North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the only organisation that can drive operations in Afghanistan forward and it can only be achieved through the implementation of a comprehensive approach (CA) under a unified command. Thus both unity of command and unity of effort will be required to arrive at a common end state.

The challenges in Afghanistan remain very significant, but with a clear and realistic strategy, unity of command and effort, and greater international coordination through NATO strategic success can be achieved.
NATO: THE KEY TO STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

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Executive Summary

Title: NATO: The Key to Strategic Success in Afghanistan

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Thesis: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the only organisation that can drive operations in Afghanistan forward and it can only be achieved through the implementation of a comprehensive approach (CA) under a unified command. Thus both unity of command and unity of effort will be required to arrive at a common end state.

Discussion: NATO and subsequently ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) have been intimately involved in operations in Afghanistan for nearly 10 years (see Appendix A). Across many nations in the Alliance there is a sense of operational fatigue and stagnation. To address this issue and with a view to achieving strategic success NATO’s concept of a CA within ISAF has been re-invigorated. Fundamental to this concept is the development of a strategic design that establishes overarching goals, objectives, and end state. With the political will to develop this strategy declared by the Alliance states at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 NATO now needs to drive this concept and policy forward to a successful conclusion.

In the process of executing this strategic design NATO will have to set the conditions for a safe and secure environment through stability, reconstruction, and development. For success to be achieved this CA will need to be developed, embraced, and executed by all contributing nations. Within the plan a unified joint command structure must be established with one clear chain of command working to NATO HQ where the political interface and strategic decisions can take place.

There are several risks and threats to achieving strategic success in Afghanistan which include the evolving insurgency, the impact of external actors, the lack of stability within the Afghan government, the limitations of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), continued political will and the use of narcotics to fund the insurgency within Afghanistan. These challenges, risks and threats are not insurmountable and strategic success can be achieved if realistic goals, objectives, and end state are established. This paper recommends the road to strategic success in Afghanistan can only be achieved by NATO through ISAF formally adopting the CA and focusing on unity of command, purpose and effort. Only then will the key issues that are restricting progress in Afghanistan be addressed.

Conclusion: The challenges in Afghanistan remain very significant, but with a clear and realistic strategy, unity of command and effort, and greater international coordination through NATO strategic success can be achieved.
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Preface

Allied operations in Afghanistan have been ongoing since 2001 (see Appendix B). NATO and her coalition partners’ goals remain focused on stabilising the nation, denying terrorists a safe haven from which to operate, and returning governance to the country. Some would question if the situation in Afghanistan has improved significantly in the last nine years and, indeed, if ISAF under NATO command is best suited to achieving strategic success in this complex operating theatre.

This paper will argue that NATO is the key to strategic success in Afghanistan. I have reviewed and analysed two fundamental questions: What is strategic success and why is NATO the key to achieving this? In achieving strategic success, NATO faces several challenges. These include setting the conditions for a stable and secure environment while developing a nation, achieving strategic patience amongst the 48 contributing nations, national caveats and the imbalance in burden sharing across the Alliance, troop contributions, Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and the lack of a comprehensive approach (CA), and a unified command structure. As well as these challenges, NATO faces several critical threats to achieving strategic success in Afghanistan. These include an evolving insurgency, the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), the development to full operating capability (FOC) of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), the political will of the international community (IC), and the underlying destabilising influence of narcotics within Afghanistan. Regional actors bring additional challenges to achieving strategic success in Afghanistan but fall outside the parameters of this paper.

This paper argues that NATO needs to redefine more realistic goals and objectives to reach an achievable end state. The Alliance can achieve this through the adoption of a CA. One of the
key tenants within the CA, which is fundamentally missing in NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, is unity of command, purpose, and effort. With the implementation of these essential principles NATO can lay out a future strategy for success in Afghanistan.

As a British officer who has been deployed to Afghanistan on more than one occasion in the last nine years, I am passionate about this subject. The focus of the British national security strategy and that of most troop contributing nations is the current operation in Afghanistan. Although much research has been done on this subject, I have yet to read a compelling case with supporting evidence that argues the key to the strategic success in Afghanistan is NATO.

In analysing this subject I have exposed the limitation of an alliance which was formed in response to the emerging Soviet threat after the Second World War. Many would argue that NATO is failing to address the core issues that dominate this complex and irregular contemporary operation.

The open and non-biased approach I have taken in this paper aims to provoke thought and discussion within the professional military and government community. In reviewing this contemporary, and continually evolving, subject I faced many challenges, including analysing the recent past and projecting an assessment into the future. For many of us this has been a long and relentless campaign with no end in sight. This paper hopefully provides vision and a road map through which a strategic end state in Afghanistan can be reached. With a myriad of uncertainties surrounding this subject the paper will, as an absolute minimum, provoke thought, discussion and debate.

I have not addressed in any detail tactical operations in theatre. However, certain themes, approaches, and concepts will be referenced. Also I have not covered the strategy of any specific
nation involved in operations in Afghanistan. Rather I have focused on key challenges, issues, and themes that are impacting the chances of success.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their continued support and understanding as we continue on this Afghan journey. As with many other military professionals we have been on this path for nearly ten years now and as yet the end of the road is not in sight.
"When the strategy is wrong, doubling the effort only squares the error."\(^1\)

**INTRODUCTION**

As operations in Afghanistan have entered their tenth year with no end in sight, NATO needs to assume primacy by unifying the divergent and at times conflicting ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) operations through the unity of command and unity of effort. This can be achieved through the employment of NATO's CA and the development of a combined Joint Civil-Military Campaign Plan, which would focus on achievable and realistic operational goals, objectives, and end-state.

This paper addresses the key issues NATO faces during a time of political uncertainty and questionable strategic patience. The challenges and risks that NATO is confronted with in Afghanistan are diverse and complex. Addressing them through a comprehensive approach is vital if strategic success is to be achieved. This paper thus recommends the road NATO needs to take to achieve strategic success. There are two common themes and assumptions in it: NATO is the only organisation that can drive this operation forward, and it can only be done though the implementation of a CA under a unified command. Thus both **unity of command** and **unity of effort** will be required to arrive at a common end state.

**CONTEXT**

NATO was born in April 1949 as an alliance "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down"\(^2\) and has survived for over 60 years. Since its inception NATO has grown from the original twelve founding members to 28 nations. Since the end of the Cold War its focus has transformed significantly. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States caused NATO to invoke Article 5 (see Appendix C) of its Charter for the first time in its history. Subsequently, under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 ISAF was
created on 20 December 2001, calling upon NATO to provide security, governance, reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan. (Appendix D).

Initially led by the U.S. the ISAF mission was limited to Kabul and the surrounding region. In August 2003 NATO assumed command of ISAF, with responsibilities which now expanded to country wide stabilization and focused on population-centric counterinsurgency objectives. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) then passed the current resolution 1883 on the 23 September 2008. The resolution directs NATO to provide security and law and order, promote governance and development, help reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide security for elections, and provide assistance to the GIROA in addressing the narcotics industry.

To take the mission forward in Afghanistan the NATO heads of state issued a further declaration at a Lisbon summit on 20 November 2010. In this they declared an enhanced contribution to a CA as part of the international community's (IC’s) effort to improve NATO's ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) effects. However, for this CA to be effective there needs to be a whole of government approach not just military.

The key issue at the root of NATO’s problems in Afghanistan is the lack of strategic design which has resulted in the disparate and uncoordinated efforts that have characterised IC activities in Afghanistan in the year’s since-2001. A strategic design that clearly articulates the political objectives and end-state could hold the key to strategic success. However, there is no point in developing a strategic design that embodies a CA if the question of feasibility is not addressed. The fundamental question thus arises: can the mission be accomplished? This paper will aim to answer that question and in doing so will highlight that all operational objectives need to be addressed for this to be achieved. These objectives, outlined in Commander ISAF's
Campaign Overview in June 2010, (see Appendix G) are by de facto the cores of the problem and the key to the solution within Afghanistan. Years of under resourcing; failure by the GIROA through corruption and waste; the lack of civil-military cooperation; and no unity of command, purpose, and effort across the IC have had a serious effect on operations in Afghanistan.

The Alliance faces yet another problem: The "Americanisation" of operations in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan on 1 December 2009. This included the decision to commit a further 30,000 troops. However, this plan also outlined an exit strategy beginning in the summer 2011. This surge of troops and equipment has increased the momentum of operations in Afghanistan, but it will also test the Transatlantic Alliance. These U.S. policies are likely to un-balance the Alliance in the short term and severely impede the ability of NATO to achieve unity of command, purpose, and effort over time.

To achieve success in this multi-dimensional theatre, several factors must be addressed. NATO's strategy must be part of a detailed plan which is implemented at all levels. While addressing the short falls within NATO and ISAF's campaign plans it is vital that national caveats and restrictions are overcome and eliminated from the operational theatre. Within any coordinated plan the GIROA must be central so as to ensure resources are employed effectively to reverse any gains made by insurgents and assume the initiative in the near term. Throughout this process the support of the Afghan people will be the measure of effectiveness. Wars are now fought for the people and amongst the people. Thus, it is the people who are the prize and the strategic goal.

**STRATEGIC SUCCESS**

Strategic success in Afghanistan can only be achieved through clear strategic direction. NATO needs to take ownership of the strategic vision outlined at the Bucharest summit in April
2008, which established four guiding principles to assist the GIROA in rebuilding its country (see Appendix H). What this ‘strategic vision’ failed to do was articulate the ‘ways and means’ by which NATO and ISAF would achieve those objectives. NATO must now be mandated to create a strategic design, based on a common overarching political goal, which will ensure the foundations are in place for the development of an integrated campaign plan. This plan should set out the framework via the ‘ways and means’ by which the overarching political goal, objectives, and end state are achieved. Within the plan COMISAF and the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) should assume overall operational command in theatre, with political direction coming from one source: the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This will thus ensure unity of command and effort is achieved. Only once the political goal, objectives, and end state are defined can NATO drive the mission forward in an effort to achieve strategic success.

**NATO Alliance: Key to Strategic Success**

Why is NATO and not ‘a coalition of the willing’ the key to strategic success in Afghanistan? NATO has the international credentials and track record of gaining the political will of Alliance members plus the approval and legitimacy across the IC. In addition, NATO is an effective political-military alliance based on common values of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Its enduring purpose is to protect the freedom and security of its members. NATO’s values and objectives are collectively recognised, lasting in their nature, and accepted as legitimate by the UN. These geopolitical credentials are fundamental to an organisation empowered to achieve strategic success in Afghanistan. Their status on the international stage is recognised by many as the foundations on which to develop and build mission success. Finally, NATO’s declared end state is to assist GIROA in exercising and extending its state authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction.
and effective governance. This ‘whole of government’ approach is vital to success in Afghanistan and aligns with President Hamid Karzai’s stated goal to assume responsibility for the security of his country in 2014. His plan was ratified by the NATO heads of state in Lisbon last year.

**Principal Challenges Confronting NATO in Afghanistan**

The end-state needs to embrace the requirements for a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and a sustainable economy. However, NATO continues to face growing pressure from troop contributing nations for a quick win and a subsequent rapid withdrawal. **Strategic patience** is a key issue exacerbated by NATO members withdrawing their troops in recent months and planned drawdown and exit strategies being initiated as early as summer 2011. The issue of **caveats and diverging rules** of engagement severely limit the employment and effectiveness of many troop contributing countries. This has a **serious impact on the unity of effort** across the operational theatre. Additionally, there is a failure to provide adequate troops, both in number and employability, which fuels uncertainty and animosity amongst coalition partners.

There continues to be a lack of coordination, management and unity of purpose between military forces, Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and other actors across the IC. NATO’s CA is clearly articulated but as yet not actioned. ISAF’s lack of unity of command, effort, or purpose further exposes the requirement for a strategy incorporating this CA. Many NGOs, aid workers, and non-military organisations respond to the priorities of their country’s capitals and not the GIROA or ISAF needs. This **national branding** of uncoordinated aid efforts is endemic in an operational theatre with the complexities prevalent in Afghanistan. There is little or no fiscal control over the allocation of resources, priority of contractual work,
apportionment of aid effort and addressing the major issue of corruption within the GIROA.\textsuperscript{14} These issues highlight the diversity and complexity of the challenges facing NATO, ISAF and the IC in Afghanistan.

**Lack of a Comprehensive Approach (CA).** In adopting a joint CA NATO is faced with three critical issues: achieving consensus on how the Alliance should apply the CA; developing doctrine, procedures, and thinking within NATO that can be adopted by other actors in Afghanistan; and establishing effective cooperation with other organisations and local actors within Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{15} The Alliance first endorsed the concept of the CA at a summit in Riga in November 2006.\textsuperscript{16} The Action Plan for developing and implementing NATO's contribution to CA was finally adopted at a summit in Bucharest in April 2008. This stated one of the guiding principles for continued operations in Afghanistan was "a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts."\textsuperscript{17} Almost three years later little headway has been made in adopting a CA due in part to a lack of consensus in three key areas. Firstly, should NATO revert to regional security in the transatlantic region, or assume a key role in the management of global security issues in cooperation with like-minded democratic countries in other parts of the world?\textsuperscript{18} Profound disagreement over this fundamental issue between member states has had a detrimental effect on the development of NATO's CA role.

The second issue obstructing the implementation of a CA is the level of military involvement. What role the military should play in stabilization, reconstruction, and development in the aftermath of war is a fiercely debated topic at national level and within NATO HQ. The structure, command relationships and unity of effort are contributing factors to this issue.
Finally, and specific to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan, is the relationship between counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and CA. Many nations believe a coordinated approach, including combat operations where necessary, go hand in hand with reconstruction. However, there is another very different school of thought that interprets the ISAF operation as a peace support mission focused on winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans through reconstruction and development (R&D). This issue is endemic in nations with different strategic cultures and threat perceptions, and goes far deeper than the interpretation of what and how to implement a CA within an Alliance and across the IC.

Unified Joint Command Structure. ISAF under NATO command is led from a four-star multi-national headquarters, based in Kabul and commanded by U.S. Army General David Petraeus (see Appendix I). NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides political direction for the mission. The strategic command and control (C2) comes from NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), based in Mons, Belgium. NATO’s Joint Force Command Headquarters provides theatre operational command based in the Netherlands while ISAF commands the five Regional Commands (RC) in Afghanistan. Petraeus is also the commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), the U.S. led counter-insurgency mission known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) provides operational command for USFOR-A while strategic and political C2 comes from Washington DC through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCoS) and ultimately the U.S. Commander in Chief (CinC), President Barack Obama. While these two chains of command exist there will continue to be confusion, duplication, and operational disparity which will impact on operational effectiveness and negate unity of command, purpose, and effort, all of which remain vital tenants
to the CA. This is a key weakness of the operations in Afghanistan and NATO is the only organisation that can truly address this issue.

**Strategic Patience.** The opinion of many when asked, "Can NATO achieve strategic success in Afghanistan?" The response is, "NATO has the watches the Taliban has the time." The recent global economic crisis has resulted in an increased focus on domestic policy and less on international influence, effects, or security. Furthermore, internal to Afghanistan the momentum of the operation is still questionable. Insurgents continue to expand their areas of influence in the west and north, while uncertainty of re-infiltration in the south and east remains a real concern. In many tribal and border areas the Taliban continue to have influence and control. This has led to the perception amongst the IC that the insurgents are fighting a war of political attrition, waiting and knowing they possess the strategic patience. For the Taliban it is only a matter of time before NATO withdraws and they reoccupy Kabul.

**National Caveats.** Burden sharing is a fundamental requirement of a healthy alliance; however, national caveats have created a two-tiered alliance of those who are willing to sacrifice and fight and those who are not. For example, constraints imposed by the German government on their military training and advisory teams do not allow them to conduct offensive operations with their Afghan counterparts. NATO continues to try and minimize the number of caveats on troops deployed in support of the ISAF mission, but with mixed results. Both at the Riga meeting
in 2006 and another at Bucharest in 2008 NATO leaders pledged to continue to work on removing the limitations on their troops. This thorny issue needs addressing if unity of command and effort are to be truly achieved in Afghanistan.

In conjunction with the challenge of national caveats is troop contribution. Politically, 48 nations supporting operations seems remarkable until the figures are examined (see Appendix J). The U.S. has by some considerable margin the largest contribution to operations in Afghanistan. This is a mixed blessing, for it is neither healthy nor balanced to achieve mission success or unity of command under ISAF and not USFOR-A.

PRTs. NATO’s development role in Afghanistan is focused through the PRT’s. These civilian-military units of varying size and composition are designed to extend the authority of GIROA across the regional commands (RCs), providing security and undertaking reconstruction projects in support of the Afghan economy. There is, however, no established model for PRTs as each of the Alliance nations approach them in their own way (see Appendix K) and operate without a central concept of operations. There is no unifying chain of command and any coordination between teams to ensure best practice is achieved on an ad hoc basis. Another hindrance for many PRTs is that civilian aid and relief organisations do not want to be associated with the military forces as they believe this may jeopardise their own security and perceived neutrality. Although the PRTs share the same mission (see Appendix L), their structure, control of funds, and management vary significantly. Lack of planning, coordination, or financial control by ISAF has resulted in an incoherent approach to development because PRT projects cannot be measured against the needs identified in a plan. Ultimately, this limits development at local and district level. Although the aspiration is that the GIROA assume responsibility for planning and implementing projects to rebuild its country, without a coherent plan, closer coordination and
financial mentorship at this time, the money is likely to disappear through the hands of corrupt Afghan officials. A vehicle for success, however, remains the coordinated efforts of the PRTs.

**Fiscal Control and Allocation of Resources.** The lack of fiscal control, allocation and accountability of resources in support of a vast number of R&D projects in Afghanistan is ad hoc at best. The United States alone has invested more than $55 billion in projects ranging from construction of government buildings to economic development projects and salaries of U.S. government contractors working on these programmes.\(^{25}\) Without any formal checks and balances or coordination and control of the funding for R&D, no one can say with any authority how the money is being spent and to what effect. According to a recent audit by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), there is no way of knowing whether the money went for the intended purposes.\(^{26}\) This uncoordinated approach to R&D is a recipe for massive misappropriation of funds which in turn can lead to a secondary effect of undermining NATO, ISAF, and the IC. In the development of a CA, NATO must address this fundamental issue with cooperation from the GIROA and its Finance Ministry.

**CRITICAL RISKS AND THREATS TO STRATEGIC SUCCESS**

Challenges can be overcome and where required compromises found when tackling the issues outlined above. However, risks and threats are those issues that, if not addressed, could result in strategic failure. They are directly linked to COMISAF’s six objectives and the ISAF mission. If the insurgents are not defeated or, at a minimum, contained, the military mission in Afghanistan will have failed. Regional actors are fundamental to strategic success through diplomacy and a policy of inclusion. They should be viewed as strategic partners and key to medium and long term stability in Afghanistan. GIROA is pivotal and the key to this failing state achieving balance, security, and economic independence in the future. As the government
develops capabilities to manage the long term stability of the nation, the ANSF will become the key practitioners of Afghanistan’s will to maintain security, stability and the rule of law. One cannot be successful without the other.

**Evolving Insurgency.** For many of the Afghan population they see history repeating itself, perceiving the Taliban victory to be inevitable. ISAF has to reverse both this perception and the enemy’s momentum, by actively assisting in the development of a legitimate and effective government, through protecting the population, and by coordinating a comprehensive R&D programme.

This insurgency has had nearly 10 years to evolve, develop, and refine its business in Afghanistan. Insurgents speak the same language, have the same ethnicity as most of the population, and are not limited by any rules of engagement. As an enemy the Taliban are very adaptive, with no rigid hierarchy or central control. They have taken mission command to a new level. Their networks are generally distributed, difficult to defeat, and relatively easy to reconstitute with fighters and junior commanders. Their evolving techniques include improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which account for the greatest number of military and civilian casualties (see Appendix M). Critical for ISAF when considering realistic goals and objective is the Taliban do not have to defeat NATO or GIROA, they simply have to survive.

**GIROA.** Success, however limited, will not be achieved until the GIROA reverses its decline in public confidence and support. This directly plays into the hands of the insurgents who are able to demonstrate in many regions outside Kabul that they are a credible alternative to the government in the capital. NATO needs to address the issues of legitimacy, governance and Afghan rule of law concurrent with their robust drive and focus on S&R. One cannot be achieved without the other.
The GIROA’s lack of will or ability to address the issues of corruption, ineffectiveness, and capability which are necessary to gain public confidence and support directly threaten the ability to achieve operational success. GIROA’s High Office of Oversight (HOO) has attributed corruption in Afghanistan to several factors: the legacy of a quarter century of conflict, erosion of state institutions, irregular financing during the conflict from various sources, worsening tensions amongst ethnic and tribal groups, growth of informal and illicit economic activities, the growth in the drug trade, and the influx of international aid.27

ANSF. At a major international conference on Afghanistan in June 2010, President Hamid Karzai set a timetable for control to be transferred from ISAF to Afghan forces by 2014.28 This ambitious deadline relies heavily on the success of ISAF to contain the Taliban in its spiritual southern heartland while also enticing thousands of insurgents to lay down arms.29 It also depends on how fast ISAF and the IC are able to train and equip their Afghan counterparts. This announcement highlights a key deliverable, set against a clearly defined timeline. None-the-less, how realistic is this benchmark? The NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) figures do not read as favorably as the Afghan President’s perception (see Appendix N). As with all statistics, they can be misleading but the figures highlight a concern in a plan that requires increased resourcing and funding.

Political Will. The financial, political, and military support to operations in Afghanistan by NATO countries is often poorly explained by the respective leadership to their people. Hence public opinion in many European countries has swung in favour of troop withdrawal, as was the case with the Netherlands last year. If the political leadership across the Alliance explained in clear terms to their respective nations why being in Afghanistan and achieving strategic success is essential to the peace and security of people ‘half a world away’, then public opinion and
support would most likely be different. Re-establishing political will amongst NATO nations through the development of public understanding that a threat does exist is essential if those nations are not to become the next target for extremism. As Lord Robertson, the former Secretary General NATO, highlighted in his speech to the Atlantic council last year, “as long as Alliance governments remain reactive, preoccupied, and paralysed in their commitment to Afghanistan then so long we will be in trouble.”

**Countering Narcotics (CN).** The narcotics industry in Afghanistan poses a threat to GIROA as well as to its economy through the creation of a parallel economy corrupting every level of national institutions. It may be unrealistic to completely eliminate corruption in the narcotics economy within GIROA. The challenge for ISAF is the implementation of a strategy that contains, and then shrinks, the narcotics economy without adversely impacting the legitimate economy. The critical risk to any CN strategy in Afghanistan is the lack of political will and the perpetual demand for drugs internationally. However, redefining a comprehensive strategy across the Alliance, with GIROA acceptance, would go a considerable way to moving the international CN efforts in Afghanistan forward. Developing an Afghan capacity which would maintain pressure on the traffickers is the best ISAF solution to the CN problem.

**INITIAL ASSESSMENT: CAN NATO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN?**

Can the mission be accomplished? Yes, providing that success is defined in realistic and practical terms. Yes, providing the operation is properly resourced. The GIROA must be central to a comprehensive plan. Effective, robust, and integrated civil-military cooperation must be developed. Unity of effort must be embraced by all actors within Afghanistan, with operations commanded from ISAF in Kabul and strategically directed by NATO.
Realistic Goals, Objectives and End state. NATO must now define success in achievable terms. Afghanistan will never be a model of western democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Success therefore means a reasonable level of security and stability for the Afghan people; a stable and legitimate government, extending to local level; a social-economic programme that achieves an acceptable standard of living by current Afghan standards; and an end of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for international terrorism. For many developed nations this may not mean much; but for the Afghan people it would mean real hope and an end to generations of war and suffering. From these observations strategic and operation goals should be developed, built on realistic timelines, and a mutually agreed end state.

Recommended Road to Success

For a solution to be reached and strategic success to be achieved in Afghanistan NATO, the GIROA and the IC need to change the way they think, are organised, and plan and execute this multi-agency operation. The NATO leadership needs to realise that an integrated civilian-military structure is essential if a joint integrated campaign plan is to be successfully executed. The development of a CA must include a reinvigorated strategic direction, clearly defined objectives, well-resourced operations, and a campaign plan that empowers the operational leadership in-theatre. With this, the building blocks for the road to success would be in place.

NATO Structure – Integration of Civilian Expertise. Vital for NATO’s success in Afghanistan is the development of a coordinated and dedicated civil-military organisation across all levels within the ISAF and GIROA structure. These organisations need to be inextricably linked, ensuring mentors, advisors, and action officers are embedded within national, regional, and district government. Similarly, military commanders focused on the tasks of shape, clear, and hold within their area of responsibility (AOR) should have a NATO civilian counterpart.
focused on coordinating the build effort. These tasks and objectives should be embedded in the lines of operation that are developed from a Joint Campaign Plan. Coordination of civilian and multi-agency operations would be through the office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) who would work closely with COMISAF. The NATO SCR would be responsible for creating political strategic effect by supporting the interface between NATO HQ, ISAF HQ, the IC, and the GIROA to ensure plans and subsequent actions are in the interests of the Afghan people.

For the strategic plan to move forward under NATO's CA the relationship between the key leadership cannot be understated. General David Petraeus (COMISAF) and Ambassador Mark Sedwill NATO (SCR) need to work seamlessly together to achieve a comprehensive strategic effect under a unified command. Throughout this process the Afghan face must remain prominent ensuring the locals have a real stake in their future. There needs to be a cultural refocus from western priorities to those of the Afghan people in a way that suits their culture and values.

To achieve this fusion and focus the creation of the position of High Commissioner, (modelled on British operations in Malaya)\textsuperscript{34} to Afghanistan should be considered. He would become the single point of contact and interface between the IC, to include ISAF, and the key leadership within GIROA. Working group integration and liaison would continue with the office of the High Commissioner facilitating transparency, coordination, and strategic interface. A UN mandated High Commissioner, with appropriate direction and guidance from NATO Headquarters, representing all major international actors would be responsible for preparing and executing a combined joint integrated campaign plan aimed at achieving the political goal in line with GIROA's intent.\textsuperscript{35} This appointment would be politically driven and would need to be
acceptable to all, in particular President Karzai, who would need to have total confidence and trust that they are focused on the Afghans best interests.

**NATO's Adoption of a CA.** This is not a new concept for the international community (IC) in Afghanistan, bearing in mind NATO's CA Action Plan (CAAP)\(^{36}\) embodies many of the central themes recognised as key to achieving strategic success. NATO's definition of CA is 'a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors'.\(^{37}\)

NATO must now take ownership and develop a joint civil-military campaign plan with clearly defined strategic objectives and an agreed end state. Without this strategic design it will be very difficult to deliver a genuinely balanced CA incorporating unity of command, purpose, and effort. Operations in Afghanistan today remain stove piped, uncoordinated, and lacking any real measures of effectiveness. In the words of General David Petraeus (COMISAF), "we are trying to rebuild this aircraft in-flight."\(^{38}\) The team tasked with delivering this CA must be balanced, cohesive, and with an authoritative political-military leadership.\(^{39}\)

**Unity of Command, Purpose, and Effort.** NATO through ISAF needs to assume unity of command within Afghanistan to ensure unity of effort is achieved across the strategic lines of operation. The ISAF mission (see Appendix E) needs to embrace unity of command and be executed under one command structures. COMISAF needs to assume command of all military forces operating in Afghanistan, while NATO's SCR needs to assume the coordination of the efforts of all other actors, government and non-government. For NATO to achieve this unity of purpose and effort amongst and between such a diverse range of actors requires a commitment to sharing information, building trust, and promoting transparency. The creation of these conditions should be part of the strategic design\(^{40}\) which needs to include unified objectives and tasks, owned by NATO (see Appendix F).
**Addressing the Issue of Caveats.** NATO leaders now need to persuade member states to contribute forces, both military and civilian, to ISAF. Most important is eliminating the restrictions placed on where those forces are employed once deployed and what they can be commanded to do. If the issue of national caveats is addressed, commanders will be afforded the flexibility to employ troops under their command without restriction. This would also alleviate a two tier alliance of those who are willing to sacrifice and fight and those who are not.\(^{41}\)

**PRTs.** With the development of a strategic design the PRTs can be restructured, coordinated, and centrally commanded. With the implementation of these changes the PRTs will become the key vehicle for success in reconstruction and development now and through transition to Afghan ownership planned for 2014 and beyond.

PRTs in the future need to be controlled centrally by ISAF and not as they are today by the respective lead nation. This will alleviate the situation that exists where by PRTs generally pursue national interests via national agendas and principles. By instilling a unity of effort and encouraging a unity of will across the 26 PRTs, unity of command could standardize and coordinate a model to ensure the PRT implements and prioritizes tasks in line with clear guidance from ISAF. Beyond this unity of effort and command is the development of direct engagement and interaction with the Afghan government at a local, district, and national level. Ideally the local population would embrace this standardised and unified approach over the system presently in place.

**Intelligence and Information Sharing.** A perennial issue within NATO and multinational operations in general is the sharing of intelligence and the over classification of information. This leads to a situation of those in the know via ‘the inner circle’ and those
supporting that privileged group. More critically it directly impedes operational effectiveness and can put troops at a greater risk.

NATO recently introduced a project to improve intelligence-sharing among forces in Afghanistan. However, while all Alliance nations and the Afghan army are now able to share information, there are different levels of access depending on the sensitivity of information. Thus, it remains the right of individual countries to decide whether or not to share that intelligence. ISAF should take the lead on this issue and develop a plan that ensures most if not all nations have access to their Secret Domain. Conversely, nations should classify intelligence and information through the ISAF system thus ensuring fast, usable, and actionable intelligence. Additionally, national ‘eyes only’ classified systems should not be used during Alliance operations as they severely restrict and considerably slow the intelligence and information flow which in turn leads to a lack of trust. Eliminating this cause for friction would enhance the unity of effort.

Understanding the Human Terrain. In the words of General David Petraeus, COMISAF, “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the centre of gravity. Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail.” Developing an understanding of the human terrain in Afghanistan is a long and involved process but it is instrumental to the implementation of the CA. This includes an understanding of the complexities of the culture, faith, and society coupled with knowing the people’s desires, grievances, and opinions. With this knowledge cultural missteps can be avoided while also communicating effectively with the Afghan population.

Winning the Information War. Information operations (IO) are playing an increasingly important role in shaping the perceptions and aligning the support of the Afghan populace and IC
alike. The Taliban’s message remains relatively unchanged in that their overarching goal is to remove the foreign military presence from their country and return Afghanistan to their form of extreme Islamic rule. This message continues to have a corrosive effect on ISAF and IC, both inside and outside the country. For NATO and ISAF the greatest impact of this IO campaign is the power this message has to undermine the resolve of the IC, impacting on the will of certain nations to continue supporting the international effort.

NATO and ISAF must now adopt a CA in addressing an IO campaign which is clear via a coordinated strategy. Their major problem is lack of coordination of messages from a variety of sources that include GIROA, individual nations, NGOs, EU, UN, and ISAF all with different audiences, focus, and intent. Within the CA the unity of effort needs to include a unity of communication. ISAF and the IC now need to play to their strengths while attacking the insurgents weaknesses. Although the Taliban message has real effect both within Afghanistan and across the IC, it is usually uncoordinated, inaccurate, and contradictory. This should be exposed and highlighted to the Afghan populace that the Taliban offer no alternative or hope for their future.

**GIROA; Improving Governance and Afghan Ownership (Afghan Face).** In many ways this is a war of perceptions. The population in Afghanistan have to believe that the future under GIROA will be better. Many Afghans are still undecided on where their loyalties lie. However through improvements in basic services, application of law and order, better access to education, more opportunities for legitimate employment, and indicators that corruption is being addressed, confidence in the GIROA would increase across the country. These perceptions are in line with a growing confidence in the ANSF and a greater freedom of movement across a majority of the country. With these perceived improvements Afghans now need to see aid and
development with an Afghan face. Governance is the real Main Effort and key to strategic success and an exit strategy from Afghanistan for NATO. This can be achieved through a long term commitment from GIROA and a directed and coordinated effort from NATO.

**Addressing Corruption and abuses in GIROA and IC.** ISAF and members of the IC at the highest level need to use a mix of incentives, penalties, political pressure, and other levers to reduce corruption and abuse by senior Afghan officials and power brokers to a level the Afghan people will accept. Only when legitimacy is achieved within the GIROA will security, stability, and development be truly addressed in Afghanistan.

Strategic success will only be achieved with greater coordination across the civilian, military, government and non-government organisations with a vested interest in Afghanistan. The ultimate goal of NATO is to assist GIROA in alleviating corruption as far as possible. In setting the conditions for success and prior to initiating an exit strategy GIROA needs to be capable of governing their country through an actively present and effective government at national, regional, and local levels. In developing a ‘whole of government’ approach further progress in governance, rule of law, employment, and the economy require a CA. Corruption is endemic across GIROA and needs to be exposed and excluded from external funding and international support. Those officials that are honest and capable should be rewarded and encouraged at ministerial, regional, district, and local levels. Corruption is not limited to the Afghan authorities and all organisations involved in supporting governance, reconstruction, and development must review their processes and potential role in promoting and facilitating corruption, waste, and funding the Taliban. Corruption within GIROA and across the IC needs to be addressed by NATO through the development of a system that ensures accountability and transparency across all actors in Afghanistan.
Crucial Role for the ANSF. The development of the ANSF and the implementation of the transition of responsibility for security to the Afghans is critical. For this to be achieved accurate measures of effectiveness need to be implemented by ISAF. This will quantify the levels of competency and capability through training statistics and operational effectiveness.

When measuring this progress ISAF must ensure accurate measures of effectiveness are developed and not simply statistics generated for the politicians. Previously ISAF has tended to exaggerate ANSF capabilities while ignoring key problems in the training and partnering process. The focus should remain on preparing the ANSF for an effective transition of responsibility ensuring they have reached the capabilities required to assume primacy and are not being driven by an overly optimistic timeline.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan has changed substantially in the last 10 years since the initial US invasion with the purpose and goal of defeating the organisation that carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001. Defeating the insurgents and ensuring Afghanistan does not revert to a safe haven for terrorists is still paramount. However the tasks NATO is really grappling with are R&D, governance, and economic stability.

It is a widely held belief that strategic success for NATO in Afghanistan is critical to the Alliance’s future. The Afghanistan Study Group (ASG) concluded, “A failure of the NATO mission in Afghanistan would also damage the future prospects of the organisation itself.”47 This paper has focused on NATO being the key to strategic success in Afghanistan, where success may have to be tailored to limited goals, objectives, and end state. NATO is the only organisation that has the interests of the international community and that of Afghanistan at the
forefront of its mission. Through consensus NATO is robust enough to address the challenges the IC faces in achieving success in Afghanistan.

Without question those challenges are diverse and will require a concerted and comprehensive approach from a unified political and military organisation. Compromises will have to be made throughout this process as these divergent issues are addressed. Some policies may appear unrealistic or a step backwards on the road to success, such as dialogue and/or inclusion of the Taliban in a political framework for Afghanistan in the future. All options should be explored if ISAF is to set the conditions for lasting stability and security in the region.

Achieving strategic success in this operation will not come without risks. It relies on several major factors to be addressed, resolved, and driven forward if NATO’s objectives and tasks (see Appendix M) are to be achieved. Containing the insurgency while developing the GIROA and the ANSF and maintaining the political will of 48 contributing nations is the challenge NATO faces. For this mountain of challenges to be climbed NATO must first define realistic goals, objectives, and end state for the Alliance and not just ISAF, USFOR-A, or the US. To achieve this certain factors need to be addressed through NATO’s CA. Without unity of command, purpose, and effort NATO will continue to mark time with at best limited success being achieved and no end state in place. In line with the CA all aspects of this operation need an Afghan face, with GIROA having primacy and NATO operating in a supportive role. All the ingredients are there to achieve strategic success; NATO now needs to adopt the right recipe through the development and execution of a Joint Strategic Plan.
ENDNOTES

2 Quote by Lord Ismay, first NATO Secretary-General, 04 April 1949.
7 NATO SCR report to the NATO Secretary General, “A Comprehensive Approach Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” (Kabul, Afghanistan, ISAF HQ, 15 July 2010), 18. Here after cited as NATO, “A Comprehensive Approach Lessons Learned in Afghanistan”.
15 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place-Why NATO’s Comprehensive Approach Will Fail in Afghanistan,” Department of Political Science, Discussion Paper, No22, (University of Copenhagen, Denmark, January 2010), 78.
18 Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place,” 89.


For further discussion of this, see Sharon Firecicz, “Poppy Eradication and Its Alternatives” (Masters Thesis, Marine Corps University, 2009).


Lieutenants General Sir Gerard Templer’s, (British appointed High Commissioner to Malaya) approach in 1952 was, “This way of life is not the American way of life. It is not the British way of life. It must be the Malayan way of life.” as quoted in Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaysia, 1948-60,” Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey, 2008), 121.

NATO, “A Comprehensive Approach Lessons Learned in Afghanistan”.


39 Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATO Senior Civilian Representative, cover letter to NATO Secretary-General on the Comprehensive Approach, (Kabul, Afghanistan, ISAF HQ 15 July, 2010).
40 Recommendations made by Mark Sedwill, NATO Senior Civilian Representative to NATO, in NATO, “A Comprehensive Approach Lessons Learned in Afghanistan”.
**Appendix A**

**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>Another name for NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Counter narcotics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Pact/treaty among countries, during which they cooperate in joint action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMISAF</td>
<td>Commander ISAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federal Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIROA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOO</td>
<td>High Office of Oversight (GIROA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>International Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission, Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provisional Reconstruction Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>Security and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

ISAF Chronology

11 Sept 2001  Al-Qaida carried out attacks on US soil.

Oct 2001    The international offensive against the Taliban began. Lakhdar Brahimi was reappointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Afghanistan.

Nov 2001    US-supported forces marched into Kabul.

5 Dec 2001  The Bonn Compact was adopted, setting up the Afghan Interim Authority under Hamid Karzai.

6 Dec 2001  The Bonn Compact was endorsed by the UNSC in resolution 1383.

20 Dec 2001 The Council authorised the establishment of ISAF in resolution 1386.

22 Dec 2001 Hamid Karzai was sworn in as head of a 30-member interim power-sharing government.

Jan 2002    First contingent of peacekeepers arrived in Afghanistan.

28 Mar 2002 The UNSC established UNAMA.

June 2002   Emergency Loya Jirga was held in Kabul, which resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Authority, and the election of Hamid Karzai as its president.

Dec 2002    The Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations was signed by the neighbouring states of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Aug 2003    NATO took over ISAF's command.

4 Jan 2004  The Loya Jirga adopted the new constitution.

March 2004  The Berlin conference took place.

Oct 2004    Hamid Karzai elected President.

14 Mar 2005 The Council extended the mandate of ISAF.
18 Sept 2005  Parliamentary elections held.

31 Jan 2006  Launch of the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan of peacebuilding in Afghanistan, at a meeting in London.

Feb 2006  More robust engagement rules for NATO ISAF troops went into effect.

31 July 2006  ISAF expanded its operations into southern Afghanistan.

21 Sept 2006  NATO met at the ministerial level, paving the way for the assumption of responsibility for the security in all of Afghanistan by ISAF in October.

26 Sept 2006  President Karzai and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met at the White House under the auspices of US President George W. Bush.

5 Oct 2006  ISAF assumed control over peacekeeping across Afghanistan by placing US troops in the east under NATO control.

2-3 Jul 2007  The GIROA, Italy, and the SG co-chaired the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan.

Aug 2007  Peace "jirga" held in Kabul brought together the presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan, parliamentarians, and tribal leaders.

21 Sept 2007  Tom Koenigs, Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, suggested that peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban should be encouraged.

3 Apr 2008  NATO leaders issued a new strategic vision for Afghanistan at the Bucharest Summit.

19 May 2008  Officials from Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan met in Tehran as part of the "Triangular Initiative", where they agreed to establish Border Liaison Offices to carry out joint operations targeting narcotics smuggling.

June 2008  France announced that it would rejoin NATO's military command structure, from which it had withdrawn in 1966.

7 July 2008  A suicide bomber targeted the Indian embassy in Kabul, killing 58 (including two Indian diplomats) and injuring 141.

22 Aug 2008  US-led airstrikes were conducted in Herat.
25 Aug 2008  Russia circulated a draft press statement deploring the civilian casualties caused by an Operation Enduring Freedom air strike in Herat on 22 August. The Council was unable to reach consensus on the text.

11 Feb 2009  The Taliban conducted simultaneous attacks against government facilities in Kabul, killing at least twenty people and injuring many others.

23 Sep 2008  UN Resolution 1833.

27 Mar 2009  US President Barack Obama unveiled a new strategy for Afghanistan. The US will now treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as a single integrated challenge and engage them in a trilateral framework.

10 May 2009  Afghan President Hamid Karzai accused the US of failing to abide by a “high moral” standard in its air strikes and demanded their cessation.

11 May 2009  Citing the need for a wider change of strategy, the US replaced ISAF commander, General David McKiernan with General Stanley McChrystal, a counterinsurgency expert.

End of June  At the end of June the UK launched a five-week operation “Panther’s Claw” in Helmand province.

30 July 2009  The Human Rights Unit of UNAMA report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, stating that civilian casualties increased by 24 percent in the first half of 2009, with 59 percent of the civilians killed by anti-government elements and 30.5 percent by pro-government forces.


8 Oct 2009  The UNSC renewed the mandate of the ISAF in Afghanistan.

1 Dec 2009  US President Barack Obama announced a revised US strategy for Afghanistan.

5 Dec 2009  In Brussels, NATO foreign ministers announced that NATO would commit an additional 7,000 soldiers to Afghanistan.

15 Dec 2009  Anti-corruption conference initiated by Afghan President Hamid Karzai was held.

26 Jan 2010  A regional summit on Afghanistan organised by Turkey was held in Afghanistan with Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan participating.

28 Jan 2010  International conference on Afghanistan took place in London.
13 Feb 2010  NATO and Afghan forces began Operation Moshtarak.

22 Mar 2010  The UNSC adopted resolution 1917 renewing and modifying the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 23 March 2011.


20 July 2010  The Kabul Conference held.

18 Sept 2010  Parliamentary elections held.

Source: www.securitycouncilreport.org
Appendix C

NATO Charter: Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Source: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

NATO Role in Afghanistan

NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. NATO does this predominantly through its United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Source: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm
Appendix D

ISAF History

"International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The concept of a UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF.

On 11 August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, turning the six-month national rotations to an end. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.

This new leadership overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enables small countries, less likely to take over leadership responsibility, to play a strong role within a multinational headquarters. ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country."

Source: www.isaf.nato.int/history.html
Appendix E

ISAF Mission

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

Security

In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, the main role of ISAF is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces conduct security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces through mentoring, training and equipping.

Reconstruction and development

Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams, ISAF supports reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with GIROA and UNAMA representatives on the ground, ISAF also provides practical support for R&D efforts, as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations, and NGOs.
Governance

ISAF, through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), helps the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. The principal mission of the PRTs in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve.

Source: www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html.
Appendix F

NATO’s Objectives and Tasks

Objective:

NATO-ISAF, as part of the overall International Community effort, and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is working with Afghanistan to create the conditions whereby the Government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout Afghanistan.

Tasks:

To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts a population-centric Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy in partnership with Afghan National Security Forces. Its key priorities are to:

- Protect the population
- Neutralise insurgent networks
- Develop the Afghan National Security Forces
- Promote effective governance and supporting socio-economic development

NATO-ISAF also provides support to the Afghan Government and the International Community in Security Sector Reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Security Forces.

Appendix G

COMISAF Objectives

1. Defeating the insurgency tactically while removing its control and influence over the population.

2. Ensuring ISAF and NATO are effective and well-resourced to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

3. Build a larger and more effective Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), to firstly support ISAF and then assume the lead, and eventually replacing ISAF forces.

4. Ensuring the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GIROA has the necessary capacity and legitimacy to lead their country.

5. Create an effective, integrated, and operational civil-military effort.

6. 6th objective is outside Afghanistan and ISAF’s formal mission. The actions and activities of Pakistan, Iran and other starts will be critical to the success in Afghanistan.

Source: COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010.
http://info.publicintelligence.net/COMISAFcampaignoverview.pdf
Appendix H

ISAF’s Strategic Vision: Bucharest Summit, 3 April 2008

Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

1. We gather in Bucharest to reaffirm our determination to help the people and the elected Government of Afghanistan build an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. Afghanistan is the Alliance’s key priority. We recognized after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, that Euro-Atlantic and broader international security is tied to Afghanistan’s stability and future. Our presence in Afghanistan is at the request of the Government of Afghanistan and mandated by the United Nations. Neither we nor our Afghan partners will allow extremists and terrorists such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda, to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people and has been felt in many of our countries and beyond. As we help Afghanistan rebuild, our guiding principles are:

   a. a firm and shared long-term commitment;
   b. support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility;
   c. a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and
   d. increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan.

Source: www.nato.int: extract from ISAF’s Strategic Vision, Bucharest Summit, 3 April 2008.
Appendix I

ISAF Command Structure


Note: COMISAF reports up two chains of command.
NATO: JFC Brunssum and SHAPE.
USFOR-A: CENTCOM and Washington DC.
At an operation and tactical level COMISAF commands ISAF Joint Command and USFOR-A.
Appendix J

ISAF Troop Contributing Nations; as of 14 Dec 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<th>Troops</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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All 28 nations are contributing to the ISAF mission. A further 20, non NATO nations are contributing forces.

Appendix K

International Security Assistance Force
Regional Commands, Major Units, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Appendix L

The PRT Mission

The PRT mission statement is not solely of military origin, as it was agreed on 27 January 2005 as part of the PRT Terms of Reference by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in Kabul, an ambassadorial-level body chaired by the Minister of
Interior that sets high level strategic policy for all PRTs in Afghanistan. The PRT mission statement, which has been incorporated into the ISAF Operational Plan, is as follows:

"Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts."

Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/

Appendix M
Appendix N
NTM-A Institutional Trainer Needs vs. Supply: 9/10-3/12

Source: NTM-A, Year In Review, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 25.

Bibliography

Commentary on Sources:
Primary Source Documents: These sources were invaluable as a foundation for this paper. The UNSCRs and various Summit Declarations show the evolution of NATO and ISAF’s involvement in Afghanistan. More recent summits indicate a willingness by Alliance politicians to focus a coordinated effort in achieving strategic success. ACT’s research on the CA and its application to the ISAF mission indicated that there is clear intent to achieve unity of command and effort in Afghanistan. The recommendations in these reports and summit declarations now need to be implemented in a timely fashion.

- Commander ISAF. ISAF Theatre Strategic Communications Strategy (Kabul: Afghanistan, ISAF HQ, 2008).
- Mark Sedwill, NATO Senior Civilian Representative. Letter to NATO Secretary-General. (Kabul: Afghanistan, ISAF HQ, 15 July, 2010).

Books: Due to the contemporary nature of this paper and the issues that surround it, there are very few books that address NATO’s CA or the issues surrounding unity of command. The books listed below did assist in developing greater understanding of the complexity surrounding the operation in Afghanistan.


Articles: The articles that provided greatest relevance were generally written by research fellows for a specific audience. The Center for Strategic Studies, although with a U.S. bias, published some very relevant articles focused on many of the aspects of this paper. The articles written by the international press were catering for a select audience and generally used a bias to appease or provoke that audience. They did prove to have some use and assist in developing the theme that certain western values and bias are directly affecting progress in Afghanistan.

Articles written by the military for a military audience were of most relevance and greatest value. Joint Forces Quarterly, the U.S. National Defense University journal, PRISM and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) publications proved to be some of the best sources for relevant material on this subject.


• Lamb Christopher and Cinnamond Martin. “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan.” Strategic Forum, October 2009, 1-12.
• Shinn James. “NATO Has the Watches. We Have the Time.” Wall Street Journal, 26 October 2009.
• Tarzi Amin. “Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program.” Center for Complex Operations, PRISM, Vol.1, No.4, September 2010.

Reports: Many of these reports provided a key insight from respected think tanks and ISAF HQ as to the way ahead in Afghanistan. Of particular interest was Ambassador Mark Sedwill’s report
to the NATO Secretary General on the CA. If the Lessons Learned from ISAF and his recommendations are employed, NATO will be moving in the right direction to achieving strategic success. Of note: none of these reports indicated that NATO was key to strategic success. However, they did as a general rule acknowledge that Unity of Command was vital for the future operational success in Afghanistan.


Research Papers: These were drawn from a variety of sources and research organisations. As a former student at the NATO Defense College in Rome, I found the papers from their research division of particular interest. They proved to be non-biased and in many cases they exposed the limitations of NATO in a complex operating environment such as Afghanistan. Most papers acknowledged that NATO and the IC were learning as the operation matured but recognised that this period in time was critical not only to the success of the operation in Afghanistan but to NATO’s future. Many nations see this operation as the ultimate test for a transatlantic security origination.

Websites: These websites proved critical to the research for this paper. For background reading and supporting appendixes the NATO and ISAF homepages were invaluable. RUSI was of particular use in viewing recent lectures by COMISAF and the UK CDS amongst others.

- www/english.aljazeera.net.
- ISAF Homepage: www.isaf.nato.int.
- The Whitehouse Homepage: www.whitehouse.gov