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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**TITLE: MANPOWER MANAGEMENT: NO TIERED READINESS – ENABLING THE  
NATION'S FORCE IN READINESS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR: MAJOR MARK D. MCCARROLL**

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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** MANPOWER MANAGEMENT – NO TIERED READINESS; ENABLING THE NATION’S FORCE IN READINESS

**Author:** Major Mark D. McCarroll, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** Through detailed review of the human resource development process for process improvement, specifically systems and policy modifications, the Marine Corps can ensure sustainment of its manpower resources for decisively engaged leadership and combat capabilities in warfighting units.

### **Discussion:**

The author succinctly lays the foundation of the current Marine Corps Human Resource Development Process (HRDP) to establish a baseline. Once the author lays the solid footings, an examination commences. The next area the author considers is a deep dive into the understanding of the Manpower Management Division and its current processes. The manpower management arm of the HRDP is the main effort in the process delivering the coordinated human resource to its end state in an operational unit.

Once the reader immerses in manpower, the author takes the reader through a holistic review of the HRDP. The author discusses areas of concern in policy and systems. A deeper understanding of readiness and reporting systems gives the reader the option to make an assessment.

The author provides several immediate policy changing and reinforcing actions to current policy. The study provides no tiered readiness data and three courses of action for readiness reporting, accountability, and execution at the study’s climax. The courses of action provide options for using no tiered readiness data in three different management contexts. The construct ranges from broad management to hyper-granular. The author discusses advantages and disadvantages to each course of action.

### **Conclusion:**

The author concludes with making immediate changes to the HRDP where practicable. In the conclusion, the author states that management of tiered readiness data should be rolled out slowly. Detailed readiness evaluation methodologies can create unit churn and potentially impact cohesion to achieve a false state of readiness. These methods are the end product of the study.

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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## *Illustrations*

	Page
Figure 1. MMEA Implementation/Stabilization Deployment Staffing Method.....	38
Figure 2. Deploying Units Notification and Actions Update Message .....	39
Figure 3. Deployed Unit Staffing.....	46
Figure 4. Deployability Factors .....	48
Figure 5. CMC Staffing Dashboard.....	49
Figure 6. Operations Analysis of the Manpower Equation.....	51
Figure 7. Current Enlisted Entry-Level Production Process Overview .....	52

*Tables*

	Page
Table 1. Enlisted Force Contract Review (Oct 12).....	53
Table 2. Enlisted Force Number of Marines per Months Remaining on Contract (Oct 12).....	54
Table 3. Enlisted Force Percent of Marines per Months remaining on contract (Oct 12).....	55
Table 4. Regional Readiness COA .....	56
Table 5. MSC Readiness COA .....	57
Table 6. MCC Readiness COA.....	58

## *Preface*

I received orders to Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC) in 2009. My first stop was to the Promotions Branch where I soon found out that the Marine I received orders to replace extended to stay in the unit. My next stop was to Manpower Management Division for reassignment. The Enlisted Assignments Branch needed a Major to fill a key position in the management section of the Readiness and Analysis Unit. A Marine Colonel last held the position and he left a few months earlier, leaving the position vacant. I arrived at the unit in my Service Alpha uniform to be greeted by two older gentlemen that ran the Distribution and Policy Section. The entry requirements were the ability to write and someone with a bit more savvy than the average major. Mr. Spooner, the branch's deputy decided that I fit the needs after a short meet and greet and my manpower journey began.

After four months of constant learning through osmosis, a brief branch school, and a flurry of meetings with my immediate supervisor, Mr. L.A. Wright, I began to grasp manpower. It was about this point that I approached my second line supervisor (reviewing officer), Mr. Hector Duenez, with a salient point. I said, "Sir, I think that I can do a lot more around here now that I know manpower." That conversation set conditions for the rest of my tour at manpower.

It did not take long for the pace of operations and complicated manpower actions to pour in at an ever increasing rate. My level of education under Mr. Wright and Mr. Duenez achieved journeyman level and beyond over the next 32 months. Two career adjutants (both Lieutenant Colonels) in officer assignments jokingly stated they were going to run a secondary military occupational specialty of adjutant on my record based on what I learned in manpower and personnel management. I politely stated that I was happy to remain an artilleryman with some additional skills that I would keep to myself. The drive to learn inspired me to finish my Masters in Management and Leadership. My interest in manpower continues, and I will seek opportunities to return to the department.

In the fall of 2011, a wicked problem was tackled, and the result was our department authored unit cohesion policies for the Marine Corps. The next problem and the inspiration for this study is tiered readiness. In the pending drawdown, management of the force must have an eye to maintaining the readiness that makes the Marine Corps a relevant force for our nation. Being ready ensures our crisis response capabilities and is the *raison d'être* of the Marine Corps' expeditionary forces in readiness.

In undertaking this study, the first step was to gain a basic understanding of the current human resource development process. Finding manpower topics in academia is difficult outside of the many statistics-based Naval Postgraduate School theses. A review of doctrinal publications and concept documents at HQMC enabled research. It was the work of one of my former colleagues, Mr. Robert Barry that sparked a fundamental understanding of management concepts. Mr. Barry, the lead analyst for the Enlisted Assignments Branch at HQMC developed a number of home grown products that enable the day-to-day management of the force, its deployability, and assignment metrics to meet the deployment cycle and unit cohesion. His current work is in tackling tiered readiness, among the myriad of wicked problems that come in by the hour at HQMC. With Mr. Barry's metric assessment, the study culminates with three courses of action for a management practice using his tiered readiness metrics.

The help of Mr. Barry, Mr. Duenez, and Mr. Wright in this study were indispensable. These three gentlemen are my mentors in manpower, business practices, staff action, interpersonal

relationships in a business setting and life skills in general. I owe them a debt of gratitude that a note in a preface of master's paper can only scratch the surface. The faculty and staff of the Marine Corps University gave me an invaluable and challenging education continuum that made me grow as a leader. My conference group fostered an excellent learning environment and our own unit cohesion made this year of study a rewarding experience. My wife Sarah played an essential role in keeping me on track throughout the year and making sure to strike the balance between my education and our family. She is a beacon of light that keeps me from grounding the ship and staying the course through rough shoal waters.

## *List of Abbreviations*

AMOS – Additional Military Occupational Specialty  
ASR – Authorized Strength Report  
BIC – Billet Identification Code  
BMOS – Billeted Military Occupational Specialty  
CDD – Course Descriptive Data  
CD&I – Combat Development and Integration  
CMC – Commandant of the Marine Corps  
CNA – Center for Naval Analyses  
COA – Course of Action  
COCOM – Combatant Command  
COP – Common Operational Picture  
DC – Deputy Commandant  
DEP – Delayed Entry Program  
DEPOD – Deployment Order  
DoD – Department of Defense  
EDIPI – Electronic data interchange personal identifier  
EMOS – Exception Military Occupational Specialty  
ESGM – Enlisted Staffing Goal Model  
FMOS – Free Military Occupational Specialty  
FORCE SYNCH – Force Synchronization (Conference)  
GAR – Grade Adjusted Recapitulation  
GCC – Geographic Combatant Commander  
HQMC – Headquarters, United States Marine Corps  
HRDP – Human Resource Development Process  
IMOS – Intended Military Occupational Specialty  
LTM – Long Term Metric  
M&RA – Manpower and Reserve Affairs  
MAGTF – Marine Air Ground Task Force  
MARADMIN – Marine Administrative Instruction  
MARFOR – Marine Force  
MCTFS – Marine Corps Total Force System  
MCRC – Marine Corps Recruiting Command  
MEF – Marine Expeditionary Force  
MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit  
MM – Manpower Management Division  
MP – Manpower Plans Division  
MSR – Modified or Manpower Staffing Requirement  
NAR – Numerically Adjusted Recapitulation  
NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer  
NMOS – Necessary Military Occupational Specialty  
NPS – Naval Postgraduate School  
OB – On Board  
ODSE – Operational database storage enterprise

OPFOR – Operating Forces  
OSGM – Officer Staffing Goal Model  
PCA – Permanent Change of Assignment  
PCS – Permanent Change of Station  
PCT – Percent  
PEF – Program Enlisted For  
PEN – Program Element Number  
PMOS – Primary Military Occupational Specialty  
POA&M – Plan of Attack (Action) and Milestones  
POI – Period of Instruction  
PROSHARE – Proportionate Share  
PTCD – Projected Training Completion Date  
RDM – Recruit Distribution Model  
S/G – Staffing Goal  
SNCO – Staff Non-Commissioned Officer  
SSN – Social Security Number  
STM – Short Term Metric  
T&R – Training and Readiness  
TAD – Temporary Additional Duty  
TECOM – Training and Education Command  
TFMMR – Total Force Manpower Models Reengineering  
TFSD – Total Force Structure Division  
TFSMS – Total Force Structure Management System  
TIP – Training Input Plan  
T/O – Table of Organization  
VTC – Video Teleconferencing

*Table of Contents*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... ii

DISCLAIMER ..... iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ..... iv

LIST OF TABLES ..... v

PREFACE ..... vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... viii

INTRODUCTION ..... 1

PART I THE HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ..... 3

    Manning ..... 3

    Recruiting ..... 7

    Classification ..... 9

    Training ..... 10

    Assignment ..... 12

PART II MANPOWER MANAGEMENT ..... 16

    Framework for Assessment ..... 16

    Assessment ..... 17

    Readiness ..... 19

    Reporting ..... 20

PART III MANPOWER CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT ..... 23

    Holistic Review ..... 23

    Recommendations ..... 29

CONCLUSIONS ..... 35

GLOSSARY ..... 36

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 59

END NOTES ..... 62

## *Introduction*

The guidance for manpower management is as good as any as a place to start in the adventure of learning the manpower process. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines manpower management as “The means of manpower control to ensure the most efficient and economical use of available manpower.”<sup>1</sup> DoD guidance for manpower management directive states its discourse plainly, “Manpower is a resource. Changes in manpower shall be preceded by changes to the programs, missions, and functions that require manpower resources.”<sup>2</sup> This study examines the human resource development process (HRDP) program to tackle manpower readiness and the effective use of manpower resources. Examination of missions and functions are an essential part of the manpower resources review; however, both of these elements remain fixed in the short term as governed by United States Code, Title X. Under this mandate, the Marine Corps is “organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet Marine forces.”<sup>3</sup> This study focuses on those elements needed to frame the discussion. The HRDP is a multifaceted program governed by the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) who serves as head of the HRDP, and the Deputy Commandant (DC) for Combat Development and Integration (CD&I). Support to DC, CD&I come from Training and Education Command (TECOM) and Total Force Structure Division (TFSD). Support to DC, M&RA comes from Manpower Plans Division (MP) and Manpower Management Division (MM). Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) also holds a pillar in the HRDP. Further, each deputy commandant maintains a stake in the process as they manage manpower resources. Working across the Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC) staff is essential for the HRDP to function effectively. In each of these divisions houses a policy or a system that affects the functioning of the HRDP. While some policies and systems are interdependent, others stand

alone. This difference exposes a potential flaw that contributes to friction points in the systemic functioning of the HRDP. Through detailed review of the human resource development process for process improvement, specifically systems and policy modifications, the Marine Corps can ensure sustainment of its manpower resources for decisively engaged leadership and combat capabilities in warfighting units.

Part I of the study is a long description of the HRDP as it operates today. The study is a wave top review; however, it does not make it any less detailed and technical. Part I provides the reader situational awareness of the system prior to reviewing potential changes. Part II examines in greater detail the operational arm of the HRDP, the manpower management process. Part III offers the reader a holistic review and offer change to positively impact readiness.

Recommendations are offered to offer a method to meet the end state of no tiered readiness. This end state potentially comes at a cost to unit cohesion. While there is a negative unit cohesion cost in the micro level, the method delivers a capable warfighting force with an experience mix founded in the science of contract length. This is the best method available to employ myriad deployments the Marine Corps will be called on to execute.

## *Part I The Human Resource Development Process*

This section details the principal subdivisions of the HRDP and their role in the overall process. A fundamental understanding of where the process is today will shape how the recommendations can support continuous process improvement. The sections that follow purport only to speak to wave top understanding rather than a deep dive of comprehensive understanding that detracts from the purpose and method of this study. In the author's three years, in one of the five functional sub-elements of the HRDP, it suffices to say detailing manpower in deep dive depth is outside the scope of this study. Nonetheless, for decision makers, the author shapes and frames essential information for subject matter experts. The framing accounts for and allows dialogue to be opened for process improvement. Stating facts and identifying surfaces and gaps are elemental to both the Marine Corps Planning Process and this study, and assist in the overall problem framing.

### **Manning**

Before manning can be discussed, fundamental definitions need to be established. In doing so the steps of the HRDP will be slightly out of order; however, building the foundation sequentially will make the understanding too complicated. The method employed will allow the reader to understand the process from an educated layman perspective.

The first definition to consider is programmed force structure. DoD Instruction 7730.64, Automated Extracts of Manpower and Unit Organizational Element Files, defines programmed force structure as “the set of units and organizations that exists in the current year and that are planned and programmed for a given fiscal year.”<sup>4</sup> For this study, the author uses structure to simplify the elongated term “programmed force structure” for ease of discussion.

The next definition is manpower requirement. Joint Publication 1-02 defines requirement as “Human resources needed to accomplish specified work loads of organizations.”<sup>5</sup> DoD Instruction 7730.64 defines requirement (manpower) as “the aggregation of military and civilian, funded and unfunded, positions representing the total manpower requirement for units and organizations in the programmed force structure. Manpower requirements are expressed in terms of 1 year of full-time workload and are determined independent of resource constraints and based on sound manpower management determinations.”<sup>6</sup> A requirement in the context of this paper is an operational need for manpower created through a troop to task analysis. Manpower managers often refer to requirements as spaces, as in a space or seat/chair at the table. Once validated, a requirement appears on a Marine Corps table of organization (T/O) and analysts at TFSD input the requirement into the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS). DC, CD&I (TFSD) owns and manages TFSMS. TFSD takes inputs and updates T/Os, also known as a structure, to support the HRDP.

The next elementary definition is a billet or position, known in the Marine Corps as a billet identification code (BIC). DoD Instruction 7730.64 defines billet or position as a “programmed manpower structure space typically defined by grade and occupation and associated with a specific unit or organization. A billet or position may be funded (authorized) or unfunded (generally called an unfunded requirement).”<sup>7</sup> As the definition alludes, it is synonymous with structure space as the two terms can be used interchangeably.

One of the most critical definitions, and the one used with extraordinary liberalism in military vernacular is unit. Definition one from JP-102 defines unit as “any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority.”<sup>8</sup> The broadest definition available does not offer clarity in manpower. For this reason, the author will offer the definition of unit in two contexts.

The first context is in manning, and the second will appear later in staffing. In manning, the manpower definition of unit is the lowest recognized organization in the TFSMS process, or the unit identification code (UIC) comprising BICs.

With those definitions in place, manning can be discussed. DoD defines manning (or programmed manning to be specific) as “those billets in the programmed manpower structure that are planned to be staffed with trained personnel at the end of the fiscal year.”<sup>9</sup> Manning is almost always interchanged incorrectly with the term staffing. Understanding the definition of manning will prevent the common misuse.

Each deputy commandant manages requirements or billets, in force structure, through advocacy. Advocacy gives determined deputy commandants a role in managing the requirements of the Marine Corps on T/Os. To assist the deputy commandants in this task, each occupational field retains an occupational field sponsor. The occupational field sponsor is the expert in the field and possesses the depth and breadth of experience to represent the occupational field for the advocate. To assist the occupational field sponsor, structure provides for a specialist from each of the primary military specialties (PMOS) comprising the occupational field. The PMOS Specialist provides for an interface for details to the PMOS level.

TFSMS is the repository for all requirements on corresponding Marine Corps T/Os; a living database constantly receiving updates as deputy commandants’ advocates and associated military occupational specialty sponsors and specialists update requirements. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) prioritizes all requirements and organizational T/Os in the governing Marine Corps order called the Manning and Staffing Precedence Order. This order establishes T/O priority. There are currently four manning precedence levels: excepted, operating forces (OPFOR), priority, and proportionate share (PROSHARE). Excepted commands receive 100%

manning for both officers and enlisted Marines. OPFOR commands receive manning at 95% of officers and 97% enlisted Marines. Priority commands receive 95% manning for both officer and enlisted Marines. PROSHARE commands receive manning at 92% of officers and 94% enlisted Marines. Precedent level indicates the priority of requirements as they are “bought” in the authorized strength report (ASR). The purchase of the requirements is based on the UIC. In manning, the lowest institutionally recognized unit is the UIC.

Prior to the execution of the ASR, the operations analysts of the DC, M&RA (MP) Integration and Analysis Section (MPP-50) determine manning controls. The manning controls account for variables governed by end strength. End strength is the constraint of Marines authorized (paid for) in the given fiscal year. DoD defines end strength more specifically: “the total number of military personnel authorized to be on duty as of 30 September of each year, as approved by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for that fiscal year.”<sup>10</sup> DC, M&RA (MP) forecasts and manages end strength daily. Further, manning controls account for the DoD authorized patients, prisoners, transients, and trainees (P2T2). P2T2 is a formula driven numeration of the categories therein contained. The ASR runs biannually in February and August. The ASR processes variables that take in to account the manning controls provided by DC, M&RA (MP) completed during the manning level process (MLP). The ASR takes all Marine Corps requirements and runs a model against each organization’s manning precedence level and determines what percentage of the T/O receives authorized strength. The ASR is the primary document for staffing of units in the staffing process discussed in that subsequent section.

Once the ASR publishes to DC, M&RA (MP), the grade adjusted recapitulation (GAR) manager executes the GAR. This process is a separate model that accounts for requirements that

do not tie to a PMOS, or “Free” requirements. Free requirements man according to their proportionate share by grade across all PMOSs in a sharing algorithm. This process allows for grade shaping to allow for career progression and promotion opportunity. Grade shaping is part of the grade structure review. In this process, structure forms like a pyramid with the senior management of the PMOS at the top and the workers at the bottom. An ideal grade structure would look like a pyramid, but not all PMOSs conform to this ideal. A pyramid represents leaders to led ratio and account for career continuation factors. Continuation factors comprise the multiple exit points along a career path, competitiveness in an up or out concept, and promotion opportunity to reach the top of the pyramid. While not all PMOSs are capable of resembling a pyramid, it is the suggested goal to provide for upward mobility and prevent stagnation at any given rank along a career path.

The GAR is the origin of all work outputs from where the HRDP conducts its business methodologies. These outputs include all “master” plans for the fiscal year that govern accession plans, retention of first and subsequent term Marines, and end strength management. The manpower planners develop and complete master plans, and the HRDP continues.

### **Recruiting**

Manpower plans generates the guiding document for recruiting. In October DC, M&RA (MP) provides the accession plan for MCRC to base its recruiting. MCRC refers to the accession plan as Memo-01. If Memo-01 requires revision, then subsequent memos follow numerically. Subsequent memos occur if the end strength significantly changes from one fiscal year to another, as in a drawdown announced requiring an in-stride change to the recruiting mission. During the year, MCRC uses the forecasted next fiscal year accession plan. According to a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study in 2005: “by October (*the start of the new fiscal year*

*for DoD*), MCRC typically has already recruited about 65 percent of the enlisted recruits who will enter during the current fiscal year, working from the prior year's plan and from conversations between MCRC and MP."<sup>11</sup> High school graduation in June accounts for the significant summer surge of applicants available in the delayed entry program (DEP).

MCRC parcels the execution of the recruiting mission to its two regions. Each region comprises three districts. The districts break down into stations. At the lowest tactical level of MCRC, each recruiting station divides into sub stations. At each echelon are a mixture of PMOS 8412 Career Recruiters, FMOS 8411 Canvassing Recruiters, Officer Selection Officers, and a cast of supporting personnel. The largest element of this workforce is the Canvassing Recruiter. The Canvassing Recruiter is the second or third term Marine selected to leave a PMOS for a three year tour as a recruiter. There are over 3,500 canvassing recruiters charged with recruiting the annual enlisted shipping goal of over 28,000.

The recruiters canvass their local population for applicants possessing the minimum requirements for service in the military. The recruiters from each service compete with each other for this pool of scarce resources. A Pennsylvania State University study in 2003 discussed the enlisted side of the equation. The study stated the targeted population qualified to enter the military numbered 800,000. Of this number, the armed services must enlist 1/4 of these qualified prospects.<sup>12</sup> Given that the high qualified targeted population is likely already amidst choices for gainful employment, the recruiter's job is a difficult prospect.

The recruiter assists the trainer in narrowing the PMOS options available to the recruit. This procedure filters the recruit into a Program Enlisted For (PEF) category. The PEF code allows the RDM to function in accordance with the needs of the Marine Corps as well as the individual's preferences.

## Classification

Classification is the process where the basic officer or recruit receives initial PMOS designation. Classification is a process managed currently in two separate and distinct assignment branches. DC, M&RA (MM) consults or receives input from the training establishments when necessary. The officer classification completes an assessment of the needs of the Marine Corps using the officer GAR coupled with a quality spread determined at The Basic School. The enlisted classification is primarily model driven but also receives input from training centers to best match Marines to the needs of the Marine Corps.

In the pure sense, the Recruit Distribution Model (RDM) completes enlisted classification. This model takes into account the accession mission plan and runs an algorithm that takes the requirements of each PMOS and matches those requirements with the PEF Code. This PEF Code either specifies a family of occupational fields, an occupational field, or can be as specific as a specified PMOS. Further, the RDM establishes the availability of a training course for the recruit to attend. The available training courses are an input to the RDM from the training input plan (TIP) governed by DC, CD&I (TECOM). The RDM essentially establishes an itinerary of where the recruit goes to once earning the title Marine. If the reader can imagine a boarding pass from one step in the process to another with the RDM as the travel agent coordinating the process from HQMC.

To give this process some life, the following example from Hollywood reveals the first result of the classification process. The reader should recall a scene from the 1987 Stanley Kubrick classic, *Full Metal Jacket*. Gunnery Sergeant Hartman is calling off the names of the newly minted Marines and giving PMOS designations. In the case of the infantry, Marines receive “0300, Infantry,” and in the case of the specified skill “4212, Basic Military Journalism.”<sup>13</sup> Here,

the pop culture illuminates the heart of the enlisted classification process following the completion of the RDM. The infantry receives basic PMOSs. The training establishment will need to refine the process from the broad occupational field infantry to the subset of PMOSs for rifleman, mortar man, machine gunner, etc. In the case of basic military journalism, the RDM establishes the final PMOS the Marine will earn through the training process.

In each case, the Marine will receive an Intended MOS (IMOS) until completion of school. In the case where there is a multi-track, as in the case with the infantry, the IMOS will be reported on the Marine at the training establishment during the training process. Multi-track schools are a sequence of schools that lead to a PMOS. Single track schools are a single school that leads to a PMOS. Both single track and multi-track schools issue a projected training completion date (PTCD) to identify to assignment monitors the *assessed* date at which training is anticipated to be complete. This date indicates when the Marine is anticipated to be available for assignment to the operation forces.<sup>14</sup>

### **Training**

Training plays roles in both the inception of PMOSs and reporting of IMOSs and PMOSs. Reporting provides visibility of Marines throughout the HRDP. At the front end of the HRDP DC, CD&I (TECOM) is the manager for the MOS Manual. The MOS Manual delineates all requirements for all categories of MOSs. Updated annually, the MOS Manual serves as the definitive resource that assists the RDM in developing its rule sets for MOS classification. The MOS Manual specifies all requirements for each MOS listed. The advocates update MOS requirements on an as needed basis or at least annually as part of the manual's review. The MOS Manual also serves as a guiding document for the categorization of MOSs in the GAR.

The first category is the PMOS, which is “used to identify the primary skills and knowledge of the Marine.”<sup>15</sup> The PMOS is the determinant for all assignments, with exceptions in the Enlisted force authorized for linguists and musicians. This prevents the assignment manager from assigning an Arabic linguist to a Spanish linguist billet or a violinist to the drum and bugle corps. Officer assignments also have exceptions for specified skill sets. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planners are examples of exceptions where an assignment ties to a skill for a required “payback” tour. Additionally, officer assignments make determinations for the needs of the Corps when specific skills will further the warfighting capability of the gaining unit.

The next category of MOSs is the additional MOS (AMOS). The MOS Manual differs from this author in the nature of an AMOS. The MOS Manual limits an AMOS to “any existing PMOS awarded to a Marine who already holds a PMOS.”<sup>16</sup> This limitation to only additional PMOSs on a Marines record limits its use. For this reason, the author will introduce a definition for consideration. An AMOS is the entry on a Marine’s record of an additional PMOS or a skill designating MOS other than the Marine’s PMOS. In addition to an additional PMOS, AMOSs comprise three other MOS types and listed in the billeted MOS (BMOS) column of a requirement. A BMOS is the duty performed by the billet on a T/O. It may be the PMOS or any AMOS. The other three types of AMOSs are the free MOS (FMOS), exception MOS (EMOS), and necessary MOS (NMOS). The FMOS is the most relaxed rule. It allows for any Marine, distinction for an officer or enlisted, to fill the BMOS. The MOS Manual defines FMOS as “non-PMOS that can be filled by any Marine regardless of primary MOS.”<sup>17</sup> An EMOS is “non-PMOS that is generally FMOS, but include exceptions that require a PMOS.”<sup>18</sup> The NMOS is

the most stringent. The MOS Manual defines it as “a non-PMOS that has a prerequisite of one or more PMOSs.”<sup>19</sup>

Training takes each category of MOS and through the advocates establishes training and readiness (T&R) standards. The T&R standards generate periods of instruction (POI) to develop course descriptive data (CDD) for the development and building of training courses. The courses build formal schools. The formal schools report IMOSs and PMOSs upon the successful completion of the MOS producing training schools. When a Marine is undergoing training, the Marine holds a program element number (PEN) corresponding to a trainee. The system tracks and accounts for the Marine trainees throughout the training continua.

The management of the cradle to grave MOS process is significantly complex. “Over the last 20 years, CNA has executed numerous studies on a wide range of training related issues.”<sup>20</sup> A study completed in 2007-2008 assessed “time to train.” This study repeats with different variables assessed while the author served at manpower from 2009-2012. CNA’s assistance as an external practitioner adds value to the economics of manpower in its continued studies.

### **Assignment**

Assignments commence when a Marine completes the training process and the training establishment awards a PMOS. Assignment is also known as staffing. The term staffing is picked up from the term staffing goal, or the amount of personnel the unit is provided relative to the unit staffing precedence. Staffing models greatly enhance the baseline of completing assignments. There are, however, several human intervention points to allow for Marines with specific skills be placed or assigned into areas that they will enhance unit performance. Ideally, a Marine does not receive orders to the OPFOR until the training process completes. There are a number of instances where this ideal is violated for so called on-the-job training (OJT). A Marine awaiting a

lateral move from one PMOS to another or an officer is waiting for a formal school seat to be made available may be assigned OJT. When a Marine is in an OJT status, the Marine cannot be deployed. The assignment allows familiarization prior to school training.

The ASR drives assignments. Once DC, M&RA (MP) completes the GAR, DC, M&RA (MM) modifies the staffing requirements and develops the modified or manpower staffing requirement (MSR). When DC, M&RA (MM) modifies the TFSD ASR it is no longer able to be referred to as the ASR. The MSR takes into account the work completed by the GAR and assesses all B-Billets, or billets that comprise of FMOSs and EMOSs where a PMOS is not specified. In doing so, a PMOS attributes to a specified portion of billets as part of the B-Billet Plan. At this point, the model manager inputs the MSR into the Officer and Enlisted Staffing Goal Models (OSGM, ESGM). Each staffing goal model possesses rule sets for allocating the inventory of Marines in the active component against institutional requirements in the MSR. The solution generated is an optimized sharing solution accounting for staffing precedent and on hand assignable inventory across the Marine Corps.

The output of the staffing goal model reflects the dictionaries, or rule sets, inputted on the front end of a model run. The staffing goal model managers run the models. Each model manager reports to a section head who manages the staffing of each segment of the population. Section heads conduct assessments to ensure adequate staffing of all units across the Marine Corps. In the event a small organization with a lower staffing precedence requires staffing and did not receive a staffing goal (S/G), the section head directs a manipulation on the front end as part of generating the MSR.

An example of this manipulation technique is at the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS). The MCAS staff is low on the staffing precedence as a PROSHARE command. This PROSHARE

command houses the air traffic controllers. Air traffic controllers are in an MOS referred to as high demand/low density (HD/LD), or a term CNA floated in 2011 expanding HD/LD to high demand, heavily deployed and chronically short MOSs. HD/LD MOSs occur when the institution did not build the inventory through the combination of accession and retention at the same rate Marines departed service. This shortage is partially why CNA added the moniker of “chronically short” in the study. As a HD/LD MOS at a PROSHARE Command, a MCAS may not draw staffing for an air traffic controller. The Marine Corps prides itself that Marines can do everything. All the same, the author believes that the Marine Corps needs to ensure that each MCAS should have an air traffic controller Marine in the tower to ensure aircraft can safely land.

Once management reviews and concurs with the optimized solution, the models use the MSR for a "run." The basic output is a S/G. The S/G is the optimized solution of Marine Corps manpower matched against the MSR. Each organization filtered into monitored command codes (MCC), comprised of UICs receives its staffing. In manning, the author offered the first part of the definition of unit. Assignment monitors use the term unit differently. Units are MCCs, not UICs. In staffing, the lowest institutionally recognized unit is the MCC. This disparity correlates to an unintended language barrier between manning and staffing. The external billet report provides a one-stop shop for the G-1 section (personnel and administration) of each major subordinate command (MSC) with the information by MCC, by PMOS, by Grade, by S/G, and on hand (O/H). In the assignment system, the PMOS assignment monitor sees the S/G and the O/H and works to staff to the S/G level for each MCC. Once the O/H targets match the S/G targets, the work of the assignment monitor is complete. Manpower authorizes the six months between S/G model runs to complete assignment actions. In specific cases, staffing executes in more Draconian means. Examples are when a unit is first established, is shutting down, is

deploying overseas, is transitioning as in the conversion of air frames (i.e. CH-46 to MV-22 or F/A-18 to Joint Strike Fighter), or is adding or decreasing authorized strength from an existing unit due to a table of organization and equipment change request (TOECR).

## ***Part II Manpower Management***

One area of the HRDP that requires more detailed assessment as it relates to readiness is the manpower management process. This process is at the end of the pipe of the human resource supply chain. Assignment managers make decisions that directly impact readiness. An examination of these current processes enables the formulation of areas of the HRDP requiring a review to achieve no tiered readiness.

### **Framework for Assessment**

Manpower Management holds a number of critical models. The institutional models previously discussed: RDM, OSGM, and RDM are all programs of record. These models drive the HRDP for those institutional requirements that are resident on recognized T/Os. Herein lays a problem that occurs with nearly every unit preparing to enter in the manpower unit cohesion staffing cycle (Figure 1). The Marine Corps is fighting different today. The models support staffing for institutionally recognized units rather than those manning document based units. Commanders make manning documents based on the conditions on the ground. Manning documents can be updated through various means: the pre-deployment site survey or changes in authorized force footprint in the case of Afghanistan, or ship mix or change in mission in the case of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), or the need for a different makeup of a unit as may become the case in the soon to deploy Australian MAGTF in the pivot to the Pacific.

The Force Synchronization (FORCE SYNCH) Conference governs the changes the manning documents. FORCE SYNCH completes the comprehensive assessment of capability and capacity of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to assume the change in tasking. The Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) vets the changes, authorized by the supporting Marine Force (MARFOR) component commander, and then MARFOR Command

(MARFORCOM) releases the tasking to DC, PP&O in the form of a classified “playbook.” DC, PP&O, on behalf of CMC, directs deployment of the forces in classified naval message traffic, commonly known as a deployment order (DEPORD). This process synchronizes through FORCE SYNCH prior to release of the message. Once the DEPORD releases, units enter into the deployment cycle. In current practice, the release of the DEPORD cues manpower management division to run a continuous assessment.

### Assessment

Once the DEPORD identifies units, DC, M&RA (MM) issues the “Deploying Units Notification and Actions Update” Message (Figure 2). The message is commonly referred to as the “Implementation message” by those G-1s and staffs who have required actions as part of the Plan of Attack and Milestones (POA&M) established therein. The message updates monthly to track any changes to deploying units or assess any manning document changes. The process regained emphasis on July 7, 2011 when CMC approved the Unit Cohesion program, and a MARADMIN formally discussed the process for the first time on October 4, 2011 (Figure 3).

Once the MARADMIN released in October, DC, M&RA (MMOA) officially became part of the process. The tracking and management of personnel between DC, M&RA (MMOA and MMEA) is the difference between art and science respectively. DC, M&RA (MMOA) manages a much smaller population and tracks personnel without respect to an end of active service (EAS). A reduction in the percentage of the first term officers may lead to a change in business practice; however, this remains to be seen. If DC, M&RA (MMOA) staffed an officer to the deploying unit personnel requirement, it meets mission. DC, M&RA (MMEA) conducts a multi-variable assessment to review staffing requirements. The assessment determines mission accomplishment.

DC, M&RA (MMEA)'s assessment screens each Marine staffed to the unit, according to the Operational Database Storage Enterprise (ODSE) data file. The ODSE is the repository of all Marines to social security number (SSN), and soon to be electronic data interchange personal identifier (EDIPI), visibility. Every code resident in the Marine Corps Total Forces System (MCTFS) is available in real time with the ODSE data. The pertinent details of the assessment lay the ability of the Marine to deploy, known as the Marine's "deployability." Common usage may also include the synonymous term "deployable." Mr. Robert Barry, lead analyst in HQMC (DC, M&RA (MMEA)), developed an analytical representation of deployability (Figure 4) with records screening, conducted by assessing MCTFS code reporting. It is helpful to take the analytical product and provide definition to it. Therefore, the author offers a definition of deployability. Deployability is the sum of factors that assess the Marine's medical, legal, contract limitation, physical limitation, future orders limitation, force control, or other factor that precludes the screened Marine from making a specified deployment. Further, the specified deployment is known for the Marine's present or future unit if under orders reported in manpower systems. Finally, the Marine must be available within acceptable parameters to provide for unit training, deployment, and a transition from service at EAS should the Marine not continue service. To the author's knowledge, this definition is neither available in current joint nor service manuals for referent and offers consideration for purposes of this study.

The assessment also filters the unit by PMOS and grade or grade grouping. This allows for the visibility of each echelon of leadership within the unit. HQMC can rapidly discern where gaps are, and what risks HQMC exposes the supported commander to by shortages in inventory preventing timely arrival of Marines. This unprecedented level of granularity gives a readiness lens that essentially is a living T/O.

## Readiness

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and DoD Joint dictionary state the definition of readiness:

**Readiness** – The ability of United States military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels. a. **unit readiness** — The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. b. **joint readiness** — The combatant commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.<sup>21</sup>

Readiness in manpower relates to deployability. This link is applicable to both unit and joint readiness. If manpower assessed every unit available against an arbitrary deployment date, the statistics would indicate that a force in readiness is the sum of its parts. Readiness is not its individual units, but its holistic capability to deploy a ready force. This is a manpower way of saying that a unit can be ready, and be deployed; however, it may need to execute a Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA) or at a minimum execute Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) authority if managed at the unit level, to provide for the differential in deployability to make the unit a fighting force. When there is a planned variation of readiness across similar like-type units, tiered readiness exists.

Senator McCain was a proponent of tiered readiness in 1996. He described tiered readiness in a three tier concept. In a policy analysis review, in 1999, James L. George succinctly summarized the Senator’s tiers:

- Tier I—Forward-deployed and crisis response forces: Forward-deployed forces, such as the Navy and Marines, and quick response forces, such the 82nd Airborne division flown in by round-trip capable aircraft, would be deployed in a matter of days.
- Tier II—Force buildup: This buildup would include initial divisions of the Army’s contingency corps—up to two divisions—and follow-on naval and air forces and reserve components. Tier II forces would be deployed in a matter of weeks.
- Tier III—Conflict resolution: These forces, including the remainder of Army units

and more reserves, are needed infrequently. They would be deployed after several months and would thus have time to fully prepare.<sup>22</sup>

The argument would favor the Marine Corps in readiness as a Tier I unit. The tiers may be a dated concept, but certainly as decision makers review defense force structure in the waning year of major combat operations in Afghanistan these arguments may resurface. If the Marine Corps is to be prioritized as a force in readiness, its manpower policies cannot allow for tiered readiness within the force itself.

Tiered readiness impacts the way the force fights. Unit cohesion, a process embraced by CMC and implemented across the Marine Corps is contingent on stability of units. If a unit requires greater than a nominal staffing build prior to executing a mission, then decisive and engaged leadership diminishes, and effectively trained and cohesive units are less prepared to deploy. These elements are the fundamental basis to reduce or eradicate tiered readiness as a practice for operating forces in the Marine Corps. Marine Corps forces must be ready continuously to meet the National Military Strategy.

According to the CJCS Readiness System, all units measure for readiness. This includes “Provisional, task-organized and “ad hoc” combat, combat support, and combat service support units of each Service and Combatant Command (COCOM) are also measured units.”<sup>23</sup> As ad hoc units are part of a readiness assessment, but are not institutionally recognized, these units need to be accounted for in the manpower process to ensure that the reach back from the assignment process to the manning process.

### **Reporting**

In order to account for ad hoc units and the readiness ratio of these units, DC, M&RA (MM) manpower analysts developed a reporting tool. The CMC Staffing Dashboard (Figure 5) succinctly reports the staffing health of units preparing to deploy in accordance with the

established staffing lock on date in accordance with the implementation message. The report assesses ad hoc as well as institutionally recognized units. The reporting basis for the health of the unit is a stop light, red-yellow-green, status. The stringent mark of green accepts nothing less than precision staffing available by the staffing lock-on date, or six months prior to deployment. If the mark misses by a factor of days or individual Marines not available at the staffing lock-on date, the report deviates from a green status. To reinforce the manpower manager not to fail, the stigma of a missed mark stays visible for the 15 month life cycle of a deploying unit; a monthly reminder to the CMC that DC, M&RA (MM) missed a goal.

The basis for the dashboard is the unit assessment report. With this basis, the CMC has a snapshot of the leadership granularity capable of the assessment report. The report assesses Officers, Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO), and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), and overall staffing. The body of the metrics determines the stoplight rating. Any stoplight rating that is not capable of assessing as green before the unit's pre-deployment training (PTP) block four training and readiness evaluation exercise constitute mission failure.

Schedules for the block four PTP event fluctuate, but most commence at or before ninety days before the deployment. Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) served as the block four PTP event for units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan or Iraq until September 2012. For units preparing for a MEU deployment, the Certification Exercise (CERTEX) was the block four PTP event. Recently, the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at 29 Palms, host of EMV changed the moniker of EMV to Integrated Training Exercise (ITX). ITX tailors the block four PTP event to the specified deployment rather than a standing PTP deployment exercise which allows flexibility in training continua.

The reporting continues through the unit deployment. Any changes annotated during deployment assesses on the dashboard. Deployed unit readiness shows deviations based on casualties suffered through the deployment. HQMC policies on combat replacements govern actions to take at readiness trigger lines for replacement of Marines due to casualty losses.

Reporting continues through the return of the unit and is assessed through 90 days post deployment. Reporting continues to allow post-deployment actions to take place. These actions include allowing leaders to remain through warrior transition, block leave periods, and reset training. CMC made the decision to hold the unit in place through 90 days to allow engaged leadership with shared experience to stay in the unit. The unit cohesion policy articulates the post-deployment period.

In progress today in DC, M&RA (MM) is the next level of construct for reporting, the no tiered readiness metrics. The metrics are built on the similar methodology as the assessment reports; however, the manager conducts the next level of examination assessment of contracts. Contract management serves to sustain readiness through time. In allowing for contract cohorts, the manager predicts the readiness threshold for a unit and sustains it. The lead analyst built the data sets, but the methodology for use of the data to information for decision makers remains undecided.

### *Part III Manpower Continuous Process Improvement*

#### *Holistic Review*

In this section, the many areas where process improvements yield value are offered. Further, the author will review those processes that DC, M&RA (MM) executes to assist in readiness. The review goal is to familiarize the reader with steps taken to sustain readiness in an imperfect system. An expert in manpower once told the author, “it is the inefficiencies in the system that makes it efficient.”<sup>24</sup> This is a product of a system that updates every six months, yet its architecture is decades old.

Manning serves to endure the long term institutional requirement. The elements of manning that bear review are those HD/LD PMOSs that are chronically short of meeting the requirement. Manning continues to program T2P2 and “FREE” billets based on an equitable share distributed across each PMOS. For every HD/LD PMOSs that cannot meet retention requirements, a needed Marine at the associated grade goes gapped in the supporting or training establishment. If the GAR process applied hard line transfers from one PMOS to another, by grade, in the retention plan to account for the shortfall in retention objectives, then those billets would be filled. The impact of this technique of over-retaining a skill causes a bubble in the cohort year and drives more competitive promotion opportunities. If the DC, M&RA (MP) planner can make adjustments on forecasted shortfalls, then the GAR can be adjusted prior to publication. A deviation of this type is a fundamental adjustment to the manpower equation. Captain Andrew Garrick, at the time of publishing he is an analyst within DC, M&RA (MPP-50), depicted the singular best product the author has ever seen on this equation in his product briefed through DC, M&RA (Figure 6). Execution of this method will increase PMOS health statistics; this is another readiness area.

Recruiting methodologies are reactive to the TIP and DC, M&RA (MPP-20) program plans. This method delivers to the trainer the needed requirement. It does not translate to shortfalls existing in the OPFOR that need to be accounted for prior to the entrance into the deployment cycle. Visibility of the DEP, the ability of the trainer to respond to a needed PMOS requirement and surge training, and then the shortfall pull from the DEP is needed to enhance readiness. The calculus of effectively pulling resources from the DEP must be driven from the FORCESYNCH, but align to institutional plans. The just in time human resource supply chain management enables unit cohesion in the OPFOR by not forcing a local move between like type units.

Classification processes do not automatically enforce the reporting of a PTCD. Systemically, diary clerks within the training establishment report PTCDs in accordance with local guidance. This is alluded to in the current entry level production process (Figure 7). The RDM assigns PTCDs for single track schools but does not assign PTCDs for multi-track schools. Further, upon arrival at school the entry-level Marine's PTCD may be re-reported in the case that the school seat is reallocated locally. This limitation relies on diary management within the training establishment. The reporting forcing function introduced in 2011 by the Head, Enlisted Distribution and Policy is not yet institutionalized. Distribution managers use the PTCD to project training production. This enables an estimated forecast listing available Marines to staff shortfalls in time to hit the CMC's deployment cycle mandates for unit cohesion. Within the training establishment, this use of the PTCD was not intended, nor does it institutionally resonate for its importance. The human interface is persistent to maintain pace of deployments. The problem with the forecast method is that it is only as accurate as the reporting. The detail is in the data, and data is not good information unless it is uniformly and accurately reported.

Lessons from the past for training are lost in the present. The purpose for requirements at training establishments has morphed into billets that the structure was not originally designed to support. Requirements specified number of trainers required to teach the training continuum, and also provided for internal surge capability. Those requirements transformed over time into curriculum managers, trainers of the trainers, doctrine writers, mobile training teams, and a number of other ancillary jobs that the structure was not originally intended. A holistic review of all training establishment billets for whom the instructors are is warranted to assess surge capacity. If the limitation is systems and not personnel, then this element of surge capacity needs to be reviewed. At joint training locations, memoranda of agreement should be examined for discussion of surge capacity for Marine PMOS output from the curricula. Only with a viable surge capability, will the training establishment be able to surge to support readiness.

The assignments order in publication is dated. Its most recent publication at the time of this study is 4 October 1994. There exist several updates provided for via Marine administrative instructions (MARADMIN) to maintain significant changes. DC, M&RA Manpower Policy Office (MPO) coordinated a draft of the updated order several times in an attempt for an update. This process continues from at least 2008 when a draft version accounted for a body of work executed to update the manual. Bringing this order up to date and into the 21st century needs to be a focus of DC, M&RA (MPO) in close coordination with DC, M&RA (MM). The long standing problems of inability to convene an OPT to finish this project needs to be deferred to the Deputy Director within the two impacted divisions within DC, M&RA.

Assignments are the ground combat element of the HRDP. When any inefficiency exists in the system, an assignment of available inventory can plug a hole in the dam with varying levels of impact. There are several capabilities that exist to support the assignment of Marines to units

entering into the deployment cycle. One of the most rudimentary authorities is the cross fiscal year extension. There exist many Marines who are in units that are slated for the deployment cycle, yet they do not possess the contract minimum time to make the deployment. At the local MSC Commander level, a waiver can be submitted for the Marine to be extended for the deployment. This authority is limited to only non-cross fiscal year extensions for deployment. Once a needed extension crosses the fiscal year boundary, it must be approved by HQMC. DC, M&RA (MPP) guards each one of the extensions with extreme caution due to end strength concerns. At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the extensions were fluid and historical estimates were over 1,000 extensions per annum. In the limited footprint of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), DC, M&RA (MP) limited the authority for these extensions. Curtailing the approval to half the historical estimates from OIF, DC, M&RA (MP) limited an essential authority to retain needed Marines already part of the unit. This first line of defense improved unit cohesion by keeping a leader in the unit to continue performing. NCOs are the Marines who were eligible for the extension. Many of the metrics of success for staffing to the deployment cycle are NCO-based.

Another assignment method to achieve increased readiness is to short tour Marines with needed skills from non-OPFOR units. Several thousand B-Billets exist in the Marine Corps where Marines are not fulfilling their PMOS duties. If shortfalls exist at OPFOR units, and Marines are available, but have not completed their tour, then a review can be completed to assign the Marine in advance of projected tour completion date. Supporting this effort takes from the OPFOR a Marine who is in dwell from a previous deployment and moves him to the supporting establishment. In essence, taking one out does not necessarily increase the skill

saturation base in the OPFOR, it merely takes away manpower that is unable to be employed in the OPFOR without dwell waiver authority.

Short touring of a Marine exposes another problem resident in the training line of the GAR. Trainees for SDAs are not accounted for in the training line. This means that while the trained Marine is short toured, his replacement is not available to take his place until he arrives and is fully trained. This gap can be as many as a few months. The impact is to the seed corn instructor base of the Marine Corps. Executing the short tour could introduce risk in entry-level training where supervision is essential in both safety and efficiency.

A conference of manpower professionals could remove friction in a number of touch points. This conference could follow the quarterly FORCESYNCH and mirror the format from a manpower force provider perspective. The manpower officers provide an estimate to FORCESYNCH, risk is assessed, and units are programmed. Once the playbook is finalized, the manpower summit commences to identify the areas of concern. DC, M&RA (MM) identifies solutions within the MSCs and offers those solutions in advance of the summit for staffing. The summit would be the forum for discussion of those solutions from HQMC that are practicable but not practical. The MSC on the ground will be able to lend the granularity to the scientific decision made at HQMC. From the summit, all shortfalls could be examined for action in support of the deployment cycle.

A manpower summit is beneficial if the requirement for deploying units is known to a degree greater than the current joint force processes offer today. The service must be willing to introduce risk to provide greater lead time for manpower resource execution. With greater visibility of future requirements, decisions can be made on promotions, redistributions, and staffing of key leaders earlier in the deployment cycle. The earlier a staffing decision can be

made, the more poised the unit will be to enter into the deployment cycle and execute training in preparation for deployment.

Actions are underway today to set further refinement and granularity to unit readiness assessment. The connection of contract assessment for enlisted Marines versus the ability to deploy against a deployment cycle at a specified time. Similar data sets can be built against the officer population should a contract limitation need be applied against non-career designated lieutenants and captains. The review offers the ability to look at MCC level units and the associated parent units in hierarchy. Further, the contract length is scoped against periods of time remaining on a contract. From this level, the data set is further broken into segments of grade groupings. The resultant data sets provide over 1.5 million metrics of success. The manager combats tiered readiness through spreading the contracts across all units. Units sustain readiness through a fair share of contract length. In other words, a unit implemented for deployment possessing a greater readiness measurement meets the spirit and intent of no tiered readiness through maintaining highest levels of unit cohesion commencing at the beginning of the 15 month deployment cycle. Executing this level of granularity continues to refine data set analysis. Manpower managers need the direction to execute the fidelity gleaned through this detailed assessment. In the recommendations portion of this study, the author critically reviews assessment of courses of action.

## **Recommendations**

The recommendation section captures two relevant areas for review and management engagement in process improvement. The first area is overarching manpower policy/process changes. The second area is a system-based change incorporating management metrics where the author proposes courses of action for use of no tiered readiness metrics.

### **Overarching Manpower Policy/Process Changes**

The first recommended change addresses staffing to the ASR. The deployment requirement for implemented units articulated in Part II's Framework for assessment does not match the institutionally recognized ASR. The deviation creates adjustments in assignments to meet the deployment demand. Further, deployability metrics (Figure 4) are levied against implemented units to achieve readiness. Providing the deployment requirement in advance of the ASR and subsequent staffing cycle will depict the deviation from the institutional requirement. Armed with the true deployment requirement, DC, M&RA (MM) staffs to the approved manning documents through the creation of temporary MCCs for ad hoc requirements. Levying a staffing precedence at the OPFOR level ensures that the equitable staffing distribution provides sufficient manpower surpluses in the MSC required to provide the personnel for deployment over and above the institutional requirement. Staffing with this methodology in mind will dramatically change the readiness levels of commands with a staffing precedence below that of the OPFOR. If readiness is paramount in the operating forces, then staffing priority and proper staffing execution should match the true demand. This method will alleviate manpower sourcing pressure in the OPFOR by impacting non-OPFOR units.

Many of the metrics of success for readiness assessment are tied to NCOs. NCOs are among the most difficult staffing targets to meet due to the limitation caused by contract. In order to

meet this demand in a more efficient manner, promotion to NCO could be tied to movement to a deploying unit extending the enlistment contract to the needs of the deploying unit. The linkage of promotion to “volunteering” to go to a deploying unit fosters success in many intangible aspects. The Marine makes a potential career decision to stay Marine thereby showing his commitment to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps extends the Marine in conjunction with the promotion meeting the needs of the Marine Corps. This method reintroduces the cross-FY extension for deployment problem addressed in Part III’s holistic review. Until DC, M&RA (MP) establishes a historical basis, the end strength impact is not known. Further, the forecast metrics are likely not possible to quantify with reasonable acceptance of success. Another ancillary benefit to the Marine Corps in this regard is that while not every promotion will be held to the deployability standard, when it is needed to be applied to meet readiness, the “right” Marine is retained and promoted. One of the mantras of the Marine Corps Manpower Assignment Process is the “right Marine, right place, right time.”<sup>25</sup>

To meet the needs of the manpower process today, a manpower management redistribution and certification conference needs to be incorporated for each MEF. In a time of fiscal austerity, adding another conference to the TAD travel budget is not easily adopted. Another way to look at this is the cost of a permanent change of station (PCS) versus the value of a conference alleviating the need for unnecessary PCS to achieve staffing readiness. Through a conference at major installations minimizing external personnel travel costs, potentially further reduced through video teleconferencing (VTC), much can be accomplished in coordinated staffing review, assessment, and implementation of required movement. DC, M&RA (MM) is able to isolate to the individual Marine, those capable of being moved under specified parameters, and the assessment of local populations. Conducted in conjunction with local MSC G-1 or other

manpower staff, much can be accomplished prior to stabilization of personnel and unit assessments. Redistributions of personnel coordinated in advance of HQMC action provides buy-in for impacts seen at the lowest level. Through the combination of the assessments and face-to-face engagement, managers achieve optimized staffing solutions. Once managers optimize solutions for personnel readiness, the commander certifies the work. Solutions completed at minimized cost conference venues are necessary in fiscally constrained environment.

Developing a manpower management common operational picture (COP) model serves to enhance the manpower conference and certification process, potentially automating the solution set in the long term. The COP reviews the master plans and assesses recruiting through an evaluation of school seats filled from the DEP. Managers assess troubled areas against class loads ensuring any measured training surges required are coordinated with TECOM. The COP also enables greater visibility of the training population to provide alerts to available Marines through PTCDD reporting on all Marines through final PMOS school determination. The process updates throughout the training process to capture any changes to the trainee along the pipeline. Data exception reports capturing time to train by PMOS identifies where TECOM spends time and effort to enhance the training continua and process improve the human resource supply chain. The COP tracks to the deploying unit annotating any deficiencies. The feedback loops lies with the assessment reports and CMC Manpower Dashboard resident within DC, M&RA.

## **No Tiered Readiness Manpower Management Approach**

Using the metrics alluded to under Part III's holistic review, the author offers careful consideration of options for a no tiered readiness course of action. In data analysis, swimming in viable live data is excellent for granularity, however, management sustainment needs to be practicable. Under this concept, the author presents three courses of action for using no tiered readiness metrics. A FY13 snapshot taken in October 2012 reveals a review of enlisted contracts across the Marine Corps (Tables 1-3). The contracts are an element consistent across all three developed courses of action (COA).

### *COA 1: Regional OPFOR Readiness*

A regional readiness management concept provides maximum flexibility in readiness staffing. The flexibility provided does not consider individual unit readiness in its concept. The region is comprised of several MSCs. If the PMOS and contract length needed are resident within the region, and units are able to be rapidly built up with personnel assets within the region, then readiness is achieved. This approach is very much in line with the status quo. The periodic review of data ties to the ongoing deployment cycle. Managers assess the OPFOR within the region for staffing snapshot of readiness. Managers review the PMOS, contract length, and unit requirements. If there are any unit shortfalls to the no tiered readiness metrics at assessment, then the region is reviewed for its capacity to support the shortfall. If the personnel assets within the region are sufficient to the readiness level of the region, then the region is "ready." If the region cannot absorb the personnel shortfall, a demand signal is identified, and the replacement shortfalls are ordered to the shortfall unit.

Manpower managers' benefit from this construct as the staffing of units will follow the standard ASR staffing method for non-implemented units. No tiered readiness metrics are likely

only to be violated in the case of HD/LD PMOSs due to the expanse of the region. This constitutes the preponderance of shortfalls in units today. While not correcting the problem due to a vast aggregate, it highlights specific shortfall areas that continue to be a concern in readiness metrics across the OPFOR.

The disadvantage of a regional construct is that many units and multiple MSCs exist in one region. The expanse of the capabilities resident in a region do not necessarily highlight readiness problem areas due to the vast aggregate. While on board personnel and contract mix within the region are hitting readiness thresholds, the individual units may be out of kilter. The granularity in metrics to see readiness problem areas is not resident in this COA construct.

#### *COA 2: MSC Readiness*

An MSC readiness management concept provides for flexibility in staffing while allowing rapid redistribution for warfighting execution within the MSC. MSCs are the most recognized organizations across the Marine Corps. As the largest part of the MEF MAGTF, MSCs are easily recognizable, and movement within is natural. The natural movement allows for forces to be moved from one MCC to another without too much friction in SOPs or unit methodologies assuming like-type unit reassignment.

An advantage to this COA is in providing the first General Officer visibility of personnel readiness. The MSC staff is sufficient to maintain visibility and engagement capability with HQMC. This provides for a two way street from HQMC to the MSC staff. In the case of individual augmentees for today's non-institutionally recognized requirements, the MSCs are already completing this action without HQMC oversight to its effectiveness.

A disadvantage to this COA is an additional filter levied on the OPFOR above the implementation process for deploying units. Readiness evaluations gain relevance with a smaller

number of units examined. The number of like-type units will drive redistributions on a regular basis to meet readiness indicators. With readiness reviewed at the MSC level, the movement is less fluid than refinement to the MCC unit level.

### *COA 3: MCC Readiness*

An MCC readiness management concept provides maximum flexibility in warfighting execution (in theory) but is rigid in assignment of exacting contract mix, PMOS, and grade group matching. “In theory” listed parenthetically to highlight that statistics management does not account for unit cohesion and sustained leadership engagement. This readiness concept postulates that any unit can be called upon at any time due to maintenance of readiness thresholds across the operating forces to the MCC unit level.

An advantage (in theory) is the ever-ready unit accomplishing the ideal of no tiered readiness. This approach discounts that personnel movement is not a problem. It assumes Marines are able to compress training, rapidly integrate into a unit, and meet unit cohesion standards. In the OPFOR, these assumptions are plausible. In many cases, to meet implementation standards for deploying units, manpower managers take these measures today with great success.

The dramatic disadvantage to the manpower manager lies in the maintenance of the system to ensure that the readiness thresholds are met. The result is a dashboard delineating every OPFOR unit and its associated readiness status relative to the readiness metrics. To ensure that the units comply with the readiness status, approximately 1.5 million metrics must be satisfied for the approximate 393 units constantly under scrutiny of these readiness assessments. The state of movement of personnel resembles water in its fluid state. Cohesion basis is limited to contract group and is fluid relative to needs across OPFOR units. Managers would be pressed to retain skills within MSCs in this construct due to the myriad PMOSs existing in multiple MSCs.

## *Conclusions*

Embarking on paradigm shifts requires decisive leadership. There are many recommendations provided herein that can be effected immediately. There are also recommendations which require further study. It is essential to gain first mover advantage once the study is complete. As the nation's premier force in readiness, the Marine Corps needs to present its chosen course of action and provide its success through examination of the implementation. In a time of budgetary constraints, this will be a tough business. Each service will vie for its relevance and position in specified national crisis response. Being the first mover in restoring readiness across the force renews the Marine Corps' raison d'être. America's 911 force, with its expeditionary forces in readiness, is not a bumper sticker it is a reality.

Implement a review of recommendations through a Commandant's Planning Guidance task for FY14. As manpower managers lay the foundation for no tiered readiness metrics, preparations in advance of this task must be taken. Staff action through dedicated OPTs like the successful force structure review group of 2011 and the force optimization review group of 2012 is what the Marine Corps needs to continue on track. Cross functional work teams developing the Marine Corps personnel readiness plans directly support all strategy and campaign plans. In austerity, people are a capital resource; management of people is paramount to success.

## *Glossary*

**Billet or Position.** Programmed manpower structure space typically defined by grade and occupation and associated with a specific unit or organization. A billet or position may be funded (authorized) or unfunded (generally called an unfunded requirement). (DoDI 7730.64)

**Deployability.** The sum of factors that assess the Marine's medical, legal, contract limitation, physical limitation, future orders limitation, force control, or other factor that precludes the screened Marine from making a specified deployment, known for the Marine's present or future unit if under orders reported in manpower systems, with acceptable parameters to provide for unit training, deployment, and a transition from service at EAS should the Marine not continue service.

**Manpower Management** — The means of manpower control to ensure the most efficient and economical use of available manpower. (JP 1-0)

**Manpower Requirements** — Human resources needed to accomplish specified work loads of organizations. (JP 1-0)

**Military End Strength** – the total number of military personnel authorized to be on duty as of 30 September of each year, as approved by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for that fiscal year. (DoDI 7730.64)

**Programmed Force Structure.** The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year and that are planned and programmed for a given fiscal year. (DoDI 7730.64)

**Programmed Manning.** Those billets in the programmed manpower structure that are planned to be staffed with trained personnel at the end of the fiscal year. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; *for the Marine Corps the term is synonymous with the ASR.* (DoDI 7730.64)

**Requirement (Manpower).** The aggregation of military and civilian, funded and unfunded, positions representing the total manpower requirement for units and organizations in the programmed force structure. Manpower requirements are expressed in terms of 1 year of full-time workload and are determined independent of resource constraints and based on sound manpower management determinations. (DoDI 7730.64)

**Tiered Readiness.** Planned variation of readiness across like-type units. (Author definition)


**Combat Readiness** — Synonymous with operational readiness, with respect to missions or functions performed in combat. (JP 1-0)

**Operational Readiness** — The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. Also called **OR**. See also **combat readiness**. (JP 1-0)

**Readiness** — The ability of United States military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels. a. **unit readiness** — The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. b. **joint readiness** — The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. See also **National Military Strategy**.

**unit** — 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority. 2. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. 3. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used. Also called **unit of issue**. 4. With regard to Reserve Component of the Armed Forces, a selected reserve unit organized, equipped, and trained for mobilization to serve on active duty as a unit or to augment or be augmented by another unit. (JP 1-0) (JP 3-33)

Figure 1: MMEA Implementation/Stabilization Deployment Staffing Method<sup>26</sup>



## Figure 2 Deploying Unit Notification and Actions Update<sup>27</sup>

UNCLASSIFIED/  
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MM /MMEA-12//  
SUBJ/DEPLOYING UNITS NOTIFICATION AND ACTIONS UPDATE//  
REF/A/DOC/MARFORCOM FORCE SYNCHRONIZATION PLAYBOOK AND SLIDER/SECRET//  
REF/B/DOC/MARCENT MANNING DOCUMENT/SECRET//  
REF/C/DOC/MCO P1300.8R//  
REF/D/DOC/MARADMIN 585/11//  
REF/E/DOC/MARINE CORPS ENTERPRISE INFORMATION ASSURANCE DIRECTIVE//  
REF/F/DOC/MARFORCOM FORCE SYNCHRONIZATION CONFERENCE OUTBRIEF DTD 30  
MARCH 2012/SECRET//  
POC/H. J. DUENEZ/CIV/MMEA-1 (HEAD MMEA-1)/DSN 278-9230/  
EMAIL: HECTOR.DUENEZ@USMC.MIL//  
POC/R. W. BARRY/CIV/MMEA-12 (HEAD, CMD DISTRIBUTION)/DSN 278-  
9220/EMAIL: ROBERT.W.BARRY@USMC.MIL//  
POC/L. REYES/MAJ/MMEA-12 (CMD DISTRIBUTION OFFICER)/DSN 278-  
9260/EMAIL: LETICIA.REYES1@USMC.MIL//  
POC/M. L. LANDREE/LTCOL/MMEA-6 (HEAD, ENL RETENTION SECT)/DSN 278-  
9003/EMAIL: MICHAEL.LANDREE@USMC.MIL//  
POC/M. D. BROYAN/MAJ/MMEA-8 (HEAD, ENL MONITOR SECT)/DSN 278-9948/  
EMAIL: MICHAEL.BROYAN@USMC.MIL//  
POC FOR STABILIZATION AND COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE/J. M.  
JOHNSON/GYSGT/MMEA-12 (SNCOIC, CMD DISTRIBUTION)/DSN 278-9298/EMAIL:  
JEREMIAH.M.JOHNSON@USMC.MIL//  
POC FOR STABILIZATION AND COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE/J. W.  
PASZKIET/SGT/MMEA-12 (CMD DISTRIBUTION MONITOR)/DSN 278-9220/EMAIL:  
JOHN.PASZKIET@USMC.MIL//

NARR/REF A IS MARFORCOM FORCE SYNCHRONIZATION PLAYBOOK AND  
SLIDER. REF B IS COMUSMARCENT FORCE REQUIREMENTS LIST. REF C IS  
MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT POLICY. REF D IS MARADMIN 585/11:  
DEPLOYED UNIT COHESION STAFFING. REF E PROVIDES GUIDANCE REGARDING  
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION//  
GENTEXT/REMARKS/

1. THIS MESSAGE, AND THE ASSOCIATED METRICS, SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND STABILIZATION GUIDELINES/MESSAGES. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MEFS, MSCS, AND MCCS NOTIFICATIONS AND GUIDANCE RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITS FOR DEPLOYMENT. MEF AND MSC G-1S ARE REQUIRED TO DISTRIBUTE THIS MESSAGE TO THEIR SUBORDINATE UNITS. UNITS/ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT IMPLEMENTED BY MMEA-12 FOR DEPLOYMENT (NON-IMPLEMENTED UNITS) ARE INVITED TO CONSIDER PARAGRAPHS 7C AND 7D OF THIS MESSAGE. THIS MESSAGE IS ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS:
  - 1A. PARAGRAPH 2: IMPLEMENTATION STATUS UPDATE
  - 1B. PARAGRAPH 3: TIMELINE AND REQUIRED ACTIONS
  - 1C. PARAGRAPH 4: ACCESSING THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE
  - 1D. PARAGRAPH 5: RE-ENLISTMENT AND EXTENSIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT
  - 1E. PARAGRAPH 6: STABILIZATION OF MARINES
  - 1F. PARAGRAPH 7: TERMINOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS

2. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS UPDATE: PER REFS (A), (B), AND (F) THE DEPLOYMENT IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND/OR METRICS OF THE FOLLOWING UNIT(S) IS NEW OR HAS BEEN CHANGED. DEPLOYMENT STAFFING GOALS (BY MCC), KEY DATES, AND RELEVANT METRICS ARE AVAILABLE PER PARAGRAPH (4).

- 2A. MCC 15D - MODIFICATION OF METRICS (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2B. MCC 15F - MODIFICATION OF METRICS
- 2C. MCC 198 - IMPLEMENTED (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2D. MCC 1ES - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2E. MCC 1F1 - MODIFICATION OF METRICS
- 2F. MCC 1F2 - MODIFICATION OF METRICS
- 2G. MCC 1F7 - MODIFICATION OF METRICS
- 2H. MCC 1FA - IMPLEMENTED (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2I. MCC 1FR - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2J. MCC 1FS - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2K. MCC 1HK - IMPLEMENTED (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2L. MCC 1HL - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2M. MCC 1PF - IMPLEMENTED (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2N. MCC 1XJ - MODIFICATION OF METRICS (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2O. MCC V11 - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2P. MCC V13 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2Q. MCC V14 - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2R. MCC V23 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2S. MCC V27 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2T. MCC V28 - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2U. MCC V32 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2V. MCC V34 - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2W. MCC V35 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2X. MCC V38 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2Y. MCC V39 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2Z. MCC V63 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2AA. MCC V81 - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2AB. MCC V8C - IMPLEMENTED (PARTIAL UNIT)
- 2AC. MCC V9B - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2AD. MCC V9C - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2AE. MCC VF1 - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2AF. MCC VF2 - MODIFICATION OF DATES
- 2AG. MCC VFD - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND OPERATION (FULL UNIT)
- 2AH. MCC VLA - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2AI. MCC VLF - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2AJ. MCC VM4 - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2AK. MCC VM5 - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2AL. MCC VMA - MODIFICATION OF DATES AND METRICS
- 2AM. MCC VME - IMPLEMENTED (FULL UNIT)
- 2AN. MCC VMJ - MODIFICATION OF DATES

3. TIMELINE AND REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR FULL/PARTIAL IMPLEMENTED DEPLOYING UNITS:

3A. D-12 MONTHS:

3A(1) MMEA ACTION: DEPLOYMENT STAFFING REPORTS (DSR) AND ASSESSMENT

REPORTS POSTED TO THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE (SEE PARAGRAPH 4). DSRs AND ASSESSMENT REPORTS ARE UPDATED BI-MONTHLY UNTIL THE MONTH A UNIT DEPLOYS.

3A(2) UNIT ACTION: ENSURE ACCURACY OF MARINE CORPS TOTAL FORCE (MCTFS) DATA. THE ACCURACY OF A UNIT'S DSR AND ASSESSMENT REPORT IS DEPENDENT UPON THE ACCURACY OF MCTFS DATA.

3A(3) UNIT ACTION: COMPLETE ALL EXTENSION/REENLISTMENT ACTIONS WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS MESSAGE (SEE PARAGRAPH 5).

3B. D-11 MONTHS:

3B(1) UNIT ACTION: SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR STABILIZATION (SEE PARAGRAPH 6).

3B(2) MMEA ACTION: COMMENCE DEVELOPING STAFFING PLANS WITH MSC/MCC INTERFACE.

3C. D-10 MONTHS: MMEA COMPLETES STAFFING PLAN AND ISSUES PCS/PCA ORDERS TO STAFF UNIT BY LOCK-ON DATE.

3D. D-9 MONTHS:

3D(1) AFTER CONSIDERING THE UNIT'S DSR AND ASSESSMENT REPORT, COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE REQUIRED TO SEND A NAVAL MESSAGE WITH SUBJECT "(UNIT MCC) COMMANDER'S CERTIFICATION" TO THE FOLLOWING AHMS MAIL-BOX: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MM MMEA12(UC) CERTIFYING THAT UNIT STAFFING (INCLUDING INBOUND MARINES) IS ADEQUATE TO MEET THE PUBLISHED DEPLOYMENT STAFFING GOAL. EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE NOTED IN THE MESSAGE.  
3D(2) MMEA WILL ASSUME THAT COMMANDERS THAT DO NOT SUBMIT CORRESPONDENCE DURING D-9 ARE CERTIFYING THAT UNIT STAFFING IS ADEQUATE.

3E. D-8 TO D-6 MONTHS: UNIT STAFFING COMPLETED WITH AVAILABLE INVENTORY NLT D-6 (LOCK-ON DATE).

4. ACCESSING COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE: ACCESS TO THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IMPLEMENTED UNITS WITH THE PROCESS OUTLINED IN THIS MESSAGE. EACH IMPLEMENTED UNIT WILL HAVE A DSR AND ASSESSMENT REPORT AT THIS SHAREPOINT SITE. THESE REPORTS ARE UPDATED BI-MONTHLY UNTIL THE MONTH THE UNIT DEPLOYS.

ALL USERS MUST HAVE A MCEITS ACCOUNT. IF YOU NEED TO REQUEST A MCEITS ACCOUNT AND ACCESS TO COMMAND DISTRIBUTIONS SHARESITE THEN PROCEED TO STEP 4A. IF YOU ALREADY HAVE A MCEITS ACCOUNT THEN PROCEED TO STEP 4B.

4A. TO REQUEST A MCEITS ACCOUNT AND ACCESS TO THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE:

4A(1): GO TO SITE [HTTP://WWW.MCEITS.USMC.MIL](http://www.mceits.usmc.mil).

4A(2): CLICK ON REQUEST MCEITS ACCOUNT ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE.

4A(3): AGREE TO THE USER AGREEMENT TERMS.

4A(4): CLICK THE SHAREPOINT SITE DROPDOWN BOX AND FIND "HQMC MMEA-12 COMMAND DISTRIBUTION".

4A(5): FILL OUT REMAINDER OF FORM WITH REQUESTED INFORMATION AND CLICK SUBMIT.

4A(6): ONCE ACCESS IS APPROVED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE SENT TO YOUR PROVIDED .MIL EMAIL ADDRESS.

4B. TO REQUEST ACCESS TO THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE IF

YOU ALREADY HAVE A MCEITS ACCOUNT:

4B(1): GO TO SITE HTTP://WWW.MCEITS.USMC.MIL.

4B(2): CLICK ON "LOG INTO MCEITS IPS".

4B(3): SELECT "DOD EMAIL" DIGITAL CERTIFICATE

4B(4): CLICK "SITE DIRECTORY" ON RIGHT HAND SIDE OF PAGE.

4B(5): LOCATE "HQMC, MMEA-12 COMMAND DISTRIBUTION" ON THE LIST AND CLICK THE WEB ADDRESS LINK.

4B(6): WHEN ACCESS DENIED SCREEN POPS UP CLICK "REQUEST ACCESS" BUTTON.

4B(7): INPUT BILLET AND REASON FOR REQUESTING ACCESS AND CLICK SUBMIT REQUEST.

4B(8): ONCE ACCESS IS APPROVED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE SENT TO YOUR PROVIDED .MIL EMAIL ADDRESS.

4C. THE "HELP LIBRARY" PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS TO DOWNLOAD ASSESSMENT REPORTS, UNIT DSR'S, AND THE STABILIZATION PROCESS.

5. RE-ENLISTMENTS AND EXTENSIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT: YOUR ATTENTION IS INVITED TOWARDS BOTH THE "EAS NON-DEPLOYABLE" AND "SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE" POPULATIONS LISTED ON THE UNIT'S DSR, IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE DEPLOYABLE MARINES THROUGH RE-ENLISTMENTS AND EXTENSIONS. AFTER EXHAUSTING RE-ENLISTMENT EFFORTS, UNITS SHOULD FOCUS UPON NON-CROSS FISCAL YEAR EXTENSIONS AND THEN CROSS-FISCAL YEAR EXTENSIONS. CAREER MARINES SHOULD RE-ENLIST; EXTENSIONS FOR CAREERISTS SHOULD ONLY BE USED IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. MARINES CATEGORIZED AS NON-DEPLOYABLE/SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE WHO ARE NOT SUBMITTING EXTENSIONS/RE-ENLISTMENTS TO DEPLOY WITH THEIR PARENT UNIT WILL BE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE REDISTRIBUTION TO ADJACENT DEPLOYING UNITS NLT D-10.

5A. REENLISTMENTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO MMEA-6 VIA THE TOTAL FORCE RETENTION SYSTEM (TFRS).

5B. FIRST-TERM CONUS MARINES VOLUNTEERING TO EXTEND "WITHIN THE FISCAL YEAR OF THEIR EAS" (NON-CROSS FISCAL-YEAR EXTENSION) FOR DEPLOYMENT, OR EXTEND WHILE ON DEPLOYMENT, SHOULD REQUEST AN EXTENSION VIA THE CHAIN-OF-COMMAND TO THE RESPECTIVE CG WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND MARINES FOR DEPLOYMENT.

5C. EXTENSION REQUESTS FOR FIRST-TERM CONUS MARINES VOLUNTEERING TO EXTEND FOR DEPLOYMENT "BEYOND THE FISCAL YEAR OF THEIR EAS" (CROSS FISCAL-YEAR EXTENSION) WILL BE SUBMITTED TO MMEA-12 VIA TFRS.

5D. FIRST-TERM OCONUS MARINES VOLUNTEERING TO EXTEND FOR DEPLOYMENT "BEYOND THE FISCAL YEAR OF THEIR EAS" (CROSS FISCAL-YEAR EXTENSION) WILL REQUIRE A "1ST TERMER EXTENSION FOR DEPLOYMENT/OER" SUBMITTED TO MMEA-12 VIA TFRS.

5E. FIRST-TERM OCONUS MARINES VOLUNTEERING TO EXTEND FOR DEPLOYMENT "WITHIN THE FISCAL YEAR OF THEIR EAS" (NON-CROSS FISCAL-YEAR EXTENSION) WILL REQUIRE AN OER (OVERSEAS EXTENSION REQUEST) SUBMITTED TO MMEA-12 VIA TFRS TO ADJUST THE RTD.

5E(1) FIRST-TERM OCONUS MARINES VOLUNTEERING TO EXTEND FOR DEPLOYMENT "WITHIN THE FISCAL YEAR OF THEIR EAS" (NON-CROSS FISCAL-YEAR EXTENSION), OR EXTEND WHILE ON DEPLOYMENT, SHOULD REQUEST AN EXTENSION VIA THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO THE RESPECTIVE CG WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO

EXTEND MARINES FOR DEPLOYMENT.

5F. CAREERISTS REQUESTING AN EXTENSION FOR DEPLOYMENT (EXTENSIONS FOR CAREERISTS SHOULD ONLY BE USED IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES):

5F(1) MUST SUBMIT A "REGULAR EXTENSION RELM" FOR OBLIGATED SERVICE TO DEPLOY THROUGH MMEA-6 FOR ACTION.

5F(2) OCONUS CAREERISTS MUST SUBMIT AN OER TO MMEA-12 VIA TFRS TO ADJUST THE RTD.

6. STABILIZATION OF MARINES. UNIT COMMANDERS WILL SUBMIT DEPLOYMENT STABILIZATION REQUESTS BY NAVAL MESSAGE TO MMEA-12 IDENTIFYING MARINES THAT WILL DEPLOY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE METRICS ESTABLISHED BY THIS MESSAGE. STABILIZATION REQUESTS WILL BE SENT TO THE FOLLOWING AHMS MAIL-BOX: CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MM MMEA12(UC). PER REF (E), SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS WILL NO LONGER BE USED IN THE STABILIZATION PROCESS; ROSTERS WILL USE THE FULL "ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE PERSONAL IDENTIFIER" (EDIPI).

6A. ATTACH TO THE NAVAL MESSAGE AN EXCEL SPREADSHEET LISTING MARINES THAT WILL DEPLOY BY FULL EDIPI, PMCC, PMOS, GRADE, LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, DRAW CASE CODE (DCC), AND DRAW CASE CODE TERMINATION DATE (SEE PARAGRAPH 7D AND THE "HOW TO" GUIDE ON THE MMEA-12 SHAREPOINT SITE).

6B. USE THE INITIAL STABILIZATION ROSTER AS THE BASELINE FOR SUBSEQUENT STABILIZATION REQUEST ROSTERS. SUBSEQUENT ROSTERS ONLY NEED TO LIST NEW ADDS/CHANGES/DELETIONS TO THE INITIAL STABILIZATION ROSTER. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT UNITS SUBMIT REQUESTS TO DESTABILIZE MARINES WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY STABILIZED AND WILL NOT DEPLOY.

6C. COMMANDERS SUPPORTING SEQUENTIAL DEPLOYMENTS WITH DEPLOYMENT DATES SEPARATED BY MORE THAN 30 DAYS WILL ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT STABILIZE MORE MARINES THAN THE TOTAL UNIT DEPLOYMENT APPROVED MANNING DOCUMENTS (BY MCC/PMOS/GRADE) IN SUPPORT OF THE MULTIPLE DETACHMENTS.

7. TERMINOLOGY/ASSUMPTIONS:

7A. FULL DEPLOYING UNIT: A UNIT (CATEGORIZED BY MONITORED COMMAND CODE -- MCC) WITH A DEPLOYMENT DEMAND SIGNAL GREATER THAN 89% OF THE UNIT'S TABLE OF ORGANIZATION (T/O), EVALUATED OVER A DETERMINED TIME PERIOD (30 DAYS).

7B. PARTIAL DEPLOYING UNIT: A UNIT (CATEGORIZED BY MONITORED COMMAND CODE -- MCC) WITH A DEPLOYMENT DEMAND SIGNAL 65% TO 89% OF THE UNIT'S TABLE OF ORGANIZATION (T/O), EVALUATED OVER A DETERMINED TIME PERIOD (30 DAYS).

7C. NON-IMPLEMENTED UNIT: A UNIT WITH A GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT DEMAND SIGNAL, PER REFERENCES (A) AND (B), THAT HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED BY MMEA-12 AS A FULL NOR PARTIAL DEPLOYING UNIT. THE STABILIZATION PROCESS APPLIES TO NON-IMPLEMENTED UNITS/ELEMENTS (SEE PARAGRAPH 6).

7D. STABILIZATION: THE PROCESS OF REQUESTING THAT A DEPLOYABLE MARINE REMAIN ASSIGNED TO A UNIT TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT TRAINING, DEPLOYMENT, POST-DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS AND COHESION. AN APPROPRIATE DRAW CASE CODE (DCC) AND DCC TERMINATION DATE IS INTENDED TO TEMPORARILY HALT PCS ORDERS ISSUANCE (WITH LIMITED EXCEPTIONS PER REFERENCE (D)). PER REFERENCE (D), THE DCC TERMINATION DATE FOR FULL DEPLOYING BATTALIONS/SQUADRONS (IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM) IS 90

DAYS AFTER THE MMEA-12 ASSIGNED "DEPLOYMENT RETURN DATE." THE DCC TERMINATION DATE FOR ALL OTHER UNITS/ELEMENTS IS 60 DAYS AFTER THE SCHEDULED RETURN DATE FROM DEPLOYMENT. A LIST OF DRAW CASE CODES IS LOCATED AT THE WEB LINK: <https://tfdw-web.manpower.usmc.mil/lookup/> (TO OBTAIN A USER ACCOUNT OR FOR SUPPORT, CONTACT THE TFDW HELP DESK AT 703-784-9167 OR EMAIL: SMBMANPOWER@USMC.MIL).

7E. LOCK-ON DATE (LOD): TARGET DATE FOR MMEA TO HAVE FULL/PARTIAL IMPLEMENTED UNIT STAFFED WITH DEPLOYABLE MARINES.

7F. END-OF-ACTIVE SERVICE/ROTATION DATE CUT-OFF DATE (EAS-CO): GENERALLY 60 DAYS AFTER A UNIT'S SCHEDULED RETURN DATE. THIS IS THE KEY DATE TO DETERMINE OVERSEAS AND FIRST-TERM MARINES' DEPLOYABILITY AND IS ASSIGNED BY MMEA-12 ONLY FOR IMPLEMENTED UNITS.

7G. ONBOARD (O/B): A MARINE CATEGORIZED IN THE MARINE CORPS TOTAL FORCE SYSTEM (MCTFS) WITH THE DEPLOYING UNIT'S PRESENT MONITORED COMMAND CODE (PMCC) REGARDLESS OF TAD STATUS, FAP STATUS, DEPLOYED STATUS AND/OR ADMINISTRATIVE ASSIGNMENT STATUS. MARINES TAD, PERFORMING DUTIES IN A FAP BILLET, OR ADMINISTRATIVELY ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER UNIT WHO ARE OTHERWISE DEPLOYABLE ARE CONSIDERED CHARGEABLE TO THE PMCC AND WILL NOT BE BACK-FILLED BY MMEA. MARINES IN THESE STATUSES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THEIR PARENT UNIT TO ENABLE THE UNIT TO CONDUCT PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND BUILD UNIT COHESION.

7H. NON-DEPLOYABLE (ND): A MARINE DISQUALIFIED TO DEPLOY PER AN MMEA ALGORITHM THAT EVALUATES THE FOLLOWING MCTFS VARIABLES: END-OF-ACTIVE SERVICE (EAS), ROTATION DATE (RTD), PRIMARY MONITORED COMMAND CODE (PMCC), DUTY STATUS CODE (DSC), DUTY LIMIT STATUS CODE (DLSC), STRENGTH CATEGORY CODE (SCC), BILLET MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (BMOS), REENLISTMENT/EXTENSION/RETIREMENT (RER) FLAGS, DRAW CASE CODE (DCC), FUTURE MONITORED COMMAND CODE (FMCC), ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE (EDD), ESTIMATED DATE OF ARRIVAL (EDA), CURRENT SOURCE OF ENTRY CODE (CSEC) AND ARMED FORCES ACTIVE DUTY BASE DATE (AFADBD). NON-DEPLOYABLE MARINES ARE CATEGORIZED AS "MEDICAL/LEGAL/OTHER" (MLO ND); "IN RECEIPT OF ORDERS" (PCS/PCA ND); "EAS/RTD NON-DEPLOYABLE" (EAS ND).

7I(1) CAREER MARINES (MARINES WHO HAVE RE-ENLISTED AT LEAST ONCE) WILL NOT BE CATEGORIZED AS "NON-DEPLOYABLE" SOLELY AS A FUNCTION OF THE MARINE'S EAS (BUT AN RTD BEFORE THE EAS-CO WILL CATEGORIZE A CAREER MARINE AS SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE OR NON-DEPLOYABLE); IT IS ASSUMED THAT DEPLOYABLE (USING VARIABLES EXCEPT EAS/RTD) CAREER MARINES NOT MEETING THE EAS/RTD REQUIREMENT WILL SUBMIT FOR RE-ENLISTMENT/EXTENSION OF RTD PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT TO ALLOW THEM TO COMPLETE THE DEPLOYMENT PRIOR TO EAS.

7I(2) SHOULD A CAREER MARINE NOTIFY THE UNIT THAT HE/SHE WILL NOT REENLIST, UNITS ARE INVITED TO CONSIDER SECTION 3001.5 OF REFERENCE (C).

7I(3) MARINES CATEGORIZED AS NON-DEPLOYABLE AND SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE ARE SUBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION TO OTHER DEPLOYING UNITS BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE CORPS.

7J. SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE (STD): A MARINE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CATEGORIZED AS "MLO ND", "PCS/PCA ND" OR "EAS ND" WILL BE EVALUATED AS POSSIBLE STD. A STD MARINE IS A FIRST TERM MARINE HAVING AN END-OF-

ACTIVE SERVICE (EAS) AND/OR ROTATION DATE (RTD), OR A CAREERIST STATIONED OVER-SEAS WITH A RTD THAT PROVIDES A LIMITED DEPLOYMENT WINDOW; EAS/RTD WILL FALL WITHIN THE STD-WINDOW ESTABLISHED FOR THE UNIT. THESE MARINES MUST COMPLETE PRE-SEPARATION COUNSELING (TAP/TAMP) PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT. MARINES CATEGORIZED AS SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE ARE SUBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION TO OTHER DEPLOYING UNITS BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE CORPS.

7K. DEPLOYABLE (DEPL): A MARINE WHO HAS BEEN CATEGORIZED AS NEITHER SHORT-TERM DEPLOYABLE NOR NON-DEPLOYABLE. THE FACT THAT A MARINE IS DEPLOYED (AND/OR IN DWELL) WILL NOT INFLUENCE SNM'S DEPLOYABILITY STATUS.

7L. INBOUND MARINES: MARINES WITH A FMCC/EDD/EDA IDENTIFYING SNM AS "INBOUND" TO A DEPLOYING UNIT WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE DEPLOYABLE. INBOUNDS ARE CATEGORIZED AS "INBOUND BEFORE LOCK-ON DATE" (INBOUND\_BLO), "INBOUND POST-LOCK ON DATE AND BEFORE DEPLOYMENT DATE" (INBOUND\_PLO), "INBOUND POST-DEPLOYMENT DATE" (INBOUND\_PDD), AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR FUTURE MONITORED COMMAND CODE (FMCC) AND ESTIMATED ARRIVAL DATE (EDA).

7M. DEPLOYMENT STAFFING GOAL (S/G): MMEA CREATES A DEPLOYMENT STAFFING GOAL FOR IMPLEMENTED DEPLOYING UNITS. THE STAFFING GOAL REPRESENTS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DEPLOYABLE MARINES RATED BY THE UNIT. THIS DEPLOYMENT STAFFING GOAL IS VISIBLE IN THE UNIT'S DEPLOYMENT STAFFING REPORT (DSR) AND ASSESSMENT REPORT POSTED ON THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE (SEE PARAGRAPH 4).

7N. DEPLOYMENT STAFFING REPORT (DSR) AND ASSESSMENT REPORTS: BI-MONTHLY REPORTS PRODUCED BY MMEA THAT PROVIDES AN UPDATED EVALUATION OF AN IMPLEMENTED UNIT FROM A DEPLOYABILITY PERSPECTIVE. THE DSR AND ASSESSMENT REPORT IDENTIFIES A UNIT'S DEPLOYMENT STAFFING GOAL AND MAPS THE UNIT'S ONBOARD POPULATION TO THE STAFFING GOAL (BY PMOS AND GRADE GROUPING). PUBLICATION OF A MCC'S DSR/ASSESSMENT REPORT COMMENCES AT D-12 AND IS RUN UNTIL THE MONTH THAT THE UNIT DEPLOYS. THE DSR AND ASSESSMENT REPORT IS POSTED ON THE COMMAND DISTRIBUTION SHAREPOINT SITE (SEE PARAGRAPH 4). THE ACCURACY OF A UNIT'S DSR IS A FUNCTION OF THE ACCURACY OF MCTFS DATA.

7O. MARINE CORPS TOTAL FORCE SYSTEM (MCTFS): MMEA ASSUMES THAT ALL MCTFS DATA IS ACCURATE. THE ACCURACY OF A UNIT'S DSR IS A FUNCTION OF THE ACCURACY OF MCTFS DATA.

8. THIS MESSAGE APPLIES TO THE ACTIVE, ENLISTED FORCE ONLY.//

Figure 3 Deployed Unit Staffing<sup>28</sup>

# DEPLOYED UNIT COHESION STAFFING

Date Signed: 10/04/2011

MARADMINS Active Number: 585/11

R 041802Z OCT 11

UNCLASSIFIED//

MARADMIN 585/11

MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MM//

SUBJ DEPLOYED UNIT COHESION STAFFING//

REF/A/MSGID: DOC/CMC/YMD: 20101022//

AMPN/REF A IS CMC'S PLANNING GUIDANCE//

POC/H.J. DUENEZ/CIV/HD, MMEA-1/-/TEL:DSN 278-9230/

EMAIL:HECTOR.DUENEZ@USMC.MIL//

POC/R. GOVONI/LTCOL/HD, MMOA-5/-/TEL:DSN 278-9998/

EMAIL:ROBERT.GOVONI1@USMC.MIL//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. PURPOSE. THIS MARADMIN PROVIDES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AS IT RELATES TO MANPOWER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO IMPROVE UNIT COHESION STAFFING.

2. SITUATION. REF A TASKED THE DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS TO RECOMMEND CHANGES TO PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT POLICIES AND PLANS WITH THE OVERALL GOAL OF INCREASING UNIT COHESION AT THE BATTALION/SQUADRON LEVEL. THIS MARADMIN FOCUSES SPECIFICALLY ON PRE-DEPLOYMENT (TIMELY ARRIVAL AND UNIT LONGEVITY OF CAPTAINS, SNCOS AND OTHER KEY LEADERS) AND POST-DEPLOYMENT UNIT STABILITY.

3. MISSION

A. PREDEPLOYMENT STAFFING. COMMENCING WITH UNITS DEPLOYING IN SUPPORT OF 12.1 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT (GFM) DEPLOYMENTS (LOCKING-ON FOR DEPLOYMENT IN SEP 2011, (SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT)), MANPOWER MANAGEMENT DIVISION EXECUTES MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS DURING STAFFING IN ORDER TO IMPROVE UNIT COHESION.

B. POSTDEPLOYMENT STAFFING. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL FULL BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS RETURNING FROM GFM DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE BELOW IMPROVE UNIT COHESION PROCEDURES.

4. EXECUTION

A. COMMANDER'S INTENT. THE ENDSTATE IS INDIVIDUAL MARINES ARRIVING AT UNITS SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT TO TRAIN AND BECOME COHESIVE UNITS PRIOR TO COMBAT OPERATIONS, AND UPON RETURN, TO REMAIN AS A COHESIVE UNIT TO ALLOW FOR POST-COMBAT ACTIONS.

B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. STAFFING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR FULL UNITS, AS DEFINED BY THIS MARADMIN, ARE ESTABLISHED:

(1) THE GOAL IS TO STAFF AND STABILIZE FULL DEPLOYING UNITS WITH DEPLOYABLE MARINES NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT DATE.

(2) MARINES WILL REMAIN IN RETURNING FULL DEPLOYING UNITS FOR NINETY DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE UNIT DEPLOYMENT WITH MINIMAL EXCEPTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 5.B BELOW.

(3) NO STOP LOSS IS AUTHORIZED TO SUPPORT POST DEPLOYMENT STABILIZATION PERIOD.

C. TO ATTAIN THE COMMANDANT'S GOAL OF UNIT COHESION STAFFING, IT IS INCUMBENT FOR COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND TO BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES, THEREBY MAXIMIZING UNIT KEY LEADERS ACROSS DEPLOYING UNITS.

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. DEFINITIONS

(1) FULL DEPLOYING UNIT. A BATTALION/SQUADRON DEPLOYING 90 PERCENT OR GREATER OF ITS TABLE OF ORGANIZATION WITHIN A 30 DAY PERIOD SUPPORTING GFM REQUIREMENTS. UNITS PERMANENTLY STATIONED ABOARD OKINAWA, JAPAN SUPPORTING 31ST MEU OPERATIONS ARE EXEMPT AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE STAFFED BASED ON ROTATION TOUR DATES.

(2) UNIT COHESION. A CONTINUUM THAT STAFFS UNITS TO TRAIN AND DEPLOY IN SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS, AND UPON RETURN, ALLOWS COMMANDERS TO RETAIN KEY LEADERSHIP, THEREBY PROVIDING DECISIVE, ENGAGED LEADERS AND SUSTAINING RESILIENCY.

B. EXCEPTIONS (POST DEPLOYMENT). TRULY EXCEPTIONAL CASES WILL BE CONSIDERED AT THE GENERAL OFFICER LEVEL AND DECISION AUTHORITY IS DELEGATED TO THE DIRECTOR, MANPOWER MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. IMPLEMENTATION AND STABILIZATION PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR SPECIFIC UNITS IS PROVIDED VIA SEPCOR.

7. RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY LTGEN R. E. MILSTEAD JR, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS.//

Figure 4 Deployability Factors<sup>29</sup>

NONDEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL	DSC	DLSC	SCC	RER FLAG	DCC
<b>MEDICAL</b>					
HIV positive					
Undergoing level III alcohol treatment	7				
Sick in hospital	O,P		L,T		
Not physically qualified (medical, dental, panorex)	2,D,	D,H,Q			
Pregnancy (after determination by proper authority)		N			
Postpartum (up to six months after delivery)					
Dental Class 3 or 4					
Physical Evaluation Board determination	R		E		
<b>ADMINISTRATIVE</b>					
End of active service (EAS) within 7 days					
Home awaiting orders (PEB)	R		E		
Mandatory retirement					
Terminal leave--mandatory retirement					
Home awaiting administrative discharge other than for expiration of enlistment or fulfillment of service obligation	X				
Unauthorized absence	I				
Absentee or deserter	S				
Captured or prisoner	Q		W		
Missing in action	K		Y		
Sole surviving son or daughter					
Hazardous area restrictions		R			
<b>LEGAL</b>					
Confined awaiting trial by general court martial	E,H		B		
Confined serving sentence of trial by general court martial	H		R,S,I		
Confined awaiting action by higher authority					
Involuntary hold beyond EAS as a special or summary court martial prisoner	9		K		
On leave awaiting results of appellate review	Z		G		
In the hands of civilian authorities	V		C		
<b>COMMANDER'S CALL</b>					
Confined awaiting trial by summary court martial	E,F				
Confined serving sentence by summary court martial					
Confined awaiting trial by special court martial					
Confined serving sentence by special court martial	E,G		3		
In hands of military authorities					
Sick in quarters		G			
Sick in Dispensary					
Under investigation by military or civilian authorities					
Administrative / legal hold					
Light Duty (1-30 Days)					
Physical remedial program		C			
Temporary limited duty	8,A				
Probation					
<b>OTHER</b>					
Undergoing primary MOS training/school	6				
Humanitarian transfer					AH
Humanitarian temporary additional duty					AH
Hardship discharge approved				Z	
<b>IA, JMD</b>					
Assigned as individual Augmentee external to MAGTF					
Assigned as Joint Military Duty external to MAGTF					

DEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL	DSC	DLSC	SCC	RER FLAGS
On duty in a billet that serves the overall mission of the command; to include personnel attending local command schools	1		0	
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)	8,A		1	
Fleet Assistance Program (FAP)			5	
Terminal leave voluntary request to transfer FMCR (not at Service limit)				
Annual leave	Z			
Deferred hostile fire				
Restricted as result of nonjudicial punishment				
Assigned, but not departed for next duty station (PCS)			F	
Insufficient security clearance				
Exceptional family member				
Request retirement				5
Retirement approved (voluntary request, not at Service limits)				7
Request transfer to FMCR				6
Transfer to FMCR approved (voluntary request, not at Service limits)				8
Request resignation				J
Resignation Approved				

Figure 5 CMC Staffing Dashboard<sup>30</sup>


Unit					Pre-Deployment												Post-Deployment						
MCC	UNIT	LOD	Post-LOD	Note	Lock-On Date (D-180)						Post-Lock (EMV or Non-EMV at D-90)						Return			Return + 60		Return + 90	
					Off DEPL (%)	Enl DEPL (%)	SNCO DEPL (%)	E4 CORE DEPL (%)	E5 CORE DEPL (%)	NCO CORE DEPL (%)	Off DEPL (%)	Enl DEPL (%)	SNCO DEPL (%)	E4 CORE DEPL (%)	E5 CORE DEPL (%)	NCO CORE DEPL (%)	LDR to MCG (%)	LDR to MCG (%)	Deployed Cohort (%)	LDR to MCG (%)	Deployed Cohort (%)		
VH1	HMH-362	SEP11	NOV11	1																			
V25	2/5 1ST MARDIV	OCT11	JAN12	2																			
V17	1/7 1ST MARDIV	OCT11	JAN12	3																			
165	MWSS-273 2D MAW	OCT11	NOV11	4																			
1Y5	CLB 5 CLR 1 1ST MLG	OCT11	JAN12	5																			
1NB	2D BN 10TH MAR	NOV11	JAN12	6																			
V38	3/8 2D MARDIV	DEC11	FEB12	7																			
VLF	HMLA-469	DEC11	JAN12																				
V61	VMFA(AW)-224	MAR12	MAY12	8																			
VMA	VMM-161	MAR12	JAN12	9																			
V27	2/7 1ST MARDIV	APR12	JUL12								*	*	*	*	*	*							
V11	1/1 1ST MARDIV	MAY12	MAY12	10																			
V39	3/9 2D MARDIV	MAY12	MAY12																				
VM4	VMM-264	JUL12	AUG12		*	*	*	*	*	*													

**Dashboard Colors are "snapshots" taken at a specific point in time -- they do not change.  
New updates indicated by cells with (\*)**

Notes																						
1	VH1: All "Green" at D-120 -- (3) Core E5s inbound during October 2011																					
2	V25: All "Green" at D-150 -- (55) inbound during October 2011																					
3	V17: All "Green" at D-120 -- (38) Core NCOs inbound during November 2011																					
4	165: NCO Leadership "Green" at D-180 --Core E4 MOSs not met (Utilities--1141/42/61/71, Engineers--1316/41/45/61/71/91)																					
5	1Y5: All "Green" at D-120 -- (16) inbound November 2011																					
6	1NB: All "Green" at D-150 -- (2) SNCOs inbound during November 2011																					
7	V38: All "Green" at D-150 -- (22) enlisted and (1) officer retained at V32 to maintain post-deployment cohesion through December 2011																					
8	V61: Deployment Date data used for Post-Lock																					
9	VMA: EMV Completed Prior to Lock-On Date -- Lock-On Date data used for Post-Lock																					
10	V11: 03xx NCOs -- (13) over T/O by EMV (5/18/2012), per ACMC guidance																					



Figure 7: Enlisted Entry-Level Production Process Overview<sup>32</sup>



1. MPP-20 provides their best estimate of what the Marine Corps requirements are going to be and provides their Best Estimate Classification Plan to TECOM FSQRMB.
2. TECOM FSQRMB begins the TIP process in January, conducts the TIP Conference in March, and produces a Draft TIP in April. TECOM FSQRMB solicits and collects requirements from RAP-2, MPP-20, MPP-25/MMEA-6, and numerous other sponsors to create the Draft TIP.
3. 1 May, TECOM finalizes the TIP. The TIP shows input requirements by MOS course progression (actual nomenclature: Course Identification Code, Sponsor Code, and Student Type Code).
4. TRNGCMD FLCs submit their proposed class schedules in MCTIMS.
5. TECOM FSQRMB accepts or rejects schedules.
6. TECOM FSQRMB Allocation Manager allocates seats to all of the classes by sponsor code for example: Active Duty, Reservist, Lat Move.....
7. Entry-level active duty allocations are made visible in MCTIMS for extraction by the RDM during the weekly RDM classification (MOS assignment) process. 7+ This information flow also directs RAP-2 (Split Track and Retrain Reservist) and MMEA-6 (LatMove) when they are able to register Marines for courses.
8. Separate from the class schedule process, MPP-20 and RAP-2 gives MCRC their Program Plans which tell MCRC what PEFs to ship to Recruit Training by trimester.
9. MCRC recruits and ships active and reserve poolees to the MCRDs.
10. MMEA-11 uses the RDM to classify recruits into a Basic PMOS and IMOS and assign to the recruit the next available FLC class date leading to their specific PMOS on day 45-52 of Recruit Training.
11. Marines graduate MCRD and go on 10 days of boot leave. MMEA-11 determines which Marines are PRASP eligible and MCT MCRC Lsns assign PRASP to Marines on a case-by-case basis. This is based on the current excess time a Marine has between a MCT graduation and the FLC report date of the class they are registered for (MAT). NOTE\*\*~86% of Marines were PRASP eligible FY12 (17,599 PRASP Eligible / 20,355 Entry Level Active Duty Recruits)
12. Non-03xx Marines then attend and graduate from MCT and attend the FLC course they are registered for. This time between MCT graduation and FLC Class Report Date is the largest amount of MAT that is created due to planning inefficiencies in the current process.
13. The Schools of Infantry, Marine Corps Communications Electronics School, and Enlisted Aviation Maintenance Training Unit have sub-classification authority for specific MOSs.
14. The Marine then either moves on to follow on schools (if applicable) or goes straight to the OPFOR. If a Marine attrites from a FLC course and is not going to be recycled into that MOS, the FLC submits a reclassification request to MMEA-11 and reclassifies the Marine into a different MOS. Reserve Marines who require MOS reclassification will be reclassified by RAP-2 via the appropriate Reserve Training Liaison.

Table 1 Enlisted Force Contract Review (Oct 12)

Months Remaining on Contract	Number of Marines	Percent of Population	Sum
00_3.0	9,284	5.28%	<b>27%</b>
03.1_6.0	6,577	3.74%	
06.1_10.0	15,007	8.53%	
10.1_15.0	16,725	9.51%	
15.1_21.0	18,530	10.53%	<b>73%</b>
21.1_26.0	20,502	11.65%	
26.1_32.0	17,735	10.08%	
32.1_38.0	26,488	15.05%	
38.1_44.0	15,759	8.96%	
44.1_48.0	18,426	10.47%	
48.1_60.0	10,758	6.11%	
60.0_+	169	0.10%	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>175,960</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	

0 to 15.0 Months Remaining on Contract

>=15.0 Months Remaining on Contract

Table 2 Enlisted Force Number of Marines per "Month Remaining on Contract"




Table 3 Enlisted Force Percent of Marines per "Month Remaining on Contract" (Oct 12)






Table 4 Regional Readiness (COA 1)



The graph depicted above display the personnel strength pooled into regions. The author took the liberty to capture only the four major regions for display to reduce clutter. The data is explained below:

- Sum of 80PCT – A metric establishing the target readiness level in aggregate
- Sum of STM – The numerical target of short term contracts; a subset of the 80PCT
- Sum of OB\_STC – The quantity of Marines on board associated region meeting the STM
- Sum of LTM – The numerical target of long term contracts; a subset of the 80PCT
- Sum of OB\_LTC – The quantity of Marines on board associated region meeting the STM
- Sum of OB – The quantity of Marines on board


Table 5 MSC Readiness (COA 2)



The graph depicted above display the personnel strength pooled into MSC. The data is explained below:

- Sum of 80PCT – A metric establishing the target readiness level in aggregate
- Sum of STM – The numerical target of short term contracts; a subset of the 80PCT
- Sum of OB\_STC – The quantity of Marines on board associated MSC meeting the STM
- Sum of LTM – The numerical target of long term contracts; a subset of the 80PCT
- Sum of OB\_LTC – The quantity of Marines on board associated MSC meeting the STM
- Sum of OB – The quantity of Marines on board

Table 6 MCC Readiness (COA 3)



The graph depicted above display the personnel strength pooled into MCCs. The author took the liberty to capture only one region for display, rather than attempting to portray the approximate 393 MCCs evaluated in this COA constantly. Further, the author removed minor company commands, such as a military police company. The data is explained below:

- Sum of 80PCT – A metric establishing the target readiness level in aggregate
- Sum of STM – The numerical target of short term contracts; a subset of the 80PCT
- Sum of OB\_STC – The quantity of Marines on board associated MCC meeting the STM
- Sum of LTM – The numerical target of long term contracts; a subset of the 80PCT
- Sum of OB\_LTC – The quantity of Marines on board associated MCC meeting the STM
- Sum of OB – The quantity of Marines on board

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## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense. *Dictionary of Military Terms*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010, 190.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense. *Guidance for Manpower Management*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005, 2.

<sup>3</sup> USC Title 10, Subtitle C, Part I, Chapter 507, §5063.

§ 5063. United States Marine Corps: composition; functions

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Defense. *Automated Extracts of Manpower and Unit Organizational Element Files* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, March 1996, 12.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense. *Dictionary of Military Terms*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010, 190.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of Defense. *Automated Extracts of Manpower and Unit Organizational Element Files* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, March 1996, 15.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense. *Dictionary of Military Terms*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010, 324.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense. *Automated Extracts of Manpower and Unit Organizational Element Files* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, March 1996, 14.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>11</sup> Anita U. Hattiangadi. End Strength: Forecasting Marine Corps Losses Final Report CNA Feb 2005

<sup>12</sup> Kevin Murphy, Jeanette Cleveland, William T. Ross, Jr. *Evaluating the Marine Corps Recruiting Effort: Volume I Findings and Recommendations*. May 2003. MCRU Contract No. M67004-99-D-0037, 22

<sup>13</sup> Gustav Hasford, Stanley Kubrick, and Michael Herr. *Full Metal Jacket*. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. (Los Angeles: Warner Bros, Pictures, 1987.)

<sup>14</sup> John Ford. "Enlisted Entry-Level Production Process Overview." PowerPoint presentation, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, Jan 2013.

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<sup>15</sup> Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. . *Military Occupational Specialties Manual* (Short Title: MOS Manual). Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2012, X.

The MOS Manual is a bit more specific in the full definition of the PMOS. “Primary MOS (PMOS) Used to identify the primary skills and knowledge of a Marine. Only enlisted Marines, warrant officer, chief warrant officers, and limited duty officers are promoted in their primary MOS. Changes to an Active Component Marine’s PMOS without approval from CMC (MM) and changes to a RC Marine’s PMOS without approval from CMC (RA) are not authorized.”

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, X.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, X.

The MOS Manual further states that “a free MOS requires skill sets unrelated to primary skills.” This statement would lead the reader to believe that FMOSs are never related skills. The author is not in concurrence with this broad generality. A more precise comment would state that as a FMOS can be filled by any Marine, it may or may not be related to primary skills. A case could be made that a Special Operations Officer, FMOS 0370, is certainly related to an Infantry Officer, PMOS 0302, as both MOSs reside in the same occupational field. This may not be rampant among FMOSs; however, as this example seeks to cast the widest net possible to find the rare officer who can perform the duties of FMOS 0370.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, X.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, X.

<sup>20</sup> Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, *USMC Training: A Synthesis of CNA's Work*. Nov 2008. (CRM D0019166.A1/Final), 7.

<sup>21</sup> Department of Defense. *Dictionary of Military Terms*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010, 256-7.

<sup>22</sup> James L. George. “Is Readiness Overrated? Implications for a Tiered Readiness Force Structure.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis n. 342. April 29, 1999., 14.

<sup>23</sup> Joints Chiefs of Staff. *CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2010., 12.

<sup>24</sup> Lester A. Wright. “Monitor School Manpower 101 Brief.” PowerPoint presentation, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 1 Sep 2009.

<sup>25</sup> Mark McCarroll. “MMEA Command Brief.” PowerPoint presentation, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 1 July 2012.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Deploying Unit Notification and Actions Update*. May 2012.

<sup>28</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Deployed Unit Cohesion Staffing*. MARADMIN 585/11, 4 Oct 2011. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/111008/deployed-unit-cohesion-staffing.aspx>

<sup>29</sup> Robert Barry. “110615\_(1000)\_Unofficial\_SORTS\_Deployable\_NonDeployable\_Cheat\_Sheet.” Excel Document, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 11 June 2011. This is the most comprehensive review of how the Marine Corps assesses deployability and makes management decisions for personnel. This compilation is listed as unofficial. The compilation of these factors simplified for consumption is nothing short of a brilliant tool.

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<sup>30</sup> Mark McCarroll. “MMEA Command Brief.” PowerPoint presentation, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 1 July 2012

<sup>31</sup> Captain Andrew Garrick. “Analysis of the Marine Corps Manpower Model,” (Unpublished manuscript, last modified April 13, 2012), Microsoft Word file, 3.

Andy is one of the leading analysts at HQMC and a friend. He is perhaps one of the sharpest minds the author has ever met. If the Marine Corps, specifically the manpower department, is lucky he will stay with the organization beyond his planned retirement for duty as a civil servant.

<sup>32</sup> John Ford. “Enlisted Entry-Level Production Process Overview.” PowerPoint presentation, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, Jan 2013.