INFORMATION AS POWER

AN ANTHOLOGY OF SELECTED UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENT PAPERS

VOLUME 1

Edited by
Dennis M. Murphy, Jeffrey L. Groh, David J. Smith and Cynthia E. Ayers

INFORMATION IN WARFARE GROUP, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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Preface

The Information in Warfare Working Group (I2WG) of the United States Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2006 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information in Warfare. The charter of the working group calls for it to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into the curriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. This publication is an important component of that effort.

Interestingly, one needs to go back to the Reagan administration to find the most succinct and pointed mention of information as an element of power in formal government documents. Subsequent national security documents allude to different aspects of information but without a specific strategy or definition. Still, it is generally accepted in the United States government today that information is an element of national power along with diplomatic, military and economic power...and that information is woven through the other elements since their activities will have an informational impact. Given this dearth of official documentation, Drs. Dan Kuehl and Bob Nielson proffered the following definition of the information element: “Use of information content and technology as strategic instruments to shape fundamental political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior of governments, supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security.” Information as power is wielded in a complex environment consisting of the physical, information, and cognitive domain.

Increasingly, however, the United States finds itself falling behind in its ability to wield the information element of power. And, while it certainly is a military “superpower” one has to question whether the United States maintains that same status with regard to information.
The current information environment has leveled the playing field for not only nation states, but non-state actors, multinational corporations and even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimal information infrastructure and little capital expenditure. Anyone with a camera cell phone and personal digital device with internet capability understands this. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed his frustration with this environment recently: “If I were grading, I would say we probably deserve a D or a D-plus as a country as to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place in the world today. And I’m not going to suggest that it’s easy, but we have not found the formula as a country.”

On the other hand, the United States military has increasingly leveraged advances in information infrastructure and technology to gain advantages on the modern battlefield. One example from Operation Iraqi Freedom is the significant increase in situational awareness from network centric operations that enabled the military to swiftly defeat Iraqi forces in major combat operations.

Clearly, managing the “message” while controlling the necessary technological “means” represent critical challenges in today’s information environment. We hope that this anthology will serve not only to showcase the efforts of the College but to inform the broader body of knowledge as the Nation struggles to operate effectively within this environment and to counter an adversary who so effectively exploits it.

This publication was made possible through the outstanding efforts of several people outside of the editors and authors. The editors wish to extend special thanks to Jim White for his tireless, professional efforts in compiling and reviewing the manuscript for the anthology. Also, thanks to him and Gretchen Smith for their collaborative efforts on the design of the cover. And, as always, thanks to Ritchie Dion for his exacting layout editing that goes well beyond the requirements for excellence.

Professor Dennis M. Murphy
Chair, Information in Warfare Working Group
United States Army War College
Section One

Strategic Communication: Wielding the Information Element of Power
INTRODUCTION

Dennis M. Murphy
Professor of Information in Warfare
Center for Strategic Leadership
U.S. Army War College

Strategic Communication has no overarching United States government definition…and no single governmental agency to provide oversight, direction, programs and resources. In fact there is no national communication strategy. But it is clear that effectively communicating the values and policies of the United States to the world, while increasingly important, is also increasingly difficult in today’s global information environment. That environment enables non-traditional players who often use cheap, ubiquitous communications means to transmit their messages with immediacy and with world-wide coverage and impact. These actors, often uninhibited by the need to be truthful, are also devoid of a bureaucracy that demands clearance and approval of public statements. And so, the United States finds itself responding to adversaries’ messages rather than proactively and effectively telling our own story. This while recognizing (according to the September 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism) that we are currently conducting a “battle of arms and a battle of ideas” that is a long term effort.

The student papers in this section examine these challenges and dilemmas and recommend strategies, organizations and processes that are necessary to win this battle of ideas.

In the first paper, Colonel Jill Ludowese reviews past government initiatives to integrate strategic communication and analyzes which government agency would be best suited to craft our national communication strategy and lead the strategic communication interagency effort.

The second paper, written by Colonel Richard Leap, looks more specifically at the distinct functions generally considered to make
up strategic communication, i.e. public diplomacy, public affairs and military information operations and, based on that analysis, recommends improvements to U.S. strategic communication.

Lieutenant Colonel Greg Julian writes an interesting concept paper that provides the outline of a national communication strategy in the third essay. While a short piece, it lists the essential goals and objectives that can serve as a model to drive U.S. government strategic communication efforts.

Finally, Colonel Dan Baggio provides a first-hand account of his experience as a senior public affairs officer during the period leading up to and during the first Iraqi national election. Embedded in this interesting Personal Experience Monograph (PEM) are significant lessons learned on how to deal with the media to most effectively tell a good news story. The PEM is an opportunity for USAWC students to reflect upon their professional experiences and aspirations, and to record those experiences in written form and to do so with a focused sensitivity to strategic considerations. In that light, Colonel Baggio’s personal experience, while different from the pure academic research of the other papers in this section, merits consideration.

These papers are insightful and address significant issues confronting our government and military...issues that are essential to winning the Global War on Terrorism. They add to the greater body of knowledge in a way that can hopefully influence decision makers to more effectively wield the information element of power in the future to the benefit of our Nation.
Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas?

Colonel Jeryl C. Ludowese  
United States Army

If the War on Terrorism is a struggle of ideas, then strategic communication is an area where we must excel. Our National Security Strategy of 2002 calls for the transformation of security institutions, to include public information efforts designed to help people around the world learn about and understand America.¹ Yet, more than three years later, little has been accomplished to build a comprehensive strategy designed to influence international audiences.

The United States has a serious image problem. World opinion, especially in the volatile Middle East, has deteriorated significantly. A groundbreaking 2002 Zogby poll queried 3,800 adults in eight Arab countries asking, among other things, their overall favorable impression of 13 countries throughout the world. Only France had consistently net positive ratings; Israel received the lowest favorability scores. But the United States was right behind Israel, in all countries polled except Kuwait.² According to a 2003 Council on Foreign Relations study, many around the world see the United States as “arrogant, hypocritical, self-absorbed, self-indulgent, and contemptuous of others.”³ The study goes on to relate that we should care whether or not we’re well-liked:

Anti-Americanism is endangering our national security and compromising the effectiveness of our diplomacy. Not only is the United States at risk of direct attack from those who hate it most, but it is also becoming more difficult for America to realize its long-term aspirations as it loses friends and influence. By standing so powerful and alone, the United States becomes a lightning rod for the world’s fears and resentment of modernity, inequality, secularism, and globalization….Washington needs to focus on traditional state-to-state diplomacy, but it must also create a strong and robust public diplomacy – one able to win hearts and minds and show people that the United States can once again be trusted and admired.⁴
The President elected to solve our image problem by designating the Department of State to lead the interagency effort to reinvigorate strategic communication. In March 2005, he nominated his close advisor, Karen Hughes, to serve as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Her appointment was expected to generate new momentum for strategic communication efforts, ensuring not only the ear of the President, but also key national security leaders throughout the administration. Upon assuming her Ambassadorial duties in September 2005, Hughes announced that she had been given responsibility under Presidential direction to lead the interagency process bringing together senior-level policy and communications officials from different agencies to develop a government-wide communications strategy to promote freedom and democracy, to win the war of ideas, and to set in place the communications strategic plans for the Administration. It was widely hoped that her leadership and influence would bring together the government’s fragmented approach to strategic communication that had thus far failed to produce a long-term communication strategy, or associated interagency planning, prioritization and execution effort.

Selecting Hughes to lead the strategic communication interagency effort was widely applauded. As Counselor to the President for the first 18 months of the Bush administration, she led the communications effort in the first year of the war on terror, and managed the White House Offices of Communications, Media Affairs, Speechwriting and Press Secretary. But the larger question looms: is the State Department the right government agency to develop our national communications strategy and lead the interagency to effectively communicate our national interests and policies abroad? There are other options. The President could direct the National Security Council (NSC) of the Department of Defense to oversee the effort. Or, he could work with Congress to create a new Executive agency to lead strategic communication initiatives to repair America’s image problem as part of our grand strategy.

I contend that a new executive agency is needed to transform our communication capabilities. In this paper I will define strategic communication and review past government initiatives to integrate
its core components. I will support my argument by outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the four options, and conclude with an analysis that will demonstrate why a new Executive agency would be best suited to craft our national communication strategy and lead the strategic communication interagency effort.

Defining Strategic Communication

The term “strategic communication” is used by the NSC, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense to address a number of disciplines that impart messages on a strategic scale. Its use can be traced to the NSC’s Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Strategic Communication, established in 2002. The PCC’s charter directed the member agencies to develop and disseminate the President’s message around the world by coordinating support for international broadcasting, foreign information programs, and public diplomacy; and to promote and develop a strategic communications capability throughout the government.

Recent studies have used the terms “public diplomacy” and “strategic communication” interchangeably. In a National War College paper, Arnold Abraham, a former Defense Department staffer, defined strategic communication quite simply as “communications that have strategic impact – the art of choosing audiences, messages, and means at a level where it has direct strategic implications.” In his August 2005 paper, Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms, Bruce Gregory, Director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University, embraces both public diplomacy and strategic communication as “analogous terms that describe an instrument of statecraft with multiple components and purposes.” This “instrument of statecraft” embraces diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting, political communication, democracy building, and open military information operations.

Others have defined strategic communication more narrowly. In his book, Soft Power, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. defines three dimensions of public diplomacy: daily communication to explain the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions; development of strategic communication themes used to sell or “brand” a particular
Information as Power
government policy; and development of lasting relationships via exchanges, scholarships, and access to media communications. Nye finds that strategic communication is simply one element of public diplomacy.\textsuperscript{10}

The Defense Science Board (DSB), a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense, formed a Task Force to study strategic communication in 2004. Their report provided a comprehensive analysis of America’s ability to understand and influence global publics. The DSB described strategic communication as instruments governments use to “understand global audiences and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, advise policymakers, diplomats and military leaders on the public implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior through communication strategies.”\textsuperscript{11} The DSB suggests that strategic communication is comprised of four core instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations. The DSB describes the four core instruments:

- Public diplomacy seeks to build long-term relationships through the exchange of people and ideas, thereby increasing receptivity to a nation’s culture, values and policies. It doesn’t seek to directly influence foreign governments—that’s traditional diplomacy. Public diplomacy concentrates on reaching people, since few major strategies, policies, or diplomatic initiatives can succeed without public support. Its ultimate goal is to increase understanding of American policies, values and interests and to counter anti-American sentiment and misinformation about the United States around the world.\textsuperscript{12}

- Public affairs addresses communications activities designed to inform and influence U.S. media and the American people. The White House and the NSC have communications offices, as do most government departments and agencies. Military commands have long maintained public affairs staffs. They focus on domestic media, but in a world of global media outlets with global audiences, their messages reach allies and adversaries around the world.
Section One: Strategic Communication

International broadcasting services are funded by the government to transmit news, information and entertainment programs to global audiences using radio, satellite television, and web-based internet systems. American broadcasting services have a rich history – Voice of America and Radio Free Europe helped win the Cold War. Today’s Radio Sawa and Al Hurra Arabic language radio and television services are now making their mark in the Middle East.

Information operations is a term used by the Department of Defense to describe the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp an adversary’s information and information systems, while protecting our own. The military have long been practitioners of psychological operations which are “military activities that used selected information and indicators to influence the attitude and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military and national security objectives.”

Strategic communication, therefore, forwards integrated and coordinated themes and messages that advance our interests and policies through an interagency effort supported by public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting and military information operations in concert with the other instruments of national power.

Communicating Foreign Policy: How We’ve Shaped America’s Message

Before addressing how the United States might best structure government to communicate and advance our interests and policies abroad, it may be advantageous to look at how we’ve done so in the past, and review how our government has struggled to integrate strategic communication within the interagency since 9/11.

The modern practice of influencing public opinion about this country, its ideas and its global policy agenda originated in the Office of War Information (OWI), which existed from 1942 to 1945. Prior to
World War II, the United States was the only major power that did not have a strategy, with a supporting bureaucracy, for carrying out ideological programs beyond its borders. That changed after Pearl Harbor. The OWI had a public affairs component which generated media coverage for both domestic and overseas audiences on the progress of the war effort. It used the services of the Voice of America, the U.S. government-funded radio network. But the OWI information effort also had a covert side: propaganda operations that were directed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The OSS was responsible for activities such as clandestine radio stations broadcasting to Nazi Germany, spreading rumors about the enemy and planting newspaper stories. Wilson Dizard, Jr., a 28-year veteran of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and State Department relates:

During the war, the OWI was running the largest propaganda operation in the world...yet the whole operation closed down just two weeks after the war ended. Its tattered remains were relegated to the third level of the State Department while Congress and government officials debated whether we should be in the propaganda business at all. A few years later...Cold War developments convinced the Eisenhower White House that a new organization, separate from the State Department, was needed to deal with the Soviet ideological threat. The decision to create an independent agency was prompted in large part by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ belief that propaganda operations were not a proper diplomatic function—an attitude many Foreign Service officers would continue to hold long afterward.\(^{16}\)

Thus, in 1953, USIA was created to counter anti-American propaganda perpetrated by the Soviet Union, and coordinate the dissemination of information to foreign audiences.\(^ {17}\) Although it was initially established as a propaganda agency, it carefully avoided using the term “propaganda” to describe what it did because of negative connotations associated with the word in the United States.\(^ {18}\)

In the early years of the Cold War, this country debated whether the use of propaganda was warranted in a democracy. Although many saw the need to counter propaganda and dis-information emanating from behind the Iron Curtain, they were also concerned
that Americans could become the victims of our own propagandistic information program directed at foreign audiences. Propaganda was seen by many to be inconsistent with democracy. Intellectuals bemoaned it as dishonestly partisan, one-sided, and anti-democratic in its techniques and aims. But others, such as Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen, made a strong case for the use of propaganda. He wrote in 1949: “Propaganda on an immense scale is here to stay. We Americans must become informed and adept at its use, defensively and offensively, or we may find ourselves as archaic as the belted knight who refused to take gunpowder seriously 500 years ago.”

As Cold War tensions eased, America’s anti-propaganda tradition resurfaced, and a new term was used to describe the USIA mission: public diplomacy. It retained the propagandistic program elements for a time, but later shifted its focus to educational and cultural programs designed to create mutual understanding rather than unilateral persuasion. These programs included information activities (such as speakers programs and library resource centers) and educational and cultural exchanges (including the Fulbright scholar program, English language instruction, and American studies programs).

International broadcasting has its roots in the Foreign Information Service, which was initiated in 1942 to counter propaganda emanating from Nazi Germany during World War II. In 1943, it was delivering the news in 27 languages over 23 radio transmitters. Known later as Voice of America (VOA), our international broadcasting efforts grew into a network of 22 stations and 900 affiliates, reaching an estimated audience of 91 million people in 53 languages. VOA was folded into USIA in 1978. Over the years, other radio and television projects were added to the international broadcasting plate: private networks Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; satellite television service WORLDNET; and Cuba-targeted Radio Marti. The International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated the various USIA broadcasting programs under a bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), comprised of eight members from mass communications and foreign affairs.

Throughout the Cold War, public diplomacy initiatives and international broadcasting helped contain and defeat communism,
promote democracy, explain American foreign policy, and expose foreign audiences around the world to American values. The USIA purpose merged countering negative propaganda with “presenting a favorable image of the United States.” We were cultivating what Joseph Nye calls “soft power” – obtaining our goals by attracting others to our culture, policies and political ideals, rather than coercing or buying them.

But after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Congress began looking for peace dividends. In the mid-1990s, with the Cold War won and no powerful adversary to counter, Congress slashed USIA budgets. For example, resources for Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, were cut in half. Academic and cultural exchanges fell from 45,000 to 29,000 annually between 1995 and 2001. Nye reflects,

*Between 1989 and 1999, the budget of USIA, adjusted for inflation, decreased 10 percent. While government-funded radio broadcasts reached half the Soviet population every week and between 70 and 80 percent of the populace of Eastern Europe during the Cold War, at the beginning of the new century, a mere 2 percent of Arabs heard the VOA.*

In 1998, Congress chose to reduce foreign operating expenses and consolidate operations. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act merged the USIA into the Department of State as part of the project to reinvent government. The Act also cut loose the BBG, making foreign broadcasting an independent government entity once more. But the USIA/Department of State merger was fraught with problems. The programs, products and personnel of the USIA, already seriously weakened by neglect in the decade following the end of the Cold War, were diminished in the reorganization. A once formidable communications agency was reduced to “a shadow on the periphery of foreign policy.”

Unfortunately, few noticed during the 1990s’ information revolution that our ability to influence audiences and shape public opinion abroad was diminishing. It became painfully clear to Americans after September 11, 2001. Although strategic communication had a high priority in the months immediately following 9/11, it was evident that the fragmented public diplomacy/public affairs entity in
the State Department was not up to the task of coordinating a strategic communication effort that required a sophisticated method to map perceptions, identify policy priorities, determine objectives, develop themes and messages, use relevant media channels, and monitor success.\textsuperscript{27} What followed was a flurry of sometimes uncoordinated interagency activities designed to fill the void.

First were the tactically-oriented Coalition Information Centers (CICs) that deployed language-qualified public affairs experts to respond to breaking news, Al-Qaeda and Taliban claims, and regional events. The CICs were a temporary fix; they were followed by the White House Office of Global Communication, established by Executive Order on 21 January 2003. It was charged with advising the President and heads of the Executive Departments/Agencies on the “utilization of the most effective means for the United States Government to ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.” Part of its charter was to develop a strategic communication strategy.\textsuperscript{28} It never did; the office closed in 2005.

In September 2002, the National Security Advisor (NSA), Condoleeza Rice, established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) designed to “coordinate interagency activity, to ensure that all agencies work together and with the White House to develop and disseminate the President’s message across the globe.” The PCC was charged with developing strategic communications capabilities throughout government. Co-chaired by the Department of State and the NSC, it met few times with limited impact.\textsuperscript{29}

Simultaneously, the Department of Defense was working on its own strategic communication effort. The Defense Department had long been using its information operations organizations (to include military deception and psychological operations) to achieve effects-based outcomes on the battlefield, and a robust public affairs apparatus to inform American and world audiences about military operations around the world. In October 2001, the Department created the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to serve as the focal point for a “strategic communication campaign in support of the
war on terrorism.” It was to “develop a full spectrum influence strategy that would result in greater foreign support of U.S. goals and repudiation of terrorists and their methods.”

The Office gained negative press scrutiny when Defense Public Affairs officials worried that OSI would undermine their credibility by placing lies and disinformation in foreign media as part of information warfare operations that would ultimately be picked up by the American press. Amid the controversy, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld closed the OSI in February 2002.

Many Initiatives – Little Progress

Several government agencies and think tanks have conducted studies over the past three years about how to repair America’s “image problem” in the world. Each advocated various methods to consolidate and lead the interagency effort to transform public diplomacy/strategic communication. Three solutions recommended in these studies to lead the strategic communication effort include: leaving the Department of State in charge, but with significant changes to its public diplomacy structure; establishing a permanent strategic communication structure within the NSC to oversee the interagency effort; or designate a public diplomacy advisor with a dedicated Secretariat.

Another option is to designate the Department of Defense as lead agency, re-establishing the mission given to the War Department during World War II.

There is one consensus: the way we’ve been doing business since the demise of the USIA has not promoted a long-term communication strategy, or an associated interagency planning, prioritization and execution effort. Why have we made so little progress? Experts point to lack of sustained direction and leadership; failure to integrate the “message” into policy formulation; a stove-piped interagency that is not organized to compete with an agile, adaptive combative enemy propaganda effort; and firewalls that preclude the integration of “elements of influence” when communicating with the media serving domestic and international audiences. These factors should be addressed when analyzing which government agency is best suited to lead the strategic communication effort. Is the leader positioned to influence policy? Is the organization structured, staffed,
focused and flexible enough to lead (not just coordinate) interagency efforts? And, is the organization able to overcome cultural firewalls separating “information” and “propaganda” designed to protect organizational credibility?

The Independent Agency Option

One course of action is to establish a stand-alone, independent executive agency to develop the national communications strategy and focus government agencies to effectively wield the information element of power. Proponents of this option contend that the “War of Ideas” cannot be won by seduction, it must be won by persuasion, and that the U.S. has “unilaterally disarmed” itself of the “weapons of ideological warfare.” To win the “War of Ideas” we must have an agency that is devoted to it.\textsuperscript{38}

Re-establishing a stand-alone agency, or a “Director of Central Information,”\textsuperscript{39} to lead the U.S. strategic communication effort would bring about singleness of purpose and focus that could not be achieved in other government agencies. Communications experts would not be relegated to third-tier positions in a bureaucracy that does not understand or appreciate the mission; Congressional funds would not be diverted to other department priorities. With its targeted focus, it would not suffer from the internal cultural firewalls that plague organizations with a broader mandate–like attempts to separate “propaganda” from “diplomacy” in the State Department, and “psychological operations” and “public information” in the Department of Defense. It could be structured to counter propaganda and dis-information with speed and agility.

Conversely, if the past is any indication, a separate agency would have difficulty trying to establish itself as a strong influence in the formation of key foreign policy decisions. With the exception of Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan, who forged close relationships with their information agency directors, our chief executives rarely brought key USIA leaders to the NSC table to develop communications strategies in making and implementing foreign policy. Edward R. Murrow, USIA Director during the Kennedy administration, was continually frustrated when he was called in to “clean up” a foreign policy debacle that could have been avoided
if public diplomacy experts had been involved in the policy’s formulation. He advocated that USIA leaders be there at the “take-off,” rather than the occasional “crash landing.”

Over the years, the USIA demonstrated that it was not adept at developing communications strategies or coordinating interagency activities at the strategic level, despite its statutory advisory responsibilities to do so. Part of the problem may have been reluctance by other government agencies to support an organization that seemed to be working at cross purposes. Traditional diplomats, famous for engaging in negotiations behind closed doors, saw public diplomacy’s open communication with mass audiences as having the potential to derail and disrupt sensitive negotiations by exposing them to public scrutiny and complicating their chances of success. And, although the military recognized the importance of influencing foreign populations to support national objectives, they had reservations about propaganda produced by a civilian organization that was not directly linked to the battlefield.

The NSC Option

The DSB recommended that the NSC take the lead as strategic communication integrator by creating a new position for a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication, who would chair a Strategic Communication Committee on the NSC “with authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of the departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to a new Center for Strategic Communication.”

There are benefits to expanding the role (and staff) of the NSC to lead the interagency strategic communication effort. It would get strategic communication into the heart of the national security policy formulation process with an organization that “thinks” in interagency terms that can serve as an “honest broker” when dealing with interagency rivalries. As the entity that creates the National Security Strategy, crafting the National Communications Strategy based on the President’s stated policies would not be much of a stretch. And,
the NSC’s close working relationship with the President provides its staff more influence with other governmental agencies, beyond that of a single agency such as the Department of State.

Conversely, using the NSC to formulate, synchronize and implement strategic communication policy would subject the effort to personnel turnover every four to eight years since the organization, with its large percentage of Presidential appointees, is susceptible to election cycles. These appointees may not have the longevity needed to provide long-term continuity to win the “War of Ideas.” It’s hard to “stay the course” when key leaders with depth and breadth of experience depart with the President. Additionally, the NSC has traditionally possessed weak tasking authority. “Operationalizing” the NSC, making it responsible for implementing rather than simply synchronizing or coordinating government policy, also goes against the preferences of some Presidents and their National Security Advisors. And, the organization’s close ties to the administration and lack of Congressional oversight (Congress does not approve the President’s NSC appointments) brings up a potential problem: the NSC’s strategic communication staff may be seen as taking a propagandistic, party-line policy advocacy approach to influencing international audiences instead of engaging, informing and persuading them to favorably view U.S. policies based on their merits. Being “too close” to the chief policymaker may dilute message credibility and effectiveness.

The Department of State Option

If one of the primary focuses of strategic communication is to explain our foreign policy and influence foreign publics, then aligning the strategic communication effort under this Cabinet Department puts the foreign policymakers and the foreign policy communicators in the same building. Unfortunately, the past tells us that proximity does not equate to working together effectively. The way the USIA and State merged has been a major factor in the Department of State’s fractured approach to integrating public diplomacy since 1999. A 2005 Heritage Foundation Report authored by Stephen Johnson, Helle C. Dale and Patrick Cronin, states:
Although it made economic sense, the merger created disarray. Negotiators unfamiliar with the USIA’s mission carved up the agency and placed regional divisions under the authority of the State Department’s geographic bureaus and buried support functions within the State Department’s functional divisions without regard for outcome. USIA’s public opinion research office was placed inside the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), outside the hierarchy of communications professionals who need its analysis the most. Most of all, USIA’s proactive communicators and creative personnel were dropped haphazardly into a bureaucracy that values secrecy and a deliberative clearance process….its independent culture clashed with the consensus-driven State Department. Without leadership that understood how to integrate public diplomacy into department operations, PD/PA [public diplomacy/public affairs] officers were left out of senior policy meetings in both regional and functional bureaus.45

Placing the strategic communication effort in the hands of the Department of State has its pros and cons. As stated, foreign policymakers and key communications practitioners are co-located. A trained cadre of USIA alumni, seasoned experts in shaping and communicating America’s foreign policy message with a long history of working closely with the Department of State in Embassies around the world, are already in residence there. Cabinet departments have more continuity than the NSC, and possess their own operating budgets, and contract authority. They are also less susceptible to the demand of election cycles.

The Department of State is well-positioned to harmonize the interagency effort, having worked closely with the other players that comprise the strategic communication team: the Department of Defense and the BBG. Embassy country teams have long included Department of Defense representatives; State’s political advisors have been providing in-residence advice to the Defense Department and regional combatant commanders for years. The Secretary of State also sits as an ex-officio member on the bi-partisan BBG, the independent federal agency responsible for all U.S. government and government sponsored (non-military) international broadcasting.

However, cabinet departments haven’t tended to think in interagency terms and often promote their own interests.46 Critics contend that the State Department is not suited to lead the interagency effort
because they advocate the more “soft sell” education and exchange programs designed to produce mutual understanding rather than an aggressive agenda of persuasion. And, using an Under Secretary of State to lead the overall strategic communication effort is not a plan earmarked for success in most administrations, since these officers rarely have direct communications with the President, are not a part of the policy formulation process outside the State Department, and do not wield sufficient influence over the other Cabinet departments. Take, for example Charlotte Beers and Margaret Tutwiler, who preceded Ambassador Hughes in the Under Secretary position. Neither had the ear of senior administration leaders, nor did they last long in the job. In fact, the office of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs went vacant or was filled in an acting capacity for nearly three years during the Bush administration between 2000 and 2005.

The Department of Defense Option

Although no major study advocated that the Department of Defense lead the strategic communication effort, it is a contender. With hundreds of thousands of troops based outside the United States, our military greatly influences how America is perceived by our allies and adversaries alike. A 2003 Council on Foreign Relations study reflects: “What the Pentagon says or what local commanders and units do has an enormous impact on the reaction of foreign publics, and hence foreign governments, to the United States.” Defense Department spokesman, Larry Di Rita, stated: “We have a unique challenge in this department, because four-star military officers are the face of the United States abroad in ways that are almost unprecedented since the end of World War II.” He added, “Communication is becoming a capability that combatant commanders have to factor in to the kinds of operations they are doing.”

Like the Roman pro-consuls of old, geographic combatant commanders wield enormous power with influence that transcends military matters and impacts all the instruments of national power. With its substantial budget and global presence, the Department of Defense is, arguably, the primary instrument of national power responsible for implementing foreign policy. The Pentagon has
a broad range of military-to-military exchanges, joint training and humanitarian assistance programs funded through combatant commander Theater Security and Cooperation programs. They constitute an aspect of “preventive defense” by developing contacts and relationships that help to shape the perceptions of foreign military officers to better understand American policies abroad.\textsuperscript{52}

In an August 2005 U.S. News and World Report article, Linda Robinson wrote: “Despite fears that the U.S. military is waging a duplicitous propaganda war, many military officials say that ‘information operations’ are inevitable dimensions of warfare and must play a role, along with State Department public diplomacy efforts.”\textsuperscript{53} Commanders in the field are more than aware that their campaigns are fought in front of local, national and international audiences. The actions of soldiers on the ground can create immediate strategic impact – such as the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal – with wide-ranging consequences.

Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq, related that shaping the message and tying it to operations is critical. “Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the Iraqi culture and psyche is a foremost planning consideration for every operation.” He added that information operations rose to a level of importance never before thought necessary. For example, unless coalition-initiated aid projects were immediately publicized, insurgents would claim credit for the results as if they were responsible for the improvements.\textsuperscript{54}

The Defense Department’s commitment to make Information Operations (IO) a core military competency is moving the services to create a trained and educated career workforce capable of providing combatant commanders with planners and specialists trained to execute information operations. Joint Forces Command is revising IO doctrine. The Joint Forces Staff College is standardizing a joint IO curriculum for field grade and general/flag officers. A Department of Defense Center of Excellence is working with the private sector to create technologies and techniques to help the military “absorb ideas that will help the military improve information capabilities.”\textsuperscript{55}
In early 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced that the Defense Department would launch eight follow-on assessments of issues raised during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). One of the QDR Execution Roadmap panels will study strategic communication in an effort to further define missions and develop doctrine for its public affairs, information operations and defense support to public diplomacy assets. Strategic communication, with its sub-component of information operations, is central to winning the “War of Ideas” and the Defense Department “gets it.” It’s pushing its doctrine, education system, training and exercises, and organizational structure to better prepare the force to execute.

With its large operating budget, robust planning capability, trained public affairs and information operations apparatuses, world-wide ties to influential leaders, and access to key American policy makers through national security channels, the Department of Defense is structured and well-positioned to lead the strategic communication interagency effort. But should it? The military could lose its credibility, and the respect and good will of both the American people and foreign audiences around the world, if it is seen to be a propaganda machine. Proponents of this argument point to what the American press called the “five o’clock follies” during the Viet Nam War, in reference to the military’s daily press briefings. Others argue that a strategic approach to communications that aligns public information with military objectives is inherently political, and would tarnish the reputation of a professional military that takes pride in maintaining its status as an apolitical public institution.

Evaluating the Candidates: The Department of Defense

The battle for public opinion in the Middle East is being vigorously waged between the radical Islamists who seek “a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom,” and the moderates who support modernity and tolerance. It’s an ideological battle for “hearts and minds” and it is in the interest of the United States to ensure the moderates succeed. To win the “War of Ideas,” the easy answer would seem to be to give the lead for strategic communication to the Pentagon and allow them build an apparatus with overt and covert components to wage political warfare similar to the OWI and
OSS during World War II. After all, the Defense Department has the structure, the skilled personnel, the budget, and policy influence to lead the interagency to success. But the issue is more nuanced.

Throughout our history, Americans have been uncomfortable with the idea of government, rather than a free press, reporting the news both domestically and internationally. Government efforts to communicate its actions are particularly controversial during times of war as the president in power seeks to maintain public support at home and abroad despite inevitable “bad news” from the war front. In an era where people remember lessons from both the Cold War and Viet Nam, some see our Government’s attempts to bring news to people in other nations as “propaganda” to sway public opinion, while others contend it is an “information campaign” designed to educate the public with facts in regions where “free” and “unbiased” media outlets are limited in number.

Since 9/11, President Bush and members of his administration have drawn numerous comparisons between the Global War on Terrorism and the Cold War. For example, the President’s October 2005 policy address to the National Endowment for Democracy contained the following:

The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our new century. Yet, in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against communism in the last century. Like the ideology of communism, Islamic radicalism is elitist, led by a self-appointed vanguard that presumes to speak for the Muslim masses... Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy teaches that innocent individuals can be sacrificed to serve a political vision...Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy pursues totalitarian aims...Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy is dismissive of free peoples... And Islamic radicalism, like the ideology of communism, contains inherent contradictions that doom it to failure.  

But the Cold War was fought with political objectives formulated to contain the spread of an ideology by countering nation states from forcefully promulgating their communist political system among the Free World. The war on terror is being fought with ideological objectives designed to counter the spread of Islamic extremism by
discrediting the terrorists and influencing publics to support the integration of their nations into an American-designed alliance of peace and prosperity. In the Cold War, America fought to defend the Free World; in the War on Terrorism, America fights to defend freedom itself. We are balancing interests and ideals. Although there is a vital need for our Government to counter Islamic extremist propaganda, this war cannot be won by the hard sell of political warfare alone. That is not to say that the Department of Defense and CIA should not engage in information operations and propaganda activities in support of the war on terror. Propaganda has always been a part of warfare. But, if the United States is to maintain credibility with publics around the world, the military, America’s ultimate instrument of coercion and hard power, cannot be seen as leading the strategic communication effort.

Evaluating the Candidates: The Department of State

The President has directed the Department of State to lead the interagency strategic communication effort. But if State is to take on and successfully execute the larger program, it must first get its own public diplomacy house in order. The DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication found numerous deficiencies and recommended significant structural and cultural changes within the Department of State. First, the DSB recommended that the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs be redefined to include input into foreign policy formulation as well as implementation. Second, the DSB found that the Under Secretary needed to be staffed and resourced to provide policy advice, program direction and evaluation, to include placing public diplomacy experts at the regional bureaus (where foreign policy is developed), as well as with the Chiefs of Mission (where foreign policy is executed). Third, the DSB suggested that State re-align the Office of Foreign Opinion and Media Research from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (where it was placed after the Department of State/USIA merger), to work for the Under Secretary in order to better measure the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts around the world. Finally, the DSB recommended that the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs approve all public diplomacy assignments, and have input into performance evaluations.
Secretary of State Rice moved quickly in 2005 to implement many of the DSB findings, and through Ambassador Hughes, is leading a cultural change within the Department. In her November 2005 House International Relations Committee statement, Ambassador Hughes outlined three efforts she has undertaken to reinvigorate communications with world audiences: integrating policy and public diplomacy at the State Department; re-launching the interagency strategic communication process by leading a high level group of policy and communications professionals to “further the freedom agenda and win the war of ideas” and; emphasizing public diplomacy as a strong, rewarding career path within the Department of State. In this area, she is working to restore the management links that were severed during the USIA merger by elevating public diplomacy in the policy-making regional bureaus to add a deputy assistant secretary with dual reports to the head of the bureau and to Hughes.

The Department of State is also making public diplomacy a part of every officer’s job description and developing ways to evaluate and reward success. But most importantly, either Ambassador Hughes or a member of her staff sits at every key policy-making meeting at the State Department, integrating public diplomacy initiatives. However, the Secretary of State did not re-align the Office of Foreign Opinion and Media Research under the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, leaving it outside the hierarchy of communications professionals who need its analysis the most.

Even with these initiatives, it is important to note that bureaucratic culture doesn’t change quickly within the State Department, and neither public diplomacy nor strategic communication have been first-line priority efforts in the past. In an article published in the Weekly Standard, Joshua Muravchik lamented that when the USIA was folded into the State Department, the latter was “more eager to absorb the agency’s resources than to carry forward its mission.” The Department of State received appropriations for public diplomacy programs during fiscal year 2006 totaling $430.4 million for Education and Cultural Exchanges (an increase of 21% over FY05), and $333.8 for other public diplomacy programs (an increase of 4% over FY05). However, the budget did not include funding to increase personnel in support of the public diplomacy
mission. Outside of the domestically oriented Bureau of Public Affairs, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has a small staff that handles foreign cultural affairs, news dissemination, and policy. She may have the mission, but Ambassador Hughes is not staffed to lead a coordinated, interagency strategic communication effort.

Ambassador Hughes has a reputation and influence her predecessors did not. She is widely respected throughout the Bush administration, and has the ear of key leaders as she works to repair our previously dysfunctional public diplomacy efforts. But any success she achieves in her current position based on her close ties with the President will likely be an anomaly that will not be sustainable when the next administration comes to power. A sub-level cabinet officer does not normally wield enough power and influence to bring together a complex function within the interagency. Bruce Gregory sums it up by stating:

*Although a strong cabinet Under Secretary of State with full support from the President and the Secretary can bring about real and immediate change, any approach that places the public diplomacy ‘quarterback’ in a sub-cabinet position over time carries a heavy burden...Whether the State Department can or should ‘quarterback’ today’s multi-agency, multi-issue public diplomacy is a threshold question to be considered with care.*

Even if the State Department had a “talented quarterback” and unlimited means, critics point out that this cabinet department, known for the “soft sell,” is ill-suited to lead a comprehensive ideological campaign to counter the radical Islamist threat. Work that used to be handled by professional USIA officers is now being executed by career diplomats who are typically less enthusiastic about the mission. In his recent book, *War Footing*, Frank Gaffney strongly states that political warfare “must not be assigned to our diplomats.” As with the Department of Defense, it’s an issue of credibility. Can a State Department that oversees a public information program that includes covert elements and propaganda still maintain credibility within its primary mission of traditional diplomacy? After World War II, it took seven years for the Chief Executive to determine that he needed an agency separate from the State Department to oversee
America’s information programs. It’s taking this administration a little longer to reach the same, inevitable conclusion.

Evaluating the Candidates: The National Security Council

But what about the NSC? The DSB and other prestigious think tanks advocate that they are the logical entity to execute strategic oversight of interagency efforts. However, a widespread opinion is that the NSC has not been “provided the direction to properly provide for the balance of issues that need to be addressed…nor empowered to coordinate those issues across the Executive Branch.”66 Additionally, critics contend that the NSC staff tends to focus on the tactical crisis of the week rather than promulgate a long-term, strategic focus, and that it “lacks adequate capacity to conduct integrated, long-range planning for the President.”67

The NSC attempted to integrate strategic communication between 2002 and 2005 with limited effectiveness. The Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), formed in 2002, was co-chaired by the NSC’s Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations and the Department of State’s Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. PCC representation was at the Assistant Secretary level. But this PCC was particularly ineffective – the DSB blasted its practical influence as “marginal at best, non-existent at worst.”68 Why did it fail to produce? One could expand the target and look at the effectiveness of NSC committees over time. The DSB points out that NSC advisors and PCC members come and go. Even when given elegant authorities, their sustained impact has proven weak. In the case of the Strategic Communication PCC, one of the Committee’s key leaders, Under Secretary of State Charlotte Beers, abruptly departed during the critical period leading to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After Beers’ departure, the PCC met on few occasions. When it did meet, its actions were described as “scripted, bureaucratic, non-accomplishing, and ineffective.”69

The NSC’s Strategic Communication PCC was not staffed, structured, resourced or given authority to lead, and ultimately failed to effectively integrate America’s message with policy. Based on this track record, it’s hard to understand why experts would point
to the NSC as the potential solution to the strategic communication problem set. But if given greater authorities by the President, which would necessitate Congressional legislation, would an NSC-led strategic communication option have potential to succeed? Perhaps, but it would take a major cultural shift for the Bush administration to adopt the level of change advocated by the DSB. The NSC would have to shed its traditional role of preparing decisions for the President, and take a more active part in ensuring government agencies act to bring about the President’s intent.

The DSB recommends that the President enable the NSC to lead the strategic communication effort by establishing a permanent communication structure led by a Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) for Strategic Communication. The DNSA would chair a high-ranking Strategic Communication Committee (SCC) with members provided from the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; the Director of the Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the BBG. 70

So far, not much is new. But the DSB goes on to recommend that the SCC provide program and project direction to a new, Congressionally-mandated, independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication. The DSB describes the Center for Strategic Communication as a “hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research and development centers, such as the RAND Corporation, and the National Endowment for Democracy.” It would be formed as a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation, with “authority to provide services to government departments on a cost-recovery basis and contract with academic, commercial, and other non-government organizations.” 71

Although innovative, the Center is not a new concept. Others, including the Council on Foreign Relations and The Heritage Foundation, have advocated the need for an organization – independent from government – that could synthesize private sector capabilities found in America’s academic, business, media and
non-governmental organization communities. The Center could: serve as a “heat shield” between the government and controversial projects, become a focal point for private sector involvement in public policy, attract media and other personalities who may not be willing to work directly for the government, and provide more credible messengers for skeptical audiences. With Congressional oversight and funding, a non-partisan composition, and status as independent entity, the Center would mitigate the argument that the nation’s strategic communication apparatus is simply a mouthpiece for the current administration. It would make audiences more apt to trust the messenger, and therefore, the message.

The DSB goes on to advocate that to help this committee succeed, that the DNSA have the “right to concur” with personnel chosen to lead major strategic communication operating entities such as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Chairman of the BBG, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. The DSB findings also recommend that the SCC be given authority to plan the work of line agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs and military information operations, but not direct the execution. Further, the DSB suggests that the DNSA should work with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to develop strategic communication budget priorities.

The DSB advocates giving a political appointee (the DNSA), who would assume the position without Congressional scrutiny, great latitude in developing budget priorities, influencing senior administration personnel assignments, and prioritizing workloads within the Departments of State and Defense and the White House Communication office. Would the NSC-led effort work in this era of intense interagency turf battles and partisan maneuvering in Congress? With Presidential mandate, and the right person at the helm at the NSC, the answer is “yes.”

But the bigger issue is that any option built around a NSC committee is not structured to create sustained impact over time. The DNSA, as a political appointee, would serve at the pleasure of the President, as would all the high-ranking members of the proposed SCC. There would be few full-time staff members to support the effort. Additionally, even if the current President and NSA agree with the
concept of using the NSC in such a manner, the next President and NSA may not. This body might be able to craft the government’s communication strategy and integrate message with current policy, but it is doubtful that it would be able to sustain long-term planning and program execution vital to our success.

Evaluating the Candidates: The Independent Agency

Should the administration look at reinventing the USIA to solve its strategic communication problem? The short answer is “no.” Since the 1960s, the USIA’s primary mission was producing soft power effects through public diplomacy and international broadcasting. It did not associate with the CIA’s covert or Defense Department’s overt information operations programs. For better or worse, the USIA’s public diplomacy mission is now ensconced within the Department of State; foreign policymakers, implementers and communicators are working to synthesize their activities. “Undoing” the State/USIA merger would cause another disruptive reorganization within the State Department, and it would come with a hefty personnel price tag. Bureaucratic efficiencies gained would be lost, driving up the cost of government in an era where both American political parties are looking for ways to cut Government spending. International broadcasting, which used to be an important arm of the USIA, has now been set apart from the foreign policy establishment by Congressional mandate to protect their journalistic independence and integrity. As long as the State Department continues on its current path to reinvigorate public diplomacy, there is no need to revisit the USIA issue. Breaking out the government’s public diplomacy apparatus and reestablishing it as a separate entity won’t solve the government’s strategic communication integration problem. It would still leave the “hard power” overt and covert information instruments out of the equation.

There is another independent agency option. If the NSC is not the right choice to lead the strategic communication effort based on its inability to sustain long-term planning and execution, one could advocate using the same organizational components and authorities, but placing the leadership and support structure in a separate, independent executive agency or secretariat. A Director of Central Information (or Strategic Communication), nominated by
the President and approved by Congress, could integrate the nation’s communication and information programs, chair or co-chair the NSC Strategic Communication PCC, and provide program direction for the proposed Center for Strategic Communication. The Director and his or her staff would be charged with streamlining efforts across agencies and departments, and assuming a role similar to the NSC as an advisor, synthesizer, and coordinator. Key tasks would include setting priorities, developing communication strategies and executing long-range planning. With a support staff of permanently assigned government employees, and augmentation from State (which would represent the interests of the BBG), Defense, and Intelligence, the Directorate could sustain long-term initiatives needed to “Win the Long War of Ideas.” Its permanently assigned employees would enable this organization to do something the NSC could not - sustain the mission through election cycles and changes of administrations.

For the independent agency option to succeed it must overcome two potential barriers that hampered the USIA in the past: key leader access and interagency cooperation. The Director must have regular access to the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and other top administration officials to ensure “message” merges with “policy.” A seat at the NSC table is a must. The agency must also obtain the full cooperation of the White House, State and Defense Departments, and the CIA to ensure all components of strategic communication are integrated, to include public diplomacy, public affairs, and covert and overt information operations. Should the Director expect such cooperation? One could make an argument that today’s interagency is different than that of past eras. The events of 9/11 have taught us that stovepiped organizations and turf battles do not help to solve complex government problems. The national security agencies are working together as never before. Studies indicate that over the last four years, the Defense and State Departments and the NSC have been willing partners to improve our strategic communication capabilities. It would not be a huge leap of logic to infer that they would work together in the future to achieve a common goal – to improve America’s ability to communicate our policies and interests by influencing, educating and informing audiences around the world.
This option does have its drawbacks. First, critics might state that because this agency would be charged with planning strategies to use both “hard” and “soft” power, it would likely be seen in the eyes of many as a propaganda manager. That’s true. But counter-propaganda is a necessary tool in the national arsenal in an era where our adversaries aggressively use propagandistic methods to forward their extremist agenda. Better to have an agency that can plan strategies to wage ideological warfare than to designate the Department of State or the Department of Defense as the lead agency, placing those organizations in a position where their credibility is compromised in the eyes of the press, the American people, and with nations and publics abroad.

Second, the Center for Strategic Communication, as defined by the DSB, would likely not gain the same participation from private agencies due to the “propaganda taint” to which this organization would be vulnerable. Another option would be to form a Corporation for Public Diplomacy, led by the Department of State, which would accommodate those organizations that would rather align themselves with the members of the national communication team who wield “soft power.”

Third, the BBG would not look favorably on aligning themselves with an agency that includes “hard power” players. Norman Pattiz, a member of the BBG since 2000 and the driving force behind the recently-created Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television projects, argues that any attempt to place the BBG within a structure that includes the CIA, Defense Department and State Department would have a “chilling effect” on the notion that its broadcasts were impartial and independent.77 The government would be best served with the BBG maintaining its “arm’s distance” relationship through the Department of State.

The Road Ahead

The analysis suggests that the President, in coordination with Congress, should establish an independent agency or executive secretariat led by a Director of Strategic Communication, who would chair a high-ranking Strategic Communication Committee, and provide program and project direction to a Congressionally-mandated, independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication. It
would create an organization with focus, flexibility, and longevity that could incorporate both “hard” and “soft” information power elements without breaching firewalls designed to protect and preserve institutional credibility within government, particularly the Departments of State and Defense. With increased emphasis on public diplomacy at the State Department, unprecedented focus and resourcing on information operations within the Department of Defense, innovative new broadcast programs initiated by the BBG, our government agencies have proven that they understand the need to act now to solve America’s image problem in the world. But there is clearly much work still to be done.

At the top of the list is a Presidential directive assigning roles and missions to the interagency to synchronize all components of strategic communication and provide a foundation for new legislation to coordinate, conduct and fund the effort. Strategic communication cuts across the lines of operation in the Washington bureaucracy. If we are to unite public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting and information operations under a single information strategy, it will take Presidential guidance to do it. Whether the designated lead is an independent agency or the Department of State (where the mission currently resides) President Bush needs to enforce his decision with written guidance that provides tasking authority, and direction to enact new Congressional legislation to fund strategic communication programs to wield this important instrument of national security and foreign policy. It is ironic that the United States “spends about $30 billion annually on intelligence to find out what others are thinking throughout the world, but only $1 billion on trying to shape those thoughts.”

The Defense Science Board sums it up this way:

*For sixty years strategic communication planning and coordination has been ephemeral and usually treated with indifference. The United States can no longer afford a repetitious pattern of hollow authorities, ineffectual committees, and stifling turf battles... There is no such thing as a “perfect” planning and coordinating structure. The success or failure of new structures ultimately will be the people involved. But substance and structure are integrally related. Good organizations can help shape good outcomes.*
If we are engaged in a “Long War of Ideas,” the problems we face today will be with us well into the future. The time to transform our information institutions in order to project our influence is now.
Strategic Communication: An Imperative for the Global War on Terrorism Environment

Colonel Richard B. Leap
United States Army

In a recent speech, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conceded the United States is losing the war of ideas, or as it is often referred to the war for “hearts and minds,” in the Middle East: “And while al-Qaeda and extremist movements have utilized this forum [satellite television] for many years, and have successfully further poisoned the Muslim public’s view of the West, we have barely even begun to compete in reaching their audiences.”¹ The current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) environment magnifies the challenges the U.S. faces in effectively conducting Strategic Communication to influence foreign audiences in favor of U.S. policies. Faced with this volatile and complex environment, U.S. Government Strategic Communication to date lacks credibility, top-level emphasis, thorough coordination, adequate resources and has thus far proven ineffective. Therefore, the elements of Strategic Communication, specifically Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information, must be significantly improved and better integrated to overcome these challenges and effectively influence foreign target audiences while safeguarding U.S. national will.

Background

Strategic Communication is a relatively recent term that lacks a universally accepted definition. For the purpose of this monograph, Strategic Communication is a term describing a national-level process of developing, coordinating and disseminating unified themes and messages through appropriate subordinate agencies to favorably influence target global audiences towards U.S. policies thus facilitating the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. It is generally agreed that Strategic Communication consists of, as a minimum, Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and Military Information Operations.² Military Information Operations is
a very broad term that includes Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception and Operations Security. Most definitions of Strategic Communication, to include the definition used in this paper, address only open PSYOP, which is also referred to as International Military Information. This is appropriate since Strategic Communication seeks to influence target audiences and PSYOP is the core capability of Military Information Operations that likewise influences foreign target audiences.\(^3\) Just as there is no single definition of Strategic Communication, there is no single government organization responsible for Strategic Communication.

During the Cold War, various government departments and agencies performed portions of the Strategic Communication mission. The United States Information Agency (USIA), which was merged into the State Department in 1998, performed well many of the functions of Public Diplomacy. The White House, National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) as well as other government departments and agencies performed Public Affairs to varying degrees. Several government departments and agencies performed strategic-level PSYOP while the U.S. Army was chiefly responsible for operational-level and tactical-level PSYOP. These Strategic Communication efforts were largely conducted independently of one another and without the benefit of an overarching government strategy. Further, they were usually conceived of after the fact to influence audiences to accept an established U.S. policy, and not as an integral part of the policy development process itself. Still, they worked reasonably well during the bi-polar Cold War. The Global War on Terrorism environment is a different story.

**Global War on Terrorism Environment**

The 2006 National Security Strategy asserts that “winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas.”\(^4\) The current GWOT environment presents many challenges to U.S. Government Strategic Communication, which complicate winning the battle of ideas.

**Perceptions of Hegemony.** The current environment is a uni-polar world where the U.S. lacks a strategic competitor. Many regions
of the world have reacted with fear and distrust of U.S. goals, policies and actions. In the 2002 National Security Strategy the U.S. reserved the right to attack preemptively – a clear indication of global hegemony, and possibly imperialism, in the view of many other countries. The willingness of the U.S. to “go it alone” or work with “coalitions of the willing” while foregoing traditional allies is frequently interpreted as arrogance or wanton disregard for world opinion. The recent U.S. reliance on military/hard power over diplomatic/soft power solutions, especially in Iraq, has created intense resentment among friends and foes alike and reduced overall U.S. credibility and influence.

Global Transparency. The explosion of communication technology and its availability at affordable prices has shifted the competition from controlling limited information to commanding limited attention. In the Middle East, those hostile to the West have succeeded in commanding the attention of their audiences through satellite television, FM radio, the Internet and cell phones. The speed of information transmission has also placed the U.S. Government at a disadvantage. Government leaders are asked to comment on breaking stories before they have a reasonable chance to ascertain the facts. Being on the informational defensive permits hostile forces to set an agenda that may result in negative impacts on U.S. opinion and national will.

Globalization. The increasing interdependence of nations is shrinking the world and is bringing cultures into closer contact. Many in the Middle East fear that Western cultural influences will have a negative effect on Middle Eastern culture and the Islamic faith. As the chief proponent of globalization, the U.S. receives the lion’s share of hostility and blame for the perceived negative cultural effects.

Middle East Fault Lines. Just as Communism in Europe and Asia was not monolithic during the Cold War, Islam is not monolithic in the Middle East. Beyond the obvious division between Sunni and Shiite, there exist fissures along national, regional, ethnic, tribal and clan lines, however, dislike of U.S. policies transcends these divisions. The United States is frequently viewed as inserting itself on the wrong side of intra-Muslim conflicts. There is also a chasm
between many of the ruling regimes in the Middle East and the people they lead. The U.S. is viewed by many in the region as supporting apostate regimes that serve U.S. energy interests while ignoring the needs of the governed.⁹

**Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.** The on-going Palestinian-Israeli conflict continues to fuel a great deal of anger in the Middle East. The U.S. is viewed as consistently siding with Israel and against Arabs.¹⁰ The recent election of a Hamas-led Palestinian government complicates the situation further. The U.S. does not recognize the Hamas-led government due to its ties to terrorism and its advocacy for the destruction of Israel. Many in the region view the non-recognition of a fairly elected government, and the consequent withdrawal of funding, as further evidence of U.S. hypocrisy towards the Muslim World.

**Anti-Americanism.** A 2005 opinion poll conducted by Zogby International showed that the U.S. continues to be viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (85%), Jordan (63%), Lebanon (66%), Morocco (64%), Saudi Arabia (89%) and UAE (73%). The poll concludes: “Overall, favorable attitudes toward the U.S. have rebounded since 2004, but are still slightly lower than the already low 2002 ratings. Negative attitudes toward the U.S. have hardened due largely to Iraq and ‘American treatment of Arabs and Muslims.’”¹¹ These highly unfavorable attitudes mean U.S. Government Strategic Communication will lack credibility and message authority with substantial portions of Middle Eastern target audiences.

Given this volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous GWOT environment in which a war of ideas is being fought, current U.S. Government Strategic Communication is wholly inadequate.

**Public Diplomacy**

United States Public Diplomacy is in a state of crisis. The crisis is not only one of words and messages, but just as importantly one of policies, actions and credibility. Two recent Zogby International polls on Arab views of America offer strong evidence that the U.S. has neither fully considered the Public Diplomacy impacts of its
Addressing the first point, Michael Scheuer, in *Imperial Hubris*, contends that many Muslims and Arabs view American policies as challenging God’s word by opposing the concept of jihad, limiting and controlling Muslim charities and insisting on changes to Islamic educational curricula; attacking Islamic faithful and their resources by supporting any government that is not Muslim, supporting apostate governments in the Middle East, imposing economic and military sanctions on Muslims and seeking oil at below market prices; and occupying or dismembering Muslim lands by occupying Afghanistan and Iraq, creating East Timor out of Indonesia and consistently backing Israel versus the Palestinians.\(^{14}\) These perceptions are reality for an increasing number of Arabs and Muslims as evidenced by recent opinion polls. The Defense Science Board (DSB) agrees that: “U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by an overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself.”\(^{15}\) It is critical that the U.S. consider the effects of its policies, real and perceived, during the policy development process and not after the fact.

U.S. policies, as they are developed, must be aligned with national values, interests and strategic objectives, and the programs and actions that ensue must reflect what is truly important to the nation. It appears that some U.S. policies towards the Middle East may not be in alignment with vital national interests and these policies should be reviewed; however, for those that are, the U.S. must rapidly implement a comprehensive system to develop, coordinate and disseminate credible messages that resonate with target audiences. Yet, attempts to do this over the past eight years have fallen far short. According to the 2004 DSB report on Strategic Communication, more than 15 private sector and Congressional reports conducted since October 2001 reached a consensus that Strategic Communication is missing, “…strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a culture of measurement and evaluation.”\(^{16}\) These failures in Public Diplomacy begin at the top.

The President of the United States has not provided decisive leadership to put the proper emphasis on Strategic Communication at
the National level. As the DSB report on Strategic Communication asserts: “A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.”17 The President failed in both the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies to even mention the power of information and the necessity of integrating information with the other elements of national power.

The recognition that Public Diplomacy must be improved and better integrated began under President Clinton. President Clinton recognized the need to integrate Public Diplomacy into the policy development process but his efforts to do so did not achieve the desired results. He folded the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department through the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998: “The two bureau structure [Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs] will bring together all elements charged with presenting and interpreting U.S. foreign policy to public audiences. It will give Public Diplomacy practitioners greater access to the foreign policy formulation process.”18 Although it seemed like a good idea initially, the advantages USIA provided were lost in the State Department bureaucracy. Almost immediately thereafter the Clinton administration realized it had a public diplomacy problem. Due to the communications revolution, almost all government departments and agencies were conducting Public Diplomacy. To resolve this, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD 68) near the end of his second term to create an interagency coordination mechanism for International Public Information (IPI), however, the NSC under George W. Bush terminated PDD 68 in early 2001 thereby leaving Public Diplomacy without the centralized direction, planning, coordination and synchronization needed.

President Bush’s administration has attempted several Public Diplomacy initiatives none of which has provided the overarching strategic direction needed. The Coalition Information Centers established following 9/11 were ad hoc and never formalized even though they had some success providing consistent and coordinated themes and messages. In October 2001, DoD created the Office
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of Strategic Influence (OSI) to: “...serve as the Department’s focal point for a ‘strategic information campaign in support of the war on terrorism.’”\textsuperscript{19} The OSI was subverted by a damaging leak to the press and shut down by Secretary Rumsfeld before it had a chance to prove its worth. Even if it had begun operations, OSI was still a DoD organization and would not have had the mandate to provide the interagency direction required to fully coordinate and synchronize Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information.

In September 2002, the NSC created the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to develop and disseminate the President’s messages to foreign audiences. The 2004 DSB report notes: “The PCC met several times with marginal impact.”\textsuperscript{20} The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the PCC drafted a national communication strategy, but the committee was disbanded in March 2003 and no strategy was ever issued.\textsuperscript{21}

Next, the White House established the Office of Global Communications (OGC) in January 2003 – a new organization that again failed to engage in strategic direction, coordination and synchronization. According to the 2004 DSB Report on Strategic Communications: “...the OGC evolved into a second tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination.”\textsuperscript{22} The OGC was permitted to quietly fade away in March 2005.

The Muslim World Outreach PCC and DoS’s Office of Policy, Planning and Resources are two recent initiatives designed to improve the ability of the government to set a new strategic direction for Public Diplomacy in the Muslim world. Although each organization has gotten off to a good start, they are not receiving any more senior leader advocacy, staffing or resources than previous Public Diplomacy organizations nor do they appear to be coordinating and integrating Public Diplomacy any more thoroughly than previous organizations.

The lack of senior leader emphasis to improve Strategic Communication is evident when one compares the recommendations contained in the 2001 DSB Report on Managed Information
Dissemination with the 2004 DSB report on Strategic Communication. Many of the recommendations such as issuance of an National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), increasing foreign opinion research, harnessing the best practices of civilian media, increased staff and funding for Public Diplomacy and others appeared in the 2001 report and were basically unchanged in the 2004 report.

Another clear indication of the lack of emphasis on Public Diplomacy is the stagnant level of funding. From 1993 to 2001, overall funding for educational and exchange programs fell from $349 million to $232 million adjusted for inflation.\(^{23}\) The total budget for “Foreign Information and Exchange Programs” fell from $1.16 billion in FY 1998\(^{24}\) to $814 million in FY 2000.\(^{25}\) Following 9/11, they increased only modestly and were funded at $972 million in FY 2005.\(^{26}\) Contrast these figures with the $74.96 billion FY 2005 supplemental appropriation for DoD\(^{27}\) and one can see the relative lack of emphasis on the information element of power compared to the military element.

Another area lacking emphasis is foreign public opinion research. The 2004 DSB Report highlighted the need to listen to foreign audiences and concluded: “Much of the current U.S. effort concentrates on delivering ‘the message’ and omits the essential first step of listening to our targeted audiences.”\(^{28}\) DoS currently spends approximately $5 million per year on polling. The Government Accountability Office’s survey of expert opinions suggested that $30 million to $50 million annually is needed for polling to provide strategic direction while measuring the effectiveness of current programs.\(^{29}\) The U.S. has responded with half-hearted organizational solutions, as detailed above, while credibility continues to erode. The best coordination, integration and dissemination of Strategic Communication messages will be meaningless if the message fails to sway the target audience(s).

The 2004 DSB report highlights that the U.S. is failing to reach Middle East target audiences because it is still disseminating information to “huddled masses yearning to be free” just as in the Cold War. “Today we reflexively compare Muslim ‘masses’ to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a strategic mistake.”\(^{30}\) In a February 2006 speech to the U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Qatar,
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes fell into this very trap.\textsuperscript{31} Under Secretary Hughes, an experienced strategic communicator, spoke to a group of Muslim leaders about American women who effected change, and the people in Afghanistan and Iraq who are yearning for freedom. One has to wonder how the target audience viewed the credibility, content and message authority of the speaker.

The short term creation and termination of Public Diplomacy coordinating staffs and offices in the NSC and DoS, the lack of funding and staffing for these Public Diplomacy organizations, and the focus on message dissemination over development of credible messages are strong indicators that U.S. Government Strategic Communication still has a Cold War orientation and is ill-prepared for the GWOT environment. The Cold-War era focus of organizations and processes that is hampering Public Diplomacy is also evident in the Public Affairs realm.

**Public Affairs**

Advances in global information technology and the speed of information transmission in the GWOT environment have increased the influence of the media. As Kenneth Payne asserts, “The media, in the modern era, are indisputably an instrument of war”\textsuperscript{32} as a country must win domestic and international public opinion while defeating enemy forces. Public Affairs (PA) doctrine and capabilities are little different from the Cold War era and are insufficient for winning and sustaining public opinion in the GWOT environment. Public Affairs capability must be greatly enhanced from the strategic through the tactical levels and the lanes in the road between Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Military Information Operations must be better defined and understood by all practitioners of Strategic Communications.

At the strategic level, PA is the domestic dissemination of information and opinion designed to bolster support for any Administration’s policies among the American public. Public Affairs efforts are not succeeding in bolstering support for the administration’s policies in Iraq. USA Today/Gallup polls from 2003 through 2006 show that Americans’ approval of the way President Bush is handling the war
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has gone from 76% in April 2003\textsuperscript{33} to 32% in April 2006.\textsuperscript{34} Even more alarming, 63% of Americans believe the Bush administration has not clearly explained what the U.S.’s goals in Iraq are.\textsuperscript{35} Whether the domestic audience agrees or disagrees with administration policies is understandable, however, the domestic audience’s belief that the administration has not clearly articulated its goals in an important policy area is a clear Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy failure.

At the operational and tactical levels, PA capabilities have not kept up with the explosion of information. Current Public Affairs staffing levels within the DoD are comparable to Cold War levels. According to Kenneth Payne “…the purpose of the public affairs staff is just that – to control the dissemination of information so as to maximize the military and political advantage to U.S. forces.”\textsuperscript{36} The embedding of journalists with units has increased the flow of information, and although embedding has the advantages of restricting what reporters see and cover, it also means public affairs staffs must be prepared to respond to breaking news with accurate answers almost immediately. Current levels of PA staffing do not permit this and the consequence is reduced credibility as civilian and military leaders look unprepared or vacillating.\textsuperscript{37} Public Affairs doctrine has not changed significantly to address the new environment.

Current PA doctrine is very much business as usual. The May 2005 version Joint Publication 3-61, Public Affairs, states: “Military Public Information [one of the three primary functions of Public Affairs] is still largely a matter of coordinating media relations. Commanders and their PA staffs should be prepared to respond to media inquiries, issue statements, schedule interviews, conduct briefings, arrange for access to operational units, and provide appropriate equipment, transportation and communications support to the media.”\textsuperscript{38} These functions are little different from what PA staffs have historically performed. This reactive posture permits the enemy at worst or the media at best to frame an issue. Once an issue is framed, the government or military has lost the initiative on what judgments people will make about it.

Consider the battle for Fallujah in April-May 2004 as a case in point. According to Ralph Peters, “In Fallujah, we allowed a bonanza of hundreds of terrorists and insurgents to escape us – despite promising
that we would bring them to justice. The global media disrupted the U.S. and Coalition chains of command. Foreign media reporting even sparked bureaucratic infighting within our own government. The result was a disintegration of our will… We could have won militarily. Instead, we surrendered politically and called it a success. Our enemies won the information war.”

Public Affairs professionals at all levels failed to effectively counter enemy propaganda while reassuring and maintaining the trust and confidence of the U.S. population – a mission delineated in joint doctrine. Part of the difficulty in maintaining the trust and confidence of the U.S. population lies in the internal Public Affairs debate over “informing” versus “influencing.”

Many PA practitioners believe their only role is to inform the domestic and international publics with accurate, truthful information and provide access to government and military officials and operations to confirm what is reported. All should agree that PA must always present truthful, credible information, however, if Public Diplomacy and open PSYOP only target foreign audiences, then who besides PA can counter the enemy’s or the media’s shaping of U.S. domestic opinion? The war in Iraq highlights this issue.

A survey of U.S. domestic newspaper, television, and Internet news finds an overwhelming focus on reporting car bombings, suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonations and the attendant casualties. Additionally, one sees reporting on the increasing organization, sophistication and success of insurgent attacks. Bruce Jentleson makes the point that: “How an issue is cast (‘framed’) affects the substantive judgments people make – and the media play a key role in this framing. The media also influence…the criteria by which the public makes its judgments about success or failure.” An April 2006 Pew Research Center poll sheds light on the effect media “framing” can have on domestic support - in April 2003, 61% of Americans felt the military effort in Iraq was going very well compared with only 13% in April 2006. Public Affairs organizations must devise new means and methods to better “frame” issues for domestic and international audiences on policy successes while countering enemy disinformation in order to reverse these trends.
Further, the U.S. Government must clarify the roles, responsibilities, authorities and relationships between Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Information Operations to not only influence foreign target audiences, but to safeguard U.S. national will. A failure to do so may result in strategic defeats in the future. Similar to Vietnam, enemy propaganda as well as the media’s framing of the security and stability issue in Iraq could create a credibility gap for the administration and shift public opinion against the war. This appears to be occurring as evidenced by negative opinion polls, partisan attacks against the Bush administration’s handling of the war, and the growing demonstrations at home calling for the removal of U.S. troops. A strategic loss in Iraq, due in large part to a failure of Strategic Communication, would have dire repercussions for the use of military force in future GWOT engagements. With so much at stake, those responsible for U.S. Government Strategic Communication appear not to recognize the gravity of the issue.

International Military Information

International Military Information capability must be substantially strengthened and completely integrated and synchronized with Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to succeed in the GWOT environment. DSB studies in 2000, 2001 and 2004 each addressed the importance of strengthening wartime PSYOP capabilities. The Information Operations Roadmap also laid out recommended improvements to PSYOP. Many of these recommendations are being acted upon and increased troop levels and equipment upgrade programs are being funded in the Fiscal Year (FY) 04-09 Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), however, these improvements may not prove sufficient in the current environment. Additionally, current improvements are not focused on improving peacetime PSYOP.

Significant increases in PSYOP forces and better dissemination methods may not lead to success if the message does not resonate and the messenger lacks credibility. SOCOM received a significant increase of $205 million over the FYDP beginning in FY 2004 for increased PSYOP and Civil Affairs forces. Further, a $45 million Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) began in FY 2004 to develop better ways to disseminate information.
Yet, no increases in funding have been allocated to the Research and Analysis Division of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) to increase its ability to determine what messages will resonate with key target audiences. Further, as noted in the 2001 DSB study: “PSYOP broadcasts lack name recognition (brand identity), credibility, and professionally developed programming.” The 2004 DSB study highlights the credibility problem by stating: “Thus the critical problem…is not one of “dissemination of information,” or even one of crafting and delivering the “right” message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, there is none.”

This lack of credibility can be seen in the Iraq war. PSYOP forces have been operating in Iraq for over 3 years and over that time there has not been a decrease in support for the insurgents but rather an increase in support. PSYOP forces may consider the non-interference of the Iraqi general population with military operations a success, however, PSYOP campaigns have had virtually no impact on the insurgents or their leaders in terms of their willingness to persevere. Further, PSYOP efforts have not driven a wedge between the insurgents and the Iraqi population, rather, a recent poll showed that almost one-half of the Iraqi population support attacks on U.S forces while only 15% strongly support the U.S.-led coalition. No amount of PSYOP forces or varied dissemination methods can overcome a lack of credibility.

Credibility must be established over the long-term during peacetime. The Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3) and Theater Security Cooperation Plans are two promising arenas that have fallen short of their potential. According to the 2001 DSB Report, “OP3 has suffered from a lack of funding and high-level attention within DoD. As a result, when (overt PSYOP) does occur, it is because of other funding sources such as mine awareness and counter-drug activities. OP3 has not fulfilled its intended potential to support U.S. foreign policy objectives.” OP3 has existed since 1984 and its lack of effectiveness demonstrates the lack of conviction about the importance of information programs in theater military planning during peacetime.

Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) are focused on traditional military to military activities and largely ignore the elements of
Strategic Communication. The TSCP format does not include a separate category for information activities – PSYOP and support to Public Diplomacy fall under the “Other Activities” category. Although many of the TSCP activities are designed to influence foreign public opinion by promoting acceptance of U.S. strategic objectives, an overarching theater information strategy does not exist to unite the activities. The most current PSYOP doctrine does address peacetime PSYOP in relation to TSCPs – this is a step in the right direction but success will depend upon the implementation of this doctrine.

Conclusion

Strategic Communication is failing in the GWOT environment. Beyond poor coordination and limited dissemination means at all levels, Public Diplomacy is enmeshed in a credibility crisis that will not be solved in the short-term. Therefore, drastic changes must be implemented very soon. Public Affairs staffs are failing to effectively counter enemy propaganda, frame issues to give the U.S. Government an advantage and protect U.S. national will. Public Affairs must move from a reactive to an active posture. International Military Information must revitalize peacetime activities and seek new ways to influence insurgents that the U.S. will face more frequently in the GWOT environment.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are provided to improve U.S. Government Strategic Communication by strengthening Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and Military Information Operations.

1. Conduct a comprehensive, bi-partisan review of U.S. national interests in the Middle East. As part of the review, closely examine all strategies, policies and programs that affect the Middle East and ensure trace back to vital or very important national interests. Further, assess each policy for its impact on key foreign target audiences. Policies and programs that do not support vital or very important national interests and/or cause further damage to U.S credibility in the region should be modified or deleted. The goal
should be, over a ten-year period, to build U.S. credibility such that a majority of the populations in Arab and Muslim nations feel that U.S. policies towards them are fair and equitable even though they may not agree with all of them.

2. In accordance with Robert Steele’s report, Congress should legislate the “creation of a National Information Council (NIC), coequal to the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC).” The DSB reports in 2001 and 2004 recommended that the President issue a NSPD to create PCC to enhance coordination of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information, and to strengthen dissemination in each realm. As discussed in this monograph, these efforts are failing to achieve the desired effects. Informational initiatives take a back seat to the military, diplomatic and economic elements of national power and will continue to do so until Information is placed on an equal organizational footing.

The NIC should have membership commensurate with the NSC and should establish a PCC at the Deputy Secretary level to coordinate Strategic Communication across all departments and agencies. The NIC should develop a National Information Strategy (NIS) to provide overarching strategic direction. The NIC should have the authority and resources to coordinate the efforts of diverse government organizations involved in Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information to influence foreign target audiences over the long-term as well as to quickly counter enemy propaganda, misinformation and “America bashing” in the short-term. The NIC must also receive priority support from the intelligence community to determine “ground truth” on how the U.S. and its policies are being received as well as to attain detailed information about and prioritization of those foreign target audiences that can be influenced.

The legislation establishing the NIC must clearly address the “lanes in the road” between Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information. It should specifically address all prior legislation beginning with the Smith-Mundt Act that is limiting the effectiveness of Information organizations in the GWOT environment. It should also specify acceptable activities
that organizations may perform to protect a key friendly center of gravity, to wit U.S. national will.

3. Support the 2004 DSB report recommendation to create an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for Strategic Communication. This center is critical to leveraging the private sector while providing a “degree of distance” for those individuals and organizations uncomfortable with government affiliation. Two of the many critical functions of the center will be first, to take advantage of the internet revolution in both civilian and military information dissemination while ensuring the highest standards of commercial media production and second, to assess the effectiveness of all information programs over both the long and short-term. This Center will play a key role in assisting the U.S. Government to rebuild its credibility, especially in the Middle East.

In conjunction with establishing the Center, conduct a review of all opinion research being performed by or paid for by all Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information organizations. Ensure opinion research does not overlap and ensure research is consistent and tailored to the needs of each individual organization.

4. Conduct a complete review of the personnel policies in DoS and DoD for civilian leadership of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and International Military Information. One Under Secretary in each Department should be the focal point and principal advisor to the respective Secretary for all information activities and each major Information activity underneath be headed by an Assistant Secretary. In DoS, the International Information Programs Coordinator would be elevated to an Assistant Secretary position under the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In DoD, create an Under Secretary for Information Operations. The Under Secretaries should be empowered to be both policy advisors and managers for the information activities in their charge.

5. Support the 2004 DSB report recommendation to triple funding and personnel for Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and International Military Information activities as a starting point.
Convene a Blue Ribbon Panel to determine the amount of funding required for all information functional areas to put the information element of power on par with the other three elements.

6. Revitalize the OP3 program and ensure it is fully integrated with Combatant Command TSCPs. Amend the Joint Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to include a separate category within TSCPs for information activities. Combatant Commanders and Ambassadors should jointly develop respective Theater/Country information plans ensuring linkage to the National Information Strategy.

7. The Secretary of Defense should issue a DoD Directive mandating extensive language and cultural training for a core of Active Duty and Reserve forces aligned to high-risk areas in each Combatant Commander Area of Responsibility (AOR). Cross-assign these personnel to the embassy country teams in high-risk nations or in regions corresponding to their language. Mandate monthly language and cultural familiarity training for all service members in each Combatant Commander AOR.
There is no more important challenge for our future than the urgent need to foster greater understanding, more respect and a sense of common interests and common ideals among Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths throughout the world.¹

— Karen Hughes

The essence of strategic communication is to synchronize and coordinate public affairs, statesmanship, public diplomacy, and military information operations in concert with the actions of employing the national elements of power to achieve national objectives. The information element of national power must be continuously employed in peacetime, during military campaigns, and throughout national efforts to cultivate a world consistent with interests and values embraced by the United States. This strategy supports the United States National Security Strategy by leveraging strategic communication to win the war of ideas and fortify America’s security at home and overseas.

Nature of the Information Environment

New public audiences are emerging through communications systems involving the internet or electronic messaging, creating new news audiences in non-traditional news venues. The future leaders and decision makers of the world include a growing number of people who have grown up playing video games and clicking through multiple media presentations. The developing audiences in foreign nations have also found the internet and emerging technologies to be a window to news previously not available to them. In order to grab their attention it is necessary to develop ways to present news that engages and involves them.

Understanding various audiences and how they perceive our messages is essential to succeeding in supporting national interests
through communication efforts. The diversity and fragmentation of the audiences, as well as the media, make for a challenging environment to compete in. Some audiences may even shift sides depending on how a particular campaign affects their concerns. The world’s media seem to be fixated on America’s faults, and this makes the adversary’s job easier by diverting attention from negative coverage of their actions to any error of the U.S. or its allies.

News groups and listserves are providing the information exchange that people went to the commercial news organizations for in the past. Access to foreign press sites and alternative press are letting news seekers go beyond the local or national news franchise perspective on the news. The conventional model of a mass medium was a one-way flow of the news from the news organizations to the public audience. Things like web logs are providing a different way to access news and commentary. Bloggers invite the contributions of their readers, and facilitate conversation between the readers. The discussion generated about the news is often the most interesting, and provides broader understanding or different perspectives of the news event, rather than the news itself.

Our adversaries are not constrained by truth and accuracy and can easily exploit information to gain and maintain ideological support. “Violent extremists are using the Internet and some mass media as a safe haven for organizational support, intelligence gathering, and offensive operations.”2 Adversaries use the internet for command and control, disseminating and collecting information.

**Strategic Intent**

“Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but for the most part we, our country, our government has not.”3 The intent of our national communication strategy is to employ our informational and diplomatic capabilities to enhance the power of our ideals to encourage people of other nations to choose freedom over tyranny. Responsibility for strategic communication must be government wide under the leadership of the NSC.

In order to keep pace with communicating to the emerging media audiences it is critical to adapt communication strategies and
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technologies to participate in these environments. It is also necessary to be able to accelerate responses to adversarial misinformation and disinformation to all potential audiences. We must be creative in seeking new ways to engage and educate people

Goals and Objectives

“To win in a global battle of ideas, a global strategy for communicating those ideas is essential.”

Goal: Synchronize interagency communication efforts. The first element of the national communication strategy is to reinvigorate the interagency process. Objective: The State Department must “identify and marshal all the communications and public diplomacy resources of our different government agencies and provide leadership to make our efforts more coordinated and more strategic.” This includes merging training and equipping efforts of the various agencies, and ensuring interoperability of information automation as well as techniques and procedures. Themes and messages generated at the highest level must be disseminated, understood and employed at the lowest levels across the spectrum of governmental agencies. This will also require changing the culture of media interaction from aversion to engagement. Synchronization of communication activities throughout the interagency community is critical. Department of Defense Theater Security Cooperation activities must be synchronized with State Department diplomatic efforts and Central Intelligence Agency activities among others.

Goal: Increase effectiveness in Strategic Communication. Doing so will require a culture that instinctively integrates the development of communication strategy into policy development, operational planning and execution to advance national interests. Objective: Institutionalize a process in which Strategic Communication is incorporated in the development of strategy, policy, planning, and execution. Strategic communication processes and supporting capabilities must be included in all aspects of the federal government’s activities and synchronized vertically and horizontally.

Goal: Promote greater awareness and understanding of America’s values, policies and interests. We must leverage technology and
seek ways to develop better communication with foreign publics. Objective: The nation must use all means to engage people with our ideas and values to build and maintain credibility and trust among friends and foes and align coalition and partner nations to support democratic processes and denounce violent extremism. Emerging technologies and audiences must be aggressively explored and engaged in order to get out in front of issues and shape the information environment rather than reacting to it. We must instill a culture of engagement across the federal government built upon coordinated themes to engage media and international partners and competitors.

Goal: Improve our rapid response capability. Objective: The U.S. government should be able to monitor stories driving news globally and give the U.S. position on these issues within the same news cycle. In an environment where rumors can reach mass audiences in seconds it is critical to be able to respond in a credible manor to dispel or correct misinformation. “We need to be more creative in our communications, using new technologies, and we need to strengthen our use of research and the evaluation of our programs to determine how to be most effective.” In order to do this we must develop ways to take advantage of the creativity of the private sector.

Goal: Understand various audiences and how they perceive our messages. In the global community effective cross-cultural communication is paramount in a world full of differences. Objective: Ensure the messages, ideals, and values the U.S. wishes to express are interpreted and received in the manner intended. Leaders and communicators must be trained and educated to acquire the necessary intercultural skills to successfully communicate in the global environment. The success of this communication strategy will be built on our ability to understand and nurture strong relationships with international and multicultural partners and audiences. Language training and cultural awareness must be incorporated in the development of diplomats and governmental communications practitioners.

Conclusion

This National Communication Strategy will require close cooperation between all elements of the national government and the American
public. Building on the lessons learned over the past several years, this strategy maps the nation’s way ahead for the next few decades of this long struggle.

It is extremely important that all elements of the United States government understand the capability and impact of this vital element of national power and work together to communicate in a synchronized manner. This understanding is critical to the implementation of this strategy. Strategic communication must be included in all plans and activities of the agencies of our government. We must leverage the advantages of our technology and creativity to develop a proactive and responsive communication capability to set conditions favorable to our interests. We must also be aware of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of affected populations and our enemies, to more effectively counter extremism, encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad.

Diplomatic, economic, and military actions reinforced by strategic communication are necessary to advance national policy objectives: “No single contributor is preeminent. All are required in a synchronized and coherent manner.”
The January 30, 2005 Iraqi election was clearly a watershed event for Iraq, as well as for the United States and its coalition partners. It marked the highlight and truly the culminating point of my nearly 14 months in Iraq. As an American Soldier and a member of III Corps and the Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I), I was proud to be a part of it and I was even more delighted for the Iraqi people as they took a gigantic leap on the path to democracy. From a public affairs perspective, the story of this election was probably the one widest covered single day event, second only to the capture of Saddam Hussein 13 months earlier. What is not well known to most is the story behind the scenes – the story that American troops were nearly “gagged” from telling their stories and the role they played on this Election Day. If it were not for the hard work, dedication, moral integrity, and intestinal fortitude of a handful of Corps and Division level Public Affairs Officers (PAOs), the American audience may very well have been robbed of this historical day, rich in significance and emotion. This is my story from my perspective and perception of reality as the MNC-I PAO. The names, dates and times herein are accurate to the best of my memory and any mistakes or omissions are not intentional. It is my intent is to tell this story and show how a well-meaning bureaucratic decision at higher headquarters nearly stymied a strategic success.

In the weeks leading up to the historic January 2005 elections in Iraq, we in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Public Affairs Office had developed a comprehensive plan to publicize important aspects of pre-election preparations together with whatever events might unfold during that historically important day. Part of that plan included having obtained clearance to have Fox News reporter Geraldo Rivera cover events from the command’s Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Baghdad. During the preparation phase of this plan, we arranged for Rivera to visit several units “outside the
wire,” including accompanying mounted and dismounted patrols in Mosul. This preparation phase culminated with us dropping him off in Tikrit two days prior to the election for a final sensing of the Iraqi population.¹

However, on the night two days prior to the election, the MNC-I Chief of Staff called me in to inform me that higher headquarters had made a last minute decision not to permit interviews with MNC-I forces on election day. This was a stunning development owing to the many commitments that had been made to the media. Fortunately, we were able to negotiate a modification to the guidance that permitted interviews with battalion and lower level elements. However, we were unable to clear media access for interviews at Headquarters MNC-I. This placed us in a very difficult position with Rivera, potentially placing him and his network in a bad position at virtually the last minute; and, compromising our ability to show an immensely important dimension of what we believed was going to be a great and vitally needed story.²

Now the stage is set for this story, providing the readers with just enough flavor and context of where and how my colleagues and I got to this historic place in space and time. And, of course, I promise not to leave the readers hanging in suspense, but will achieve closure by telling the “Paul Harvey”³ and disclosing how we remedied this situation and ultimately enjoyed at least some limited success on the strategic media battlefield scene.

Background from January 2004 – January 2005

As I look back on the months, weeks, and days leading up to the first free Iraqi elections, I was very skeptical about both the Iraqis’ and our ability to fulfill the promise and successfully “pull it off.” I always kept these doubts buried deep inside me but exuded an optimistic front to friends, colleagues, acquaintances and most casual observers. I always thought and still think we were morally right in going after Saddam Hussein. Unlike some, I believe that there was ample justification in addition to going after weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to this day, do not eliminate the possibility that these WMD may have been moved. However, my doubts about the elections stemmed from the apparent discord among the
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and the lack of infrastructure and sophistication of the Iraqi people. It was not that I didn’t think that the Iraqis could eventually have free elections, but frankly to expect them to get their act together in a year’s time, I believed was very ambitious – to say the least. Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and the lot of our American founding fathers – who declared independence in 1776 – took eleven years to get the United States Constitution written and two more years to put it into effect in 1789 with George Washington as our President. Needless to say, it was astonishing to me that the first round of Iraqi elections indeed happened on January 30, 2005.

The Journey: Deploying from Fort Hood to Iraq

The day came when we finally deployed – the weeks of anxiety and anticipation passed and it was time to go. I drew my 9mm Beretta Pistol at the HHC (Headquarters and Headquarters Company), III Corps Arms Room, Fort Hood, Texas around dusk on January 8, 2004. After dropping off my two duffle bags and one parachute kit bag with all my personal belongings and equipment, we went to a gymnasium with a nice send-off ceremony, which allowed us about an hour to say goodbye to our loved ones. After that we were quarantined and moved out by bus to Fort Hood’s huge Abrams Field House, which was nicely converted to a manifest site replete with all the very efficient last minute checks of wills, medical records – to include last minute shots – dog-tags, etc., as well as good food, music, books, video games, board games, stationary and telephones to pass the time until we boarded our planes.

We departed sometime in the pre-dawn morning hours of January 9, 2004. After just one short stop in Germany at the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base on the south side of Frankfurt Airport, we arrived during a monsoon-like downpour of rain in Kuwait City, Kuwait, followed by an hour or so bus ride to a stopover “tent city” called Camp Wolverine, Kuwait. I never knew the desert could be so wet and cold as we crowded about 30/40 people into GP (General Purpose) large tents which leaked like sieves.

We left Kuwait in multiple waves of C-130 Hercules airplanes on January 11, 2004. My flight was a rousing harbinger of things to come
as the pilot dropped flares and took evasive measures when our plane was shot at on approach to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) by some sort of small hand held missile – probably an RPG. It was a blessing that nobody vomited, although many looked white as ghosts. We landed safely at approximately 2100 hours, took roll call, boarded buses and drove to Camp Victory (named for V Corps).

After in-processing and orientation to the operations of Combined and Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) at Camp Victory, (it was January 14 or 15 when) I got to experience my first wild ride down the infamous stretch of road know as “The Airport Road” or “Route Irish” (for the University of Notre Dame based on a naming convention in an early operations plan [OPLAN] that used college team names for various routes) to the International Zone, better known as the “Green Zone” of Baghdad, where the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was headquartered. After a mission brief, I was whisked away in a soft-skinned sports utility vehicle driven by a U.S. Marine Corporal at over 90 miles per hour. I learned soon that this young corporal and the majority of the other 60 or so troops I would inherit believed in the mantra “speed means security” – if that was true, I was certainly secure!

**CJTF-7 Grounding: My Days as CPIC Director in the International Zone (IZ)**

CJTF-7 was the military headquarters and CPA was the political headquarters. My job initially was as the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) Director. The CPIC supported both CJTF-7 and CPA, but the military personnel belonged to CJTF-7. The plan was for my unit (III Corps, from Fort Hood, Texas) to replace V Corps from Heidelberg, Germany as the core of CJTF-7. I spent the next 10 days or so doing “left-seat-right-seat” transition with my predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Kevin Gainer, a swell guy. Kevin was a real quiet guy – an unlikely hero, who earned a purple heart from multiple shrapnel wounds during the makeshift MLRS (multi-rocket launcher system) attack of the Al Rashid Hotel on October 26, 2003; this attack was responsible for the death of a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Although injured, LTC Gainer was stalwart in helping to evacuate other Soldiers and especially
civilians who were panicking during the attack. Interesting enough, this attack marked the beginning of things to come – it happened just a day after the 14th of July Bridge over the Tigris River was reopened and the very day the curfew over Baghdad was lifted. Bear in mind that we were not calling these attacks and resistance an “insurgency” at this time.

My first real taste of the war came at just about 0800 Baghdad time on January 18, 2004 during my transition with LTC Gainer. We were about to have our morning CPIC meeting, when a huge explosion literally rocked our building. The concussion was so loud, we actually thought our building was hit by something. It turned out to be a huge car bomb or VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive device) using a Toyota truck loaded with over 1,000 pounds of plastic explosive and several 155mm artillery shells “daisy-chained” together, which exploded at the “Assassin’s Gate” leading into the Green Zone – less than 300 meters from the CPIC. Within minutes Colonel Bill Darley, the CJTF-7 PAO, dispatched Kevin and me, with a team of Combat Camera to the scene to witness first hand and record the damage and carnage. The scene was bizarre, almost surreal in a lot of ways to me. I’ll never forget the smell – the odor was like an almost sickening sweet barbeque with metallic overtones. I remember the scene – it was a mangled mess of burning or burnt, twisted vehicles, including a bus full of people on their way to work. There was charred and greasy debris all over the place, including chunks of meat, which on inspection were pieces of human flesh. One poignant sight was a car with what appeared to be a woman in the passenger side huddling over to protect a baby or small toddler she was holding. All the bodies were little more than skeletons covered with black melted tar-like flesh, barely recognizable as humans. Estimates of the carnage varied. The Associated Press reported on January 19: “Latest figures show 24 people were killed and about 120 injured in the weekend truck bombing at a gate to the headquarters compound of the U.S.-led coalition, the Iraqi Health Minister said Monday. U.S. officials put the casualty toll at ‘about 20’ dead and 63 injured.”

During the next four months as the CPIC Director for CJTF-7, I experienced several other incidents to include rocket and mortar
attacks, and road movements just ahead of IED (improvised explosive device) attacks or caught in traffic jams just behind IED attacks. And although my personal safety was probably more threatened by these later attacks, nothing had a singularly profound effect on me like that first baptism at Assassin’s Gate.

CJTF-7 Splits: Welcome MNF-I and MNC-I

On May 15, 2004, CJTF-7 officially split into two headquarters. The warfighting tactical/operational command became known as Multi-National Corps Iraq, with III Corps as its core, under the leadership of Lieutenant General (LTG) Thomas F. Metz. The political/strategic headquarters was called Multi-National Forces Iraq, initially with LTG Ricardo Sanchez from V Corps remaining in command, until General George Casey replaced him on July 1, 2004. By request of Brigadier General (BG) Mark Kimmitt, I stayed on at the CPIC through the first two days of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse trials, which were major media events that used the CPIC as the venue, through the release of 24 detainees from Abu Ghraib on May 24, 2004.

Move to Camp Victory as MNC-I PAO

Late May 2004, was a happy time for me to rejoin my III Corps brethren at Camp Victory. By all indications, LTG Metz seemed thrilled to have his staff back under his command – I know I was happy to be back in the fold. My able deputy and plans officer from Fort Hood (MAJ Scott Bleichwehl) and the PAO Sergeant Major (SGM Eric Parris) greeted me with open arms. During the next few weeks we put together a PAO staff and established physical work spaces to accommodate them in our newly renovated headquarters building, which was formerly known as Saddam Hussein’s Al Faw Palace and referred to by Americans as the “Water Palace.” We also focused on purchasing SUVs and sophisticated satellite broadcast equipment called DVIDS (Defense Visual Information Distribution Systems), among other innovations as we prepared to tell the MNC-I story and serve as an advocate for the divisions and other subordinate formations.
Operation Al-Fajr or Phantom Fury: The Retaking of Fallujah

The period from June 2004 to January 2005 saw MNC-I tackle multiple operations and myriad activities. Pertinent to setting the conditions for successful Iraqi elections were a number of shaping operations in partnership with the fledgling Iraqi government. The last major push to set the conditions was the much-anticipated return to Fallujah, a town held captive and used as a safe-haven for insurgents. The operation was known as Operation Al-Fajr – which means “The Dawn” in Arabic; the original name was Operation Phantom Fury – this was changed to better resonate with the Iraqi people, since the idealistic goal was to take Fallujah from the insurgents and give it back to the good people of Fallujah. Operation Al-Fajr lasted about six weeks – starting in early November 2004 and wrapping up in late December 2004. From a coalition perspective we believed it was not only a tactical victory, but we gained some traction in strategic information credibility with the capture of evidence of several bomb making factories, torture chambers, human slaughter houses, weapons caches (including many in mosques), and insurgent broadcasting and film-making equipment. In contrast, interesting enough, there were wide differences in media coverage – some left leaning press and bloggers were quick to criticize this as a “war crime within a war crime” even going as far as wrongly characterizing the use of white phosphorus illumination rounds as evidence of illegal chemical weapons.6

Media Coverage Plans for the January 2004 Iraqi Elections

As the military typically does, this being no exception, there was a concerted effort over time to plan for the MNF-I/MNC-I support plan for the Iraqi elections. The planning had been going on for months. The media coverage plan was also being worked at multiple levels.

The overall military goal of the election from an information perspective was to tout the bravery and improvement of the Iraqi Army and National Guard, and emphasize that we, the Coalition Forces, were in direct support of the Iraqi Forces. This top-down guidance was well disseminated, in my opinion. If you asked
American troops from the most junior private to the most senior general officer, they would repeat the mantra: “We are supporting the Iraqi Forces in their first democratic elections.” The preparedness and quality of the Iraqi Forces was very uneven; in some rare cases “support” might mean a few American advisors with reach-back capability with an Iraqi battalion. In other cases it might mean an American brigade supporting an Iraqi squad. I am not being cynical here; I saw a lot of brave Iraqis – many of whom gave their lives – but it is impossible to grow a military remotely comparable to ours during conflict, on the fly, in such a short period of time. The Iraqis were getting better in most cases, but were clearly not at a level to operate on their own.

One thing that was consistent across the country was the strategy for the Americans and other coalition partners to take a back stage on the “outer cordon” if you will. The image that was not desired and would not be tolerated was a polling place with non-Iraqis securing the polling box. We must take a back seat. I fundamentally agreed with that philosophy and all the guidance about what we should emphasize and not emphasize was well meant. However, ultimately, there is a need to balance between touting the Iraqis and honestly telling of the roles and missions of the MNC-I troops there. From an American perspective, without compromising operations security (OPSEC), we had a responsibility, in my view, to tell the American public what 160,000 troops (up from 130,000 for the purposes of security and shaping for the election) were doing in Iraq. Though it was well-intended, a sole emphasis on only the Iraqi Forces without acknowledging the Americans and Coalition partners potentially insulted the intelligence of the general population shaped by the media, whose job it is to tell the story and can ultimately hurt the integrity and efficacy of the strategic mission. This is a prelude to the events that transpired within the last 36-48 hours prior to the election.

The Scheme: Where MNC-I Fit in the Chain

At Headquarters, MNC-I, I worked closely and diligently to synchronize or at least de-conflict the embed plans and media operations of all the subordinate divisions and task forces. One of MNC-I PAO’s roles was to act as a mitigating agent for the subordinate formations in
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dealings with MNF-I Strategic Communication (STRATCOM); this organization at Headquarters, MNF-I was an umbrella over PAO, Information Operations (IO), and Psychological Operations. The MNF-I Spokesman and MNF-I STRATCOM Director was U.S. Air Force Brigadier General “Irv” Lessel. The CPIC also fell under MNF-I STRATCOM and did not report directly to the MNF-I PAO – which in my mind was not a good construct and a constant point of contention. For the purposes of this paper, I will not get into a lot of detail here, but wish to set the stage by framing where MNC-I fit in the daily chain of command and PAO staff channels, with respect to both our higher and lower echelons.

In addition to working to support both our higher and lower headquarters, MNC-I PAO often had select “high visibility” media directly embedded within the Corps Headquarters to get the perspective of LTG Metz and his staff, but also used the Corps Headquarters as a staging base for multiple trips and related stories in various subordinate unit sectors. At MNC-I PAO, we had a plan and made pledges to embed media for the lead-up and actual execution of the January 2005 elections.

Headquarters MNC-I Media Embed Plan

During the run-up to the election there were a lot of big name media, some of whom essentially invited themselves – the late ABC Anchorman Peter Jennings comes to mind, as well as CNN’s Christiane Amanpour. But there were journalists with whom we had already developed a relationship and established plans for a repeat embed for months. The plan was to give these journalists as much access as possible to tell the story of the elections from our perspective; which was consistent with the approach and stated higher command policy that we were supporting the Iraqis for “their” elections – it was not our show. As New York Times reporter Thom Shanker recalled: “Camp Victory was simply over-run with big name media types in the week or two before the election. Many network anchors were there (one of your comrades was even asked to have one of these anchor’s suits dry cleaned. Dry cleaned???). No doubt that created a manpower issue for your PA staff.”

The two journalists I will focus my story on are Thom Shanker of the
New York Times, who was with us two weeks up till election day and in particular, Fox News’ Geraldo Rivera and his spectacular television coverage.

**Thom and Geraldo: Great Americans**

I personally know or have met hundreds of journalists. Like any group of people from any walk of life, there are some good news media personalities and some bad ones, and a whole lot of them somewhere in the middle. Two gentlemen who I would never hesitate to work with are Thom Shanker and Geraldo Rivera. In many ways these two men are as different as night and day, but they share a passion for telling the real stories of Soldiers and Marines, not from a thousand miles away, but right there with them, sharing the danger, living in the same conditions, and eating the same rations. A PAO should never ask a journalist for a “good” story, but he or she has a right to expect a fair story. As a military PAO I have always ascertained and strongly believe that our story, especially at the unit level – warts and all – is fundamentally a good story. Allowing access to “fair” journalists will get you a good story more often than not. Thom and Geraldo get it right and have delivered great stories about our men and women in Iraq.

Thom Shanker has the honor of being the first true embedded reporter with MNC-I. He interviewed and established a rapport with LTG Metz before we ever departed Fort Hood and initially arrived in Baghdad soon after the MNC-I breakaway from CJTF-7, in May 2004. The interpersonal relationship and trust we built with Thom paid big dividends. As a PAO, it is a good day when the morning starts out with your boss on the front page above the fold of the New York Times in a positive piece.

Thom is a very thoughtful and intellectual guy; he is thorough and checks his facts with multiple sources – a consummate professional. He has a warm and very polite personality. Although on the surface he may seem rather introverted, once you get to know him, his witty charm and sense of humor shine through. Realizing full well that PAOs must supposedly be careful about crossing the line of familiarity vice professional relationships with media to ensure objectivity, I can say with a clear conscience that I consider Thom a
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dear friend who has shared wartime experiences with me and I have absolutely no concerns about any professional compromise.

Geraldo Rivera is a household name; his name usually strikes a chord with people either in a positive way or a negative way – not much in-between. What a lot of people do not realize, is that Geraldo has worked for every major network and cable network, with successful shows on all and has continually redefined himself. Both an entertainer and truly gifted journalist – his passion and enthusiasm are always apparent.

The work Geraldo has done in both telling our story and lifting the morale of our Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors is under-appreciated in my view. He is human and made an unintentional mistake with the infamous “Map in the Sand” episode during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom – but nobody was harmed because of the error. He apologized and has done a world of good for our servicemen and women since then.

In my view, Geraldo is truly a brave man – those who criticize him for exaggerating and glamorizing himself have not likely been around him during peril. The first time I met him was via the phone in February 2004 when he and his crew were attacked while driving from Tikrit in the 4th Infantry Division’s AO (Area of Operations) heading toward Task Force Olympia’s and the “Stryker Brigade” AO in Mosul. He was on the phone with the CPIC media desk at one time, with the sound of small arms gun fire very audible. I found him equally brave in person in two other incidents; the first was on a foot patrol in Mosul two days prior to the election and the other on the Election Day in an open courtyard at the police station in Saba Al Boor – west of Baghdad. I will describe these in some more detail and will also share a story that will put him in perspective and give you an insight to the man that Geraldo really is.

Pre-election Embeds: Thom and Geraldo Arrive

Thom Shanker arrived at Headquarters, MNC-I around the middle of January 2005; this was his third visit. He stated: “During my two weeks at MNC-I ahead of the election, I conducted interviews on a wide variety of topics with a large number of officers involved.
The themes included the transition to local control by the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces], with coalition forces moving into a stand- 
back/overwatch role; the changing make-up of the insurgency; and 
progress in standing up Iraqi Security Forces.”

His recollection clearly supports my premise that the U.S. and Coalition Forces clearly knew their “lane” in terms of where we fit into the picture and what the important messages were that needed to be communicated. Another point, which I will magnify in a moment, Shanker also observed was: “…And I seem to recall that one order came down from the top, whether MNF-I or the Third Deck at the Pentagon I don’t know, that only Iraqi faces should be on TV. So it helped that I had been there so many times before, and worked for print media.”

Geraldo Rivera arrived on January 25 and his crew arrived a few 
days earlier as I recall on or about January 22. This was his second 
embed with MNC-I. The logistical challenge for Geraldo’s team 
was that they were traveling with about 2,500–3,000 pounds of 
gear to include a mini-studio for his live TV show broadcasts. He 
sent his team in a few days ahead to set-up and scout out potential 
venues and get some story ideas. The biggest difference between 
the broadcast media (television in particular) and the print media are 
the visuals. You need to find stories and backdrops that are visually 
stimulating for TV and that can be packaged for maximum impact 
and short time. TV can have an immediate impact and wide appeal 
to broad audiences, but the disadvantage of television is that the 
stories tend to be only an inch deep with little shelf life; this is why 
that although both television and print media are relevant, the needs 
of TV and the requirements of units and PAOs supporting TV tend to 
be much higher. While Thom Shanker was off interviewing several 
key leaders for his in-depth pieces, we had to start to work hard right 
away, as Geraldo was ready to get out there and tell stories.

Geraldo’s Plan and Chance Meeting with LTG Metz

While walking back to my office in the palace after dinner at our 
new Camp Victory Dining Facility – new since Geraldo’s last visit in 
June 2004 – we discussed the venue for his Election Day coverage. 
Geraldo pitched an idea about having what could be described as an
“election day return central” from the Joint Operations Center (JOC), from which he would broadcast his special two-hour live show and give periodic live updates to Fox News throughout the day. As we walked up the spiral marble staircase leading to my office, we had a chance meeting engagement with LTG Metz, who was coming down the stairs. Geraldo, not known for his shyness, came right out and pitched his idea to LTG Metz. LTG Metz was favorably disposed to the idea and we seemed to have the green light to carry on with this JOC venue plan. Over the next few days the Fox engineers worked closely with the MNC-I security and electronic experts to figure out and hard wire the JOC for the election return coverage. This effort was completed in parallel and simultaneously with Geraldo’s news trips around the Iraq Area of Operations.

**Weapons Cache: Geraldo Visits TF 2-12 Cavalry AO**

Bright and early on the morning of January 26, 2005, Geraldo, cameraman Christian Galdibini, and I flew from the Camp Victory Helipad to meet with LTC Tim Ryan, Commander, Task Force 2-12 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, in his AO near the Iraqi town of Latifiyah, south of Baghdad near the Euphrates River. Three days earlier, Tim’s troops discovered a huge buried cache of weapons, munitions and explosives, in eight separate locations. They were helped by local Iraqi farmers turned informants who wanted to get on with their lives and were disenfranchised by the insurgents. This cache (actually a field of over 100 caches) extended over acres of sand dunes with countless high explosive rounds to include tons of field artillery, anti-aircraft, and tank rounds, as well as ten 1,000 pound FROG 7 warheads. The 2-12 Cavalry with a contingent of Iraqi National Guard were excavating sites and blowing them up in place. We spent all day with the 2-12 Cav and returned in the early evening. That night Geraldo put together a piece that aired that afternoon (back in the U.S.) on Fox News. LTC Ryan and the Task Force Baghdad (1st Cavalry Division) PAO, LTC James Hutton, had been trying to get journalists to go out and cover this good news story – most media were either afraid or didn’t want to bother with going out in the sticks to cover the story or both. No problem for Geraldo – we pitched the story and he conservatively turned it in to a triple, if not a homerun.
Of note, was that this would have only been a night for bad news – if we didn’t have this coverage of a positive development. The big story that day was tragedy; a Marine Corps helicopter crashed, killing 31 total – I believe it was 30 Marines and 1 Navy corpsmen. This event, unbeknownst to me at the time, had a profound impact on Geraldo Rivera. I found out about this impact two days later, as will be revealed later in this monograph.

Long Cold Helicopter Flight from Baghdad to Mosul to Tikrit to Baghdad

January 27, 2005 was another huge day for telling the warriors’ story – we flew to Mosul to spend the day with Task Force Olympia – replete with mounted Stryker Patrols, dismounted foot patrols, and an opportunity for Thom Shanker and Geraldo Rivera to accompany GEN Casey and LTG Metz, while BG Ham (Task Force Olympia Commanding General) gave them briefings and a tour of election preparations under way.

The group consisted of my deputy (Major Scott Bleichwehl) and me as the PAO escorts, Thom Shanker, and Geraldo with a crew of two – producer/cameramen Greg Hart and cameramen Christian Galdibini. The helicopter ride to and from was one of the coldest I can ever remember, which is quite a statement, considering I was a former Air Assault Battalion Operations Officer in Korea. As Thom Shanker recalls it in an email:

*You (LTC Baggio) and Scott (Major Bleichwehl) and Geraldo and I flew up in a Black Hawk. You and Scott were wearing DCUs (Desert Camouflage Uniform) and your body armor. No cold-weather gear visible. You and Geraldo sat in the front seat; Scott and I in back. Doors open. It was freezing cold. The flight home that night was even worse. The nighttime temperature clearly was far below freezing; add to that the chill of a 50-knot or so wind. I saw you rubbing your Ranger tab to stay warm, a story I have told many times to your Ranger comrades when I meet them...And we had to stop at Balad and refuel.*

One of the funniest things I remember was watching Geraldo during the flight and his body language as we became colder and colder. The pilots put Geraldo up front next to the door gunner to get a
good look. As one would expect, at first all of us were excited and attentive to peering out the doors-open helicopter and viewing a big slice of the Iraqi landscape. I was freezing, but trying not to show it. After several minutes Geraldo began rearranging luggage to try to block the wind and covered himself with a makeshift blanket of suitcases and duffle bags – he looked miserable. At one point – I believe it was at our refueling point in Camp Anaconda, Balad – Geraldo looked me straight in the eye and dead-panned: “Next time I’m flying coach.”

On the ground bright and early at Mosul, we linked up with the new TF Olympia PAO. We spent the first part of the day with Company A, 1-24th Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. We were given a situational update and briefing of the AO in the company command post and then we loaded up in Strykers and went on a mounted patrol. We were given an excellent orientation of the AO and even stopped at a forward platoon command post on a four or five story building in Mosul. While we were on patrol in the Strykers, there was a mortar attack in our vicinity. We raced to a dismount point and pursued the pinpoint of the launch on foot patrol. Inside this residential area, the streets were narrow and dirty, within a maze of two to four story town-house type buildings. We found a spot in a run-down playground that appeared to be burn marks which may have been the launch point of a rocket or some type of mortar. While on patrol we encountered small arms fire apparently coming from one of these close quartered buildings within our sector. We were maneuvering from building to building staying close to the walls; Major Bleichwehl and I maintained accountability of the journalists and made sure they were not too bold for their own good.

What really struck me that day and made me proud to be an American Soldier, especially witnessed by the journalists, was the calm and collected way these young officers, non-commissioned officers, and junior Soldiers conducted their business. They went door-to-door politely asking people for any information about who might have launched mortars or was taking poorly-aimed (Thank God!) rifle shots at us. These guys, our Soldiers, were unflappable – at the request of Geraldo, they also took an informal poll, asking folks if
they planned to vote. As I remember it the results were mixed, with some saying “yes” and some saying “no” and I distinctly remember at least one or two saying they weren’t sure, because they did not know who the candidates were. I am not sure how typical this neighborhood was compared to others – I do know that this was a particularly impoverished part of town – there seemed to be a lot of working age men just hanging around with nothing to do. I am not sure of the actual time of our boots on the ground, it was probably an hour but it felt like an eternity. We mounted up and returned to the Stryker Forward Operating Base (FOB). We had been out for about three hours.

The day’s efforts contributed to some great stories of Soldiers doing a tough job. According to Thom: “At one point during the trip to Mosul, we visited an FOB in the AO of Lt. Col. Erik Kurilla. His troops had set up a sniper position and overwatch in a bombed-out building. While all the generals and reporters were milling about, a car bomb went off just a few hundred yards away.” The visit resulted in a spot story on pre-election preparations, which was released on January 28.12 Geraldo got a lot of B-roll (short for “background-roll” – which is camera footage used for filler or visual context in a story) and some small snippets and sound bytes that were interspersed throughout the day on Fox News.

That night about 2300 or so, we dropped Geraldo and crew off in Tikrit in the 1st Infantry Division’s AOR. The plan was for them to spend the night and interview the Commanding General, MG Batiste and see the preparations being done in Saddam Hussein’s home town. We left him with the 1st Infantry Division PAO and proceeded by to Camp Victory.

**No American Faces: BG Troy Breaks the News**

I remember that night, upon my return, when BG William “Bill” Troy, the MNC-I Chief of Staff, came into my office. It was late, around 0100 in the morning on the 28th I think. He told me to sit down, which made me worry. Thoughts raced through my head. What happened? Why was he trying to break something gently to me? Were my wife and kids and parents OK? Then he started in: “I know how hard you have worked to plan the media interface for
Election Day, especially the embed with Geraldo... Look, there’s been a change to a “no American faces” policy. Also, Geraldo will not be able to operate out of the JOC as planned.” I just about lost it!!!! I understood and the troops understood the sensitivities about giving the Iraqis their due, but in my opinion this was short-sighted and did not answer the mail to the American public about what our 160,000 troops were doing in Iraq. Ideas like this are the same types of things that lose confidence with the American public and encourage discussion of “spin” or should I dare say “propaganda” on the part of the U.S. military.

I started working it hard – that very night or rather morning. One voice of reason was USAF Colonel Jerry Renne. He was the MNF-I STRATCOM PAO – a deputy to Brig Gen Lessel (not to be confused with the Army Colonel who was General Casey’s PAO). Colonel Renne helped to get a modification. Anyway, I remember pushing back; my very vocal resistance was rewarded with a modification in the policy that allowed only lieutenant colonels and below to talk. Still, no generals or full-colonels could be interviewed and no media were allowed in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) on Election Day and nothing at the Headquarters, MNC-I level. This was still not satisfactory, but much better than a totally no-American face policy.

**Breaking the Bad News to Geraldo**

It was sometime in the early afternoon, as I recall, on January 28; we were only about 36 hours away from the first free elections in Iraq and my invited media guest, Geraldo, who we planned on since June, was being told to go away. I felt plain awful and literally sick to my stomach as I made my way out to the helipad to meet Geraldo and break the bad news to him – it was not fun being me at that moment. Returning from Tikrit, the helicopter landed, then there was a scurry of activity as Geraldo and crew passed boxes of gear and luggage from under the rotors. I studied Geraldo closely, still trying to figure out what I was going to say to him. With a bag on his right shoulder and dragging a wheeled suitcase with his left arm, the mustachioed Mr. Rivera came charging out from under the blades. In an effortless one stroke, one armed flip, he removed his black
Kevlar helmet, grabbed it in his right arm and joined it with the bag on his right shoulder, his hair blowing wildly in the helicopter blast.

Both the concerns of ruining our reputation and credibility with Fox and Geraldo in particular, as well as our ability to tell this key bit of MNC-I (and frankly III Corps) history weighed heavily on me as we scrambled to find alternatives not only as a professional responsibility, but as a matter of honor, believing that the broken commitment could easily be perceived as a betrayal of trust. The anxiety apparently showed on my face as I trudged to the helipad to meet Mr. Rivera on his return from Tikrit. As Geraldo saw me walk towards him, he looked at me and asked me what was wrong. I paused and then said: “Geraldo I’ve got some bad news.”

His chin dropped, his face became tensely serious, and his eyes narrowed with concern, and he said: “What’s wrong, what happened?”

“Well,” I began, “Though I know that we had committed to support your coverage of the election from here, for reasons I am not at liberty to explain, we have to cancel your access to the MNC-I (JOC).”

At that point, his eyes opened and his face regained its composure, and he let out a clearly audible gasp of relief. Our helmets were off; he then physically grabbed my head, with his left hand behind the nape of my neck, and placed his forehead on my forehead – skin to skin – and said: “Is that all?” Continuing he said, “Man, you had me worried. I thought you were going to tell me another helicopter with troops was shot down or something like that – Man, am I relieved!” After briefly discussing our efforts to find alternative ways to cover the election, he then said, “Don’t sweat it; this is just bureaucratic B.S.; we’ll figure something out.”

That moment was the defining one in my relationship with Geraldo. I went from pre-judging him as an entertainer and sensational journalist before I met him, to liking him and trusting him the first time we worked together, to this point…and I will say it to anyone’s face…I learned to love him like a brother. Sure Geraldo Rivera is
flamboyant, but his emotion and passion is real – what you see on camera is who he truly is and there is nothing phony about him.

Thom Shanker Departs on Election Eve

During Thom Shanker’s embed, he conducted interviews with Generals Casey, Metz, Chiarelli and Ham. Thom Shanker departed Iraq with five great stories about the election – one which was released prior to the elections and four written, but held-up for later release. His stories often required visits to distal ends of the country for him to get a true sense or feel of the country. One day he went out on patrol with a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division (which had folded under 1st Cavalry Division). He focused on pre-election security, especially liaison with local police units in the area of operations. A story released on the 30th was a combination about pre-election patrols and hard work in both the Abu Ghraib slums of Baghdad and in Mosul. Then there was his “big election story” which he talks about below, focused on pre-election security, especially liaison with local police units in its AO. Thom’s ability and willingness to write these rich kinds of stories, reinforced why it was important to engage the American media with American military. Thom wrote me in an email:

...the big piece I filed on Election Day, and ran the day after the voting. I landed back in DC to be on station to cover the political aftermath of the Iraqi vote. But I was called in straight from the airport to write a page-one story about all of the clever and outside-the-box things the coalition had done to deter and prevent violence. They are all listed in the story I sent you (which should be at the bottom of this e-mail). They included General Metz’s orders to stockpile supplies so he could halt convoy traffic; pushing as many combat troops out of the FOBs as possible; set up fake polling places ahead of the vote to draw insurgent attack, and then announce the real ones just 48 hours in advance so the insurgents would have difficulty in targeting; setting up a daisy chain of searches for women voters; printing new I.D.s for Iraq police and police cars to prevent impersonators. This story, which was chased the next day by most of the mainstream media, would not have been possible without the access I was afforded over the two-week embed. The agreement, of course, was that those tactics, techniques and procedures could not be written in advance. But
Information as Power

the story, which ran the day after the election, informed the readers about all of the very clever planning and execution done by the coalition to produce an election day that surprised all with the low level of violence.\textsuperscript{16}

Salvation: 256th ESB from Louisiana to the Rescue

The scramble was on. We were now more or less 36 hours out from elections and as gracious as Geraldo was, I knew it was only because of his faith in Major Bleichwehl and me to come through for him and his crew as we always had. As a matter of fact, Geraldo had so much confidence in our abilities to sort it out as I recall, he arranged to fly to the Green Zone with the intent of interviewing some of the high rollers at the political level. The crown jewel of his trip – and I don’t remember the details of how he set it up – was an exclusive interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

So the new guidance was unit level, rubber meets the road sort of stuff. My first call was to my fellow Fort Hood brethren and logistically closest unit, Task Force Baghdad. As it turned out, the Task Force Baghdad and 1st Cavalry Division’s Public Affairs Officer, LTC James Hutton, was able to set up a visually rich opportunity at a police station in Saba Al Boor, supported by the 256th Enhanced Separate Brigade (ESB) of the Louisiana National Guard. Ironically, the change of venue resulted in some of the most dramatic and famous coverage of Election Day. Rivera reported from polling stations and featured the work of the Soldiers of the 256th that demonstrated the great effort that had gone into making the election a resounding statement of success.\textsuperscript{17}

The way I remember it, is that my faith in prior coordination was now somewhat shaken, considering the events over the last few hours which rendered not only handshakes, but written plans obsolete. I did not assume LTC Hutton’s suggestion was a done deal. I rechecked with him to ensure that this was communicated via the 1st Cavalry chain to his Commanding General, Major General (MG) Peter Chiarelli, and back down to the unit. I also coordinated directly to the 256th ESB to get a sense of the climate there and see if it would be a good match. And, of course I ran it up the chain to MNF-I STRATCOM, to make sure they had no heartburn.
So when I was comfortably sure that we were locked in, I called Geraldo – still at the International Zone, to brief him up. I called him enthusiastically, prepared for the hard sell – but I did not have to sell hard. Geraldo graciously and sincerely said, “I’m sure it will be great. I’ll see you tomorrow morning and we’ll work all the details.”

So it is now election eve back at Camp Victory. Geraldo’s plan now is to do a two hour live show from 0600 to 0800 Baghdad time, which I believe was 2200 to 2400 EST. For anyone who has never worked with this kind of format, it requires moving in and out to keep Americans’ short attention span interested. This means there are requirements for short prepackaged stories and interviews as well as guests standing by in studios around the world to be brought on the show. Geraldo literally brings the studio to him in virtual reality, while on location. A lot of work and it all seems easy to moms and dads sitting home in America watching.

**LTG Metz: Interview in the JOC**

Geraldo really wants to interview LTG Metz. LTG Metz sincerely feels bad that we could not do the Election Day show in the JOC – but “orders is orders” as my old first sergeant used to say. What I suggest is that he interview the general today – the day before the election; the General is not opposed to my suggestion that he interview with Geraldo the day before the election, but he has a caveat. LTG Metz tells me, “OK Dan, but I want you to make sure that MNF-I is OK with this. General Lessel (USAF Brig Gen, MNF-I STRATCOM) needs to ensure GEN Casey is read-in and approves.” After phone calls back and forth, it is a done deal – the interview is on – in the JOC. It is now after dinner and we are less than 12 hours from election time on January 29, 2005. The beautiful part is that this interview – in which LTG Metz was awesome – was one of those packaged pieces that was played on Geraldo’s live show on Election Day. The show aired EST in the states at 2200 on the 29th – once again technically not Election Day. So the bottom line is that I did not violate the letter of guidance, but we got the same net result and I would say even better, because we got visuals of the JOC incorporated into the show, but the original plan was not nearly as
exciting as what was to be. Also, to jump ahead for the record, the post election feedback from the Pentagon and MNF-I was positive.

After the interview LTG Metz apologized to Geraldo for any hardship the last-minute changes had caused him and offered any support he could to include the use of his helicopter to transport the crew back to Camp Victory after the elections. We did take advantage of this offer; our extraction plan was now set.

Convoy to Saba Al Boor

It was now about 2000 hours on January 29; the plan, I believe was to link-up around midnight in the 256th ESB motor pool, located at Camp Victory North (renamed by 1st Cavalry Division as Camp Liberty). We then had to cross-load the 3,000 pounds of Fox News’ equipment between about a dozen vehicles on a pitch black night, in preparation for an SP (Start Point) time of 0100 as I recall. The vehicles were so full, that Major Bleichwehl actually borrowed our Corps historian’s armored HMMWV to gain a few seats; we were short a seat and Major Johnson (the historian) graciously relinquished his seat and stayed back.

I was tired – I don’t think Scott and I even went to bed that night prior to the convoy to the election site. I kind of remember going to the latrine trailer for one last quality nature call – a real luxury in otherwise austere conditions – and a shave and face wash. I may have taken a 30-minute cat-nap, which was my normal procedure on these kinds of events. I do know that on the ride over I was nodding off. It was probably just as well that I was sleepy or I might have been real edgy, since I vaguely remember the convoy stopping along the route in what we called “Indian (or Injun) Country” several times during my sleepy stupor.

Preparation for the Show

We arrived at the Saba Al Boor Police Station around 0200. Once we parked the vehicles, we inventoried all the equipment, then helped Geraldo and crew scout out the best location – which was on the roof of the police station – and then helped his crew put the set together. We accomplished all this by a little after 0300, I think.
Geraldo, set up a makeshift office inside and worked on his laptop putting the final touches of his show together. The troops from the 256th ESB set up shop, to include a makeshift command post and placed snipers and 360 degree security around the police station.

One thing interesting to me was talking to and observing our snipers in positions on the roof of the police station. Attached to each modified M-14, 7.62mm Sniper Rifle was a red laser. When you aimed the weapon at a target, you could see the red dot with the naked eye a long way off. Pointing this laser served as quite a deterrent to any would be attacker. During darkness, we saw several men dressed in dark clothes acting in a very suspicious manner, darting in and out and from behind buildings across the street of the police station. They seemed to me to be casing out our position in order to get into a posture to fire something at us.

Like magic, as the snipers trained their rifles on these intruders painting them with the knowing red laser dots, we watched them run away like the cowards they were, without a shot fired. There was a bit of a cat and mouse game, as one or two would probe us again to test the alertness of our snipers, just to be met with our familiar laser dots, which was counteracted again by running out of view. So we knew there were folks out there watching our every move.

The live air time was 0600–0800. Normally, we PAOs will be on the set of these kinds of telecasts about one hour early to help answer last minute questions, hustle to find troops with particular home towns or other unique angles – like two brothers serving, father and son, husband and wife, etc. – and just to make sure the talent and crew have a warm and fuzzy feeling. This meant Scott and I had about two hours to kill before our 0500 show time. So we decided to crawl up in the back of a HMMWV and sleep.

We were so tired, we were giddy. I remember walking up to this vehicle in the parking lot at this police station in the middle of a town in the middle of nowhere. Visions of George Armstrong Custer danced through my head – what if the bad guys decided to do something? The vehicle was cold, dirty and uncomfortable, but we were too tired to care. After crawling in and cramming up together in the back of the HMMWV, we looked at each other and had one of
those simultaneous laughing attacks. It was a therapeutic heartfelt stress reliever. We asked ourselves: “What were we doing out here? We could be back at Camp Victory, but no, not us. Here we both are, two “forty-something” husbands and fathers running around with the media in the “Red Zone” after thirteen months in country and only two weeks or so left before we were going back to our families in Texas. What is wrong with us?’’ But we had such a good laugh; I remember tears were running down my cheeks. Scott and I made such a good team through all the good days and bad days – at least speaking for myself, our ability to talk, listen, cry, and yell at each other helped me keep sane over 13 months in Iraq. Major Bleichwehl was my right-hand and left-hand man through a lot of sticky situations and will always be my younger brother – our fraternal bond will forever be strong.

Show Time: Dawn of a New Iraq

The live show was fantastic. After several communications tests and making sure the folks in the U.S. were ready to go, it kicked off right on time at 0600. The time of the show was perfect for visuals, as it started off in pitch black and continued through sunrise and full daylight. During the show, off-camera during a commercial break, in response to the beautiful vista and the historic situation, Geraldo’s field producer Greg Hart coined the phrase: “The Dawn of a New Iraq.” Moved by the phrase’s simple, but eloquent symbolic meaning, Geraldo said it on camera and gave the attribution to Greg Hart.

As the first light came up over the horizon, we began to see a flurry of activity as people – men, women, and children – began streaming out into the streets. It was a carnival-like atmosphere with people waving Iraqi flags, ladies delivering flowers to our troops in front of the police station, kids playing and men dancing in the streets and alleys. The reaction by most of us who saw this was joyful emotion. Geraldo’s on-camera emotion was heartfelt and was palpable by all that were there. Really, there was an initial sigh of relief as the first two hours of elections went off without a hitch. My doubts that we or the Iraqi people could ever pull this off were melted away. I truly felt proud to be a part of this historical event.
The show wrapped-up promptly at 0800, followed by hugs and high-fives. Geraldo off-camera was really crying tears of joy. It was an electric atmosphere. The plan now was to eat breakfast and then to take Geraldo and a cameraman on a tour of the local polling place and hopefully interview some Iraqis. The additional footage would be sent back to use during the day for Fox updates and much of it for Geraldo’s Sunday night show (early Monday morning Baghdad time) which we would shoot at Camp Victory with two Military Police units. After this, we would pack-up all our gear and get extracted via LTG Metz’s flight of helicopters.

**Lethal Mortar Attack Does Little to Quell Iraqi Spirit**

We all had the opportunity to eat some or part of a military Meal-Ready-to-Eat (MRE). Geraldo went out and returned to the police station and was very happy with the scenes he encountered in town. It was approximately 0930 while we were physically escorting Geraldo Rivera in the flat open court yard at the front of the police station, that we heard the close scream of a mortar. The mortar flew directly over our heads and landed approximately 25–35 meters away from us on the opposite side of a thin retaining wall. The attack resulted in the confirmed death of one Iraqi civilian.

Upon sound recognition of a mortar overhead, we reacted instinctively. Major Bleichwehl and I immediately secured the journalists; we were yelling at them to get down and physically pushed them to the ground to minimize exposure. Minutes after the attack we escorted Geraldo Rivera to the scene, where an Iraqi woman lay dead on her way to vote. This attack was well documented by Geraldo and was the centerpiece of a news segment on national television and incorporated into the next night’s show.

The poignant scene of this attack ironically represented both what was wrong with this country and what was right in terms of an indelible spirit of a people yearning to be free. It was striking: on the one side you see Geraldo next to this dead Iraqi woman who was moments earlier vibrant on her way to vote crying out, “Why? Why?” But, the amazing thing to me was that after a period of time – I believe it was within 30 minutes – an ambulance came and took away her body, and then I watched with my own two eyes as people continued
to queue up to vote. These brave people refused to be intimidated by terrorists. This opened my eyes and serves as a touchstone to me whenever I see negative speculation about the future of Iraq. I often remark that in many towns and cities across the U.S., people might not vote at sight of the first rain cloud in the sky – not these folks. This powerful story would not have been told had we not been there to tell it to the American people.

Return to Camp Victory and Preparation for the Next Morning Show

At approximately 1300 on January 30, we said good bye to the 256th ESB and Iraqi troops and police on the scene and to Saba Al Boor. I met an Iraqi Army Lieutenant who was happy for his country, but swelled with emotion and conflicted sadness about separation from his family members due to Saddam Hussein’s oppressive regime – he said in very broken English that he had a brother in America (Detroit, I believe) who he has not been in touch with and had no idea how to get in touch with him or whether or not he was even still alive. Before leaving I posed for a picture with him. We all felt a true feeling of satisfied accomplishment, as we prepared to literally leave our small police station and friends in the dust. Two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters landed in the dusty open field next to the police station. We loaded up our kit and away we went.

As soon as we landed at Camp Victory, our job was to find a venue and unit to do the next morning’s show with. We called the operations desk for Headquarters, 89th MP Brigade (which was a III Corps and Fort Hood organic unit) and made arrangements to link up with members of two different MP brigades – units that were either attached to or working with the 89th MPs, but not organic to them. Army Military Police (MP) often deployed piecemeal – one company at a time. As I recall, Headquarters, 89th MPs were preparing for redeployment. The 89th MP Brigade Commander, Colnel Dave Phillips (a great supporter and reliable producer of media engagement), had already departed for Fort Hood and by late January. The 89th MP Operations Desk (in name only) was a mix of folks I did not know. We ended up with a great combination of troops from the 18th MP Brigade, who were members of the North
Carolina National Guard and another group from the 42nd MP Brigade, a Regular Army unit from Fort Lewis, Washington.

The idea was to have Soldiers on the show as a backdrop and to get their reaction to the successful elections of the day prior. One nice touch of the show was when Geraldo presented the troops with hand-made greeting cards from his nephew’s elementary school in New Jersey – some of the cards were read live on television. It was another great program and showed Iraqis proudly displaying their purple dyed index fingers, which was their proof that they had voted. It was another two-hour live special (Geraldo’s shows are normally one hour) show and a magnificent encore to the earlier day’s events.

After the show wrapped-up, the Fox crew packed up all their gear and had well-earned hot breakfast and showers. Major Bleichwehl and I escorted them to Baghdad International Airport for their military flight to Kuwait, enroute back to the U.S.. We said our goodbyes, exchanged manly hugs and kisses, and wished them the best – not so secretly remarking that we wish it were us going back instead. But our day was soon to come. Scott was leaving in about a week and I was going home in a little over two weeks. We both considered this experience the high point of our tour and a very satisfying way to culminate.

Conclusion

Indeed Americans almost missed the elections through the eyes of American troops on the ground, who helped to make this day possible. A short-sighted policy, though well-intended was aimed at giving the Iraqis all the credit – it was Iraq’s day. The problem with this is that in its simplicity, the policy ignored the complexity of the global information environment we live in today and myriad audiences. The obvious audience, which was almost intentionally ignored was the American media – whose job it was to tell the story of our American Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who were giving their lives daily to help this country achieve freedoms and some sort of democracy. It is paramount that the military never lose sight of the difference between truth and fiction. Most people in America, Iraq, and around the world were intelligent enough to
know that 160,000 American troops must have been doing something over in Iraq. To say otherwise or not say anything is an insult to the American people who pay taxes and give their sons, daughters, husbands, wives, parents and friends to serve in our military – many giving the ultimate sacrifice.

As it turned out the coverage was overwhelmingly positive. Our troops were not arrogant and they gave the Iraqis their just due and expressed happiness for the Iraqis, while putting things in their proper context with respect to our mission. The events with Geraldo and Thom Shanker were generally typical of the kind of news being told by embedded reporters with units across the country. All the feedback we received from higher headquarters was very positive. As leaders, PAOs – even at the most tactical level - have ample opportunity to shape the strategic landscape. Like any military officer, at the end of the day PAOs must obey orders. However, it is paramount, that as experts in communication and media relations, we must be vocal in advising the best way ahead and articulate the second and third order effects of poor decisions to mitigate potential media blunders. If I had not pushed back on behalf of the MNC-I and all the Multi-National Divisions and Forces, to tell our story – in particular the American story – in relation to the elections, it would have been a grave blunder indeed.
SECTION TWO

Information Effects: Integrating Information in Warfare
The previous section examined strategic communication as a way of telling the U.S. government story through its themes, messages and actions. This section focuses on “information effects,” that is the achievement of desired outcomes by applying information in warfare as well as considering the informational impact of other combat actions. Rafal Rohozinski and Dennis Murphy rightly note that “if IO (information operations) is meant to accomplish a planned intent, then the concept of ‘information effects’ compels a broader analytical lens that includes the unintended consequences of both IO and kinetic actions.” In short, the messages soldiers send, both through informational means and other actions, will in some way influence the receivers: adversary, friendly, and neutral, be they foreign or domestic. Our military must be culturally astute enough to identify appropriate messages and messengers for each specific target audience in order to positively influence them if we are to win the long-term battle of ideas as expressed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The student papers in this section examine what the military can do in both word and deed to meet these challenges.

In the first paper, Lieutenant Colonel John French (in a Department of Distance Education award winning paper) provides a unique perspective on the role of thought control used by terrorist organizations and recommends a strategic influence campaign to counter it.

The second paper, written by Lieutenant Colonel Rick Welch looks more specifically at the indigenous social networks inherent in Iraqi tribes and recommends a policy and procedure for U.S. and coalition forces to effectively use this network to fight the battle of ideas.

Finally, Colonel Chris Holshek considers the mutually complementary areas of intelligence, information operations and civil-military
operations and argues that synchronizing these three areas under an effects-based, systems approach at all levels is critical to success across the spectrum of conflict from peace to war.

Well-written and insightful, these papers serve to provide the military with the necessary tools to fight the long term struggle in the Global War on Terrorism and ultimately counter ideological support for terrorism.
The events of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new era for U.S. national security, although warning signs long existed. As early as 1946, a U.S. Intelligence Review noted the Muslim world, “…is full of discontent and frustration, yet alive with consciousness of its inferiority and with determination to achieve some kind of general betterment.” The intervening years changed little as the Muslim world stagnated due to authoritarian and corrupt governments weighed down by stifling bureaucracies, extended disengagement from the world economy, regional unemployment averaging 25%, and repeated success for the Muslim’s primary antagonist, Israel. It is not surprising then that Osama bin Ladin’s 1996 “ruling” to, “…kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military” as a religious duty for all Muslims was acted upon by a select few. These vanguards, drawn from a broader group of those with uncompromising and absolute beliefs (puritans), embrace extreme violence (violent puritans). Unfortunately, they receive tacit and overt support from many Muslims, and a key determinant for many is their faith. This link to Islam raises the specter of religious war, and if either the U.S. (the West) or Muslim world accepts this notion, then the current global system is at risk.

The U.S. must meet this ideological challenge with the same vigor with which it confronted fascism and communism. However, the moniker “Global War on Terrorism” undermines this reality as it mires the U.S. in the tactical thinking of force-on-force, or physical warfare. Military success, while an important component, simply cannot defeat this ideology. Strategy must go beyond engaging the enemy, or even his beliefs, and address factors leading to those beliefs. Secretary Rumsfeld identified this gap in his 2003 “War on Terrorism” memorandum:
...Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? ...Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The U.S. is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists...

Precepts of the effects-based approach to joint military operations provide a vector to address this concern. At its core, an effects-based approach “is about the mind perceptions and the cognitive dimensions of an adversary’s reality, regardless of any physical or military inferiority or superiority.” Going beyond knowing the enemy or even their motivations, strategy development should assess psychological factors impacting puritan behavior. One little discussed subject to consider is thought control, which provides an opportunity to indirectly alter behavior versus directly subduing the believer. While this proposal is controversial, it may provide key insight to a successful effects-based strategy.

This paper offers methodologies behind thought control as one avenue to defeat the violence of many puritan ideologues. To present this case, thought control theory is described with particular emphasis on its psychological underpinnings and use in promoting ideological extremism. Next, puritan use of thought control, from taking advantage of environmental factors through indoctrination of recruits, is provided. These elements establish a baseline for the paper’s final section where countering the puritan’s ability to perpetrate thought control, as part of a broader persuasion-based strategic influence effort, is offered. Importantly, this paper is not a psychological or sociological study, and the information presented, while fair, is selective. The intent is to open a window to new policy considerations in the war against violent puritans.

**Thought Control**

*The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.*

— Steve Biko, South African political leader
Table 1. Continuum of influence and persuasion.¹⁰

Thought control methodologies provide a means to better understand and counter puritan ideology. This proposition may seem extreme but it is not, and to make it more palatable consider the following. First, thought control is simply a social process designed to influence and persuade, like other techniques listed on the continuum at Table 1. It is subtle, involves little or no overt physical abuse, and results in a new “internalized” self. Brainwashing, on the other hand, generates a rationalized self of coercion and self-preservation,¹¹ and the source of influence is perceived as “the enemy.”¹² Second, review the following statements which, intended or not, relate to thought control.

- “Western leaders can no longer afford to overlook the cult characteristics of Islam.” – Pentagon briefing paper, 2005.¹³

- “The term cult and New Religious Movement (NRM) are used interchangeably¹⁴ …NRMs can be found [in] Islam, including Al Qaeda,¹⁵ – RAND Study, 2005.

- “…NRMs have two defining characteristics – a high degree of tension between the group and its surrounding society and a high degree of control exercised by leaders over their members....”¹⁶ – RAND Study, 2005.

- “Once they have joined the ranks of the jihadists [violent puritans], recruits undergo an intense blend of religious indoctrination…”¹⁷ – Palmer in “At the Heart of Terror,” 2004.

If the West can overcome tendencies towards religious relativism, especially regarding Islam, the principles of thought control can broaden “counter-puritan” efforts.

A product of social psychology, thought control is “a system of influences that disrupts an individual’s identity and replaces it with a new identity.”¹⁸ Fundamental to this suggestion is change, which is inherently benign. It becomes “negative” when an individual’s ability to think and act independently is undermined.¹⁹ A myriad
of controlling techniques exist, and they are rooted in Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT). Basically, individuals seek consistency across behaviors, thoughts and emotions, and when one changes, the others adjust to reduce cognitive dissonance. Social psychology has shown that manipulation of these elements by outside actors can result in thought control because “...everybody is deeply influenced by their environment. It is human nature to adapt to what is perceived to be ‘correct’ behavior.”

Controlling the environment then is central to thought control, which, at the most basic level, means influencing behavior, information, thoughts and emotions (BITE). Efforts include endless machinations, and range from controlling one variable to an assault across an individual’s physical reality, thought processes, information sources and emotions. Importantly, while controlling one variable can alter behavior, the impact increases exponentially when all are adjusted. The intent of course is to control, to some extent, an individual’s autonomy. Methods can be applied in a focused manner, such as brainwashing, or more broadly through nuanced thought control. Like the great engines of change (education, psychology, religion, politics), thought control uses the “approaches to change” in Table 2, although it relies primarily on coercion and exhortation.

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<td>Coercion</td>
<td>You must change under threat, or actual use, of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exhortation</td>
<td>You should change to maintain moral standing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Therapy</td>
<td>You can change and find relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realization</td>
<td>You can change and reach your potential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Approaches to change people.

Successfully applying the above techniques is complicated and rooted in psychology, and while a detailed psychological analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to identify psychological themes inherent in thought control. Listed in Table 3, these apply regardless of ideology (religious, political, destructive) and exist to varying degrees. When taken to extremes, through convergence of ambitious ideology (messianic for example) and “immoderate” personal character traits, totalism can result.
Section Two: Information Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milieu Control</td>
<td>Control of environment and communication - both external and internal. Control what subject hears, reads, writes, experiences and expresses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mystical Manipulation</td>
<td>Build &quot;mystique&quot; around the organization - creates a &quot;mystical imperative.&quot; Subjects are the &quot;chosen&quot; - higher calling eliminates questions from &quot;below.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Purity</td>
<td>Everything is black and white - creates sharp divide between good and evil. Anything not in accord with &quot;approved&quot; doctrine must be eliminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cult of Confession</td>
<td>Personal confession to the organization - symbolic surrender to the group. Confession opens door to approved &quot;cures&quot; which are manipulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacred Science</td>
<td>Basic dogma is considered sacred - the ultimate moral vision for existence. Doctrine, and those presenting the doctrine, are beyond questioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading the Language</td>
<td>Thought terminating cliché - provides start and finish of doctrinal analysis. Promotes unity and doctrine - constricts language, thinking and experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine over Person</td>
<td>Elevates doctrine over human experience - chosen ideology replaces truth. Requires subjects to change and meet doctrinal mold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensing of Existence</td>
<td>Decides who has the right to exist - clearly identifies those who do not. Justifies death penalty - creates world of &quot;being versus nothingness.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Psychological themes common to thought control environments.\(^{26}\)

This merging of people and ideas, with its emotional penchant for "all or nothing" (totalism), results in extreme behavior and potentially devastating consequences such as religious war, extreme political upheaval and cults of death, and its warning signs are listed at Table 4.\(^{27}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exaggerated control and manipulation of the individual.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blanketing of the environment with guilt or shame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on man’s hopelessness and depravity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for man to submit to a vengeful deity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed system of faith promoting the ultimate truth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Criteria to evaluate religious totalism.\(^{26}\)
Even a cursory review of the psychological themes highlights an obvious link between thought control and religion, and suggests psychological vulnerabilities exist. At its core, religion promotes spiritual and real doctrines of moral, ethical and spiritual behavior, and “influence” is expected. According to thought control methodology, this influence can be positive or negative, and the dividing line is loss of independent thought. Across religions there are examples of healthy and destructive influences, with the latter most common during searches for heresy or attempts to increase enthusiasm among the faithful. Whether religious-based or not, certain personality traits, centered on insecurity and low self-identity, increase susceptibility to thought control. Listed in Tables 5 and 6, these traits combine with situational vulnerabilities and lack of awareness concerning thought control to decrease internal defenses. For purposes of this paper, situational vulnerabilities include significant emotional events of short duration, such as divorce, death in the family and loss of job, or long term frustration, such as discontent and loss of hope. Importantly, the natural changes of late adolescence and early adulthood increase the impact of these factors, making this group particularly susceptible to thought control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hassan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor critical thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity and/or low self-esteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those seeking altered states of consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning disorders, drug/alcohol problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual identity issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phobias of any kind</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Personality traits linked to thought control.31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lifton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early lack of trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme environmental chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total domination by parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerable guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe identity crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Personality traits linked to thought control.32
Violent Puritan Ideology, Terror and Suicide Bombers

When hopes and dreams are loose on the streets, it is well for the timid to lock doors, shutter windows and lie low until the wrath has passed.

— Eric Hoffer, The True Believer

Puritan organizations in the Muslim world are many, and those engaging in violence rely on thought control when unleashing their most potent weapon – the suicide-bomber. Despite disparate causes, groups like al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and many splinter organizations seek total submission of their enemies through the psychology of terror. By wantonly killing themselves, suicide-bombers are sanctified while spreading death and destruction and feeding puritan propaganda. This ultimate personal sacrifice however is not made by puritan leaders or decision-makers. They reserve these acts of finality for recruits seeking economic, social, religious and personal rewards. It is here that thought control plays a pivotal role in the totalism of violent puritan ideology. Despite the apparent willingness of many Muslims to martyr themselves, it is clear their personal autonomy has been guided, and then corrupted, by a variety of psychological, environmental and recruitment strategies.

Many in the Muslim world seek change, making them psychologically vulnerable to thought control. For a multitude of reasons, many self-induced, the Muslim world has suffered at least 200 years of scientific, cultural, political, economic, academic and social stagnation, colonialism, destructive independent rule and numerous military defeats at the hands of “outsiders.” Considering the Muslim world is largely comprised of “shame-honor cultures,” these failures must either be covered up or revenged to restore honor.\(^{34}\) Since globalization raises both the impact and awareness of these failures, hiding them is impossible and, given the depth of malaise, restoring honor is exceedingly problematic. The resulting frustration promotes a tendency towards an inferiority complex, which is a primary personality trait increasing susceptibility to thought control. (See Tables 5 and 6) In extreme cases it leads to fanaticism, where in the ultimate self-renunciation, fanatics reject
traditional self-advancement and instead seek to acquire pride, confidence and hope, through affiliation with a holy cause. For those who give themselves completely to the cause, a “new” and clean life is produced. The goal for all is to restore self-esteem, which they gain in varying degrees by pursuing a selfless versus self-centered life. Converts to this quest for faith and pride include the poor, misfits, selfish, ambitious, minorities, bored and sinners. This of course spans the strata of Muslim life revealing the risk that this malignancy could metastasize from disparate individuals to the collective Muslim world. From this fodder, Muslim leaders, both secular and religious, have historically manipulated cultural proclivities and BITE to promote their “cause de jour” at the expense of personal autonomy. Today, Islamic puritans follow suit and their primary tool is religion.

While psychological factors lay important groundwork for the creation of puritan groups and their suicide-bombers, more is needed when considering those that target the U.S.. According to a RAND study, anti-Americanism, radical Islam and a willingness to use violence for political purposes constitute environmental factors essential to violent puritan groups, and all are enabled through thought control.

![Figure 1. Convergence of anti-Americanism, radical Islam and political violence.](image)
Numerous examples from across the Muslim world highlight pervasive anti-American sentiment. While overt “reasons” for this hatred are many, it is important to remember the following two assertions. First, a common hatred is at least as important as a common faith in generating unified action, and the “ideal devil is a foreigner,” 40 or for most Islamic puritan groups, “infidel.” Importantly, a derivative of this unity is self-sacrifice, clearly a prerequisite for suicide bombers. 41 Second, Muslim views of Americans are often emotional perceptions rather than rationale assessments, 42 and while their accuracy is often questionable, it is their emotional appeal that is important. Through a variety of thought control techniques anti-American sentiment is fomented in the region. The most obvious method is through control of information, which is often filtered through religious or state-run entities. It is not surprising then that prolonged exposure to anti-American “information” impacts other BITE elements. Supplementing this effort are group dynamics inherent in Muslim society where conformity to family, clan, tribe and society is not only expected, but valued. It is with these methods that religious and secular leaders have repeatedly relied on social contagion theory to spread and solidify emotions and behaviors 43 that are decidedly anti-American. If doubt exists, one needs only to consider “spontaneous demonstrations” in the region targeting U.S. interests. This “group dynamic” and desire to conform provides a lever for manipulation that crosses into religion as well.

The role of radical Islam in puritan ideology is critical and steeped in thought control methodology. First, Islam, like all organized religions, influences BITE. This is accomplished through many methods to include standards of behavior, recurring rituals, group dynamics, shame, punishment, religious education and more. Accordingly, it is central to identity formation, both individual and collective, 44 and is critical to three of the four internal methods of social control in Muslim society (Table 7). This control, without submerging into Islam’s tenets and competing interpretations, lays important groundwork for radical Islam and provides a linking element for Muslims from moderate to fanatic. For puritan ideology, control is extended through radicalized versions of Islam. Promoting a pan-Islamic worldview, these Muslims embrace religious unity over nationalism and support the implementation of Islamic law. 45
Unfortunately, due to splintered religious authority within Islam, radical Islam has spread through state sponsorship in Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, popular movements within Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan, and threatens the existing order in several countries today (Egypt and Algeria). Also a product of Islam’s fractured jurist system, and critical enabler for puritan groups, is the ability of those with power to exercise religious clout. This dispersion of Koran interpretation authority plays into the hands of puritan leaders and empowers their ability to control followers. Importantly, it should be apparent that radical Islam is simply a means to an end versus a true belief system, and its real value to puritan leaders is the pathway it provides to totalism. (Tables 3 and 4) The resulting religious imperative, fostered through arcane interpretations of the Koran, justifies holy terror.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Islamic identity” as marker to counter the “West”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Religious elites in symbiotic relationship with “established power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Religious elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Parents socializing children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Levels of social control within Muslim communities.

Many puritans use violence for political purposes, which is a problematic practice common in the Muslim world. In many areas, long held traditions embrace violence (including terrorism) as a means to attain power. When justified by Islam, the result is religious terrorism that is unconstrained by conventional political, moral or practical boundaries. In fact, the opposite is true as the quest for fundamental change is assumed to justify, on religious grounds, even greater acts of violence. Considering the goal of puritan violence is overwhelmingly psychological and symbolic, versus the “possibility” of heroic death in traditional combat, violent puritan groups call for the ultimate self-sacrifice via the suicide bomber. It is here, specifically through recruitment strategies, that these groups exercise their most direct forms of thought control.

Potential recruits for suicide bombing, whether targeting the U.S. or not, come from across the Islamic world and beyond, and are predisposed to support the puritans for a variety of reasons. Importantly, while they cross all socio-economic classes, the common
theme is frustration and desire for change. This disaffection is then focused by exposure to the environmental factors described above, and the result for many is burgeoning support for the puritans. Accordingly, many are willing participants in the subsequent thought control they endure.

The Life Cycle of Terrorists at Figure 2 highlights the importance of recruitment as the last link before training or employment. Recruits come from mosques, Islamic study circles, schools, universities, youth, health and welfare organizations, charities and other social clusters. They either self-identify, or are targeted by teachers or community and religious leaders, based on perceived zeal, for terror and suicide operations. Techniques are sophisticated and are often long-term efforts heavily dependent on the individual recruit. According to Palmer, “...recruiters are superb psychologists who spend hours ministering to the psychological needs of their recruits and assessing their psychological vulnerabilities.” The poor are provided means, the lonely a sense of belonging, the sinners the hope of redemption, and the angry with a target for their wrath. Thus, earthly and religious vulnerabilities are equally useful to puritan leadership. Over time, recruits are folded into the organization through religious indoctrination, training events and participation in low-level operations. For those that progress, the reward of Martyrdom is possible, a concept at the heart of puritan thought control.
In accordance with thought control methodology, violent puritans must influence recruits to the extent they internalize, at least for the duration of martyr operations, a willingness to kill innocent people and commit the ultimate sacrifice. To overcome these hurdles, they manipulate the psychological themes described in Table 3, primarily through radical Islam, to create totalism. It begins with recruits being isolated from family and friends, where violent puritan groups control both environment and communication. This milieu control provides immersion where the following broad methods of coercion and exhortation are applied to impact BITE: brutalization, meaning an increased divestiture of self essential to self-sacrificing action; classical conditioning, defined as positive feedback following knowledge of, or participation in, acts of violence; operant conditioning, the repeated stimulus-response common in repetitive training; and role models, which is the elevation of preceding martyrs to deity status.  Importantly, many of these measures are evident in daily Muslim life. Through intense “religious indoctrination,” recruits are provided extreme interpretations of concepts such as infidel (heathen), jihad (struggle in the name of Islam), takfir (declaring “former” Muslims apostates, and shahid (martyr), ultimately convincing them they have the right, and duty, to “dispense with existence.” These techniques are particularly effective on 18-27 year olds due to their natural receptiveness to change, and the tendency for strong group cohesiveness to promote self-sacrificing action. To be fair, many recruits are also motivated by less lofty goals such as financial gain for family members, revenge and personal gain through rewards in the after-life. In the end however, violent puritan leaders rely on the “ticket to paradise” they generate within their recruits to carry out suicide bombing. As one failed martyr claimed, “I didn’t want revenge for anything. I just wanted to be a martyr.”

As a reminder, it is the manipulation of individuals through thought control that is the problem, not the religious imperative itself. In other words, some puritan ideologues use violence to perpetuate their beliefs and Islam is a useful tool, not the other way around. Regardless, the threat is real and three data points bear this out. First, consider the level of frustration in much of the Muslim world. Second, consider that there are approximately 52 million Muslim
fanatics and 120,000 “fighters” world-wide, and suicide bombers now include women, children and even state-sponsorship. Third, consider that many violent puritan organizations are aggressively seeking WMD, and that “Those committed to dying in the cause of God can hardly be concerned with the sacrifice of others.”

Decomposing Suicide Bombers, Terror and Puritan Ideology

*Synergy is the driver. There are two levels of synergy: there are operating synergies, which, you know, you’d have to be stupid not to try to take advantage of, and then there are strategic synergies.*

—John Malone, Businessman

All the elements of national power are required to defeat the violence of some puritan ideologues, and their potentially catastrophic use of suicide bombers. An outstanding template for success, which includes traditional and non-traditional means, is the Center of Gravity (COG) Analysis at Figure 3. Drafted in 2001, and revised in 2003, it accurately identified the COG as a violent ideology and proposed innovative countermeasures across all elements of power. The violent ideology COG is operationalized by two critical capabilities: conduct violent acts of terrorism and; promote ideology leading to several critical requirements. This strategic plan is both reinforced and expanded upon by thought control methodology. While a variety of direct and indirect means are required to both defend against and attack puritan organizations and capabilities, one important subset is to undermine their ability to exercise thought control, because without it, their ideology is constrained. This can be accomplished through a persuasion-based strategic influence campaign, which provides the framework to cause extensive debilitation to puritan ideology.

Persuasion-based strategic influence, rooted in persuasion and indoctrination theories as well as social and cognitive psychology, offers methods to affect influence at the strategic level. It goes beyond Information Operations and uses planned operations:
### CENTER OF GRAVITY - VIOLENT IDEOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Vulnerability</th>
<th>DIME/MID (P)LIFE **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pool of zealots - Disaffected young men</td>
<td>Job options, education - Alternate escape and/or survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets - Vulnerable, soft</td>
<td>Force protection measures, Protect critical infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media coverage</td>
<td>Media blackouts, control counter information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to ordance</td>
<td>Disarmament, disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb-making skills</td>
<td>Kill/capture skilled zealots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>Requirement to communicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>Public scrutiny/interdict - Eliminate halawas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>Travel restrictions/inspections - Enforce border/INS policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctuary (training, etc.)</td>
<td>Supporting regime removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brainwashed population - Hides/facilitates</td>
<td>&quot;Deprogram&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Vulnerability</th>
<th>DIME/MID (P)LIFE **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oppressive Islamic regime/ineffective central government - Chaos, abject poverty</td>
<td>Effective government and functioning infrastructure - Mid-class market economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy</td>
<td>Literacy program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Bad&quot; charismatic leaders - Ayatollahs, Imams, Mullahs</td>
<td>Discredit, capture, remove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression of women</td>
<td>Gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>Promote acceptance of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Law</td>
<td>Constitutional revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal and &quot;Mob&quot; culture</td>
<td>Promote individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Educational&quot; sanctuaries - Mosques, madrassas</td>
<td>Public/international scrutiny - reveal &quot;politics&quot; and remove</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Critical Requirements

- Pool of zealots
- Targets
- Media coverage
- Access to ordance
- Bomb-making skills
- Command and Control
- Finances
- Mobility
- Sanctuary (training, etc.)
- Brainwashed population

### Critical Vulnerability

- Job options, education
- Force protection measures
- Media blackouts
- Disarmament
- Kill/capture skilled zealots
- Requirement to communicate
- Public scrutiny
- Travel restrictions
- Supporting regime removal
- "Deprogram"

### Coalition Concept

Simultaneous parallel engagement against ALL critical vulnerabilities – globally, w/regional focus – two regions at a time (minimum)

### Major GWOT Regions

- Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Eurasia

### Decisive Points

- Capture/prosecute ideologues; Saudi Arabia; Iranian government; Jakarta; De-Nuclearize Israel, remove Palestinian Authority regime; solve Palestinian displacement issue.
- Tailor and task organize forces/participants. Execute - Assess - Adjust - Execute some more!

** DIME = Elements of national power: D-Diplomatic, I-Information, M-Military, E-Economic
** MID(P)LIFE = Tools of national security policy: M-Military, I-Information, D-Diplomatic, P-Political, L-Law Enforcement, I-Intelligence, F-Finance, E-Economic
covert and/or overt to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences...to influence the perceptions, cognitions, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose...is to induce or reinforce foreign behavior favorable to the originator’s overall political and strategic objectives.63

Accordingly, at its core these are psychological operations attempting to produce behaviors by altering “attitudes, opinions, reasoning and/or emotions.”64 The parallels to BITE in thought control theory are obvious and important. In effect, the goal is to exercise thought control on a mass scale, and it is not coincidental that the most common method of persuasion is informational (radio, television, movies and newspapers).65 This mimics thought control’s “deprogramming” and “exit counseling” theory, where information-based content provides the key to restoring personal autonomy.66 The trick is matching psychological objectives with desired behavior.67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance</th>
<th>Conformity</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enticement or coercion</td>
<td>Environmental, social manipulation</td>
<td>Indoctrination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short preparation, short duration</td>
<td>Medium preparation, short/medium duration</td>
<td>Long preparation, medium/long duration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: The spectrum of psychological operations.68

At the broadest level, psychological objectives describe the desired impact of persuasion operations on target audiences. Displayed in Figure 4, they range from simple coercion to indoctrination (thought control), and all are required to counter violent puritans. Importantly, while the range of influencing methods is limitless, they must be sequenced and timed appropriately, as presented in Figure 5, and there are many potential hazards: unintended second and third order effects, blowback if discovered, uncertainty of impact, and objectives working at crossed purposes. Accordingly, integration of a persuasion-based strategic influence campaign into traditional
operations is a daunting task.\textsuperscript{69} Despite this difficulty, if persuasion is sequenced correctly and applied to the right audience, puritan organizations will be defeated.

![Figure 5. Sequence of events in persuasive communication.\textsuperscript{70}](image)

One important subset of a persuasion-based strategic influence campaign is to undermine puritan thought control capabilities. If successful, the ability of violent puritans to conduct their most violent acts is diminished and the spread of their ideology is curtailed.\textsuperscript{71} Based on puritan manipulation of psychological and environmental factors, and their highly developed recruitment strategies, the following proposals are offered to deflate their ability to “make” violent terrorists and suicide bombers. If these are applied in conjunction with the actions identified in the center-of-gravity analysis in Figure 3, puritan ideology will atrophy. This attempt to enter the cognitive realm, where decision-making takes place, is deeply psychological and exceedingly complicated. Accordingly, these proposals do not constitute a comprehensive list nor are implementation details provided. They do offer a general view of strategic persuasion operations linked to puritan thought control capabilities, and all must be tailored to specific audiences. Broad interagency and international organization support is required and will often be covert.

1. Establish an Office of Strategic Influence: To facilitate and synchronize influencing efforts, create an Office of Strategic Influence attached to the National Security Council. Apolitical, this cell should enhance interagency direction and cooperation, and must incorporate broad expertise to include the following fields; policy, legal, cultural, military, sociology and psychology. Organized regionally, it should focus long-range (10-30 years) and have the ability to harmonize shorter term influencing efforts. Even as a U.S.-only initiative, this concept forces proactive consideration of national policy and desired
ends (objectives), and it should be exported to willing partners. The intent is to deconflict and maximize limited means (resources) while increasing potential ways (concepts) to achieve national, and even international, interests.

2. Thought Control Study and Training: Train personnel in the DOD, DOS, CIA, FBI and U.S. Intelligence agencies on thought control methodologies. Areas of interest should include the identification and eradication of organizations utilizing destructive thought control. Civilian cult and thought control experts can provide the initial cadre.

3. Undermine the link between suicide bombing and martyrdom: The violent puritan’s call to martyrdom is the single most important factor enabling their acts of terror, and also constitutes their most effective thought control mechanism. To deny them this lever, the U.S. must promote “moderate Islam” to both inoculate potential recruits and possibly “deprogram” active puritans. The psychological objective is conversion, and this is accomplished by aligning (or realigning) BITE with the concept that suicide bombing is unacceptable behavior. To be credible, this message must come from Muslim religious leaders who can effectively traverse, and compress, the sequence of events for persuasion operations. (Figure 5) When appropriate fatwas and religious teachings are discovered, the U.S. must offer support via all available means, to include through reliable surrogates to avoid the perception (and reality) of U.S. complicity. Increasing the intensity and range of these messages is critical. Several “moderate” messages that should be reinforced include:

- “Suicide bombing” is unequivocally suicide resulting in rejection from heaven.
- Islam is not at war with the west, making puritan calls to jihad illegitimate.
- Intentional killing of innocents, whether Muslim or not, results in rejection from heaven.

There are of course many areas where religious direction can impact puritan activities, but these three most directly undermine the violent
puritan’s use of martyrdom as a control mechanism. To varying degrees these are happening today. For example, 58 Pakistani religious scholars issued a fatwa forbidding suicide attacks against Muslims or the “killing of any non-Muslim citizen or foreigner visiting the country,” asserting that those committing such attacks in public venues or places of worship would cease to be Muslims.\(^\text{72}\)

4. **Jurist System:** Islamic “authenticity” is dispersed due to a malfunctioning jurist system\(^\text{73}\) and puritan organizations operate in this vacuum to garner “religious authority.” The resulting power, based largely on popularity, provides puritan leaders a control lever via fatwas. While relatively unimportant outside of puritan groups, these fatwas are controlling over members. The U.S. should help project the message of moderate Muslims. The goal is to deepen the wedge between the puritan’s use of Islam and Islam itself, which in the process will shift the Muslim world’s critical-mass, which is dangerously close to the puritans, towards moderation.

5. **Education Reform:** Many in the Muslim world value “blind imitation” over critical thinking\(^\text{74}\) raising their susceptibility to thought control. This tendency is reinforced by authoritarian regimes and social structures promoting extreme conformity, or, dependent thought. By establishing independent thought, or the ability to see beyond self-centered views (defined by “the group”), puritan thought control is undermined. Individuals can avoid the loaded language, prophetic ideology and uncompromising black-and-white world views that lead to totalism. The psychological objective is conversion, in this case creating the internal ability to critically think. Accomplishing this is a difficult and long-term task requiring diplomatic, economic and information elements. Broadly, the U.S., with coalition partners and international organizations, should promote education reform. Transformation should stress education pedagogy conducive to critical thinking while simultaneously reducing rote learning common to madrassas. These efforts require “acceptance” by participating countries, which allows the imposition of “measures of accomplishment.” Important second and third order effects, beyond increased ability to stave off the lure of puritan ideology, include preparation for a globalized world and potentially reduced frustration. At the broadest level, this initiative may, in the
Section Two: Information Effects

long term, tip the scales in the proverbial balance between reason and faith. When the former encroaches, moderation results,\(^7\) and controversial or not, puritan ideology is fundamentalist in nature. It all begins with reflective criticism

6. **Support “Deprogramming” Efforts:** While controversial, the U.S. must overcome political correctness and support aggressive deprogramming efforts. These are currently occurring in Saudi Arabia,\(^6\) Indonesia, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, and Australia is considering a policy change to allow domestic deprogramming when Islamic terrorists are involved.\(^7\) The psychological goal is conversion and there are benefits on several levels – intelligence, exploitation through propaganda, and most importantly, greater insight into the psychology of why individuals join puritan groups and how they are manipulated to commit terrorist acts.

These are but a few options to include in a persuasion-based influence campaign to achieve strategic effect. Other alternatives include the following; reduce wide-spread frustration (reducing the desire for change), promote factors leading to a shift from a shame to guilt-based society (self criticism enables self-correction), raise Muslim self-identity (reduces susceptibility to thought control and undermines the lure of “pride through messianic causes”), and there are countless more. Importantly, while many of these proposals obviously support other objectives, they are listed here specifically for their utility in undermining puritan thought control efforts. Another way to view this is synergy. How to implement these proposals is a difficult task requiring thought control and psychological expertise, but if successful, violent puritans may be constrained to conventional and insurgent operations, which while significant, are more manageable.

**Conclusion**

The information presented clearly supports the contention that thought control methodology constitutes not only a new perspective with which to view violent puritan ideology, but offers innovative options to counter its effectiveness. In the ultimate effects-based strategy, denying puritans the ability to commit their most violent acts undermines their ideology, because without it, their actions are
devoid of meaning. This is no simple task however, and countering puritan thought control as a way to erode their ideology is a long-term proposition at best. Unfortunately, the overwhelmingly direct nature of current efforts affords ample time to refine strategies for countering puritan ideology.

This paper offers the fundamentals of thought control as one foundation upon which to develop a persuasion-based strategic influence campaign designed to dissolve puritan ideology. Based on an understanding of thought control methodology and appreciation that many puritans manipulate psychological and environmental factors to perpetrate extreme violence, countering puritan thought control is offered as an important facet of a persuasion-based strategic influence campaign. Importantly, it is not a silver bullet or complete answer. It is however, a portal into possible methods of operating in the cognitive realm where battles are ultimately won or lost. Thought control methodology is a vehicle to enter this dimension at a truly strategic level. Although only one aspect of a grand strategy, it is an important one that requires further study. Accordingly, while the proposals offered in this paper are substantial, they provide only a glimpse of the possibilities.
Although there were mixed reports detailing the level of U.S. and Coalition success in Iraq prior to February 22, 2006, the shocking attack on the sacred Golden Mosque in Samarra moved the country closer than it has ever been (post-Saddam) to complete civil war, raising serious questions and debate about whether the U.S. cause has been lost and the withdrawal of all coalition forces warranted. The growing sectarian tension and violence, on top of an ongoing lethal insurgency, combine to alarm even the most optimistic about what lies ahead for Iraq.

Despite the setbacks, however, President Bush declared in our Iraq victory strategy that “...we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more” and that “failure is not an option.” It thus follows that avoiding a civil war in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest, not to mention vital to the security of Iraq and the region. Since Iraq is a society that is divided along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines, as well as those of political orientation and ideology, it is not surprising to see the Iraqi people migrate to those groupings to find safety, security, and basic needs in an environment where the government is either incapable of or unwilling to provide these needs. This could lead to an untenable and dangerous situation much like that which occurred in Yugoslavia after the death of its dictator. When there are “empty social spaces” within a disintegrating nation-state, its peoples often migrate or return to the infra-state layers, such as a tribal structure, for protection and basic needs.

Is there any way for the U.S. and its coalition partners to prevent or slow down this slide into potentially virulent factionalism? It is the premise of this paper that if the Coalition creates an institutional mechanism and develops a unified strategy dedicated to engaging leaders of and influencing people in and through Iraq’s indigenous
social networks, particularly the tribal network, it can achieve success with the U.S. national military strategy in Iraq.\textsuperscript{5}

This paper discusses historical examples of the relationship between tribes and state formation in the Middle East in general; cites historical examples of the relation between Iraqi tribes and the Iraqi state; describes the organization of the tribal structure in Iraq as well as tribal characteristics, customs, and practices, the knowledge of which are essential to U.S. success in Iraq; and finally, provides recommendations for establishing an institutional mechanism and program for implementing the U.S. national military strategy in Iraq through Iraq’s tribal structure.

**Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East**

Reports in the anthropological, sociological, and political science literature vary as to the relationship between Middle Eastern tribes and the formation of Middle Eastern states. In this literature, tribes are generally seen as representing large kin groups that are organized and regulated according to blood and family lineage, whereas states are structures through which the ultimate power of the state is executed.\textsuperscript{6} Khoury and Kostiner, however, provide a more detailed definition of “tribe” that may help bring clarity to the discussion of what constitutes a tribe for the purposes of this discussion:

‘Tribe’ may be used loosely of a localized group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader; both features being commonly attributable to interaction with states. Such tribes also form parts of larger, usually regional, political structures of tribes of similar kinds; they do not usually relate directly with the state, but only through these intermediate structures. The more explicit term confederacy or confederation should be used for a local group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and perhaps class composition, yet is politically unified usually under a central authority.\textsuperscript{7}

Because of these structural and sociological differences between the
organization, function, and ethos of tribe and state, it is generally argued that tribes and states are opposed to one another. States have advantages of authority of the ruler, ability to exert military force, control of access to economic resources and markets, and a bureaucratic apparatus for taxation, whereas the tribe has the advantages of geography, mobility, a warrior population, and flexible capacity for organization. Irrespective of whether tribes are opposed to or provide support to states and state building, governments throughout history have been forced to deal with the tribe. In doing so, governments have tended to either eradicate the tribe, incorporate it into the state, or sustain the balance of state power through a policy of dividing the tribe so the state can conquer the territory. Regardless of the method employed by the government, the fact remains that each state has had to deal with tribes in some form or fashion and each method chosen had reciprocal consequences to the state. It is generally accepted that tribes in the Middle East will not evolve into a nation-state; however that does not mean that the tribe has no positive impact on state formation.

There are several examples in the Middle East where tribes have had a positive influence over and on state development and function. In Jordan, for example, the tribes have played an important stabilizing role to the monarchy via a significant presence in the armed forces as well as in the use of the tribal structure to encourage participation in the electoral process. The tribes have successfully secured a sizable number of seats in the parliament thus providing a mechanism for the tribe to have a voice in government. Additionally, the use of the tribes’ unique dispute resolution mechanism to settle disputes at the local level has contributed to the strengthening of civil society in Jordan.

While Yemen is not considered a stable or progressive society by Western standards, the tribes have demonstrated some traits which appear democratic in nature. From May 1990 to April 1993, one observer of Yemeni tribes noted certain democratic elements such as elections of tribal leaders, consensus in decision making, a sense of equality among tribesmen, and a form of political organization in some parts of the country capable of protecting its members from abuses of state power. Another development during this same time period was the convening of several tribal conferences,
Information as Power

with several thousand in attendance, resulting in the publication of resolutions demanding the rule of law, pluralism, local elections, fiscal responsibility, and other civic demands, while arranging for mediation of tribal disputes. This does not mean that Yemen is a bastion of democracy—it is not; but it does mean that there are traits and characteristics demonstrated by the tribal structure that can help stabilize society and assist the state in modernization and some level of democratization. As one author has noted in his studies of the Yemen political experience, “Allowing the tribes to have some democratic input and domestic autonomy is often easier for the central government than efforts to impose strong, political control over tribal areas.”

While Oman’s social organization remains predominantly tribal in nature, this society has demonstrated some values that are fundamental to the democratic process and essential to civil society. Those traits and values reflected include free economic opportunity and trade, representative leaders, a belief in education in order to advance society, an expectation that leaders are to represent the interests of the tribes, a mechanism to settle disputes, and the ability to interface with the state and negotiate agreements that advance the interests of the tribe and its needs.

The point is clear—states can try to eradicate the tribes, incorporate them into the state, or divide and conquer them, but they cannot ignore the tribes. Tribes will continue to exist long after many states, administrations, or regimes are gone. Successful governments will undertake serious efforts to utilize the tribal structure in stabilizing the state and strengthening civil society.

Tribes and the Iraqi State

Most experts agree that Iraq is a society very much influenced by its tribal identities. Some reports suggest that over three-quarters of the population trace membership to one of the approximately 150 tribes in Iraq, while other estimates of membership are lower.

Throughout Iraq’s long and turbulent history, each governing body or ruling authority had to deal with the tribes in some form or fashion in order to govern. The course of dealing with the tribes by these
respective authorities included using military force against the tribes, securing their cooperation with state activities and programs, leaving them alone as long as they did not threaten the ruling authority, using patronage to divide and conquer, and rewarding tribes favorable to the state while punishing those out of favor. In each case, the ruling powers had to develop a strategy for dealing with the tribes.

During the Ottoman period, tribes formed most of the population. Ottoman central control was relatively weak and it allowed the tribal confederations to loosely govern their respective areas. Toward the end of this period, the Ottoman ruler increased its control over the tribes through settlement programs and land reform measures. This reduced the tribal leader’s influence within the tribe and initiated disintegration of the traditional tribal system.\(^{17}\)

After the demise of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, the British moved in to occupy the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. They united these provinces into one nation-state and gave it the name Iraq. Under British policies, power was restored to the tribal sheikhs that fueled the reemergence of the tribal structure in many ways, although at the same time, the British assumed control of heretofore tribal functions of land management, essential service distribution, and law enforcement.\(^{18}\) The British used a method of “divide and conquer” to retain control of the tribes within various regions of Iraq. The aim of the British policy was to keep the monarchy stronger than any one tribe, but weaker than a coalition of tribes, giving the British rulers the upper hand in deciding disputes between the monarch and the tribes. One mechanism instituted by the British that added power to the tribal sheikhs was passage of the 1924 Tribal Criminal Disputes Regulation. This law granted power to the sheikhs to conduct tribal courts in rural areas of Iraq. Another law was passed in 1933 granting large land estates to tribal sheikhs that acted as a legal mechanism to bind the tribes to the land.\(^{19}\)

During the Ba’ath party rule, initially (in 1976) tribal identity was outlawed, as the party regarded tribalism as detrimental to Ba’athist ideology and programs of reform. At the same time, however, Saddam Hussein used his tribal roots to consolidate his power within the Ba’ath party by giving key state jobs such as the defense ministry, the military bureau, and the National Security Bureau to
members of his Al-bu Nasir tribe and its main core, the Al Beijat clan. However, the rejection of the tribes did not last long. As the Ba’athist state began to fail, especially after its defeat by the U.S. in Operation Desert Storm, Saddam reached out to the tribes as a method of holding the delicate fabric of the state together. He used an elaborate system of patronage to buy the loyalty of the various tribes with gifts ranging from key jobs in government and industry to cash, personal property and land. Additionally, during this period of re-tribalization he invented new tribes and tribal leaders in order to marginalize real tribal leaders that might still remain a threat to his regime. This created a proliferation of tribes and tribal leaders and a dilution of tribal influence that remains a problem to this day for the U.S.-led Coalition.

Since the Coalition arrived in Iraq, there has been no consistent, unified policy or strategy on utilizing the tribal structure to support the mission. The policy, in most part, is left to the whim of the local commander, thereby creating pockets of inconsistent practices with respect to the tribes. Given Iraqi tribes’ history of dealing with ruling powers, this practice has created confusion, ambiguity, and at times resentment of coalition practices from key tribal leaders. While it is not the author’s purpose to list every effort that has been made to reach out to Iraqi tribes, some will be noted.

For instance, there were news reports prior to the U.S.-led invasion, that elite forces, termed “cash squads,” were entering Iraq with huge sums of money to buy the allegiance of tribal leaders. There is, however, no data available as to the scope and extent of such a program or its effectiveness in the overall campaign.

Early in the war, the 82nd Airborne Division aligned its goals and objectives with the interests of the tribes in its area of operations in western Iraq, spending a reported $41 million to create jobs, establish a veteran’s office, and launch a civic-improvement program in Al Anbar province. These initiatives provided opportunities for young male Iraqis to work and to resist the temptation to join the insurgency. Additionally, the Division was receiving an average of three hundred tips per week regarding insurgent activity by March 2004, compared to only twenty per week in August 2003. It is not clear whether this program was continued by any units that followed,
but from news reports of the unrest in western Iraq, it is likely that no such program was continued—at least not in the scope of the 82nd Airborne Division’s program.

In December 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer III, created the Office of Provincial Outreach (OPO), which was designed to begin a program of outreach to the tribes and leaders. The sparsely staffed organization was headed by a senior U.S. government civilian who managed a small staff of U.S. military and other civilians. One of the key members of the group was Lieutenant Colonel R. Alan King, who had performed as a Civil Affairs battalion commander during the invasion. As the point man for reaching out to the key tribal leaders in Iraq, LTC King spearheaded the establishment of a tribal council that met regularly to discuss issues relating to the military occupation and provide advice as to the future development of the country. Although the program was understaffed and under funded, it did have some success, as the contacts made with these leaders led to the capture and arrest of nearly a score of Iraqi fugitives pictured on the famous deck of cards or listed on the Coalition “blacklist.” The OPO was also instrumental in negotiating conflict termination of the uprisings in Sadr City and Fallujah in April 2004 through the tribal influence.

Following the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq in late June 2004, the CPA was dissolved and replaced by the formal establishment of the U.S. Embassy. The OPO, as it was organized and operated under the CPA, was not duplicated in the new embassy, although there was an Office of Provincial Outreach in name. The precise work of the CPA OPO was continued by this author in his capacity as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 to the Commanding General of the First Cavalry Division. While there were successes as a result of this program, and an attempt to coordinate tribal engagement with the new Embassy and the Multinational Force-Iraq headquarters, this author is not aware of any consistent national program that has been adopted or established—nor of any national, unified or consistent policy on tribal engagement developed or implemented by any key headquarters or agency.

It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a method for the establishment of an organization responsible for dealing with the tribes, as well as
the development of a national outreach program and strategy for influencing the tribes. An effort made in this direction would not only assist with the current mission, but would be critical to the attainment of victory in Iraq.

The Necessity for a Tribal Engagement Strategy and Program

Of all the controversies surrounding the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and other coalition partners as well as the resulting occupation and administration of the country, one theme emerges more clearly than any other—we didn’t understand the culture or the society. As a result, the mission is in serious jeopardy. Forces were unleashed that had long been kept silent or impotent by Saddam Hussein’s brutal policies of violence and suppression—forces that have taken the country to the brink and slightly over the edge to civil war.27 Understanding foreign cultures must become a core competency of our new expeditionary military if we are to succeed in future conflicts, especially in such volatile regions as the Middle East.

McFate argues that understanding and utilizing certain aspects of an adversary’s culture can bring positive results strategically, operationally, and tactically. One such recommendation is to understand and utilize preexisting indigenous social systems and organizations, such as the tribal system and structure, to create legitimacy for an occupying power and to facilitate stability and security operations.28

There are good reasons to understand and utilize the tribal network within Iraq. First, the key tribal leaders are often highly respected members of Iraqi communities and it is important to build strong relationships with them, especially in areas where security is most at risk. Second, by building relationships with the tribal leader, it is easier to execute a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the tribal members. Third, once a relationship of trust has been established with the tribal leaders, the Coalition can fund programs through the tribal leaders on local employment projects, public works improvements, agrarian programs, and security and intelligence initiatives, as some members of the coalition have done.29 Fourth, there has been a resurgence of tribal power since the fall of Saddam and competition has arisen between tribal leaders and religious clerics. These groups are attempting to fill
the vacuum left with the demise of the regime and, since they are all heavily armed, it makes sense to engage them and try to bring them into the legitimate political process instead of leaving them to the temptation to engage in lawlessness and political violence.30

Andrew Krepinevich offers a solid fifth reason and some sage advice which bears reproducing here. He suggests that the U.S. should work to build a coalition that cuts across key Iraqi religious, ethnic, and tribal groups that are willing to support a democratic and unified Iraq. This would be a long-term effort (at least a decade) and it would not seek to win over every group in its entirety, only a substantial portion of each. This coalition then would serve as the “critical mass” in support of the U.S. objectives in Iraq.31 Additionally, he gives advice on how to make this plan work:

Stitching this coalition together would require a good understanding of Iraqi tribal politics. In many areas of Iraq, the tribe and the extended family are the foundation of society, and they represent a sort of alternative to the government. (Saddam deftly manipulated these tribal and familial relationships to sustain his rule)...Creating a coalition out of these groups would require systematically mapping tribal structures, loyalties, and blood feuds within and among tribal groups; identifying unresolved feuds; detecting the political inclinations of dominant tribes and their sources of power and legitimacy; and determining their ties to tribes in other countries, particularly in Iran, Syria, and Turkey....

Accurate tribal mapping could guide the formation of alliances between the new Iraqi government and certain tribes and families, improve vetting of military recruits and civil servants, and enhance intelligence sources on the insurgency’s organization and infrastructure. Most important, it would facilitate achieving the grand bargain by identifying the Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite tribes that would be most likely to support a unified, independent, and democratic Iraqi state. In return, tribal allies should receive more immediate benefits, such as priority in security and reconstruction operations.32

Another very important reason to understand the tribes, tribal ways, and culture has to do with the protection of coalition forces. There are some unique characteristics, codes of conduct, and customs among the tribes which can be used in a positive way, or that can lead to tragic results if not recognized or respected by coalition forces.
Despite the fact that most Arabs dwell in cities and villages and not the desert in this modern world, many hold the Bedouin ethic and ethos as the yardstick by which to be measured. The Bedouin is seen as the living ancestor, witnesses to the ancient glory of the heroic age for the Middle East. Certain characteristics, customs, and practices developed from the structure of the Bedouin society. During their wanderings in the desert, several units would form sub-tribes, then combine to form tribes, and tribes would come together to form confederations. The units were based primarily on kinship and practiced intermarriages to preserve the lineage. As a result of these alliances, group solidarity developed. Loyalty to the group (asibiyya) became the supreme value and moral code by which to live and die. Tribesmen and women (through their chastity and modesty) were taught from an early age to protect the group solidarity. Anyone threatening or causing harm to that solidarity was subject to vengeance.

The concept of honor (sharaf) is another core value of the tribe used to preserve and protect group cohesion and individual integrity. There are several aspects to this concept. For instance, there is honor in having numerous sons; in demonstrating the ability to defend one’s family, tribe, home, village, country, and property against an adversary; in conducting a raid according to tribal rules of warfare; in showing bravery and courage; in showing Bedouin hospitality and generosity, no matter how poor one is (even to a fugitive or potential adversary who seeks asylum, and even at the risk of one’s own safety); in having pure Arab blood; by women preserving their sexual honor for the family; in showing a strong sense of group solidarity; and in behaving with dignity and always preserving “face” (wajh). As one writer has noted, “All these different kinds of honor, clearly distinguished in Arab life and operative at various times and on various occasions, interlock to surround the Arab ego like a coat of armor.”

Therefore, if someone causes serious harm or death to a member of the tribe, or if one’s honor is damaged by the action of another, then an act of revenge is required to avenge (al-tha’r) or restore the honor back to the person, family, or tribe. As the saying goes, “Dam butlub Dam—blood demands blood.” If an individual in the
tribe is shamed, then the whole tribe is shamed. As a result, an act of revenge is needed to restore honor to the family or tribe and protect its collective honor. Thus, the Arab saying, “It is better to die with honor than live with humiliation.” An alternative (used as a means of stopping revenge attacks) may be to settle the dispute in the tribal way by engaging in mediation (fas’l). If the disputing parties can reach a satisfactory agreement to compensate for the harm or injustice, a blood feud or revenge attack may be averted.

It is imperative for all members of the Coalition to know and understand these tribal characteristics, customs, practices, and codes of honor in order to avoid triggering revenge attacks on Coalition forces as a result of inappropriate Coalition conduct in the course of its operations. Likewise, the characteristics of solidarity (asabiyya), honor (sharaf), hospitality, generosity, courage, integrity, and dignity are values that are essential to an effective civil society. The Coalition should tap into those values and use the tribal ways to achieve its objectives of creating a secure, prosperous, and stable, democratic Iraqi state. This objective can only be achieved by creating an institution that is solely dedicated to identifying, understanding, and developing strategy for utilizing the Iraqi tribal structure and network to achieve the U.S. national military strategy for victory in Iraq.

The Mechanism for Success

This author recommends that an office or directorate be established at the national level (either MNC-I or MNF-I or Embassy) that is solely dedicated to, and authorized to establish and execute policy relating to, Coalition interaction with the various indigenous social networks in Iraq, especially the tribal system. A suggested name for this entity might be Office of National Outreach Programs and Initiatives or Directorate of National Outreach Programs and Initiatives.

This office should be vested with the following characteristics and authorities:

- It should be designated a primary or special staff section reporting directly to the MNF-I or MNC-I Commander or U.S. Ambassador, and be the lead advisor on all matters of tribal affairs.
• It should be clothed with exclusive and sufficient authority and responsibility to develop and direct the execution of all Coalition policies, programs, strategies, and activities dealing with the tribes after appropriate and complete staff and interagency coordination.

• It should have appropriate fiscal authority and resources to fund the execution and implementation of all tribal policies, programs, and activities that are approved by the Commander.

• Its staffing should reflect the joint, multinational, interagency, and host nation characteristic of the Coalition.

• It should be granted authority to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize Coalition tribal policies, programs, and objectives with those of the appropriate Iraqi government officials, agencies, and ministries.

In addition to these characteristics and authorities, the office should be structured with certain elements:

• First, the command element should consist of a Director (0-6) and Deputy Director (0-5), with sufficient clerical staff to support the work of that element.

• Second, there should be an operations element staffed with experienced operations officers (0-4) and mid to senior grade non-commissioned officers that can track Coalition activities and operations that impact the tribes throughout the country.

• Third, a functional element consisting of civilian or military personnel with education, experience, and expertise in cultural anthropology, sociology, Islamic religion, Iraqi culture, history, politics, and tribes, that can also be cleared at least to the U.S. Secret level of security classification. The section should also possess adequate native linguist support.

• Fourth, a plans and policy element staffed with civilian and military personnel skilled in developing strategic and operational level plans and policies.


- Fifth, a fiscal element with expertise and experience in budgetary matters capable of managing funds for the types of programs that might be associated with the activities of this proposed office or directorate.

- Sixth, a security element, adequately trained, equipped, and staffed to escort principles or functionaries on missions related to the activities of this office.

- Finally, a tribal liaison element consisting of military officers with the task of interfacing with the tribes and military forces in various sections of Iraq to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of programs and de-conflict issues. It should include tribal coordinators made up of vetted Iraqi nationals that interface with the various tribal councils and report the activities of the councils to the office or directorate.

It is not the intent of this paper to spell out every detail of how this new office should be organized, staffed, equipped, or clothed with authority. It is only to suggest a conceptual model from which others can create the details. It is an ambitious plan; however, as was previously noted by Andrew Krepinevich, if the U.S. chooses to embark on this engagement strategy, it must be prepared for a long duration of at least a decade to see success.38

The benefits of such an office are many, but primarily it will be an important conduit through which the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq will be executed. That plan sets forth three tracks on the road to victory—political, security, and economic.39

Under the Political Track, the Coalition intends to help forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic governance. This is to be achieved by helping the new Iraqi government isolate the enemy, engaging those outside the political process to join that process, renounce violence, and help to build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions.40

The Security Track involves a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency. This is to be done by developing Iraqi Security Forces, helping the Iraqi government to clear areas of enemy control, holding areas freed from enemy influence while
ensuring they remain under the influence of the Iraqi government, and building the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.

Under both the Political and Security Tracks, the tribes can help achieve Coalition and Iraqi government objectives. There is little question that many insurgents and foreign jihadists are living among and within the Iraqi population at large and in many of the rural tribal areas. Knowing also that it is a tribal value to provide hospitality to those who seek it, it can safely be assumed that insurgents are finding sanctuary and asylum based on these principles and also on the assumption that some tribes are loyal to the insurgent cause. However, if the coalition builds bridges of trust to the tribal leaders and tribes, forms a collective solidarity with them (asabiyya), and demonstrates a commitment to improving the quality of life for the tribe and its leaders, then, over time, the enemy will be denied sanctuary and asylum as the loyalty of the tribe will have shifted to the new bond of solidarity.

Additionally, if security or combat operations are required in a region, then it is necessary to have a strong relationship of trust with the key tribal leaders in those areas to reduce the friction between the combat forces and the people and to mitigate any unnecessary, collateral or unintended harm or damage done to innocent civilians. This can avoid the situation of creating new enemies to avenge (al-tha’r) the honor of the individual or tribe that was harmed. The tribes may also be enlisted to help with security operations by providing information and intelligence about the insurgents or actually used to eliminate the threat from insurgents or foreign jihadists as seen illustrated recently by a leading tribe in western Iraq.\textsuperscript{41}

The tribes can also be influenced to support the other branches of these tracks. They can participate in the political process and influence others in the tribe to do the same. They can be used as a conduit for information to counter the propaganda of the insurgents and jihadists and to disseminate information favorable to state-building in Iraq. They can assist the Iraqi Security Forces with securing and holding areas of the country, keeping them free from enemy influence once they are cleared. And, they can help build the Iraqi Security Forces and support civil society and the rule of law by
sending their best and brightest from the tribe into government and private sector service for the country.

The tribes can likewise assist with the success of the Economic Track. They can provide skilled workers to help rebuild and restore Iraq’s damaged infrastructure by partnering with the Iraqi government and Coalition on reconstruction projects. They can help protect development projects in their respective areas. And again, they can encourage their best, brightest, and most business savvy members to participate in economic activities and initiatives designed to help Iraq rejoin the international economic community.

Finally, the Coalition, through the newly established office or directorate, can coordinate the dissemination of information and the promotion of educational and training initiatives that will help the tribes participate in viable economic activities that will improve their quality of life, provide an adequate source of income, and dry up the pool of individuals that are available for or tempted to join the insurgency. While there will be some risk to this suggested initiative, this author believes the benefits of moving forward with such a program far outweigh the risks. Conversely, the negative consequences associated with the risk of ignoring and alienating the tribes are far greater than any benefit derived from ignoring or alienating them.

**Conclusion**

In the Iraq Victory Plan, President Bush has defined the boundaries and set the stage for how and why the U.S. must remain engaged in Iraq until final victory is achieved. Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror. Therefore, success in Iraq is an essential element to the success of the “long” war against international terrorism. He declared that the ultimate victory in Iraq will be achieved in three stages, short, medium, and long. He defined the short term as,

> An Iraq that is making steady progress in fighting terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency; meeting political milestones; building democratic institutions; standing up robust security forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security; and tackling key economic reforms to lay the foundation for a sound economy.42
This author submits that it is critical to build the bridges with the tribal networks in the short term stage (as outlined in this paper), in order to build the larger bridge to victory in the final stage. The short term stage is really the foundational stage for building a stable, democratic Iraq. It is in this phase that the tribes can contribute their best people to help build strong, effective ministries, democratic institutions, and civil society and participate in reconstruction and economic initiatives. It is in this phase that the tribes can form a bond of solidarity with Coalition forces and the fledgling Iraq Security Forces to deny sanctuary to, identify, and fight the insurgent and terrorist forces that threaten to take the nation into civil war. It is the tribes that can help the Coalition and Iraqi forces hold key areas once they are cleared of the enemy forces. It is the tribal leaders and influential members of the tribes that can persuade their members to reject insurgent propaganda, violent extremism, and political violence. And it is the tribal leaders and other influential members of the tribes that can encourage and persuade its members to support the development of a democratic, secure, and prosperous Iraq and a sense of pride and national unity (asabiyya).

While there may have been initiatives with the tribes in the past, and there may be some initiatives in existence today, it does not appear that these efforts have been sufficient, timely or consistent. Now is the time to act—to engage in a paradigm shift in our dealings with the tribes. Time is of the essence. History shows that, although Iraqi tribes can be weakened and marginalized at times, they cannot be destroyed. Build the suggested organization now with adequate staffing, budgetary and other appropriate authorities. If the Coalition sows seeds to the wind in trying to ignore the tribes, it will reap a whirlwind and the consequences that follow. It will most likely be bogged down in a quagmire until the American people force the U.S. government to bring their sons and daughters home without a clear victory, as occurred in Vietnam.

With nearly three-quarters of the Iraqi people ascribing membership to a tribe, and in the face of an unformed and ineffective Iraqi government, the tribe becomes one of the most effective ways and means to influence and win the hearts and minds of the people. Building bonds of trust and reliability with Iraqi tribes and tribal
leaders is one essential key to building a bridge to victory and bequeathing a safe, prosperous and democratic society to the Iraqi people.
REACHING THE POINT OF FUSION: INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Colonel Christopher J. Holshek

War in the 21st century is a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous business in which Napoleon’s maxim that “in war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one” takes on new meaning. The informational and cognitive dimensions have eclipsed physical factors in a flattening, non-linear world of instant, globalized communication and 24/7 media cycles, while shrinking decision cycles and increasing interdependent second- and third-order effects. In an increasingly integrated strategic and operational environment, intelligence, information operations (IO), and civil-military operations (CMO) have thus moved to the forefront of 21st century warfare. Since 9/11, “timely and actionable intelligence… is the most critical enabler to protecting the United States at a safe distance.”

Meanwhile, more normal stability and counterinsurgency operations involve a “…confluence of military and non-military operations…” In counterinsurgencies, for example, IO and CMO are two of three critical lines of operation in current Army counterinsurgency doctrine. And “…because insurgency is a holistic threat, counterinsurgency must be integrated and holistic.” These parallel developments have, therefore, made synchronizing intelligence, IO and CMO under an effects-based systems approach at all levels critical to success across the full spectrum from peace to war. While there is some doctrinal recognition of this, the point of fusion has yet to be reached in ways that make this holistic understanding, applied integratively, the modus operandi of strategic and operational decision-makers.

There is plenty of evidence, both doctrinally and in recent operations, of the triangular connectivity between intelligence, IO, and CMO and the need for better synchronization in order to mitigate duplicative and counterproductive efforts as well as fill any gaps between them. Although the joint intelligence manual, JP 2-0, discusses very little...
in terms of a connection to either IO and CMO, in the emerging strategic and operational environment, for example, most actionable intelligence is of the “human intelligence” (HUMINT) variety.

The “high tech” Army remains engaged against non-traditional adversaries who cannot match its combat power. These adversaries, however, are able to engage the Army across the spectrum of the security and operational environments using unsophisticated, yet effective, human-based techniques, augmented with today’s technology. Cold War paradigms developed for operations conducted during peace and war do not adequately address the current and future complex environments in which the Army will be operating. Tactical and operational levels of war regularly take on strategic importance. Information is the key to winning this battle successfully, and to this end, HUMINT sources are critical.5

Much HUMINT originates from open sources and comes through information and cultural or situational awareness and understanding derived from personal contacts and relationships through diplomacy, commercial activities, IO, and CMO. Intelligence, IO and CMO have effectively become an inherent mission for every soldier, coined in the phrase “every soldier is a sensor” (as well as a “sender”).

This leads to the now overriding role of culture. Concurrent to the rise of the importance of CMO and HUMINT has been the advent of the concept of “cultural intelligence.”7 This concept, originating in the 1990’s, has taken off since 9/11, and been validated in successive deployment rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Cultural awareness and an empathetic understanding of the impact of Western action on a Middle East society were constantly at the forefront of all operational considerations, regardless of the complexity... Cultural awareness and understanding how
insurgents support from the center of gravity became the important
campaign consideration.\textsuperscript{8}

Likewise, the role of CMO in the intelligence preparation of the
environment (IPE) process has accelerated with OEF and OIF,
particularly with stability and support operations (SASO).

IPB for SASO focused on the civilian population and the supporting
infrastructure of the area of operations...CMO planning is part
and parcel of warfighting in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century...The ethnic, religious,
and cultural make up of the civilian population at the beginning
of hostilities and when they come into contact with U.S. forces...
Cultural concerns must be identified to reduce friction between
U.S. forces and the civilian population...The IPB must also identify
the key locations for restoring a functioning society that will need
protection such as banks, government buildings, public records,
fire stations, police stations, court houses, jails/prisons and any
other location that will have a significant impact on restoring the
functions of a city/society. This identification enables commanders
to determine risk and to allocate resources.\textsuperscript{9}

Doctrinal guidelines for the fusion of intelligence and CMO, however,
are underdeveloped, whether in intelligence or CMO doctrine.
(While there are both joint and USMC doctrinal publications on CM,
ironically, or perhaps paradoxically, the U.S. Army has no CMO
document.\textsuperscript{10}) Civil affairs (CA) and CMO doctrine have traditionally
taken an arms-length approach to the relationship with intelligence
operations. The operational relationship between intelligence and
CMO is highly sensitive, yet for the reasons suggested above,
now unavoidable. Historically, the CA community has insisted
that, in order to protect the credibility of their operations and for
force protection reasons, CA personnel should not be involved in
intelligence-gathering in any way. While practically, intelligence
operators in the field who delve too far into CMO-related tasks
and operate openly and directly with CA may also place CA and
other personnel in support of CMO as well as their mission at great
risk. Regardless, these two communities need to establish doctrinal
divisions of responsibility and robust yet discreet operational
lines of coordination to help each other while staying out of each
other’s way. The way to do this may lie in the concepts of cultural
intelligence and atmospherics under an effects-based approach.
The doctrinal and operational relationship between intelligence and IO is more robust, especially in the most recent joint IO doctrinal publication, JP3-13. An entire chapter is dedicated to “intelligence support to information operations”. Two key insights in this chapter are that “IO intelligence often requires long lead times” – a base understanding of the relationship-building nature of CMO. It also discusses the role of “human factors analysis” and “cultural analysis” – much of which originates from CMO and PSYOP activities. Many of these analysis factors, as well as the “cognitive properties of the information environment” discussed in the chapter, are found in CMO estimates and area assessments done by CA. In another example: Military deception is essentially intelligence-centric, particularly with regard to its use of cultural factors analysis.

The relationship between IO and CMO is lightly treated, unfortunately, in the new IO doctrine. Other than a quote of the definition of CMO, it is mentioned that CMO is a related capability as is public affairs. It then refers to the joint doctrine on CMO, JP 3-57, which discusses that IO may “complement or support” CMO and that CMO planners should “take an active part” in the IO cell in order to deconflict activities and merge “capabilities and related activities into a synergistic plan.”

Still, there are plenty of examples of civil-military and interagency coordination in IO, such as the inclusion of the private sector, the Justice Department and other interagency partners in network operations.

Understanding the imperative to synchronize intelligence and IO with CMO lies first in understanding what CMO are. CMO have been applied, albeit not always in their currently recognizable form, by the Army for almost its entire history. CMO have since doctrinally matured, the latest joint definition being:

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other
Section Two: Information Effects

Although the Cold War focus of CMO was on “minimizing civilian interference in military operations,” especially since Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, commanders are better understanding the value of CMO to visualize and shape the civilian component of the integrated operational environment (the “C” in Army Field manual FM 3-0’s METT-TC – mission, enemy, terrain, time, troops available, and civil considerations). Joint and Army doctrine already acknowledge that CMO permeate all military operations at all levels across the full spectrum of conflict. CMO and civil affairs (CA), however, are not synonymous. Put simply, CMO are a concept or way, while CA is a means or capability.

Beyond what is discussed in both the joint IO and CMO doctrines, CMO and CA have considerable impact on IO and the “war of ideas,” not only due to “key leader engagement” of indigenous public opinion and decision makers and international civilian relief and reconstruction managers at the tactical and operational centers of gravity, but through generation of “good news stories” on relief and reconstruction progress gained through its civil-military coordination and information management activities, thus feeding both strategic communications and IO efforts at the tactical, operational, strategic centers of gravity. Moreover, the growing civil information management (CIM) role of CA and its longstanding civil-military operations center (CMOC) and CMO estimate are tools, like the IO and effects cells, that can facilitate fusion among intelligence, IO, and CMO – if properly synchronized.

This is particularly true in non-kinetic intensive lines of effort – Phases 0 (Shape), IV (Stabilize), and V (Enable Civil Authority). Intelligence, IO, and CMO are not only synergistic, economy-of-force, non-kinetic ways and means to operationalize strategy, they are most effective when employed preventatively in theater security cooperation (TSC) strategies in conjunction with interagency activities. The Navy’s annual humanitarian relief exercise in Haiti, Operation New Horizon, synchronized cruises in the Caribbean and
Pacific under an interagency engagement effort, as well as EUCOM’s Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, are good examples of these synergies at work preventatively.

While it is clear that the holistic, systemic relationship between these behaviorally oriented lines of operation (vice “multipliers”) is growing faster than doctrinal developments, it is important to insure that all three doctrines discuss not only the why’s of this interrelationship, but as importantly the how’s. In addition to doctrinal synchronization, primary intelligence, IO, and CMO operators need to be likewise co-educated and trained:

_Doctoral changes are not the only way in which military organizations demonstrate learning, although the published nature of formalized doctrine makes it convincing evidence of change. Learning is also demonstrated in the curricula of military schools and training institutions..._15

In the information-dominated environment of the 21st century, applied national security strategy must now be at an unusual level of comprehensiveness, integration, and balance, from formulation through execution. Reaching the potential fusion of intelligence, IO and CMO is a natural progression of this overriding imperative. In addition to the constraints and restraints of the emerging strategic and operational environment, physical resource options to the United States are also becoming more costly and limited, while cognitive and psychological opportunities are only beginning to be exploited. We can no longer afford the compartmentalization of intelligence, IO and CMO. The margins of error are becoming too narrow, the consequences and stakes too high, and the opportunities too great to keep doing the business of national security as usual. It’s time to think both inside and outside of the box.
SECTION THREE

Network Centric Operations: Leveraging Information to Enable Landpower
This section investigates the implications of leveraging information in the operational environment. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published in 2006, emphasizes the journey toward net-centricity as a centerpiece of defense transformation. The QDR states the vision of net-centricity as, “harnessing the power of information connectivity…. By enabling critical relationships between organizations and people, the Department is able to accelerate the speed of business processes, operational decision making as subsequent actions.” There should be little doubt that the Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to move toward creating a net-centric environment. The Acting Director, DoD Office of Force transformation, Mr. Terry J. Pudas, recently stated, “This whole notion, for example, of network centric operations is no longer a debate. Debate is now focused on how we implement it, what is the best way to resource it, and what is the return on investment.”

The student papers in this section examine strategic leadership competencies required in the information age, organizational change requirements, coalition and multinational implications, and the budgetary challenges to achieve net-centricity.

Mr. Rich Totleben’s paper explores the strategic leader environment of 21st century warfare. He examines how an information age organization equipped with advanced information systems and decision support systems can affect strategic leadership communicative skills. The author recommends a communication strategy to mitigate the adverse effects of computer and network-enabled information management systems to interpersonal communication skills. Mr. Totleben makes a strong argument that strategic leaders should develop techniques to deal with the overwhelming amount of information available to make decisions through enhanced information management systems.
The next author, Mr. Thomas W. Donnelly Jr., examines the linkage between knowledge management (KM) and network-centric warfare. He argues that strategic leaders within the DoD should understand the relationship of KM to NCW. He recommends that Army doctrine, training, and education of strategic leaders must change to incorporate new competencies, tasks, and skills required to effectively operate in a knowledge domain characteristic of NCW. Mr. Donnelly develops a pragmatic approach to implement a KM strategy and recommends changes to senior leader education to address skills and competencies required to operate effectively in the 21st century.

The final paper in this section, written by Colonel Reynold F. Palaganas, examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) plan implementing Network-Enabled Capability (NEC) in the NATO Response Force (NRF). The author states that future expeditionary operations will rely on rotational NRFs in a Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) capable of executing an effects-based approach to operations that strives for decision superiority. The paper describes in detail NATO’s Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) vision and conceptual framework. The author investigates the potential obstacles to implementing the NNEC in the context of the NRF. The author looks at the roles and responsibilities of various NATO bodies that must come together to develop a strategic plan to achieve the vision of the NNEC.

These papers provide insights and useful analyses on a number of relevant topics to achieve the benefits of network-enabled organizations and leaders. The United States and its coalition partners are on the front end of understanding the implications of network-centric warfare. These papers make recommendations to people, processes, organizations, and technology to advance the path toward leveraging information through collaboration to achieve enhanced situational awareness and speed of decision making.
Strategic Leader Communicative Skills in a Network-Centric Environment

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Within this complex environment, it is an inherent responsibility of the strategic leader to become a master of information and influence.
–Strategic Leadership Primer
U.S. Army War College

The nature of 21st century warfare provides unique challenges to leaders, both civilian and military, throughout an organization. Globalization, demographic shifts in an information-based society, the emergence of non-state actors, asymmetric threats, and rapid advances in technology are just a few of the significant trends leaders must address as they guide their organization to success. Depending on the leader’s position, critical thinking, adaptive skills, and a greater appreciation for the fundamentals of influencing others will be necessary to guide diverse teams toward accomplishing complex tasks in an uncertain environment. The consequences of not accomplishing a mission at the strategic level place greater emphasis on direct and organizational level leader transitions to the strategic leader’s environment.

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) is an emerging capability that will affect strategic leaders. The lack of a common definition and perspective on the specific traits of this capability add to the already uncertain leadership environment. At first glance, NCW seems to apply technology to enable better communication. However the operational concepts of NCW will change the way strategic leaders influence others, and drive changes in the cognitive skills needed to make decisions. NCW’s operational concepts offer great promise to increase military capabilities. Yet there are known and unknown disadvantages to its application.
There are countless references providing insights on senior leader competencies, skills, and attributes. Envisioning the future, consensus building, communication, managing national level relationships, and representing the organization are five key competencies. Although communication is an interpersonal competency found at all leadership levels, the communication process at the strategic level differs greatly from lower levels. Strategic leaders communicate directly and indirectly, both inside and outside the organization. Word choice, clarity of the message, and even the choice of communication channels are extremely important.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the affect that the NCW environment will have on a strategic leader’s communicative skills. The paper will begin with an examination of NCW’s objectives and characteristics, then explore future leader skills and competencies in relation to this developing capability. The components of the basic communication model serve as a tool to examine how automated information management systems influence communication, and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of electronically mediated communication channels. The paper will then analyze several studies aimed at improving communication to identify specific measures to mitigate the adverse affects of network-centric operations. Finally, the paper will recommend several solutions for strategic leaders to mitigate the adverse affects of network-centric operations on their interpersonal communication skills and effectiveness. The electronic mediated channels through which strategic leader selects to communicate have unique characteristics that facilitate communication and also introduce barriers in the process. Automated communication systems providing the dominant channel in a network-centric environment will adversely affect a strategic leader’s interpersonal communicative skills. These affects require a deliberate communication strategy to mitigate their influence on a strategic leader’s effectiveness.

Approximately two-thirds of a leader’s time is spent communicating. The relevancy of this topic for senior leaders is clear, and is magnified by the number of communication systems they must employ. *Aides de Commo* may be needed in the future to work the technical aspects of wireless computing, cellular phones, text messaging, and to
safeguard the long list of user names and passwords associated with each device. Additionally, the technical gear of today will soon be replaced by advanced devices. Decision support systems, expert systems, networks, and software applications enter the leader’s environment every year. “Incremental improvements in existing high-tech systems yield substantial consequences for businesses and workers, creating both vulnerabilities and opportunities for both.”

The Network-Centric Environment

The Department of Defense’s (DoD) transformation to a network-centric force has already started. The Office of Force Transformation is the lead agency for this effort and listed it as one of its top five goals back in October 2004. Defense Agencies, industry partners, Combatant Commanders, and Service Departments have initiated activity to bring this concept to an operational capability, influencing the conduct of warfare at all levels. The intent of this paper is not to discredit NCW, but to understand its characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages to enable leaders to make the most of its capabilities.

The 2003 Defense Planning Guidance describes a shift from an industrial age to an information age military in its transformation goals. This shift takes the armed forces from a platform-centric to a network-centric capability, which enables information sharing and a common operational picture across all levels of command. Strategic leaders who have progressed through the ranks based on their ability to master a platform-centric environment must adapt their skills to a network-centric environment. The challenge to this leader transition is an evolving definition of NCW.

Network-centric warfare (NCW) is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of shared battle space awareness that is exploited to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent. This linking of people, platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision aids into a single network creates a whole that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts. The result is networked forces that operate with increased speed and synchronization and are capable of achieving massed effects, in many situations without the physical massing of forces required in the past.
An initial assessment of the Office of Force Transformation’s description of NCW is that it relies heavily on technology. Communication over secure networks should be faster, and reduce or eliminate the need for people and systems to be near each other to pass information. While technology may dominate NCW capabilities, its description does attempt to address the human dimension of warfare. The concepts of shared battle space awareness, commander’s intent, and decision support systems are related to the cognitive ability of people in the network-centric environment. Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski also emphasized NCW’s human aspect in his forward to *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*. He states that networking is a human activity enabled by information technology.

A graphical depiction of network-centric operations helps describe the environment strategic leaders will face in the future. Figure 1 portrays the environment as the Information Grid, where the network-centric architecture will be established. Sensors, Command and Control, and Shooters are the three key nodes in the network, with information flowing from and to each entity, but control only emanating from the Command node. While the Command and Control node would undoubtedly include the Commander, control could be generated from the Sensor and Shooter nodes if the Commander allows automatic engagements based on set criteria.
In its purest form, network-centric operations is a system. Objects are inputs to the system, processed through the three key nodes in the sensor and engagement grids, with the output being the desired effect placed on that object to reduce or eliminate its influence on the network.

As with any new theory or concept, there are advocates and opponents. Change always generates opposing views and NCW’s evolving definition and strong reliance on emerging technology make it a prime target for spirited debate. One thing for certain is that NCW has already started. DoD spending on NCW related technology in 2006 is programmed for $69.7 billion, with up $702 billion in total spending through 2016.8

The Office of Force Transformation’s NCW description provides several advantages to this emerging capability. Geographically dispersed friendly forces linked by the network can avoid the enemy’s effort to mass effects on friendly capabilities. Entities on the network can share battle space awareness and terms of reference in analyzing, discussing, or deciding on courses of action. The network also provides secure links between key nodes, aides to increase the speed of decisions, and achieves massed effects on an enemy without massing friendly forces. Jake Thackray’s analysis of NCW provides second order advantages to this emerging capability. He explains that greater battle space awareness enables collaboration between disparate entities and enhances their ability to “self-synchronize” their activity with others.9 General Wallace’s analysis on NCW concludes that shared battle space awareness also stimulates initiative in commanders who would otherwise hesitate due to a lack of clear information, and that the ease network access provides commanders greater freedom to circulate on the battlefield to visit other commanders and Soldiers.10

General Wallace’s article on this subject is titled “Network-Enabled Battle Command” versus the theory’s Network-Centric description. This is an important distinction since the focus on technology, or hardware, is one of NCW’s greatest criticisms.11 Its mere status as a theory or emerging concept, unproven on the battlefield, has created a large group of naysayers highlighting potential disadvantages. Milan Vego argued that the application of advanced
information technologies will not provide the panacea to all the problems associated with modern warfare. Vego concluded that unless we identify and resolve NCW’s weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities, it will not provide the decisive capability its advocates are advertising.\textsuperscript{12} Wallace’s article describes several disadvantages to creating a central focus on technology and not on the commander or people who are responsible for the mission. The gizmos in network-centric operations may shift the responsibility for making decisions from the commander to the hardware, overload entities on the network with data, make it difficult to distinguish between important and irrelevant information, and allow commanders to micro-manage subordinate leaders given their common operational picture.\textsuperscript{13} Paul Harig reinforces this argument in his analysis of the human dimension to leadership and its clash with technology. Harig cautions that automated decision making systems may eclipse intuition and provide the strategic leader with so much information capability, that they become addicted to the system and risk averse to acting without them.\textsuperscript{14}

Whether an advocate or opponent to NCW capabilities, strategic leaders should take prudent measures to prepare for its influence on their ability to guide individuals and organizations to success. Prudent measures involve understanding the theory behind the capability, its advantages and disadvantages, and how the capability affects strategic leader skills. The transition from organizational to strategic levels of leadership is now more complex, requiring another transition from platform-centric to network-centric skills.

**Strategic Leader Skills**

The U.S. Army Doctrinal Leadership Framework Model identifies the necessary skills and actions needed at the direct, organizational, and strategic leader levels.\textsuperscript{15} The model includes interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills that a leader must master to be effective. The competencies change as a leader transitions between levels. Throughout the various skills and levels, there is one constant competency leaders must possess – the interpersonal skill of communication. The average person spends 70\% of the day communicating.\textsuperscript{16} This skill influences everything a leader does regardless of their particular leadership style.
Autocratic leaders must eventually transmit decisions to the organization. Participatory leaders must have two-way communication systems to gain input from others in the decision making process. Situational leaders must have a communication system to sense the environment before determining an appropriate leadership style. As automated communication and information management systems dominate the network-centric environment, they too will influence the strategic leadership environment. The leader’s understanding of his or her essential communicative skills, and the advantages and disadvantages of enabling this competency with advanced technology, will determine if the leader or network has the greater influence on the level of success.

For strategic leaders, communication is an essential skill given the magnitude of their duties and responsibilities. These responsibilities include providing a long term vision, shaping the organizational culture, managing relationships with external organizations and national level authorities, representing the organization, and managing change within the organization. Strategic leaders use communication to articulate their vision for the organization, describe objectives and the end state, and give guidance to focus the collective effort. Communication is essential to shape the organizational culture by ensuring members understand acceptable norms, behavior, and standards. When strategic leaders develop relationships with external entities, their influence is directly attributed to the ability to persuade and negotiation with others to act in the organization’s best interests. Persuasion and negotiation inherently involve communication. Another term for being a representative for an organization is to act as a spokesperson, where the dominant skill remains communication. As strategic leaders manage change within the organization, they must monitor information to assess progress, seek and provide feedback to adjust the organization’s effort, and motivate members to take the initiative. Whether resolving conflict, allocating resources, making decisions, or performing any of their other roles and responsibilities, effective communication dominates the strategic leader’s skill requirements.

The Army developed its doctrinal model based on leadership theories and studies, and vetted these skills by analyzing successful and unsuccessful leaders throughout history. While historical studies are
Information as Power

valuable in providing time tested examples and valid perspectives on leadership, they offer few clues for future leadership requirements. In a rapidly changing environment, strategic leaders cannot wait for others to analyze their tenure and identify the successful skills that they need today.

In July 2004, The Army Research Institute (ARI) completed a fifteen-month study on the competencies needed for future leaders. They identified political-economic, technological-scientific, demographic-cultural, and operational factors as the primary influences on future Army operations and leaders.\textsuperscript{17} The study validated the need for interpersonal, tactical, and technical leader skills; and specifically for strategic leaders -- the interpersonal skill of communication. Additionally, the study described numerous challenges created by emerging technology. “The future environment will involve increasing amounts of information transfer as a result of technological advances; therefore, written communication and oral communication will be vital.”\textsuperscript{18}

Network-centric capabilities will be one of the many technical influences on strategic leadership. NCW’s capability to enable shared awareness and provide a common understanding of the situation directly relate to one of ARI’s requirements for future leader competencies. ARI’s analysis shows that future leaders need to ensure a shared understanding throughout their organization. Leaders achieve this by active listening, using verbal and nonverbal means to reinforce communication, employing effective communication techniques, expressing thoughts clearly, recognizing potential miscommunication, and using the appropriate means for conveying messages.\textsuperscript{19} The interpersonal skill of communication will remain a dominant competency for future strategic leaders and the application of network-centric operations will influence its effectiveness. While NCW’s speed and security are definite enhancements to this skill, an analysis of the communication process reveals several adverse affects.

The Communication Process

Strategic leaders must understand the communication process to recognize the influence that network-centric operations will have on
their interpersonal skills. “By understanding the nature and power of communication, and practicing effective communication techniques, one can better relate to others and translate goals into actions.” Executive level leaders should view communication as a system with input, a process, and output. The goal of any communication system is to match how the recipient receives the message (output), with the sender’s intended message (input). Unfortunately, the process has natural barriers against achieving this goal. With an understanding of the communication process, strategic leaders can take measures to mitigate additional barriers when they mediate their message with information technology.

The seven components to the communication process are the sender (source), message, encoding, the message channel, decoding, the receiver, and feedback. Figure 2 shows the relationship between these components. The sender encodes the intended message into symbols that add substance and meaning to the sender’s thought, and selects a channel or media to convey the message to the recipient. This channel can be verbal, non-verbal (body-language), written, electronic, or a combination of several media. The receiver decodes the message into symbols that add meaning and substance to the receivers thought process. The final component in the communication process is feedback. Feedback occurs when the receiver provides a response to the sender indicating how the original message was received, interpreted, and acted upon. Feedback is critical to the communication process since it determines if the process achieved its goal of a similar thought conveyed between the sender and receiver.

Figure 2. The Communication Process
There are several barriers to achieving a similar thought between the sender and receiver. First, the sender and receiver are limited by their skills, attitudes, knowledge, experiences, and culture as they respectively encode or decode the message. The receiver may translate the message differently unless there is a common framework for coding transmissions with the sender. Another barrier is the ever present element of noise in the communication process. Noise is generated from several sources including background interference, extraneous words, and transmission failures. Information overload also generates noise with unwanted, unneeded, or disruptive information. As Figure 2 portrays, even the choice of the communication channel may generate noise. The means of transmission influence a leader’s ability to communicate and may provide a potential source of communication failure.

Computer assisted and network enabled information management systems have unique characteristics as a communication media. Just as network-centric operations have the advantages of enhancing shared awareness, providing secure channels, increasing the speed of information and decisions, and facilitating greater collaboration, it also has the same disadvantages as other electronically mediated communication.

The network-centric environment will introduce technical noise in communication that is distinct to the electronic channel, and will distract both the sender and receiver from the entire process. The technical nature of computer hardware and their associated software applications require additional time, skill, and effort to process the message. This additional time, skill, and effort is necessary to complete the process, but does not add to the context of the message. Erroneous inputs disrupt the communication process and frustrate both the sender and receiver as they try to retrieve the message from the network. Networked systems also generate noise by creating multiple sources of information and adding to the growing problem of data overload. Technical noise also comes from the need to get to a terminal or carry a device to access the network architecture. Automated communication systems also generate noise through time differentials. The network stores messages until the receiver accesses the system. The time difference between the sender’s
transmission and the receiver’s decoding can be immediate, a few hours, or even days. Automated information management systems may notify the sender that the message was sent without problems and alert the sender when the destination computer terminal received and opened the transmission. However, this does not mean the intended recipient received the message.

The network-centric environment will introduce decoding noise in the strategic leader’s communication process by reducing non-verbal cues that are critical to the communication process. Spatial arrangements between sender, receiver, and within groups strongly affects their behavior, ability to transfer information, and even the emergence of leaders. Strategic leaders who mediate their messages through a network create barriers to the communication process by filtering out facial expressions, tone of voice, body language and other physical indicators that the receiver needs to accurately translate the message. Network-centric communication may contain text, symbols, graphics, and sound, but these bytes of information are only part of the message. Analysis of oral communication highlights this decoding problem. During face-to-face communication, the total impact of the message is 7% verbal, 38% vocal, and 55% facial. The words or verbal component of the message accounts for only 7% of the meaning. The receiver decodes the rest of the meaning through non-verbal signals. Without visual contact in network-centric operations, strategic leaders reduce the effectiveness of their interpersonal communicative skills because the recipient cannot observe the critical non-verbal cues needed to accurately decode the message and must accept the message without clarification.

The network-centric environment will introduce noise in the strategic leader’s communication process by reducing feedback that is essential for the leader to ensure the message is understood. Charles McConnell argues that some forms of computer mediated message traffic are not communication. “The one way process is not communication; it is simply the dispensing of information to another person, information that may or may not be received in the form intended.” Just as network-centric operations reduce the receiver’s ability to decode the message, they also inhibit the sender’s non-verbal cues from the receiver. By selecting a network-enabled message channel, leaders
adversely affect their ability to communicate by creating barriers to a two-way exchange of information. The study of large businesses has validated this adverse effect. Few employees prefer only electronically mediated communication channels. Between 50% and 75% would rather have a combination of electronic, print, audio-visual, or just face-to-face sources.\textsuperscript{29}

Today’s strategic leaders are already communicating through computers and network-enabled information management systems. This is a reality in the complex leadership environment. Network-centric operations will increase the influence of automated information management tools on future leaders. These tools have obvious advantages and disadvantages, but the adverse affect on the essential interpersonal communicative skills is not so obvious. Leaders must realize that the differences between the intended and perceived meaning of the message often results from the complexity of the communication channel.\textsuperscript{30} An analysis of the communication model shows how technology introduces noise, hinders decoding, and creates barriers to effective feedback. Harig wrote, “the medium might rewrite the message.”\textsuperscript{31} A strategic leader’s understanding of the communication process will identify NCW’s adverse affect on interpersonal communicative skills and be the foundation for developing solutions to the problem.

Solutions

NCW will change the way military forces and their interagency, intergovernmental, and coalition partners operate. Managing the change to network-centric capabilities will be a challenge for leaders whose experiential learning path was in a platform-centric force. What makes this change even more difficult is that the impact of digital communication is not fully understood by both political and military leaders.\textsuperscript{32} Analyzing the characteristics of NCW and the communication model helps identify the adverse affect on interpersonal communication skills. In order to develop solutions for this problem, it is imperative that leaders at all levels in combat, institutional, and system acquisition fields understand the capabilities, limitations, and organizational employment of technology.\textsuperscript{33}
Communication specialists and consultants have studied technology’s influence on organizations and leaders, offering a variety of solutions to the problem. One study found that only 35% of employees actively look at their organization’s intranet on a daily basis. This section will identify and analyze two solutions that reduce the barriers associated with automated communication systems. The criteria to analyze and compare each proposal are cost, time, feedback mechanisms, providing non-verbal cues, and noise reduction. Cost is defined as capital expenditures necessary to implement the solution (lower is better). Time is defined as the period required to establish the solution (shorter is better). Establishing a feedback mechanism is the degree that the solution provides a means for the receiver to clarify the message with the sender. Preferably, this mechanism is available with the original message channel. Provisions for non-verbal cues refer to the solution’s ability to provide visual and aural contact between the sender and receiver. Preferably, these cues should be available with the original message channel. Noise reduction refers to the solution’s simplicity and ability to control information overload (less is better).

Throughout the related literature, communication specialists emphasize that any solution must start by analyzing how information flows within the organization. Two studies have analyzed this flow and recommend specific measures to improve communication. The Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy stresses redundant communication channels with brief backs for clarity and feedback. Linda Gasser, a management development specialist at Cornell University, recommends that managers develop an internal communication strategy. While each option reduces the adverse affect of computer mediated communication, the evaluative criteria show one solution as the best course of action.

The Military Academy’s solution involves additional staff personnel in the communication structure to act as information filters, uses redundant communication channels, and stresses brief backs as a method to provide feedback. Staff members serve as Aides de Commo and filter extraneous messages to reduce information overload and ensure the receiver gets only useful information.
The sender gains an increased sense of communication success by transmitting messages on two separate channels, providing the receiver with multiple sources for decoding. A brief back is when the receiver tells the sender how he or she decoded the message, provides feedback to the sender, and affords an opportunity for clarification. Brief backs can happen instantaneously, but are normally conducted after a short delay from the sender’s transmission.

The advantages to this alternative are a positive feedback mechanism, non-verbal cues, and a moderate effort to reduce noise. Although the feedback mechanism is not immediate, the sender and receiver ensure clarity through this process. The sender also gives non-verbal cues during the brief back and compensates for the non-verbal cue delay by sending a simple message that the receiver can easily decode. Filters are a good method to reduce information overload and other unwanted noise in the communication process. However the leader must give the staff specific guidance on the type of information to filter, and the disposition of the filtered information.

The disadvantages to this alternative are cost and time. Redundant message traffic defeats the purpose of network-centric operations. Network-centric systems should speed the flow of information and not burden the network with multiple transmissions. Redundant communication increases system cost, manpower requirements, and compensation for additional staff members. Additionally, redundant transmissions create noise by requiring the receiver to access several communication sources for the same message. The brief back process adds time because the sender and receiver must establish another communication session to clarify the context of the original message.

Glasser’s solution requires leaders to develop a communication plan for the organization, covering all levels and types of information. The strategy determines what to communicate, to whom, when, and through what type of media. The leader analyzes information flow in the organization and develops a communication strategy to address four topics. First, the sender must identify the purpose of the communication. The purpose could be informative, notification, personal, directive, or require a decision. Understanding the purpose determines how the sender encodes and transmits the
message. Second, the sender analyzes the intended receiver. The sender decides if the receiver requires or desires the information and modifies the context of the message depending on the receiver’s communicative abilities. Superiors, peers, and subordinates expect certain types of communication. Third, the sender selects the media to transmit the message. This could be one-way, interactive, formal, or informal, and depends on the purpose of the communication and the receiver. Finally, the sender assesses the risks and benefits of transmitting the message along the specific channel to the intended receiver. This assessment is a final check to reduce errors in the communication process.

The advantages to this alternative are cost, time, feedback, and non-verbal cues. Gasser’s strategy does not increase cost because it uses the existing media. The leader also addresses time requirements during the strategy analysis process to ensure the receiver gets the message when the receiver needs it. This solution provides a feedback mechanism and non-verbal cues when they are necessary. If the leader wants to distribute information or direct a specific action, he could use a computer mediated channel because feedback and non-verbal cues are not essential in these messages. However, if the manager must negotiate or requires input to his organization’s planning process, he should select video teleconferencing, a meeting, or other collaborative media to gain feedback and observe non-verbal cues.

The disadvantage to this solution is a poor effort in reducing noise. The solution continues to complicate the communication system by using all available message channels. The receiver must access several sources depending on how the sender decides to transmit the message. This solution does not provide measures to prevent information overload. The leader only decides if the information is required or desired.

In comparing the Military Academy and Gasser’s solutions in relation to the evaluative criteria, Gasser’s solution is less costly and requires less time for implementation. The leader selects and transmits a message along a single channel only once. The Military Academy’s redundant communication system increases expenses with twice the message traffic and more manpower requirements. Redundant communication and the brief back sessions add time
to the communication process in the Military Academy’s solution, and counter the overall advantage to NCW’s goal of speedy decisions. However, the brief back process does have the advantage of providing the essential element of feedback. Gasser’s method provides a feedback mechanism only when the manager decides it is appropriate. Both solutions provide the same non-verbal interaction between the sender and receiver. The West Point solution provides this interaction during the brief back process. However, this event could happen long after the original message is sent. Gasser’s solution provides non-verbal cues only when the manager selects an interactive channel. The Military Academy’s filters in the redundant communication process have a noise reduction advantage over Gasser’s plan. Gasser does not specify a step in her strategy to reduce information overload.

Both methods would improve the manager’s interpersonal communicative skills and reduce computer mediated barriers to effective communication. Each solution completes the communication process with a feedback loop, provides the critical non-verbal cues for message decoding, and reduces the inherent noise in the communication system. With the weighted criteria applied to the alternatives, Gasser’s internal communication strategy becomes the best solution to the problem. This strategy is less costly, faster, and mitigates the adverse impact of network-centric operations on a strategic leader’s interpersonal communicative skills.

Recommendation

Strategic leaders should develop a communication strategy to mitigate the adverse effects of computer and network-enabled information management systems on their interpersonal communication skills. The foundation for this strategy would be Gasser’s four-step communication decision making process. Leaders should also take additional steps to compensate for the weaknesses in Gasser’s strategy. These additional steps include providing feedback mechanisms, reducing noise, and using participatory leadership to develop and implement this strategy.

Most organizational cultures place a high premium on *face time*. Strategic leaders shape this culture and should make a concerted
Section Three: Network Centric Operations

effort to mitigate NCW’s barriers to feedback. Network-centric operations also affect feedback from the leader to subordinates when the subordinate initiates the communication process. A method to improve feedback is to schedule follow-up communication with the interested parties. This follow-up may be a short message over the same channel, or preferably another channel such as a telephone or video conference to give the receiver different cues. Leaders can use the brief back process to facilitate feedback, but its application in NCW may make this additional step applicable to certain types of information and not all communication encounters. Leaders must also encourage subordinates in their organization to ask questions and seek clarification when information is unclear. Finally, strategic leaders should increase personal contact with the people in their communication network. This would reinforce the fact that a human being exists on the other side of the network-centric display terminal and provide an opportunity for person-to-person contact.

The strategic leader’s communication strategy must reduce noise in the network-enabled process. To accomplish this, the strategy should not only describe how to use the information management system, it should instill the concept of information responsibility. Peter Drucker discussed the concept of information responsibility in his article, *The Coming of the New Organization*. Drucker asks a simple question to develop information responsibility – “Who in this organization depends on me for what information, and on whom, in turn, do I depend?”

The written strategy should focus management on the information component and not the system. What information is important, who needs it, when do they need it, and what we do with all the other information are several key questions to ask in this analysis. Information responsibility will reduce noise by eliminating uncertainty concerning how the organization processes information, takes steps to prevent information overload, and highlights time-sensitive and important information for immediate action. Finally, the policy should designate the appropriate channel to transmit specific types of information. Network-centric communication systems may not be the right channel for all communication needs.

The final recommendation to improve upon Gasser’s four-step decision making process is to include subordinates and external
groups in the strategy formulation process. Including people who represent the entities in network-centric operations will increase their commitment toward using the system and gain consensus in applying the strategy. As executives use a participatory leadership styles to build consensus on the communication strategy, they will also gain keen insights and perspectives from the people who work with network-enabled systems every day. This perspective will help shape the leader’s intent for a communication strategy.

Conclusion

*If there were a strategic communication corollary to the U.S. Military’s intelligence preparation of the battle space it would be: correctly analyze the combined impacts of audience, impact, message and means.*

–Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication

The application of advanced information technology in the theory and concepts behind NCW constitute a significant transformational capability. This change will affect the already complicated environment for strategic leaders who have developed their skills and demonstrated their abilities in platform-centric organizations. As leaders transition from direct and organizational levels to strategic positions, they must study the future environment and prepare for its challenges.

NCW theory and concepts offer both promise and pitfalls associated with its application. While some positive and negative characteristics are easily identifiable, others require more analysis. The automated information management systems that provide the dominant channel in a network-centric environment will have adverse affects on a strategic leader’s interpersonal communicative skills. These channels introduce disruptive noise in the communication process, lack the non-verbal cues essential for decoding messages, and create barriers to the feedback needed to complete the communication process.
Strategic leaders can mitigate these adverse effects with a detailed communication strategy. The strategy should take active measures to support feedback mechanisms, instill a culture of information responsibility to reduce noise in the communication process, and involve subordinates and other key stakeholders in the strategy development process to achieve consensus in its implementation.

Technology is a useful tool in a leader’s kit bag. It provides a means to perform essential communicative skills. A communication strategy will address the ways to achieve effective interpersonal communication objectives while balancing the risks associated with its application. “In the end, it could be argued, all great commanders are the same. They adapt the technology of their times in a highly personal, reflective space where machines can extend, but never supplant, the human dimension of their leadership.” 39 The effective strategic leaders in a network-centric environment will understand technology’s influence on their skills and master this transformational capability to make rapid and correct decisions.
Knowledge Management and the Strategic Leader

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Knowledge Management (KM) is a new discipline and a key enabler for strategic leaders to succeed in the information age and the knowledge economy. There are a variety of definitions associated with KM, and from these definitions the strategic leader can assimilate some constants that are worthy of consideration and study. While the study of KM is weighted to the private sector and academia, the application of the field in military organizations is equally important. Successful implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) as an operational concept will rely heavily on a community of leaders who are trained and educated to apply KM principles and processes within strategic organizations.

Much of the current writing concerning KM and its application in the knowledge economy, involves the term “knowledge leadership.” Our society entered into the new age of globalization, and a knowledge economy where the source of power is information. Leading organizations in this age will require strategic leaders or executives who can create a framework within which innovation and ideas can create the leader’s vision for the organization. Harnessing the power of information is critical for private, public and government organizations.

This paper will argue that KM is a key process that strategic leaders must understand and implement within their organizations, and that current Army doctrine and training for strategic leaders must change in order to incorporate the new competencies, tasks, and skills required to effectively operate as a knowledge leader in the information and knowledge domain. As the American Productivity and Quality Center (APQC) noted, “We define knowledge as ‘information in use.’ Knowledge can’t exist without information. With good information, people can make better decisions and take intelligent action.”

1
What is Knowledge Management?

Views from Academia

As KM evolves into its own field of study within academic circles, there is a difference of opinion as to just what KM entails. A doctoral dissertation by Dr. Alex Bennet offers a good conceptual view from which to start. “Knowledge management is an embryonic field that gives visibility and focus to an awareness and appreciation of knowledge. Knowledge, the foundational concept, is best understood as the capacity to take effective action.” His dissertation later states that KM primarily works with meta-knowledge or knowledge about knowledge, and explains the importance of people, organizations, technology networks, and knowledge about knowledge processes in order to achieve the ultimate goal of enhancing human and organizational performance through the creation, sharing, and application of knowledge. Interestingly enough, the attributes cited above are nearly identical to the components of NCW as described by the Office of Force Transformation.

Another view from the Knowledge Management Center International (KMCI) treats KM more formally as a branch of management and a social science, which seeks to improve business performance by enhancing that organization’s capacity to solve problems. KMCI defines KM as an inter-related set of activities whose purpose is to enhance knowledge processing. A popular benchmark publication echoes this theme with the definition; “Knowledge management (KM), which is the systematic processes by which knowledge needed for an organization to succeed is created, captured, shared, and leveraged.” The APQC also defines KM as a systemic process, but states that the goal of a KM initiative “…..is to enhance the performance of the organization and the people in it through the identification, capture, validation, and transfer of knowledge.”

While there are differing views about how KM moves from theory to reality, three common points emerge. KM focuses on the study of knowledge, the processes surrounding knowledge, and improvement of organizational performance.
A View from the Business World

As KM moves from academia to the business world, more concrete definitions emerge, and a greater emphasis is placed on the notion of creating value for the company, as opposed to the notion of merely “improving performance.” In fact, distinctions are made between the early theories and of KM, and the current practitioners in the marketplace. “First-generation KM seeks only to enhance the integration of existing organizational knowledge through strategies such as knowledge capture and sharing. Second-generation KM strives to improve knowledge integration, too, but it also seeks to improve knowledge production.”

Second-generation KM clearly distinguishes itself from its earlier theory, by stating that sharing and disseminating knowledge is not good enough. There must be a value created by doing something with knowledge that contributes to organizational success. The APQC makes this point quite clearly as it now defines KM as an emerging set of strategies and approaches that allows knowledge to flow to the right people at the right time in order to use the knowledge to create more value for the enterprise.

The implementation of KM in the business world also institutionalized the term “communities of practice” (COPs). Again, a wide variety of definitions surround the term, but the consensus of opinion is that the COPs consist of networked groups of people who share common objectives, and who mutually benefit from sharing information, practices, and ideas (knowledge). The COPs become virtual repositories of knowledge and enhance value for an organization by retaining that knowledge, and by developing innovative solutions to problems.

Views from the Department of Defense (DoD)

Current DoD literature offers little in the way of defining or operationalizing the discipline of KM in a strategic organization. In fact, what is more noticeable is the dearth of KM guidance or procedure available to any level of headquarters, in spite of the creation of Command Knowledge Officers in virtually every Combatant Command and Sub-Unified or Component Command.
As Joint Publication (JP) 6-0 (Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations) underwent staffing and rewrite, references to KM actually fell out of the final version. The May 9, 2003 2nd draft contained at least a definition of KM, but the final version dated March 20, 2006 does not contain any mention of KM.

The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Pamphlet 5 cites the draft JP 6-0, and establishes an unofficial DoD definition as “Knowledge management is the handling, directing, governing, or controlling of natural knowledge processes (acquire/validate, produce, transfer/integrate knowledge) within an organization in order to achieve the goals and objectives of the organization.” The pamphlet then explains that KM will later focus on the processes and procedures to support a collaborative environment, but offers nothing else in the way of a conceptual or operational framework.

U.S. Army doctrine focuses primarily on the Information Technology realm, with Army Regulation (AR) 25-1 describing Army Knowledge Management as “...the Army’s strategy to transform itself into a net-centric, knowledge-based force and an integral part of the Army’s transformation to achieve the Future Force.” The description in AR 25-1 is clearly a first-generation view of KM as it focuses on information sharing and dissemination to improve decision making by linking people, technology, and information, but the AR does not address the primary role of KM in knowledge processes or in creating value for the Army.

Despite the writings and conceptual documents outlining the transformational aspects of NCW, the DoD and the Army are less focused on documenting a doctrinal basis for adaptation and implementation of KM as a supporting discipline. Contemporary writings however, offer an insight into the criticality of KM to both NCW and strategic decision makers operating in the information age or knowledge economy. “Knowledge Management allows a user to take the now—or even the past—and make accurate predictions about what is going to happen in the future….What defines knowledge management is its ability to allow all decision makers to decide on an immediate course of action and to make projections about future events.”
The Importance of Knowledge Management to a Strategic Leader

The Strategic Environment

The knowledge economy and the globalization trends create dilemmas for both corporations and military organizations. Information overload combined with increasing numbers of regulatory guidelines complicate decision making systems. Predicting future trends and charting strategy for an organization become complex tasks with enormous second and third order effects. Strategic leaders routinely rely on reports, feedback, and industry information sources to make key decisions. However, a recent International Data Corporation (IDC) study states that fewer than 14 per cent of managers were very confident that the reports developed in their organizations deliver the relevant information to the right people at the right time. The study concluded that the system shortfalls are due to the lack of investment in the right analytical tools and a disconnect between how information is delivered and the decision support function of that information.12

Similar challenges and environments face military strategic leaders. The JFCOM Joint Operational Environment Living Draft describes the strategic environment as one in which information is the ally of someone with the capability and intent to exploit it, and the means of exploitation will center on layered networks that enable NCW. A key element of success in this environment will be leaders who are savvy enough to build the KM processes that connect the people to the right information. “Knowledge is critical for making decisions faster and better than the adversary and for sustaining the advantage of knowledge and decision dominance.”13

Despite the dearth of doctrinal guidance on KM, the current Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) acknowledges the importance of decision and information dominance, and alludes to the importance of KM in the strategic environment.

The better we understand our own forces and capabilities, the adversary and the environment, the better we can employ and integrate joint force actions to create decisive effects. Knowledge must be timely, relevant, and accurate to be of value, and it must be acquired, prioritized, refined, and shared vertically (strategic,
operational, and tactical) and horizontally (within the joint force and among interagency and multinational partners). All knowledge is built on information from integrated strategic, operational, and tactical sources, both military and civilian. The future joint force must possess the capabilities required to accomplish this integration.\(^{14}\)

The Joint Operations Concepts (JOPsC) also implies that KM is a key ingredient to the success of NCW in the current strategic environment, as it describes the three domains of conflict – information, cognitive, and social. The social domain is then described by NCW as the domain in which humans interact, form shared awareness, and make collaborative decisions. This process of moving from shared awareness to collaborative decision making is in fact the KM discipline. KM is an essential tool to navigate the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of the strategic environment. It provides the processes by which the strategic leader makes decisions.

**KM and Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)**

While discussions progress in academia, corporations and government agencies concerning the value of KM in today’s knowledge economy, it is clear that the KM discipline must play a prominent role in leading the DoD’s development of NCW. Globalization and the strategic environment described in the JOE, combined with the networks of transnational and non-nation state actors present a web of threats that are not easy to quantify or describe. Harnessing information and creating knowledge are key processes to defending our national security. Vice Admiral (retired) Herbert Browne stated in a commentary in *Signal Magazine*, “An observer need look no further than the controversy over weapons of mass destruction to understand the importance of investing in knowledge management. Unknowns about shape, form, storage, transport are as clear a definition for why knowledge management is required as is any that I know.”\(^{15}\)

To confront this present and future strategic environment, the DoD will rely on the emerging concept of NCW. Four components of NCW are people, technology, processes, and organizations. Technology is an enabler for NCW, and it is an enabler for KM. The remaining three components are clearly all pieces of first and second generation KM.
At its core, effective NCW equates to successful implementation of second generation KM to create the value knowledge and decision superiority, which results in speed of battle command and a more effective and lethal fighting force.

A strategic leader within DoD must understand the concept of NCW, and in order to understand NCW, the leader must understand the fundamentals of KM and its application to an organization. NCW is less about the leader who champions technology, but rather it is more about the leader who can envision the processes that technology can enable, the organizational changes that must occur to enable those processes, and the human behavior that must change to work within the organization.

While NCW aims to create shared battlespace awareness to accelerate the speed of command, the true value created by KM is both the increased speed of decision making, and the quality of the decisions that are made.

Empowered by knowledge, derived from a shared awareness of the battlespace and a shared understanding of commanders’ intent, our forces will be able to self-synchronize, operate with a small footprint, and be more effective when operating autonomously. A knowledgeable force depends upon a steady diet of timely, accurately information, and the processing power, tools, and expertise necessary to put battlespace information into context and turn it into battlespace knowledge.

The evolution of NCW is on-going and strategic leaders must understand how to operate in the strategic environment to leverage this new concept. Two recent operations underscore the importance of senior leaders understanding the role of KM in managing the changes in processes and organizations in order to implement NCW. The results of KM processes, collaboration technology, and networked organizations give enormous power to the smallest elements on the edges of organizations, and these elements also become the primary sensors and collectors driving the information flow to the decision makers.

Paul Saffo, Director of the Institute for the Future, cites the power of small Special Forces teams in Afghanistan networked to global
strike air power as a prime example of NCW concepts enabled by collaboration tools and KM processes. The lethality of the tactical team increases exponentially because of the combatant command’s ability to synchronize global strike missions with tactical operations. While the actual “call for fire” is a basic task and an interoperability issue solved decades ago, the capacity for rapid planning and decentralized execution planning on a global scale are enabled by KM processes and systems.

However, Mr. Saffo then cites the failure of strategic leaders to capitalize on the early implementation of these processes.

> Once military leaders “got used to the new normal,” they reverted to traditional military tactics, techniques and procedures. This led to incidents like those that occurred in Tora Bora. This is why Osama bin Laden has not been captured, because U.S. forces went back to traditional warfighting after those first few months in Afghanistan. Because leaders are networked does not mean they are collaborating, which can lead to the creation of large bureaucracies instead of leveraging technology.\(^{17}\)

Mr. Saffo also cites the federal response to Hurricane Katrina as another lost opportunity for KM and NCW. While the federal response organizations and processes are still structured for a very hierarchical information flow, there is little emphasis or movement to network the elements on the periphery and feed information across physical and bureaucratic lines to speed decision making and execute operations. Both scenarios clearly show that NCW is evolving and it can be a powerful force to add value and capability to military organizations. However, strategic leaders must understand the importance of KM in developing the processes needed to deal with the information flow, and collaborate across organizational boundaries to achieve decision and information dominance.

The Role of the Strategic Leader in KM

“In every successful large-scale KM initiative we have examined, including those in this study, an important senior champion or group saw the strategic value of knowledge management and endorsed what became a significant investment in it.”\(^ {18}\) This study by the APQC is but one of several examples that cite the fact that the only
organizations that successfully implement KM, are those in which the senior leadership is supporting and resourcing the change.

The strategic leader plays a critical role in implementing KM for three reasons:

- First, the strategic leader establishes the vision for the organization, and in many cases that leader may also largely develop a strategic action plan to implement the vision. Instituting KM within an organization requires the strategic leader to focus the areas about which the organization should seek knowledge. These areas are those which directly support the future of the organization and should represent the areas that have high potential for generating knowledge with future strategic value.

- Second, the strategic leader identifies where the opportunities are to collect or generate this knowledge. KM studies of both British Petroleum and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) cited the strategic leader’s vision and identification of opportunities as key elements to the successful implementation of KM practices within these organizations.\(^{19}\)

- Third, the strategic leader is the primary person to influence cultural and organizational change. As noted in the first section, KM involves changing processes, practices, and most likely organizational structures. “Senior executive support is critical to change behavior and institutionalize new approaches to knowledge management. … Executives often have a vision of how this capability will enhance the future success of the organization to achieve its mission.”\(^{20}\) Without the support and drive from the strategic leader, KM initiatives generally result in nothing more than failed IT experiments.

**What Does a Strategic Leader Need to Do with KM?**

**Strategic Knowledge Leadership**

While it is unrealistic to think that every DoD or U.S. Army strategic leader will or should become an expert in KM, it is appropriate and necessary for strategic leaders to focus on KM in their organization. This focus should be intertwined with the leader’s vision for the
organization, and it should create value as it drives organizational and process changes. It will be extremely difficult for large organizations to succeed in the knowledge economy or NCW environment without successful KM practices. Leadership is the number one critical factor for successful implementation of KM initiatives, especially because KM is a new discipline. Other factors that follow leadership are Culture, Structure, IT Infrastructure and Measurement. KM initiatives will compete for a strategic leader’s time and resources along with hundreds of other priorities. The leader’s basic understanding of these success factors, combined with a rudimentary understanding of KM, and his vision for the organization will provide a foundation to implement or improve KM practices.

KM is more than a passing management trend. It is intertwined with the essential system of command and control (C2) for any large organization. KM provides the processes and policy that enable the members of the organization to operate, which in turn creates value as the organization accomplishes its mission. JP 6-0 states, “The first element of C2 system is people—people who acquire information, make decisions, take action, communicate, and collaborate with one another to accomplish a common goal.” Leading people and implementing KM practices will give the organization a decisive advantage. Not only will the command and control system improve, but the other battle command or mission essential systems will improve as KM practices bring together people, processes and technology to facilitate the exchange and understanding of relevant information.

Advancing these changes within a strategic organization will take the personal impetus of the senior leader. As noted previously, every “successful KM” organization benefited from senior leadership vision and engagement. Because KM involves changing practices, policy, and often times organizational structure, the senior leader must set the framework for the change. “Senior executive support is critical to change behavior and institutionalize new approaches to knowledge management… Cultivating a knowledge-sharing culture is the result of a successful knowledge management strategy.”

A senior leader committed to KM implementation will tie his vision for the organization to his KM strategy. He will articulate the key
processes, missions, or tasks the organization must accomplish in order to succeed, and he will enable the collaboration, information sharing, and knowledge creation necessary to accomplish them. Most importantly, he will establish a culture and climate within the organization that rewards teamwork, openness, innovation and learning in order to make this cultural change.

Implementing a KM Strategy

Implementing a KM strategy involves more than publishing a vision, proclaiming KM policies, and investing in the necessary IT infrastructure. The cultural changes mentioned above will present the greatest challenge to the organization and the senior leader. The leader will rely on inter-personal competencies to change his organization’s ability to operate in the strategic environment. Instituting cultural change for the purpose of enabling KM practices will require the strategic organization to look both internally and externally. The senior leader will use his negotiating and communicative skills to precipitate these cultural changes. Fundamental to any KM effort is the paradigm shift from “need-to-know” to “need-to-share.”

Convincing both internal members of the organization and external agencies to move to this paradigm is challenging. This complex business of knowledge transfer is termed “strategic transfer,” and it involves linking organizational goals, elements of the organization responsible for the goals, key knowledge components, polices required for collaboration or shared awareness, and the technological tools needed to create that knowledge. Linking these pieces establishes a system for knowledge transfer much like the NCW concept of linking sensor, shooter, and decision maker to achieve decision and information dominance.

The strategic leader will need to move within his organization to identify the key information, sources, and processes that must be synchronized in order to accomplish the mission and achieve the vision. The internal KM structure within the organization will grow as the leader develops or empowers subordinates to create the processes, policies, and technology systems that create the shared awareness and new knowledge. As this structure grows, the organization creates knowledge that is shared among individuals
and communities of practice. This synergy then creates value as the organization is better able to make decisions and deal with information requirements within its strategic environment.

Externally, the senior leader will need to look at the primary agencies that provide the information or benefit from the knowledge his organization creates. These agencies and organizations must be motivated to share information, and the leaders must focus on developing the requirements that describe the information flow, processes, roles, responsibilities, and employment concept.24

Defining success or describing an end state for a KM strategy is a difficult task at best. It is argued that a true knowledge organization must continually produce knowledge, deal with new information sources, and evolve itself to meet the demands of the strategic environment and knowledge economy. The strategic leader understands that the organization’s vision may be an end state never actually realized, but there must be measurements to grade the degree of KM implementation within the organization. Otherwise, KM will become another initiative for the duration of his time, vice a true cultural transition. The APQC offers a simple yet effective list of steps in a roadmap for a senior leader to gauge whether KM is taking hold within his organization.

1. KM is linked directly to the business model.
2. KM initiatives are widely deployed.
3. All managers and employees are trained to use them.
4. Methodically address the KM strategy to identify gaps, and outline methods to close the gaps.
5. Formal support structure and rewards program for KM.
6. Sharing knowledge is the norm in the organization.

An organization that accomplishes all of these steps, however, is still not guaranteed success. The knowledge shared and produced, must result in a value for the organization. Essentially, the exchange of information, the KM processes, and the knowledge created must result in a transaction of sorts that achieves organizational objectives
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or mission success. Similarly, Admiral (retired) Arthur K. Cebrowski cited high transaction rates as one of the four metrics of success for war in the information age. He also listed creating and preserving options, developing high learning rates, and achieving overmatching complexity at scale as three additional metrics for success.  

For the military strategic leader, the value created by KM is increased combat power for his organization, or for the combat forces in the case of support organizations. The central idea of the Net-Centric Joint Force Concept is that if the Joint Force fully exploits both shared knowledge and technical connectivity, then the resulting capabilities will dramatically increase mission effectiveness. KM and NCW are inextricably linked, and the senior leader must implement a KM strategy in order to achieve the information and decision superiority. The CCJO envisions that “Knowledge allows the joint force to see, understand, and act before an adversary can, or before operational needs go unmet in humanitarian crises. It is essential to the identification, creation, and assessment of effects.”

Changes to U.S. Army Strategic Leader Education

KM is an evolving practice or discipline, yet it is mature enough and linked so closely with NCW that it is worthy of additional mention in the doctrine for educating strategic leaders. KM needs to be addressed directly as a strategic leader competency in the U.S. Army War College Strategic Leader Primer. The current publication adequately addresses the responsibility of the strategic leader to master information and influence in order to succeed in the strategic environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, change, and ambiguity. However, neither the specified competencies, nor the specified tasks that accompany the competencies adequately address the importance or the need for the strategic leader to drive KM strategy within his organization.

The doctrine calls for the leader to manage change, build a learning organization, and leverage technology in doing so. Technical competencies state the importance of systems understanding, recognizing interdependencies and awareness of information-age technology. While all of these tasks and competencies are accurate, they do not convey the concept, practice, or importance of KM as
a critical enabler for the strategic leader. The Army Policy in AR 25-1 places the CIO/G6 as the proponent for Army KM policy and guidance. The text of AR 25-1 primarily addresses business practices and IT aspects of KM, but it does little to address the “ends” or “ways” of the Army strategy for the use of KM by strategic leaders to develop NCW capabilities, and add value to the Army by increased capabilities in battle command and lethality.

Specifically, the Strategic Leader Primer should address KM as a separate conceptual or technical competency. KM as a discipline involves people, organizations, technology, and processes. The ability of a strategic leader to implement a vision in the strategic environment of the knowledge economy and the information age is directly proportional to an organization’s understanding and implementation of KM. The ability of the strategic leader to influence organizational culture is also directly proportional to understanding the effect of KM in creating value from the organization. KM is a critical enabler to achieving the leader’s vision and tasks. Similar to organizational culture change, implementing a KM culture is a five to ten year process that outlasts the tenures of multiple leaders. A strategic leader must be exposed to case studies and practices that demonstrate the factors that create the conditions for an organization to transition to a knowledge sharing culture.

Ultimately, the strategic leaders of today and tomorrow will operate in a NCW environment. Debates will continue on how far or how fast the DoD is evolving in NCW, but ultimately large organizations are operating and will continue to operate in a networked environment. Both first generation KM (knowledge sharing and dissemination), and second generation KM (knowledge integration and knowledge production), are key components to successful implementation of NCW. Today’s strategic leader must have a basic level of competency with KM in order to link vision, organizational objectives, information sources, knowledge requirements, policies, processes, and technology. Without this basic competency, KM will remain an ill-defined discipline focused on IT solutions. Two successful KM corporations, Hewlett Packard and British Petroleum, both had CEOs firmly committed to KM. “The American Productivity and Quality Center notes that the best practice organizations come to rely on the
CEO having a personal belief in the efforts and including effective knowledge management as part of the organization’s vision.”

The framework for the strategic leader competencies should also include an explanation of the benefits and uses of COPs within strategic organizations. The Center for Creative Leadership asserts that as the strategic environment of the knowledge economy and the information age continue to become increasingly complex, the associated challenges become more difficult to solve. The Strategic Leadership Primer makes an important distinction between problem management and decision making. Communities of Practice are critical KM processes and organizations that allow individuals to create knowledge and develop solution sets through cross-functional and external coordination and collaboration. As noted by the Center for Creative Leadership, senior leaders must develop this new skill of creating an environment where others can help them succeed through a process of collective and interdependent decision making across boundaries and functions.

At the more basic level, it is critical that strategic leaders become exposed to the emerging concept of the Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) and study examples of how various organizations have succeeded and failed to use this resource. The corporate world continues to struggle with how to place the CKO in the organizational structure and how to define its roles and responsibilities. There is even less documentation of examples within the DoD, but all levels of organizations are beginning to create these positions. The potential exists for this resource to either enable NCW to develop, or to hinder the advancements in NCW. The end result will depend on senior leadership.

Much of the DoD and the U.S. Army divested themselves of the Total Quality Management (TQM) phenomenon before the concept of Net-Centric Warfare became a common term. Unfortunately, ill perceptions about “another management craze” may still linger, and perceptions of KM and its utility for military organizations will continue to fluctuate. However, what separates the two is the fact that KM is inextricably linked to NCW concepts and tenets. NCW is a reality, and strategic leaders are now practitioners of a new form of warfare.
It is imperative that these leaders become conversant and familiar with the discipline of KM, in order to balance the people, processes, technology and organization to create the value of increased combat power. As Admiral Cebrowski poignantly stated, “The predominant pattern of human behavior in the information age is network behavior. Network-centric warfare is about human behavior in a networked environment, and in warfare, human behavior ultimately determines outcome.”
Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability: Implications for NATO Response Force’s Envisioned Roles

Colonel Reynold F. Palaganas
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...NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels... [to] prepare the Alliance to meet any threat....

– General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)¹

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Response Force (NRF) represents a new dimension in deployability and interoperability of NATO and nationally provided rotational forces. Alliance heads of state endorsed the NRF concept during the 2002 Prague NATO summit. It is a work in progress with two envisioned roles: (1) operating as a high readiness, modular quick reaction force for strategic crisis response from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that sets NATO priorities; and (2) serving as NATO’s transformation catalyst as the entry point for capability improvements.² Future expeditionary operations will rely on NRFs in a Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) capable of conducting Effects Based Operations (EBO) and striving for “decision superiority” (DS).

NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) – the vehicle for network-centric operations as a Transformational Objective Area (TOA) – is defined as “the Alliance’s ability to federate various components of the operational environment, from the strategic level down to the tactical levels, through a networking and information infrastructure [NII].”³ It has the objective potential to exploit economies of scale for collectors, decision makers, and effectors through coordinated capabilities distributed across nations.⁴
NNEC’s vision and strategic challenge is to improve operational effectiveness through complex networking of Alliance and national capabilities. To transform NRF operations from a “platform-centric” to a “network-centric environment,” NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) elements, NATO’s two strategic commands, member nations, and industry must move beyond CIE rhetoric and “business as usual” Cold War mindset as enterprise network stakeholders by implementing a Federation-of-Systems (FoS) NNEC concept as the interoperability driver that joins common interfaces and information services.

Research scope is based on an unclassified literature review and assistance from NATO subject-matter-experts. The paper introduces NRF principles and NATO commanders’ relevant strategic vision concepts. It presents a working definition of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and identifies tenets associated with the four domains of warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) Net-Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW) and the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) Network-Enabled Capability (NEC) models are highlighted as forerunners of NNEC. The paper describes roles of relevant NATO bodies and NNEC conceptual framework components. It then analyzes impediments to implementing NNEC and NRF role implications. These include dealing with a legacy oriented environment, technological insertion gaps, and national and NATO common funding contribution levels. Substantive details regarding potential participation from non-NATO nations, civilian, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), an effects-based approach to joint operations construct, NRF operational attributes, or NNEC competency levels are beyond the scope of this research.

**NRF Principles and NATO Commanders’ Strategic Vision Concepts**

**NRF Principles**

The deployability principle translates to a multinational expeditionary force of up to 25,000 troops with land, maritime, air, and special operations components and standard component command headquarters task organized for high and low intensity missions. NAC approves its employment under the “first force in, first force
out” principle. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) is a force catalog indicating types of capabilities for NATO defense planning scenarios. NRF readiness requires 5-30 days notice-to-move within or beyond the Euro-Atlantic area for an operation usually 30 days long, depending on the element deployed and embedded logistics capabilities.\(^9\)

The scalability principle means the NRF commander configures the modular force to a scenario. Minimal required capabilities range from a stand-alone force for NATO Article 5 (collective defense) or non-Article 5 (crisis response, out-of-area) operations such as evacuation operations, disaster consequence management, humanitarian crisis, or counter-terrorism with specialized forces commanded by a single headquarters; to an initial entry force facilitating follow-on units’ arrival; to being assigned to a larger force for high intensity missions.\(^{10}\)

The rotation principle allows equitable burden sharing and broadening of joint operations experience. At NATO force generation conferences, member nations contribute rotating forces for a minimum capabilities package. The NRF goes through a process of training and SACEUR certification, followed by a six month operational stand-by period. Joint Force Command (JFC) of the NRF rotates among one of NATO’s three permanent headquarters based in Brunssum, (the Netherlands), Naples (Italy), or Lisbon (Portugal).\(^{11}\)

The NRF’s initial operating capability was declared in October 2004. Full operational capability will occur following a June 2006 exercise.\(^{12}\) NRF force packages were activated in contingencies, however, including humanitarian assistance to U.S. Gulf Coast victims of Hurricane Katrina and Pakistan’s earthquake relief efforts in 2005.\(^{13}\)

**NATO Commanders’ Bi-Strategic Vision: EBO, CIE, DS Enabling Concepts**

“Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge by NATO’s Strategic Commanders” reflects guidance from SACEUR (General Jones) and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT – then Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr.) regarding Alliance transformation of
forces, concepts, and capabilities (Figure 1). It sets the scene for the Concept for Alliance Future Joint Operations (CAJFO). This section summarizes mutually exclusive definitions for EBO, CIE and DS. They collectively describe an expeditionary force able to create desired battlespace effects, employ “net-centricity” (a robustly interconnected information environment enabling horizontal and vertical collaboration), and conduct multinational operations interdependently.

Figure 1: Framework for Transformation

EBO. All elements of Alliance power – diplomatic, information, military, economic – (DIME) are applied and integrated to create campaign effects to achieve desired outcomes. John Admire, an expert on transforming coalition warfare, interpreted EBO’s significance to the NRF: “[The] objective is a responsive and networked force to influence and adapt to an adversary’s actions by enabling us to shape and reshape our options and actions amid the uncertainty of battle and crisis situations.” The NCW effects-based system links sensors, shooters, and decision makers as knowledgeable entities to achieve desired functionalities such as surveillance or precision strike, rather than distinguishing between platforms and military services.
CIE. Admire cites U.S. Joint Forces Command’s definition:

The aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes structured for...creating and sharing data, information, and knowledge necessary to plan, execute, and assess joint force operations and enable the commander to make better and faster decisions than the adversary.\textsuperscript{18}

For NRF defense planning, it would transition from a vertical or hierarchical serial process to parallel collaborative planning with a flattened structure.\textsuperscript{19}

DS. NATO’s strategic vision defines “decision superiority” as follows:

The state in which better-informed decisions are made and implemented faster than an adversary can react, [sic] allowing the future joint force commander to shape the environment to best fit his needs and objectives. [It] is critically dependent on achieving and maintaining a position of information dominance [read: information superiority] and shared situational awareness during all phases of an operation.\textsuperscript{20}

In Figure 1’s transformation framework, “information superiority” (IS) and “network-enabled capability” (NEC) underpin the DS pillar and serve as key enablers for all TOAs.

Network Centric Warfare and NATO Network Enabled Capability - Background

NCW Tenets

NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) Chief Architect Dr. Tom Buckman stresses in the \textit{NNEC Feasibility Study} (NNEC FS) that further NNEC development as a Federation-of-Systems has to incorporate NCW tenets into NATO concepts of operation.\textsuperscript{21} Numerous literature exists advocating NCW as a new way of thinking on how a force operates. NCW experts David Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick Stein offer a widely acknowledged NCW hypothesis in \textit{Network Centric Warfare, Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority}: 
An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.\textsuperscript{22}

NCW’s four tenets in Figure 2 comprise the theory behind NNEC: that is, a flexible network creating an information advantage among geographically dispersed forces which results in a decisive warfighting advantage.\textsuperscript{23} There are two takeaway points from this diagram. First, joining static, deployable, and mobile segments accentuate the potential power of “networked” robust military nodes. Second, the theoretical NCW “value chain” refers to “networking” interactions present in a warfighting force’s four domains: information, cognitive, social, and physical.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Tenents of Network Centric Warfare\textsuperscript{24}}
\end{figure}

“Information Domain”: This is cyberspace where information is created, managed, shared, and protected. Command and Control (C2) of military forces is communicated and commander’s intent is conveyed.\textsuperscript{25}
“Cognitive Domain”: This is the mind of the warfighting participants and supporting populace – the realm of EBO in which the force is capable of sharing awareness via collaboration, making decisions, and taking actions based on commanders’ intent. It is characterized by intangibles such as leadership, unit cohesion, morale, situational awareness, and public opinion.26

“Social Domain”: This domain operates in the societal background of cultural awareness and assessing change.27

“Physical Domain”: This is the traditional warfare domain where strike, protect, and maneuver take place across the environments. Operations are synchronized with the right information at the right place at the right time in the right format because this is where physical platforms and networks connecting them reside.28

**NATO Network-Centric Frames of Reference**

NATO’s network-centric frames of reference can be traced to two leading NATO nations: the U.S.’ NCOW and U.K.’s NEC models. The NCOW model supports DoD’s *Joint Vision* and *Joint Operations Concepts* strategic documents to describe conduct of future joint military operations. A Joint Force’s emphasis on full spectrum dominance necessitates a capabilities-based approach.29 NCOW describes how DoD applies net-centricity to daily business and warfighting activities. NCW results from fully applying NCOW. To transform forces away from a platform-centric to a networked force,30 DoD strategy requires: (1) centralized, policy-based planning; (2) decentralized execution; (3) shared awareness; and (4) agility (flexibility and adaptability).

U.K.’s NEC model supports the operational goal to “conduct effects based operations with highly responsive, well integrated and flexible joint force elements that have assured access to an unprecedented freedom of manoeuvre within the entire battlespace.”31 Its core elements are sensors, a network, and strike assets. NEC aim is to support the U.K.’s “Defence Capability,” the armed forces’ ability to support government policy in the future strategic environment.32
U.K. defense policy mindset requires that it “…act[s] as an effective and capable member of a U.S.-led coalition as [its] most likely principal partner in any major military operation.” NEC development strategy will not be wholesale transformation as this is cost-prohibitive, but rather evolve as prioritized capabilities when equipment and systems become obsolete. NEC’s envisioned role is to enable formation of agile forces (i.e., traditional warfighting communities, including core and ad hoc mission groupings), by assembling prescribed building blocks so NEC supports a set of different communications systems optimized for different environments.

Relevant NATO Bodies

Table 1 (facing page) summarizes NATO relevant bodies involved in NNEC development and implementation.
### Section Three: Network Centric Operations

#### RELEVANT NATO BODIES

| NATO Military Committee (MC) | - Responsible for overarching NNEC concept  
|                            | - Advises the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on NNEC |

| NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Board (NC3B) | - Acts as the Board of Directors of the NATO C3 Organization (NC3O); oversees the work of two NC3O constituent agencies: the NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) and NATO Communications and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA)  
|                                                      | - Serves as NNEC link to the Nations and coordinates with other NATO staffs, such as the Infrastructure Committee and Military Agency for Standardization  
|                                                      | - Keeps MC informed on NNEC activities; overarching authority in C3 architectures to enable effective integration of C3 capabilities |

**-- NC3A**

- Chartered to develop, procure, and implement state-of-the-art capabilities for NATO and provide high level scientific advice and testbed support to NATO bodies
- Formed NNEC Integrated Capability Team
  -- Developed NNEC Feasibility Study (NNEC FS)
  -- Provides Integrated Project Team (IPT) for NRF and coalition interoperability

**-- NCSA**

- Chartered as a military command to provide end-to-end secure NATO-wide information exchange and information processing services using fielded Communications and Information Systems (CIS)

| NATO Headquarters Consultation, Command, and Control Staff (NHQC3S) | - Provides support to the NAC, MC, and other NATO committees as a single integrated civilian and military staff; supports NC3B  
|                                                                      | - Coordinates all C3 aspects of NNEC, including policy and standards guidance |

| NATO Bi-Strategic Commands | - Formed an ACT IPT  
|                           | - Under authority of the MC:  
|                           | -- Developed NNEC Foundation Document  
|                           | -- Developed overarching NNEC Vision and Concept  
|                           | -- Develops NNEC Strategic Framework documents  
|                           | -- Develops NNEC capabilities; lead for Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E) to focus on how emerging solutions are to be used operationally  
|                           | -- Adapts military doctrine and training for the NRF |

**-- Allied Command Transformation (ACT) (Commanded by Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT): Norfolk, VA)**

**-- Allied Command Operations (ACO) (Commanded by Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR] Casteau, Belgium)**

- Has military operational command over the NRF
- Focuses on current operations; has operational planning/mission execution that includes NRF standards, certification, and exercises/contingencies

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Table 1: Relevant NATO Bodies and NNEC Roles\(^{35}\)
NNEC Conceptual Framework

ACT’s NNEC Foundation Document presented initial NNEC perspectives as a precursor to NC3A’s NNEC FS and ACT’s NNEC Vision and Concept. These are starting points for the NNEC Strategic Framework, a series of five sequential documents under development detailing key activities, milestones, and identifying investment requirements for NNEC delivery. NNEC’s complexity has steered ACT to incrementally seek nations’ endorsements of these documents staffed for MC approval.

Whereas the centerpiece for NCW tenets in Figure 2 is oriented to a theoretical behavior chain interaction supporting the four warfare domains, the conceptual framework centerpiece in Figure 3 encompasses NNEC’s components: integrating “human processes” with “information” in a “network” to link collectors, decision makers, and effectors in an open standards environment commensurate with changing technology and doctrine.

The “network” component comprises NII’s physical infrastructure: communications, network, computer, and core services layers. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) specifying adequate performance levels for the user such as extended reach and increased bandwidth,
rapid reconfiguration on short notice, and network security are keys to effectively managing scarce system resources. This component constitutes the framework’s “technical” aspect.

The “information” component encompasses information management aspects oriented toward a need-to-share. In the information sphere resides a collection of logical busses or virtual databases. This component constitutes the framework’s “organizational” aspect.

The “people” component constitutes the framework’s “social” aspect that includes organizational users, national stakeholders, industry, and cultures. NATO and the nations can be interconnected between human aspects of information technologies and shared networks.

These broad components express NATO’s blueprint transformation from a stovepiped to an NII enterprise. What has yet to be nested into the NRF environment are redefining tactics, techniques, and procedures as part of an evolving CIS management strategy. For instance, to allow operational commanders more flexibility to develop their tactics and deploy NRF packages, NNEC must federate evolutionary capability changes that redefine interoperability boundaries or apply enterprise controls to preclude disjointedness.

**Impediments to Implementing NNEC and NRF Role Implications**

The Alliance justification to equip the NRF with NNEC is to enable “operational effectiveness” – what a 2001 RAND report calls “a transformation of NATO from a regional defensive alliance to a worldwide responsive and offensive force” in highlighting deployability, scalability, and rotational burden-sharing principles. Yet the litmus test – achieving nations’ commitments of providing robust and capable linkages to reinforce network-centric tenets – reveals slow progress and a “business as usual” mindset. At the outset, NATO has to clearly define NRF minimal capabilities in the CJSOR for each scenario against what rotating nations will earmark for C3 capability. Challenges with implementing NRF NNEC are rooted in overcoming interoperability impediments. This section analyzes three implementation concerns with implications on the NRF’s envisioned roles: dealing with a legacy environment,
technological insertion gaps, and national and NATO common funding contribution levels.

**Dealing with a Legacy Platform-Centric Environment**

One impediment to implementing NNEC is dealing with the legacy environment. Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and CIS policies in the mid-1980s reflected single service force doctrine characterized by inflexible, point-to-point connectivity (“one-to-one” static network relationships). Maritime, air, and land forces were previously task organized as separate services, relying on rigid interoperability via direct information exchange requirements (IERs – also called information flows). IER elements included who needed to talk to whom, over what means/system, in what format, and with what products and volume. This vertical linear thinking meant national military services separated their geographical battlespace areas to optimize their platform-centric systems at the expense of network synchronization.

A network-centric operations environment represents a paradigm shift. The right side of figure 4 depicts NNEC’s reliance upon standardized layers of network common interfaces and protocols to allow horizontal interoperability across functional areas without regard for national origin, vice vertical connectivities within service component functions as shown on the left.

![Figure 4: Joint Interoperability: A Stovepiped Versus Gridded, Multi-layered Approach](image)

Figure 4: Joint Interoperability: A Stovepiped Versus Gridded, Multi-layered Approach
An NII grid consists of point-to-multipoint connections (“one-to-many” or “one-to-network” dynamic relationships) between sensors, decision makers, and weapons systems for improved IERs. Dr. Buckman views the NII as a “flexible global networking capability” serving as the “entry fee” or initial technical foundation for static or deployed elements. This advantageous situation will allow the NRF to jointly task organize air/space, land, and sea packages ad hoc, enabling the massing of effects without necessarily massing forces in planning scenarios.

Although technology exists to support the NRF’s transition between platform-centric and network-centric environments, the potential mismatch between operational needs and actual C3 capabilities requires that NATO C3 bodies institute and enforce doctrinal changes to overcome transformational resistance. First, the lack of coherent network-centric environment guiding principles or keystone authoritative reference for NRF CIS support has created a cultural void to adapt alliance relationships to NNEC’s emergence. Beyond the NNEC Vision and Concept document, an Allied Joint Publication (AJP) for CIS doctrine does not exist that: (1) incorporates NCW tenets, defines critical network-centric capabilities/characteristics, establishes a common NEC language, and delineates operational imperatives; and (2) dovetails the bi-strategic Commands’ Strategic Vision or Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations. Developing and agreeing to an AJP for MC approval can be a lengthy, frustrating process, especially when NC3 proponents consider revising promulgated Allied publications in tandem for NNEC consistency.

Second, lacking an authoritative reference has impeded NNEC common understanding as nations restructure their forces or play catch-up in basic expeditionary military capabilities. During ACT’s first NNEC workshop conducted 29-30 March 2004, conferees of one working group observed that human and system interoperability inefficiencies are exacerbated for NRF decision makers:

*Each nation’s drive toward jointness in the past decade or so has exposed a total lack of interoperability between the services, and even different echelons. Every organization created their own unique standards, systems, and communications networks. In*
NATO, we can multiply the problem by 26 [each with their own particular Service methods and culture]. Trying to prevent these interoperability problems is the reason we have STANAGs, but they don't address everything.\textsuperscript{43}

Outdated STANAGs do not help situations in which a coalition of the willing with NATO, non-NATO countries, civilian agencies, and international organizations are not on the same networks, as evidenced by interoperability issues experienced in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{44} In the transformation catalyst role, dynamic STANAGs are required to adapt NRFs to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology and industry open standards such as web technologies.\textsuperscript{45}

Updated CIS doctrine and policy supports the NRF with improved techniques of collaborating and planning in its crisis response role. Capabilities include fusing a NATO Common Operational Picture or friendly force tracking for shared situational awareness among networked units, sensors and weaponry. Overcoming NATO’s platform-centric doctrine is as much a disciplined approach in the organizational learning, cultural, and intellectual efforts of high-tech or lower-tech militaries as it is a technological effort.

**Technological Insertion Implications**

A second impediment to implementing NNEC involves NRF technological insertion concerns. These focus on two themes: (1) getting nations’ consensus to open standards architecture to drive NATO interoperability and synchronization of NRF data, applications, and systems; and (2) bridging the technology gap with technological innovation and support of technology transfer or related information sharing.

The first theme impeding technological insertion is convincing nations to adopt an open standards backbone architecture. The federation of networks in which participants can join or withdraw at will, emphasizes an evolving capability in the NNEC vision keenly dependent on NATO’s interoperability coordination role: “…NNEC cannot be a single, well-defined and centrally controlled solution with final, long-term answers for how…[these] capabilities will be used. Rather…NATO must progress…efforts along intermediate sets of objectives and capabilities.”\textsuperscript{46} For nations to independently
Section Three: Network Centric Operations

develop and insert NII compatible systems, NC3A and ACT have the lead to redefine existing architectures to address NATO-to-nation and nation-to-nation connectivity.  

For NATO-to-nation connectivity, NCSA provides enterprise service delivery of NII common services accessible to the NRF. This includes provisioning NATO communications infrastructure such as wide area networks, wireless, and deployable satellite communications as points of presence for reach back of geographically dispersed forces. NCSA supports communications hub interfaces and information exchange gateways to numerous NATO C3 systems such as Alliance Ground Surveillance capability or Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System for intelligence collection. In theory, nations access NII baselined communications and core information services such as office automation or messaging. It implies nations adopt commercial tools and open standards (such as Internet Protocol [IP] based solutions) to enhance C2 systems interoperability and shorten decision cycles faster than national/military specific standards would otherwise.

In practice, the challenge with implementing overarching NNEC architectures – whether short term (2008) or mid term (2012) target architectures, or a long term (2020) reference architecture linked to the NNEC FS – lies in the nations’ capability or political commitment to technologically keep pace with agreed upon common standards and services to meet essential NRF requirements or ad hoc C2 arrangements. These contributions are fundamental to successfully operationalize the NNEC concept, since nations fund and own a substantial portion of CIS capabilities like sensors and tactical network equipment.

The burden rests with NC3 bodies to provide proof of concept that transforming to NNEC given these immature, “work-in-progress” architectures will improve NRF net-readiness, cost less money than current operations, and improve service levels. NCW skeptics like Australian Strategic Policy Institute Director Aldo Borgu argue the unintended consequences of implementing architectures that are too technology-centered and information-driven when he stated: “…[execution of] NCW should result in larger numbers of smaller, less complex and less costly platforms/systems operating as
nodes in a wider network. In reality, it [is] more likely to result in a smaller number of more complex and more expensive platforms and systems.\textsuperscript{52}

Case in point: as JFC Naples’ Land Component Command (LCC) Headquarters, the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps faced difficulty integrating its higher to lower responsibilities with subordinate multinational elements to operate over extended lines of communication during the 2005 NRF-4 rotational preparations. LCC communications planners could not assure total system interoperability within multinational deployable force packages. Their workaround was to collocate organic CIS assets with subordinate elements. They found this procedure more reliable than installing and managing gateways and interfaces. They did not disregard the latter where possible; however, they considered employing equipment interfaces as “a bonus, and not a guarantee.”\textsuperscript{53}

For joint integrating architectures to operate seamlessly in an NRF implies more cooperative effort and training rehearsal than any one nation can provide.

The lack of unified multinational systems engineering also impedes NRF NNEC implementation. Dr. Buckman’s study suggests establishing an NII Systems Engineering Group from NATO and member nations to allow independently developed national networks to interconnect and interoperate, similar to the way the Internet has been built and operates.\textsuperscript{54} In its field testing catalyst role, the NRF can interact with ACT to validate the Group’s common technical standards or “minimum building codes” set for national systems engineering solutions. Opportunities include COMBINED ENDEAVOR, Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, or training package trials at Stavanger, Norway’s Joint Warfare Center.\textsuperscript{55}

The second theme impeding NNEC technological insertion is bridging the technology gap. NC3A’s objective role in consulting the nations is to determine how best to deliver NII capabilities between national systems and international infrastructures so nations can implement a minimum set of capabilities.\textsuperscript{56} NNEC offers the opportunity for nations, large or small, for NRF “contributions” either with a broad set of capabilities or specialized areas.
Section Three: Network Centric Operations

ACT information technology chief Major General Rudd S. van Dam notes one concern is countries conducting unilateral NEC technological pursuits with differing levels of ambition or resources. Nations furthering projects that are non-NNEC compatible – for example, recapitalizing legacy systems – mean the NRF continues to operate with stovepiped linkages. There is also not a clear “top-down” disciplined methodology or single integrated roadmap to synchronize nations’ system fielding capabilities. The lack of harmonization means nations place different emphasis on funding priorities and timelines for program updates or technological advances. Even if basic commercial technology is shared, a rotating nation assuming risk in one of its capability programs or a delayed national system fielding may impact on the NRF’s degree of interoperability.

The cumulative effect is this: for ACT, this limits the NRF’s field testing catalyst role in striving for quick wins to incorporate CIE technologies, such as dealing with information collection, management, and dissemination functions. In the NRF’s quick reaction force role, ACO’s training focus means each rotation identified in the CJSOR would have to be certified to a different interoperability baseline to validate network and system integrity, as equipments with limited proven interoperability are introduced in live operating environments.

A second more sensitive concern involves technology transfer or information sharing. John Hopkins University researchers Jeffrey Bialos and Stuart Koehl are critical of current U.S. technology transfer and information sharing restrictive policies. For instance, access to developmentally advanced U.S. NCW enablers, such as the Blue Force Tracking System (BFTS) or Digital Rosetta Stone, is either limited or not technologically releasable. Little cooperation has existed on exchanging detailed technical information on critical C2 systems between the United States and Europe so proper interfaces and bridges are developed. Europeans view their exclusion from meaningful participation in U.S. transformational programs as contributing to a European capabilities gap. This will lead to the NRF implementing an unsatisfactory least-common-denominator or applying solutions intentionally chosen for their incompatibility, resulting in a “dumbed down [degraded] NRF.”
Even when nations’ ambitions are similar, tremendous differences exist in transatlantic spending patterns. Bialos and Koehl conclude that without significant U.S. cooperation or “top-down” policy changes to transatlantic technology transfers, rotating nations will “likely operate at different levels of [affordable] capability in the next decade and beyond.”

The technology transfer impediment is also prevalent within the European continent. First, a framework of rules is lacking to formally share information of defense technology enablers among themselves, so the NRF benefits from the “plug and play” of each other’s equipment. This includes a lack of cross-border research sharing of European Union (EU) members and NATO programs. National administrative barriers and intellectual property rights considerations such as proprietary software code and system architectures can undercut less capable NNEC nations in fusing time-sensitive intelligence for tactical data links from diverse sensors, for instance. The result is increased risk to support certain mission scenarios if CIS investments offer lower acceptable performance levels.

Second, Bialos and Koehl cite hindrance factors such as the fragmented and inefficient nature of European defense procurement, or national defense decisions to allocate more spending for operations and maintenance instead of future investments. These have made nations reluctant to share technologies or not rely on those which are innovative. This barrier detracts from ACO’s intent to certify and rotate national forces through the NRF system as modernized and interoperable forces for expeditionary missions.

European NATO members could mutually benefit by collaborative ventures among themselves. For example, the Network-Centric Operation Industry Consortium (NCOIC) is a not-for-profit program. Formally established in September 2004, it helps promote dialogue among industry, academia, and government subject-matter-experts to share architectures, open standards and common protocols, best practices, and systems engineering techniques. It can also bind European allies with a sense of commitment to defense procurement transformation. It does not, however, take the place of formal technology transfer agreements between nations.
National Funding and NATO Common Funding Support Implications

A third impediment to implementing NNEC involves friction between NATO C3 bodies and member nations’ capabilities in national funding and NATO common funding levels for NRF support. Despite nations’ political commitment, what matters are actual significant pledges NATO’s nations provide to ensure NRF requirements are funded by the right source.

A *Defense News* article noted that Spain, which provided the NATO Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps headquarters for NRF-5’s LCC, was aggrieved the Pakistan earthquake relief operation cost about 16 million euros ($19 million) because it was one of the countries whose turn it was to provide NRF military resources. In another *Defense News* report, General James Jones, SACEUR, told U.S. congressional committees in March 2006 that only eight of 26 NATO countries are fulfilling a 2002 Prague Summit pledge to dedicate at least two percent of their gross domestic product to defense. He warned of a “train wreck” if other countries did not increase their financial contribution.

These juxtaposed views of varying contribution levels to Alliance interoperability reflect a broader debate of lingering political uncertainties to the NRF’s progress in its expeditionary military capabilities. Nations are concerned about what “upfront” investments are required to interface within a broader network. The NRF implication is this debate has created tensions in defining its quick reaction force role on when it should be deployed and how it is funded. This has caused some member nations “to call for more of the NRF’s costs to be financed out of shared NATO funds. But Britain, Germany, and France are wary of the NATO principle of common funding, arguing it could deter nations from investing in their own national forces.”

National funding is the individual nations’ responsibility for provision and investment in national military assets. Each nation’s operational level of ambition for network-enabled capability is shaped by its national interests to help determine its policies and priorities for multinational contributions. To put in perspective:
during the ACT sponsored 2004 NNEC conference, 19 of 26 NATO nations’ representatives participated in an NNEC questionnaire to discern their understanding of NNEC’s transformational impact. The conference report summary inferred most desired a national and an Alliance capability as a high priority. However, an NRF technology gap remains as some nations are just beginning their NEC venture while others have made considerable advances with their national systems.

Common funding reflects nations’ expenditures governed by NATO finance regulations. Of note are collective requirements for infrastructure projects or acquisitions through agreed cost shares. NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) requirements, such as an Alliance-wide general purpose communications segment, are categorized as a Capability Package (CP) of projects submitted to the NATO Infrastructure Committee.

The NNEC Foundation Document contends an upfront investment is needed in a number of specific projects leading to tangible products that reduce risk to NNEC incremental delivery. At ACT’s Industry Day 2004 conference, information technology chief Major General van Dam noted defense organizations have traditionally purchased systems as platform-based projects to optimize vertical information exchanges, placing less emphasis on horizontal information integration with each other and other nations’ systems. Subsequently, continuing common funding for platform-centric projects has reinforced the interoperability barrier illustrated in Figure 4’s stovepiped portion.

NSIP acquisitions require various NATO resource management committees broaden CP representation of common funded requirements. Ideally, NC3 audits conducted using eligibility criteria would reappraise projects within existing CIS acquisition topics and rescope those to correct a CIS capabilities imbalance, accept those planned to support NC3A’s NNEC architectural guidance, and discontinue legacy programs not aligned with NNEC FS recommendations. Case in point: ACT’s NNEC Data Strategy document refers to current platform-centric model support for data storage where information is typically collocated with the information-processing platform itself. A planned software
capability shift to enterprise network storage access within a NATO funded CP is consistent with the NNEC provision of service-oriented architecture to help reduce network and server bottlenecks for wider authorized user information sharing.

Implementing NNEC for the NRF implies NATO manages nations’ expectations of common funding for evolutionary program development. Budget-constrained nations are not about to expand NATO owned assets using their agreed cost shares without knowing how assets are used or what quick wins will result from CP audits. As architectures mature, a broadening of NATO CP crosscutting topics impacted by NNEC and leveraging economies of scale wherever political consensus is acceptable, help mitigate fiscal constraints so NRF’s testing focus involves prototype solutions pragmatically aligned with the NNEC concept.

Conclusions

NATO and member nations will rely upon the NRF in its two envisioned roles as the focal point to operationalize CIE network enabled common services. As a complex federation of independent NATO and national networks, implementing NNEC in the NRF presents interoperability challenges for NATO stakeholders.

In analyzing three broad impediments to implementing NNEC, there are two main implications to the NRF’s roles. One is the NRF cannot robustly leverage its quick reaction force capabilities without NATO C3 bodies breaking away from their “business as usual” stovepiped policies, architectures, and management approaches that have helped perpetuate or create interoperability seams and gaps NNEC is intended to overcome with NII’s plug and play infrastructure. Slow consensus in developing and implementing key network enterprise standards, interfaces, and unified flexible doctrine for NNEC will lead to interoperability differences for each NRF rotation, impacting on robustness and quality of services delivered for collaborative planning, information sharing, persistent and shared situational awareness to enable DS.

The second implication is the NRF cannot accelerate NNEC evolutionary programs or improve NATO/national systems in
its transformation catalyst role without firm mutual stakeholder commitments to reduce the technology and capabilities gaps. Otherwise, the lack of clear joint network ownership or accountability from nations, conflicting national interests to support NII capabilities due to disparate levels of NEC ambition, insufficient national or common funding levels, and delayed timelines for NRF technological insertions will jeopardize the NNEC Strategic Framework being developed supporting the NNEC concept.

Recommendations

To better accommodate the NRF’s high combat readiness role, the first recommendation is for NC3 bodies to reassert their overarching CIS interoperability roles and responsibilities. Focusing on NRF quick wins, such as NATO conducting periodic audits of existing and planned CP programs or establishing an NII Systems Engineering Group to emphasize standards and interface capacity, will present innovative NRF opportunities to be operationally effective with reduced risk and cost. Nations should leverage ACT’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center to share NRF experiences and engage in ACT’s training centers of excellence, such as Stavanger’s JWC.

To address the NRF’s capability transformation role, the second recommendation is for NC3 to exploit distributed Alliance crosscutting capabilities, integrating NNEC economies of scale wherever political consensus is acceptable. This includes convincing nations to share information on developmental work of new technologies. In parallel, nations must have the political will to invest upfront in network-centric initiatives and refresh their technologies through a rolling program, while reducing investments to recapitalize national legacy systems.

The third recommendation is for both NC3 bodies and the nations to stay connected with industry fora such as NCOIC. NRF NNEC interoperability needs to be an intellectual teaming effort so plug and play capability differences are narrowed to meet defense planning requirements.

Although NNEC capabilities are still immature, the NRF cannot fall back on a platform-centric environment. NNEC adaptation is more
than NATO/nations being “networked”; it is also about overcoming the “networking” (people and information) challenges. Through clearly understood NNEC roles, objectives, shared responsibilities, and nations’ compliance, the NRF will remain relevant in executing NAC approved missions as Alliance military capability shifts from a regional to global focus.
Notes

Foreword


2. Emergent NATO doctrine on Information Operations cites Diplomatic, Military and Economic activities as “Instruments of Power.” It further states that Information, while not an instrument of power, forms a backdrop as all activity has an informational backdrop.


4. Rumsfeld, Donald, in a speech to U.S. Army War College students, Carlisle, PA, March, 2006.

5. Groh, Jeffrey L. and Dennis M. Murphy, “Landpower and Network Centric Operations: how information in today’s battlespace can be exploited,” NECWORKS, Issue 1, March 2006.
Section One – Strategic Communication

Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas?


2. James J. Zogby, What Arabs Think (Utica, NY: Zogby International, 2002), 61-64. Overall impression of the US reflected in the Zogby poll (% favorable/% unfavorable): Lebanon - 26/70; Jordan - 34/61; Kuwait - 41/48; Saudi Arabia - 12/87; UAE - 11/87; Morocco - 38/61; Egypt - 15/76; Israel - 16/78. Besides Israel, only Russia had a lower favorability rating than the United States in any of the countries polled. In Kuwait the overall impression of Russia was 33% favorable, 61% unfavorable. Zogby repeated the poll in six countries in 2004, recording the results in “Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn About America,” 2004; available at http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/Impressions_of_America04.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 December 2005. The United States only made small headway in the UAE. The favorable/unfavorable percentages follow: Morocco - 11/88; Saudi Arabia - 4/94; Jordan - 15/78; Lebanon - 20/69; UAE - 14/73; Egypt - 2/98.


4. Ibid., 3.


7. Ibid., 2.

8. Ibid.


12. Ibid., 12.


19. Ibid.

20. Nye, 104.


22. Nye, x.


27. Defense Science Board, 2. It didn’t help that the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was unfilled for two of the first four years of the Bush administration.


30. Ibid., 24.


33. Edward P. Djerejian, “Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, October 2003), 58-66. The Djerejian report also advocates establishing a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy to head a small office with limited responsibilities: “Establish strategic goals and messages, oversee establishment of programs that meet these goals, and ensure effective measurement of these programs.”


36. Frank Gaffney, Michael Waller, Alex Alexiev and Caroline Glick, “Wage Political Warfare,” in War Footing: Ten Steps America Must Take to
Notes for Section One

_Prevail in the War for the Free World_, ed. Frank Gaffney (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 145.


40. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 3.


44. Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith and Elizabeth McKune, “The National Security Policy Process,” National Security Policy and Strategy, Volume 2 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 15-17. Generally, the National Security Advisor’s (NSA) roles are to advise the President, advance the national security policy agenda, and oversee the effective operation of the interagency system. The emphasis placed on these roles depends on the President’s preferences for managing national security affairs, the NSA’s interpretation of his/her role, and the personalities and styles of the leaders that comprise the key policy-making bodies. For example, during Condoleezza Rice’s tenure as NSA, she focused more on advising the President and coordinating his policies between departments, rather than initiating policy at the NSC and directly monitoring policy implementation in the Executive Branch Departments. Like the NSA, the roles and mission of the National Security Council (NSC) staff have evolved based on presidential preference, the NSA’s organizational and management style, or the complexity of the national security problem. A close working relationship between the President and his cabinet secretaries may result in one or another department dominating national security policy development.
and implementation. Conversely, interagency rivalry could lead to an expanded NSC role.

45. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 3.

46. Defense Science Board, 60.


48. Defense Science Board, 24. Charlotte Beers served as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for 18 months; Margaret Tutwiler for 6 months.


50. Shanker and Schmitt.

51. Mitchell J. Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power,” Parameters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 64-65. Thompson took this concept from a 2000 Washington Post article by Dana Priest entitled, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy?” Although the article focused on Latin America, its central premise can be applied to geographic combatant commanders around the globe. “The Pentagon’s role in policy design is increasing. Military engagement activities have been growing, while State Department and foreign aid budgets have fallen or stagnated. Although civilian officials and Congress still generally play the greater role in U.S. policymaking toward Latin America, they clearly do not have the greater momentum. Well-funded, frequent military engagement programs are outpacing or eclipsing U.S. diplomatic engagement with some countries while eluding effective civilian and congressional oversight. By forging relationships and incubating policy initiatives, these military activities are leaving the non-defense branches of government – including Congress – often struggling to keep up.”


Notes for Section One


59. Ibid.


64. Gregory, 34.

65. Gaffney, Waller, Alexiev and Glick, 145.


69. Abraham, 7.

70. Defense Science Board, 63-64.

71. Ibid., 66-68. The DSB states the Center should be guided by three purposes: 1) Provide information and analysis (non-departmental and non-political advice) to decision makers on issues vital to US security
to include: global public opinion; media trends and influences on audiences; information technologies; and the role of culture, values and religion on shaping human behavior. 2) Develop plans, themes, products and programs to create and implement communications strategies to capitalize on opportunities and respond to security threats. 3) Provide services in support of strategic communication objectives such as: fostering cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people and information; maintaining knowledge databases of those with specific language skills and cultural competencies that might be recruited for specific, short-term assignments; deploying temporary communications teams; and continually monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of themes, messages and programs.

72. Gregory, 36.
73. Peterson, 11.
74. Defense Science Board, 64.
75. Nye, 104. At its peak in the 1960s, the USIA had over 12,000 employees; it was down to just over 6,700 personnel by the time it was disbanded in 1999.
76. Peterson, 9. The roles and tasks described in this paragraph were taken largely from recommendations made by the Council on Foreign Relations as they advocated the establishment of a separate agency to oversee America’s public diplomacy apparatus.
78. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 14.

**Strategic Communication: An Imperative for the Global War on Terrorism Environment**

7. Schneider, 20.
8. Ibid. 36.
15. Schneider, 35.
16. Schneider, 16.
17. Ibid, 3.
22. Schneider, 25.


28. Schneider, 38.


30. Schneider, 36.


36. Payne, 85.


57. Ibid, 76.

**National Communication Strategy**


5. Hughes.


7. Hughes.


**The Dawn of a New Iraq: The Story Americans Almost Missed**

1. Baggio quote provided to Military Review – Editor COL Bill Darley. Editor’s note: The anecdote was solicited by the Editor, Military Review, from the Public Affairs Officer (COL Dan Baggio) who served under LTG Metz in Iraq during the period running up to and through the first Iraqi election described in the basic article. Published in Military Review VOL LXXXVI, NO. 03, MAY-JUNE 2006.
2. Ibid.


7. Thom Shanker, email, Subject: RE: Jan/05 Election success, 08 May 2006. Thom Shanker, a Washington D.C. based Pentagon Beat reporter for the New York Times was embedded with Multi-National Corps Iraq (III Corps) multiple times; he was the first ever embedded reporter with HHC, MNC-I in June 2004 and was embedded during the lead-up to the Iraqi Elections in January 2005.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Geraldo Rivera, Fox News, was embedded in the weeks leading up to and including the surprise hand over of sovereignty from U.S. Administrator L. Paul Bremer to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004, two days earlier than expected.

11. Shanker.

12. Christine Hauser and Thom Shanker, “The Conflict in Iraq: Election Day; Voters in Mosul Need Shield of Snipers,” New York Times, 28 January 2005 (Late Edition), sec. A, pg. 1. Story follows: MOSUL, Iraq, Jan. 27 - Snipers are taking up positions across Mosul. The concrete barriers around the voting sites are up. The actual polling stations are being opened, replacing the decoys set up to deceive the insurgents. An election will be held Sunday in this violence-racked city of 1.6 million, but it remains an open question here – as in so many other Sunni Arab
cities where the insurgent presence is strong—whether enough people will brave the dangers to vote in significant numbers. “Mosul is a hot spot,” said Salem Isa, the head of security for Nineveh Province. “We have special security plans and will try to take all the possible steps to get them to the boxes peacefully.” It will not be easy. Even handling election materials is considered so dangerous that ballots and ballot boxes will be distributed to the 80 polling centers by armored American military convoys. “The military has to do it because of the security situation,” said Khaled Kazar, the head of the elections commission here. “No one would ever volunteer to move this stuff.” Once considered a model city of the occupation, Mosul has descended into a hellish sectarian stew, 65 percent Sunni Arab and 30 percent Kurdish, with a sprinkling of Turkmens, Assyrians and other ethnic groups. Making matters worse, in November thousands of police and security officers abandoned their posts under an insurgent assault that coincided with the American attack on Falluja. Since then, scores of civilians have died in attacks. Kurds, government officials and Iraqi security officers have been massacred. Thousands of American troops poured into the region after the uprising in November, anchoring security, arresting suspects, uncovering caches of weapons and carrying out raids in some of the most extensive military operations in the country. Hundreds of Kurdish fighters have been sent here to enforce security. But much damage had been done, and election officials were left scrambling to catch up. Mosul’s 700 election workers, threatened by insurgents, walked off the job. A warehouse full of ballot papers was attacked and burned in December. “It has not gone to plan,” said Maj. Anthony Cruz, the liaison officer between the elections commission in Mosul and the American military. “They had to reconstitute a large portion of staff.” To recruit more election workers, Mr. Kazar promised prospects a secure place to stay, food provisions and a bonus of $500—a major sum in Iraq right now. The drive apparently paid off to some extent. On Thursday, Mr. Kazar was busy leading a group of new recruits in the basics of balloting. At a guarded building in Mosul, he demonstrated how to mark voters’ fingers so they could not vote twice, how to use the voting booths and how to check identities. One election worker said he joined the commission because he was convinced it was the only way to get the country out from under military occupation. “We need an election to get a real government going and to get real police and security forces,” said the man, a 25-year-old Arab from Mosul, who declined to be named because, he said, he would be “slaughtered” if he were identified. American officials have been trying to convince Iraqi voters that they can vote safely. “American and Iraqi operations conducted over the last several weeks have set the conditions for the vast majority of Iraqis to vote safely,” Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander in Iraq, said in a brief interview here. But even so, he
warned, “there will be violence.” This week, an American-military supported radio talk show called “Your Voice” hit the airwaves to try to inform Iraqis in the area about the process and to drum up new recruits for election work. In about half an hour on the air, Mr. Kazar fielded at least five calls from listeners. “We will take every possible precaution to make the election sufficiently secure,” he told one listener. Another man called up and apparently voiced wariness about the election. “This is your future, beginning from your neighborhood, your city and your country,” Mr. Kazar answered. Despite such efforts, however, turnout is expected to be low. To begin with, many Sunni Arabs here and throughout Anbar Province, home to Falluja, Ramadi and other volatile cities that form the center of the resistance, are not interested in voting under any circumstances. With that alienation and the pervasive threat of violence, officials are expecting a turnout of only about 30 percent in the Arab section of Mosul and are hoping for as much as 50 percent in the more secure Kurdish area. But they caution that these are just guesses, and that the actual turnout will be affected by what happens on Sunday. Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of coalition forces across northern Iraq, said his “nightmare scenario” would be “multiple, simultaneous suicide attacks early on election day.” The goal of such an insurgent offensive, he said, would be to deter voters just as the polls open, when many people were still making up their minds whether to venture out. “The real key is Iraqi security forces,” said General Ham. They will be guarding election places between now and Sunday, and searching voters on election day. American troops, he said, would be on patrol and on call, but away from the polling places. Meanwhile, Mr. Kazar was giving his raw recruits last-minute instructions on voting procedures. “They will go to the cabinet and fill out the ballot,” he said. “He will go to the box.” Then, he said, putting his hand on top of two clear plastic containers, “These are ballot boxes.” The 30 or so election recruits listened raptly. Mr. Kazar folded up two ballot papers, one for the national assembly and another for provincial elections, and placed both of them in one box, pausing for effect. “Some will want to put both ballots in one box, but don’t let them,” he said. And finally: “When the ballot box is full, secure it well.”

13. Baggio.

14. Ibid.

15. Thom Shanker, “The Iraqi Election: Patrols; American Forces in Iraq Brace For Their ‘Day of Reckoning,’” New York Times, 30 January 2005 (Late Edition), sec. 1, p. 18. Story follows: BAGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 28 – Col. Mark A. Milley picked his way through open sewage and ankle-deep mud that stuck to his boots like sand-colored glue as he led a manhunt through the Abu Ghraib slum, his target the assassin of an Iraqi security officer. The mission, punctuated by random small-
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arms fire from a housing block, ended with Colonel Milley getting neither his man nor annoyed. Meeting next with the police general for Baghdad west of the Tigris River, the colonel was told that the Iraqi police were threatening to boycott duty as election sentries on Sunday if they did not get more automatic weapons. Colonel Milley calmly said that he had been pressing the American military and the Iraqi Interior Ministry for the weapons. In fact, across a day of patrols through one of Baghdad’s most threatening sectors, Colonel Milley raised his voice only once, when a jobless father of three said he was too fearful to go to the polls. “I traveled 7,000 miles from Fort Drum, N.Y., so you could vote!” he said at a volume just below that of approaching thunder. “So you better get out and vote. Show some courage.” Colonel Milley told the Lebanese-American interpreter for the 10th Mountain Division’s Second Brigade, which he commands: “Translate that. Translate every word. And tell the rest of these people, too.” For an American military that already has lost more than 1,000 lives to hostile action in Iraq, guaranteeing the election on Sunday offers the clearest, most precise mission since President Bush commanded the military to drive straight for Baghdad almost two years ago. Since then, American forces have executed a complex set of orders to battle home-grown insurgents and shadowy attackers, help rebuild Iraq’s economy and train a new army, all incremental projects that will continue beyond the 12-month tour of any soldier here. “That’s why, for us, the day of reckoning is Jan. 30,” said Maj. Michael Lawrence, executive officer of the First Battalion, 24th Infantry, based at Mosul. “We think we’re being successful. We also know we can’t let one day define the entire effort. But this is our mission now.” Soldiers on point do not debate evidence on Saddam Hussein’s program of unconventional weapons. They do not argue exit strategies or disengagement. And the question of whether enough troops are committed to Iraq is answered by looking to their immediate left and right. They pass the Skittles and PowerBars, load their weapons and just want to get through the patrol, election day, their tour in Iraq, and then go home. “It’s a funny thing: They don’t want us here, and we don’t want to be here,” said First Sgt. Robert Wright of Company A, First Battalion, 24th Infantry. He is one of those small-unit leaders who is so sharp at guiding soldiers into urban combat that he has picked up the nickname Jedi. “We know it’s important to get these people back on their feet,” he said. Company A knows most directly about loss from this unconventional war, where even Iraqis who work among them may be their enemies, or an enemy may be wearing a uniform stolen from one who works among them. The commander, Capt. Bill Jacobsen, was one of the 22 killed when a bomb struck a mess tent in Forward Operating Base Marez last month in Mosul. Capt. Jeffrey Van Antwerp was thrust into command. “We didn’t lose a step,” he said. “We got up and moved out.” This week he moved his men onto a
square beneath a mosque in Mosul where mortars were launched five minutes earlier. Seven men were rounded up as possible witnesses to the mortar attack. Captain Van Antwerp quizzed each, in a tough way. But after shouting questions at the seventh – he wore a T-shirt with the “Friends” television show logo – Captain Van Antwerp relented. He let them go, but only after telling them to vote. “We have to get the information about the insurgency,” he said. “But we don’t want to create more sympathizers for the anti-Iraqi forces.” In the fight against those insurgents, by late Friday, Colonel Milley’s efforts for the Baghdad police general had helped bring in 80 percent of the requested AK-47’s. “Victory is won one inch at a time,” he said.

16. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “The Iraqi Election: The Military; Security Efforts Hold Insurgents Mostly at Bay,” New York Times, 31 January 2005 (Late Edition), sec. A, p. 1. Story follows: WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 – By increasing American troop strength in Iraq, banning all civilian car traffic and ordering a host of other security measures – some within standard military procedure and others distinctly not – American and Iraqi forces widely thwarted insurgents who had threatened to wash the streets with blood. Even so, military officers acknowledged that the security measures could not all be sustained over time and that insurgents might still be capable of conducting a catastrophic attack. But even on a day where as many as 44 people were killed, including nine suicide bombers, and 100 wounded in insurgent attacks, Pentagon officials and military officers said they had expected much worse. And they pondered whether their major offensive push over recent weeks had, in fact, knocked the insurgency back on its heels. Some even cautiously ventured that election day had been a test for the insurgency, too, and it had been found unable to press a sustained, timed attack in the face of a concerted defense. And perhaps more important, it seemed unable to keep Iraqi voters at home through intimidation. The American military pushed its presence in Iraq from 138,000 to 150,000, the highest level since Baghdad fell, and one senior officer involved in the planning said insurgents had blundered in waiting too long to mount their own pre-election offensive. Just a week ago, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Islamic militant who is the most wanted insurgent in Iraq, warned in an audiotape broadcast on the Internet that any Iraqi who voted deserved death. Commanders had received plenty of intelligence that insurgents had been hoping to present a nightmare scenario of multiple car bombings early on election day to dissuade Iraqis from venturing out to the polls. So a nationwide ban on civilian automobile traffic was ordered, and vast swaths of major cities were declared no-parking zones. “They were saving them,” the officer said, referring to insurgent car bombs. “And I think they saved them for nothing.” Every soldier on election duty heard intelligence warnings that insurgents would try to slip bomb-laden suicide vests into
polling places beneath the long gowns of an Iraqi woman or of a man in woman’s clothing. That presented a particular difficulty in a society where it is not acceptable for a man to search a woman, and there were hardly enough women in the Iraqi Interior Ministry to spend a day at every polling site conducting body searches. But American officers devised a solution. They agreed on a plan with Iraqi security forces, who were the visible presence inside each polling place, that one of the first women to arrive at larger polling places would be searched, and that woman would in turn be asked to search 10 others. One of those 10 would then search 10 others before voting, and so on in a daisy chain. Another concern was insurgents masquerading as Iraqi security forces to penetrate polling sites. To counter that threat, the American military printed special badges just for Iraqi forces on election duty, each numbered and registered. Misdirection played a large part in the plan. The American military mounted patrols and ordered preparations in areas that were never meant to be opened to voters, trying to bait the insurgents into planting bombs or planning attacks in the wrong places. The announcements of the official polling places were withheld until Thursday night. Plans for election security began taking on a fever pitch just after November’s operation to rout insurgents from Falluja, and quickened even more after Jan. 1. In just the past six weeks, American, Iraqi and other forces conducted more than 1,000 cordon and search operations, and mounted more than 400 specific attacks on suspected insurgent and terrorist targets. The military does not release internal estimates of insurgents killed in action. But a number of officers said the pre-election offensive resulted in the capture or death of 30 percent to 50 percent of the names on their target lists. “No organization can operate with those kinds of losses,” one commander said. Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, commander of day-to-day military operations in Iraq, ordered the stockpiling of ammunition, food and fuel, partly motivated by the desire to halt military convoys before the election, depriving insurgents of a target and allowing troops usually on convoy security duty to focus on attacking insurgents and assisting in the defense of election sites. Commanders also took a number of unusual steps to reassign large numbers of soldiers from support and logistics missions to a security role out on the streets, increasing the combat force on the streets of Baghdad by one-third. Although dozens of people were reported killed in suicide bombings and other attacks around Iraq on Sunday, Pentagon officials and senior American commanders in Iraq expressed relief and some surprise that the violence was not worse. “I admit to being surprised at the level of insurgent activity,” Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of American forces in northern Iraq, said in an e-mail message after the Iraqi polls had closed. “I thought it would be much higher.” Many American commanders saluted the Iraqi security forces, whose decidedly mixed performance in recent
weeks and months has caused some American officers as well as top Bush administration officials to question the Iraqis’ ability to secure their own country. Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commands the First Infantry Division, said in an e-mail message on Sunday night that the insurgents’ “ineffective attacks” hampered fewer than 3 percent of the 951 polling stations in the four provinces in north-central Iraq that his forces oversee. Commanders warned, however, against being lulled into any false sense of security after the voting. “The post-election period will still be a high-threat period as it is likely, in my opinion, that the insurgents will try to detract from the successes of today,” General Ham said. He predicted that insurgents now would single out voting officials, Iraqi security forces “and certainly the winners, once they are announced.”

17. Baggio.
Section Two – Information Effects

Deprogramming an Ideology: Thought Control and the War on Terrorism


4. Khalid Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2005): 16-19. The term puritan is used to accurately identify that segment of Muslim society with the potential to embrace extreme violence. Opposed to “moderates,” characterized as modernists, progressives and reformers, puritans are absolutist and unequivocal. It is this intolerance of competing ideas that provides the foundation for the global spate of violence, and this is not accurately captured in the myriad of competing terms – fundamentalist, militant, extremist, radical, fanatic, jihadist or Islamist. Importantly, while there are non-violent puritans, the focus of this paper is on those who embrace violence, and this should be considered when the singular term puritan is used. The genesis for this use of the term puritan is heavily dependent on El Fadl’s The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists.


8. David Lazarus, “Effects-Based Operations and Counterterrorism,” Air & Space Power Journal (Fall 2005): 24. The term Effects-Based Approach is used in lieu of Effects-Based Operations to comply with current doctrine and capture the planning, versus operational, aspects of this approach. This concept is central to the presented thesis, and while David Lazarus uses the term Effects-Based Operations, the
context in which he uses it is clearly in accord with Effects-Based Approach.


15. Ibid., xiv.

16. Ibid., xiv.


19. Hassan, Releasing the Bonds, 38.


22. Ibid., 42.

23. Ibid., 54.


25. Ibid., 438.

26. Ibid., 420.

27. Ibid., 419.

28. Ibid., 456.

29. Ibid., 454.

30. Ibid., 86.
35. Hoffer, 12.
36. Ibid., 15.
41. Ibid., 60.
42. Palmer and Palmer, 32.
45. Cragin and Gerwehr, 4.
46. El Fadl, 28.
47. Lewis, 23.
52. Davis and Jenkins, 19.

54. Ibid., 4.

55. Palmer and Palmer, 166.

56. Ibid., 165.


58. Lifton, 469.


61. Palmer and Palmer, 140.

62. David Connors, “Center of Gravity Analysis,” 2001, revised 2003. Developed in its entirety, and periodically refined by David Connors for personal and professional use in his capacity as the Air Force Senior Service Representative to the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA. Paper copy was obtained in July 2005 and reset into Microsoft PowerPoint for presentation in this paper.

63. Cragin, 14.

64. Ibid., 14.

65. Ibid., 27.

66. Hassan, 69.

67. Cragin, Dissuading Terror, 15.

68. Ibid., 15.

69. Ibid., multiple pages.

70. Ibid., 22.

71. Palmer and Palmer, 130.


73. El Fadl, 37.

75. Harris, 19.

Stepping out of the Quagmire: Building Bridges to Victory through Iraq’s Indigenous Tribes

3. W. Andrew Terrill, Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2005): 1. See also, Noah Feldman, Vali Nasr, James Fearon and Juan Cole, “Power Struggle, Tribal Conflict or Religious War?” Time Magazine, 26 February 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1167736,00.html, (accessed 27 February 2006). Feldman, et.al. posit that the “brewing” civil war is not a result of ancient hatreds between Sunni and Shi’ites, as they have lived together peacefully, and inter-married producing offspring of the mixed marriages, for centuries. They argue that, “Instead we are witnessing in Iraq what occurs when government collapses and there is no state around capable of guaranteeing personal security.” People seek help by migrating to social, religious, ethnic, or political comfort zones that provide the security needed. This then can lead to polarizing and violence-prone groupings.
4. Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: SAQI, 2003): 114. The concept of “empty social spaces” was coined by Bertrand Badie and refers to social spaces that escape the authority of the State.
5. The two major indigenous social networks that are influential in Iraq are the tribal structure and the Islamic religious structure. Due to constraints on the size of this written project, the author intends to address only the tribal structure. However, many of the principles that will be posited about building bridges to victory through the tribal
structure can be made applicable to the Islamic religious structure. This author brings more than scholarly research to this topic as he served nearly 18 months in Iraq working with the many indigenous social networks in Iraq, especially the tribes. He first served for 12 months as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 to the Commanding General of the First Cavalry Division, MG Peter Chiarelli and later as the Director of the Office of National Outreach Programs & Initiatives for the MNF-I CMO Directorate, under the direct supervision of the National Iraqi Assistance Center. In each capacity, among his other duties, he operated a Tribal Advisory Group which engaged the key tribal leaders of the major tribes in Iraq and enlisted their support in stability and security activities. Additionally, the project began identifying the legitimate tribes and serving tribal leaders in an effort to distinguish those “tribes” and “sheikhs” that are not considered legitimate—those that resulted specifically from Saddam’s “re-tribalization” of Iraq in his effort to create support for his regime in the failing state. The fruit of that work is being compiled into a reference book on Iraqi tribes and their customs, practices, and characteristics which will be sent back into the field for use by the Coalition. The author also engaged key religious leaders within the two major Islamic sects as well as the other religious groups in Iraq to similarly enlist their support with Coalition efforts in Iraq. Finally, the author also created an Iraqi Culture Training team to provide extensive training to both military and civilian members of the Multinational Coalition. These programs were hampered by the lack of a dedicated institutional mechanism to plan and execute the program of engagement, the lack of a national strategy for utilizing these social structures, and the lack of fiscal authority necessary to seal the relationships and demonstrate Coalition resolve in making the social structure effective and relevant.

6. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990): 4, 18. The authors opine that since the state is more of a “mechanical solidarity” that operates through ethnic, economic, bureaucratic, and political groups, tribal societies would have to undergo tremendous changes in tribal ethos or character to morph into a state. However, they explain that even thought tribes don’t generally form states, they often contribute significantly to state formation.


8. Ibid., 42.

9. Montgomery McFate, *The Tribe in the Desert: State Options for Countering Tribal Insurgency* (forthcoming), 3. This is a draft work by McFate and to date has not been formally published. It is part of
McFate’s ongoing work to explain, illuminate, or provide assistance to the Coalition in Iraq with regard to partial makeup of the insurgency.

10. Ibid., 5. See also Khoury and Kostiner, pages 10-13, for historical examples which show that although whole tribes may not evolve into states, they can evolve into what is termed “chiefdoms”. Chiefdom can be viewed as a hybrid political formation that has characteristics of both tribe and state. Some notable examples of chiefdoms in the Middle East are the first Saudi State (1744-1822), the Mahdiyya in Sudan (1881-1898), and the Sanusiyya in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Libya.


15. One must be careful here. First, the word tribe can be confusing. Tribal structure in Iraq is generally hierarchical and there are different terms for each level. Qabila is generally the term for a large tribe or
confederation of tribes; Ashira refers to the major sub-tribes or smaller tribes; Hamoula or Bayt refer to a house within a tribe or sub-tribe. From there you have clans and families that make up the foundation of each organization. Other terms that may be used for levels of tribal structure (depending on which part of Iraq you may be referring to) include ‘imara for sub-tribe; sadr-chest; ‘unuq-neck; batn-clan; fakhith-thigh; and, fasila-lower part of leg to refer to a large house. See also Jabar and Dawod, pages 115-116, for a good discussion on tribal structure. Second, during the Saddam Hussein regime, Saddam created new tribes and tribal leaders to help protect his regime and stabilize the country. As such, the real number of legitimate tribes and tribal leaders is yet to be determined by careful study and research. As mentioned in FN 5 above, one such work in that area is underway and expects to produce a reasonably accurate report identifying the legitimate tribes and current key leaders of that tribal structure in the next few months.


18. Ibid. 37. See also, “Tribal Structures.”

19. Ibid., 37, 85., McFate, 13-14.

20. McFate, 14. See also Jabar and Dawod, 85-88.

21. Ibid., 14. See also Tripp, 265-266, and Jabar and Dawod, 93-95.

22. Again, it is the hope of this author that the tribal identity project mentioned in note 5 will alleviate some of the problem of identifying legitimate tribes and tribal leaders. One problem created by the confusion over which tribe is real and which is not, is that when the Coalition works with a “fake sheikh”, as they are affectionately called by Iraqis, then the Coalition runs the risk of alienating the real sheikhs and tribes by offending the honor of the sheikh and the tribe. This can lead to conflict between the real tribe and the Coalition.

24. McFate, 18-19.

25. Anna Ciezadlo, “A Scholarly Soldier Steps Inside the World of Iraq’s Potent Tribes,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 December 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1230/p01s03-woiq.html, (accessed 2 March 2006). See also, McFate, page 18. McFate cites an anonymous source designated as “former intelligence” and quotes the source as saying that his plan to leverage traditional authority systems in Iraq was rejected by CPA. The source reported, “The standard answer we got from Bremer’s people was that tribes are a vestige of the past, that they have no place in the new democratic Iraq.”

26. At the same time this author had begun to work with the OPO in tribal and religious leader engagement in his capacity as the Assistant Chief of Staff G5 for the First Cavalry Division. Since the OPO was going to be disbanded with the CPA after Iraqi transfer of sovereignty in June 2004, and LTC King was to redeploy, my assistance was sought to continue the program of engagement with the tribal and religious leaders and introductions were made to pass the relationships to my care. I was also involved in the conflict termination activities in April 2004 and more particularly with those in Sadr City. Although tribal influence was helpful in obtaining the cease fire in the Sadr City conflict with the forces of Moqtada Al Sadr, it was the engagement with religious leaders within his inner circle that produced the most results. The relationships built in these early meetings were essential and contributed to the success of the First Cavalry’s mission during its tour of duty in OIF II.


29. Ibid., 45. McFate cites an example from the British forces operating in Amara, Iraq. They recognized the tribal structure’s importance to their mission. As a result, they appointed tribal leaders to local councils and gave the councils large sums of money to distribute. This reinforced the sheik’s political standing and created an alliance that helped the British with the success of its mission. Also cited is the example of how Saddam Hussein was captured by elements of the 4th Infantry Division because of its diligent work in mapping the tribal structure and kinship tree for Saddam and his tribe. See also Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: The Role of Tribes,” November 14, 2003; http://www.cfr.org/publication/7681, (accessed 25 April 2005); and, Faleh Jabar, “Rethinking Iraq: Tribal Identities,” April 25, 2004, http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc217.html, (accessed 29 December 2005).


32. Ibid., 6-7. This author would add that he endorses the plan laid out by Krepinevich as long as the program seeks to identify and work with the legitimate tribal leaders and tribes as a priority of effort.


34. Ibid., 96.

35. Ibid., 85.


37. The reader should recall that this was the name of the office headed by this author, as described in note 5, between March-June 2005. However, there is no record that the office was maintained after the departure of the author nor is there evidence that such an office exists in Iraq today that is conducting the type or scope of work described or recommended in this paper.

38. Krepinevich. See note 30 for complete citation.


40. Ibid., 1, 14.


42. Bush, 3.

43. This author is not suggesting there is no tribal engagement taking place; however, what is being done does not appear to be based on a unified plan, strategy, or program that is national in scope and reflects a clear policy by MNF-I Command or the U.S. Embassy. The strategy suggested in this paper is designed to correct that problem and build a network of engagement strategy, policy, and programs that can work
within the tribal network to permeate every level of Iraq society and implement the Victory Plan for Iraq.

44. McFate, “The Tribe in the Desert: State Options for Countering Tribal Insurgency,” 11.

**Reaching the Point of Fusion: Intelligence, Information Operations and Civil-Military Operations**


3. See Department of the Army Field Manual-Interim FMI 3-07.22 (expires 1 October 2006), Counterinsurgency Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2004, especially Ch. 3.


11. *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 February 2006), III-1-5. The format for a CMO estimate can be found in *Department of the Army FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations* (Initial Draft), (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1 August 2005), Appendix B.


13. Ibid., GL-6.


Section Three – Network Centric Operations

Introduction


Strategic Leader Communicative Skills in a Network-Centric Environment


7. This figure was taken from the U.S. Army War College, Department of Distance Education, Course 592, Lesson 2 instructions. The figure represents the Course Author’s continued development of the diagrams found in David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare (Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2002): 101.


Notes for Section Three


15. The ideas in this paragraph related to the U.S. Army Doctrinal Leadership Framework Model are taken from an online U.S. Army War College Course 501, Lesson 1, Section 1, Module 2 tutorial.


18. Ibid, 45.


20. Ibid, 54.


23. Robbins, 117.


31. Harig, 134.


33. Horey, 46.

34. Sinickas, 34.


39. Harig, 133.

**Knowledge Management and the Strategic Leader**


3. Ibid., 234.


Notes for Section Three


25. American Productivity and Quality Center, Roadmap To Knowledge Management, (Houston, TX: APQC, undated): 5.


28. Rumizen, 270.


**Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability: Implications for NATO Response Force’s Envisioned Roles**


2. Ibid, 5.


6. The “Federation-of-Systems” or federated network means national networks and assets are still under their respective nation’s ownership and autonomous control. This situation is different from a national network environment that operates as a standalone entity. The joining together environment relies on the voluntary support of NATO members. The federation builds a multi-layered and multi-participant network using agreed upon common interfaces and services.

7. Interoperability is defined in both the NNEC Feasibility Study (NNEC FS) and NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision & Concept as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”

Division, 5. NRF can be configured for up to 25,000, consisting of a brigade-size land component with a forced-entry capability, a naval task force composed of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day, and a special forces component. Combat support and combat service support capabilities will be NRF integral parts. Forces designated are limited to NATO nations only; however, non-NATO nations may be invited to participate on a case basis.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.


15. Ibid, 22.

18. Ibid, 8.

19. Ibid.


21. Tom Buckman, “NATO Network Enabled Capability Feasibility Study Executive Summary” Version 2.0, NATO C3 Agency (Communications and Information Systems Division, October 2005), 1. Dr. Buckman is NC3A Chief Architect and Leader of the Architecture and Integration, Integration Program Team, and NC3A’s Project Manager for the NNEC Feasibility Study. NNEC FS is a key element of an overall ACT led concept undertaken by NC3A with operational scenarios input from ACO and ACT. It further develops the NNEC scope, concept, establishes a strategy and a roadmap to implement CIS infrastructure capabilities (synonymous with the term NII). In January 2004, 12 NATO nations contracted NC3A to conduct this 18-month study.


27. Garstka, “Network Centric Operations: An Overview of Tenets and Key Concepts” briefing. During the 10 October 2005 NATO NEC Short Course, Mr. Garstka’s presentation depicted a fourth domain, the “social domain” alongside the cognitive domain incorporated into the networked force’s value chain. The 2001 Network Centric Warfare, Report to Congress and Alberts, et. al’s Understanding Information Age Warfare publication, however, provided only three warfare domains shown as overlapping in a Venn diagram.


29. “Network Centric Warfare,” ii. “Full spectrum dominance” is the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations.

30. Ibid. “Networked” describes a Joint Force that is linked and synchronized in time and purpose. Just as NII supports NNEC, the Global Information Grid (GIG) is the infrastructure supporting the collection of all information systems used by DoD under the oversight of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).


32. Ibid. U.K. defence capability has seven components that collectively provide the Defence Capability Framework: “prepare, project, operate, protect, sustain, command, and inform.” NEC primarily benefits the “command” and “inform” components of defence capability by permitting free exchange of information. NEC also enables the other Defence Capability components.

33. Ibid, 9.

34. Ibid, 17.


When fully developed and approved by the NATO Military Committee, the NNEC Strategic Framework will consist of the Vision and Concept, Architecture, Roadmap, Business Case, and Detailed Plan necessary to implement NNEC.

37. Ibid, iv and 7. This Conceptual Framework model was adapted and developed by SACT and the U.S. DoD Office of Force Transformation to meet the unique requirements of NNEC, given its multi-national character. For clarification of military functions, “collectors” are sensors/platforms that transform raw data sources into useable information. The goal of their effort is information superiority. “Decision makers” are categorized as multinational military, governmental, and non-governmental agencies linked to network-centric capabilities. The goal of their effort is decision superiority. “Effectors” are weapons systems/shooters, political, economic, or information capabilities. The goal of their effort is execution superiority (or EBO type effects).

38. Rita Boland, “NATO Undergoes Massive Transformation,” Signal, February 2006, 60. In 2001, the RAND Corporation, an Arlington, Virginia based non-profit research organization, published a report titled European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation. The report was generated in the aftermath of NATO’s 78-day air offensive in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. It provided recommendations identifying several major areas in which NATO and its individual nations could improve support to future coalition military operations.

39. “Draft Status Report and Proposed Way Ahead on the Joint Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Concept for NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC),” NATO C3 Board Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (SC/1), AC/322(SC/1)N(20006)0002, 21 February 2006, 1-1. A NATO STANAG is promulgated by the Chairman, Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) under the authority vested by the NATO Military Committee. The need to update existing NATO single service CIS concepts for deploying tactical forces has been identified in different fora, such as STANAG 5048, SUBJECT: The Minimum Scale of Connectivity for Communications and Information Systems for NATO Land Forces. At the same time STANAG 5048 was being revised, the NNEC concept was developing.


41. Buckman, 2. NII capability implies the need for an unprecedented degree of flexibility, agility, adaptability and interoperability in the force structures involved and in the networking and information systems that support them.
42. NATO C3 Board Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (SC/1), 1-2. A work plan within the NC3 community has been slow in producing current conceptual and doctrinal documents such as a capstone Allied Joint Publication for CIS issues relative to NATO led multinational forces (such as the NRF) for conducting operations involving more than one service. Specifically, in November 2004 the NC3 Board tasked Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (SC/1) to develop a Joint CIS Concept for NNEC. Its main aim has been to focus on understanding CIS principles and responsibilities for planning, managing, operating and providing resources for the NII. Aside from ACT’s January 2006 NNEC Vision and Concept, a lack of doctrinal consensus exists of what right might look like when articulating guiding principles and responsibilities for network enabled organizations like the NRF.


44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. Although STANAGs have helped facilitate interoperability, the drawback under the current rigid process is the amount of time it takes to achieve STANAG ratification among the nations. To further complicate the process, setting up a STANAG does not automatically mean any nation has to implement it.

46. “Guiding Principles for C3 System Interoperability Experimentation, Test and Validation in Support of NRF and NNEC,” undated, NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 1-1. Specifically, NRF CIS interoperability requirements would need to be identified within the operational view of NATO C3 architectures developed in accordance with a NATO C3 Systems Interoperability Directive (NID) and NATO C3 System Architecture Framework. ACT development of NNEC architectures will serve as nested references for the NNEC Strategic Framework documents once both are fully developed.

47. “NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision & Concept,” Allied Command Transformation, iii, 3. The federated approach of evolving improvements recognizes national capabilities/contributions changing over time, as operational groupings of member nations change, and as NATO capabilities change.
48. The “reach back” concept relies on long haul, end-to-end satellite connectivity with deployable ground terminals geographically dispersed between forward deployed and non-deployed elements of an NRF headquarters conducting split based operations.

49. Arnaud Vandame, “The Challenge of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC),” briefing given to the NATO NEC Short Course, 13 October 2005, 19. Commander Vandame is with the French Navy and is Integrated Capabilities Team (ICT) Deputy Leader for ACT-IS NNEC.

50. Buckman, 14. Internet Protocol (IP) refers to a maturing commercial information transport mechanism that depends on a single virtual “black” core (NATO Unclassified) network with IP encryption devices to handle voice, data, or video traffic for multiple security domains and classification levels. IPv4 and its successor, IPv6, work on a digital bit addressing scheme available to route or control data packets moving across the network. Dr. Buckman points out in the NNEC FS that to support static or mobile domain requirements in the communications layer of the NII physical infrastructure, the idea behind extending the virtual network using IP as a convergence standard should enable operating locations to use whatever type of transmission media users may have access to in support of CIE.

51. “NNEC Architectures,” Information Superiority and NATO Network Enabled Capability Integrated Project Team, (IS-NNEC-IPT), NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 24 June 2004, 15-16. FoS architectures will have to accommodate emerging design techniques such as service-oriented architecture (SOA) which allow software applications from different vendors to interoperate between component equipments and be modified to be compliant with changing technologies to facilitate information sharing.


54. Buckman, 13-14. The Internet depends on the Internet Engineering Task Force to coordinate development of common standards to allow independently developed national networks to interconnect with the look and feel of a created common set of accessible services inherent
in the Internet. Similarly, the logic is for NATO to consider adopting the Internet IETF model for developing NII standards.

55. COMBINED ENDEAVOR is an annual, U.S. European Command sponsored, Partnership for Peace ( PfP) C4 Integration and Interoperability Exercise enabling interoperability between U.S. and NATO/PfP CIS equipment by documenting and exercising technical and procedural solutions. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) is an annual exercise hosted by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 26 coalition countries participating, including diverse military services and government agencies that focuses on interoperability trials to formally assess technology for its ability to solve interoperability challenges. The Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, was established for conducting joint and combined experimentation and analysis, assisting ACT’s developmental work on new technologies, modeling and simulation.


58. Vandame, 21.

59. Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl, “The NATO Response Force: Facilitating Coalition Warfare through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing,” Defense and Technology Paper Number 18, September 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Defense_Tech_papers.html, (accessed 22 March 2006), 62. Mr. Bialos is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Security and Industry Program at the John Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Center for Transatlantic Relations, and a partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill and Brennan. Mr. Koehl is a defense analyst and a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations. Blue Force Tracking (BFT) is a system derived from the U.S. Army’s Future Battle Command – Brigade and Below, that enables commanders to track friendly forces down to individual vehicle level to avoid fratricide. It has
a limited U.S. release. Digital Rosetta Stone is a non-releasable U.S. developmental system that will aid in creating bridges between the NRF and U.S. C4I (Command, Control, Computers, Communications and Intelligence) systems.

60. Ibid, viii and 65.
61. Ibid, xi and 4.
62. Ibid, 12.
66. Reuters, 1.
69. “NATO Handbook,” 202. Two aspects characterize the principle of common funding. One aspect is “cost share,” an agreed percentage or formula related to costs associated with NATO activities. The second aspect is the “over and above principle.” This means that common funding can be used to fund requirements that are reasonably above what a nation would be expected to provide for NATO’s benefit. Types of common funded budgets include: headquarters budgets, which support the military command structure; program budgets related to exercises, experimentation, reorganization, training and education; mission budgets for Crisis Response Operations; and NATO civilian personnel pensions.
70. NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) is implemented under the Infrastructure Committee’s supervision within NAC approved annual contribution ceilings. It finances the provision of installations
and facilities needed to support the roles of SACEUR and SACT that are recognized as exceeding the member nations’ national defense requirements.


74. NATO CIS acquisition programs for NNEC consideration are Automated Information Systems (AIS), NATO General Purpose Communications Segment (NGCS), SATCOM Post 2000, NATO General Tacoms Post 2000, Air Command and Control System, Ground Surveillance, and Missile Defense.

75. Buckman, 6. Dr. Buckman mentions in his Table of Recommendations section of the study that there are around 82 Capability Packages (CP), each containing one or many projects ranging from C4ISR capabilities to infrastructure facility upgrades from the other NATO Transformation Objective Areas, that will need to be assessed from an NNEC perspective.


77. Boland, 58.