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    After 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense rushed to create cultural training programs within the Services to address a perceived lack of cultural expertise, but a lack of consensus remains regarding the effectiveness of their methodologies and overall programs. For this reason, a review of cultural programs within foreign militaries offers useful feedback from countries experienced in conducting foreign military operations. This research compares the cultural learning programs of ten countries. The commonalities discerned among the foreign militaries indicate a consensus between countries regarding the advantages of using cultural advisors in the field to inform complex decisions. Likewise, most countries agree on the requirement for cultural awareness training in a flexible, easily-digested package that can be broadly available to general purpose forces. However, the review uncovered that formal assessment is absent across the board to validate the usefulness of these types of cultural learning programs.

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: APPLYING CULTURE TO MILITARY OPERATIONS: A REVIEW OF FOREIGN MILITARIES

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Applying Culture to Military Operations: A Review of Foreign Militaries

Author: Kathi Gates

Thesis: With the U.S. military’s cultural programs still in their nascent stage, a review of how foreign militaries define and incorporate cultural knowledge offers a useful tool from which to glean best practices in the employment of cultural expertise.

Discussion: Following 9/11, the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan placed a spotlight on an inadequate understanding of foreign cultures within U.S. Department of Defense. As a result, the military Services rushed to create their own cultural training programs and doctrine, but a lack of consensus remains regarding their methodology and effectiveness. For this reason, a review of cultural programs within foreign militaries offers useful feedback from countries experienced in conducting foreign military operations. This research compares the cultural learning programs in ten countries. The commonalities discerned among the foreign militaries indicate a consensus between countries regarding the advantages of using cultural advisors in the field to inform complex decisions. Likewise, most countries agree on the requirement for cultural awareness training in a flexible, easily-digested package that can be broadly available to general purpose forces. However, the review uncovered that formal assessment is absent across the board to validate the usefulness of these types of programs.

Conclusion: Investments in cultural learning and expertise cannot be made effectively and accurately until the Services are better able to clearly define the requirement for and most appropriate application of cultural knowledge in military operations.
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INTRODUCTION

The Focus on Culture

With the U.S. military’s cultural programs still in their nascent stage, a review of how foreign militaries define and incorporate cultural knowledge offers a useful tool from which to glean best practices in the employment of cultural expertise. After nearly a decade of conflict, the importance of cultural knowledge has reached the level of conventional wisdom in the Department of Defense. Acknowledging these challenges in a speech to military veterans in 2009, President Obama expressed that our military’s strength “will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures they understand.” ¹ In support of this idea, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta wrote in a Memorandum to the Defense Services and Agencies dated August 10, 2011 that “Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment. Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations.”

Showcasing this new focus, doctrinal publications such as the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap² and the DoD Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities³ emphasize the value of cultural skills. This advocacy is often expressed in amorphous catchphrases, calling for a “holistic approach” and the “right mix” of language, regional, and cultural competencies. The Defense Language Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Services to “strengthen cultural capabilities” and “create a force that is culturally competent and values these competencies.”⁴ With such broad direction, the Services have not reached a consensus regarding the doctrine’s practical implementation:
how to train, whom to train, what to train, and to what depth. Even so, the Department of Defense continues to make significant resource investments in cultural training programs, despite little feedback regarding their effectiveness.

The United States is not alone in wrestling with the question of how to operate effectively in a complex foreign environment. Many coalition partners have created their own cultural learning models, some of which have been incorporating practical experiences for over half a century. The U.S. may be able to draw on these experiences to improve and refocus its own cultural training doctrine, and as a result be better postured to meet future threats.

**Cultural Learning Terminology**

Before delving into the approaches of the various militaries, it is important to review the evolution of cultural terminology, as the terms themselves often reflect the manner in which a military employs culture during military operations. The term “culture” is often defined in terms of beliefs, traditions, religions, and social norms. The challenge for militaries with defining culture is that the definition seems overwhelmingly abstract. Because the concept is so broad, military members are left wondering how to apply it in operation settings or areas of responsibility.\(^5\)

Generalizing about mass populations does not help the warfighter, because such generalizations miss the important multilayered and multifaceted nature of human existence. By reducing individuals to a single tribal group or ethnic group we fail to grasp the important interconnections between individuals and groups—information that could be critical in understanding insurgent networks, the movement of illegal goods, or ties of power and allegiance in a region.\(^6\)
For this reason, many U.S. and foreign defense organizations have more narrowly defined the idea of culture through terminology that indicates a specific focus and depth of cultural knowledge.

Within the U.S., the military services began offering “cultural awareness” training as an initial building block. These courses were most often non country-specific (culture-general) in nature and oriented towards increasing individual service members’ awareness of their own culture and providing a sample model for analyzing other cultures. It was quickly realized that these generic courses were inadequate preparation for the warfighter.

In the hurry to push culture out to the operating forces, quick, easy-to-digest models of culture are often selected for training. Such models appeal to the military because of their visual simplicity on a power point presentation or their quick transformation into a check-in the box” form. However, when tested in the operating environment- the only test that matters to a military serviceman whose life is on the line- these models do not always deliver. In essence, a broad understanding of the elements that comprise culture was insufficient to understand enemy motivations and sources of local unrest.

Because cultural “awareness” may lack the depth required to understand a specific operating environment, the U.S. Defense Language Office (DLO) also discusses cultural knowledge in terms of “cultural capability” and “cross-cultural competence.” The DLO unofficially defines cultural capability as “a combination of knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes regarding the associated culture(s) in the area of operations and those common to any culture (culture-general), and defines cross-cultural competence as “ the ability to operate and interact effectively within a culturally complex environment.” The term “cultural competence” appears more easily applied to military operations than cultural awareness because it involves a more comprehensive understanding of the organizations, infrastructure, populations, and
environmental, economic and religious events both contemporary and historical in the AO.\textsuperscript{10}

This type of specific knowledge requirements provides a guide for identifying both the obvious and hidden aspects of a culture.

However, even though the term cultural competence requires a greater depth of knowledge than cultural awareness, its definition may be too academic for military purposes. Recently organizations such as the U.S. Marine Corps have emphasized the phrase “\textit{operational culture}” as a concept with greater utility:

The warfighter is not going to be concerned with all aspects of culture, but only those aspects that influence the area where warfighter operates. Therefore, operational culture as a term is of greater use to the warfighters than simply culture: that is, those aspects that can influence the outcome of a military operation or, conversely, those military actions that influence the cultural balance within an area of operations.\textsuperscript{11}

With this more focused application of the idea of culture, the military commander will better know the enemy, allowing him to pinpoint critical vulnerabilities, understand what the population is willing to fight for and leverage that understanding to meet mission objectives. \textsuperscript{12}

In short, since 2001 an infusion of culture-related terms has populated military doctrine and strategy documents. Cultural learning in the U.S. military now encompasses everything from cultural awareness, to cultural capability, cross-cultural competence, and in some organizations, “\textit{operational culture}.” Interestingly, the terms have evolved from the immediate basic need to be familiar with the area of operations to an increasing emphasis on how the knowledge can be effectively employed during operations. The following review of cultural doctrine and training trends within foreign militaries illustrates a similar trend, while any notable differences appear to result from differences in the countries’ perspectives towards international operations.
Military representatives from ten countries were provided identical questionnaires in the course of this research. Each country (with the exception of the United Kingdom) submitted a response. The questionnaire asked for information regarding published doctrine related to cultural training, and requested a description of the processes or programs in place to assist their military in integrating cultural knowledge and addressing cultural challenges both prior to and during deployments. Where formal training programs existed, the representatives were asked to describe course goals, content, instructional methodology, course duration, intended audience, and specific cultural terminology used. The questionnaire also requested that the countries identify how each program’s effectiveness was assessed. The following sections summarize the information provided by each country.

GERMANY

Doctrines

The German military, or Bundeswehr, defines culture as a “necessary, typical and mobile system that a group, at times unconsciously, relies on for guidance” and notes that cultures have both visible elements and underlying intangible values. Like several of the U.S. Services, however, rather than focus on the broad concept of culture, the German military highlights the need for “intercultural competence” to meet the requirements of multinational cooperation with allies and partners and conducting global operations. The Bundeswehr defines Intercultural Competence as:

the individual ability and the willingness of Bundeswehr personnel at home and on operations to deal adequately with other cultures, religions, life worlds and their peculiarities while being aware of their own cultural identity as well as to acquire the
necessary knowledge and abilities and to develop a sense of understanding and sensitivity for foreign values, perspectives and courses of action.\textsuperscript{15} The German Ministry of Defence also notes that this type of intercultural education “links their actions to the protection of peace and freedom, and strengthens assuredness, especially on operations.”\textsuperscript{16} Of note, the Bundeswehr emphasizes that force protection and counter-insurgency strategies are not the primary focus of their intercultural program.\textsuperscript{17} This caveat may correspond to the fact that the Bundeswehr’s primary task is still viewed as a “national and collective defense in the classical sense.”\textsuperscript{18}

Training

Structurally, the German military has created a “Central Coordination Office for Intercultural Competence.” This office is housed within the Leadership Development and Civic Education Center (Innere Führung), and is the central point of contact for issues related to intercultural competence. The office focuses on establishing policy documents, training aids and programs, and coordinating other relevant training courses through German federal and military universities and training academies.\textsuperscript{19} The Central Coordination Office offers a training package that includes cross-cultural awareness elements during basic training, pre-deployment training and a course entitled “Intercultural Competence for Multipliers.” The goal of the “Multipliers” course is to train personnel to implement cross-cultural training and address cross-cultural issues with their peers and subordinates throughout their military service. The course is primarily geared towards officers and higher-ranking military members with the intent that they will spread cross-cultural competence theory and practice among their units.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, the course focuses this intensive intercultural education towards professional military members with
the belief that it will improve their ability to react ethically in conflict situations where cultural differences exist.\textsuperscript{21}

The Bundeswehr views general cultural awareness and cultural competence as a lifelong learning process that is ideally divided into four phases. Phase I includes the general cultural awareness training for all military members during basic training. Phase II incorporates culture-specific training as part of pre-deployment preparation in addition to quick-reference “smart cards” that list basic cultural facts and key language phrases on a pocket-sized reference sheet. Phase III involves coaching from Intercultural Operational Advisors while in theater and Phase IV relates to reintegrating deployment experiences into relevant “lessons learned” seminars.\textsuperscript{22}

The “Intercultural Operational Advisors” referenced in Phase III of the German cultural competence learning process can be either civilians or military personnel. These advisors are regional experts who are co-located with high-level military leaders to provide a deeper understanding of the cultural layers of a region. The advisors maintain contacts with the local population in theater and have a network of specialists in Germany from which to draw additional information. In the future, the German military hopes to provide operational advisors to the lower ranks as well to answer questions and discuss experiences.\textsuperscript{23}

AUSTRALIA

Doctrine

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) operational handbook on “Working Amongst Different Cultures” defines culture as “the shared concepts that guide what people believe, how
they behave and how this behavior is interpreted.” The handbook uses the “iceberg metaphor” to illustrate both the visible aspects and the hidden underlying drivers of a culture, and notes that within any given culture there are discernible subcultures as well.

Like the German military, the Australian military advocates cultural awareness for all members. In fact, the Australian Army’s Future Land Operating Concept states that “All members of the Land Force (including interagency elements) must possess cultural competency and therefore must be trained in basic media, communication, cultural and linguistic skills and specific in-country knowledge.” But in a somewhat different approach from Germany, Australia’s doctrine also includes a very specific focus on the battlefield advantage brought by cultural knowledge. For example, the Australian Army lists as one of its “design rules” the following: “The Army is to regard cultural, societal and language Capabilities as combat multipliers and as such, these skills need to be developed across all corps’ and managed as a resource across the Army. Every soldier acts as a tactical ambassador whose cultural competence is a force multiplier.” In this way, Australian doctrine emphasizes cultural capability as a warfighting rather than peacekeeping tool.

Even when the Australian military uses the same terms as the German military, the shared terms carry different nuances. In his “Commander’s Intent” in 2009, the Chief of the Australian Army urged commanders to strive for “cultural empathy” in training and on operations. However, within the Australian Army empathy is viewed not just as sensitivity towards other cultures, but as a deeper level of understanding thought processes and motivating factors. This inclusion of motivating factors within the definition of empathy reinforces the Australian emphasis on cultural empathy as a tool to win conflicts in addition to building rapport.
Training

Cultural training is a relatively new phenomenon in the Australian military. As recently as 2009 there was no formalized cultural training within the Australian Army. Training objectives were left to the commander’s discretion; as a result the Australian soldier has relied on the “good bloke” approach to dealing with foreign cultures.\(^{29}\) This gap was addressed by the Australian Defence Force’s 39\(^{th}\) Personnel Support Battalion (PSB) when they began offering Force Preparation Training to military service members as well as government civilians in advance of deployment.\(^{30}\)

In 2010, the 39\(^{th}\) PSB determined that their cultural awareness module was rudimentary and lacked academic depth, so an effort was made to contract academics to support cultural training. One result was to provide a contracted specialist with access to academic knowledge and country/region subject matter experts to develop training, to ensure that the training “will continually evolve.”\(^{31}\) In August of 2011, the 39\(^{th}\) PSB began offering a two-part training package. The first element was a 2-hour generic orientation to culture titled “Understanding Culture.” The training includes a generic cultural awareness element that emphasizes the tangible role cultural knowledge provides as a force protection measure, as well as a mission enabler.\(^{32}\) The second element entails a 70-minute country-specific culture brief that discusses elements of language, religion, tribes/social structure, etiquette, traditions, negotiations, and gender rules of the target country.\(^{33}\)

The operational handbook mentioned referenced earlier was also prepared as a resource for deploying personnel. It emphasizes that positive perceptions of ADF military members will facilitate force protection, intelligence, and popular support, and that success can only be
understood in terms of stability and positive change in the local culture. Overall, the handbook addresses culture in three parts: (1) the key aspects of culture (identity, behavior, religion, law and justice, and politics), (2) communicating across cultures, and (3) working with partners such as interpreters and non-governmental agencies. In addition, the handbook advocates “deployed cultural advisors” (CULADS) and human terrain teams as sources of information.

Besides the 39th PSB, the Australian Centre for Army Lessons (CAL) offers pre-deployment booklets covering the countries to which the ADF deploys. CAL’s focus differs from the Personnel Support Battalion in that it also manages a website that includes lessons learned, operational reports and video images to help individuals prepare for deployment. In addition, Australia’s Adaptive Warfare Branch provides “quick reference cards” similar to Germany’s smart cards that outline different ethnic groups and etiquette tips for soldiers.

Soldiers who have an identified talent for a language may be sent to the Australian Defense Force School of Languages for three months to study a language and learn cultural empathy. Upon completion, the soldiers mentor their own units through cultural presentations and running their own language training. On a yearly basis, commanders issue their training directive and if they are aware of a pending deployment can include cultural training in their plan. However this program is not mandated and is at the commander’s discretion.

The Australian Combat Training Center offers more hands-on cultural training. For example, the Center uses vignettes to highlight the challenges of mentoring foreign militaries. The Tactical Commanders Orientation Package (TCOP) is aimed at platoon commanders and noncommissioned officers. Although not wholly aimed at cultural issues, the course uses guest speakers, vignettes and academic resources to address more culture-related challenges in
counterinsurgency operations. Mission Rehearsal Exercises at Australia’s Combat Training Centre also incorporate cultural aspects. Role players simulate local police, religious leaders and provincial government authorities as well as the general population.

FRANCE

Doctrine

The importance that France places on understanding the culture(s) in an area of operations is illustrated by a number of doctrinal French papers. For example, the French Defence and National Security White Paper of 2008 emphasizes the need for “insight into the politics, society and culture of potential theaters of operation.” The preceding year, the French Joint Forces Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation issued a Crisis Management Concept (2007) that outlined the importance of support from the local population during international and intercultural operations by explaining that “popular support is a determining factor for success in both tactical and strategic terms.” Similarly, The French Counterinsurgency Manual specifically lays out the need for cultural information:

For all, the global knowledge on natives’ culture has to allow getting in touch with the population by avoiding behavior misconduct. For the command, it is about knowing the environment in all its dimensions (politics, history, culture, human and physical geography, religion, economy, etc.) in order to grasp all the complexity of the situation and try to understand the intentions of the various protagonists.

The preceding examples illustrate the French military’s view that winning over the local population through cultural understanding is an integral factor in both tactical and strategic success. France defines operational culture as “the understanding of foreign cultural norms,
beliefs and attitudes: it is an operationally relevant field guide used by general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate a complex human terrain.46

Much of this philosophy was developed by two famous French military officers, Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey, who established the first principles of expeditionary operations that integrated operational culture in the late 1800s.47 These military strategists emphasized the importance of understanding local political, social and economic culture and local languages in order to conduct effective civil-military and information operations.48

Training

In contrast to Germany and Australia, French doctrine adopts a distinctly long-term approach to cultural learning. France’s history of colonialism is an important factor in the French military’s current view of cultural learning as a career-long process. As the retired French military officer Colonel Henri Bore´ explains, the French Army has been developing the concept of operational culture over the last 100 years, and the primary lesson learned is that “operational cultural learning is a long-term process.”49 Like other nations, the French view cultural training in relation to the cultural “iceberg.” However, their timeline differs drastically. In the French view, it takes approximately a year to gain cultural awareness to see the visible aspects of culture (the tip of the iceberg) and to understand what has been seen and why it is important. It takes between two to three years to begin to discern the hidden aspects of the cultural iceberg, and approximately ten years to gain true cultural competency.50

French cultural training does not follow a pre-determined template. The primary organization responsible for administering cultural training is the Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l’Outre-Mer et l’Etranger (French Military School for Service Abroad), referred to as
EMSOME. EMSOME itself was established over 100 years ago.\textsuperscript{51} As a training model, EMSOME emphasizes the target culture’s traditions, beliefs, political and social systems and local hierarchies in order to effectively employ psychological operations, elicit intelligence (HUMINT) and conduct civil-military operations. EMSOME provides training to all units and individuals prior to deployment.\textsuperscript{52}

In terms of focus, “EMSOME emphasizes the ‘so what’ of operational culture in its seminars, and small-unit leaders convey their experiences to each other at the battalion level.” In fact, because there is no specific job title or mission occupational code for intelligence in the French military, all squad leaders and team leaders are required to understand the geo-political situation.\textsuperscript{53} All cadets in the French officer training academies take part in a course on Intercultural Relations and Negotiations with the intent to teach future leaders how to analyze and understand foreign cultures.\textsuperscript{54}

Often unit leaders and deploying individuals will attend courses at EMSOME, and when operations officers and security cooperation officers are readying for deployment their entire family will take part in a 1-2 week training course. More often, mobile training teams from EMSOME train both enlisted soldiers and officers at their locations.\textsuperscript{55} Unit commanders determine the course length and subjects covered, and military members experienced in the target culture conduct the instruction. The EMSOME mobile teams comprised of military personnel conduct most of the training, but also utilize local experienced personnel.\textsuperscript{56} The program’s purpose is to help company commanders train their platoon and squad leader by studying a country’s culture, history, economic issues, social norms and traditions to learn about the local population within France’s area of operations.”\textsuperscript{57} The logic behind using military
members to teach culture is that the mission determines what the requirements are for cultural knowledge. The instructor has to first understand the mission- security cooperation, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, etc.- in order to marry the cultural training with the tactical tasks.  

Training subjects encompass basic skills such as key survival phrases, societal greetings and numbers, as well as how to use an interpreter. Knowledge shared includes local geography, climate, infrastructure (roads, airfields, medical facilities) and the history of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in the area. “EMSOME updates the information provided by pervious rotations in the country, giving the battalion commander situational awareness of the support the local population needs in his future are of operations; schools to renovate, wells to dig, and bridges to repair.” While there is no formalized method for evaluating the benefits of the training, ENSOME revises its program content based on direct feedback from its uniformed members.

The in-depth nature of French cultural training is illustrated by their Africa training model. Before deployment, platoon leaders heading to Africa learn how to fight an insurgency, including how to apply the knowledge of local cultures, traditions and warfighting approaches when training local national militaries and militias and trying to win the support of the local populace. As Bore’ explains, cultural training should address complex questions such as the following: “How to be both a rifleman and a vital intelligence collector? How to translate subtle changes in the population’s habits or in individual behaviors into vital intelligence data? How to track guerilla infrastructure and simultaneously run pacification programs in our areas of
Responsibility?" In other words, French pre-deployment training focuses on the lesson that the hidden elements of local cultures are often the key to mission success.

UNITED KINGDOM

Doctrine

Although Great Britain’s Ministry of Defence was reluctant to provide specific information on its policies and programs related to cultural learning, some conclusions can be drawn from published doctrine. British doctrine emphasizes that cultural information across government departments should be available during the early stages of developing a campaign plan. For example, the United Kingdom’s Joint Note of 2009 emphasizes the fact that cultural training and education are critical to gain knowledge of “others with whom, amongst whom and against whom we operate.” The report describes the requirement for culture-generic education for all military members as well as culture-specific training as a component of pre-deployment preparation. In annex 5A, the Joint note outlines definitions for varying levels of cultural capability as well as the target audience for those levels of training and desired skills.

Training

In April of 2011, the United Kingdom established the “Defence Cultural Specialist Unit” (DCSU) to provide cultural awareness training to the British military. The DCSU has two goals: (1) to deploy effectively-trained Cultural Specialists (CULADs) into theater and, (2) to support cultural awareness training for deploying personnel. The DCSU has a longer-term goal to introduce cultural training across all services at the entry level.
The DCSU currently offers cultural awareness training through two venues, an “All Ranks Briefing” and two 45-minutes sessions for Tactical Commanders Cadre. At the intermediate level, DCSU offers a two-day Cultural Understanding Course and a Train the Trainer Course. Additionally, the DCSU developed a week-long “Cultural Specialist Level One” course to give personnel an understanding of local culture. The course is designed for all deploying personnel but particularly those who will have sustained contact with the local population. The “Cultural Specialist Level Two” course last approximately 20 weeks and is designed to cover anthropology, psychology, sociology and influencing skills. While the initial focus of the DCSU has been on Afghanistan, the intent is to broaden the framework to include other areas of operations.

As mentioned previously, the DCSU created a pool of deployable cultural advisors known as “CULADs.” Each advisor is a linguist and uses their regional expertise to advise senior military commanders at key decision points. The CULADs develop their expertise during the DCSU’s Advanced Cultural Specialist Program. The CULAD program is comprised of a two-week academic, culture-general course, followed by a fifteen-month language course. Upon completion of language training, the CULAD undergoes approximately 12 weeks of training in theater-specific operations, Information Operations and liaison activities. The CULAD course is completed with a final three to four-week block of training focusing on country/area-specific cultural characteristics, including power relationships, economics, politics, religion, history, etc. The total CULAD training packages encompasses approximately twenty months.
### Annex 5A- Levels of Cultural capability (United Kingdom Joint Note 5A-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Target Audience</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural Awareness</td>
<td>Basic knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their importance and impact, and the ability to apply this knowledge, skill and attitude to predictable scenarios to created desired effect.</td>
<td>All personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Understanding</td>
<td>Intermediate knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their importance and impact, the ability to apply this knowledge, skill and attitude to unpredictable scenarios and contribute to analysis of the effect</td>
<td>Personnel with duties specifically dealing with the local population, authorities or media, for example Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) personnel, Military Security and Stabilisation Teams (MSSTs) and those conducting Key Leadership Engagement. Personnel in Military Capacity Building embedded training teams. Personnel planning and directing influence activity and selected intelligence personnel. Personnel operating at the higher level of command engaged at political interface, liaison to other government departments and national authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Competence</td>
<td>Advanced knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their importance and impact, the ability to apply this knowledge, skill and attitude to unpredictable scenarios, and analyse and evaluate the effect in order to synthesise this evaluation to create new improved effect.</td>
<td>Personnel acting as cultural advisors to commanders and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bespoke</td>
<td>As required</td>
<td>Senior Commanders and Defence Attaches.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CANADA

**Doctrine**

Canada’s primary doctrine related to cultural learning is the Canadian Defence Force’s Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (2006). The publication outlines the requirement for a civil-military cooperation operator to have a sound understanding of the cultural context in which he or she is operating. Within the document, culture is defined as
“something that is shared by all or almost all members of some social group; something that the older members of the group try to pass on to the younger members, and something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behaviour or structures one’s perception of the world.” The document also defines cultural awareness as a “sustained sensitivity toward local customs, conventions, culture and ways of life is of fundamental importance to all missions.”

Similarly, the Canadian Army Training Authority’s Direction and Guidance (D&G) to the deploying Task Force Commander also addresses cultural awareness. This formalized guidance outlines all of the training the deploying Task Force must accomplish, and includes a paragraph dedicated to Security Force Advisor Training that specifically addresses cultural training. The document states that cultural awareness training must be tailored to enable a soldier to be employed as an advisor to Afghanistan national security forces (ANSF).

Interestingly, Canada also recently published a document entitled “Cultural Intelligence and Leadership” that advocates the development of cultural intelligence within the Defence Forces. The Canadian Defence Academy defines cultural intelligence as “the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific goal or range of activities.” This seems to combine a culture-general approach with the American concept of operational culture. For example, according to Cultural Intelligence publication, military members should be able to understand and articulate their own culture and identify and analyze cultural elements within the theater of operations that either help or hinder mission success. In addition, the military member is taught to react ethically in order to maintain legitimacy and credibility. This critical thinking skill, once developed, can be applied in any operational environment. A side benefit is that these cultural skills can be applied not only towards understanding local cultures, but also towards
improving relationships with coalition and international partners. The document notably cautions against relying upon culture-specific knowledge and observable behaviors to guide strategy, planning, decisions and action, given the complexity of cultural systems.78

**Training**

The Canadian Army’s Center of Excellence has overall responsibility for cultural awareness training, which is delivered under the auspices of the Canadian Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). Training is offered to any troops deploying overseas. The training delivery is contracted out through the Canadian Federal Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The DFAIT in turn assigns the task to their own school within their department that looks after the cultural awareness training of Canadian foreign diplomatic staff. The school is called the “Centre for Intercultural Learning” (CIL). In other words, the PSTC identifies what needs to be taught during cultural awareness training and the CIL delivers the training.79

Canadian cultural awareness training is designed to be conducted immediately prior to Security Force Advisor Training, as this captures most of their deploying personnel. The Peace Support Training Centre includes five days of cultural awareness as part of a formal two-week Afghan National Security Forces Advisor training. The course focuses on general orientation towards the host country’s culture and is targeted towards the specific mission. For example, when Canadian forces were fighting in Southern Afghanistan, the cultural awareness training was very Kandahar/Pashtu-centric. Now that Canadian forces have redeployed to Kabul and the north of Afghanistan, the PSTC has adopted a more general Afghan approach that includes Dari and Pashtu.80
Canadian cultural awareness training is conducted using a formal, structured curriculum that is entirely classroom-based. Training is interactive and draws on the experiences of previously-deployed soldiers. At a minimum there is one class facilitator from the Centre for Intercultural Learning and one Afghan Country Expert. A country expert is generally a native Afghan who has personal experience living and/or working in Afghanistan and often they have served with the international security assistance force as Language Assistants or as civilians within the ANSF or with senior Afghan leaders. A significant number of the Afghan Country Experts have been relocated to Canada because their services to ISAF/Canada have made it too dangerous for them to remain in Afghanistan.  

In general, personnel assigned to small missions such as Egypt or Lebanon will spend a day with a country expert contracted from the DFAIT. With regards to Afghanistan, personnel deploying into staff positions receive two days of cultural awareness training, compared with ANSF Advisors who receive 4.5 days of training that is directly tied into the Security Force Advisor Training package. Canada’s ANSF Advisor Training stresses the following five themes: credibility, patience, dignity, respect/gender roles, and expectation management. Everything taught is linked directly towards reinforcing those five themes. In addition, the PSTC has recently added 1.5 days of language instruction for personnel deploying as advisors, with the goal of learning 10-15 key phrases for greetings, rapport building, and ice-breaking. The language curriculum is tied into the course themes of credibility and respect. 

To date, the Canadian military has not formally evaluated the program’s training effectiveness or conducted a formal validation of the training, and is instead relying on reports out of Theater from the Army Lessons Learned Officer. It is also important to note that similar to Australia, the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre integrates cultural familiarization into field
training exercises in preparation for deployment operations. The training includes role-playing along with lessons learned from previously deployed teams and advice for Cultural Advisors. Further discussion would be valuable to determine to what extent their computer and classroom-delivered cultural learning modules complement the field training exercises, and whether the exercises introduce a level of realism that improves the effectiveness of the learning taking place.

NORWAY

The Norwegian Army does not have a formalized doctrine or definition related to culture. While cultural training occurs at all levels of military training, the focus remains on general cultural awareness/sensitivity. The Norwegian Commander and Staff College retains responsibility for cultural understanding as an element of pre-deployment training, but the comprehensiveness of the training offered varies. For example, the Norwegian military addresses culture during a four-hour block of instruction its Ethics and Behaviour course. The instruction covers the UNESCO definition of culture and Gert Hofstede’s analogy that culture is like the “software portion of a computer.” The most frequent method of addressing culture is by field priests who are responsible for a one to two hour lecture in cultural sensitivity. Occasionally Afghanistan experts present briefings on cultural taboos and lessons learned from the field.

Norway hires social anthropologists to teach culture-general knowledge, but because the anthropologists are unfamiliar with military operations, and consequently service members sometimes view their contributions as having limited operational relevance. The Norwegian military has begun to integrate human terrain analysis by analyzing social and cultural power relations between groups and actors in the area of operations. However, this is more focused
towards intelligence preparation of the battlefield for the commander rather than broad perspectives for the entire unit.\textsuperscript{85} Norway has also implemented a “gender perspective” training course that relates to operations both in Norway and in war zones, and gender roles remain the primary cultural factor for which Norway has developed in-depth training.\textsuperscript{86}

Margrethe Haug, a social anthropologist with the Norwegian Army, notes that the demand for cultural understanding has grown from the bottom up, as soldiers and officers bring home their deployment experiences.\textsuperscript{87} Because the training is not doctrinally required, its implementation remains ad hoc.\textsuperscript{88} The responsibility for providing training rotates between the Battalions responsible for the deploying group, and as a result the training content and presentation methods vary. Much of the responsibility for cultural lessons learned falls to the recently re-deployed units who take part in advising during pre-deployment training and exercises for the new unit.

NEW ZEALAND

Overview

New Zealand offers a unique perspective on cultural awareness as a consequence of its own indigenous Maori culture. During initial or basic training, the military examines its own organizational culture. Two of the services, the New Zealand Army and Navy, utilize elements of the Maori culture in order to establish a common service culture. For example, the Services integrate traditional customs for a formal welcome and farewell ceremony before and after missions. Members of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) believe this understanding of their own cultural roots plays a large part in preparing service members for service in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{89}
When preparing for deployment, the NZDF conducts formal cultural training as part of a pre-deployment training package. For Pacific island nations, the training is limited to a country brief since the NZDF still retains a significant amount of experience within the island nations and their own Maori culture and language has some commonalities. For missions in less familiar surroundings, the NZDF offers basic language and culture training. The training is comprised of approximately ten different forty-minute modules. The modules provide a country-specific overview, instruction on specific cultural interaction and lessons learned from personnel experienced in the region. The modules also include language familiarization covering greetings and language related to rules of engagement prior to the use of force. Once in theater, service members become skilled in the use of interpreters.90

THAILAND

Overview

Thailand is a strong supporter of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPK), and became a member of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System in 1998. Since that time, Thailand has deployed under the UNPK aegis to Korea, Iraq, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Burundi, Sudan and Nepal, and other humanitarian assistance missions. Thailand has not formalized culture-general or cultural awareness training, but instead utilizes the guidelines provided by the UN Peace Operations and Core Pre-Deployment Training doctrine and applies those guidelines to Thailand’s own Peace Operation Process Study and Training Doctrine.

The United Nation’s Peacekeeping Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials intrinsically connect cultural knowledge with the legitimacy of U.N. operations. The United Nations lists
international legitimacy as one of the most important assets of a peacekeeping mission, and states that perceptions of an operation’s legitimacy can change based on the respect shown to local customs, cultural artifacts, institutions and laws.\textsuperscript{91} The training materials further outline that it is critical for peacekeeping personnel to have an understanding of local history, culture and values.\textsuperscript{92} In addition, the United Nations Basic Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping explains that peacekeeping personnel should have “have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and culture in the mission area, as well as the Capacity to assess the evolving interests and motivation of the parties.”\textsuperscript{93}

Once an upcoming deployment is identified, all team members (military, both officer and enlisted ranks, and civilian) begin a four to six month full-time training program. In addition to the subject areas outlined by the UN, Thailand adds course content related to the target region’s history, geography, politics, economy, military, and roots of the conflict.\textsuperscript{94} Thailand utilizes both civilian and military instructors and combines the instruction with language studies. The training is generally ad hoc and in response to a crisis situation or peacekeeping mission.

**BRAZIL**

**Overview**

Brazil does not have formalized doctrine with regard to operating in foreign cultures. However, participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Lebanon and Haiti are beginning to spur the demand to address this topic area. At the present, this need is met by officers and noncommissioned officers with experience in the target regions presenting lessons learned and conducting training exercises with relevant cultural components.\textsuperscript{95} Interestingly, one
Brazilian officer related he does not feel cultural differences present a significant problem to the Brazilian troops when deployed as Brazilians “in a natural way deal pretty well with other nations” and that positive interaction is facilitated by the openness of Brazilian culture.

SINGAPORE

Overview

The Singapore Armed Forces does not have an existing cultural training program, as its focus is more regional than global. As a result, cultural differences stemming from operating in a far removed region are not viewed as a significant operational factor. Additionally, cultural factors are well understood by the Singapore population given its diversity, international flavor and geographic position. In those unusual instances where servicemen are deployed into unfamiliar locations such as Afghanistan, pre-deployment training is offered on an “as needed” basis.

SUMMARY OF APPROACHES

After reviewing the approaches towards integrating culture among the preceding ten nations, it is evident that many similarities exist. Most countries have developed a tiered approach when addressing culture, and have a basic cultural awareness course for all military members as its foundation. Five of the ten nations use “cultural advisors” or specialists as a resource for deployed military leaders. Four countries- Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom- have dedicated schools for cultural education (Annex A).
Where differences exist between countries, the national defense strategies and priorities of those countries may provide a reason. For example, Germany’s emphasis on cultural empathy may reflect the fact that for the most part, the Bundeswehr participates only in peacekeeping missions and the traditionally defensive role of the military. In contrast, Australia, Canada and France employ a distinctly operational approach towards culture, utilizing cultural knowledge as an enabling tool and force multiplier during counterinsurgency and stabilization missions. France remains unmatched in its focus on the long-term development of cultural expertise in a geographic area throughout the military member’s entire career, possibly as a result of its colonial history. Also unique, Canada offers the only “whole of government” approach where the training conducted includes the ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, whereas Australia is the only working document that addresses culture between coalition partners.97

**Applications for the U.S.**

As mentioned previously, Australia offers an Internet-based repository of lessons learned for its personnel. Often the lessons learned are discussed during mission rehearsal exercises in preparation for deployment. Unfortunately, in most cases this sharing of information remains optional, informal, and lacks standardization. It may be beneficial to examine how the U.S. military can consistently capture both cultural success stories and critical cultural failures and propagate them as inexpensive but valuable reference tools for future deployments.

Next, the apparent value of general culture awareness training is reflected in the fact that each country in this study (with the exception of Singapore) includes it either as part of basic military training or during pre-deployment preparations. The challenge is to avoid merely presenting a laundry list of factors that comprise a culture but provide no real benefit to the
warfighter. The Canadian Defence Force’s employment of “cultural intelligence” offers a potentially effective alternative to more simplistic cultural awareness training. In particular, it represents a low-cost, high-return training model by applying critical thinking skills to a foreign cultural environment, with the aim to prevent the types of individual cultural mistakes that have a disproportionate strategic impact.

Finally, while it is practical to develop a cost-effective and flexible model to help the military prepare for the cultural operating environments of the future, in-depth regional expertise will always be required to understand the complex and underlying cultural factors affecting any given area of operations. A majority of the countries included in this study have filled this requirement with a cadre of experts, such as the United Kingdom’s cultural advisors (CULADs) and Germany’s Intercultural Operational Advisors. The advisors are often academic experts or natives of the region who are hired on an ad hoc basis. These experts do not necessarily have to deploy in order to provide “reach back” expertise to military units. It is worth examining whether hiring and/or training a smaller cadre of cultural advisors presents a more advantageous cost-benefit model than developing in-depth, country-specific cultural training courses for large numbers of military personnel. Similarly, an expansion or reorientation of existing Foreign Area Officer programs may adequately meet this requirement.

REMAINING CHALLENGES

While the cultural learning programs compared between these ten countries vary in focus, intensity, and magnitude, almost all were spawned in reaction to ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether the training programs remain models that could or should be replicated in response to crises of a different type or location. The similarities in
cultural approaches identified between militaries, such as the use of cultural advisors, provide an implied consensus about a limited number of best practices. But the lack of formal assessment data regarding the effectiveness and utility of culture knowledge in military operations means that a number of questions remain unanswered. The challenge in the future will be to address the following issues:

1. What are the requirements for cultural knowledge?

   - Does every military member require cultural training to operate effectively? Should the training be tailored depending upon the audience (intelligence, general purpose forces) or rank?
   - What depth of cultural knowledge is required to operate effectively in a complex foreign environment?
   - Do general purpose forces actually need culture-specific knowledge, or can they be taught to adapt to foreign cultures through analytical thinking similar to Canada’s “cultural intelligence” training? Is it possible that an adaptive, flexible mindset is more valuable in deciphering local cultures than a framework of specific knowledge?

2. Does the type of mission (peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance) affect the depth of cultural knowledge and method of training required?

3. Is cultural knowledge enough by itself, or should it be paired with language?

   - Can a culture be adequately understood without also understanding its language? If not, at what point are basic language skills required and for whom? What level of proficiency does cultural “expertise” require?

4. How can predictive intelligence help prepare for future operations?

   - How can we develop and maintain a sufficient breadth of cultural expertise in a resource-constrained environment?
- How can the military be better poised to react quickly with the requisite cultural expertise in response to an unanticipated crisis?

5. How can we adequately capture the cultural “lessons learned” and integrate them into future operational planning?

6. In the end, what evidence exists that cultural training improves operational effectiveness?

- Given the fact that none of the countries surveyed have a formal process to evaluate the effectiveness of their programs, how do we know cultural training actually works?
- Is the end result worth the financial investment?

CONCLUSION

Given limited financial resources and the uncertainty over the locations and types of future crises, cultural learning programs need to be flexible, easily adapted and offer immediate utility. The preceding review of cultural learning programs among foreign militaries reveals a number of common approaches, such as the employment of cultural advisors and the requirement for cultural training that is easily digested and rapidly and broadly available to general purpose forces. These commonalities imply that the similar approaches offer utility and effectiveness to military operations, but formal assessment is critical to validate this assumption. The review also highlights further issues the military must address in order to build the right type and amount of cultural capability. Investments in cultural learning and expertise cannot be made effectively and appropriately until the Services are able to definitively answer these challenging questions.
## Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cultural Awareness</th>
<th>Cultural Competency (country-specific)</th>
<th>Cultural Advisors / Experts</th>
<th>Formal Training School</th>
<th>Primary Content Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Cultural self-awareness, empathy, stabilization efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Empathy and understanding as a force multiplier in COIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Long-term operational culture to win popular support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Understanding is crucial to conduct effective campaigns/operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Peacekeeping, Security Advisors, Cultural Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Cultural sensitivity, Deployment Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Basic cultural awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Occasional pre-deployment training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Bore, Henri, Lt Col (Retired), French military, personal interview, 7 Nov 2011.


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