

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE*Form Approved*
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 02-05-2013		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) November 2012-May 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Strengthening the Emerging American-Indian Partnership in Asia.				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Kent, Rory D.				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS India; United States; Economics; Diplomacy; Foreign Policy; Military; China; Pivot					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: Strengthening the Emerging American-Indian Partnership in Asia.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Date: 1 May 2013

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Date: 1 May 2013

Executive Summary

Title: Strengthening the Emerging American-Indian Partnership in Asia.

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Thesis: An India that continues to grow economically, diplomatically, and militarily, which is closely aligned with the United States, will serve as a stabilizing force as elements of America's national power pivots to Asia. A strong Indo-American partnership in the region can establish an effective bulwark against a rising, more aggressive China.

Discussion: Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, India has emerged as a growing power in Asia. Its emerging economic influence and future potential as a regional power caused the Bush Administration to redefine its relationship with India. By signing a bilateral nuclear agreement, both countries signaled a break with the past and established a new partnership. While historically, India has viewed American foreign policy with skepticism, today's leaders are beginning to embrace this new strategic relationship in order to facilitate its future growth and define itself as a credible presence in the region. By cultivating a "whole of government" approach, the United States can enhance India's emergence as an important entity in the region and establish a partnership which will place a check on possible Chinese territorial expansion. Growing economic ties and increasing military interoperability have solidified this "game changing" relationship. India's willingness to incur additional diplomatic obligations and a cultivate ties with traditional American allies in Asia has the ability to maintain the peace and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific's maritime realm. This partnership of two of the world's most important democracies will serve as a stabilizing force in Asia.

Conclusion: In order to secure its national interests in Asia, the United States must strengthen its relationship with India by establishing new trade agreements, continuing transfers of nuclear technologies, pushing for an increased diplomatic role for India on global issues, and building a closer military to military partnership. This growing partnership not only decreases the burden on U.S. resources in the long run, but also forms an effective bulwark against growing Chinese aggression in the region.

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Preface

India's economic potential and democratic institutions makes her an alluring partner for the United States during its shifting focus from the Middle East to the Pacific. I became interested in studying Indo-American relations after reading articles on India's continued population growth and economic prospects. Some studies show India's economy exceeding China's in the next century. India's rise has been less threatening than China's and, discounting Pakistan, India retains cordial relations with her neighbors. I see India as sharing similar strategic goals with America in the region and a stronger relationship as mutually beneficial for both nations.

I have attempted to use current sources from Indian or Indian-American scholars to evaluate the prospects of enhancing Indo-American relations and I will highlight a few. S. Paul Kapur, professor of political science at the Naval Postgraduate School, Amardeep Athwal, professor at the Institute for Defense Studies, and Sumit Ganguly, professor of political science at Indiana University, give insightful accounts of Cold War Indo-American relations. C. Raja Mohan, a research fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, Pretap Mehta, president of the Centre for Policy Research, a New Delhi-based think tank, and Devika Mistry, an expert on the Indian Navy, provides outstanding analysis on India's current foreign policy strategy and military capabilities. Dr. David Brewster, an expert on Indian strategic affairs and faculty member at the Australian National University and David Fidler, national security law professor at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, both demonstrate a significant understanding of India's growing role in Asian and have written important works on India's future role as a global power.

I: INTRODUCTION.

As the United States military initiates the "pivot to Asia," members of President Obama's administration are revamping other elements of national power to include, but not limited to, diplomacy, politics, and economics in order to meet the strategic goals associated with this pivot. As National Security Advisor Tom Donilon argues, America's "rebalancing posture towards Asia...harnesses every element of our national power. It is a long-term effort to better position ourselves for the opportunities and challenges we're ...likely to face in this century."¹

Numerous Obama Administration officials suggest that the Asia-Pacific region "...is the dominant arena of strategic interaction."² Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, claims that America's pivot must "create an operational conception that links more the Indian Ocean with the Pacific [because] these are going to be the two dynamic oceans of our future."³ Focusing on a wide-range of issues from trade to human rights and from defense of the global commons to developing strong military-to-military relationships, Assistant Secretary Campbell recognizes that the United States will "have to work with more nations that will sustain a strong American presence in the Asia Pacific."⁴

While the economic benefits associated with the pivot are bountiful and military relationships with long-standing allies such as Japan and Australia are sound, significant issues threaten to destabilize the region. As internal forces push Pakistan deeper into the Islamist camp and as China continues to increase its belligerency throughout North and Southeast Asia, the United States government must continue to cultivate and strengthen relationships in the region. Any successful "pivot" to Asia must include a plan that builds a stronger strategic relationship with India. Professor C. Raja Mohan, Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Dehli, keenly observes that the "United States has declared that India is the

linchpin of the new Asian strategy.”⁵ As a growing power, India’s regional influence will continue to expand in the coming decades.⁶ As such, America’s pivot represents “an extraordinary opportunity for India. The unfolding Sino-U.S. rivalry has the potential to end India’s prolonged isolation from East Asian geopolitics” and can transform India into an “indispensible element of the new regional balance of power.”⁷

A closer partnership between India and the United States will enhance the region’s stability by assuaging destabilizing agents. Increased trade and mutually beneficial commercial arrangements between India and the United States juxtaposed with growing economic interaction within multilateral institutions allows for additional opportunities for strategic dialogue and diplomacy. Trade enhances regional cooperation by contributing to economic growth. This growth has the ability to prevent regional disputes from expanding. As commercial ties grow throughout the Asian-Pacific, the wealth that is generated and economic interdependencies created tends to ameliorate dialogue in a variety of venues. This reinforces the ability of diplomacy to overshadow force as a means to mitigate the chances of regional disputes from escalating. Geoffrey Pyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs claims that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,

outlined a vision of economic cooperation, trade liberalization, increased trade flows, and people-to-people linkages throughout the region, referring to it as a ‘New Silk Road.’ In essence, this New Silk Road vision is a framework through which regional partners can think about and promote economic integration.⁸

Economic integration provides the cornerstones necessary for promoting peaceful settlements of disputes.

The establishment of economic and diplomatic linkages, especially between a growing India and an established United States, will facilitate the rise of India throughout the region and broaden its global outlook. In expanding its economic and diplomatic horizons, India seeks to

establish a stronger military relationship with the United States and its allies. Because of India's post-colonial suspicions, building sturdy military ties will become easier after reinforcing other aspects of this partnership in the realm of trade and diplomacy.

The prospects of strengthening the strategic relationship between India and the United States are challenging, but if the American government continues its course of taking a nuanced, whole of government approach and reaches out to India politically, economically, diplomatically, socially, and militarily, the prospects of having a peaceful and prosperous pivot to Asia improves. The fact that India is an established democracy means that American officials must not only convince Indian officials that a closer partnership is beneficial, but also India's diverse population. For now, India's leadership appears willing to reciprocate America's intentions of strengthening relations; just recently, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggested that these two nations "share the common goal of making this one of the principal relationships of our countries."⁹ While the actions of other nations, notably China and Pakistan, will undoubtedly play a role in how quickly the Indo-American relationship coalesces, the United States needs an effective strategy in cultivating its most important partnership in Asia. I argue that an India which continues to grow economically, diplomatically, and militarily, closely aligned with the United States, will serve as a stabilizing force as America's military, political, and economic entities pivot to Asia. A strong Indo-American partnership in the region, along with the participation of traditional Asian allies, will establish an effective bulwark against a rising, more aggressive China.

This paper starts with a brief overview of United States-India relations since 1947. India's foreign policy since its independence in 1947 continues to affect the way in which many Indian politicians and citizens view the United States. Many look upon America's interactions

with India on the global stage through a suspicious lens. This paper also examines the interaction of economic policy and broader diplomatic engagements as they relate to how the opening of the Indian economy created a space to expand bilateral relations between the United States and India. After this background information, this paper discusses how a stronger strategic partnership in terms of economics and trade, foreign policy and diplomacy, and military interoperability enhances regional stability and places a check on possible Chinese aggression. This paper concludes with a reiteration of the need for a whole of government approach and summarize the likelihood of how the United States and India can accomplish this mutually benefiting goal of forming a stronger partnership in Asia.

II: AN OVERVIEW OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY 1947-1991.

When India attained its independence in 1947, the nation's political leadership sought to disassociate itself from anything resembling a neocolonial relationship with western powers. After its colonial experience with Great Britain, India initially rejected the notion of cultivating a strategic relationship with either superpower, especially Great Britain's closest ally the United States. Emboldened by nationalism that rose with the post-colonial wave, India's leadership sought an independent foreign policy that would unite other post-colonial nations in forging their own path in the form of the Non Alignment Movement (NMA), which served as the foundation for India's foreign affairs. India's leadership failed to understand that despite the inherent altruism associated with the NMA, external events in the 1970s would push India into eventually choosing a camp. In the later stages of the Cold War, once the United States grew closer with the People's Republic of China and its continuing support of Pakistan, India turned to the Soviet Union for both economic and military support. This turn towards the Soviets proved what some

American officials seemed to suspect: that India's policy of nonalignment was but a cloak that covered its true solidarity with main rival.

American foreign policy experts maintained a *cavalier* attitude towards India's swing to the Soviet camp. Since India's centralized economy failed to produce trade benefits and opportunities for exports, Washington viewed India's relationship with the Soviets as an annoyance and focused on cultivating stronger relations with China and supporting Pakistan who played a role in fighting Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. The United States had essentially written India off as a lost cause. So long as India's disputes with Pakistan did not engulf the region into war, America officials were content with ignoring India.

Thus, during the Cold War, Indo-American relations were a product of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's policy of nonalignment and the interplay of India's disputes with both China and Pakistan. Two key events influenced the transformation of this relationship: India's economic reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of Indo-American ties that led to the 2008 Indo-US nuclear agreement. According to Senior Research Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Professor Vojtech Mastny contends, "The collapse of Soviet support precipitated a severe economic crisis in India. 'Had India realized earlier that the Cold War had ended,' its foreign minister commented in retrospect, 'it would not have been left behind.'"¹⁰ While the current relationship between India and the United States represents a significant break from the past, elements of India's political culture and sensitivities still linger today and represent a challenge for a closer partnership.¹¹

As previously highlighted, India's policy of nonalignment has its roots in its colonial experience and served as a means to establish an independent course in global affairs, one that did not limit them to either the American or Soviet camp. As Professor of South Asian Studies

at Jawaharlal Nehru University, C. Raja Mohan explains, "The capacity to resist the dominance of the great powers was central to the very conception of nation building in India, as in so many other states in Asia."¹² Part of the strategic appeal of nonalignment was India's longing to adhere to the "Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence," which they saw as a means to prevent foreign powers from influencing internal Indian affairs or propel India into external conflicts.¹³ These five principles formed the basis of India's nonalignment agenda: 1) "mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty," 2) "mutual nonaggression, 3) "mutual noninterference in internal affairs," 4) "equality and mutual benefit," and 5) "peaceful coexistence."¹⁴

For a newly independent nation occupying a strategic geographical location in the early stages of the Cold War, India sought an optimum path which allowed them to maintain the moral high ground while serving as a leader for other post-colonial nations. As Political Science Professor at Indiana University, Sumit Ganguly, argues, "the ideas embodied in the doctrine of nonalignment were in keeping with elements of India's historical and cultural legacies."¹⁵ Despite the lofty rhetoric and high ideals of the Non Aligned Movement and the Five Principles, external factors forced India to deal with territorial and geopolitical realities. Military conflicts with both Pakistan and the People's Republic of China assuaged India's idealized vision of its role in foreign affairs. International Law Professor David Fidler contends that part of this was due to India's own internal weaknesses; he asserts, "India's relative weakness during the Cold War prevented Indian support for the Five Principles from having a significant impact on the nature of international relations, dominated as they were by the global, ideology-centric superpower conflict."¹⁶ Instead of fostering shared peace and prosperity throughout the region, India became entangled in wars that an adherence to the Five Principles was intended to prevent.

India's external conflicts during the Cold War mainly centered on Pakistan and China; disputes over territories and boundaries initiated these conflicts. India's war with China in 1962 evolved from "disputes over the McMahon Line, the colonial-era border claimed by India."¹⁷ While initially holding a favorable impression of the People's Republic of China in the aftermath of its civil war, by 1958 the cooperative nature of their diplomatic relationship waned because of territorial ambiguities.¹⁸ European powers negotiated the border between India and Tibet during the 1913-1914 Simla Conference. Although China had representation at the Conference, those officials did not vote. This border became known as the McMahon Line. Additionally, when revolts broke out in Tibet in the late 1950s and China responded with force, the Dalai Lama fled to India where he and his "government in exile" received asylum; China took this as a diplomatic affront.¹⁹ Perceived Chinese aggression near its border propelled India to increase its military presence along the McMahon Line. India built military outposts on the border, which further angered the Chinese; minor skirmishes occurred in both the Longju and Kongka regions.²⁰ Despite the efforts of both nations to seek a negotiated settlement, war emerged in October of 1962 after numerous and provocative cross border incursions by Indian troops. The war ended with a definitive Chinese victory the following month. While Chinese troops withdrew to the previously designated border, the Indian leadership "opposed China's point of withdrawal."²¹ Many Indian experts claim "the outward sense of optimism that had characterized defense and foreign policy making at the political level between 1947 and 1962 never returned."²² Indian officials believed that China's military behaved rashly with their excursion into India. India's defeat by the People's Liberation Army brought a sense of national humiliation. No longer would New Delhi have a positive outlook on Beijing and Indian officials began to look upon

China and its motives in the region with suspicion. China's relationship with Pakistan only heightened India's mistrust.

Like its dispute with China, India's conflict with Pakistan also involved disputed territory. There have been four conventional wars between these two nations since 1947, and countless number of cross-border skirmishes. The first three wars took place within the context of Cold War realities involving quasi-alliances with the Soviets and Americans. In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 or the First Kashmir War, both sides fought for the control of the Kashmir region, the conflict ended with a United Nations ceasefire arrangement in which Pakistan received two-fifths of the disputed territory while India received the remaining three-fifths. Because of India's leadership within the Non Aligned Movement and its socialist-styled economy, the United States looked towards Pakistan as a top anti-communist ally in Central Asia and bestowed upon Islamabad the status of "most allied ally."²³

India's second post independence war, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, took place in the aftermath of India's 1962 defeat with their war with China; Pakistan used India's defeat as a pretext to launch an assault into India's portion of Kashmir. Since China's victory over India three years earlier, the United States endeavored to develop closer ties to India as a way to contain the PRC. During the last eighteen months of his presidency, President Kennedy attempted to be mindful of America's relationship with Pakistan, but believed providing aid to India would prevent China from interfering with Pakistan as well. President Kennedy maintained, "In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion. Chinese incursions into the sub-continent area a threat to Pakistan as well as India..."²⁴

Despite military American military aid to both nations, war erupted between India and Pakistan in 1965. Another United Nations ceasefire ended the conflict and as a result, Pakistan grew closer to the People's Republic of China. American policy makers determined that Pakistan was to blame for initiating hostilities and revoked their military aid. Furthermore, China's Zhou Enlai consistently inferred that India was the "outright aggressor" and blamed the conflict on "U.S. imperialism."²⁵ With Pakistan in China's camp, and fearing that India would become entrenched with the Americans, thereby isolating the Soviets in South Asia, the Soviets made a strong effort to develop closer relations with India. Once again, India's leadership within the NMA and philosophical adherence to the Five Principles was undercut by external forces, mainly the United States and Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the United Nations. Both the Indian leadership and the public developed a strong ambivalence towards the United States, despite its military aid. They viewed American foreign policy as extremely self-serving, securing its own interests in the region vice having concern for India's border issues and overall security. Events in the next decade would further erode Indo-American relations.

Six years after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, with Henry Kissinger's visit to China in 1971, India turned to the Soviets for economic and military aid who were more than willing to assist India, partly as punishment towards Pakistan for serving as a back-channel between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. While cultivating closer relations with Pakistan to establish talks with the PRC, President Nixon took a deeper view of America's interests, especially as it pertained to India. One year prior to this, President Nixon had informed his Secretary of State William Rogers, "India is relatively more important to our interests than Pakistan...If we can please only one of the two countries, we should lean towards India."²⁶ Nevertheless, President Nixon desperately needed to establish relations with the PRC to undermine the Soviets and gain

leverage at the Paris Peace Talks. Once again, India saw American foreign policy interests as antithetical to India's goals in the region. Despite President Nixon's belief that a better relationship could be beneficial for American interests in the region, he needed to place that on hold while pursuing his historic China initiative.

Meanwhile, in 1971, Pakistan's military operations in what would become Bangladesh propelled India to support the Liberation Force in Bengal; war then emerged between India and Pakistan once again. This was the most destructive of the four wars and ended with Pakistan's defeat and the creation of Bangladesh. The treaty that followed, the Simla Agreement, placed an end to hostilities, enabled India to release 90,000 POWs back to Pakistan, and returned land that India had seized during military operations. Throughout the next two decades, India continued to receive aid from the Soviets and received little attention from the United States, whose policies in the region were focused on facilitating the arming of anti-communist fighters in Afghanistan. Since India's economic model at the time was not attractive for foreign investment, the United States lacked the economic and political interests to further ties with India.

While attempting to operate within the Five Principles and lead the Non Alignment Movement, India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, found itself caught within the confines of Cold War international relations and eventually pulled into the periphery of the Soviet influence. According to Soviet officials, "Rajiv...freed himself from his earlier illusions about rapprochement with the United States [and] was now leaning towards the Soviet Union amid ongoing re-evaluation of India's priorities."²⁷ India was more or less comfortable with this relationship in the latter stages of the Cold War. Besides, India's socialism, combined with the ideological leanings of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi meshed well with the Soviet's economy that became more open under Mikhail Gorbachev. At various meetings with Soviet

officials, “Rajiv railed against the United States accusing it of waging ‘economic warfare’ to destabilize India.”²⁸ At this time, India believed that American interests in the region would never coincide with India’s and even if both nations shared the same goals, the United States would abandon India in order to maintain closer ties with China, a relationship which was growing throughout the 1980s. According to Professor Mohan, India’s “de facto alliance with the Soviet Union...was a classic bargaining act against Sino-U.S. rapprochement.”²⁹

With the fall of the Soviet Union, India's foreign policy followed a more pragmatic approach at the expense of a dogmatic, ideologically driven anti-colonialism. It was not just a bi-lateral engagement with the United States, but an all-encompassing revision of its relationships with other nations. As Ganguly contends, India "dropped its reflexive, neuralgic hostility towards the US, upgraded its diplomatic ties to Israel, continued cautious attempts to improve its relations with the PRC, and made a major effort to court the countries of Southeast Asia."³⁰ This was driven by the hard realities that India faced with the suspension of Soviet military and economic aid. To have a more effective foreign policy that could face post-Cold War challenges, India had to reform the economy and liberalize markets as a way to produce economic growth, increase domestic production, and attract foreign capital. India realized that economic growth produced a broader array of choices in foreign affairs and international relations; with a growing economy, mixed with a pluralistic political system, India emerged through its last war with Pakistan and its growing nuclear program relatively unscathed. Since India’s economic reforms and increased commercial ties with East Asia, India’s conflicts with its neighbor Pakistan have not reach 1971 levels. Even the Mumbai attacks in 2008 met with a moderated response from India; the need for foreign investment, peaceful relations with its

neighbors, and regional stability as a way to increase economic growth tempered India's response to Pakistan.

In joining multilateral institutions that focus on trade, climate change, human rights, and other issues, India reaped the benefits of promoting its interests abroad without the constraining features of the Non Aligned Movement; multilateral institutions, especially ones concerned with economic growth increased the diplomatic pragmatism of each participant's foreign policy.

Mohan correctly asserts, "New Delhi's focus slowly began to shift away from the NAM and G-77 to East Asian multilateralism, where India sought to integrate itself with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other forums of the globalizing Southeast Asia."³¹

According to the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia's (ERIA)

Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (CADP), India and ASEAN commercial relations grew significantly throughout the last decade. According to the report, "India's trade with ASEAN has increased from US\$ 7.13 billion in 2000 to US\$ 41.32 billion in 2009. Grown at 22 percent in the last decade, India's trade with ASEAN presently shares about 10 percent of India's global trade..."³²

The liberalization of India's economy facilitated the economic growth and enticing commercial opportunities, thereby propelling India's rise in Asia and the forging of closer relationship with the United States. Again, external factors caused India to abandon the NMA approach to foreign policy. The benefits of India's economic liberalization caused its leadership to redefine its foreign policy and approach to international relations. Rather than excoriate the United States for eliminating its chief benefactor, India's leaders used the fall of the Soviet Union to formulate policies to transform India into a relevant actor on the world stage. Nehru's use of the NAM and India's partnership with the Soviet Union "has been rendered obsolete, and

Nehru himself is now widely regarded even in India as a dilettante in foreign policy.”³³ India’s revised foreign policy was the result of its economic reforms and the growth that resulted from these reforms gave its leaders the political capital to enter into a new relationship with the United States. As Professor Mastny contends, “As India became increasingly integrated into the global market...the Indian government increasingly looked to the United States as its preferred strategic partner.”³⁴

III: INDIA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS AND REVAMPED RELATIONS WITH AMERICA, 1991-PRESENT.

Economic reforms in the early 1990s and the opening of foreign trade and investment enabled India to go from a 0.8% growth rate in 1991 to an 8.3% growth rate in 2010.³⁵ The level of growth was staggering; its annual GDP increased from 267 billion in 1991 to 1,430 billion in 2010.³⁶ By reforming the "Licensing Raj" in which state sponsored and protected monopolies inefficiently manufactured a variety of products, Prime Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao eliminated centralization and bureaucratic impediments transforming the economy into an engine of growth.³⁷ Prime Minister Manmohan Singh institutionalized additional reforms; as Pretap Bhanu Mehta, President of the Centre for Policy Research, asserts, "...under his initiatives, the state would dismantle domestic controls on private enterprise, gradually integrate India into the world economy, rationalize the tax and tariff structures, and provide transparent regulation."³⁸ These market reforms catapulted India into the top ten largest economies in the world; prior to the financial crisis in 2008, India's "annual two-way trade more than doubled between 2004-2008, from just under 30 billion to 66 billion."³⁹ These reforms, while domestically controversial, enabled India's economy to remain competitive and stable throughout the latest global economic crisis. While India still struggles with poverty, more and more Indian see their

economic situations improving, with many entering the middle class each year. According to the United States Intelligence Council, "India will become the world's biggest driver of middle-class growth by 2030."⁴⁰ Since 2009, India's household savings rate has stayed above 30 percent [and] the country's private consumption rate is around 60 percent" which leads observers to conclude that "India's economic ups and downs have neither overtaxed the public...nor dampen its appetite for goods and services."⁴¹ It also demonstrates that India's economy can effectively weather global economic downturns, which would have previously caused substantial economic and social upheavals.

India's continued growth and development gave credibility to their economic reforms and politicians have grown more confident at the prospect of a new round of economic liberalization reforms, which may soon be on the horizon. India's economic growth has recently slowed and India's foreign direct investment has decreased by 67% from 2011's high of 47 billion dollars.⁴² Recent talk of further economic liberalization and market reforms increased the confidence of India's trading partners. Having benefitted from foreign investment and increased trade, India cultivated a new outlook on foreign policy.

India's economic revival has paved the way for a foreign policy renaissance. It further caused other nations, most notably the United States, to re-evaluate the way in which it views India and its role in the region. As Professor David Brewster, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University, maintains, "India's successful transition to a great power armed with nuclear weapons also moved India's intellectual balance in favor of realists and pragmatists and effectively ended the longstanding dominance of Nehruvians and left-of-centre internationalists over the foreign policy discourse."⁴³ Part of this transition is due in part by nations such as the United States taking a more nuanced and flexible approach to India, especially with regards to

India's nuclear program. While India representatives were present at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty negotiations, they refused to sign the treaty based on nationalistic ambivalence and skepticism of 1968's nuclear powers.⁴⁴ India's defeat at the hands of China and that nation's nuclear capability pushed India to develop their own arsenal beginning with their 1974 test of Pokhran-1. Despite India's pledge of a "no first use" policy, the United States Congress passed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 which sought to "end cooperation with those states....that detonated nuclear explosives;" throughout the 1980s, the United States refused to export any nuclear related material to India, including that which had purely civilian energy uses.⁴⁵ India's test in 1998 brought further rebukes from the Clinton Administration and relations between these two nations cooled. Relations warmed rapidly with the arrival of a new administration. Seeing India's promise in the new century, President George W. Bush took a broader view on this issue. However, without India's economic reforms, America's negotiations concerning with India's nuclear program may have been coercive rather than cooperative in nature.

Bush Administration officials immediately formulated a new strategy in dealing with India. Starting in 2001, American policy makers saw the incredible rise in India's economy and the benefits of India as a trading partner. Simultaneously, members of the Bush Administration also saw China as a growing threat in the region. While the Bush Administration contemplated enhancing relations with India, Indian officials also took a role in redefining Indo-American relations. As Brewster asserts, "India pursued the US relationship aggressively, with Prime Minister Vajpayee calling India and the United States 'natural allies' whose relations 'constitute the key element in the architecture of tomorrow's democratized world order.'"⁴⁶ In 2004, Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bush signed the 2004 "Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership,"

a document which called for “expanded cooperation in three areas: civil nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade.”⁴⁷ This was just the beginning. Both nations developed the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement AKA "123 agreement," (completed in June of 2007 and signed in October of 2008) which "represented an important threshold" in cultivating a strategic relationship in which the "United States effectively recognized India as a *de facto* nuclear weapons state and allowed India access to civil nuclear and US defense technology." ⁴⁸ By including military technology in the agreement, the United States signified that its interests in the region are intertwined with India's; had India not demonstrated their economic potential and to a lesser extent, their vibrant political democracy, this spirit of cooperation and partnership would not have been cultivated.⁴⁹ Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter argued that cultivating a partnership with India requires the elimination of red tape; he asserts, "We want to develop a joint vision for U.S.-India defense cooperation...we want to knock down any bureaucratic barriers in our defense relationship, and strip away any impediments."⁵⁰

For its part, India saw this nuclear deal as a way to determine if the nation had the confidence in a new strategic partnership with America. Shiv Shankar Menon, India's Foreign Secretary at the time states that the negotiation was more "about the merits of trusting the [United States] or the consequences of a particular line of policy rather than about the substance of the agreements themselves."⁵¹ For the first time since its independence, Indian leaders grew confident in America's ability to engage with India on an equal footing.

The Bush Administration's pragmatic approach to the "1-2-3 Agreement" sent a clear message to Indian officials that the United States shared their interests and viewed India as a vital partner. While still maintaining commercial ties with China and tolerating a quasi-pseudo

military partnership with Pakistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States sent a clear signal that, besides the traditional allies of Japan and Australia, the Asian power that most clearly shares America's interests is India.⁵² Prior to this, India would have viewed America's military aid to Pakistan and trade relations with China as suspicious at best and anti-Indian at worst. India's relative political stability and democratic institutions combined with a dynamic economy, which resulted from key market reforms, shaped America's pragmatic policy with regards to India's nuclear program.⁵³ With India's increasing economic presence in the region and growing confidence, Indian officials have grown more receptive to a stronger relationship with America. America must now continue to further develop this relationship and assist India's transition from a South Asian power to an Asian power.⁵⁴ To do so, the United States must continue its whole of government approach; developing stronger economic ties is the least controversial way in which to build upon this already solid partnership.

IV: FORMULATING A STRONGER ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC, AND MILITARY INDO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP.

India's continued rise in the region and on the global stage presents a key opportunity for the United States. As stated before, India's economic growth launched the country into the spotlight for investors and companies seeking new markets, an intelligent workforce, and high profits. Building upon the economic reforms of the past twenty years, India seeks to transition from a regional power to a global one. As Professor Fidler, contends, "India's post-Cold War trajectory of economic growth provides compelling evidence of a country experiencing unprecedented, history-making shifts in its capabilities and potential material power and global influence."⁵⁵ The United States prefers a strong Indian presence in East Asia as a means to ensure regional balance. In order to form a bulwark against possible Chinese aggressive

expansion and diplomatic coercion in the Asia-Pacific, the United States will become increasingly dependent upon India to serve as a counterweight to China's rise. To strengthen this partnership, the United States needs to focus on three main areas: economics, diplomacy, and military. By assisting India in expanding its capabilities in these three elements of national power, the United States has the opportunity to make the most out of its pivot to Asia. India's expanding economic presence throughout Asia, especially in East Asia, will have an enormous impact on regional economic growth and trade. As India's economy continues to grow, diversify, and integrate into the lucrative markets of East Asia, the greater need they have for solidifying their diplomatic and military capabilities in the Pacific. India's growing economy will increase the level of trade conducted in the region; it will also place greater demands on securing energy resources. As trade levels and economic interdependencies increase, so too will the level of diplomatic interactions between the region's nations. The fusion of economic interests and diplomatic discourse provides a key element of stability within the region. This fusion provides an impetus for growing powers, such as India, to support open Sea Lines of Communication and fosters cooperation among like minded nations.⁵⁶ The United States can assist India in formulating a more effective economic strategy, which focuses on energy and free trade through its participation in multilateral institutions. A mutually beneficial energy policy and membership in key trade organizations will further improve India's economy and increase its cooperation with the United States in the areas of diplomacy and security.

IV.1: ECONOMICS AND TRADE.

Trade and participation in trade organizations are important steps that India has taken to expand its influence into East Asia where more developed economies reside. Within a few years of India's fiscal reforms, under the sponsorship of Singapore, "...India's institutional links in

Southeast Asia developed quickly, becoming a sectoral ASEAN dialogue partner in 1992 and a full ASEAN dialogue partner in December 1995. India also sought a security role in the region and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996."⁵⁷ India sees both the economic and political benefits associated with membership in multilateral institutions; from 1993 until 2008, India's trade with ASEAN countries increased from \$2 billion dollars to \$47 billion dollars.⁵⁸ Having close financial ties with nations such as Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea not only benefits India's developing economy, but it also strengthens its burgeoning role as strategic ally in East Asia. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong claims, "We have always been in favor of India participating as the dialogue partner in ASEAN. We think it is good for India, for ASEAN and for Singapore."⁵⁹ Domestically, there are still vocal critics of free trade within India's electorate, demonstrating that more work remains in forming additional trade relations with other ASEAN nations.

Nevertheless, despite these challenges, as India's economic growth expands, its ability to influence other ASEAN countries will as well. Maintaining a strong economy with a transparent political system is seen by many East Asian countries as a better alternative than some other large powers in Asia. Wall Street Journal reporter Patrick Barta recently suggested that China's neighbors are suspicious of that nation's recent rise; he asserts, "...concerns range from the commercial, such as natural resource extraction and Chinese merchants selling cheap imports, to the geopolitical, seen in Beijing's offshore territorial claims."⁶⁰ By integrating itself among key trade organizations, such as ASEAN, India can participate in vital dialogue with more advanced economies to address these concerns.

Most of India's trade in the region takes place with Asia's more mature economies. India has demonstrated a high level of success with regard to finance and trade with ASEAN's larger

economies vice developing ones, since many politicians are skeptical of lower priced agricultural products supplanting domestic ones.⁶¹ In time, trade with nations such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma may expand and ultimately flourish, but many in India still view these developing nations as economic competitors. Free trade between all of ASEAN nations will ultimately benefit all who participate in the organization.⁶² Open markets and well established commercial ties also facilitate diplomatic discussions. According to Prime Minister Singh's opening statement at the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit, India and ASEAN "have institutionalized summits...and nearly 25 mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation."⁶³ He further claims, "...the path to regional peace and stability is greater coordination, cooperation, and integration among our economies. ASEAN [provides] a regional mechanism of cooperation and consensus [that serves as] a great force for peace and prosperity."⁶⁴ As India's economy continues to develop, its ability to conduct diplomacy in the region will also rise.

The United States can influence India's economic growth and future development by using energy resources as leverage to encourage India to participate in additional free trade agreements in order to further open its economy. To form a stronger commercial relationship with India, America needs to become India's largest energy supplier. Despite its historic economic transition and ascendency, India faces significant challenges in terms of infrastructure and energy needs; this lack of resources inhibits future growth. Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, a political scientist and former deputy assistant of state for South Asia from 2001-2009, cites India's poor infrastructure energy dependency as a major challenge. He writes,

Rutted highways, old airports, decaying ports, and chronic electricity shortages weaken nearly every aspect of India's economy: the roads between India's four largest cities are poor, New Delhi's showpiece high-tech district of Gurgaon has gone dark and hot, and power for lights and air conditioning often fails even in state capitals.⁶⁵

Because of rapid economic growth and an expanding population, India's electric grids and transportation systems are at best overburdened and at worst collapsing; electricity shortages and poorly maintained roads add substantial costs for businesses. According to Cyrus Guzder, Chairman and Director of AFL Private Ltd and a member of the board of Governors of The Reserve Bank of India, "India has a voracious appetite for energy and minerals...but cannot dig, import or shift enough coal to keep the lights on."⁶⁶ Lack of domestic energy resources further strains India's power shortfalls; its oil imports hover around 80%. The United States has the potential to ease India's energy and infrastructure burdens.

American oil production is at record highs. The technological advances in oil extraction from such places as the Bakken in North Dakota have transformed the energy sector. With its massive natural gas and coal reserves, American energy production can provide India relief in exchange for trade concessions and support in multilateral institutions.⁶⁷ According to the International Energy Agency, "the U.S. could surpass Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest oil producer in 2017, and it could eclipse Russia as the world's largest natural-gas producer in 2015."⁶⁸ If America can harness domestic energy resources, mainly coal, oil, and natural gas, Washington "will have more discretion to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to loan oil to other countries to meet geopolitical or geo-economic aims."⁶⁹ By leveraging special oil and natural gas concessions for India, the United States has the ability to encourage additional economic reforms and market liberalization policies in return. Giving India additional sources of energy at competitive prices will undoubtedly produce trade concessions in key sectors of the economy. India is receptive to negotiations and began "lobbying" efforts for a formalized "energy partnership."⁷⁰ Not only will this have an enormous domestic benefit for India's economy, but it will also increase India's stock in Asia as a lucrative trading partner. Having

access to cheaper energy will draw capital to other areas of India's economy. The establishment of close commercial ties between India and the United States will enhance both nations' economic goals throughout the region; it was also improve India's status as a vital trading partner within the region.

Only with continued investment, increased energy related exports, and the elimination of trade barriers, can the United States assist India in its development, which will make India a more attractive trading partner in the region. As the world's largest economy, the United States has the ability to shape India's trade relations in the region. Many in the region maintain that America's economic involvement in the region is vital for stability. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong contends,

I think the U.S. is a major factor in the strategic balance of the world and Asia ... a lot of trade and economic engagement depends heavily on the U.S. So it makes sense to keep the U.S. engaged. It is good for ASEAN to have the U.S. as a partner and have ASEAN-US meetings regularly.⁷¹

As part of its pivot, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon suggests that the United States is also "rebalancing our efforts...on Southeast Asia and ASEAN."⁷² America is attempting to influence ASEAN through the Expanded Economic Engagement or E3 initiative in order to "contribute to the regional impulse for deeper economic integration."⁷³ This United States-ASEAN trade agreement "aims to simplify customs procedures and improves the transparency of customs administration, investment confidence, and regulatory principles and practices."⁷⁴

Working through these organizations lends America the ability to influence India's economic reforms through multilateral channels which may yield better results rather than through bilateral negotiations, which would come with increased scrutiny from some of India's left of center politicians.

As of this year, the United States has become “India’s top trading partner in goods and services.”⁷⁵ According to Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Twining, bilateral trade between India and the United States continues to grow rapidly, doubling “every five years since 2001.”⁷⁶ The current administration needs to formulate a strategy concerning increasing trade with India. Recent trade initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Investment Partnership do not include India; these organizations will perform more effectively if they take advantage of a dynamic and growing economy such as India’s. Twining further contends that in order for India to enact additional market reforms, placing it within the context of having access to important trade organizations can help assuage domestic suspicions; he further maintains, “Liberalized trade with the U.S. would help India eliminate tariff and regulatory barriers that penalize Indian consumers, while improving market access for Indian exports.”⁷⁷ The TPP has the ability to improve India’s trade with Asian countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Vietnam, while stimulating new economic relations with countries such as Canada, Chile, and Mexico. Additionally, the United States needs to apply pressure on other nations to include India in other forums. For example, India is still not a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).⁷⁸ By leveraging its economic power and using a nuanced, diplomatic approach, the United States can quietly assist India in additional liberalization and increased presence in vital trade forums, thereby enhancing India’s profile in the region. These trade agreements are vital to the pivot; if trade negotiations lack progress and results, “America’s value as a friend or ally would be high only in case of potential conflicts.”⁷⁹ Being seen as a strictly military entity limits the extent to which an Indo-American partnership can fully develop.

IV.2: DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY.

Merging its burgeoning commercial presence in the region with a capable military, aligned with the United States, will provide India the diplomatic influence it needs as it grows more powerful. India's history makes it well suited to have a robust and energized foreign policy in the region. As its economy integrates more with the region's top trading partners, and as China's rhetoric increases as it pertains to disputed territories, India will have a more important role to play concerning regional stability. Its recent pragmatic approach to foreign and democratic infrastructure makes it a promising ally in the region. This section will discuss the ways in which India can grow diplomatically and form alliances with the United States and others as a mean to ensure that China's rise remains peaceful. I will expand on the ways in which other regional entities view India, how the nation's economic and political systems lend it regional credibility, the importance of the United States and India cultivating regional alliances as a hedge against China and a way in which America can expand India's diplomatic influence.

India's emergence as a potential economic heavyweight has not only redefined its relationship with the United States, but has also revolutionized the way in which they view other Asian powers, especially those in the Far East. As Brewster notes, "Throughout most of the Cold War, Indian leaders viewed Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia as little more than protectorates of the United States and therefore of little interest to India except, in the case of Japan, as a potential source of capital and technology."⁸⁰ India's economic growth has redefined how it views those nations that have been among America's closest allies in the past half a century. This pragmatic approach to foreign policy and the cultivation of regional partners remains crucial to legitimizing India's future role in Asia. While the rise of other Asian regimes have caused concern for the United States, (Japan in the 1930s and China today), America and its

Asian allies hold a favorable view of a potent India. As Mohan argues, "India has a noticeable lack of historical baggage in its dealings in much of the region, [excluding Pakistan.] India is commonly perceived in Southeast Asia as essentially a benign power and not a would-be hegemon..."⁸¹ Having legitimate democratic institutions juxtaposed with a non-aggressive foreign policy have given India credibility in the region as a potential diplomatic heavyweight.

This is where India's former policy of nonalignment compliments its rise as a regional power as its influence flows eastward. Its prior armed conflicts were limited to Pakistan, who has limited trade and political interests with East Asia, and China, whose rise in the region is met with suspicion. Historically, it has not negatively impacted nations in East Asia. As such, India's rise has not been met with suspicion. The fact that many in the region appreciate India's historic independence and sense of tolerance further enhances the nation's diplomatic credibility. India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, claims that India's values have enabled others in the region to look towards Indian leadership on certain geopolitical issues. Speaking at an event in Washington D.C., Prime Minister Singh maintained, "...there are other values which are more important than the growth of the gross domestic product...the respect for fundamental human rights, the respect for multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious rights."⁸² These altruistic statements concerning a state's proper conduct have played well for India in the region and greatly contrasted India with its main rival in the eyes of other nations..

India's leaders have recently realized that the more economically and diplomatically intertwined their nation is with East Asia, the wealthier and more influential it will become, thereby serving as an additional source of stability in the region and effectively conducting diplomacy. Describing India's push eastward, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee suggested in 2007, "Fortunately, after nearly a millennia of inward and landward focus, we are

once again turning our gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-establish itself..."⁸³ This "gaze outwards and seawards" is not frightening to Asia-Pacific nations. Many nations have realized the need for another powerful, democratic influence in the region that will place checks and balances on those nations who seek territorial gains by coercive means, such as China. As Mohan maintains, "While cooperation among democracies might not be enough to promote sustainable institutions in the global commons, such cooperation could shape and nudge non-democratic great powers toward moderation and accommodation."⁸⁴ The United States cannot shape the region by itself, having India as a partner, along with its traditional allies, will promote regional stability. Increasing India's diplomatic influence with America's allies will provide enormous dividends. In the last few years, India recognized this and has formed close diplomatic relations with Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam which have resulted in solidifying "defense ties" between these nations.⁸⁵ The Bush Administration's pragmatic approach to India's nuclear program has paid enormous dividends in terms of India's integration in the region. America's allies view India in the context of what Prime Minister Singh discussed above.

While India's interests in the region are becoming more aligned with America's, India does not wish to portray itself as a pawn of the United States, or even worse, America's pit bull in Asia. As India's partnership with America grows, China will attempt to portray India as a lackey who will conduct the bidding of its overseers in Washington. Often times, India's domestic critics voice apprehension when New Delhi aligns itself with Washington in controversial global issues, such as U.S. sanctions against Iran.⁸⁶ By building diverse partnerships with nations such as Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and others, India can formulate a strategy in the region that will enable it to

expand economically, promote its vision diplomatically, and, if need be, secure its interests militarily. Brewster argues that bilateral arrangements will expand India's diplomatic relationships. He writes,

even if an anti-China coalition led by the United States were to eventuate in the future, New Delhi's intuitive preference would be to assert its strategic autonomy even more forcefully...[by emphasizing] the development of strategic relationships in the Asia Pacific on a bilateral basis...[thereby] maximizing India's freedom of action."⁸⁷

This appears short-sighted. By cultivating a collective effort among key trading partners, Indo-American allies can uphold the status quo in the Pacific. This alliance structure is forming within ASEAN. According to *The Economist*, "ASEAN is keen to implement a 'code of conduct' covering the South China Sea disputes, China refuses to acknowledge a collective position."⁸⁸ A bloc of ASEAN nations, with the backing of an Indo-American partnership, can prevent China from increasing tensions if they act collectively. As of now, "Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, supported by Singapore and Thailand, want ASEAN to register serious concerns over what they see as China's belligerent actions."⁸⁹ According to Peter Drysdale of the East Asia Forum, "civilized conversation" with regards to the South China Sea "is helping to restore the status quo and keeping the door open to progress on core American objectives, shared by most regional partners."⁹⁰

Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Chief of Naval Staff (2004-2006), concurs with the need to act collectively with key partners and suggests, "The appropriate counter to China's encirclement of India is to build our own relations, particularly in or neighborhood, on the basis of our national interests and magnanimity towards smaller neighbors."⁹¹ Diplomatically, India has a strong position and can build upon its relationships in East Asia, while simultaneously appearing independent of the United States. Forming stronger ties with India must be built on

patience; India will become a more vocal supporter of the United States and its policies in Asia, especially as China takes more coercive measures in securing its self-serving interests in the global commons. It is within this realm that the United States will become more reliant upon India's growing military capabilities and the abilities of other allies. The fact that India has developed close relations with traditional American allies is a sign of progress and further illustrates the role that economic growth has played in India's enhanced diplomatic posture.

Forming these alliances assisted India in extending their influence beyond the geographic boundaries of South Asia. Throughout the Cold War, many experts pointed to the border dispute with China and China's close ties with Pakistan as having limited India's influence in Asia to South Asia; with India's economic growth and increase in foreign trade, these two contentious issues no longer have the ability to constrain India's regional reach.⁹² In fostering more potent diplomatic, ties throughout Asia, India needs to develop a comprehensive strategy; as Feigenbaum contends:

New Delhi will need to achieve two major goals: first, break the confining shackles of South Asia and become a truly Asian power that is integrated into the East Asian economic system and influential throughout the wider region; and second, project its power and influence globally, whether by assuming a role in protecting the global commons, shaping international finance, becoming a more significant aid donor, or leveraging a seat in the G-20 and other leading international institutions.⁹³

By tackling important issues through negotiations within global institutions, India and her allies can influence the Asia-Pacific's future. Working with allies through diplomatic channels is in the best interests of India, the United States, and Asia's democratic nations. As India grows stronger economically, it must also develop significant military capabilities, mainly in the maritime realm to secure trading routes in the region. Having a dynamic economy, juxtaposed with a modern, capable military will cause India to accept certain diplomatic obligations, the

most important of which is vocalizing the need for open Sea Lines of Communication. By establishing strong ties with East Asian powers, India must now “...formulate a resilient policy on the issue of the global maritime commons in the South China Sea as well as unfettered international right to navigation of these waters.”⁹⁴ America’s role in developing this policy is vital, but India’s inputs on the issue remains crucial; seeking ways in which to expand India’s role remains important.

One way to increase India’s diplomatic potential is to argue for an increased role for India in dealing with global issues. The United States needs to push for India's permanent admission to the United Nations Security Council. Even though China will block all attempts for India's admittance, it will demonstrate to the Indian people that America supports the diplomatic role their nation plays on the global stage. As the second most populous nation on track to surpass China, and as a burgeoning economic power, India has a legitimate claim for having a permanent seat. The United States should seek every opportunity to obtain this important position for India. It will reap significant rewards for both nations if it succeeds and benefits the world by having an additional liberal democracy on the Security Council. Even if this does not succeed, the United States should extend every opportunity to bring India into discussions on global issues such as regional security, global commerce, and human rights. By increasing India’s clout within the region, America and its allies can leverage India’s size and future potential against the region’s rising authoritarian power.

America and its allies need to establish a bulwark against an expansive China, whose bellicosity has grown towards its neighbors in both the South and East China Seas. To do so effectively, America needs India's influence throughout the continent to expand and flourish. India's rise in diplomatic influence is needed to safeguard the region against China's expansionist

vision which "run[s] counter not just to U.S. objectives in the region, but to all those others in the region that depend on the open seas of the Western Pacific for trade and economic prosperity."⁹⁵ Today China's politburo would reject any comparison of India's potential strength with their current economic and military abilities and global influence.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, India and America's traditional Asian allies view China as a credible threat to regional stability, especially since China has engaged in currency manipulation, maritime belligerency against the Philippines and Japan, and a rejection of curtailing North Korea's nuclear ambitions. As Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell argues, many Asia-Pacific powers "want a good relationship with the United States in its own right, but they also believe that a strong, durable, stable reliable relationship...gives them a better ability to deal with the giant in the neighborhood."⁹⁷

Territorial disputes aside, India, too, has been a victim of China's economic shenanigans; despite China being India's largest trading partner, the Indian government has been frustrated with Beijing's dumping activities where China unloads goods at below market prices to undercut India's domestic production of low-cost consumer goods.⁹⁸ Other nations have expressed similar concerns and are seeking ways in which to minimize China's influence. Establishing closer ties to the United States is one way in which nations such as Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam have sought to curtail a growing Chinese threat. According to *The Economist*, "the Philippines and Vietnam now look openly to America for military and diplomatic support as they face an assertive China in their sea of troubles."⁹⁹ As India increases its presence throughout the region both economically and diplomatically, it is in their interest to enhance the Indo-American military relationship.

IV.3: MILITARY.

While providing support to India's growing diplomatic and economic goals throughout the region, the United States continues its role in assisting India's military, especially in the realm of maritime security. Since the end of the Cold War, India "move[d] away from the traditional notions of sea-denial and its diplomatic component of keeping other naval powers out of its neighborhood, [to a concept that] value[s] cooperation and contract with other navies."¹⁰⁰ India's emerging interests in the region are becoming more aligned with those of the United States. With India's growing economy, reliance on trade routes, and need for regional stability "protecting the sea-lines of communication in the Indian Ocean [has become] an important objective [of India]. That was also an objective widely shared by other trading nations and the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean, the United States."¹⁰¹ For the last ten years, the Armed Forces of United States and India have increased their engagement in the form of military exercises and weapons procurement. From an Indian perspective, while this represents the most controversial aspect of the new partnership with the United States, it is one of the most promising as it has the opportunity to transform India into a global power. With the rise of multiple, credible threats in the region, it is in the interests of both nations to ensure both militaries have a strong partnership and increase their interoperability. This will be done through the development of a strategic plan that seeks to increase military engagement, training exercises, and foreign military sales.

The responsibility of assisting India in shaping its naval growth and capability in the region falls upon the Commander of United States Pacific Command (U.S. PACOM). U.S. PACOM specifically mentions the importance of India in its Strategic Guidance.¹⁰² This guidance specifically cites three key areas in which to engage the Indian military: "Deepen

military-to-military interaction and interoperability, encourage military-to-civilian relationships to counter common threats, [and] support India's evolution as a leading and stabilizing force in South Asia."¹⁰³ The United States Department of Defense sees this growing relationship as mutually beneficial. Prior to the 2012 U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta argued "that a 'close partnership with America will be key to meeting India's own stated aims of a modern and effective defense force."¹⁰⁴ He further asserted that "...for this relationship to truly provide security for this region and for the world, we will need to deepen our defense and security cooperation."¹⁰⁵

For the past ten years, the Department of Defense has seen a growing India as a stabilizing force in the region and one that can assist in securing sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and beyond, perhaps having a larger maritime presence throughout all of Asia.¹⁰⁶ America is fortunate that India shares this vision of an expanding naval influence throughout Asia as well. India's 2007 Military Maritime Strategy: Freedom to Use the Seas states that "control of maritime choke points, islands and trade routes in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and in the Bay of Bengal 'expanded to include the 'arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca."¹⁰⁷ Since Washington and New Dehli agree that India should have a larger maritime presence in the region, both nations seek to continue enhancing each other's capabilities through military engagement, training exercises, planning efforts, and military sales.¹⁰⁸ Since both nations explicitly agree that they share similar strategic goals, Director of U.S. PACOM's India Strategic Focus Group (ISFG) Colonel Michael Albanese states that U.S. PACOM is taking the next step in making the "relationship as routine, formalize, and functional in a way that great partners do."¹⁰⁹

One of the best ways in which to “formalize” this relationship is to engage in bilateral and multilateral training exercises. From 2003 to 2010, India and the United States have participated in 50 military exercises, the most that India has had than with any other nation.¹¹⁰ Recently, both militaries have expanded the number of exercises they conduct to 12 or more per year.¹¹¹ Not only have these exercises increased a greater sense of cooperation between both armed forces, but they have also strengthened India’s engagement throughout the Pacific. India used these exercises to improve its interoperability with other Asian nations, notably Japan who shares India’s concerns with keeping sea lanes of communication free and have grown increasingly apprehensive over China’s intentions in the region.¹¹² The Commander of U.S. PACOM Admiral Samuel J. Locklear is a strong proponent of India sharing the burden of prohibiting the disruption of vital trading routes on the seas. He states, “We hope to partner with [India] to share the strategic landscape as it applies to how we apply security to the globe that allows prosperity and peace, freedom of movement and...prosperity in the world.”¹¹³ This notion of “sharing the strategic landscape” is exactly the image of the United States wishes to convey to the Indian public. By “formalizing” the exercises and conducting them on a routine schedule, India will grow more comfortable in expanding its role in Asia.

These exercises cover all spectrums of conflict, reflecting U.S. PACOM’s hope of a more active Indian naval presence in the region.¹¹⁴ From search and rescue operations to convoy security and from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations to more kinetic type operations, U.S. PACOM is preparing India to deal with any number of potential threats. Since India operates in a region susceptible to both geological and political abnormality, it makes sense that both nations see India playing a larger role.¹¹⁵ Admiral Locklear envisions an India growing more capable and confident as a result of the increasing complexity of recent naval exercises.

One naval exercise in particular, the Malabar Exercise, “have particularly increased in scale and complexity... involve[ing] three carrier battle groups and other ships from India, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Singapore.”¹¹⁶ The degree to which India is increasing its participation with the American military shows signs of a maturing relationship.¹¹⁷

The location of these exercises also demonstrates a renewed trustworthiness between these nations. INDIAEX 2012, “a bilateral exercise designed to demonstrate cooperation between the U.S. submarine rescue system and Indian submarines,” took place off the coast of Mumbai where four years earlier terrorists from the Pakistan-based group Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted an amphibious-based terrorist operation which killed over 160 people.”¹¹⁸ While this exercise appears to have humanitarian benefits associated with increasing the safety of submarines, it can be assumed that India is also seeking pro-active measures in preventing seaborne terrorist attacks from occurring in Mumbai. As important as maintaining a capable counter-terrorism force is, especially in the wake of India’s security forces’ poor performance in Mumbai, anti-terror and counter-terror training must include India’s interagency and civilian law enforcement. This, in turn means that the United States must provide interagency personnel to assist U.S. PACOM with its exercise and training program. Some of India’s issues with combating terror are procedural and structural; both of which hampers the tactical acumen of their special forces. As Feigenbaum asserts, “India's effectiveness in combating these threats is weakened by the highly federalized structure of its government. Indian intelligence and law enforcement have weak traditions of cooperation; policing is largely a state, not a federal matter...”¹¹⁹ Interagency personnel from the United States government have the expertise needed to assist India with increasing the functionality and organization of various government security agencies.

Military exercises and interagency cooperation are but one aspect of military engagement; another important element of a mature military to military engagement is the existence of a robust military sales program. India's participation in America's foreign military sales program has grown tremendously in recent years. Interoperability is of a key concern for both countries as seen in the development of proposed military sales and leasing agreements, namely the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACCSMA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA), and a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). These agreements will facilitate a greater exchange of military hardware in the fields of communications, aviation, and logistical support.¹²⁰ Among the recent sales to India is the "USS Trenton, six Hercules C130J aircraft, and 24 Harpoon Block II missiles."¹²¹ Increasing the technological complexity of India's military hardware points to Washington's and New Delhi's unease over China's increasing bellicosity in the region.

Eventually, a growing Indian military with an institutionalized and formalized defense treaty with the United States can effectively block China's expansion. An escalating People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) presence throughout the Pacific, along with the PLAN's naval base operating in Pakistan, causes Indian military leaders and government officials to reexamine India's military role in the region. Admiral Suresh Mehta, Indian Chief of Naval Staff 2006-2010 has a profound understanding of the type of threat that China has on India's regional maritime interests. He asserts,

China is shaping maritime battlefield in the region. It is making friends in the right places. If you don't have the capability to operate in these waters, for a length of time, then you need friends who will support your cause, when the time comes, so definitely China is doing that, as there are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and down below Africa. So it is a known fact that we are ringed by states which may have a favorable disposition towards China.¹²²

Just as during the Cold War, China's activity, both militarily and diplomatically, within the region is impacting the terms of India's foreign policy and alliances. Essentially, when facing maritime intrusion by a rapidly expanding China, India has no choice but to align itself with the United States. Seeking a strategic partnership built upon shared interests and cooperation with the world's largest navy will protect India's maritime interests and those of other Asian powers who wish to transport goods throughout the global commons unimpeded.

As Indo-American relations grow and strengthen, so too will India's maritime abilities. Given time, America will expect India to be the main facilitator of maritime stability and prosperity throughout the Indian Ocean and play an increasing role in East Asia.¹²³ India's Military Maritime Strategy: Freedom to Use the Seas publication expresses the necessity of growing the Indian navy and its ability to serve as a bulwark in the Indian Ocean against regional rivals. As Indian Naval expert Devika Bipin Mistry explains,

The Doctrine does maintain a focus on the navies of Pakistan (and China) within the South Asian context and states that the 'primary responsibility lying on the Indian navy is to guard the steel ring created by Singapore, Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Socotra...to ensure that the Indian Ocean must remain Indian.'¹²⁴

As China continues to aggressively pursue its interests throughout Asia, India is the only Asian nation that has population and economic potential to rival China's growing maritime power. While India's naval partnership with the United States is strong and becoming even closer, it needs to expand its influence throughout all of Asia and cultivate the trust and cooperation of other Asian nations, especially those in Southeast Asia who have been feeling pressured by China's rise. By continuing a path of maritime cooperation with the United States and Asian democracies, within twenty-thirty years, Indian naval power may serve as the most formidable bulwark against an expansionist and belligerent China.¹²⁵

V: CONCLUSION.

The United States needs the world's most populous democracy and future economic power to share the burden of ensuring peace, prosperity, and stability throughout South and East Asia. In order for America's influence to remain credible, this renewed pivot to Asia must include the strategic task of constructing a firmer partnership with India. The prospects of increasing India's cooperation, despite years of mistrust during the Cold War, remain viable. Economic reforms and participation in multilateral trade organizations have broadened India's perspective on foreign policy throughout the last twenty years. New Delhi is no longer constrained by a myopic, ideological hostility to the West and its Asian allies. As Mohan contends, "as India becomes a major power, its worldview could become increasingly similar to the Anglo-American traditions on openness and rule of law in the global commons."¹²⁶ After signing the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, Prime Minister Singh informed President Bush, "We have welcomed investment and private enterprise to become leaders in the global economy. We have stood against the dangers posed by extremists... We have demonstrated that we cherish liberty, honor human dignity, and respect the rule of law."¹²⁷ While an aggressive China will hasten the alignment of Indo-American strategic goals, internal factors, such as maintaining economic growth and securing energy needs, juxtaposed with the external factors associated with establishing favorable trade agreements, exerting global influence through diplomatic and humanitarian channels, and participation in multilateral institutions, will require India to strengthen its ties with America and her fellow Asian democracies. By expanding its presence under the umbrella of shared cooperation with democratic allies, India can serve as an agent of

stability within Asia. As the United States conducts its whole of government approach in fostering India's role as a global power, America can successfully conduct its "pivot" to Asia.

¹ Peter Drysdale, "America's Pivot to Asia," *East Asia Forum*, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/26/americas-pivot-to-asia-and-asian-akrasia/>, (accessed April 18, 2013).

² "The Obama Administration's Pivot to Asia," *The Foreign Policy Initiative*, Transcript of A Conversation with Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia>, (accessed April 18, 2013).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* Kurt Campbell claims, "There has been a strong general commitment to the foundational aspects of our policy, commitment to our allies and our strategic partners, a recognition that our military is our ticket to the big game, a commitment to free, strong trade that we are an optimistic economic player in the Asian Pacific region and a recognition that you have got to deal with emerging players on the scene."

⁵ C. Raja Mohan, "China's Rise, America's Pivot, and India's Asian Ambiguity," *India Seminar*, Volume 641, January 2013. http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/641/641_c_raja_mohan.htm, (Accessed April 18, 2013).

⁶ "Special Report India," *The Economist*, (Sept 29-Oct 5 2012): 3. India currently has the world's tenth largest economy and in 10-12 years will surpass China as the world's most populous nation.

⁷ C. Raja Mohan, "China's Rise, America's Pivot, and India's Asian Ambiguity."

⁸ "Delivering on the New Silk Road." U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2012/194735.htm>, (accessed on April 18, 2013).

⁹ S. Paul Kapur, "India and the United States from World War II to the Present: A Relationship Transformed," *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, edited by Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 251.

¹⁰ Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 12, Number 3, Summer 2020, 85.

¹¹ Mastny, 87. Mastny writes, "India was one of the few countries in which America's popularity soared rather than plummeted during the Bush presidency."

¹² C. Raja Mohan, "Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons," *The Washington Quarterly*, 33:3 (July 2010): 139.

¹³ David P. Fidler, "India and Eastphalia," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Volume 17, Issue 1. (Winter 2010): 151.

¹⁴ Fidler, 151.

¹⁵ Sumit Ganguly, "The Genesis of Nonalignment," *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, edited by Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.

¹⁶ Fidler, 154.

¹⁷ David Brewster, *India as an Asia Pacific Power*, (London: Routledge, 2012), 35.

¹⁸ Amardeep Athwal, *China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 20. Athwal claims that India was the first "non-socialist country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC" and argued for their inclusion on the United Nations Security Council.

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- ¹⁹ Athwal, 21.
- ²⁰ Larry Wortzel, "Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War," *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75*, edited by Laurie burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry Wortzel, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 328-330.
- ²¹ Athwal, 22.
- ²² Athwal, 22.
- ²³ Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, "US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars," *South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Volume 25, No. 1, (January-June 2010): 23. In a report to Congress entitled the "Mutual Security Program," President Truman affirmed that "Pakistan's friendship for the West may become an important factor in giving stability to the Near East." 25.
- ²⁴ Soherwordi, 28.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*, 32.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*, 33.
- ²⁷ Mastry, 79.
- ²⁸ Mastry, 78.
- ²⁹ Mohan, "China's Rise, America's Pivot, and India's Asian Ambiguity."
- ³⁰ Ganguly, 4.
- ³¹ Mohan 140.
- ³² Fukunari Kimura and So Umezaki, *ASEAN - India Connectivity: The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Phase II*, ERIA Research Project Report 2010, No. 7, December 2011.
- ³³ Mastny, 88.
- ³⁴ *Ibid*, 87.
- ³⁵ Brewster 7-8.
- ³⁶ Brewster, 7-8.
- ³⁷ Brewster, 7.
- ³⁸ Pretap Bhanu Mehta, "How India Stumbled," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, Issue 4 (July-August 2012): 65.
- ³⁹ Evan Feigenbaum, "India's Rise, America's Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, Issue 2, (March-April 2010): 78.
- ⁴⁰ Daniel Twining, "U.S. Trade Can Help India Reform," *Wall Street Journal*, March 26, 2013.
- ⁴¹ Mehta, 64
- ⁴² "Special Report India: Aim Higher," *The Economist*, 4.
- ⁴³ Brewster, 19.
- ⁴⁴ Mussarat Jabeen and Ishtiaq Ahmed, "Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation," *South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Volume 26, Number 2 (July-December 2011): 412.
- ⁴⁵ Jabeen and Ahmedm, 414.
- ⁴⁶ Brewster,50.
- ⁴⁷ Jabeen and Ahmed, 419.
- ⁴⁸ Brewster, 51.
- ⁴⁹ C. Raja Mohan, 141. Mohan argues that in the 2008 Nuclear deal with the U.S., "Prime Minister Manmohan Sng h put his political life on the line, in an attempt to get the nuclear deal approved by parliament, exhibited the painful political transformation in India's worldview."

⁵⁰ Donna Miles, "PACOM Works to Advance U.S.-India Strategic Partnership," *American Forces Press Service*, (August 14, 2012), 3.

⁵¹ Feigenbaum, 81.

⁵² Fidler, 156. David Fidler astutely notes, "India's transformation was dependent on which superpower won the Cold War, and, ironically, it was not the superpower the Indians had preferred during the Cold War. India's remarkable economic and diplomatic renaissance largely occurred on the coattails of American power and influence."

⁵³ From a United States policy perspective India's nuclear program differs from Pakistan's. The United States made a clear distinction between both nations when choosing to develop a nuclear partnership with India, vice Pakistan. In a direct contrast to India, Pakistan has suffered the following setbacks in the past 15-20 years: a military coup, lack of economic potential as compared with India, instability caused by Islamic extremists, and closer military relations with China.

⁵⁴ Brewster, 50. Brewster maintains, "As a senior US official in New Delhi put it: 'India as a global power is in an early, formative phase. The United States' job for the next 5-10 years is to promote, assist, and shape that process.'"

⁵⁵ Fidler, 149.

⁵⁶ Peter Drysdale, "America's Pivot to Asia." Drysdale provides important insights into National Security Advisor Tom Donilon's "long term vision for Asia." He claims Donilon aspires "to see a region where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully, where the freedom to access the sea, airspace, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce, where multinational forums help promote shared interests, and where citizens increasingly have the ability to influence their governments, and universal human rights are upheld."

⁵⁷ Brewster, 15.

⁵⁸ Brewster, 45. To demonstrate how far India has yet to go in the region, Brewster cites, "Bilateral trade between China (excluding Hong Kong) and ASEAN states grew from 8 billion in 1993 to 192 billion in 2008."

⁵⁹ Sujay Mehdudia, "The More India engages with ASEAN, the More it Can Reap the Benefits," *The Hindu*, December 25, 2012.

⁶⁰ Patrick Barta, "Neighbors Grow More Wary of China," *Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 2013. Roland Dannreuther, "China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity," *International Affairs*, Volume 87, Issue 6 (November 2011), 1348. Dannreuther claims that Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's president warned that, "China cannot just come here and dig for raw materials and then go away and sell us manufactured goods."

⁶¹ Brewster, 46.

⁶² Feigenbaum, 82. According to Feigenbaum "New Delhi has signed free-trade agreements with Singapore, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has joined regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum."

⁶³ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "PM's Opening Statement at Plenary Session of India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit," December 20, 2012, <http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/20981/> (accessed April 22, 2013).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Feigenbaum 81.

⁶⁶ "Special Report India: Aim Higher," *The Economist*, 9.

⁶⁷ “The Experts: How the U.S. Oil Boom Will Change the Markets and Geopolitics,” *Wall Street Journal* editorial. March 27, 2013. WSJ’s editorial board argues that “U.S. oil and gas exports will also garner closer ties to allies and friendly countries through closer economic relations. A domestic oil and gas boom will...allow it to dominate international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank.”

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Twining, *Wall Street Journal*.

⁷¹ Sujay Mehdudia, *The Hindu*.

⁷² Drysdale. “America’s Pivot to Asia.”

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Twining, *Wall Street Journal*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Twining writes, “Indian leaders might find it easier it liberalize, for instance, if they can do so as part of joining APEC. Economically, APEC membership would deepen India’s integration with the major Asia-Pacific economies.”

⁷⁸ Brewster, 13.

⁷⁹ Derek Scissors, “What a Good Trans-Pacific Partnership Looks Like,” *Backgrounder*, The Heritage Foundation No 2772, March 8, 2013.

⁸⁰ Brewster, 19.

⁸¹ Mohan, 30.

⁸² Charles Wolf, *China and India 2025: A Comparative Assessment*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 131.

⁸³ Brewster, 27.

⁸⁴ Mohan , 145.

⁸⁵ Feigenbaum, 82. Feigenbaum, claims "India has also deepened its defense ties with Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam--four countries that are also wary of China's rise and maintain close, or have deepening ties with the United States."

⁸⁶ Mohan, 142. Mohan writes, India "...insisted that Tehran must abide by its commitments under the NPT. New Delhi came under intense criticism at home for abandoning an autonomous policy toward Iran under U.S. pressure."

⁸⁷ Brewster, 23.

⁸⁸ “All Change at ASEAN,” *The Economist*, February 9, 2013.

<http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21571461-hopes-calmer-times-under-years-new-management-all-change-asean>, (accessed April 18, 2013).

⁸⁹ “Divided We Stagger,” *The Economist*, August 18, 2012.

<http://www.economist.com/node/21560585/print>, (accessed April 18, 2013).

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Brewster, 32.

⁹² Brewster, 35.

⁹³ Feigenbaum, 82.

⁹⁴ Jayadeva Ranade, “China, the South China Sea, and Implications for India,” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Volume 7, Number 2 (April-June 2012) 173-174. Ranade further explains the implications if India fails to be an advocate for opened SLOCs by arguing, “Any sign of

weakness or backtracking on the issue will seriously undermine India's relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN nations."

⁹⁵ Mohan, 144-145.

⁹⁶ Brewster, 42. Brewster contends that "...the Chinese do not generally see any strategic equivalence between themselves and the Indians-they perceive themselves as a global power and any comparison with India as demeaning...They see India as weak, divided...lacking in comprehensive national strength."

⁹⁷ "The Obama Administration's Pivot to Asia," *The Foreign Policy Initiative*, Transcript of A Conversation with Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia>, (accessed April 18, 2013). Campbell also insists that "even countries who had problems about various aspects of our...overall approach are uniformly welcoming in terms of, 'Come visit. Visit more. Work with us.'"

⁹⁸ Brewster, 37.

⁹⁹ "Divided We Stagger," *The Economist*, August 18, 2012.

¹⁰⁰ Mohan, 143.

¹⁰¹ Mohan, 144.

¹⁰² United States Pacific Command Strategic Guidance. <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/strategic-guidance.shtml>, (accessed January 18, 2013). In the "Method" portion of the Commander's Intent, it states that in order to "promote regional security and deter aggression", PACOM must "concentrate on five Focus Areas: Allies and Partners, China, India, North Korea, and Transnational Threats."

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Miles, 2.

¹⁰⁵ Miles, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Brewster, 53. Brewster claims, "The QDR 2010 assumes that India will act as a guarantor of the existing liberal order, describing India as having a 'commitment to global stability' and being 'a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.'"

¹⁰⁷ Devika Bipin Mistry, "Power or Purpose: Modernization of the Indian Navy," A Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University, (Georgetown University April 2011), 29. Mistry cites India's Military Maritime Strategy: Freedom to Use the Seas (2007).

¹⁰⁸ Miles, 1. U.S. PACOM, together with other elements of the US government, is looking towards developing a "long-term partnership with India 'to support its ability to service as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region'"

¹⁰⁹ "US Pushes for Enhanced Military Cooperation with India," *India Today*, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/articlepriny.jsp?aid=224864> accessed on January 18, 2013, (October 15, 2012): 1.

¹¹⁰ Brewster, 53. Brewster claims, "India conducted more than 50 military exercises with the United States between 2003-2010, significantly more than with any other country."

¹¹¹ Miles, 2. Miles states, "India partners with the United States in dozens of military exercises every year as it builds an increasingly strong military."

¹¹² Feigenbaum, 81. He argues, India "has engaged in trilateral military exercises with the United States and Japan, despite Chinese protests"

¹¹³ Miles, 1.

¹¹⁴Devika Bipin Mistry, 23. Mistry maintains that the "naval cooperation between the US and India is perhaps the most successful dimension of this budding partnership. The two nations are not only collaborating in terms of bi and multinational exercises and operations, but for the first time, in the acquisition of maritime hardware and software."

¹¹⁵Miles, 2. Miles states, "Most of the exercises tend to be at the component level. The annual Exercise Malabar involves the U.S. and Indian navies...the U.S. and Indian armies train together through Yudh Abhyas exercises, frequently weaving humanitarian assistance and disaster response scenarios into the engagements."

¹¹⁶Brewster 53. Brewster notes that Exercise Malabar 2007 took place in the Bay of Bengal.

¹¹⁷Miles, 2. "The two countries' air forces train together through Cope India exercises, and the Indian Air Force participated for the first time in the U.S.-sponsored Red Flag exercise in 2008."

¹¹⁸Commander, Submarine Squadron 11 Public Affairs 1, "US, Indian Navies to Hold Submarine Rescue Exercise," <http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/030071> accessed on January 18, 2013 (Posted October 18, 2012).

¹¹⁹Feigenbaum, 81.

¹²⁰Brewster, 55.

¹²¹*Ibid.*

¹²²*Ibid*, 39.

¹²³*Ibid*, 59. Brewster maintains, "...the United States sees India as playing an important role in the 'burden sharing' of certain maritime security needs in the Indian Ocean"

¹²⁴Mistry, 30.

¹²⁵*Ibid*, 3. According to Mistry, India's Navy has an all-encompassing strategy to advance its nation's interests which include "military, diplomatic, constabulary, and benign (humanitarian) roles towards its primary maritime objective of 'ensuring[ing] national security and provid[ing] insulation from external interference so that the vital tasks of fostering economic growth and undertaking developmental activities can take place in a secure environment..."

¹²⁶Mohan, 145.

¹²⁷Ajay Ghosh, "Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh's Historic Visit to USA," NRI Today, <http://www.nritoday.net/community-news/426-cover-story-prime-minister-manmohan-singhs-historic-visit-to-usa>, (accessed April 22, 2013.)

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