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MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**“An Operational Army Reserve: The Way Ahead”**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Title:** “An Operational Army Reserve: The Way Ahead”

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**Thesis:** In a fiscally constrained environment, an Operational Army Reserve must be established to complement the Total Force in countering the complex and fluid threats of the 21st century.

In order to man the force and provide predictability, fully implementing management processes such as the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) and “continuum of service” (COS) will make a transition to an Operational Army Reserve a reality.

**Discussion:** The Army Reserve has served the nation since the late 1890s, but a reliance on a part time force dates back to the early years of the Republic. The idea of a federal reserve force evolved from the state militias, today’s National Guard. Employing the Reserve in support of contingency operations has proved to be a challenging task since its establishment on 23 April 1908. Significant differences in organization, personnel manning, and mobilization have exacerbated the issues over the years. The increasing reality of budget reductions across the “Whole of Government” has the Department of Defense and the Army reevaluate the roles and missions of the Reserve Component. To effectively posture the Army to meet future threats to national security requires an Operational Army Reserve as an integral part of the Total Force of the 21st century.

**Conclusion:** The Army Reserve will be an enduring operational force within the Total Army that provides support to the combatant commanders and support to civil authorities. The Active Army must capitalize on the efficiencies offered by an Operational Army Reserve in order to continue to be in a position to effectively and successfully manage the national security challenges of the next decade and beyond.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC/s	Active Component/s
ARCOMs	Army Reserve Commands
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
CAR	Chief of the Army Reserve
CEF	Contingency Expeditionary Force
COS	Continuum of Service
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DEF	Deployment Expeditionary Force
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
ERC	Enlisted Reserve Corps
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GE	General Electric
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OMAR	Operations & Maintenance Army Reserve
ORC	Officers Reserve Corps
PsyOps	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAND	Rand Corporation
RC/s	Reserve Component/s
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
RPA	Reserve Personnel Army
RRCs	Regional Readiness Commands
RSCs	Regional Support Commands
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

## **PREFACE**

To relieve the stress on the Total Force, the Army has significant decisions to make regarding an establishment of an Operational Army Reserve. Today's Army Reserve has been fully engaged in current conflicts around the world, and in no other time in history has the Reserve been consistently "operational." We must take advantage of the readiness and experiences of the Citizen-Soldier and establish an Operational Army Reserve.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the requirement for an operational Army Reserve Component for the 21st century. With decreasing defense budgets, the need to capitalize on our reserve forces is more necessary than ever before. We must provide validity and predictability for our reserve soldiers through the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) and the "continuum of service" (COS). We must continue to utilize the Army Reserve as an operational force and not lose the experiences gained during the last decade. It makes fiscal sense for an Operational Army Reserve and will make reality for a Total Force policy.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank several people, without whom this project would not have been completed. First and foremost my wife Kendra, who provided unwavering moral support and encouragement through this process. Also, I'd like to thank our children, Kinsey and Kayla, who have also been the reason behind all my success. Finally, I'd like to thank my mentor Dr. Richard L. DiNardo for his guidance and mentorship.

## **Introduction**

In a time of persistent conflict and an uncertain security environment, the increased contributions made by the United States Army Reserve (USAR) will continue to be needed both now and in the future. The era when the USAR functioned primarily as a strategic reserve is over. Chief of the Army Reserve LTG Jack C. Stultz recently wrote:

America's Army has come to rely on the Army Reserve over the past 10 years for regular, cyclic and predictable support to the operational force world-wide. We are committed to continuing the transformation of the Army Reserve, enabling us to provide ongoing support to expeditionary and domestic operations and theater-security cooperation missions. Everything we do as an organization will be geared toward maintaining the Army Reserve as an enduring and essential part of the operational force.<sup>1</sup>

Without a question, active army forces require continued access to the nation's reserve forces as the defense budget is reduced. In a fiscally constrained environment, an Operational Army Reserve must be established to complement the Total Force in countering complex and fluid threats of the 21st century. In order to man the force and provide predictability, fully implementing management processes such as the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) and "continuum of service" (COS) will make a transition to an Operational Army Reserve a reality.

The requirement to establish an Operational Army Reserve is more important than any time in the nation's history. The purpose of this paper is to examine the requirement for an Operational Army Reserve to support the Total Force. It discusses the benefit of an operational reserve in a budget-constrained environment. Finally, the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and "continuum of service" (COS) are examined as effective tools to manage an operational reserve.

## **Evolution of the Army Reserves**

After the Spanish-American War, the Secretary of War Elihu Root worked with Congressman Charles W. Dick to strengthen the militia into a standardized force with federal funding and oversight, but one that retained its state functions.<sup>2</sup> This formed our nation's current National Guard. The Dick Act was passed on January 21, 1903 and replaced the Militia Act of 1792. The bill reaffirmed the principles of federal funding, federal inspections, and federal standards for training upon which today's Reserve Components are built. The bill also provided for a pool of potential officers eligible for service in any future volunteer force, a provision that opened the door for the creation of the Army Reserve.<sup>3</sup>

The Spanish-American War revealed that the Army Medical Department had wartime shortages of medical professionals. Elihu Root's ideas for a reserve corps soon grew into concrete form with a 1908 act to increase the efficiency of the Medical Department of the United States Army. This initiative created the federally controlled Medical Reserve Corps on April 23, 1908. This date was subsequently designated the official birthday of the United States Army Reserve (USAR).<sup>4</sup>

By 1916, the character of the debate on the organization of the Army had changed. Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916 to counter the events along the Mexican border and the war in Europe. The act established the Officers Reserve Corps (ORC), the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC), and the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The 1916 legislation contained a training camp provision which trained civilians to be commissioned officers in the reserves. The camps gave increased publicity to preparedness and the idea that citizens had a universal military obligation.<sup>5</sup>

Reliance on the Citizen-Soldier continued throughout the 20th century. When the nation entered World War I in April 1917, the provisions to build the Army contained in the National Defense Act of 1916 were enacted too late to have much effect. The Army Reserve provided approximately 80,000 enlisted and 89,476 officers to America's war effort. Most of the enlisted soldiers had no military experience and most of the officers completed the ninety-day Officer Training Camp.<sup>6</sup> After the war, Congress enacted the National Defense Act of 1920 to reduce defense spending. This act organized the Army into the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. The Organized Reserve was essentially the Officer Reserve Corps which grew and sustained its ranks with officers from the ROTC and military training camps. This cadre formed the additional combat units that would be formed during a large scale war.<sup>7</sup>

A significant event that occurred during the interwar period between World War I (WW I) and World War II (WW II) was the establishment of the Executive of Reserve Affairs, the antecedent to today's Chief of Army Reserve. This position provided a full-time general officer to monitor the interest of reservists and offer counsel on these matters to the Chief of Staff of the Army.<sup>8</sup> The reserves needed a spokesman during this period due to defense budget reductions. The national defense policy during this time was that of maintaining a relatively small Regular Army supplemented by a larger force of trained reservists. The nation desired this construct, but fiscally, it was not prepared to support even this modest level of military activity.<sup>9</sup>

As World War II approached in 1939, the United States required a large army. The Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) had the only available pool of trained, commissioned officers. Again, the US was met with another challenge of mobilizing a large force to augment the Regular Army. By the end of 1941, twenty-six Organized Reserve divisions were ordered to active duty. The divisions eventually became the active duty divisions.<sup>10</sup> When the war ended,

the Soviets became a threat to US national security. Once again, our nation was faced with the cost of maintaining a large standing Army to counter a threat. The nation came to rely more heavily on the Reserve components to ensure national security.

In the 1950s, the US was reluctant on mobilizing the reserves to support the Korean War due to the Soviet threat. To rectify this, Secretary of War George Marshall established a new recall policy and implemented the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. This act aligned the Reserves into a Selected Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve, combined they comprised the Ready Reserve.<sup>11</sup>

In 1967, the Army Reserve was reorganized into 16 geographic Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) and realigned the forces so units primarily had combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles. At the same time, the position of the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) was created; it replaced the Executive of Reserve Affairs. This structure remained until the 1990s when the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) was established, and the ARCOMs were replaced with 10 Regional Support Commands (RSCs). The RSCs would later transform into Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs). The RRCs were responsible for training and readiness of reserve units in their region.<sup>12</sup>

The Vietnam War brought another major change in the Reserve force policy. The Reserves were primarily not utilized during the war, and as a consequence of this decision, the Total Force Policy was implemented. This policy assigned units significant roles in support of the active Army units and therefore, maintained a smaller, all-volunteer active Army. More significantly, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams placed certain essential military specialties in the Reserves and National Guard to assure that the Army will never again fight a war without mobilizing the reserves. This policy became known as the Abrams Doctrine.<sup>13</sup>

## **Operational Army Reserves**

The Total Force Policy began transforming the Army Reserve from a purely strategic reserve into an operational reserve. The Army Reserve increased its unit and individual readiness during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, the Reserves participated in numerous conflicts such as Grenada and Panama. Its ability was not put to the test until Operation *DESERT SHEILD* and *DESERT STORM* in 1990. More than 88,000 Army Reserve soldiers mobilized and deployed in support of this operation.<sup>14</sup> The operation proved the Army Reserve was ready for its role in the Total Force.

The operational tempo of the Army Reserve continued to increase from the Gulf War to present day operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Reserves have deployed to places such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. The Reserve was no longer just deployed during times of crisis but was routinely deployed. The Reserve was still primarily a strategic reserve and was not fully integrated into the operational force. Although not fully integrated, the Reserve was operating at an increased tempo.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 further increased the operational tempo of the Army Reserve. It has evolved from a strategic reserve to a complementary component of the Active Army. The Reserves are no longer a back up force for a big war, but a force that is consistently mobilized to support on-going missions from war, contingencies, and security cooperation missions. Since September 2011, over 188,000 reservists have been mobilized, and half of all Army reserve component service members are now combat veterans. In addition, about 12 percent of the Selected Reserve force are mobilized and deployed at all times.<sup>15</sup> The nation will continue to rely on the reserve forces.

Transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve was unplanned. As defense scholar Richard Weitz stated this transformation is the de facto globalization of the “Abrams Doctrine.” This concept dictates the United States should never go to war without its Guard and Reserves, as it did by and large during the Vietnam War, because it severs the American public’s connection to and support for U.S. military operations.<sup>16</sup> The Army Reserve was traditionally designed for infrequent use. Previously, the Army Reserve was granted months to train and prepare for a mobilization. Today, the Army Reserve is optimized for predictable and recurring operational use.

### **Current Strategic Roles and Functions**

Rebalancing a reliance on the Reserve Component will ensure the long-term viability of a strategic reserve. Repeated combat tours, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief missions have produced an operational force that fully expects to be deployed on a regular basis. An operational force developed through persistent conflicts across the globe, the Army Reserve is more able to provide critical capabilities than at any other time in its history. As a provider of these capabilities, the Army Reserve has become a true contributor to the Total Force. The Army Reserve is an essential part of the operational force; its experienced Citizen-Soldiers remain ready to support the full spectrum of operations well into the future.<sup>17</sup>

The Army Reserve forces are no longer supplemental reinforcements to the active force. The reserves are a critical element of the Army’s war fighting team. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen wrote in 2010, “We could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces.”<sup>18</sup> Despite the sacrifices the Citizen-Soldiers have made, the U.S. national security entities will not enact future policies and budgets to support an operational reserve. There are discussions within DOD

and Congress of placing the reserves back into a purely strategic role. This has always been the case when defense budgets are constrained. In an effort to save costs, the Reserve Components were always targeted for downsizing in times of reduced defense budgets. Reverting back to a strategic mission has occurred after every major conflict since the creation of the Army Reserve in 1908, specifically the reductions after WW II and most recently the first Gulf War. Going back to a purely strategic reserve would reverse Army Reserve readiness gains, eventually reduce the level of operational experience, and neglect the significant resources invested in the soldiers and units over the past nine years. The Department of Defense (DOD) has made great strides to sustain an operational army reserve, but unless defense policymakers have a shared vision on the role of the reserves, it will be placed back into a strategic reserve as the budget diminishes.<sup>19</sup>

The 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) failed to identify specific roles and missions of the reserves. Although the Reserves' role was not specified, the QDR codified the need for an operational reserve well into the future. It states:

Prevailing in today's wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component-especially those that possess high-demand skill sets-in an operational capacity well into the future....The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas.<sup>20</sup>

As discussed in the 2010 QDR, the future character of conflict will be much different than today. Our potential adversaries will conduct asymmetric threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist attacks, hybrid warfare combining high and low technology tactics, and loss of access in the sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. Some key U.S. missions where Reserve Component capabilities will likely have an enduring application are homeland defense,

defense support to civil authorities, theater security cooperation, and protection of DOD infrastructure in space and cyberspace.<sup>21</sup>

Many of today's complex missions require specialized skills, and one of the arguments to maintain an operational reserve is the opportunity for the Active Component to draw upon the cutting-edge skills and knowledge found in the civilian workforce. The capabilities to support key U.S. missions are found in the Army Reserve. For example, the Army Reserve provides the Active Army with 87 percent of its Civil Affairs capacity, more than two-thirds of its sustainment commands, and half of its military police commands and information operations groups.<sup>22</sup> Members of the Army Reserve have civilian backgrounds and careers that provide them with backgrounds in specialized and high-tech fields, which are difficult to train and maintain in the military.

In a time where warfare is becoming more complex, soldiers possessing multiple military and nonmilitary skills will prove invaluable during operations involving military, political, economic, and technological lines of operations. The Reserves have members with these abilities. Enhanced by civilian skills that serve as a force multiplier, the Army Reserve delivers vital military capabilities essential to the Total Force. The Department of Defense (DOD) could certainly pay to have an active-duty infantry soldier to be trained in the latest police tactics in order to advise host nation forces. But it would make more sense to use a Reservist who's a civilian law enforcement officer with 20 years of experience. Likewise, a Reservist employed as a Google software engineer can fill a computer network operations billet, or a Reservist with a graduate degree in anthropology could serve in a Civil Affairs billet. A recent RAND Corporation assessment identified that Reservists employed in high-tech fields such as information technology were utilized to provide the most current knowledge, tools, and

techniques for cyber warfare.<sup>23</sup> Using the Reserves in this way can eliminate redundancies in the Total Force and reduce the requirement to staff positions for these operations. Pentagon officials have reached similar conclusions. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote, “More programs like this can be developed and we are working with the Services and their Reserve components to find appropriate force structures that can capitalize on the professional skills of Reservists and Guardsmen, while not detracting from the readiness in our conventional formations.”<sup>24</sup> This concept in conjunction with an appropriate mix of RC/AC structure will enhance an already flexible and agile force.

The Army Reserve has some of the best qualified people the nation has to offer, and they have joined the Reserves with an expectation and desire to become members of an operational reserve. The Reserve Component must be part of the solution to counter the complex future security environment such as stabilizing failed states, cultivating political and military capacity in allied nations, and maintaining information superiority.<sup>25</sup> As the National Security Advisor James Jones stated in 2006, “The unique expertise the Guard and Reserve units bring to Civil Affairs, Information Ops, and PsyOps, and many other aspects of our high-demand, low-density type capabilities that are in such precious supply, are absolutely critical to the execution of our future strategy.”<sup>26</sup> Additionally, the Army Reserve soldiers are enhanced by civilian skills that serve as a force multiplier and are vital to the Total Force.

### **Budget and Readiness**

The Army Reserve soldier is a battle-tested and cost-effective resource. The nation cannot allow Reserve soldiers to lapse in momentum and experience gained in operational expertise and capabilities when the drawdowns in both Iraq and Afghanistan are complete. The

nation must maintain an edge on the battlefield and home land by fully resourcing the Army Reserve, a proven vital component of our national security strategy.<sup>27</sup>

U.S. policymakers believe that defense spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will end soon as troops are withdrawn. As the defense budgets are reduced, the policymakers have not considered the significant costs needed to reduce troop levels and to reset training and equipment for future full spectrum operations. Additionally, the defense budget reductions have pressured the Department of Defense with rising personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement costs.<sup>28</sup> With rising costs and limited budget resources, an operational Army Reserve is an ideal investment option.

The Reserve Component currently makes up 43 percent of the total Department of Defense force but consumes just 9 percent of the annual defense base budget (see Figure 1).<sup>29</sup> The Army Reserve is a cost-effective force provider in the current fiscal environment where the United States is confronted by numerous global challenges. Maintaining a ready, accessible Army Reserve is a solution to achieving balance between national security and fiscal reality. A predictable and rotational use of the Army Reserve can significantly identify efficiencies within the defense budget.<sup>30</sup>




Figure 1. Source: Briefing, OASD/RA, March 2011

Since 2001, the Reserve Component has successfully secured funding to meet its operational tempo. The Reserve Component continues to be financed by the “Overseas

Contingency Operations” (OCO) budget account. This account will cease to exist once U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down. With the elimination of OCO funding, the operational functions of the Army Reserve, gained from a decade of combat operations, will also diminish.<sup>31</sup> As the Chief of the Army Reserve LTG Jack C. Stultz told congress, “If we operationalize the Reserve – and in my opinion, we don’t have a choice – then we’ve got to put those dollars required for training, for equipping, all that, into the base budget.”<sup>32</sup> From 2001 to 2010, the Army Reserve received \$52.7 billion. This included \$32.1 billion in Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) funding and \$20.6 billion in Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) funding. Additionally, the Army Reserve received similar Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. If the Department of Defense (DOD) decides to institutionalize the operational Army Reserve, then the Army will retain critical capability while maintaining strategic depth. If DOD chooses not to maintain an operational reserve, then over the next decade the Army Reserve will revert back to a strategic reserve and risk to lose the experience of soldiers from non-use and further resource constraints.<sup>33</sup>

The process of fully institutionalizing Army Reserve operational costs is progressing slowly, even at a halt. Although, the Army plans to request funding from Fiscal Years 2012 to 2017 to transform its reserve component into an operational reserve, it has not implemented a plan to fully incorporate the needed equipment to support an operational reserve into its budget and projected spending plan. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Army lacks a detailed plan on the requirements to transition to an operational Reserve.<sup>34</sup> Such uncertainty does not fare well for predictable funding for an operational Reserve in the DOD’s base budgets.

The Army must develop a transition plan to shift Reserve Component requirements from war supplementals to the base budget. The Army has not established firm readiness requirements nor progress metrics to monitor the transition to an operational reserve. This is directly tied to the lack of agreement on the future roles and missions of the Army Reserve. First, the U.S. government has not implemented changes to mobilization and budget policies to support and sustain an operational reserve component. Second, there are no legal requirements to assess the reserve component's roles and missions. To move forward, DOD should designate the Army Reserve and National Guard as a "force of choice" for missions such as homeland defense, civil support, cyber defense, security cooperation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, DOD must identify all of the policy, process, and budgeting reforms required to successfully enable the reserve component to perform the said missions. As a direct result of not defining the roles and missions, "DOD decision makers and Congress will not be in a sound position to determine the total costs to complete the transition and decide how to best allocate future funding."<sup>35</sup> This will make it difficult to justify a stable, predictable funding requirement for an operational reserve in DOD's future base budgets.

### **Managing an Operational Army Reserve**

In addition to establishing funding for an operational Reserve, a key area of discussion is Reserve utilization. DOD has begun to conduct an analysis of "stress on the force," which revealed wide differences in utilization of military skills and occupations in both the Active and Reserve forces. The analyses revealed that certain military occupational specialties (MOS) were utilized more frequently. For example, military police were activated and deployed at a higher rate than most other occupations. Overall, the analyses exposed large disparities between the force structure and the need for specific skills.<sup>36</sup>

The analyses resulted in “force rebalancing” which changed and improved allocations of capabilities within the Active and Reserve forces relative to demand. This continued to improve on the current Army Reserve structure of primarily providing Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) specialties. Particularly important are the enabling capabilities in the Army Reserve such as logistical, engineer, military police, medical, and civil affairs support. Current and projected demands for Army forces will require continued access to the Army’s reserve components. This means that mobilization and operational use of reserve component soldiers and units will continue. The Army of the 21st century will require a mix of both active and reserve components interdependently operating on a rotational cycle.<sup>37</sup>

To provide ready and relevant forces on a sustained basis during persistent conflict and future missions, implementing the Army Reserve’s supply-based Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is essential. This rotational process is intended to achieve cyclic unit readiness over a defined planning horizon for future missions. The mission options vary from deployments in support of named operations, theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, or domestic response. Supply-based ARFORGEN typifies the transition under way in the Army Reserve from the demand-based source of the past decade to a predictable unit rotational cycle. The current cycle for Fiscal Years 2012-2014 is five years to one. That is one year available and four years in reset, train, and ready. The goal for the Army Reserve is a six-year cycle. This process allows Army Reserve leaders to identify predictable deployment windows and manage readiness and training of forces to support future missions.<sup>38</sup>

The Army Reserve will continue to provide strategic and operational depth to the Total Army through ARFORGEN. “To achieve the readiness progression required by operational readiness cycles, units transition through three ARFORGEN-defined readiness pools-

RESET/Train Force Pool, Ready Force Pool, and Available Force Pool (see Figure 2).”<sup>39</sup>

Expanding this initiative further, the Army Reserve recently transitioned away from Expeditionary Force packages. Units will receive an Available Force Pool date allowing rotational units to be considered a part of the Army’s Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) with a training focus on full spectrum operations. Some units will be sourced as part of the Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) and focus their training on specific requirements to meet a contingency within a theater of operations. In other words, through the ARFORGEN model, units are task organized to either execute planned operational missions as part of DEF or respond to unplanned contingencies as part of CEF. Looking forward, as the demand for DEF units decrease, the Army Reserve will increase support to CEF through Theater Security Cooperation, Homeland Defense/Security, and other operational missions.<sup>40</sup>

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are highly competent and can be expected to respond effectively to national emergencies. Using reserve forces as “first responders” is an example of supporting Homeland Defense and Security missions. Legislation is being considered to provide the Army Reserve broader authority to call up troops for homeland security and also allow units to deploy for operations lasting 120 days or less. Currently, Title 10 authorizes utilization of the Army Reserve in the homeland in instances of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Army Reserve should work in conjunction with the National Guard, state, and local governments during homeland contingencies. This is not taking the mission away from the National Guard but simply augmenting it as required. There should be a logical progression where local civil authorities respond, and then the National Guard is called. This is usually all that is needed, but when federal help is required, that’s when the Army Reserve can provide the expertise and assistance.<sup>41</sup> The Army Reserve, managed through ARFORGEN, has a

range of capabilities, such as military police, civil affairs and CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) specialists, to make it effective in dealing with domestic disasters.




Figure 2. Army Reserve Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN)

In conjunction with the Army Reserve’s supply-based ARFORGEN model, the Department of Defense must fully implement the “continuum of service” (COS). COS must focus on effectively rebalancing the Army Reserve and target recruiting and retention efforts. The critical challenge the Army Reserve faces to successfully implement supply-based ARFORGEN is the manning strategy.<sup>42</sup> The implementation of both programs is vital to institutionalizing the Army Reserve as an operational force.

The continuum of service will encourage soldiers to continue lifelong service between the Army components and a civilian career. According to John Nagl, president of the Center for New American Security, “the continuum of service, a set of laws and policies providing career flexibility, will allow the U.S. military to recruit and retain the most talented people from a 21st century workforce in which individuals do not expect to work at the same company for 40 years, but instead prefer diverse experiences with varying levels of intensity over time.”<sup>43</sup> In other

words, COS can facilitate the transparent movement of members between a service's various components as well as in and out of civilian service without significant breaks in total service if a break is not desired. This concept will fully support an operational Reserve and allow a soldier to both serve in an active/reserve status and have a civilian career.

The Army Reserve is exploring the “continuum of service” (COS) initiative to make reserve service more attractive for soldiers, families, and employers. When this initiative becomes a program of record, soldiers can transfer from one component to another in a seamless, efficient manner that meets the needs of the soldiers as well as the readiness requirements of the Total Force. Establishing a COS is paramount in manning the force with talented soldiers while at the same time meeting their needs of serving their nation, their families, and their civilian careers. To retain the highest quality soldiers for an enduring operational force, the Army Reserve must think in terms of being a *Soldier for Life* (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Continuum of Service (COS)

If a COS strategy is properly developed and implemented, there will be new opportunities to employ talent at the right place, and the right time, while utilizing prior training and experience. Our Defense Department must have a system that affords military personnel an ability to move seamlessly from active duty, reserve, and guard duty assignments. Additionally, the reserve components can play a significant role in the "Whole of Government" approach towards national defense. Ultimately, greater returns on personnel investments can be achieved if there is a more efficient flow of personnel between active and reserve components, as well as between government, private industry, and the military.<sup>44</sup>

In an era of rapid technological advance and reducing resources, the opportunity to partner the needs of the Army with industry is advantageous and beneficial. "A continuum of service allows for the flexibility and optimization of the special skills and functions which make up a significant portion of the Army Reserve capabilities-all of which are essential to the Total Force."<sup>45</sup> The emergence of technical skills and training required in the Army and in corporate America establishes a need for technical expertise. An example is a software engineer at Google serving in the U.S. Army Cyber Command. Another great example is the Army Reserve's partnership with GE Healthcare to provide civilian training and certification of our Army Reserve X-ray technicians. Both the Army Reserve and GE Healthcare will benefit from having a fully trained soldier and employee. The sharing of training and resources between the military and industry, along with an established and functional continuum of service, could provide significant, cost-efficient means of manning an operational Army Reserve.<sup>46</sup>

The Army Reserve provides a broad range of civilian-related competencies that match any public or private organization at the local, state, or federal levels. The Army National Guard is state, regional, and often local. The Army Reserve is federal and regional. It is this

characteristic that makes the Army Reserve so well suited for domestic disaster relief as well as for providing land combat power to national defense capabilities. The Army Reserve, supported by the other military services, is competent, organized, and equipped for national emergency response in support of the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or any state's or group of states' Offices of Emergency Preparedness.<sup>47</sup> An Operational Army Reserve is a vital national asset that must be preserved and utilized not only for national defense but also for homeland defense and security.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has come a long way in developing a ready, capable, and available operational reserve. Although an Operational Army Reserve is not fully implemented, the Defense Department has codified it. "Secretary Gates issued Directive 1200.17 (October 28, 2008), Directive 1235.10 (November 26, 2008), and Instruction 1235.12 (February 4, 2010), which collectively enshrined the principles and policies required to sustain the Reserve Component as an operational reserve."<sup>48</sup> The purpose of Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, dated October 29th, 2008, is to establish the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational force. The directive provides three key points; RCs provide connection to the American public; continuum of service must be utilized; and utilization rules (ARFORGEN) are implemented. The post 9/11 operating environment of persistent conflict forced an operationalized Army Reserve into existence and with that, a greater need to enhance how the Department of Defense manages a *Soldier for Life*.<sup>49</sup>

## **The Way Ahead**

The Reserve Component has always been an integral part of the nation's National Security Strategy. The militias fought along side the 1st Continental Army and defeated the

British in the War of Independence. The Federal Reserve evolved from these militias and has become the United States Army Reserve (USAR) today. USAR evolved through necessity when our nation needed them during the 19th century in the War of 1812 and the Spanish-American War; during the 20th century in War World I (WW I), World War II (WW II), and the Korean War. By the end of the 20th century, the Reserve Component (RC) was utilized more frequently in security, stabilization, and reconstruction missions. In the past decade since 9/11, the RC was consistently utilized as an operational force. A requirement for an Operational Army Reserve is clearly validated.

The demand for U.S. ground forces over the last two decades has required almost continuous use of both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. Employment of the Army's RC has evolved over the last decade. More than 170,000 Army Reservists mobilized since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.<sup>50</sup> The force is more experienced than ever before. The Army's experience during this period has validated the Total Army concept in support of the U.S. national security interests. The nation is now at a point where current and projected demands for Army forces will require continued access to the Army's RC, making real what has been in policy since the "Abrams Doctrine" was implemented after the Vietnam War. This means that mobilization and operational use of RC soldiers and units will continue in the foreseeable future.

Army Reserves will remain a vital part of the Total Army Force facing the national security challenges of the next decade and beyond. The recently published Defense Strategic Guidance dated January 5, 2012, reaffirmed the requirement for an operational Reserve. One of the principles for a Joint Force of 2020 stated a need to examine the force structure of Reserve forces. Specifically, it states the Defense Department will need to examine the mix of Active

Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy. It also indicated and reaffirmed that the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that the nation continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces. The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness.<sup>51</sup>

A reduced defense budget will also make the Reserve Component a more viable source of employing a military force for contingencies. “DOD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.”<sup>52</sup> Using the RC in this way will require a fundamental shift in the way DOD envisions those forces. In the past, the department has viewed the Reserve as essentially a force of last resort. It was only to be used after all Active Component resources were expended. This must change and some missions, especially those that are highly predictable, should be seen as appropriate for making the Reserve Component the first option. As the defense budget decreases in the coming years, reliance on the Reserve will increase, with some Army missions moving permanently into the Reserve Component. The successful obtainment of an Operational Reserve capability will leverage costs and provide significant returns on the investment.

Today’s Army Reserve is uniquely positioned and structured to provide operational support in complex security environments. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq completed and the proposed drawdown in Afghanistan, the nation can expect to see declining defense budgets and end-strength reductions, while still preparing for future operations. The Army Reserve, maximized for strategic agility at reduced cost, provides the necessary capabilities to the

combatant commander. The nation and DOD are now at a strategic juncture with respect to the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve can return to a strategic force or become an enduring operational force ready to meet the challenges across the full-spectrum of operations.

The nation will reap the benefits of operationalizing the Army Reserve. Some of the benefits are a low-cost force, relief of active duty forces by allowing more dwell time, and positive readiness impact on the Reserve Component. With minimal recapitalization of readiness funded in the base budget and through annual employment of Army Reserve forces for operational missions such as Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), the Army Reserve can maintain readiness levels and support the National Security Strategy. An Operational Army Reserve is the most efficient and cost-effective answer to the nation's national security requirements.

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