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INDIGENOUS POLICE FORCES: A CRITICAL COMPONENT TO SUCCESSFUL NATION BUILDING AND INESCAPABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR U.S. MARINE CORPS

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**14. ABSTRACT**
The Marine Corps has historically been involved in nation building efforts throughout the world because it can provide the necessary resilience and resources in hostile environments. The use of military services in nation building efforts, however, has been controversial. Controversy over whether service members possess the requisite skill set, knowledge, and expertise for training indigenous police forces, a stated objective in nation building, exists. Consequently, Marines have been directly responsible for training indigenous police forces throughout history with little to no formal training or guidance. Marines have accomplished this mission due to their ability to adapt. The virtue of adaptability can no longer be the sole solution. With Marines’ foreseeable involvement in training of indigenous police forces, the Marine Corps must develop capabilities based solutions it can use for future law enforcement related missions. This paper initially presents the argument for the military’s role in nation building with emphasis on the lack of requisite skills its members possess. This paper then seeks to provide solutions to current gaps in doctrine and contracted solutions that will result in a capability the Marine Corps can utilize for future advisory/training missions.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**
The Marine Corps must develop capabilities based solutions to adequately prepare its forces to be effective host nation trainers and advisors of indigenous police forces for current and future advising missions. Such solutions include enhanced training for selected military police officers, modifying the current military police structure and mission statement, downsizing and/or removal of current contracted solutions, and using internal resources the Marine Corps already maintains which includes reservists with policing backgrounds and irregular warfare skill sets possessed by active duty members.
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INDIGENOUS POLICE FORCES: A CRITICAL COMPONENT TO SUCCESSFUL NATION BUILDING AND INESCAPABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR U.S. MARINE CORPS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Indigenous Police Forces: A Critical Component to Successful Nation Building and Inescapable Responsibility for U.S. Marine Corps

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Thesis: The Marine Corps must develop capabilities based solutions to adequately prepare its forces to be effective host nation trainers and advisors of indigenous police forces for current and future advising missions. Such solutions include enhanced training for selected military police officers, modifying the current military police structure and mission statement, downsizing and/or removal of current contracted solutions, and using internal resources the Marine Corps already maintains which includes reservists with policing backgrounds and irregular warfare skill sets possessed by active duty members.

Discussion: The Marine Corps has historically been involved in nation building efforts throughout the world because it can provide the necessary resilience and resources in hostile environments. The use of military services in nation building efforts, however, has been controversial. Controversy over whether service members possess the requisite skill set, knowledge, and expertise for training indigenous police forces, a stated objective in nation building, exists. Consequentially, Marines have been directly responsible for training indigenous police forces throughout history with little to no formal training or guidance. Marines have been able to accomplish this mission due to their ability to adapt. The virtue of adaptability can no longer be the sole solution. With Marines' foreseeable involvement in training of indigenous police forces, the Marine Corps must a develop capabilities based solution it can use for future law enforcement related missions. This paper initially presents the argument for the military's role in nation building with emphasis on the lack of requisite skills its members possess. This paper then seeks to provide solutions to current gaps in doctrine and contracted solutions that will result in a capability the Marine Corps can utilize for future advisory/training missions.

Conclusion: The capabilities based solutions presented in this paper focus significantly on the military police community. The suggested solutions are not an overnight fix, but they will posture the Marine Corps for future success and call upon Marines with suitably enhanced skills to serve as effective trainers and advisors. Training programs and reorganization of structure will enhance the Marine Corps training and mentor capabilities that will allow the Marine Corps to meet this requirement.
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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The members of the U.S. military have been involved in nation building activities around the world throughout history. Training indigenous security forces has been an integral element of the Marine Corps' warfighting legacy. I chose this topic because training police forces is a key ingredient in nation building efforts. If the goal of nation building is establishing a legitimate government, then focusing on indigenous law enforcement is crucial. An established police force provides the link between the central government, security institutions, and local communities. The military's initial involvement in law enforcement activities can shape the environment and set the foundation for later efforts in developing legitimate indigenous law enforcement organizations. This paper focuses on current Marine Corps initiatives related to law enforcement capabilities. While it discusses overall nation building goals initially, the central discussion is related to Marines training indigenous police forces.

The efforts and research invested in this paper come at a very relevant time for the Marine Corps because the 35th Commandant recently expressed the need for greater emphasis for Marines filling the roles of trainers and advisors. Additionally, the 2010 Force Structure Review Group recommended consolidating military police organizations to fulfill current and future law enforcement efforts as a major initiative (See Appendix A).

I would like to thank the members of the Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW), Quantico, Virginia for their assistance in this project, specifically Col Jon Doering, Director of CIW, who allowed me full time access to his staff and resources. Additionally, I would like to thank Mr. Reyes Cole, Mr. Robert Abbot, and Mrs. Rebecca DeGuzman. They provided significant insight as well as information that otherwise would have not been obtained without their help and direction. Significant time and sincere interest was taken on their part to assist me with this research. I would also like to thank Dr. Adam Cobb, my mentor, and Dr. Patricia Scanlon, Director of the Leadership Communication Skills Center, Marine Corps University for their time, patience, encouragement, and assistance with this research project.
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The United States (U.S.) military continues to play a major role in nation building around the world as evidenced by current engagements such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Most individuals may associate nation building with the term Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) or what the Department of Defense (DOD) refers to as stability operations. Regardless, of whether it is referred to as nation building, COIN, stability operations, post-conflict operations, reconstruction, or peacekeeping, all desire to achieve the same goal: host nation initiatives that can sustain government legitimacy.¹

To better understand the arguments and solutions for effective nation building that are discussed in this paper, it is important to define the term and to explain what the military provides in support of this mission. Although DOD does not use the term nation building per se, nation building can be defined as the use of armed forces in the aftermath of a conflict to support an enduring transition to democracy.² The military’s programs in support of nation building include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and other U.S. Code Title 10 (DOD) programs and activities, such as helping with the local infrastructure and civil affairs.³ (Appendix B lists top U.S. engagements in nation building.)

The Marine Corps must develop capabilities based solutions to adequately prepare its forces to be effective host nation trainers and advisors of indigenous police forces for current and future advising missions. Such solutions include enhanced training for selected military police (MP) officers, modifying the current MP structure and mission statement, downsizing and/or removal of current contracted solutions, and using internal resources the Marine Corps already maintains which includes reservists with policing backgrounds and irregular warfare (IW) skill sets possessed by active duty members.
Methodology

This paper used an historical research method approach to prove that the Marine Corps must focus greater attention on the use and organization structure of its MP units and recognize the need to provide critical skill set training that is required for successful nation building efforts. Such attention will lead to effectively trained indigenous police forces. Primary sources were used to review past Marine Corps training operations to determine patterns and connections with current nation building efforts and to identify possible solutions. Primary sources include interviews and discussions with members of CIW and members of past police transition teams (TT). Additional sources, both primary and secondary, included Marine Corps doctrine, administrative messages, analytical reviews, and lessons learned reports.

The concept of this paper is not to argue for or against the role of the U.S. military in nation building missions. Rather, this paper focuses on developing solutions associated with current Marine Corps initiatives and doctrine related to training indigenous police forces. This paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides pro/con arguments for nation building. The second section provides a history of the Marine Corps’ involvement in training of indigenous police forces as well as describes the transition of what was once a Department of the State (DOS) led police force training initiative to the current DOD-led effort. The third section discusses current Marine Corps’ initiatives and doctrine focusing significantly on the largest law enforcement advising contracted solution to date known as the Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) Program. Lastly, solutions are provided that will produce an enduring capability for the Marine Corps and its requirement to train indigenous police forces.
Military Involvement in Nation Building - Arguments For and Against

As a testament to the military's future role in nation building, Defense Secretary Robert Gates states, "The U.S. is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan – that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire – anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales." With high odds of facing similar future challenges, the U.S. military must be prepared to assume greater responsibility in nation building. Such responsibility must include significant attention to and enhanced recognition of training indigenous police forces by each service. An effectively trained police force will establish security institutions and leadership whose presence builds support for the Host Nation (HN) government. In order to further argue the need for enhanced training and recognition for training indigenous police, it is first essential to examine the arguments for and against the role of the military in nation building.

While there is little doubt of the military's role in conventional warfare, controversy exists when the military is involved in nation building, or stability operations. Warfighting is not just about winning the war. It is about winning the peace as well. The U.S. excels at the first phase and requires the military's resilience and resources to support the post-combat phase of war that requires a shift in skills, techniques, and engagements. Unfortunately, the key reason those opposed to the military's role in nation building is often due to the lack of requisite knowledge and the skill sets those in uniform possess.

The argument that the U.S. military involvement is critical in nation building is evident in military doctrine, reports, studies, presidential addresses, and current civil military engagements. Among those who support nation building is Richard Haass, President of The
Council on Foreign Relations and former director of policy planning for DOS. Haass affirms that “it is one thing to oust a regime, quite another to put something better in its place. Prolonged occupation of the sort the United States carried out in Japan and West Germany after World War II is the only surefire way to build democratic institutions and instill democratic culture.” The Germany and Japan nation-building examples prove that democracy is transferable, that society can be transformed, and such transformation is sustainable. In DOD terms, as stated earlier, these efforts were referred to as stability operations. Recently, DOD Directive 3000.07 established stability operations as a core military mission equivalent to combat operations. Despite the successes of nation-building engagements, there are those who still debate the military’s involvement in nation building.

One of the biggest arguments, however, for the opposition to the military’s involvement in nation building is the lack of requisite skills among its members. For example, Dr. James Payne, a research fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of Lytton Research and Analysis Center, is among those who oppose military involvement. He claims, “Many times military officers (end up at the scene of nation building military engagement) with no background in politics, sociology, or social psychology.” Given Payne’s wording to describe required nation building skill sets, he indicates the military is not well-suited, skilled, or trained for the responsibility of nation building. However, the words he uses to describe critical skills are referred to by the DOD as Irregular Warfare (IW) skill sets. Additionally, military advisors quite often find themselves in situations where they are not adequately prepared. For example, a Marine Corps officer who returned from Iraq approached Robert Perito, the director of the Security Sector Governance Center of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). He asked, “How should I have gone about training Iraqi police in a place where security had not been fully
established, insurgent attacks were still common, and criminal gangs operated with impunity?\textsuperscript{11}

This is just one example for the Marine Corps during current operations, but is certainly not the first time Marines have found themselves inadequately prepared for advising missions. In 1933, during the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, Marine Corps Captain H.S. Keimling found himself in a similar situation and reported the following to his commanding officer:

\begin{quote}
I hope it is possible that you can put it across to have the Marine Corps get up a pamphlet in practical police work... I believe it should be made part of the law course in the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. It is very important that when the Marines capture a place for the Navy in a foreign country that we have officers competent to handle one of the most important functions of getting in touch with the natives.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

This recommendation never came to fulfillment most likely because of institutional resistance. Today though Marines still find themselves involved in advising roles with doctrine and training that is less than adequate, which only brings credibility to Mr. Payne’s argument.

Given the arguments for and against the military’s role in nation building, one thing is certain – the Marine Corps will continue to be engaged in nation building with significant devotion to the role of training indigenous police forces.\textsuperscript{13} Despite history, the military, and specifically the Marine Corps has failed to adequately prepare individual service members for training and advising of indigenous police forces.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{History of Marine Corps Involvement in Nation Building and Transfer of Responsibility}

The U.S. has an extensive history of using its military to train indigenous police and security forces. The Marine Corps has had its fair share of experiences in this work, which has
become an historical and integral element of the Marine Corps’ warfighting legacy from the Banana Wars to the recent conflicts.\textsuperscript{15} Adaptability has been the key characteristic that has allowed the Marine Corps to be successful at training indigenous security forces. For example, in 1916 the Marines went to Santo Domingo on short notice and ultimately became involved in the broader task of pacifying and governing the country for which they were not initially prepared.\textsuperscript{16} A remarkably similar operation was Operation Just Cause, where the Marine Corps was responsible for training the Panamanian National Police forces.\textsuperscript{17} The toughest test of adaptability, however, came during the Vietnam War. Initially, training for the war was geared towards amphibious missions, but later shifted to counterinsurgency training.\textsuperscript{18} General Victor Krulak, United States Marine, says it best about adaptability when he quotes Marines as saying, “Try as hard as you can to be ready for it, but be willing to adapt and improvise when it turns out to be a different battle than the one you expected, because adaptability is where victory will be found.”\textsuperscript{19} While training indigenous police forces has been a re-occurring mission, it is not one that the Marine Corps has pursued diligently. The Marine Corps has simply adapted to training and advising missions, although the responsibility for training indigenous police forces was never intended to be a DOD-led initiative. That may have been an acceptable course of action in Haiti in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century, but contemporary societies are generally much more complex to manage.

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Officially training indigenous security forces is a DOS responsibility.\textsuperscript{20} The DOS is tasked to train such forces, despite the fact that the military historically has been the first on the ground to provide initial training support for security. Thus, the military has always turned over training responsibility to interagency organizations, multinational forces, or civilian police.
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officers to the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and State. While this remains the policy, the reality is the DOD is the lead agent for indigenous police training.

DOD took the lead in 2004 when President Bush issued a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) granting the Commander, U.S. Central Command authority to train and equip Iraqi police. Yet, the directive was driven by circumstances unique to the policy towards Iraq at that time. When the directive was issued in 2004, the U.S. was approaching a pre-determined deadline for transfer of government to Iraqi sovereignty, and President Bush deemed the military as the only organization able to meet that goal as it had the necessary resources to handle the police training program. This directive formally transferred training responsibility from DOS to DOD, and significantly affected the Marine Corps beginning in 2005.

When the PDD was signed, the Army-led Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) took control of all DOS and DOJ civilian police training teams. Then, in early 2006, MNSTC-I combined the various police units into a constabulary force called the Iraqi National Police. Subsequently, 2006 was deemed the “Year of the Police” for the U.S. military. The Marine Corps contributed significantly to this effort beginning in 2005, when reservists who were civilian police volunteered for active duty knowing they would train Iraqi Police.

Unfortunately, when the Marines reservists arrived in Iraq, they were not provided instructions for actual training and advising methods. Instead quantity, not quality, of those trained was the sought after goal. Nevertheless, the Marines adapted. Since no official guidebook or training pre-requisite for training indigenous police forces existed; the Marines provided instruction to Iraqi police based on their training and experience in the U.S. Some
Marines adapted by providing training material that they brought from their home station police academies. The Marines did what they could based on what they were provided. Success was measured by the quantity of Iraqi police trained instead of measuring their quality. Lieutenant General James Dubik (USA and former Commander of MNSTC-1 from June 2007-July 2008) highlights this fact in his account of the “Year of Police,” when he states, “creating police is not a numbers game. Numbers do not determine effectiveness.” Although the Marine Corps attempted to staff the training mission with the correct resources (i.e. reserve civilian police officers), resources quickly dried up, and the reserve civilian police officers were eventually replaced with Marines who had no experience in policing. The policing effort thus became a DOD responsibility that has lasted for eight years and counting.

DOD continues to lead the training efforts and the military police TTs are considered a central part of the strategy to train and equip national security forces. The U.S. intervention in Iraq from 2003 to present is the largest law enforcement and police training effort since the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. By the end of 2006, TTs had assisted in the training and equipping of approximately 326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 188,000 Iraqi police and national police forces. Most recently, an October 2010 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report states that the number of Iraqi police trained has risen to over 400,000. As previously noted, the real measure of success is whether the local police force aids in developing a legitimate national government. Unfortunately, success has not yet been achieved. The next section provides some reasons for this lack of success.
Current Marine Corps Doctrine / Initiatives

Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have required DOD to adjust its training and doctrine. While the military police TTs are on-going, the Marine Corps has taken greater recognition on the role of training indigenous police, which has resulted in an updated MP Operations Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-34.1 and the COIN Field Manual (FM) 3-24. MCWP 3-34.1 and FM 3-24 devote several pages to host nation police training by defining responsibilities and relationships as well as the need to work with other government civilian agencies. Additionally, the Marine Corps has created several programs run by contractors and hired individuals to fill current law enforcement (LE) capability-related gaps. Contracted individuals include members of the LEP program, which is the largest law enforcement advising program contracted by the Marine Corps to date.

A LEP officer is a law enforcement professional who advises Commanders and Marines at the battalion (BN) and regimental combat team (RCT) level specifically engaged in the COIN fight. The Marine Corps adopted the U.S. Army contracted LEP program because the Marine Corps recognized the need for its own LEP capability. Several contracted programs/experiments were implemented prior to the adoption of the LEP Program. The first experiment leading up to the LEP program was Operation Metro, which was conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) in conjunction with I Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) in 2005 and 2006. The MCWL experiment included a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer teaching “Cop on the Beat” skill sets to Infantry Marines.34

Military units that used recently acquired police skill sets in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2005 to 2006 provided positive feedback for the program and stated the techniques were vital to
mission success. As a result, Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT) initiated a contract to obtain LEPs for each deploying infantry battalion. Then, in April 2009, the LEP Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 0282/09 announced plans to obtain individuals with the requisite criminal enterprise, analytical, and investigative skills and to embed them at the Corps, division, and brigade/regiment level across Iraq and Afghanistan. This 12-month program was to be the one-year proof of concept initiative for the Marine Corps.

The LEPs' success during its trial year resulted in a Universal Urgent Needs Statement (UUNS) request for operational law enforcement support for counterinsurgency/irregular warfare operations written in December 2009. This document expressed the need to formally integrate LE methodologies and techniques in Marine Corps counterinsurgency operations. Concurrently, Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson's Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Commander's Intent stated that his Marines would "focus their efforts on protecting civilians from the Taliban and on restoring Afghan government services, instead of mounting a series of hunt and kill missions against the insurgents." The Marines required the requisite police-like capabilities provided by the LEPs for the mission of protecting and restoring.

Based on a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) report, the concept of embedding experienced LEPs as advisors with the Marines at the RCT and BN level was deemed successful and proved effective and beneficial in the COIN fight. What this report failed to do, however, was define/quantify the metrics of effective and beneficial policing. The LEP program, however, has been not without its problems. Commanders used discretion on how best to employ the embedded LEPs. LEPs reported to their assigned units and commanders had no idea how to employ them or what capabilities they were able to provide. This is a classic example of
decisions made at HQMC that do not filter down to the “boots on the ground.” To counter this issue, the Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) drafted the *Commander’s Guide to Law Enforcement Professionals (LEP Handbook)* in an effort to advise commanders on how best to employ the LEP and informs the commanders of the LEPs’ associated responsibilities.

Another issue, and probably the key issue, with the LEP program is the cost of hiring personnel. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the Marine Corps contracted 54 LEPs for a total of $16.8 million; and in FY11, the Marine Corps requested $27 to $36 million to employ 54 to 64 LEPs, respectively. In recognition of the hefty price tag and need for a long term solution, the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration along with the DC Plans, Policies, and Operations continues to develop an enduring integrated LE/COIN capability that will enable the transition from a contractor to a government sourced solution. That solution has not yet been determined.

Concurrently with the LEP program, is the ongoing responsibility of the Marine Corps, and other services, to train and equip their members to train indigenous police forces via military police TTs. Currently, the II Marine Headquarters Group (MHG) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is tasked to train individual augments and deploy them in support of the TT mission. II MHG has had this mission since 2005, prior to the release of Marine Corps specific doctrine that discusses TT advising.

The section on Host Nation TT training for MCWP 3-34.1 states that the primary mission of the TTs is to advise the security forces in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, and infantry tactics. The role of the police TT is to provide a similar function for the HN police forces. The COIN manual centers on the need for collaboration with
civilian partners. It further defines the role of advisors as the enforcer of roles of polices and to establish authority. The current doctrine is at the strategic level and is therefore broad. While the doctrine on host nation police training programs provides an overview of the responsibilities associated with police work such as managing police records, administrative oversight, information systems development, and information gathering, it lacks the technical substance required to employ the right skill set for effective policing. The right skill set is critical to ensuring effective training of indigenous police forces. There has to be some solution at the operational and most importantly at the tactical level when it comes to the training of indigenous police forces.

_Solutions for an Enduring Capability_

In the course of this research three prospective new approaches for enhancing the training of indigenous police forces came to light. First, MPs need additional training and unit reorganization in order to effectively advise indigenous police forces. Training that is specific to police host nation training needs to be conducted by formal schools. The current practice of spreading MP companies throughout the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) needs to be reversed and MP Bns need to be reconstituted. Second, the role of the contracted LEP must eventually be replaced with a skilled MP. The LEP program is costly and cannot endure with the current price tag. With proper training, selected MP’s can fill the LE advising (LEA) mission using the IA system. Lastly, the Marine Corps must tap into its resources of active duty members and civilian police reservists who possess the policing/IW skill sets to train indigenous police. Each proposed solution is detailed below.
Military Police Additional Training Requirements and Considerations for Reorganization

Military Police operate under doctrine making them capable of performing specified duties of garrison and those of combat. MNSTC-I determined that the Iraqi government needed much attention in their policing community in 2005. The evolution of Iraqi Police training became what is known today as the Police TTs. Active duty MPs were sought after to fulfill this mission. The increasing demands for military police did not decrease the combat role (i.e. providing combat support such as convoy and escort security) they provided as well. With the increased demand, MPs must be prepared to do both missions.

MPs and civilian police officers have different jobs and require different skill sets. Civilian police training is essential because an MP is training the local officer to be a civilian police officer, not an MP. For example, civilian police officers are often trained to be flexible on an individual level and adjust their attitudes to the situation to include the de-escalation of force as needed. The MP officer tends to be less flexible and is use to operating in a garrison environment such as a military establishment where the rules are pretty cut and dry and there is little room or need for discretion. Military forces also tend to focus on those things they are most familiar with such as weapons handling, marksmanship, equipment maintenance, and other higher end police skills. Military intervention with police also tends to lean towards the higher end of stability policing tasks such as riot control, convoy security, motorized patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and weapons training. While all important, there must be some focus on community policing skills that bring about community and trust and support. Currently, the Marine Corps formal school for MPs does not meet the requirement of training MPs adequately for HN police trainers.
When comparing the Marine Corps MP officer schooling at Fort Leonard Wood and various civilian police academies across the United States, it is evident that the six-month curriculum provided by most civilian police agencies provides more detailed instruction than the three-month curriculum provided by the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{45} The focus is also significantly different. As it should be, Marines are trained in military skills. Simply stated, the Marine MPs are not designated to lead police advisor roles nor do they meet the requirements to serve on a police TT just because they have the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) designator.

While the MP doctrine has included host nation training as a responsibility of the military police, additional training is not provided. At the officer corps (2\textsuperscript{nd} Lieutenant and above), and according to the curriculum at Fort Leonard Wood, they are the only afforded introduction to the role of HN training. Now this is not to say that informal instruction is not provided to the basic enlisted Marine on the role of HN training. Typically, at a Marine Corps school, senior Marines train junior Marines. Experiences and war stories may be shared that relate to the training of HN police, but the training does not exist in the form of official Period of Instruction (POI). With the current curriculum, the MP is not appropriately trained for the role of advising indigenous police forces. Moreover, according to a lesson learned article, "the training most Marines receive before beginning an advisory assignment is more akin to training combat survivalists than trainers."\textsuperscript{46} The focus of training must be more than that.

The focus of training must be to train, advise, and assist. No matter how professional they are, MPs do not currently possesses the requisite skills for training of indigenous police forces. Good military police officers do not necessarily make good advisors. Although they are
suitable for use against conventional threats that are often not quite appropriate for solving problems the host nation may face.

A young or seasoned Marine MP, will never match the experience associated with the LEP individual (often a twenty year veteran civilian police officer). However, with the current revision (September 2010) of the MCWP 3-34.1, Military Police Operations, the training must be there to support the doctrine which clearly states the role and responsibilities of the host nation police trainer. Specific recommendations follow.

Selected MPs require a subsequent school focusing specifically on the training of indigenous police forces. The curriculum should center on lessons learned over the last several years. Additionally, higher level skills such as civilian criminal investigation procedures, unorganized crime operations, and police intelligence operations should be taught. This school is best suited for the rank of Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). Upon completion, the Marine receives a subsequent or specialty MOS. He becomes a resource in much of the same capacity as the LEP, either serving as an advisor to the Commander in the role of training/advising indigenous police forces or playing a leadership role on a Police IT. Schooling will allow the Marine Corps to build its active duty as well as reserve capability. Not all MPs require this special skill set, but by providing the training and the MOS designator, Commanders are able to view and pool their resources from within. A pool of resources is critical that is why the current MP structure is worth discussion.

Coinciding with the need for subsequent schooling and use of MPs as advisors, the mission statement requires modification. The current MP company’s mission statement does not discuss any advisory/training responsibilities. A current MP company’s mission statement is:
To provide combat support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) through Maneuver Mobility Support Operations, Law and Order Operations; Area Security, Interdiction Operations and provide training in-lieu of MP forces.

Associated tasks are as followed: (1) Conduct route reconnaissance and surveillance, (2) Conduct Main Supply Route regulation and enforcement, (3) Conduct straggler and dislocated civilian control operations, (4) Conduct area, airfield, Forward Arming Refueling Point, and port security, (5) Conduct convoy security for high value/risk missions, (6) Conduct law enforcement and customs operations, (7) Conduct limited detainee operations, (8) Conduct training in-lieu of MP forces, and (9) Conduct MP Planning.47

Coupled with the need for further training and revision of the mission statement, reorganization of the current MP structure must be reviewed. Disbanding the Military Police Battalions (MP Bns) and task organizing MP companies in June of 2007 in support of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) further exacerbates the current challenges associated with tasking MPs for the role of training indigenous police forces. While there is no doubt that the MPs play a vital role in their combat support role, maintaining integrity of the MP Battalion would still allow for support of the MAGTFs in a task organized manner much like that of the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) as well as provide a pool of uniformed expertise for these specialty MOS's. Just prior to publication of this paper, the results of the Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group, 2010, released the results that contained major initiatives. A major initiative includes the consolidation of MPs to support LE requirements (See Appendix A).

Removal and/or Reduction of Law Enforcement Professional Program

Using a contracting mechanism such as the LEPs is not conducive to a consistent effective approach to enabling indigenous police. The LEP program as indicated earlier is costly and cannot be sustained. Contractors often cannot or will not operate in unsafe environments. Additionally, the current success of the LEP program is viewed strongly as personality driven, both from the perspective of unit leaders and the integration/understanding of what is needed and
expected of the LEP. A significant review of the LEP program was conducted by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned in June 2009. The report indicates some of the associated challenges such as hiring the right individuals, pre-deployment training with the LEPs and the commander’s understanding of how best to utilize the LEP. A U.S. Government (USG) solution must be developed. Use of full-time USG solution provides a consistently effective approach to enabling local police to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in a recovering state.

Much like the recommendation of additional schooling for the MP, it is recommended that Marines fill the LEP role and become law enforcement advisors (LEAs). For a time being until the MP LEA is created, the contracted position would remain until those contracted positions could be sourced as permanent GS positions. The LEA requirement by contractors would gradually decrease as the Marine Corps builds this capacity. The Marines selected for the LEA role would be required to attend the earlier proposed TT specific MOS school. The MP would be required to have obtained the rank of Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) or officer. Using a uniformed Marine alleviates some of the civilian to military work related issues currently associated with the LEPs. Additionally, having a Marine as that LEA provides continuity and a clear chain of command. Furthermore, the cost associated with a Marine is dramatically less than the LEP contracted position. This additional training would require additional schooling, but schooling that is outside of Training and Education Command’s (TECOM) scope of responsibility.

A Marine’s experience would not match that of a seasoned 20 year veteran of the civilian police forces and thus a rigorous training program including partnership with DOJ and DOS as
well as spending time at a civilian police organization would be required. Much like the Congressional Fellowship program, acceptance to the program would require proven work performance, letters of recommendation, and serve as an incentive for those who desire to excel in their Marine Corps career. Special duty pay is worth consideration. A minimum of a year out of the fleet is recommended to train at the police stations and DOJ and DOS. This requirement would be a joint effort with interagencies and curriculum development would need to begin as soon as possible. The uniformed LEA would not occur over night, but would provide an incentive to those Marines who desire the responsibility and challenge associated with advising and training indigenous police forces.

Untapped Resources From Within

The final recommendation for improving the Marine Corps LEA capabilities is utilizing the resources that the Marine Corps currently possess. While it appears to be the most simple, the mere point is to invoke the thought that there are resources available for training indigenous police forces. Two resources come to mind. The first one is the members of the U.S. Reserve Component and the second is a capability/capacity review of the current IW skills to include MOS and college trained individuals.

Members of the U.S. Reserves bring civilian skills and experiences to the Marine Corps beyond what is available in the regular active duty forces. Talent that is not currently affiliated with the military resides in the civilian community – representing untapped skills that are hard to grow or maintain in the active duty forces. Recall the referenced “Year of the Police” where Marine reservists who were civilian police officers were utilized to train the Iraqi police forces. Skills such as these are critical to the successful training and advisory missions. The process for
taking on a skill set management program must begin with the Marine Corps recognizing civilian skills as a Reserve Component core competency. While the Marine Corp recently initiated the “Registration of Civilian Employment (CEI) For Marines in Ready Reserve (Notal),” where reserve Marines are required to input their civilian occupation into the Manpower and Reserve Affairs database, the process of utilizing these civilian skill sets is slow at best.49

The second resource is a capability/capacity study of the Marine Corps active duty forces. All the information as it relates to MOS or college degrees is readily available in Marine Corps Total Force Structure (MCTFS) system. The CIW is currently tracking this information as it relates to skill sets required for IW. In addition to the 7,448 MOSs with varying law enforcement training, the Marine Corps has 1,227 individual with college degrees in the area of criminology and law enforcement – untapped resources.50 While it might not be feasible to pull a Marine of his primary MOS to fill a gap, it is worth a consideration.

Conclusion

Being responsible for training indigenous police forces is probably one of the hardest military tasks because initial actions by U.S. forces can shape the environment and set the foundation for later efforts in developing legitimate indigenous law enforcement organizations. The significance of a country having an effective legitimate police force cannot be debated. A significant issue though lies with ensuring those selected to train indigenous police forces possess the requisite training and skill sets. These issues are primarily the lack of education, experience, and skill set required for effective training of police forces.
Historically, DOS has been the lead agent responsible for training indigenous police forces. However, when time became a critical factor and the military was deemed the only organization to have the necessary resilience and resources, the lead shifted to DOD. This new responsibility to train indigenous police forces has required a shift in attitude for the Marine Corps. Knowing that the military was the lead effort, the Marine Corps had to adopt a new approach and mindset in engagements such as Iraq and Afghanistan, which includes minor adjustments to Marine Corps doctrine. Although Marines have successfully accomplished a number of missions throughout history without proper training or doctrine, Marines have accomplished their tasks through the virtue of adaptability.

The Marine Corps must better prepare its forces for the road ahead. Current contracted programs are not sustainable. The solutions proposed in this paper are not an overnight fix, but given the right program and time, they are solutions that will set the Marine Corps up for future success and call upon skilled Marines to serve as effective trainers and advisors. Now is the time to move beyond the ad hoc, make it happen as you go approach and develop enduring capabilities based solutions that can be used by Marines in future conflicts. As the current Commandant General Amos states, “the Marine Corps will face an ever-changing character of warfare that will require not only fighters, but trainers and mentors alike.”

Lastly, the findings of the 2010 Force Structure Review Group (FRSG), commanders at the front, and individuals throughout history have concluded, the time to develop a solution has not only passed, but is needed for future LE related missions.
Notes:


3 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, April 2010, 12. DoD definition states refers to nation building as nation assistance which is defined as Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and other US Code title 10. [JP 1-02] (DoD) programs and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. 371. Other activities include, but are not limited to, repair, maintenance or construction of economic infrastructure such as roads, schools, electrical grids, and heavy industrial facilities and of health infrastructure, water and sewage facilities. They can also include training and assistance to police, the military, the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.


5 The Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual, FM 3-24, 6-64 to 6-97.

6 The following support the role of the U.S. military in nation building: Stability Operations, FM 3-07; COIN Manual, FM 3-24; Independent Task Force Report No. 55, “In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities,” 2005; Dennis E. Keller, “US Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the US Capacity Gap.” PKSOI Paper, August 2010; Commandant of the Marine Corps: 35th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, January 2011 states, “the Marine Corps will face an ever-changing character of warfare that will require not only fighters, but trainers, and mentors alike,” 5. President Clinton, Bush, and Obama have all at one time addressed the military’s involvement in stability operations. President George Bush, however, set the stage in a televised press conference one month after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when he stated that the U.S. would remain to help stabilize post Taliban Afghanistan once the military mission had been completed.


8 DOD Directive 3000.7, Stability Operations, was signed on September 16, 2009.

Mayhem, and he has taught political science at Yale University, Wesleyan University, Johns Hopkins University, and Texas A & M University.

10 DODD 3000.07. Irregular Warfare Directive, December 1, 2008, tasks secretaries of military departments to track military capabilities and track the capacity and proficiency of the Military Services to meet CCDR IW-related requirements in accordance with strategic guidance documents. The Joint Operating Concept for IW, Version 2.0 states, "The Services should continue to refine personnel tracking systems that identify IW-unique skill sets (e.g., in security force assistance activities, regional expertise, intelligence and/or interagency experience) to support the joint force.

11 David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The Police in War; Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2010, 1. Robert Perito used this question as the basis for his book. He states that this question was the premise for his book and uses this book to outline the fundamentals of police training. Fundamentals included developing a core curriculum, teaching advice, and focusing on officer safety and survival.


13 Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council Decision Memorandum 17-2010 signed by General Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, indicate that the Marine Corps will continue to develop an enduring integrated Law Enforcement/COIN capability that will include Marine assets. 18 Feb 2010.

14 Advising missions for U.S. military forces are abundant throughout history. Such examples include: Japan, Germany, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, and Vietnam. Additionally, history can be learned from the British in Malaya. The British established, reformed, and trained an entire Malayan police force between 1952 and 1953.


17 David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The Police in War; Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime. 33-35. Marine Forces participation in JUST CAUSE highlighted the flexibility of the Marine forces. They modified established and rehearsed contingency plans at the last minute. They were given responsibility for areas of operation much larger than originally envisioned. They made great efforts to re-establish order in the civilian community. Finally, they worked with the Panamanian National Police (PNP) to establish their credibility and legitimacy.


19 Ibid, 1. General Krulak makes a general statement as to what he has heard Marines say.

20 DOS led efforts include the International Police Academy, DOJ run International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (iCITAP), and civilian police officers from DOJ and DOS. From 1954-1974, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ran the International Police Academy. The program ended in 1974 by congressional vote for fear that the program would damage US reputation as there was belief that the program
taught, approved, or advocated the use of torture techniques. It was twelve years later when DOJ established the ICITAP to enhance the investigative capability within law enforcement agencies in emerging democracies and developing countries that still exist today. ICITAP was the first civilian law enforcement development and training organization on the ground after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq which deployed hundreds of advisors to Iraq, and trained tens of thousands of Iraqis.

21 COIN Manual FM 3-24, 231. The COIN manual indicates that police training is a multinational, DOJ, and DOS assisted effort and indicates ideal leaders for police training are civilian police officers.


24 Ibid., 14-15. With the Presidential Directive, the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) was established under control of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) under Army leadership. By 2006, MNSTC-I combined all CPATTs led by DOJ into a force called the Iraqi National Police (INP). In Dec 2006, the Year of the Police was proclaimed by the U.S. military due to significant quantitative numbers such as 180 U.S. Police Transition Teams (PTTs) and 39 International military police teams imbedded within Iraqi forces.

25 Phone Interview with MSgt Jose Mercado, dtd. 21 Jan 2011. MSgt Mercado is a New York Police (NYPD) Officer and United States Marines Reservists who served on the 1st Iraqi Police Training Team for both the Fallujah and Ramadi districts. His responsibilities included serving in the assignments of Operations Chief, Logistics Coordinator, and Police Instructor. He was provided no clear guidance as to how to train the police and relied on his own police academy training experience. He brought NYPD curriculum to Iraqi Police. His fellow Marines were civilian police officers with varying military occupational specialty (MOS) backgrounds. They partnered with Department of the State International Police (IPLO) officers.

26 Ibid, Phone Interview with MSgt Jose Mercado, dtd. 21 Jan 2011.


28 Phone Interview with MSgt Jose Mercado, dtd. 21 Jan 2011. MSgt Mercado, NYPD Officer, indicated that he and the rest of his police trainers were eventually replaced with Marine infantrymen. Although they were quick to adapt to the procedures already in place, they did not have any prior police experience.


30 Military Police Operations, MCWP 3-34.1, 4-10.

31 Ibid, 4-10.

Significant class discussions, case studies, and COIN doctrine point to the police forces as a requirement for establishing the rule of law, judicial courts, and a penal system – all crucial for legitimacy. One significant case study is the British in Mayla COIN operation. The British in Mayla successfully trained the indigenous police forces. Between 1952 and 1953, a four month basic course was provided. Mayla represents the central role police play to countering insurgency and ultimately establishing legitimacy.

MARCENT Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) Advisor Program Overview, LE Handbook Development Conference power point presentation, 07 July, 2010. Operation Metro used proven LE TTP's applied to COIN operations with support from tactical surveillance architecture and investigative databases. It increased the flow of actionable information about organized crime to aid in tracking and disruption of the combined criminal and terrorist activity in each individual AO thereby leading to a reduction in IED’s and attacks, 18.


The Commander's Guide is endorsed by MCD Commanding General Lieutenant General George Flynn. This MCIP explores ideas for refining the use of Law Enforcement Professionals in light of likely operating environments, adversaries, tactics, and technologies. This publication does not prescribe specific solutions. Rather, it broadly describes a number of potential options for employment. These options must be critically examined through operational experimentation and practical application in order to determine their feasibility, operational utility; and desirability.

Ibid, The LEP Handbook consists of the following: fundamentals of the LEP, principles of employment, an overview of the LEP program, limitations of employment, and essentially a how to guide on planning for and the assessment of the employment of the LEP on operations. The LEP program is: (1) Proven Law Enforcement (LE) Techniques Tactics and Procedures applied to COIN Ops, (2) Experienced LE Advisor/SME for unit commanders and staff who can think outside the traditional military box, (3) Unit resource to assist with established USMC training programs, and (4) Commanders' resource to increase the flow of actionable information about organized crime/gangs to aid in tracking and disruption of the combined criminal and terrorist activity in the Area of Operation. The LEP program is not: (1) HN police trainers, (2) the end all/be all for all LE related matters, interrogators, additional action officer for unit project, and (3) not a watch officer. Along with what the program is and is not, there are significant limitations, based on the contracted work, that are associated with the employment of the LEP.

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The author was a member of II MHG from 2004 to 2007 and was engaged in the support of STs training and deployments.

Discussion with MSgt Jose Mercado, NYPD Police Officer, and past studies of police training requirements confirm this statement.

A review of the MP curriculum was conducted on the detachments website. A comparison was then done to randomly selected civilian agencies police academies, which resulted in the average of 6 months of academy requirement of police training.

Terry L. Walker, CW05, "Lessons Learned: Valuable Information for Training or Advising Iraqis." Marine Corps Gazette: Jun 2008, 92, 6. 41

Mission statement pulled from Total Force Management System (TFSMS). TFSMS maintains every Marine Corps unit's mission statement, tasks, task organization, and table of equipment. It is managed by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Total Force Structure Division (TFSD). It requires Common Access Card (CAC) and password for access.


Registration of Civilian Employment Information (CEI) for Marines in the Ready Reserve (NOTAL) Marine Administration Message R 081618Z Feb 09, MARADMIN 0084/09.

Capability/Capacity: Civil Security Operations Slide. Provided by Mr. Robert Abbott and Mrs. Rebecca Deguzzman at the Center for Irregular Warfare, Quantico, VA, 10 Sept 2010.

### 2010 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW GROUP MAJOR INITIATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating Forces</th>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced infantry battalions (27 to 24)</td>
<td>- Cadre division, wing, logistics group, and Mobilization Command HQs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced artillery battalions (11 to 9)</td>
<td>- Increased civil affairs groups (3 to 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced flying squadrons (70 to 61)</td>
<td>- Doubled counter-intelligence/human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced wing supt group HQs (3 to 0)</td>
<td>- Increased air and naval gunfire liaison Companies (2 to 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased unmanned aircraft sys Squadrions (4 to 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reorganized Marine logistics groups</td>
<td>Supporting Establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consolidated military police to support law enforcement requirements</td>
<td>- Reorganized installations commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Built five joint task force capable MEBV HQs for GCCs</td>
<td>- Training Command HQ consolidated into Training and Education Command HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased regional component capacity</td>
<td>- No changes to HMX-1, nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Preserved 60% of the irregular warfare enablers from the 202K force</td>
<td>Security, joint billets, Chemical-Biological, Incident Response Force, or State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased Cyber structure &gt; 250</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased Marine Corps Special Operations Command by &gt; 1000.</td>
<td>- Reduced civilian structure &gt; 2900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# U.S. Nation Building History

## America's History of Nation-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Territory</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>U.S. Troops</th>
<th>International Cooperation</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Lessons Learned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1865–1952</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>Joint project with Britain and France, eventually NATO.</td>
<td>Very successful. Within 10 years an economically stable democracy and NATO member.</td>
<td>Democracy can be transferred. Military forces can undertake democratic transformation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1945–1952</td>
<td>352,500</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Very successful. Economy strong, democracy and regional security achieved.</td>
<td>Democracy can be exported to non-Western societies. Traditional nation-building initiatives can be simplistic but may be expensive than multifaceted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>United Nations (U.N.) humanitarian effort.</td>
<td>Not successful. U.S. achieved other than denuclearization and delivered in Mogadishu and other cities.</td>
<td>Unity of command can be as essential in peace as in combat operations. Nation-building objectives must be scaled to available resources. Peace may need to be deployed alongside military forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1994–1995</td>
<td>21,600 (plus 3,000 international police)</td>
<td>U.N. help by peacekeeping.</td>
<td>Not successful. U.S. forces remained in place. President elected but left before democratic institutions took hold.</td>
<td>U.S. misconduct can be costly and long-lasting. Peacekeeping forces must be competent and disciplined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1995–present</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Joint effort by NATO, U.N., and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.</td>
<td>Mixed success. Democratic elections within two years, but government is constitutionally weak.</td>
<td>Unity of command is required with interagency and inter-organization cooperation. Military and civilian forces can be serious challenges to enduring democratic reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999–present</td>
<td>15,000 (plus 4,600 international police)</td>
<td>NATO military action and U.N. support.</td>
<td>Mixed success. Elections within 3 years and strong economic growth. But no final resolution of Kosovo's status.</td>
<td>Broader participation and effective administration can be successful with unity of command and American leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001–present</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>Moderate contribution from U.N. and non-governmental organizations.</td>
<td>Too early to tell. No longer launch pad for global partnerships. But limited democratic structure and no real government stability layered basis.</td>
<td>Low initial input of money and troops yields low output of security, democratization, and economic growth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>