipped? From where would the personnel and equipment be drawn? What would the parameters of the unit’s mission be; would they only police German nationals, or would U.S. personnel and displaced persons fall under their jurisdiction? Most importantly, given a limited amount of time how would a force, equivalent in size to a U.S. Corps, be properly trained and certified to enforce occupation laws professionally? This was perhaps the most critical question of them all, as these troopers might have considerable authority, including rights of arrest, search and seizure. However, before any of these issues could be addressed, a firm commitment from the War Department and the U.S. Army’s leadership in Europe to implement the Constabulary concept was needed.

The idea for organizing a force tailored to specific occupation missions started with the Fifteenth United States Army in November of 1944. In studying occupation problems, the Fifteenth Army staff proposed the development of a force specifically organized to control the frontiers of the Army’s boundaries. This force would be distinctly different from the occupation troops assigned to garrison duty in the cities as it would be highly mobile and be responsible for providing security over a wide area of operations. On April 15, 1945 the Fifteenth Army
organized a force to fulfill this aforementioned mission. Three months later, the Third Army made a similar proposal of their own that was subsequently endorsed by the Twelfth Army Group. While concepts for a highly mobile force tailored to occupation duties were developing from units in the theater, General George Marshall sent a telegram to General Eisenhower on October 3, 1945 proposing a police-type organization be established in Europe following the conclusion of hostilities. A similar proposal had been made by General Douglas MacArthur for the Pacific Theater which would use a combination of American officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with natives used to fill out the ranks. After reviewing the proposal, the USFET staff responded to Marshall that the development of a police-type occupation force was suitable for use in the European Theater with some modifications. Most significant of the recommended changes was to not use Germans or other European nationals to fill out the lower ranks of the proposed police force. In USFET’s estimation it would reduce the efficiency of the formation due to communication difficulties associated with bringing non-English speaking personnel into the ranks. The USFET staff felt time and resources would be better used creating a “dependable” force composed of exclusively U.S. personnel.46

45 After becoming fully operational on January 6, 1945, the Fifteenth U.S. Army performed a series of unique missions in the European Theater of Operations as a subordinate element of the Twelfth Army Group. The Fifteenth’s varied missions included: controlling headquarters for reconstituting units that experienced heavy fighting in the Ardennes campaign, controlling headquarters for SHAEF reserve elements, and responsibility for the Twelfth Army Group’s coastal sector which included containing German elements trapped in the Lorient and St Nazaire pocket. On April 1, 1945 the Twelfth Army Group gave Fifteenth Army the mission to defend the west bank of the Rhine opposite the Ruhr Pocket while simultaneously performing military government and occupation duties in the Rhineprovinz. As requirements to conduct the defensive mission diminished the Army turned exclusively to occupation duties. The Fifteenth gradually assumed responsibility for the Saar and Phalz provinces as well as the western portion of Hesse. In this capacity, the Fifteenth also established a Frontier Command to control movement along the German borders with Holland and Belgium. The Fifteenth Army’s recommendation for a Constabulary force was a byproduct of the mission analysis conducted when establishing the Frontier Command. See Leonard T. Gerow, History of the Fifteenth United States Army: 21 August 1944 to 11 July 1945, 18-61.

46 Charles E. Morrison and Daniel T. Murphy, The United States Constabulary,
Planning for the Constabulary

Planning at United States Forces European Theater (USFET) began in earnest after General Eisenhower committed to the concept in his correspondence with General Marshall. Studies conducted by the USFET staff identified requirements for a force of 38,000, providing roughly one trooper for every 450 Germans. Additionally, the chief of the G2 (intelligence) section recommended a Constabulary-type force be provided for each of the Military District commanders to be constituted using cavalry troops with a background in mounted and mobile operations. As originally conceived, the Constabulary would be responsible for security throughout the U.S. zone but would not supplant the U.S. military police or the German civilian police. The planning estimates and concept were sent from USFET to the military districts for comment; after incorporating feedback, an order was published on October 31, 1945 directing the establishment of interim Constabulary forces in each of the Military Districts as well as occupied Austria and the Bremen Enclave. The Seventh U.S. Army utilized the 15th Mechanized Cavalry Group and the Third U.S. Army used the 2nd and 6th Mechanized Cavalry Groups to form their District Constabularies. These cavalry groups ultimately served as the nucleus of the Zone Constabulary and provided valuable lessons learned for the USFET staff as planning progressed.

While the District Constabularies were being formed, USFET planning continued for a theater-wide force under the control of a single commander. On October 16, 1945 USFET received guidance from the War Department to move forward with Constabulary development. In turn, General Eisenhower informed his subordinate commanders on October 24 that a theater wide police force would assume security responsibilities in Germany. On November 3, the USFET staff took the first action in a deliberate planning process by issuing an initial directive to start planning for a “state police” type occupation force. This was closely followed by a formal

directive on November 25, specifically tasking selected USFET staff sections for input and the requirement to assign one officer per section to serve as a Constabulary planning action officer. Initial guidance described the Constabulary as a mobile force that would require additional signal and ordnance support above that provided to a standard unit due to the distributed area over which it would operate.  

The mission statement adopted by the Constabulary described many of the special considerations under which the formation was intended to operate. The mission developed directed that it would:

Maintain general military and civil security: assist in the accomplishment of the objectives of the United States Government in the occupied U.S. Zone of Germany (exclusive of the Berlin District and Bremen Enclave), by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellions, and acts prejudicial to the security of the U.S. occupational policies, and forces; and maintain effective military control of the borders encompassing the U.S. zone.

Initial estimates called for using cavalry and mounted units to form the core of the organization with a three-month period being allocated for organizing and training the unit as well as establishing a Constabulary school. USFET set a target date of July 1, 1946 for the Constabulary to assume its mission. The next step in forming the organization was selection of an officer with the right background and temperament to serve as the commander.

Upon returning to Germany from Christmas leave in the United States Lieutenant General Earnest Harmon was summoned to General Joseph T. McNaurney’s office. McNaurney, Eisenhower’s successor as the European Theater Commanding General, informed Harmon on January 10, 1946 that he would be assigned as the Constabulary Commander and have about six months to form and train the organization. Harmon had been recommended for the job by

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47Ibid., 1-32.
48A. F. Irzyk, “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice,” 18.
49Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 18-21.
Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott and was viewed as the right man due to his profane nature and reputation for rehabilitating failing units. Harmon also possessed considerable knowledge of mounted and mechanized operations having been commissioned a cavalry officer with service as a horse cavalry squadron commander in World War I. This was followed by combat experience in WWII during which he led the U.S. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armored Divisions. The August 1946 issue of Life magazine described him as the “most colorful and kinetic commander in the ETO.” A dynamic personality such as Harmon’s was needed to instill the discipline and high standards envisioned for the elite organization the Constabulary was intended to be. When General McNarney assigned Harmon the task, he introduced an additional component in the mission, that of policing not only German citizens but also enforcing rules and regulations for the American occupation forces. Harmon cited a demonstration staged at the USFET headquarters in Frankfurt by U.S. serviceman demanding faster demobilization and redeployment as an indicator of the deteriorating discipline of U.S. units in Europe following the war. Now that a commander was present to make key decisions, detailed planning could begin for the Constabulary’s organization and training.

With the publication of a warning order from USFET, planning shifted to Third Army.

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50 Davis, Come as Conqueror, 167.


53 One anecdote from the Constabulary’s formation highlights Harmon’s view of his new mission and his blunt and forthright demeanor. When addressing soldiers of the 474th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion concerning their new mission he informed them they were about to “get off of [their] beer-soaked asses’ and become soldiers again.” See Michael A. Rauer, “Order out of Chaos: The United Stated Constabulary in Capital Germany,” Army Historian, no. 45 (Summer 1998): 26.

54 Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 280.
Shortly after Harmon’s appointment, he formed a small planning group on January 14, 1946 at Third Army Headquarters in Bad Tolz. It was generally composed of officers that had served in mechanized cavalry groups in the war or had served with Harmon on the XXII Corps staff. The USFET warning order had been deliberately vague in some regards to allow the Constabulary commander and staff a level of flexibility in establishing the organization. Parameters they had been given included the July 1, 1946 deadline to be fully operational, a projected organization of forty-eight squadrons organized like the WWII mechanized reconnaissance squadrons (without light tanks or assault guns), and that there would be ninety days available for training prior to assuming the mission. The group went to work developing unit tables of organization and settled on a structure consisting of three brigade headquarters, each with three regiments assigned. In turn, each regiment had three squadrons, and each squadron had a headquarters troop and five operational or line troops. The Constabulary structure maintained several special organizations including a tank troop, service troop, horse platoon, and motorcycle platoon at the regimental level. Additional squadron headquarters were identified later to fill special functions

55The WWII reconnaissance squadron consisted of a headquarters troop, three reconnaissance troops, an assault gun troop, and a light tank company. If part of an armored division the squadron contained an additional reconnaissance troop. See Harry Yeide, *Steeds of Steel* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), 28.

56The Constabulary’s use of the brigade as an echelon of command represents either an anachronism or a prescient view of the Army’s organizational future. By 1942, the U.S. Army had generally ceased using the brigade as a maneuver element and it would not be reintroduced into the U.S. Army organization on a large scale until the adoption of the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions in 1961. Overall, Constabulary brigades shared more in common with the pre-WWII brigade, being commanded by a brigadier general and controlling regiments, vice battalions. See John J. McGrath, *The Brigade: A History* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 46-61.


58Much to the satisfaction of Cavalry officers who had served in pre-war horse cavalry units, the Constabulary maintained one platoon of horse mounted troopers in each Regiment. The horse platoons were used to conduct border patrols in areas inaccessible to vehicles and in riot
such as air liaison, signal support, or administration of a school for training Constabulary personnel. The nascent Constabulary staff briefed the tables to General McNarney on February 7, 1946 and after gaining his endorsement the tables were flown to the War Department and approved shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{59}

As the Constabulary planners continued their work, they established the geographic disposition the Constabulary forces assumed. Each brigade was co-located with the Military Government post assigned to administer a German \textit{Land}. Brigades were responsible for security within the confines of that \textit{Land}, with 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade in Greater Hesse, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade in Bavaria, and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade in Wurttemburg-Baden. Within the brigade areas the regiments corresponded to the nine Regierungsbezirk (region) found within the \textit{Länder}. Finally, each squadron aligned itself with at least one \textit{Kreis} (county) but could be assigned multiple \textit{Kreis} if the situation warranted.\textsuperscript{60}

On February 4, 1946, a theater-wide conference was held for the reorganization of forces in Europe. The Seventh U.S. Army had been identified for deactivation, leaving the Third U.S. Army as the primary tactical headquarters. When the reorganization was complete, Third Army controlled the Constabulary as well as the remaining combat divisions in the theater. The conference also identified units for assignment to the Constabulary and the projected dates they fell under its control. All units assigned provided an existing headquarters as the nucleus of a new Constabulary organization. The Third Army assumed control of the VI Corps staff and used its personnel and equipment to form the Constabulary headquarters. It then used the staff and troops of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Armored Division headquarters to form one brigade and the two combat command headquarters to form the remaining two. USFET employed a wide variety of sources to form control operations. The platoons were organized using troopers with previous equestrian experience and captured Wehrmacht horses. See Hofmann, \textit{Through Mobility We Conqour}, 410.

\textsuperscript{59}Snyder, \textit{Establishment and Operations}, 32-35.

\textsuperscript{60}Ziemke, \textit{Occupation of Germany}, 341.
regiments and squadrons. For the regiments, these included mechanized cavalry group
headquarters, armored group headquarters, and armored division combat commands. Squadrons
were formed using WWII mechanized cavalry squadrons, mechanized infantry battalions, tank
battalions, anti-aircraft artillery battalions, and tank destroyer battalions. The common thread in
all these units was the mobile nature of their mission during the war. USFET directed that all
units be released from their current assignment and fall under Constabulary control during a
window starting on February 15, 1946 and ending on April 1, 1946. With the arrival of February,
as units came under Constabulary control, training could begin in earnest.

Training for the Security Mission

Acknowledging that most of the troops assigned to the formation would not have police
experience, being drawn mostly from the combat arms, the Constabulary Headquarters
established a deliberate training program with the objective of developing the skills and tactics
required to execute its unique mission. Planning called for the training to be executed in three
phases. The first started as soon as unit commanders felt sufficient personnel were on hand and
entailed training for officers and senior NCOs that formed a cadre of instructors to carry out the
next two phases. Additionally, troopers designated to fill a technical or specialty role were be
trained in this phase, through either on-the-job training or through attendance at a theater school.
To this end, USFET gave the Constabulary specific quotas at the theater intelligence school,
signal school, ordnance technical school, and the provost marshal school. The Constabulary
command placed the responsibility for organizing and conducting training at the regimental level,

61Kendall D. Gott, Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The United States Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 11 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 12.

62Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 35-57.

since units entered the training phase at different levels of proficiency. This allowed commanders to assess their units and control the starting point of training as well as the pace. This initial phase was to be completed no later than April 1, 1946.64

The second phase started on April 1 and consisted of eight weeks of unit training designed to teach the junior enlisted troopers the skills needed to serve in the Constabulary. The first four weeks of training were dedicated to basic soldier skills and the second four weeks were dedicated to tasks specific to the Constabulary mission.65 A review of the task list established for the program highlights its comprehensive nature and the detailed analysis that went into ensuring Constabulary Troopers were prepared to carry out their mission properly. Training topics ranged from those focused on operating weapons and equipment specific to the unit, such as operating the M8 Greyhound Armored Car or the M2 machine gun, to more complex tactical skills, such as conducting search and seizures or familiarization with occupation policies and regulations.66

The Constabulary Headquarters tasked the 2nd, 6th, and 15th Constabulary Regiments, which had experience from serving as District Constabulary units, to develop mobile training teams that were made available to assist units during the second phase of training. Based on their experience, these three regiments were not required to execute phase I and II training, which enabled them to continue functioning as District Constabulary forces while simultaneously providing the mobile training. Together, the teams had enough capacity to train three squadrons at one time with training focused on tasks specific to the Constabulary and its mission. Having already executed Constabulary operations, the units selected for the training mission occupied a unique spot within the organization. Not only did the trainers possess the required technical skills


to operate Constabulary weapons and equipment, but they could also speak with authority about what techniques and procedures worked based on experience.67

Additional training occurred in phase II, beyond individual skills for the junior enlisted troopers. Officer and senior NCOs attended classes three nights a week; topics for these professional development sessions were varied but generally covered subjects that developed the unique knowledge and skills required to lead troops in the Constabulary. Subject areas included search and seizure operations, teaching and instructional methods, use of intelligence specialists, and interpretation of aerial photographs. A unique feature of the Constabulary training program was the low level at which technical training occurred. In phase II regiments and squadrons conducted specialized training for radio operators, motorcycle, and automotive mechanics. The phase culminated with collective training executed up to the troop level and included the execution of operations unique to the Constabulary such as raids, riot control, check points, and cordons. Phase II training concluded in May and was deemed a success, but standards in some areas had not been reached due to personnel turnover and other external factors.68

Phase III training was labeled pre-operational training and conducted from June 1-30, 1946. In phase III emphasis was placed on performance-oriented training while lecture and theory were minimized. Effort was made to use the chain of command to conduct the training to provide the junior officers and NCOs practical experience and enhance their leadership abilities. Starting on June 10, units conducted practical exercises in the areas surrounding their Kasernes (bases) to attain proficiency in collective tasks specific to the Constabulary mission. Tasks trained included: mounted and dismounted patrolling, checkpoint operations, operation of border control points, and quelling disturbances. At a minimum each troop conducted one training iteration of a search

67Ibid., 45-47.

68Ibid., 71.
and seizure mission and each brigade completed a command post exercise. Concurrent to the training, units made preparations to assume the Constabulary mission on July 1. This included preparing special equipment, such as road barriers and signs, as well as executing reconnaissance of projected operational areas and establishing contact with the units currently occupying the Constabulary areas of operation to coordinate their relief in place. At its conclusion, phase III training was deemed excellent. Despite several reoccurring external factors that hampered phase II training, the Constabulary leadership assessed their units at “a high state of readiness for operations.” The pre-mission training helped to develop common techniques and procedures; another significant structure serving the same purpose for the Constabulary was the Trooper’s Handbook.69

The Constabulary Headquarters published the Trooper’s Handbook in February 1946, in time for units to use it during the ninety-day training period before fully assuming its mission. Written by Lieutenant Colonel Warren D. Haskell, a former commissioner for the Rhode Island State Police, the handbook provided information and guidance for the trooper to use in the execution of their day-to-day tasks.70 The handbook was divided into three chapters with three appendixes. The first chapter covered general information such as the Constabulary mission and the organization’s relationship to other agencies within the occupation. The second chapter covered operations and provided tactics and procedures both at the individual and small unit level. Illustrations and diagrams were used throughout this section depicting various actions such as the proper method for handcuffing individuals or formations used by squads and platoons for riot control. Checklists and instructions are also found in this section establishing standards for conducting patrols, check points and other Constabulary operations. The third chapter covered the

69Morrison and Murphy, The United States Constabulary, 58-59. and Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 72-75.

70Hofmann, Through Mobility We Conquer, 416.
various civil and military courts in which Constabulary troopers might appear when required to testify against a suspect. It also described how troopers should conduct themselves when testifying. Lastly, the three appendixes contained the U.S. occupation proclamations and ordinances that had been published to the German people and were then being used as laws and regulations governing in the U.S. zone. The Constabulary took other measures to ensure units were proficient in the tasks covered in the *Trooper’s Handbook*, one method for doing this was the creation of a Constabulary School.71

The Constabulary School at Sonthofen

The requirement for a school to teach procedures and skills unique to the Constabulary was identified in the initial planning. Conceptually, the school trained officers, NCOs, and technical troops in courses generally four weeks in length. Once trained these men returned to their parent formation with the ability to pass on the knowledge and skills they had acquired to the troopers at their home station. Not only did the students graduate from the course better educated and trained as individuals, they were also expected to be better trainers. The Constabulary’s commander, Lieutenant General Harmon, saw additional purposes for the school beyond the training mission. First, he viewed it as a library and repository containing the latest Constabulary doctrine, a source to which units could “reach back.” He also envisioned it as a laboratory for the development of new techniques and procedures; once perfected these new ideas were readily transferred to the force via the graduating students. With a concept in place the next step was securing an appropriate location and to start organizing the school.72

A facility developed for training elite National Socialist adolescents located in Sonthofen,


72Snyder, *Establishment and Operations*, 47.
Germany was selected as the school’s location since it had not been damaged in the war and the facilities were well-suited to the Constabulary School’s requirements. In January 1946, the Constabulary Headquarters directed the 2nd Cavalry Squadron to take control of Sonthofen and prepare facilities for use as the Constabulary School. In February, the 465th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion permanently relieved the 2nd Cavalry Squadron and was re-designated and re-organized as the Constabulary School Squadron. The School Squadron was organized into a headquarters and service troop, an academic troop, a demonstration and guard troop, a medical detachment, and a chaplains department.

The school’s organization started with the commandant, Colonel Harold G. Holt, who had commanded Combat Command B, 13th Armored Division during the war. Holt was in charge of the entire institution and was assisted by a deputy commandant that directed the academic staff. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Newton served as the first deputy commandant and was well-suited for the position having served as a school administrator before joining the Army and during the war having been assigned as the director of training at the Armored School. Academically, the school was divided into six departments: tactics, communications, vehicle maintenance, public safety, general subjects, and geopolitics. Each department provided classes and instruction related to their functional area to the various courses taught at the school. Courses were aimed at different audiences starting with the basic constabulary course, which was separated into different programs for officers and enlisted soldiers based on their unique

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requirements. Throughout its existence, the school also offered a number of specialty courses with tailored programs for communications, intelligence, field grade officers, desk and records personnel, and a special investigators course. The number of courses and departments changed several times during the school’s operations. 76

The Constabulary school made a number of adjustments to its program of instruction and organization based on several factors. Most importantly, the school solicited feedback from units operating in the field and adjusted the curriculum and techniques to ensure the latest developments were incorporated, taught, and disseminated throughout the formation. Likewise, the proportion of time allocated to subjects and content was changed based on feedback from the field. One example is the tactics course, which originally contained instruction on basic tactics used by motorized infantry and mechanized cavalry. After the first class, the school’s leadership deleted this training so more time could be spent teaching techniques specific to the Constabulary mission such as raids or checkpoints. Duplication of effort within the theater necessitated other changes, to this end the signal and intelligence courses were dropped since the Third Army ran very similar programs. A department of weapons was added in February 1947 in response to concerns over the readiness of Constabulary forces to meet a Soviet attack. 77 Finally, other changes were made to the school in order to consolidate courses within the Third Army, many of the additions were not directly related to the Constabulary mission and attendance was not restricted to Constabulary personnel only. These included an Aircraft and Engine Maintenance School, the Third Army NCO academy, a course for administrative personnel and clerks, and a theater-wide four week officers supplemental course designed to fill the gap in professional

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76Snyder, *Establishment and Operations*, 83-86.

77Hofmann, *Through Mobility We Conquer*, 418.
military education that developed during the war. Although the school began to lose its unique nature with these additional courses, it still served as a key element in creating uniform standards and procedures across the formation.

As the Constabulary formed and prepared to assume its security mission, at least four significant structures were utilized or developed to transform the organization from an unconnected conglomeration of various unit types to a homogeneous well-trained organization. First, a deliberate planning process incorporating the relevant staff sections was utilized at the USFET and Third Army headquarters to ensure details were thought through across the numerous functional areas within the organization. Second, a deliberate training plan was initiated with uniform standards and tasks identified. To assist in the training process, units with the requisite knowledge and expertise were tasked to develop mobile training teams to help raise the proficiency of the entire organization. The plan was progressive in nature and made use of what is today called the “train the trainer” concept throughout, ensuring the leadership of the organization was responsible for its success or failure in gaining proficiency. Third, the Constabulary School at Sonthofen was formed to train Constabulary leaders and troopers uniformly, and to serve as a laboratory for developing Constabulary techniques and procedures as well as a repository for doctrine and knowledge. Finally, the Constabulary leadership invested in the development of doctrine specific to their organization in the form of the Constabulary Handbook, making critical knowledge, standards and procedures accessible to the most junior trooper. While the development of many of these structures was resource intensive in terms of personnel and time, their value to the organization must have been significant. With the help of these plans and programs, over forty diverse units ranging in type from tank battalions to anti-aircraft artillery were trained and formed into a cohesive security force for the U.S. occupation of Germany.

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Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 87-91.
By July 1947, the Constabulary had successfully established itself as a Corps-level organization with broad responsibilities for security of the U.S. occupation zone. The formation and training period had been a tumultuous one, filled with the challenges inherent in relocating, equipping, and training a disparate conglomeration of formations and turning it into a coherent organization united in thought and purpose. With the hard work behind it, the Constabulary was poised to enter what should have been a very stable period during which it could refine and perfect its procedures and operations. However, in spite of its efforts, the Constabulary remained an organization continuously in transition.

Conditions Compel Organizational Change

Several factors drove this state of constant change for the Constabulary, some old and some new. First, the German people had reacted positively to the U.S. occupation forces, there had been no major uprisings or disturbances. Second, the German police were reaching a level of proficiency where they could assume responsibility for the security and law and order of the German people. Moreover, on March 15, 1947, OMGUS turned over the responsibility for border security exclusively to the German Land Border Police Service. The third factor was the continued rate of troop reductions in Europe, not only for Constabulary forces, but across the entire theater as well. Finally, the tensions with the Soviet Union which had appeared at Potsdam had not abated; instead relations with United States’ former ally continued to deteriorate. These four factors combined to propel the Constabulary into the second major phase of the formation’s history, which entailed significant changes in organization, training, and mission. Along with


these changes came additional structures to guide and assist the Constabulary through these new developments.

The Constabulary underwent a series of major organizational changes, with the first series necessitated by manning issues, followed by another set of changes directed by the theater headquarters in conjunction with the War Department. In conjunction with theater wide troop reductions the Constabulary was directed to decrease its end strength by 1200 soldiers in January 1947. Based on this directive the Constabulary Headquarters made the determination it could not fully man all units and decided to deactivate all of the regimental light tank troops and then subsequently the fifth troop from each Squadron effective March 1, 1947. The cuts reduced the overhead in headquarters and support personnel while ensuring the remaining troops had their full complement of soldiers. Constabulary units subsequently altered their operating procedures, placing greater emphasis on the use of intelligence to guide operations, the use of checkpoints instead of roving patrols and the substitution of visits by commanders and staff officers to key German government and civic offices in lieu of patrols.81

In May 1947, the Constabulary drew up plans to further reorganize and reduce its strength based on guidance from the EUCOM staff. Further troop reductions had been ordered for the theater and the Constabulary was directed to reduce its strength to 18,000 troops from its then-current strength of 31,185. The reduction necessitated a corresponding cut in the number of active units in the organization. As such, the 3rd Brigade was deactivated along with four of the nine regiments and eleven of the twenty-four squadrons. 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for both Hesse and Wurttemburg-Baden, taking over the area of operations vacated by 3rd Brigade. 2nd Brigade’s area remained unchanged, encompassing all of Bavaria.82 Additionally, measures

81Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 142.
82Hofmann, Through Mobility We Conquer, 438-438.
were taken to consolidate the smaller platoon and troop outposts at squadron sized kasernes and to reduce the unit’s operational tempo by focusing patrols in areas where the majority of crimes occurred. The consolidation program reduced Constabulary locations from two hundred in 1946 to only twenty by 1949. In a subsequent round of changes in early 1947, the Constabulary Headquarters moved to Heidelberg so it could assume the administrative and command responsibilities of the Third U.S. Army, which the War Department had scheduled for deactivation. Force reductions in the theater were the primary impetus for this round of reorganizations. That trend changed with the next iteration of transitions.

On March 14, 1947, upon assuming command of the newly-formed United States Army Europe (USAREUR), Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner set out to develop a tactical combat capability in his formation. Recognizing the threat from subversive acts or a general uprising were lower than the possibility of an external attack, he planned to remedy the disparity in force structure to meet the latter. General Huebner faced an uphill battle. Both major combat arms units assigned to USAREUR, the Zone Constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division, were dispersed throughout the American occupation zone. The former had been concentrating on police type duties and the latter had been guarding static occupation sites. Huebner’s initial actions were directed at the 1st Infantry Division and consolidating and training its 26th Infantry Regiment to form a mobile reserve. He quickly shifted focus to the Constabulary when he directed the formation of a regimental-size reserve. The reserve was to be largely free from static

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83Cameron, “There and Back Again,” 133.

84Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 138-144.

85USAREUR was originally designated U.S. Ground and Service Forces Europe, on November 15, 1947 it was redesignated as U.S. Army Europe. For clarity, the designation still in effect today has been used throughout. See Francis S. Chase, Reorganization of Tactical Forces VE-Day to 1 January 1949, Occupation Forces in Europe Series (Karlsruhe, Germany: US European Command Historical Division, 1950), 21.
responsibilities so it could conduct training or be available for use on short notice.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{An Emerging Combat Mission and the Armored Cavalry Regiment-Light}

On July 3, 1947, the Constabulary selected the 5th Constabulary Regiment to serve as its reserve. Originally composed of the 34th and 74th Constabulary Squadrons, it was subsequently augmented with two additional squadrons, the 66th and 68th. The Constabulary Headquarters consolidated the regimental headquarters and three of the assigned squadrons in Augsberg, while the 66th remained at its previous station in Deggendorf. The 5th Regiment took measures to increase its firepower, the first of which involved converting Troop E, 74th Constabulary Squadron to a light tank troop, and Troop E, 68th Constabulary Squadron to a recoilless rifle troop. Later the regiment combined these two troops with a headquarters and service troop to form a provisional squadron. In September 1947, the Constabulary Headquarters re-designated the 5th Constabulary Regiment as the 2nd Constabulary Regiment with a concurrent change for the 34th and 74th Squadrons to the 2nd and 42nd Squadrons. That same month the 2nd Constabulary went to Grafenwöhr where it trained as a regimental combat team with the support of the 7th Field Artillery Battalion. Upon returning to Augsberg, the 2nd Constabulary maintained its focus on tactical training with policing duties being an economy of force mission fulfilled by one troop per squadron. Formation of the Constabulary reserve foreshadowed even greater changes in mission, organization, and training.\textsuperscript{87}

Anticipating these forthcoming changes, General I.D. White issued guidance altering the Constabulary’s organization and training plan in April 1948. The first piece of guidance the Constabulary published was a re-manning table organizing the line troops into three functional platoons; a recon platoon equipped with jeeps and M8 armored cars, a rifle platoon transported in

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}, 21-28.

\textsuperscript{87}\textit{Ibid.}, 28-30.
two and one-half ton trucks, and a weapons platoon equipped with mortars and recoilless rifles.\textsuperscript{88}

The Constabulary Headquarters also directed brigades to disband their police sections, a feature adopted during the organization’s formation that was no longer needed. Additionally, it published a new training program using a modified series of Army Ground Forces tests. Units rotated through the Grafenwöhr training area and were evaluated using the Rifle Platoon Combat Firing test, the Cavalry Reconnaissance Platoon Combat Firing test, and the Infantry Battalion Combat Firing Test. These incremental adjustments laid the groundwork for a series of more significant developments that would take shape two months later.

In June 1948, General Lucius D. Clay, the EUCOM commander, met with General Huebner and the third commander of the Constabulary, Major General Isaac D. White, to discuss the organization’s future. To better align the Constabulary with the exigencies present in the European theater regarding Germany’s stability and the Soviet threat, the three leaders made significant decisions that definitively shifted the organization’s focus from policing to combat operations. First, the Constabulary would be organized roughly as an armored division. Second, the 2nd Constabulary Regiment would have priority in the re-organization and conversion to an Armored Cavalry Regiment-Light. Finally, several Constabulary units would be disbanded or used as the nucleus of other battalions; once formed and trained these new battalions would bring more combined arms capability to the organization. The Constabulary Headquarters developed the reorganization plans and after EUCOM approved them, they were forwarded to the Department of the Army (DA). The senior leaders made a significant decision to move forward with the reorganization prior to receiving approval from DA. If the planned re-organization had been disapproved, then the actions taken up to that point would have been for nothing, the equipment required for the new organization would never arrive, creating needless turmoil within

the Constabulary.  

As it had with the reserve mission, the 2nd Constabulary Regiment paved the way for the transformation of the rest of the Constabulary command. The 2nd Regiment’s conversion to an Armored Cavalry Regiment-Light (ACR-L) entailed a significant change in organizational structure and mission for a Constabulary Regiment. The ACR-L organization was born of WWII lessons learned by cavalry formations that had been documented and turned into recommendations in the *General Board Report No. 49, Tactics, Employment, Technique, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units*. The Armored Cavalry Regiment-Light reflected the board’s desires for a more robust and durable formation than its predecessor, the mechanized cavalry group. To this end, the ACR-L was a triangular organization with three reconnaissance battalions; each battalion contained three companies that in turn had three platoons. To support the reconnaissance companies, each battalion could draw on resources in a medium tank company and assault gun company. Platoons in the reconnaissance companies were equipped with a mix of jeeps, tanks, and mortars. With the substitution of light tanks for armored cars in the reconnaissance companies, and the addition of a separate medium tank company, tank strength in the ACR-L squadron increased over previous Constabulary organizations significantly.

The Constabulary regiments under the ACR-L structure adopted a new mission set to accompany the new table of organization and equipment (TO/E), which firmly established it as a fighting organization. Intended tactical tasks included conducting reconnaissance, security, and

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89Ibid., 38-39.

90Robert S. Cameron, *To Fight or Not Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 93-98.

91John J. McGrath, *Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 149-150.
light combat. Within this framework the ACR-L was expected to execute pursuits, exploitations, flank security, and screening actions. Secondary missions included offensive and defensive operations, urban operations and securing lines of communications. In recognition of its Constabulary origins, the ACR-L was also to be capable of establishing security in occupied areas. USAREUR and the Constabulary Headquarters converted two additional regiments, the 6th and 14th, to the armored cavalry TO/E in fulfillment of a request General Clay forwarded in April 1948 to the Director of Army Plans and Operations, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, asking that all Constabulary regiments transition to the ACR-L structure. All three were complete with the reorganization before the end of 1948. Once fully organized and equipped as an ACR-L, the three cavalry regiments formed the core of a versatile organization capable of executing a wide range of tasks which fulfilled Generals Clay and Huebner’s desire to make the Constabulary more than just an occupation police force.

USAREUR instituted additional changes with the 1948 reorganization. In the event of an emergency, it designated the Constabulary headquarters to serve as a command and control (C2) element for the Constabulary brigades and the reorganized 1st Infantry Division. The “Victory” Division having been fully reconstituted as a tactical force capable of combat operations through General Huebner’s efforts. To serve this C2 function, the Constabulary organized its command and staff elements as a modified corps headquarters with the requisite special troops. Additionally, the two constabulary brigade headquarters had been reorganized to fill the role of an armored division combat command. To increase USAREUR’s and the Constabulary’s

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92Libby, “Policing Germany,” 134.
93Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight, 98-99.
94Combat commands were utilized in WWII U.S. Army armored divisions in lieu of brigades to create flexible combat teams task organized by the division headquarters to meet mission requirements. With no combat forces permanently assigned, the combat command could be tailored for its assigned task through the attachment of armor, mechanized infantry and field
combined arms capability, several squadrons were deactivated and replaced with either field artillery or anti-aircraft artillery battalions. When the reorganization was finished, five Constabulary squadrons had been deactivated with USAREUR forming four field artillery battalions and one anti-aircraft artillery battalion in their place. However, once complete, only two of the field artillery battalions were organic to the Constabulary. Additionally, USAREUR identified and reorganized engineer and ordnance battalions to support the Constabulary in its new tactical mission using units assigned in the theater. All subordinate unit headquarters for the Constabulary’s new organization were in place before the end of 1948.95

Two squadrons, the 22nd and 53rd, remained unaffected as the Constabulary was reorganized and refocused on its new combat mission. As other constabulary squadrons were either deactivated or transformed, these two squadrons remained as the only U.S. forces committed to the border security mission. The 22nd was assigned to the 14th Constabulary Regiment, a subordinate unit of the 1st Constabulary Brigade, and was stationed in Bad Hersfeld. The 53rd was assigned to the 6th Constabulary Regiment as a part of 2nd Brigade and located in Schwabach. The eastern border butting up against East Germany and Czechoslovakia was divided between the two squadrons, with the 22nd and 53rd taking the northern the southern portions respectively. In April 1949, both squadrons were re-designated, with the 22nd reflagged as the 15th Constabulary Squadron and the 53rd reflagged to the 24th Constabulary Squadron. The squadrons remained assigned to their parent regiments as the 6th and 14th converted to the ACR-L structure. However, in practice the border security squadrons were controlled by their brigade headquarters, with the 15th even being formally attached to 1st Brigade in October 1949. The two squadrons remained on the border until their deactivation in 1952, ultimately being the last Constabulary artillery battalions from the pool of units permanently assigned to the division. See McGrath, *The Brigade*, 49-49.

95Chase, *Reorganization of Tactical Forces*, 41-44.
units on active duty. Already familiar with the border security mission, the 22nd and 53rd did not need a significant amount of training to assume their mission. However, this was not the case for their sister squadrons as they converted in 1948.96

On April 26, 1948, the Constabulary Headquarters issued a memorandum outlining the training guidance subordinate units followed in conjunction with the reorganization. The memorandum suggested using committee style training and outlined a list of tasks to achieve proficiency in. Based on the directive, units were to train on conducting limited objective attacks, hasty defense, and delaying actions. Additionally, dismounted training was to focus at the platoon level; this training also served as a vehicle for exercising command and control systems and mobility at the troop level and higher. Further reinforcing the transition from occupation duties, the headquarters issued a verbal order on June 23rd suspending all training on police and stability tasks. Henceforth, all training was focused on tactical tasks required for combat operations.97

As Constabulary units progressed through their conversion and training regimen, they were gradually incorporated into larger exercises. Starting on July 27, 1948, the 6th Constabulary Regiment participated in a free maneuver exercise at Grafenwöhr. This was followed by the 2nd Regiment’s participation in exercise NORMAL, the final USAREUR summer exercise of 1948. NORMAL was conducted in four phases with the 2nd Regiment acting as an aggressor force and involved assembly area operations and free play maneuver; the exercise culminated with a road march back to their winter quarters.98 Exercise SNOWDROP in January 1949 involved the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment training with the 1st Infantry Division as well. This was followed by the joint and combined exercise HARVEST in September 1949 in which the whole Constabulary


98Ibid., 57-58.
served as the aggressor force. Participation in collective maneuver training highlighted the proficiency and readiness the Constabulary attained in a relatively short period. An element enabling this rapid transition were two unique schools developed in the transition period.

The Tank Training Center and Constabulary NCO Academy

As the constabulary regiments converted to the ACR-L table of organization they acquired a substantial number of light and medium tanks. To facilitate the training required to turn light cavalry scouts into proficient armored crewman, the Constabulary Headquarters tasked the 2nd Constabulary Brigade in July, 1948 with establishing a tank training center. Located in Vilsek, Germany, the Constabulary directed units to rotate personnel through the Tank Training center not only to become proficient tank crewman, but also to become trainers that could pass their acquired skills onto personnel at their home station. The school trained the various crew positions on the tank including the driver, gunner, and loader, as well as officers selected to serve with tanks. The curriculum featured instruction for both the light and medium tanks which had been added to the regimental TO/E. The center used the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Knox as a model and executed training in gunnery, tactics and maintenance. To graduate a student needed to successfully complete a military stakes competition which consisted of twenty testing stations drawn from the eight week curriculum. A review of the training center’s 1949 table of distribution reveals a significant investment in personnel. It called for a lieutenant colonel to serve as the commandant, as well as two majors (XO and S3) and a staff composed of four

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100 Chase, Reorganization of Tactical Forces, 40.

101 Cameron, “There and Back Again,” 132.

sections; S1 (personnel), S3 (operations), S4 (logistics) and Provost Marshal. In turn, each of the major training sections—driving, maintenance, gunnery, tactics, and communications—had a captain assigned as the head instructor. Under the staff and head instructors were 149 enlisted men serving in maintenance, instructional and support positions. The school had been designated the 7767th Tank Training Unit and eventually turned over to USAREUR control when the Constabulary Command was deactivated.

A little over a year after the 2nd Constabulary Brigade was given the mission to open the Tank Training Center, the Constabulary Headquarters assigned it the task of opening a non-commissioned officer academy. Located in Munich, Germany, the first class started their instruction on October 1, 1949 and consisted of 150 students. Later the student body grew to 320 students. Major General I.D. White identified the requirement for an NCO academy, believing “that an Army's chain of command is no stronger than its critical link—the noncommissioned officer.” Like the other Constabulary schools, troopers rotated through the course and then back to their home station. The curriculum placed considerable emphasis on the NCO’s role as a trainer and his ability to replicate the instruction received at the academy when he returned to his unit after graduation. The academic staff was divided into three departments: leadership and command, tactics and personnel, and administration. While the academy’s subjects included instruction on administration, supply, and military justice, a number of the classes focused on tactical subjects and served to improve the abilities of the NCO to train and lead troops in combat. To this end, the curriculum devoted 146 hours of instruction to leadership and another fifty were

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104 Cameron, “There and Back Again,” 134.

devoted to tactics. The third block, methods of instruction, consisted of forty-two hours; however, within those forty-two hours, fifteen were dedicated to weapons instruction. Classes were originally composed entirely of Constabulary NCOs; later the course was opened to non-commissioned officers from across USAREUR. Billed as the only course of its type in existence in 1949, it was another unique structure developed by the Constabulary to increase proficiency and standardize procedures across the formation.106

The Constabulary developed a handbook to accompany the instruction presented at the academy. Much like the school’s curriculum, the handbook’s contents reflected the Constabulary’s changing mission and training focus. Composed of seventy-one pages, all but fifteen were dedicated to individual or leader skills required to operate in a combat environment. Sections of the handbook were dedicated to the principles and tactics needed to successfully conduct offense, defense, and reconnaissance operations. Subsequent portions addressed proper radio procedures, land navigation, gathering and processing intelligence, and calling for and adjusting artillery and indirect fire. Consistent with the emphasis the Constabulary NCO Academy placed on the NCOs role as a trainer, seven pages were dedicated to how to prepare, deliver, and assess training using a five stage model for delivering instruction. Tasks associated with policing and stability operations are almost completely absent, with only three pages at the end of the handbook dedicated to civil disturbances. The handbook’s cover graphically highlighted the Constabulary’s new mission and organization. In addition to the Constabulary’s insignia, a medium tank and the U.S. Armored Forces shoulder patch were prominently featured. Much like the Trooper’s Handbook, the text developed for the NCO Academy provided a standardized set of techniques and procedures troopers would need to master. It served as yet another method to re-orient the formation and normalize skills required to successfully execute

106Ibid., 36-37.
the Constabulary’s changing mission.\textsuperscript{107}

Originally formed to serve as a highly mobile police force providing security over wide areas of occupied Germany, the conditions for which the Constabulary was organized and trained had largely disappeared by 1948. If it were to remain a relevant force contributing to the security of Germany, the Constabulary would have to adapt its organization, mission, and training. To accomplish this, it utilized a number of the same structures it had during its formation. A detailed unit training program, directed by definitive guidance from senior USAREUR and Constabulary leadership, was published and executed. The Constabulary also developed unique training institutions to “train the trainer” so that not only individuals benefitted from their program of instruction, but the unit as a whole. In the same tradition of District Constabularies and their mobile training teams, the Constabulary Headquarters tasked units within the organization to develop and run unit schools. Finally, unique training doctrine was utilized. Use of the modified Army Ground Forces combat firing tests exhibited the continued ability of Constabulary leadership to create training material specific to the needs of the organization. Additionally, development and publication of the NCO Academy’s \textit{Noncommissioned Officer’s Tools} handbook served to standardize techniques and procedure needed to be successful in combat operations. Much as the Constabulary had done during its formation and early training, it once again exhibited the ability to adapt and develop structures required to successfully change and meet the circumstances under which it was operating.

CONCLUSION

Executing change in the military can be a difficult proposition, and perhaps more difficult in peacetime. Factors such as: the large size of an organization, the bureaucratic nature of the U.S.

\textsuperscript{107}United States Constabulary NCO Academy, \textit{Non-Commissioned Officers Tools} (Munich, Germany: United State Constabulary NCO Academy), 1-71.
Army, and the simple fact that an urgent need for change is missing when the force is not “in contact”, can all work against change occurring rapidly or successfully.\textsuperscript{108} In spite of these factors, the Constabulary was able to make diverse changes in mission and organization within a two-year period. To do this, it had to develop policies, plans, systems, and institutions to make these transitions possible. In essence, the Constabulary developed a set of structures that a formation can use to change its orientation, focus its efforts and increase proficiency in tasks required to function in the new operating environment effectively.

**Five Structures that Enabled Change**

Generally, the structures that enabled transition for the Constabulary fall into five broad categories. The first was development of a clear vision for the organization which provided focus and set the tone for the Constabulary as it transitioned. Second was the use of focused planning efforts that resulted in training plans and guidance. This process resulted in clearly articulated priorities, timelines, and training guidance upon which subordinate units acted. Third, was the creation of Constabulary run schools to develop the knowledge and skills required for the Constabulary’s unique mission and organization. Moreover, these schools were critical “pivot points”, which the organization used to reorient itself during transitions. Fourth was the use of doctrine tailored to the organization’s distinct mission set. Not only did this doctrine serve to standardize techniques and procedures across the Constabulary, it also conveyed critical elements of the commander’s vision for the organization. The final structure employed to enable transition was the use of units as “test beds” to develop lessons learned and best practices before the application of changes across the entire Constabulary. However, if these structures were to work in concert, the two commanders that led the Constabulary through its transitional periods needed

to provide a conceptual backbone.

Senior leaders in the U.S. Army are a critical component in effecting change. One of the key elements used by leaders to extend their influence is through the publication of a vision to which all members in the organization prescribe and understand. Leaders during the Constabulary’s transitions were effective in establishing a vision for the organization. Moreover, they backed their vision with the appropriate guidance and structures to operationalize it. Lieutenant General Harmon encapsulated his vision in the Constabulary motto, “Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice.” In three words, the motto described how the organization should be able to transit the operational area quickly, how it should constantly be alert for signs of trouble, and that it should always act impartially and fairly. All these elements were essential if the Constabulary was to establish itself as a credible force in occupation Germany. Towards this end, the Constabulary trooper had to adhere to high standards of military bearing, customs, and courtesies. As such, in the three-month train up period, and at the Constabulary school, trainers and instructors placed emphasis on these subject areas. Additionally, Lieutenant General Harmon’s goal was to visit each of the twenty-seven Constabulary squadrons once a month to ensure subordinate formations were meeting his high expectations and adhering to his vision. When Lieutenant General I. D. White assumed command of the Constabulary, he identified the forthcoming shift away from police-type activities and took actions to transition the formation. These included: disbandment of the police sections at the brigade, regiment and squadron levels, publication of planning directives emphasizing conventional operations, and the June 1948 order to cease all training on police tasks. These actions established a clear direction for the

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110 Irzyk, “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice,” 21

111 Harmon, MacKaye and MacKaye, Combat Commander, 282-286.
organization through well-defined priorities. Complementing the commander’s vision during transitional periods were the supporting staffs that produced plans and guidance.

Detailed training plans and systems were a hallmark of the Constabulary’s formation. The three-month training plan published in 1946 clearly identified the tasks needed to support the Constabulary’s unique mission. It incorporated many of the techniques found in contemporary training plans, including a progressive approach where troopers trained and mastered individual skills before moving to more complex collective tasks. Likewise, performance-oriented training was emphasized over classroom instruction, a hallmark of any effective modern training program. The Constabulary incorporated use of the “train the trainer” concept as well, with a suitable period established to afford officers and senior NCOs the requisite time in phase one to master the subjects they would teach. This concept was also a component in the Constabulary’s transition away from stability operations. Units expected the Officers and NCOs sent to the Constabulary Tank School and NCO Academy to not only gain proficiency as individuals, they were also intended to carry back the knowledge gained at those institutions in order to train the troopers at their home station. In 1948, the Constabulary published definitive training guidance that established training objectives and clear priorities as well. The training memorandum published in April established what tasks units should train on and suggested methods for attaining proficiency. Likewise, use of the modified Army Ground Forces firing tests established baseline standards across the formation that units could use to set training goals as well as an objective method for measuring readiness from the platoon through battalion level.

Unit run schools serve a number of important functions, including an effective system to communicate the commander’s standards across the formation and as a method to increase the

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113 Snyder, *Establishment and Operations*, 65-75.
proficiency of the junior officers and NCOs responsible for training the enlisted soldiers.\textsuperscript{114}

Constabulary schools figured prominently into its approach to training throughout the organization’s history. Establishment of the Constabulary School at Sonthofen in 1946 served to not only train leaders and technical specialists within the Constabulary ranks, but also as a central location within the organization for collecting best practices and lessons learned from operational units. The school cadre could in turn use these in the development of updated doctrine, and rapidly incorporate them into lesson plans for the next Constabulary class. Finally, the school was to serve as a venue to “train the trainer” thereby multiplying the effect of the training and making the school a system for normalizing techniques and procedures across the formation.\textsuperscript{115} Certainly, the school served as a powerful tool for the Constabulary commander, wanting to ensure the 38,000 troopers in his command thought and acted uniformly. Likewise, the Constabulary Tank Training Center and Noncommissioned Officer Academy served similar purposes for Lieutenant General I.D. White as he transitioned the Constabulary focus in 1948. Both institutions sought to fill a training gap in the formation by focusing organizational resources to develop the knowledge and skills required to execute the Constabulary’s new mission. Additionally, both institutions maintained the emphasis on the “train the trainer” concept, ensuring that techniques and procedures critical to the Constabulary’s new mission diffused across the organization.\textsuperscript{116} The operation of these schools was a resource intensive proposition for the Constabulary. Their capacity to develop and disseminate the skills and knowledge needed to transition the formation must have certainly outweighed the costs. Constabulary school graduates served to inculcate


\textsuperscript{115} Snyder, \textit{Establishment and Operations}, 47.

\textsuperscript{116} See Cameron, “There and Back Again,” 132-134. for details concerning the Constabulary Tank Training Center and Clarke, “NCO Academy,” 36-37. for details concerning the Constabulary Noncommissioned Officers Academy.
uniform procedures across the formation, another method used to achieve this end was through the publication of Constabulary specific doctrine.

For the U.S. Army, doctrine fulfills several basic functions. It describes how it will operate, organize, and conduct planning. Additionally, it represents standardized knowledge to be used for education and training. The Constabulary Trooper’s Handbook fulfilled all these functions, but also reinforced principles and themes that went beyond general information and prescriptive checklists. A survey of its contents highlights its utility as a ready reference for the trooper, serving to standardize procedures across the formation. Additionally, the Trooper’s Handbook consistently emphasized a number of themes that were crucial for individual troopers to apply if the organization as a whole was going to succeed. These included the importance of teamwork and cooperation, an emphasis on maintaining a sharp appearance in uniform and a calm, dispassionate, and courteous demeanor. Finally, and most importantly, making well-informed decisions on the spot and using common sense were stressed; initiative was a key trait needed when patrolling in small teams separated by great distances. Likewise, the Constabulary NCO Academy’s Noncommissioned Officer’s Tools handbook served very similar purposes. It provided a ready reference for the non-commissioned officer to use in preparing himself and his troopers for the Constabulary’s changing mission focus in 1948. Moreover, through its almost total omission of tasks, techniques and procedures related to policing and stability it clearly signaled what was important to the Constabulary and what was expected of leaders and troopers in the formation.

The final structure utilized by the Constabulary to enable transition was the use of units to test concepts before their full implementation. Established before the formation of the Zone Constabulary, the 2nd, 6th, and 15th Mechanized Cavalry Groups, serving as district constabularies,

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fulfilled this function for the formation and training that took place in 1946. Subsequently, USFET used the District Constabulary experiences to inform their estimates provided to the U.S. War Department and in the initial planning conducted in 1945. Another benefit garnered from the district constabularies was the mobile training teams each of the mechanized cavalry groups fielded in support of the 1946 training program. While providing the training teams might have been a burden for the district constabulary units, the benefit to the rest of the organization must have been substantial. The ability to develop skills and knowledge from experienced practitioners cannot be underestimated. The Constabulary incorporated this technique in the 1948 transition as well. Once again, the 2nd Constabulary Regiment played a prominent role in spearheading the transition by serving as the first constabulary regiment to convert to the armored cavalry regiment-light table of organization. When EUCOM and Constabulary leaders identified the 2nd Regiment as the spearhead for the Constabulary’s transition efforts, an additional task that accompanied the transformation mission was to establish a training school for other Constabulary units. When faced with significant changes in organization and mission, a unit serving as a “test bed” is an important method to garner valuable experience without subjecting the whole formation to potentially costly mistakes.

Implications for the Contemporary U.S. Army

What can the contemporary U.S. Army learn from the Constabulary experience? The five structures applied by the Constabulary to enable transition provide useful methods for large unit commanders to train their formations and transmit standards when reorienting their force. While harder to execute because they control fewer resources, the techniques are suitable for units below the division and corps level as well. Looking beyond the general utility of studying

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Constabulary transition structures, there are three challenges the contemporary U.S. Army is facing that can benefit from the application of the structures listed above. First, with the conclusion of operations in Iraq and the reduction of troops committed to Afghanistan, U.S. Army units will be returning to a training focus that includes core competencies that have been largely neglected for the past ten years. Second, with the introduction of the regionally-aligned forces (RAF) concept, divisions and brigades will need to develop training programs unique to their mission. It is likely the U.S. Army’s institutional component will not be able to meet the diverse training requirements the RAF program will entail. Finally, the U.S. Army’s announced restructuring of infantry and armored brigade combat teams with the introduction of additional maneuver, engineer, and field artillery assets will require a deliberate process to transfer and integrate these new units.

In 2010, the United States withdrew the last American Army units from Iraq, and in February 2013, President Barack Obama announced the U.S. intention to significantly reduce troop strength in Afghanistan and turn over responsibility for the country’s security to the Afghans by 2014. With the conclusion of operations in Iraq and the reduction of forces committed to Afghanistan, increasing numbers of United States Army units will reorient their training from a stability and counterinsurgency focus to a broader one including training to develop conventional capabilities. Concerns over the need to rebalance the U.S. Army’s training focus have found a voice in recent strategic guidance provided by the U.S. Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff. It is also evident in the transition that U.S. Army combat training centers (CTC) have made to the decisive action rotation format. In a decisive action rotation, units execute training across a wide spectrum of tasks, including force-on-force combined arms.

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120 Entous and Barnes, “President to Halve Afghan Force in Next Year”
This new training focus will require units to train on tasks that have not been a priority since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. These include tank and infantry fighting vehicle gunnery, combined arms maneuver, and the concentrated use of artillery cannon fires. The Constabulary experience very closely parallels what U.S. Army units returning from Afghanistan will likely be asked to execute, a shift in training focus from stability operations to combat operations.

The Constabulary provides some clear lessons and examples for units transitioning their focus to conventional operations. First, much like the Constabulary Headquarters in 1948, units must establish clear training objectives and priorities. A return to the disciplined application of training management principles and publication of annual and quarterly training guidance will serve the same purpose as the Constabulary training memorandum published in April 1948. Additionally, setting training gates like the Constabulary’s use of the Army Ground Forces platoon and battalion firing tables provides a good aim-point for units to work towards as they attain proficiency in conventional warfighting skills. The staggered nature of deployments on U.S. Army installations means that some brigades will be more proficient than their recently returning counterparts in conventional skills. Corps and division headquarters should leverage these units much like the district constabulary units were used to form mobile training teams or small unit schools to assist redeploying formations in their transition back to a more conventional training focus. Finally, contemporary U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the requirement for leaders “to focus on training the few collective tasks that will best prepare it and its leaders to accomplish a mission or adapt to the requirements of a contingency mission.”


122 U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and
Constabulary’s June 1948 order to cease all training on police type tasks, unit commanders at all levels cannot shy away from making a clear delineation in training priorities.

In the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the United States Army introduced its plan for Regionally Aligned Forces. Under this concept, brigades, division headquarters, and corps headquarters establish a relationship with one of the United States Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). Designating a unit as a regionally aligned force can indicate the formation is currently assigned to the GCC, is allocated to the GCC, or is designated by the Army to prepare for a regional mission in a combatant command’s area of responsibility. Within the RAF framework, a unit that is regionally aligned will maintain proficiency in their fundamental skills but will also train on skills related to the formation’s regional alignment. These include developing an understanding of the designated region’s language, culture, militaries, and geography. The wide range of locations against which a unit can be aligned creates an extremely diverse range of training requirements across the United States Army. It is unlikely the U.S. Army’s institutional structures will be capable of developing training programs and material tailored to each unit’s mission or country of alignment. Unit commanders will likely need to develop innovative solutions to fill this potential gap.

The Constabulary experience provides a good starting point for regionally aligned units as they train and prepare for their mission. Unit-level handbooks, like the Trooper’s Handbook, can provide basic knowledge and skills for the mission, and serve as a conduit to disseminate the commander’s vision and intent for the formation’s regional mission. Additionally, much as the Constabulary employed the “train the trainer” concept, the potential exists to send selected leaders to orientation courses provided by the U.S. Department of Defense or civilian higher education programs.

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education institutions. These selected leaders can gain language, culture, and geography skills and knowledge and return to serve as trainers within the organization to multiply the effect gained through these individual training experiences. Finally, formations with a regionally-aligned mission should seek out other U.S. Army units that have previously served in their designated location. United States Army Special Operations forces and conventional units that have been regionally aligned provide two potential sources of experience that if properly leveraged can provide a similar capability to the mobile training teams established by the district constabulary units in 1946.

On June 25, 2013, General Raymond Odierno, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, announced plans to reorganize the U.S. Army infantry and armored brigade combat team structure. Projected changes under this reorganization call for the addition of a third maneuver battalion (combined arms or infantry) and the transformation of the brigade special troops battalion to a brigade engineer battalion. Additionally, artillery battalions in the brigade will convert from a configuration with two firing batteries and sixteen artillery pieces to three firing batteries with eighteen artillery pieces. The U.S. Army will transfer some of the additional organizations, such as the third maneuver battalion, from deactivating brigade combat teams. Others, such as the brigade engineer battalion and additional artillery battery will need to be developed using pre-existing organizations to serve as the nucleus of the formation.125

U.S. brigade combat teams and their parent organizations can derive several important lessons from the Constabulary experience to apply to this current round of reorganizations. Detailed planning at the division or corps level must precede intra-organizational moves. Since maneuver battalions will transfer as self-contained organizations, the tendency to treat this as a simple task organization change may dominate thinking at higher echelons. A focused planning

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process will identify the other organizational changes required within the brigade to support an additional battalion, such as increased signal, maintenance and distribution capabilities. Conferences can also be a useful tool to develop shared expectations and create buy-in, much like the February 1946 theater-wide reorganization conference that established the timeline for transferring units to the Constabulary. 126 Finally, staggering the reorganization of artillery battalions and brigade engineer battalions will allow time to develop lessons learned and best practices as they relate to these new formations. The units selected to reorganize first will serve the same purpose as the district constabulary in 1946, or the 2nd Constabulary Regiment in 1948. On the surface, the changes announced in June 2013 may appear as simple reorganization actions, in some cases returning formations to the organization they had before the U.S. Army adopted the brigade combat team structure. However, applying lessons learned from the Constabulary experience will ensure the changes are carried out deliberately, and with as little friction as possible.

The Constabulary was an organization consistently in transition. From its formation in 1946 to the deactivation of the last squadrons in 1952, the Constabulary made four significant changes in organization. These organizational developments were accompanied by two distinct mission sets. Many of the transitions were predicated on changes in the operating environment, ranging from personnel reductions directed by the War Department to the gradual emergence of America’s Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. In each case, the Theater and Constabulary Headquarters adjusted the mission, organization, and training to meet the exigencies faced by the formation. To aid in these changes, the Constabulary consistently applied structures from the categories described above to train and reorient the force. These structures ranged from the development of unique Constabulary doctrine and schools, to the use of detailed planning and clear direction in the form of training guidance or the commander’s vision. Each assisted the

126Snyder, Establishment and Operations, 36.
commander in normalizing standards and procedures across a large formation. Likewise, contemporary U.S. commanders can apply the same techniques when forced to adapt their organization. In spite of its relatively short history, the Constabulary provides powerful and useful methods organizations can apply when faced with change.
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