

WHY LEADERSHIP MATTERS: JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A Monograph

by

MAJ William E. Brown
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Candidate: Major William E. Brown

Monograph Title: Why Leadership Matters: Joint Task Force Planning with the Department of State

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Jeffrey J. Kubiak, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
Juan K. Ulloa, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 10th day of December 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

WHY LEADERSHIP MATTERS: JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE by MAJ William E. Brown, 40 pages.

This work examines the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander and the United States Ambassador during contingency operations conducted by the United States. The work examines the impacts of this relationship on operations conducted for regime change and how it influenced conflict termination in the 20th century. The work examines two historic case studies: Operation Just Cause and Operation Uphold Democracy. Moreover, the work examines communication and integration between the strategic policy makers, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and how they are linked to the Joint Task Force to answer the primary research question.

The Operation in Haiti is an example of international institutions working to achieve clear termination criteria, which are necessary to ensure successful war termination or conflict resolution. Though vastly different in scope, duration, and international support Operations Just Cause and Uphold Democracy highlight the best and worst examples of United States military intervention. The drastically different cases highlight the differences in the types of conflict termination and the stark differences in the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander and the in country ambassador. Numerous aspects about collaborative planning and integration of the Department of State and Department of Defense could improve, but the focus of the conclusions and recommendations will be on Department of Defense led initiatives.

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INTRODUCTION

This work examines the question: what is the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander and the United States Ambassador during contingency operations conducted by the United States. This is accomplished through examination of the impacts of this relationship on operations conducted for regime change and how it influenced conflict termination in the 20th century. To answer this question the work examines two historic case studies: (1) Operation Just Cause, the intervention into Panama to remove the regime of Manuel Noriega and (2) Operation Uphold Democracy; an intervention in Haiti in 1994 to restore the government of Jean Baptist Aristide. Moreover, the work examines communication and integration between the strategic policy makers, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and how they are linked to the Joint Task Force to answer the primary research question.

The larger questions that are exposed in this research include: how does the JTF commander conduct planning toward the desired end state and not just those purely militarily-achievable objectives derived from that end state? What responsibility does the JTF commander have for planning the transition from military operations to those better served by the Department of State and other instruments of national power? What is the operational link to the strategic process that will help build a comprehensive end-to-end plan of action required by the United States Government in pursuit of its national security objectives?

The United States has primarily engaged in limited conflicts since the end of World War II. The cases selected reflect instances in which the United States Government conducted intervention, not total war, for the goal of regime change. The selected cases each highlight one of the forms of conflict termination defined later in this work. These cases are of interest as they highlight the difficulties that can arise in situations where there is not a strong relationship between the Joint Task Force Commander and the in country Ambassador. As stated by the research question the work will primarily focus on the Joint Task Force and the relationship it has

with the in country ambassador, if it is different from the relationship of the next senior level of command, and if so why.

Selecting Cases: From World War II to the Modern Day

The U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan following the end of World War II terminated the last declared war in U.S. history. Since World War II, the U.S. has been involved in dozens of military operations that were not total war; however, the relationship this work seeks to understand is more interesting than the examples provided by World War II. This makes the use of World War II case studies less relevant for this body of research.

The Korean and Vietnam Conflicts also do not provide the insights sought by this project. Korea was a United Nations (UN) action to restore South Korea's borders. Additionally, while U.S. forces did cross that border it was never a stated goal to remove the North Korean regime. As the Korean conflict was never officially terminated it is not suitable for this study. The Vietnam conflict, while undoubtedly capable of providing useful insights into interagency operations, does not serve the purpose of this research because although the United States government did allow regime change to occur during the conflict, it was not the stated goal of intervention. In fact it was the opposite of the stated goal. The U.S. was trying to prevent regime collapse.

The next interventions considered for study were Grenada and Panama. These cases represent Cold War-era conflicts in which the U.S. conducted operations for the explicit purpose of regime change. Grenada as a contingency operation focused on dislodging Communist footholds in a United States sphere of influence. Conversely, the invasion of Panama specifically targeted the regime of Manuel Noriega and restoration of the legally elected government thus making it a prime case to use as the base for this study.

President Clinton used the U.S. military in Haiti in 1994 to lead a multinational force sanctioned by the United Nations to restore the legally elected government. The original plan for

the intervention utilized two different plans. The first course of action involved a high intensity operation and the latter utilized an unopposed incursion to remove the Cedras regime. A last minute deal brokered by former President Jimmy Carter changed the dynamic of the intervention essentially forcing a reframing of the problem. This makes the Haiti intervention ideal for this case study.

The cases selected represent examples of interventions undertaken with regime change as the stated goal of the United States government. These cases involved U.S. military forces as well as other U.S. governmental agencies. The situations in Panama and Haiti introduce more limited U.S. objectives. Operations in Iraq differed from the selected cases in duration and provided a comparison of a planned limited war that became a long war. The analysis of the first two cases results in an understanding of the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander with other U.S. Government Agencies working to achieve war termination or conflict resolution. Incorporating the lessons of these case studies provided a historical lens to examine cases where the United States government utilized force explicitly for regime change.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Operation Just Cause was executed to remove the regime of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. The reasoning behind the removal was to stabilize the country and ensure the safety of American citizens operating the Panama Canal. The objectives for Operation Just Cause were: (1) safeguard the 30,000 Americans in Panama, (2) protect the canal and 142 defense sites, (3) help the Panamanian opposition establish democracy, (4) neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces and (5) capture Noriega. The canal was considered strategic terrain that facilitated the movement

of naval vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic in the event of a conflict in Europe or the Middle East.¹

Manuel Noriega rose to power in August of 1983 following the death several years earlier of his patron, Omar Torrijos Herrera. Noriega, acting quickly, secured the passage of Law 20, which created the Panamanian Defense Forces. The law designated the National Guard as a police force, creating separate air, ground, and naval forces. Law 20 also made civilian control over the military more ceremonial than functional, allocating budget and oversight control to Noriega. Noriega integrated the Panamanian Defense forces into the economy. Panamanian Officers moved from serving in symbolic positions on cooperation boards to ownership of lucrative businesses in Panama. Noriega used fear and intimidation instead of mass killing to maintain order. The regime used targeted violence to silence critics of the regime rather than mass retaliation against the public. The Noriega ordered decapitation of rival Dr. Hugo Spadafora in September of 1985 was a perfect example of Noriega's intimidation methods.² Politically, Noriega intimidated the civilian government in much the same way, removing President Barletta for investigating Dr. Spadafora's murder, silencing resistance with a threat to President Barletta's family.

Noriega felt both secure domestically and in his relationship with the United States. Involved with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the United States military, Noriega provided key information and allowed latitude for operations by

¹Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause: Panama* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 5-29; Lawrence A. Yates, *U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, Crisis Management, June 1987–December 1989* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2012), 8. President Carter negotiated a deal to return control of the canal to the Panamanian government but retained the right of the United States to maintain a military presence and operate the canal until December 31, 1999

²Yates, 9-14.

these agencies in Panama. The CIA acknowledged Noriega supported Cuba providing information and technology to Cuba, but ascertained what Cuba received was not damaging. Noriega supported the United States with intelligence about the Sandinistas and narcotics trafficking. The latter would later be used against Noriega when his illicit drug trafficking was discovered. The support and acquiescence Noriega received from the United States came into question in June 1986 when the United States Senate investigated Noriega. Following the investigation an article by Seymour M. Hersh in the *New York Times* highlighted much of Noriega's illicit dealings. While this alone did not unhinge support from the Reagan administration, it raised serious questions concerning his relationship with the United States.³ While not damaging to U.S. national security, Noriega's dealings with Cuba coupled with his narcotics ties eventually drove a wedge between the Panamanian dictator and the U.S.

The deterioration of the situation in Panama was exacerbated on 5 February 1988 when two U.S. Attorneys indicted Noriega, a high-ranking foreign official, without notifying the Attorney General of the United States.⁴ The indictments changed the narrative of U.S. policy regarding Panama, prompting by January 1988 Congress to cut all economic support, freeze all payments for use of facilities in Panama and cut formal military cooperation. This Congressional action removed General Woerner's and Ambassador Arthur Davis' ability to interact with the regime to achieve conflict resolution.⁵ Due for a biannual review, SOUTHCOM planners updated the Panama contingency plans, adding a proactive plan for possible operations in Panama should

³Yates, 9-14.

⁴Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1990), 236-257.

⁵The indictments had the effect of limiting negotiation with Noriega. GEN Woerner who had maintained an ongoing dialogue in hopes of persuading Noriega to step aside would soon be ordered to discontinue all contact. The indictments had the effect of limiting any real chance a conflict resolution.

the need arise.⁶ The increased hostility from the regime triggered U.S. Southern Command planners to update non-combatant evacuation plans from February through November of 1988 and to examine how the threat of force might be used to topple the regime through persuasion or if necessary, coercion.⁷

The relationship between Noriega and the United States had been deteriorating for the latter half of President Reagan's second term. President Reagan adopted a policy of economic sanctions to create conditions for the Panamanian Defense Force to remove Noriega, negating the need for direct U.S. intervention.⁸ The commander of United States Southern Command, GEN Woerner had dealt with Noriega during most of that period. GEN Woerner became increasingly frustrated with what he felt was viewed as a "limited and ineffectual approach" of the Reagan administration that failed to mobilize the interagency in a synchronized manner to address the crisis in Panama.⁹ Early planning by United States Southern Command and the United States ambassador in Panama sought to negotiate Noriega's voluntary exit from Panama. As the crisis escalated both the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, Arthur Davis, and GEN Woerner sought a synchronized interagency solution.¹⁰

GEN Woerner, and later General Thurman, would conclude that Woerner's lack of connections with Washington policymakers and the Pentagon proved to be a hindrance to his

⁶Cole, 21. Previously plans focus lay with securing the Canal Zone in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Yates, 195.

⁹On Pentagon preparations for a tougher policy, see Joint Staff Action Processing Form (and attachments), through Director Joint Staff, to Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 May 89, sub: Strategy Position Paper on Panama; as well as attachments., Position Paper, J-5 to DJS, 13 May 89, sub: US Strategy and Policy in Panama.

¹⁰Yates, 195.

recommendations gaining traction.¹¹ GEN Woerner, never having served a tour in the Pentagon or in the Capitol, lacked the political connections in Congress that could have advocated on his behalf. Additionally GEN Woerner's only advocate on the Joint Staff, ADM Crowe, could not counter the military critics alone. The "Panama problem" was inherited by the administration of George H. W. Bush in January 1989. GEN Woerner received instructions to keep the situation under control until after the American elections of 1988. GEN Woerner appreciated the American political situation and reported to ADM Crowe the best opportunity to influence Panama would be the upcoming Panamanian Presidential elections.¹²

Following the Panamanian elections of 1989, GEN Woerner developed *Fissures II*, a plan that detailed a "Panama Triad" to force Noriega from power resulting in conflict resolution.¹³ Utilizing the U.S. military, international pressure and Panamanian opposition working in synchronization would compel Noriega to relinquish control. The plan called for a gradual buildup of forces under SOUTHCOM control, leveraging the internal resistance to Noriega in Panama, and leveraging the Organization of American States to apply pressure. GEN Woerner additionally advocated using leverage from other nations to support the opposition in Panama. The State Department arranged for the Organization of American States to meet in Panama, though the resulting meeting did not compel the regime to change behavior. *Fissures II* suffered the same fate as its predecessor and yielded little. GEN Woerner noted that Washington attempted to solve the Panama crisis with "wishful thinking and rhetoric, never forcing the interagency system to bear the cost of solving the problem."¹⁴ The interagency structure did not

¹¹Ibid., 137.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., 192-195.

¹⁴Gabriel Marcella and General Frederick F. Woerner Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), "The Road to War: The U.S – Panamanian Crisis, 1987 – 1989", draft article, 6 May 91.

synchronize or coordinate efforts resulting in a disjointed approach from various agencies. This prevented the synchronization GEN Woerner envisioned. Successful regime changes in the Philippines and Haiti in 1986 bolstered hubris in the Department of State and the White House regarding the Organization of American States.¹⁵ Former Secretary of State Baker suggested that the appearance of cooperation was necessary in case force was used later. Secretary Baker claimed in his book the administration tried to send the message to the PDF to ouster the regime or the United States would.¹⁶ General Woerner would later claim the United States never leveraged the opposition in Panama or the Organization of American States effectively against Noriega. Thus ignoring two of the legs required for *Fissures II* success.¹⁷

Following the 1989 Panamanian elections in which it appeared Noriega's puppet candidate had been overwhelmingly defeated Noriega nullified the results claiming foreign interference. President Bush decided to energize the situation with new blood. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney immediately stepped up efforts to pressure the Noriega regime to step down by encouraging censure by other Latin American countries, increasing troop levels in Panama, and evacuating military dependents in Panama.¹⁸ President Bush issued National Security Directive 17 on 22 July 1989 in an attempt to pressure Noriega to retire. The goal was to create economic distress for the Panamanian elite, who in turn would force Noriega from power. The President hoped to leverage the Panamanian people to conduct internal regime change rather than the use of direct military force. While there was an attempted coup by the military, it was unsuccessful and led to a series of purges to re-solidify Noriega's power. The President also

¹⁵James A. Baker III. and Thomas M. Defrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 183.

¹⁶Ibid., 183.

¹⁷Yates, 195.

¹⁸Cole, 11.

replaced the USCINCSO, General Woerner, with General Maxwell R. Thurman who was serving at the time as Commander of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and had been slated to retire.¹⁹

Of these changes the most important would be the appointment of GEN Thurman, as CINCSOUTH. GEN Thurman possessed attributes that created opportunities for his success that GEN Woerner never had. Having served a tour as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Thurman had a solid knowledge of the power brokers in the capital. While in transition from TRADOC, GEN Thurman met with top leaders of the National Security Council, Drug Enforcement Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Treasury, the White House and Congress. GEN Thurman, understanding he would need the support of the Department of State players in Washington, made friends with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Bernard Aronson. GEN Thurman assumed CINCSOUTH with a key to success his predecessor never had: interagency and political capital.²⁰

The first operation planned and executed following the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Just Cause, tested the concept of joint operations mandated by the new law. Original planning for operations in Panama began with the JCS Planning Order of 28 February 1988, while GEN Woerner was CINCSOUTH.²¹ Upon assuming command of SOUTHCOM, GEN Thurman ordered the revision of all of the military plans. GEN Thurman reportedly alluded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Army South staff were a bunch of area experts not warfighters, that they lacked the skill needed to plan and execute operations as a Joint Task Force. This attitude by

¹⁹Cole, 13; Baker, and Defrank.

²⁰Yates, 243.

²¹John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 7.

GEN Thurman led him to request the XVIII Airborne Corp as the Joint Task Force replacing Army South as the Joint Task Force.²²

GEN Thurman, utilizing new powers of the Goldwater Nichols Act, appointed Lieutenant General (LTG) Carl Stiner, Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Joint Task Force-Panama Commander. This move was to solidify the chain of command for the operation and avoid disjointed command issues experienced in Grenada. LTG Stiner's staff developed Operations Order (OPORD) 1-90 to execute Operation Blue Spoon. One of the difficulties in planning involved the compartmentalization of individual service and interagency planners. Each SOUTHCOM subordinate headquarters planners were only authorized to receive information concerning their part of the plan.²³ This also limited the role interagency elements were utilized for planning as most did not have the requisite clearance to be read in on the plans. The planning was not completely done in a Department of Defense vacuum, however. The Charge de Affairs Panama, John Bushnell, invited the ousted, legally elected Panamanian officials to a dinner where he and GEN Thurman briefed them on Just Cause and asked them to lead the effort to set up the new government.²⁴ Though the planning was largely compartmentalized a deliberate effort was made to incorporate joint and interagency elements, but this was primarily at echelons above the JTF level.²⁵

The final plan OPORD 90-2 called for simultaneous action by Joint Special Operations Task Forces and Joint Task Force Panama to achieve the objectives of the National Command Authority. The JTF OPORD 90-2 focused on the four subordinate operations conducted by

²²Yates, 245.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, 35.

²⁵Ibid., 74.

conventional forces and the Rangers, but left special operations planning to the JSOTF.²⁶ The final act of the planners was to change Operation Blue Spoon to Operation Just Cause. The plan called for Task Force RED, an Army Ranger Battalion, to attack Rio Hato in order to neutralize the 6th and 7th Panamanian companies. These elements had been loyal to Noriega during the last coup and were expected to provide stiff resistance. After reluctance on the part of the National Command authority, the Rangers were given additional support from F-117As to provide air interdiction (AI).²⁷

Task Force (TF) Atlantic, a brigade of the 7th Infantry Division would seize the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal and the roads leading to the canal from Gamboa to Colon. Additionally they would capture the electric distribution site at Cerro Tigre, Coco Solo Naval Air Station, Fort Espinar, Madden Dam, Renacer Prison, and military installations in Colon while also neutralizing a naval infantry company and the 8th infantry company. Task Force Pacific, the 82nd Airborne Ready Brigade and a Ranger Battalion would conduct an airborne assault northeast of Panama City.²⁸ The Rangers would precede the paratroopers by forty-five minutes at Torrijos-Tocumen Airport. The Task Force was assigned to secure Cerro Azul and Paitilla airfield, and then neutralize a cavalry squadron at Panama Viejo, Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron, and the 1st Infantry Company at Tinajitas.²⁹

Task Force Bayonet consisting of the 193rd Infantry Brigade and the 503rd Military Police Battalion would operate in the Panama City with Task Force Semper Fi, a United States Marine element. Task Force Bayonet would neutralize 5th Rifle Company at Fort Amador and

²⁶Ibid., 22.

²⁷Ibid., 22-31.

²⁸The brigade consisted of 1st and 2nd battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment.

²⁹Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, 22.

forces at the Comandancia. The Task Force would additionally seize objectives at fort Clayton, Gorgas Military Hospital, and Quarry Heights. Simultaneously Task Force Semper Fi would secure the Western approaches to the Panama Canal.³⁰

Upon completion of conventional combat operations the remaining ground troops would commence stability operations under Blind Logic, which was changed to Promote Liberty due to its complicated nature, until the 7th Infantry Division and 16th Military Police Brigade arrived to relieve them. The plan called for all conventional ground forces to be relieved by the 7th Infantry Division no later than thirty days after execution. The operation, while well rehearsed and planned, did not go exactly to plan.³¹

While U.S. leadership tried to minimize risk to operational security, national news agencies began reporting on the large number of aircraft leaving Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While there were unconfirmed leaks, official findings concluded that Panamanian Defense forces and Noriega either ignored the warnings due to ineptitude or that a full attack was not expected. Regardless the Panamanian Defense Forces were not prepared for the magnitude of the United States force that attacked.³²

Operational security was compromised prompting GEN Thurman to order acceleration of the special operations timeline by fifteen minutes. The two F-117As dropped their 2,000-pound laser guided bombs effectively disrupting the Panamanian 6th and 7th Rifle Companies allowing 1,300 U.S. Rangers to conduct an unopposed airborne assault. Forty-five minutes later 2,700 paratroopers reinforced the Rangers effectively isolating Panama City. The Rangers would see the heaviest fighting at Rio Hato requiring over five hours subduing the two Rifle Companies.

³⁰Ibid., 22-23.

³¹Ibid., 21.

³²Ibid., 34-35.

Task Force Atlantic, a battalion from 7th Infantry Division and a battalion from 82nd Ready Brigade engaged the Panamanian Defense Force's 8th Rifle Company at Fort Espinar and the naval company at Coco. The battalion from the 7th Infantry Division was able to seize the electrical distribution center, Fort Davis, the Military Hospital, Madden Dam and the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. The battalion from the 82nd Airborne captured Renacer Prison freeing American and Panamanian prisoners. Task Force Atlantic reported all of its objectives complete at 1029 Eastern Standard Time.³³

Task Force Semper Fi attacked at H-Hour and secured the approaches to the Bridges of the Americas effectively isolating Rio Hato from the Comandancia. They additionally captured Vera Cruz, Arraijan, and the outskirts of Howard Air Base. By 0700 Task Force Semper Fi had consolidated and was ready to continue offensive operations.³⁴

Task Force Bayonet, the other task force in Panama City, attacked through urban sprawl to capture key targets in the city. Supported by Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles and AH-64 Apache helicopters Task Force Bayonet seized Fort Amador, the Comandancia and reinforced the embattled U.S. embassy. The resistance at the Comandancia was so staunch U.S. Forces had to destroy most of the building before the Panamanian Forces would surrender. Three U.S. helicopters were forced down during the assault. The engagement lasted for over three hours. The Comandancia provided the command and control for the Panamanian Defense Forces, once captured resistance became disorganized above small unit actions.³⁵

Other combat actions took place the first day but most forces either conceded defeat or broke contact and fled to form roving bands. GEN Stiner conceded Panamanian Defense forces

³³Ibid., 39-40.

³⁴Ibid., 40.

³⁵Ibid., 41.

fought harder than expected. One advantage the U.S. enjoyed was that remaining Panamanian Defense Forces seemed more interested in looting than attacking U.S. forces. This caused difficulties once Just Cause transitioned to Promote Liberty. Noriega's flight to the Nunciatura signaled the end of organized resistance in Panama enabling transition to stability operations.³⁶

Although the transition from combat to stability occurred relatively smoothly in Just Cause, the lack of collaborative planning with other agencies had exacerbated problems during the transition. The compartmentalized planning conducted at Fort Bragg was relatively unknown to stakeholders such as Department of State and the Department of Justice. The Department of Defense stove-piping prohibited collaborative planning that could have eliminated confusion during the transition. The Top-Secret classification level limited the role of other government agencies during the planning. State Department planners would have been able to offer valuable insight concerning dealings with third party diplomats and rules of engagement. The lack of an ambassador on the ground during the operation forced the deputy chief of mission, John Bushnell, to assume that role. Though involved in the transition to the new government, he was not consulted as prior to the initiation of combat operations.

The short-term effects of the operation for the United States were two-fold; first it solidified the Chairman's role under the Goldwater-Nichols Act and secondly it gave much needed confidence to civilian leaders about joint military operations. For the Panamanian people the operation restored the legitimate government and received praise from Panamanians during exit polls. International opinion decried the invasion and criticized the United States intervention. The Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the intervention as a violation of international law and the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the

³⁶Ibid., 41-42.

action as well.³⁷ The first limited action since Goldwater-Nichols provided valuable lessons leaders would use when planning Operation Uphold Democracy.

Operation Uphold Democracy

Operation Uphold Democracy was a United Nations sanctioned Chapter 7 action authorizing the United States to compel General Raoul Cedras to return power to the legally elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide. Unlike Operation Just Cause undertaken by the Department of Defense following Goldwater-Nichols, this would be a coalition operation supported by a United Nations mandate to remove the current regime. The United States demonstrated a maturing process of interagency and defense planning and execution in the events leading up to and following Operation Uphold Democracy. As with Operation Just Cause the United States would attempt diplomatic means prior to resorting to military intervention. While the crisis was eventually resolved through conflict resolution by former President Jimmy Carter, the threat of military force compelled the regime to capitulate to international will.

The initial attempt at peaceful intervention, the deployment to Haiti of the USS Harlan County, that effort was less successful and actually set the stage for escalation. The USS Harlan County incident occurred in August of 1993 when 225 observers from the Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG) were unable to unload in Port-au-Prince. The JTF HAG was an ad hoc organization; a mix of personalities and many of those alerted to serve had no idea of what they were to accomplish.³⁸ Just as the USS Harlin County prepared to set sail, eighteen Special Operations Forces Soldiers were killed in a gun battle in Somalia. General Cedras believed if he

³⁷Glenn J. Antizzo, *U.S. Military Intervention in the Post Cold War Era: How to Win America's Wars in the Twenty First Century* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 63.

³⁸Phil Baker, interviewed by Walter E. Kretchik, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1997.

could convince President Clinton that any action in Haiti would resemble the recent results in Somalia that the U.S. would forgo military action.³⁹ Accordingly, General Cedras staged several demonstrations with armed protestors at the pier and with vessels in the harbor that led to the departure of the USS Harlan County and JTF HAG.⁴⁰ The Harlan County incident set the stage for international condemnation and paved the way for a planned U.S. military intervention.

U.S. planners began developing Operation Jade Green.⁴¹ These plans grew to become Valiant Dragon and later OPLAN 2370. Like Panama, the Administration wanted to avoid military intervention if possible. A collaborative effort between the Department of Defense and the Department of State was under development. This plan was considered a first because many government agencies planned alongside the military.⁴² As the situation progressed, diplomatic efforts to return Aristide to power were continually derailed by Cedras. On 19 September 1994, with 16 aircraft airborne to insert elements of the 82d Airborne Division, former President Jimmy Carter brokered an agreement in which Cedras and his ruling cabinet would leave Haiti no later than October 15. On the eve of the assault the mission was no longer a question of war termination but a diplomatically brokered conflict resolution. This would present many challenges to the XVIII Airborne Corps planning staff as they had to now change the plan to accommodate the agreement brokered by President Carter.⁴³

³⁹Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 10 March 1994), 27.

⁴⁰Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 41.

⁴¹John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 62.

⁴²Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 76-77.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 76.

Department of Defense was in a transition period during the planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. The Berlin Wall had fallen in 1989 and internal turmoil in the Soviet Union left the United States without a traditional threat. The National Command Authority directed the Department of Defense to deactivate ground-launched nuclear weapons in Europe and focus on containment of nuclear devices and chemical agents in Eastern Europe. The same month as a 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union hundreds of thousands of servicemen and women returned from the Gulf War to face budget cuts and personnel reductions.⁴⁴ The loss of eighteen Rangers during a peacekeeping operation in Somalia in 1993 made many military and civilian leaders in the United States wary of United Nations military operations and contributed to the Harlan County episode.

Following the Harlan County's withdraw, United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to begin planning a forcible entry operation for Haiti. The planners developed two plans one utilizing interagency assets of the executive branch and a second focusing on a use of force scenario. USACOM developed a political-military integration plan that was accepted and implemented by the National Security Council working group on Haiti. Adopting the plan codified roles for all the instruments of national power during the operation. In theory all the players had a vested interest in the operation. Unfortunately the top-secret classification and compartmentalization stove piped much of the planning at the Joint Task Force level.⁴⁵

The use of force scenario for Haiti OPLAN 2370 was developed by the XVIII Airborne Corps. One of the difficulties with the planning involved the classification level. The two lead planners for the operation literally worked in a broom closet of the corps headquarters building to

⁴⁴Ibid., 27.

⁴⁵Ibid., 43-45.

maintain the security of the operation. The two JTF planners were forced to plan alone, unable to integrate other planners who lacked the “need to know” or were deliberately excluded from the planning in order to maintain OPSEC. The compartmentalization also made collaborative planning difficult for the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), the 82nd Airborne Division, and XVIII Airborne Corps. The military planners at the JTF did not have any means to communicate with the Department of State or the Department of Justice for their roles in the operation. While USACOM had accomplished integrated planning at the component command level, the top-secret classification hindered integrated planning for the JTF.⁴⁶

OPLAN 2370 envisioned a twenty-four day mission executed in five distinct phases. The phases, predeployment and crisis action allowed four days. The deployment of troops and combat operations would take three days to complete. Following combat operations the reorganization of the Haitian military and police would set conditions for transition to follow-on multinational force and reception of a multinational force. The ground forces consisted of the 82nd Airborne Division, United States Marines, and a JSOTF composed of Army Rangers, Special Operations Forces, and Navy SEALs. The 82nd would conduct an airborne assault to seize objectives while the JSOTF attacked selected targets in Port-au-Prince and conduct operations to secure the surrounding countryside. Mounting political pressure compelled President Clinton to continue diplomacy and JTF 180 was disestablished.⁴⁷

USACOM, by direction of the JCS, ordered the XVIII Airborne Corps to begin planning a peaceful entry into Haiti that concluded with a handover to a multinational force. The product, OPLAN 2380, called for the uncontested entry of U.S. forces to Haiti to conduct all the previous

⁴⁶Major William B. Garrett, interview with Dr. Robert K. Wright, Dr. Donald Carter, and Ms. Cynthia L. Hayden, Oral History Interviews, 29 March 1995.

⁴⁷Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 49-51. The original note in the book attributes this to the JTF 180 briefing slides.

missions except the neutralization of the FAd'H and the Haitian police. OPLAN 2380 as planned called for 179 days of operations in Haiti. The Forces Commander not happy with having the JSOTF and 82nd committed for that period of time directed the 10th Mountain Division to refine the OPLAN 2380. The 10th Mountain Division would become JTF 190 under OPLAN 2380. The plan called for 10th Mountain to first establish security; conduct NEO of American citizens and other individuals as necessary, and the return of a functioning Haitian government. Control of Cap Haitian and Port-au-Prince were key to JTF 190 accomplishing its stated goals. The insertion plan was a first for the DoD as it called for the 10th Mountain to deploy by helicopter from an aircraft carrier. The unit was not trained for this type of employment, but the USACOM Planners believed this gave the unit maximum flexibility in force projection. USACOM later decided to merge the two OPLANs meaning neither OPLAN 2370 or 2380 would be implemented as planned.⁴⁸

OPLAN 2375 merged the first two days of operations from 2370 with the long-term plan envisioned in 2380. With tensions running high in Haiti, both the XVIII Airborne Corps and 10th Mountain Divisions were working to complete three different plans not knowing which one they would execute. Shortly after briefing the updated 2370 OPLAN to the COMJTF 180 the order to execute OPLAN 2730 was issued by USACOM.⁴⁹

The morning of 19 September the Cedras junta reached out to former President Carter requesting he arbitrate a settlement. President Clinton authorized Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to negotiate on behalf of the United States. As the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were airborne on the way to Haiti LTG Shelton received orders to halt 2370 and prepare to execute 2380 the following day.

⁴⁸Ibid., 57-60.

⁴⁹Ibid., 70-71, 78.

LTG Shelton gave his planners three hours to develop a new plan that incorporated the tenets of the Carter negotiations. None of the previous plans considered the Junta remaining in power during the transition. A plan was developed to seize the airport to facilitate a meeting between LTG Shelton and the junta the following morning. The new plan 2380 plus required U.S. forces to deal with the Junta during the transition in an atmosphere of mutual respect.⁵⁰ This forced JTF 180 and JTF 190 to react as events unfolded. The unforeseen change created numerous difficulties with the civilians who wanted revenge against former regime cronies and existing security forces trying to maintain order.⁵¹

Far from perfect, Uphold Democracy was effective at integrating interagency elements into a military plan of action. The Department of State's role in organizing and facilitating Caribbean Command (CARICOM) was unprecedented. The creation of CARICOM turned a unilateral United States mission to enforce United Nations Resolution 940 into a multinational effort. The Department of State and the Joint Staff Future Plans section (J5) spent months soliciting buy-in from Caribbean nations for the multinational effort. By July 1994 the nations of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Antigua, and Barbuda committed troops to support the mission. A meeting in August solidified the requirements of each nation, and devised a plan for training, equipping, and paying the members of the coalition. Operations following the initial invasion would now be handed over to a multinational organization operating under a United Nations mandate.⁵² Not only did the nations of CARICOM

⁵⁰General Henry H. Shelton, CINC, JTF 180, interviewed by Lieutenant Steve Dietrich, 22 October 1994, Cynthia Hayden, ed., *JTF 180 Uphold Democracy: Oral History Interviews* (Ft. Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1990), 62.

⁵¹Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 76-78.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 64-65.

participate; Great Britain, Canada, Holland, and Argentina all provided naval forces to conduct maritime intercept operations (MIO) to enforce the embargo of Haiti.⁵³

During the operation GEN Shelton ensured he not only incorporated interagency elements through Ambassador Swing but also the host nation. GEN Shelton after humiliating General Cedras the first day realized he would be the key to maintaining control of the FAd'H. Starting on D+2 GEN Shelton applied elements of what we today call design. Understanding the current context of the operational environment in Haiti GEN Shelton and Ambassador Swing applied elements of operational art—specifically basing, enter of gravity, and end state—to achieve desired future conditions.

Operating within the constraints of President Carter's negotiated settlement, GEN Shelton and Ambassador Swing had their work cut out for them. Using the threat of force the team established basing for U.S. forces and agencies at Port-au-Prince Airport and Cap-Haitien. These key points allowed not only US forces to flow into Haiti but much needed civil relief and reconstruction equipment. Additionally this allowed the flow of commerce to resume demonstrating to the Haitian people the United States was interested in their wellbeing.⁵⁴

GEN Shelton understood the tactical center of gravity for Cedras was his heavy weapons company. The only mechanized force available to General Cedras, it provided mobility and firepower greater than the mostly light American forces initially had at their disposal. General Cedras, had he decided to resist, could have greatly hampered landing operations at the airports and major ports before being neutralized. Special operation forces quickly seized the camp and taking control of the most dangerous weapons available to the FAd'H.⁵⁵

⁵³Ballard, 114.

⁵⁴Ibid., 107-113.

⁵⁵Ibid.

Understanding the political situation in Haiti made Ambassador Swing and GEN Shelton intensely effective. While neither participated in the creation or training of CARICOM, both understood the importance of the mission being seen as an international effort. While miniscule in comparison to United States Force, CARICOM forces showcased the resolve of Caribbean nations to help protect their own affairs. Unlike Just Cause the United States also leveraged the Organization of American States to support intervention, alleviating fears of United States colonialism.⁵⁶ The CARICOM force immediately garnered international recognition of the mission and solidified support for the United Nations backed mission. The success of the CARICOM mission allowed GEN Shelton and Ambassador Swing to move forward with the endstate of installing the elected Haitian President Aristide and the transition of JTF to the United Nations Mission to Haiti (UNMIH).⁵⁷

USACOM's interagency working group was directly responsible for most of the interagency coordination for the operation. At the Joint Task Force level Department of Defense and interagency stove piping resulted while working in a compartmentalized top-secret environment for most of the planning process. Additionally the creation of OPLAN 2380 gave XVIII Airborne Corps planners much needed flexibility for coordinating interagency efforts. OPLAN 2380 was not compartmentalized like 2370, thus facilitating ease of coordination. XVIII Airborne Corps planners used OPLAN 2380 to fix and address issues that had gone unresolved in 2370.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., 107-117.

⁵⁸Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon C. Bonham, 12 October 1994, ed., Cynthia Hayden, *JTF 180 Uphold Democracy: Oral History Interviews* (Ft Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1996), 25.

The United Nations Chapter 7 authorization for the use of force in Haiti severely limited what actions the Joint Force could conduct. Title 10 U.S. Code additionally constrained what the Joint Force could do to assist the Haitian people other than providing security. The problem AMB Swing and GEN Shelton faced could not be overcome by security alone. The Haitian people lacked even the most basic necessities for survival. Realizing that no progress could be made in restoring the legislature or judicial and police reform, the JTF and embassy went to work. The first order of business to entice non-governmental organizations to expedite recovery operations would be the departure of general Cedras. GEN Shelton kept a tight rein on general Cedras and the FAh'D, conducting numerous raids on weapons caches and arresting known Cedras supporters in FRAPH. Immediately following the raids, Raymond Kelly, former New York City Police commissioner, arrived with the International Police Mission to begin training the Haitian police supported by Army Reservists because of the lack of available Department of Justice Agents. On 7 October, the Haitian parliament passed an amnesty bill allowing general Cedras to depart Haiti. Cedras' departure on 10 October 1994 cleared the way for the return of President Aristide. This action convinced the international community to lend support. Fifteen countries offered \$77 million in aid followed by the inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which offered over \$230 million together.⁵⁹

With the return of President Aristide, GEN Shelton took more of a military role while the Department of State led in Haiti by AMB Swing took the leading role. As more CARICOM troops and multinational forces under the United Nations arrived, the Joint Task Force continued to reduce capacity and transition responsibilities to international forces. Admiral Miller, USACOM commander travelled to Haiti on 24 October 1994 and ordered Task Force 180 to

⁵⁹Ballard, 119-125.

redeploy to the United States. TF 180 transitioned operational control to Task Force 190.⁶⁰ This marked the end of the predominantly U.S. lead security operations in Haiti. While TF 190 remained under operational control of the United States the mission was effectively becoming a diplomatic effort. The joint and interagency inroads made in Uphold Democracy would have a profound effect on how the United States would plan and execute later operations.

Analysis

Analysis of these cases will focus on an examination of the research question as to the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander (and staff) and the Ambassador (embassy) during conflict resolution. This will develop the primary focus on the relationship of the ambassador and the Joint Task Force Commander, if one existed and how it was shaped by strategic events. To understand how the relationship influenced conflict termination we must first understand what constitutes conflict termination.

Forms of Conflict Termination

To understand how the Joint Task Force Commander and the Department of State work together during conflict termination, we must first define what this term means to both communities. Academic literature uses the terms “war termination” and “conflict termination” interchangeably. War is the use of military force between two or more parties. Nations can have conflicts with each other that do not involve active, armed hostilities. Tariffs, recall of ambassadors, or enforcement of international sanctions are examples of nonviolent conflicts. To understand the role of the Joint Force Commanders and the Department of State in conflict termination we must first define what conflict termination means. There are numerous ideas

⁶⁰Ibid., 126-127.

concerning the definition of conflict termination. This work will examine the origins of conflict termination and focus on the ideas of war termination and conflict resolution.⁶¹

The 19th century Prussian General and war theorist Carl von Clausewitz discussed the importance of clear war conflict termination in his book *On War*. Clausewitz's experiences in the Napoleonic Wars led him to question the losses Prussia suffered to France. Clausewitz attempted to explain war through use of metaphor. Carl von Clausewitz pointed out the linkage between policy and strategy when he stated,

No one starts a war or rather; no one in his senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.⁶²

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.⁶³

Clausewitz defined war as “the act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”⁶⁴ He argued that the political ends determine both the military objective and the resources required. He stressed the point to achieve the objectives of a war the country's political and military leaders must focus on three factors: the system of opposition or the total capabilities of its military forces, economic means and popular support available and how long war is sustainable.⁶⁵ Clausewitz believed a nation needed to compel the enemy through coercion or persuasion into compliance. Eliminating an enemy's economic means of fighting allows nations to achieve success. While

⁶¹Michael I. Handel, *War Termination—A Critical Survey, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1978), 12.

⁶²Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 92.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 75.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 89.

Clausewitz advocates compulsion of one's enemies, he warns that no result in war is ever final.⁶⁶ Clausewitz's writings clearly emphasize the importance of war termination and conflict resolution even though he did not specifically use the term. Clausewitz's work set the base for future political theory on this subject.

Professor Fred Iklé is considered an authority in political theory as related to war termination. Professor Iklé was a former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration and influenced the Weinberger and Powell doctrines.⁶⁷ He wrote the first edition of his widely read book, *Every War Must End*, during the Vietnam War. The most recent revision was published after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.⁶⁸ His book stresses the difficulty of successful war termination and the implications for future conflicts. He claims the difficulty arises when governments allocate a disproportionate amount of time developing detailed plans for conduct of a military campaign, but insufficient time linking these means to the ends.⁶⁹ Iklé doubts the ability of politicians and soldiers to end the fighting they start without clear objectives. Iklé suggests that military and civilian leaders do not spend requisite time linking the utility of force to the political strategy they hope to achieve. Iklé says this complicates the ability of rational state actors to bring war to a successful conclusion.⁷⁰

Professor Iklé, like many writers in the field, advocates a whole-of-government approach to planning war termination or conflict resolution. Professor Iklé states that leaders must look beyond military means to the internal and external pressures of a nation and available external

⁶⁶Ibid., 75-89.

⁶⁷Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 22.

⁶⁸Lewis Sorely, *A Better War* (New York: Harcourt, 1999), XIII.

⁶⁹Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1.

⁷⁰Ibid., 106.

support systems.⁷¹ Roger Spiller's, another scholar who has written on ending wars, states "actions of war and the conclusions they produce cannot be separated from one another or indeed from the influences of the world beyond the battlefield."⁷² The solidifying point is the interrelationship of the people, the government, and the military required for successful planning for war termination or conflict resolution.

While considered an authority in international relations Professor Iklé's work is not all inclusive of the field. A glaring criticism of Inkle is that his latest version does not address or assist with the issue of insurgency.⁷³ Professor Iklé would likely cite the lack of a long-term plan as a cause of the insurgency. No major power has yet to enter a military conflict during the last century in which it has not had to fight at least a residual resistance force. While not necessarily an insurgency, it still must be accounted for in planning modern interventions.

Joint and Army doctrine are historical evolutions from past lessons. One lesson from numerous military studies and oral histories is that conflict termination planning, from the start, must be an interagency process not simply the Joint Task Force. The Clinton Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive of May 1997 that fell short in providing structure for clarity and unity of effort. The directive attempted to create linkages with the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and other appropriate members of the National Security Council to the Department of Defense during contingency planning.⁷⁴ A joint

⁷¹Ibid., 2.

⁷²Roger Spiller, *War Termination and American Practice*, War Termination Conference 2010: United States Military Academy (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 7-8.

⁷³Lawrence D. Freedman, "Every War Must End," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2005), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60681/lawrence-d-freedman/every-war-must-end>, (accessed 10 June 2013).

⁷⁴Presidential Decision Directives, National Security Council 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," White Paper (Washington, DC, May 1997).

planning group (JPG) consists of designated representatives of a joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander.¹ While an interagency JPG can produce guidance for an Ambassador and a GCC provides guidance for JTF, there is not a doctrinal construct linking the JTF and Ambassador for collaborative planning to develop objectives and a clear end state. It is clear that there is a missing link between military operational planning and the interagency process. Military war termination doctrine has improved, especially since Operation Enduring Freedom, but it is still lacking structure. Current joint publications address cooperation not process.

One of the key tenets Iklé exposes is planning for long-term success. Operations in Haiti were planned for the long-term with a follow-on United Nations mission and Caribbean Command initiative to continue after the JTF. Planning for operations in Iraq at the United States Central Command focused on a year timetable for conclusion. U.S Central Command focused on warfighting and not rebuilding upon the conclusion of hostilities or when the “fighting” stopped. The Bush Administration made it a stated goal to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The difference in planning for Haiti and Iraq being that Haiti addressed a long term plan for reinstating the legally elected government and supporting it following combat operations. The exact opposite applies for Iraq; the U.S. Central Command did little to address the election of a government to replace the regime or what that government might look like. The Department of Defense and Department of State knew what Haiti needed to look like following the intervention; neither organization could say the same for Iraq. Planning documents from November 2001 show

the Department of Defense planned to topple the Iraqi regime but gave little thought to what Iraq would look like after regime fell.⁷⁵

An extensive review of the national security interagency system from an international relations standpoint is The Project on National Security Reform report, *Forging a New Shield*. A directed review of the interagency system by the George W. Bush administration posits that the current system was designed to handle sequential cold war era challenges and is ill-suited for dealing with limited operations requiring the simultaneous integration of military and diplomatic resources.⁷⁶ The report illustrates the shortcomings of attempted integration of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. The report later asserts, “because of parochial departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system.”⁷⁷ Without the ability to synchronize efforts any attempt at creditable war termination or conflict resolution guidance is difficult at best.

The ambiguous nature of the political directive concerning democracy would later cause problems during Operation Promote Liberty and slow development of a new Panamanian government and defense force.

With the decision to execute, President Bush provided one clearly political objective among the four listed, reestablish democracy In Panama. The fact that democracy never was defined as an end-state objective and was understood implicitly and intuitively made it easy for diplomatic and military leaders to articulate the position that

⁷⁵Declassified document from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to U.S. Central Command, Commander Tommy Franks, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/> (22 September 2010).

⁷⁶Project on National Security Reform Report, “Forging a New Shield” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 26 November 2008), ii.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, vi.

responsibility for making Panama's democracy work rested only with the Panamanians and not with the U.S. Government.⁷⁸

The military or operational objectives were three-fold; neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces capabilities, rapid seizure of the Panama Canal and surrounding territory to prevent sabotage and protect civilians working there, and finally the detention of Manuel Noriega and release of American prisoners held in Panama.⁷⁹ From the case study it is arguable that the United States through its strategic policy created a situation in which only military force could end tensions. The sanctions against the regime hurt the Panamanian people but did little to influence Noriega. His ties to drugs and Cuba were not affected by Congressional actions. The decision not to allow the SOUTHCOM Commander along with the Ambassador to engage with Noriega cut off a possible conduit that could have been utilized to convince Noriega to flee Panama for a friendly country. Finally, the most damaging artifact of the entire case study was the conviction of a foreign head of state in federal court without the knowledge of the United States Attorney General, the Secretary of State, or the President. This forced the United States down a policy road that led to regime change. While other decisions could have possibly changed the outcome, the method by which the conflict was terminated was the most influential in terminating diplomatic efforts and proceeding with military operations.

Operation Uphold Democracy had two competing plans at the start of operations each with different criteria. Ironically a last minute deal brokered by former President Carter allowed for conflict resolution. The deal brokered redefined what military objectives would be. The objectives at the start of OPLAN 2370 included:

To neutralize the Haitian Armed Forces (Fad'H) and police; to protect U.S. citizens, third country nationals, designated Haitians' interests and property; to conduct a

⁷⁸Fischel, vii.

⁷⁹Antizzo, 50.

NEO (non-combatant evacuation operation) as required; to restore civil order; to establish essential services...and to set the conditions for the re-establishment of the legitimate government of Haiti.⁸⁰

The military also assisted with the reorganization of the Haitian Armed Forces and police, but were not the proponent for this portion of the operation.⁸¹ The Department of Justice originally agreed to the training mission though later the Department of Defense executed the mission. With the Carter plan U.S. forces now had to accomplish regime change with a standing regime and do so through cooperation and respect instead of through force of arms. General Shelton working with AMB Swing was able to leverage the FAh'D to keep order during the transition to the Aristide government.

The history of each case indicates varying levels of integration of different Joint Task Force commanders and the ambassadors involved in war termination. In Haiti there was an Ambassador in country to integrate with after the initial intervention. Following the initial intervention both cases illuminate the military integrated with the Department of State with varying degrees of success. Complications arose as the planning conducted between government agencies in Washington and with the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) was stove piped respectively to the Ambassador and the Joint Task Force. Neither organization at the operational level conducted prior coordination with specialists from the government agencies that did the planning, or each other. Operation Uphold Democracy was little better. The interagency working group never disseminated products to the Joint Task Force Commander and the JTF was not allowed to share the Top Secret documents of OPLAN 2370 with the U.S. embassy planners in Haiti. Uphold Democracy was different because of OPLAN 2380; allowed the planners at the JTF to begin working with government organizations outside of their compartments. As noted

⁸⁰Bonham, interview.

⁸¹Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 48.

previously, XVIII Airborne Corps planners took advantage of the Secret level classification to conduct coordination with interagency elements to address shortfalls identified in OPLAN 2370 that had not been corrected due to the compartmentalized nature of the plan. The final element of Uphold Democracy that makes it stand out as a success is the personality of the JTF Commander.

General Shelton was able to radically change his plan on short notice. To do this he co-opted the support of AMB Swing. Respecting the rank afforded to an ambassador, General Shelton worked in the background to support the Ambassador, yet never let General Cedras forget that he was no longer in charge. General Shelton's leadership created an integrated team between the United States embassy in Haiti and the Joint Task Force.

War Termination Versus Conflict Resolution

The lack of diplomatic pressure would not plague the Reagan administration after Grenada. In Panama the administration heeded the request of the SOUTHCOM commander and the ambassador not to take action but blunted the approach with the same failed diplomatic policies applied in the Grenada.

GEN Woerner and Ambassador Davis spent two years advocating with first the Reagan then Bush administrations to apply gradual pressure (military and economic) to the Noriega regime while maintaining diplomatic and military dialogues. The policy requests advocated by the ambassador and General Woerner appeared to fall flat. General Thurman would later posit that General Woerner lacked the political and military support in Washington to advance his recommendations. General Thurman was a known commodity in the Pentagon and in government. He also understood that the policy makers were finished with diplomacy. His focus was solely on military operations and immediate transition to the new Panamanian government.

Uphold Democracy was a successful conflict resolution from General Cedras to President Aristide. Negotiated in the eleventh hour, the settlement set the stage for a peaceful transition of power in Haiti. Unlike Panama, national institutions continued to function and there was minimal

disruption to essential services and the existing security apparatus. The combined team of GEN Shelton and AMB Swing were able to leverage General Cedras' government to retain control of security forces and maintain government services during the transition to the Aristide government. Unlike Panama the United Nations would be responsible for reconstruction and training following the transition. The United States entered the conflict with a limited role and quickly built capacity with multinational partners to set conditions for success without extended United States involvement.

Achieving conflict resolution rather than war termination created a unique set of circumstances in Haiti as compared to Panama. Once the mission transitioned to threatening the use of force, instead of actual combat, the context of the situation changed. Instead of destroying security forces and key infrastructure in a forced entry operations, Haiti saw a peaceful entry of U.N. forces lead by an American JTF. While security still required significant troop strength the narrative of the operation changed from forcible removal of a regime to a focus on setting conditions for a peaceful transition to the new government. Key to the entire operation was GEN Shelton's leadership. From the beginning of operations, he recognized the need for a shift from a military lead to a Department of State lead. GEN Shelton deferring to AMB Swing, preferred to set conditions for success from behind the scenes. This leadership was instrumental in achieving conflict resolution by shifting the paradigm from war termination to conflict resolution through diplomacy.

Differing Results: Conflict Resolution and War Termination

The primary difference in conflict resolution versus war termination can be simply summarized by the question; "how much stuff do we have to break?" The occasions in which the United States conducted regime change and elected to take a military approach largely ignoring diplomacy led to costly and often unsynchronized operations. As pointed out earlier in this work by Ikle, military planners tend to concentrate on winning the battles and not what the result will

look like long term. Operation Just Cause in Panama differed from Haiti in that in the latter we transitioned to organizations that are better suited for building civil institutions. The United Nations and the nations of CARICOM provided entities to do the rebuilding. Unlike Just Cause, but like Urgent Fury, the security infrastructure remained largely intact and unaffected by the intervention. Dismantling the existing security structure created numerous problems for Panama and eventually replayed itself in Iraq.

The Department of State is structured to support both war termination and conflict resolution through a variety of means. According to the United Nations Charter the only legal justification for military action is a United Nations Security Council mandate (Chapter 7) or actions to protect a nation(s) from an eminent threat, empowering defensive alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. has ambassadors at both the United Nations and the NATO that answer to the Secretary of State. Nonetheless, when these organizations decide to act, the Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, work together to build consensus. Often nations in NATO and the United Nations do not have the capacity to support operations without support from other members. CARICOM forces participating in Haiti underwent training provided by the Department of Defense. The Department of State set conditions through diplomatic engagement to secure the support of other nations while the Department of Defense ensured they would be equipped and ready to support the mission.

What Was The Relationship: General to Ambassador

The Department of State, specifically an in-country embassy, had no direct linkage to a standing Joint Task force. American ambassadors have no authority over a JTF preparing to conduct operations within their respective mission country. The Department of State operates on a miniscule budget compared to the Department of Defense, limiting options for creating and utilizing ad hoc organizations during a crisis. The responsibility fell to the Joint Task Force to

establish systems that facilitate integration within planning efforts once the Joint Task Force receives the directive to beginning planning a contingency operation. While there are elements with DoS experience in the GCC their role is limited.

Blind Logic's weakness was that it failed to address the idea of democracy to the Panamanian people. President Guillermo Indira observed that the United States “didn't have a specific plan to help us in establishing democracy . . .”⁸² The real question is why was the Department of Defense the lead in what should have been a Department of State affair? Moreover failure to integrate the State Department with the JTF staff is more of a resource constraint than an actual failure by DoS to integrate appropriate expertise to achieve stated ends. As policy is created by the Executive branch and passed to the Department of State for implementation, diplomatic efforts are often seen as a continuation of executive politics. This highlights the need for an interface between the Joint Task Force and the in country team for parallel planning and unity of effort. Without this interface, the JTF Commander and Ambassador are unable to integrate and synchronize Department of Defense and other government agency efforts.

During Uphold Democracy, GEN Shelton drew upon a common North Carolina upbringing with Ambassador Bill Swing to foster cooperation. Shelton in his memoirs described assuring the Chief of Mission; “if the JTF does something he does not approve of the JTF would cease immediately and sit down with the embassy to figure out a solution.”⁸³ GEN Shelton explained his role to the Ambassador as a facilitator and included him in every meeting and immediately assigned a liaison officer to Ambassador Swing. GEN Shelton set the tone in many of the dealings with Cedras, allowing Ambassador Swing to take the lead and only intervening

⁸²Fishel, vii.

⁸³General Hugh Shelton (Ret), *Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior* (New York: St. Martin's Griffen), 244.

when Cedras or his cronies did not heed the Ambassador's request. GEN Shelton was able to see past the military objectives to understand the political ends. GEN Shelton provided the means and ensured he built an interagency team once afforded the opportunity.⁸⁴

As was the case in Just Cause, the compartmentalized nature of OPLAN 2370 hindered interagency synchronization. But the Joint Staff directive to create OPLAN 2380 with a lower classification level facilitated the interagency coordination that OPLAN 2370 lacked.⁸⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The Operation in Haiti is an example of international institutions working to achieve clear termination criteria, which are necessary to ensure successful war termination or conflict resolution. Though vastly different in scope, duration, and international support Operations Just Cause and Uphold Democracy highlight the best and worst examples of United States military intervention. The drastically different cases highlight the differences in the types of conflict termination and the stark differences in the relationship of the Joint Task Force Commander and the in country ambassador. Numerous aspects about collaborative planning and integration of the Department of State and Department of Defense could improve, but the focus of the conclusions and recommendations will be on Department of Defense led initiatives.

Each geographical combatant command (GCC) had a Department of State representative for planning, but they are only one voice in a Department of Defense strategic organization. They have no formal authority with an Ambassador or other Department of State elements, nor can they approve support from the Department of State regarding specific plans or operations. In effect they serve only an advisory role to the geographic combatant commands.

⁸⁴Ibid., 244-250.

⁸⁵Bonham, interview.

In the case of Just Cause unity of effort was achieved in the Department of Defense, the same cannot be said of the other government agency plans for Just Cause. Rather, unity of effort within the interagency arena was ragged at best. Foremost among the reasons was that throughout the planning process, none of the agencies that would have to participate in the restoration of Panama were involved in the development of Blind Logic. It was classified, compartmentalized, and held almost exclusively within DoD channels.⁸⁶ The issue with Just Cause stemmed from a narrow focus on tactical operations with little thought to what would follow cessation of hostilities. Part of the problem stemmed from the recall of the United States Ambassador prior to hostilities. While the ambassador was out of country the deputy chief of mission integrated with the GCC, helping set the stage for restoration of the democratically elected government. There is little evidence to support the view that GEN Thurman was as concerned with what the Jus Post Bellum would look like as he was a rapid military victory. While this was not the case during the initial planning for Just Cause, the transition of commanders caused a shift to a more tactical and less diplomatic focus. This was exacerbated by the recall of the Panamanian Ambassador prior to the start of hostilities.

Recommendations

This work focuses on both the Department of State and the Department of Defense, but the resulting recommendations will focus on how the Department of Defense might remedy the issues. While there are numerous solutions to the issues identified, it is not helpful to address those outside the control of the Department of Defense. Two types of solutions address the prevalent problems identified in this work. The recommendations of this work focus on solutions

⁸⁶Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, viii.

that address issues through structural changes in Department of Defense constructs and the selection of commanders.

Structural solutions identified stem from the inability of the Joint Task Force to coordinate and plan with the in country mission. This often is indicative of stovepipe lines of communication from Washington to separate stakeholders and further complicated by differing levels of classification at each echelon during planning. This could be remedied in several lateral-staffing initiatives.

A possible solution is the creation of a permanent position on the Corps staff (civilian) to correlate with the Department of State and facilitate planning and transition. The position, while funded by the Department of Defense, would require the holder to have previous experience with the Department of State. Success would be contingent on acceptance of this plan by the Secretary of State. This would give the JTF Commander a link to the Department of State with the bona fides to act as a link to the in country team and the Department of State in Washington.

Another option creates a team within DoD that can immediately deploy with digital and video connectivity capabilities that would allow the Joint Task Force staff to integrate and communicate with the in country embassy or to wherever the next ambassador is located. While embassies maintain a secure communications facility this package would allow an expanded capability solely for planning. This could assist with collaborative planning and allow expanded communication between the JTF Commander and the country team. An issue with this is the structural requirements for establishing a sensitive compartmentalized information facility. The differing requirements for Department of Defense and Department of State would have to be reconciled. This option alone does not provide a direct linkage for planning; it only facilitates a communications capability. Currently there is no record of such a DoD capability.

The previous options address understanding and communications capability, but not integrated planning. The final recommendation, a permanent Department of Defense element

embedded with the Department of State, is key to collaborative planning. Expanding the current DoD presence to include a significant planning capacity that can deploy with DoS assets could provide this. This would not replace the existing military personnel in the embassy. Personnel assigned from DoD would work in Washington D.C. for the State Department and deploy to augment the embassy in the event of a crisis. This common link would have the benefit of working within both organizations and could facilitate collaborative planning. The ability to translate from one lexicon to another would be invaluable. The previous recommendation concerning a communications capability combined with this option could be the bridge to the planning gap illustrated in this work. This combined with the second aspect of the recommendations, military leadership, provides a glimpse of what collaborative well-commanded missions could look like in the future.

The different commanders in each of the case studies contributed to success in differing ways. In Panama, specifically the change in commanders at CINCSOUTH and the transition from ARSOUTH as the Joint Task Force lead to XVIII Airborne Corps, created a vacuum with regard to the situational understanding of the dynamics in Panama. The transition of commanders at SOUTHCOM, while politically motivated, stemmed from a leader that lacked experience in Washington and with the Joint Staff. His replacement, GEN Thurman, while well-known and integrated in Washington, lacked the two years of operational and cultural knowledge acquired by GEN Woerner. Thus GEN Woerner could not gain traction in Washington leaving him unable to influence policy decisions. Conversely GEN Thurman, while politically entrenched with decision makers in Washington, lacked the operational insight and a nuanced understanding of the situation in Panama. A blending of both leaders might have led to conflict resolution rather than war termination.

Operations in Haiti followed quite the different course from Panama. While the situation in Haiti continued to evolve prior to the JTF arrival there, the commander, GEN Shelton, perhaps

blended the best of both worlds described above. The JTF already had planned for conflict termination or war termination, but what they did was more a hybrid of the former. The Carter agreement required reframing to understand the problem facing the JTF. The agility of GEN Shelton set the conditions for successful operations in Haiti. The ability of the commander and his staff to reframe the problem once the paradigm of the mission had changed facilitated agility on the part of the JTF and the Ambassador. While critics would argue conflict termination is less complicated than war termination, the evidence in the case of Haiti supports the assertion that the commander's vision set the conditions for either form of conflict termination.

The evidence in the case studies supports the assertion that collaborative planning and leader interaction between the Department of Defense and the Department of State affect conflict termination. The agility and vision of the JTF commander and GCC commander influence how limited operations conducted for regime change are concluded. While the recommendations for collaborative planning may influence future operations the importance of selecting the right leaders is essential to the success of military operations.

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