

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2010 - March 2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE COAST GUARD PATROL BOAT OPERATIONS IN THE ARABIAN GULF: THE WAY FORWARD IN THE POST-OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ERA				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Justin A. Kimura Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT This study proposes there is need for continued Coast Guard Patrol Boat presence in the Central Command area of responsibility, beyond the proposed conclusion of Operation NEW DAWN and the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, and further proposes the best course of action for utilizing the Patrol Boats in Central Command is to complete the security and interdiction mission and protect the Iraqi gas and oil platforms before transferring this mission to the Iraqi Navy, and then transitioning to Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime Law Enforcement efforts throughout the Central Command theater.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 38	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g., 30-06-1998; xx-08-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATES COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER. Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORS AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/ monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**COAST GUARD PATROL BOAT OPERATIONS IN THE ARABIAN GULF:
THE WAY FORWARD IN THE POST-OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ERA**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**JUSTIN A. KIMURA
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

AY 10-11

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: *Carver D. McKenna*

Approved: *[Signature]*

Date: 7 MARCH 2011

Oral Defense Committee Member: *[Signature]*

Approved: *[Signature]*

Date: 7 March 2011

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	iv
PREFACE.....	v
INTRODUCTION	1
THE 110 FOOT ISLAND CLASS PATROL BOAT.....	3
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT.....	4
CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE.....	7
STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS.....	8
MISSION ANALYSIS	11
Security and Interdiction.....	12
Law Enforcement.....	15
Piracy and the Horn of Africa.....	17
Theater Security Cooperation	19
CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS	22
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	24
APPENDIX A: COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	27
APPENDIX B: PATFORSWA FORCE STRUCTURE DIAGRAM	29
APPENDIX C: SURVEY OF PATFORSWA WPB COMMANDING OFFICERS.....	30
APPENDIX D: SURVEY RESPONDENTS	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	32

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Executive Summary

Title: Coast Guard Patrol Boat Operations in the Arabian Gulf: The Way Forward in the Post-Operation Iraqi Freedom Era

Author: Justin A. Kimura, Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard

Thesis: This study proposes there is need for continued Coast Guard Patrol Boat presence in the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR), beyond the proposed conclusion of Operation NEW DAWN and the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, and further proposes the best course of action for utilizing the Patrol Boats in Central Command is to complete the security and interdiction mission and protect the Iraqi gas and oil platforms before transferring this mission to the Iraqi Navy, and then transitioning to Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime Law Enforcement efforts throughout the Central Command theater.

Discussion: Prior to this study being completed, the Commandant of the Coast Guard decided to leave the Coast Guard Patrol Boats in the Central Command AOR as long as appropriate funding was provided. This study identifies possible missions for the Patrol Boats within Central Command and analyzes how applicable these missions would be towards supporting national strategic goals, and further identifies challenges facing each mission. The four missions considered are Security and Interdiction, Law Enforcement, Anti-piracy, and Theater Security Cooperation, all of which contribute to national strategic goals. The study also found that the most significant challenge facing the Patrol Boats is the age of the vessels themselves. Each of the Patrol Boats in Central Command, not unlike their U.S. based counterparts, are years beyond their prescribed service life and are proving to be maintenance challenges.

Conclusion: The best course of action for employing the Coast Guard Patrol Boats in the Central Command AOR is for the Patrol Boats to complete and transfer the mission of protecting the Iraqi gas and oil platforms to the Iraqi Navy, and then participate in Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime Law Enforcement efforts throughout the Central Command AOR.

Preface

I chose to conduct my research into the Patrol Boats in the Arabian Gulf in order to recognize the efforts that my fellow Cuttermen are putting forth in advancing the nation's strategic goals. Being a two-time Patrol Boat Commanding Officer myself, I am aware of what it is like to serve onboard a Patrol Boat. It is physically and mentally demanding as the Patrol Boats, being as small as they are, are easily subject to the effects of rough seas, and because the Coast Guard often demands a high operational tempo from these cutters and crews. At the same time, the small size of these crews makes the service onboard especially rewarding as the crews really bond with each other. So, with the aggressive tempo of Patrol Boats operations in the Gulf, I certainly recognize and salute their efforts.

I would first like to thank Lieutenant Commander Mike Turdo, the Central Command Desk Officer at Coast Guard Headquarters, for helping me to identify my topic and for pointing my research in the right direction. I would also like to thank the past and present Commanding Officers who led our Patrol Boats in the Gulf. Their input was crucial to obtaining first hand knowledge from the theater. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Charles D. McKenna, Dean of Academics at the Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, for his guidance throughout my project and for undertaking the exceptional challenge of working with his school's only Coast Guardsman.

Finally, and most importantly, I am forever indebted to my wife Sharon, who put up with my procrastination and prolonged grumpiness during my research and writing. This project could not have been completed without her support.

INTRODUCTION

“In a sense, the Coast Guard is a ‘Rubik’s Cube’ in the ‘puzzle’ of national security. It can combine and recombine to work with its various domestic and foreign partners to shape effective responses to twenty-first-century security demands.”

- Vice Admiral Vivian S. Crea, U.S. Coast Guard¹

The United States of America, with its 95,000 miles of coastline facing all compass points, is a true maritime nation that has depended upon the sea for its livelihood since the republic was first established. The sea that America relies upon for commerce and transportation is also the same sea that presents many challenges to the security of the nation. Especially in the modern global situation, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, the defense of America’s coastline and maritime environment are now more important than ever, and at the same time, has forced America to push her defense of those boundaries out farther than ever.

Beginning in 1790, when the Revenue Cutter Service was formed to suppress maritime smuggling following the American Revolution, and culminating in 1915 when the United States Life-Saving Service was added to create the modern day Coast Guard, the Coast Guard and its ancestral services have played a significant role in defending America’s maritime boundaries. This record of service most notably includes participation in every major conflict, ranging from the cutter *Harriet Lane* firing the first maritime cannon shot in the Civil War², to Signalman First Class Douglas Munro earning the Medal of Honor while evacuating Marines from Guadalcanal

¹ Vivian S. Crea, Vice Admiral, USCG, “The U.S. Coast Guard: A Flexible Force for National Security,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Winter 2007, 15-23, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519490&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2010).

² Truman Stobridge, “The United States Coast Guard and the Civil War: The U.S. Revenue Marine, Its Cutters, and Semper Paratus,” U.S. Coast Guard History, http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/Civil_War_Stobridge.asp (accessed December 18, 2010).

in World War II, to Patrol Boats intercepting Viet Cong trawlers and smugglers during the Vietnam War.

The Coast Guard's role as "America's Maritime Guardian"³ continues proudly in the current operating environment. Since America was attacked on September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has evolved and undertaken new roles, both domestically and overseas. Here at home, the Coast Guard has seen the mission of Homeland Security rise to the top of its priority list, right along with Search and Rescue. Overseas, the Coast Guard played a significant role in the execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and continues to maintain a presence during Operation NEW DAWN (OND).

One of the major elements in the Coast Guard's participation during OIF was the deployment of six 110-foot Patrol Boats (WPBs) to the OIF theater. From 2003 until the completion of OIF in 2010, the six WPBs operated out of Bahrain and conducted maritime security operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG).⁴

With the conclusion of OIF and the approaching deadline for all U.S. forces, including those of the Coast Guard, to withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2011,⁵ the Coast Guard now faces a decision what to do with the forces it has in the former OIF AOR. In particular, what is to be done with the six deployed WPBs?

³ U.S. Coast Guard, *U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian*, Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, May 2009), 3.

⁴ William H. Theisen, PhD, "Guardians of the Gulf: A History of Coast Guard Combat Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2002-2004," (Portsmouth, VA: Atlantic Area Historian's Office, June 11, 2009), 12.

⁵ *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq*, http://www.usf-iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf (accessed December 19, 2010), 20.

Several classified-level decisions have already been made at the strategic levels within senior Central Command (CENTCOM) and Coast Guard leadership regarding the future of the WPBs in the CENTCOM AOR. This study will focus on open source needs identified throughout the theater and then analyze how capable the WPBs are of responding to and meeting these needs. The research conducted and documented in this paper was completed notwithstanding the fact that decisions have already been made. This study proposes there is need for continued WPB presence in CENTCOM, beyond the proposed conclusion of OND and the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, and further proposes the best course of action for WPB employment in CENTCOM is to complete the security and interdiction mission and protect the Iraqi gas and oil platforms before transferring this mission to the Iraqi Navy, and then transitioning to Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime Law Enforcement efforts throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

THE 110-FOOT ISLAND CLASS PATROL BOAT

Over the past 25 years, the 110-foot Island Class Patrol Boat has been one of the Coast Guard's most valuable coastal multi-mission assets. Commissioned over a seven year period between 1985 and 1992, the 49 cutter fleet, built by Bollinger Shipyards in Lockport, Louisiana at a cost of \$7 million each, was based on a successful British-tested design. The Island Class, all named after U.S. islands, replaced the older 95-foot Cape Class vessels.

The "110s", as they are commonly known throughout the Coast Guard, are commanded by a Lieutenant (O-3) and manned by a crew of 18 personnel. They are powered by twin V-16 diesel engines totaling over 5,000 horsepower and can attain a top speed of more than 29 knots. The cutters only draw approximately seven feet of water, making them ideal for coastal and littoral operations. They have an operational range of more than 1,800 nautical miles and an

endurance of five days. The cutters are equipped with a 25 mm machine gun, two .50 caliber machine guns, and an array of small arms.⁶

The Island Class was designed to perform a variety of missions, ranging from offshore surveillance, search and rescue, to law enforcement. The first eight cutters were stationed in the Coast Guard's Seventh District in Miami, Florida and quickly proved their worth as a high-speed, highly maneuverable, low-draft vessel in executing drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean during the early 1990s. The rest of the fleet was eventually stationed around the entire Coast Guard, including along both coasts, throughout Alaska, and out west to Hawaii and Guam.

The Island Class was originally designed and built with a 15-year service life and many of them are showing their age after exceeding that service life. While several of the fleet have or will be going through mid-life extension projects, the entire fleet is due to be replaced by a brand-new, 154 foot long Sentinel Class cutter beginning in late 2011.⁷

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT

In the summer of 2002, the Coast Guard, along with the rest of the Armed Forces, began preparing for possible combat operations against Iraq. In September 2002, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), the maritime component of CENTCOM, requested Coast Guard support for the pending mission, dubbed Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Navy primarily valued the Coast Guard as a force multiplier due to the Coast Guard's experience and well-trained ability to operate in the near-shore littoral environment. The majority of the

⁶ "USCGC BAINBRIDGE ISLAND Characteristic Sheet," U.S. Coast Guard, <http://www.uscg.mil/d1/cgcBainbridgeIsland/info.asp> (accessed December 17, 2010).

⁷ Michael Valliant, "Fast Response Cutters: The Heroes of the Coast Guard Fleet," *Delivering the Goods*, Vol. 34, November 2010, 1, <http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/CG9newsletterNov10.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2011).

waterways touching Iraq were often shallow, silty, and restricted, and the only Navy assets capable of operating in this environment were their Special Forces boat units. The Coast Guard WPBs were capable of operating in these environments for a longer duration than the Navy's boat units. Additionally, the Coast Guard units and personnel provided an extensive law enforcement and maritime security background that would be highly beneficial in intercepting, boarding and inspecting Iraqi vessels.⁸

During the initial deployment of Coast Guard forces into the OIF theater, there were actually eight WPBs in the overseas theater. Four of these cutters, *Bainbridge Island*, *Grand Isle*, *Knight Island* and *Pea Island*, homeported in various ports along the East Coast, were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea under a shore command designated as Patrol Forces Mediterranean (PATFORMED), based in Sicily. These four WPBs arrived in theater in March 2003 and were joined by the 378-foot High Endurance Cutter *Dallas*, homeported in Charleston, South Carolina. They conducted escort duties between the Strait of Gibraltar and Turkey, which served as the northern front for access into Iraq. However, this mission was short-lived as Turkey soon closed all lines of communication across its territory. The five cutters then commenced a mission to conduct Leadership Interdiction Operations by cutting off waterborne escape routes from Iraq through Syria. This mission ended shortly thereafter when Syria agreed to seal its borders. As a result of the actions of Turkey and Syria, there was no longer a need for PATFORMED. All five cutters were released from Mediterranean operations and subsequently returned home.⁹

The remaining four WPBs, *Adak*, *Aquidneck*, *Baranof* and *Wrangell*, also homeported along the East Coast, were deployed to the NAG under a shore command designated as Patrol

⁸ Theisen, 1.

⁹ Theisen, 19.

Forces Southwest Asia (PATFORSWA), based in Bahrain. Additionally, several other Coast Guard assets were deployed to the NAG. The 378-foot High Endurance Cutter *Boutwell*, homeported in Alameda, California, carrying an HH-65 helicopter and an aviation detachment from Barbers Point, Hawaii, deployed with the Amphibious Ready Group *Tarawa*, and eventually joined with the four WPBs to form Task Force 55. The 225-foot buoytender *Walnut* deployed from its homeport of Honolulu, Hawaii to provide a pollution response capability should the Iraqis damage or destroy their offshore oil terminals. There were also numerous Law Enforcement Detachments, Port Security Units, Pollution Response Strike Teams and shore-based support personnel. At the height of combat operations in OIF, there were 1,250 Coast Guard personnel in theater.¹⁰

In the early weeks of 2003, leading up to the start of major combat operations on March 19, 2003, the WPBs and *Boutwell* joined a Coalition force of approximately 150 ships and conducted escort operations and maritime interdiction operations (MIO) in the NAG to enforce United Nations (UN) sanctions and control the flow of maritime traffic in and out of Iraq. They focused on protecting legitimate maritime commerce, while preventing illegal smuggling as well as precluding the escape of any enemy leadership by sea.¹¹

The WPBs other primary mission was to conduct maritime security operations (MSO) around the two primary Iraqi gas and oil platforms (GOPLAT), the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and the Khor Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT), prior to the start of combat operations. This task was vital for several reasons. The GOPLATs were a vulnerable target as any malicious damage to them would result in a massive open flow of gas and oil into the waterways of the NAG. Additionally, there were also Iraqi troops stationed on these platforms, using them as a

¹⁰ Theisen, 1-6.

¹¹ Theisen, 12.

base for small boat operations. The GOPLATs also provided significant revenues for Iraq as the main point for exporting petroleum products via seaborne shipping means, and would have to be preserved for the future economic well-being of Iraq during the anticipated post-war reconstruction period and beyond. Because of the significance of the GOPLATs, U.S. and Polish Special Forces raided and secured the platforms on March 20, 2003. During this operation, the Special Forces were reinforced by the WPBs, who maintained a security border around each terminal to ensure no enemy personnel escaped and that no reinforcing efforts succeeded.¹²

The four WPBs, which were later joined by two more WPBs, *Maui* and *Monomoy*, continued the GOPLAT missions at ABOT and KAAOT until the end of OIF and maintain a presence into the current day Operation NEW DAWN.¹³

CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

At the end of major combat operations in April 2003, most Coast Guard units returned to the U.S. and resumed their normal missions. PATFORSWA was commissioned as a permanent command in 2004 and, through the end of 2010, the Coast Guard maintained a presence of approximately 400 personnel in the CENTCOM AOR.

- Command and Support Staff, 97 personnel – The shore-based command structure consisting of operations, maintenance, logistics, administration, weapons and planning staffs.
- Patrol Boats, 136 personnel – WPBs *Adak*, *Aquidneck*, *Baranof*, *Maui*, *Monomoy* and *Wrangell* conducting a variety of missions as part of Destroyer Squadron 50, Expeditionary Strike Group Five and NAVCENT. There is also a seventh crew that

¹² Theisen, 18.

¹³ Michael Turdo, Lieutenant Commander, USCG, CENTCOM Desk Officer, personal conversation with author, December 20, 2010.

intermittently operates all six of the WPBs while the permanent crews are resting or training.

- Port Security Unit 308, 120 personnel – Providing maritime force protection and critical infrastructure protection for U.S. and coalition naval assets in Kuwait.
- Redeployment and Assistance Inspection Detachment, 33 personnel – Providing direct support for U.S. Army units redeploying back to the U.S. or within the CENTCOM AOR.
- Advanced Interdiction Teams, eight personnel – Providing support to U.S. Naval vessels in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
- Port Advisory Coordinating Element, three personnel – Assisting the Government of Iraq with the development and successful implementation of national port security policies.

There are also several other officers serving as liaison officers to coalition forces. Appendix B depicts the overall PATFORSWA structure.¹⁴

PATFORSWA falls under the overall command of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area in Portsmouth, Virginia but also reports to NAVCENT and CENTCOM as Combined Task Group (CTG) 55.1.1.

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

“Naval power is the natural defense of the United States.”

- President John Adams, 1796
2nd President of the United States¹⁵

From the Commander in Chief down to the tactical commanders, there are various requirements that support, and dictate, the continued presence of the Coast Guard, and in

¹⁴ Benjamin Berg, Lieutenant Commander, USCG, Deputy Commander PATFORSWA, e-mail message to author, October 15, 2010.

¹⁵ *Naval Operations Concept*, 2010, 35.

particular the WPBs, in the CENTCOM AOR. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010, the President states that the overarching goal of the security strategy is “focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century...while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time.”¹⁶ The NSS further states that a significant objective is to preclude further actions of Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. One way to achieve this goal is to deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states, offering examples such as Yemen and Somalia. Additionally, the NSS seeks to further America’s partnership with Pakistan, in order to target extremists within Pakistan as well as strengthen its border with Afghanistan.¹⁷

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2008, although published before the current NSS, carries several similar themes. The Secretary of Defense states, “for the foreseeable future, this (strategic) environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system.”¹⁸ The NDS defines several objectives, two of which are to defend the homeland and to promote security. Defense of the homeland requires a fine balance between accommodating the expansion of globalization and the positive results it brings, such as the spread of technology, economics and people, while still deterring the spread of terrorism and disruption that occurs along the same routes. In order to promote security, the best method is to encourage peaceful change within the international system and by assisting to build the capacities of at-risk nations.¹⁹

The Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 was published in order to support national-level strategies and promote cooperative efforts across the three naval services, the U.S. Navy,

¹⁶ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 1.

¹⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 20-21.

¹⁸ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008, 2.

¹⁹ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008, 6-15.

the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The NOC details how the naval services will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and winning wars in a manner consistent with national strategy.²⁰ The NOC reinforces the idea that the sea and its maneuver space are of vital interest to national and international security because the sea connects all nations and all nations rely on the sea in one way or another. Reiterating the thought of the NDS, the sea carries as much risk as it does opportunity due to the freedom of movement within. As such, the NOC suggests that a strong and aggressive forward presence is vitally important to America's strategic security interests. The NOC specifically requires that the naval services will "employ *globally distributed, mission-specific forces*...that promote stability, prevent crises, and combat terrorism...and protect U.S. vital interests, assure friends, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries."²¹

The NOC specifically highlights the capabilities of the Coast Guard and the value of these capabilities across a wide range of missions. Within the objective of projecting power, the Coast Guard is highly capable of operating in the littorals, the area of the sea that separates the open ocean from shore. In supporting the goal of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) missions, the NOC once again values the Coast Guard's littoral capacity, relying on the Coast Guard to operate where larger Navy ships are unable. The NOC also recognizes the Coast Guard as an international expert in missions such as Search and Rescue, Law Enforcement, and Maritime Interdiction and Security, and combines this with the Coast Guard's ability to project soft power and conduct training and partner-building missions with rising allies. Especially of note is the

²⁰ *Naval Operations Concept*, 2010, 1.

²¹ *Naval Operations Concept*, 2010, 28.

Coast Guard's unique ability to conduct Law Enforcement missions under Title 14 of the U.S. Code, unlike their Department of Defense counterparts, which operate under Title 10.²²

In its 2010 Posture Statement, the Coast Guard describes one of its main missions as Defense Readiness. Under this mission, it states that the Coast Guard will continue to support U.S. Combatant Commanders through the training of Iraqi maritime security forces, secure Iraqi ports and GOPLATs, and train foreign partner nations in maritime law enforcement, search and rescue (SAR) and security. The Coast Guard will also provide capabilities and resources in support of naval warfare mission areas. Meeting the strategic goals set forth in the NSS, NDS and NOC, the Coast Guard's own strategic goals include serving as a multi-mission maritime service capable of being a force multiplier and partner in the global theater.²³

MISSION ANALYSIS

"With national and international partners, U.S. Central Command promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and nonstate aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity."

- Central Command Mission Statement²⁴

Several key decisions regarding the future of PATFORSWA and the WPBs have already been made at the CENTCOM and Coast Guard Headquarters level. In August 2010, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., decided to maintain the Coast Guard presence in the CENTCOM AOR as long as the Coast Guard forces continued to be funded by Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.²⁵ The current OCO funding that

²² *Naval Operations Concept*, 2010, 38-39.

²³ U.S. Coast Guard, *2010 Posture Statement*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, February 2010), 16.

²⁴ U. S. Central Command, "Our Mission," <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-mission/> (accessed December 4, 2010).

²⁵ LCDR Turdo, December 20, 2010.

the Coast Guard receives annually to operate and maintain PATFORSWA and its assets is approximately \$240 million.²⁶ The information and discussions leading to these decisions, including the Request for Forces from CENTCOM to the Coast Guard and the Commandant's Decision Memo, are classified.

In addition to researching open source documents to determine and analyze mission requirements throughout the CENTCOM AOR, the author conducted surveys across a random sampling of current and previous PATFORSWA WPB Commanding Officers (CO). A copy of the survey is included as Appendix C. Of the surveys issued, 18 were returned and of these 18 replies, four were from COs currently serving in theater with the remaining 14 from COs who previously completed their one-year tour in theater. These past and present COs have a significant amount of afloat experience ranging across multiple Coast Guard cutter classes, including prior commands, in addition to shore-based tours including assignments as Congressional Liaisons, White House staff members, Navigation Instructors, and operational staff officers. These COs were queried because they not only have first-hand experience of CENTCOM operations, but also because of their extensive knowledge of the Coast Guard as a whole.

MISSION ANALYSIS – SECURITY AND INTERDICTION

Dating back to the pre-combat phase of OIF, throughout the entire duration of OIF, and into the era of OND, the combined missions of Maritime Security Operations, Maritime Interdiction Operations and Maritime Infrastructure Protection have been the primary missions for the PATFORSWA WPBs. These missions seek to augment the counterterrorism efforts of the regional countries and deter the efforts of terrorists' use of maritime infrastructure and sea

²⁶ U.S. Coast Guard, *2010 Posture Statement*, February 2010, 42.

lanes. The primary objects of these missions were the two GOPLATs, KAAOT and ABOT, located in Iraqi territorial waters. The importance and value of these GOPLATs, which provide between 70 and 85 percent of Iraq's gross domestic product, is significant as they are both vulnerable targets that if attacked, could result in dire consequences, both economically and environmentally.²⁷

The WPBs also conducted boardings near the Khawr Abd Allah Waterway (KAA) in support of United Nations sanctions. The KAA runs along the border between Iraq and Kuwait and is the main maritime thoroughfare leading to Iraq's major deepwater port of Umm Qasr. Besides enforcing the UN sanctions, these boardings targeted arms smuggling, potential mine layers, suicide attack boats and any Iraqi leadership attempting to escape the country. The WPBs and their crews proved successful at this mission as they intercepted a tug carrying mines as well as several small boats being prepared for suicide attacks. Furthermore, the WPBs conducted escort operations within the KAA for vessels carrying humanitarian aid into Umm Qasr, ensuring the safe passage of these vessels in a formerly hostile waterway.²⁸

At the transition between OIF and OND on September 1, 2010, the mission of guarding the GOPLATs continued to be the primary focus of the WPBs. In their survey responses, all 13 COs stated they spent an average of 85 percent of their patrol time guarding the GOPLATs. The four current COs who responded also stated that with respect to the GOPLAT mission, the transition from OIF to OND had been transparent.

²⁷ D. Keith Simmons, Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class (AW), USN, "Iraq Assumes Control of Oil Terminal from Coalition Forces," U.S. Navy, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=44882 (accessed January 10, 2011).

²⁸ Basil Tripsas, Patrick Roth, and Renee Fry, "Coast Guard Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom," Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, October 2004, 30.

However, the demands of the GOPLAT mission are beginning to ease. On April 30, 2010, the Iraqi Navy assumed control and responsibility for the KAAOT. According to U.S. Navy Rear Admiral T.C. Cropper, Commander of Task Force Iraqi Maritime, “The Iraqi Navy is ready and capable of assuming security responsibility for KAAOT...this milestone represents another indication of increasing Iraqi operational independence. It's very important to the way ahead and the future of Iraq.”²⁹

Additionally, the Iraqi Navy completed its first-ever 24-hour patrol of the ABOT on January 7, 2011. This patrol was completed in their newest patrol boat, a 35-meter Swift Class patrol boat designated as PB301 and marked a significant milestone in the development of the Iraqi Navy.³⁰ The Iraqi Navy will eventually assume complete security duties for both KAAOT and ABOT.³¹

Although the Iraqi Navy assumed security duties for the KAAOT and will eventually do the same for the ABOT, the Coast Guard should maintain a WPB presence in support of security and interdiction missions for several reasons. First, the Coast Guard WPBs have been doing this mission successfully since 2003 and have not had one successful attack occur on their watch. Second, their continued presence will reduce the pressure for the Iraqi Navy to assume full responsibility for the GOPLATs and serve as a force multiplier once the Iraqi Navy does take over. And third, the presence of the WPBs meets the requirements of both the NOC and Coast Guard Posture Statement, in which the WPBs will promote stability, prevent crises and combat terrorism by maintaining the security of Iraqi ports and GOPLATs.

²⁹ Simmons.

³⁰ David Scott, Sergeant, USA, “Iraqi Navy completes first 24-hour patrol on Iraqi Armed Forces Day,” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, <http://www.dvidshub.net/news/63676/iraqi-navy-completes-first-24-hour-patrol-iraqi-armed-forces-day> (accessed January 20, 2011).

³¹ Simmons.

MISSION ANALYSIS – LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Coast Guard is regarded as an expert in Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE). Within the U.S., the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for both maritime drug interdiction on the high seas and for migrant interdiction. In 2009, the Coast Guard seized 160.1 metric tons of cocaine valued at over \$4.9 billion, 71,234 pounds of marijuana valued at \$64.6 million, and 58 trafficking vessels, and detained 322 suspected smugglers. Additionally, the Coast Guard interdicted nearly 3,700 undocumented migrants attempting to illegally enter the U.S.³²

The Coast Guard should parlay this success into the execution of MLE missions in the CENTCOM AOR. Lieutenant Craig Allen, the current CO of *Baranof*, stated that smuggling of narcotics and weapons in the Arabian Gulf is prevalent and he believes the WPBs would be best employed in joint MLE operations with coalition partners that utilize the assets, expertise and training of the Coast Guard. Combining these traits with the local knowledge and expanded jurisdiction and authority that regional partners would provide in their respective waters would result in, as Lieutenant Allen puts it, “what we do best – which is find, chase down and apprehend *Ali Baba* (their [regional allies] generic term for any bad guy).³³

In general, the Coast Guard is often more well versed in MLE operations than the Navy, mainly because of the frequency with which the Coast Guard conducts the mission. In contrast to the Navy, as well as the other Department of Defense branches, which operate under Title 10 of the U.S. Code and are somewhat restricted in domestic MLE because of *Posse Comitatus*, the Coast Guard, which operates under Title 14, is able to conduct MLE operations on a regular basis. Within the Coast Guard, the WPBs conduct a large share of the overall MLE mission and

³² U.S. Coast Guard, *2010 Posture Statement*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, February 2010), 16.

³³ Craig Allen, Lieutenant, USCG, CO of *Baranof*, e-mail message to author, January 12, 2011.

are well suited to the mission with their high speed, maneuverability and ability to operate in shallow-water environments.

In order to improve an international effort against the maritime smuggling of illegal narcotics, the U.S. has partnered with numerous other countries and entered into bilateral agreements that strengthen the fight against drugs. These agreements often facilitate U.S. assets conducting hot pursuit into another nation's territorial waters, expedite extradition efforts of detained smugglers, and provide for joint investigations. Using the U.S.-Costa Rica agreement as an example, "These agreements preserve the partner nation's sovereignty and its jurisdiction, while deterring the abuse of its vessel registry, territorial sea and airspace by drug traffickers."³⁴ The U.S. has agreements such as these with a host of Caribbean nations, where maritime drug trafficking is prevalent, and has most recently entered into the U.S.' first agreement with an African nation, Cape Verde. To support this agreement, the Coast Guard deployed the cutter *Dallas* to Cape Verde in June 2008 for a joint MLE patrol with the Cape Verdean Coast Guard and the French Navy.³⁵

The Department of State lists two countries in the CENTCOM AOR as being "Major Illicit Drug Producing and Major Drug-Transit Countries:" Afghanistan and Pakistan.³⁶ With the investments the U.S. has already made in Afghanistan, and with the U.S.' desire to strengthen its partnership with Pakistan, the U.S. should add the issue of illegal drug trafficking to its agenda

³⁴ Embassy of the United States of America, "Fact Sheet on the U.S.-Costa Rica Counter-Narcotics Maritime Agreement," (San Jose, Costa Rica: December 1999), <http://sanjose.usembassy.gov/maritfact.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).

³⁵ Phillip J. Heyl, Captain, USCG, "A Perfect Fit for Africa," *Proceedings*, Vol. 134, No. 8 (August 2008), 39-41, <http://www.usni.org/userfiles/file/Aug%20Pro/Heyl%20Aug%2008.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2010).

³⁶ Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1*, Washington, DC: March 2008, 5, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100890.pdf> (accessed December 17, 2010).

with these nations and pursue similar bilateral agreements like it has in the Caribbean and Africa. To support such an agreement, the WPBs would be well suited to bring their tactics and abilities to the coast of Pakistan and conduct MLE operations with the Pakistan Navy.

MISSION ANALYSIS – PIRACY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

Piracy continues to be a significant threat near the coast of Somalia on the Horn of Africa (HOA). According to the International Maritime Bureau, a non-profit organization that serves to protect the integrity of international trade, 2010 was a record year worldwide for the amount of ships and people taken hostage at sea. Acts of piracy were most prevalent off the coast of Somalia, where 49 vessels were hijacked at 1,016 crewmembers were taken hostage. At the end of 2010, Somali pirates still held 28 vessels and 638 hostages.³⁷

In order to combat the piracy activities near the HOA, a multinational task force was established in January 2009. This force, designated as Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and overseen by NAVCENT, operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, and serves to “deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.”³⁸ Their efforts contributed to reducing the number of attacks from 117 in 2009 to 53 in 2010.³⁹

There are both significant positives and negatives in considering using the WPBs for the anti-piracy mission. According to Lieutenant Charlotte Mundy, former CO of the *Maui*, “the

³⁷ International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services, “Hostage-taking at Sea Rises to Record Levels, says IMB,” January 17, 2011, <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb> (accessed January 18, 2011).

³⁸ Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force 151, <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmef/151/index.html> (accessed January 5, 2010).

³⁹ International Chamber of Commerce.

WPBs offer an outstanding platform from which to conduct anti-piracy operations.”⁴⁰ The advantages that the WPBs employ in MLE operations, high-speed and maneuverability, along with the Coast Guard crews’ expertise in force protection and conducting vessel boardings, support Lieutenant Mundy’s belief.

However, Lieutenant Mundy further stated, “In order to reduce transit times and increase effectiveness, there would need to be a forward operating base, similar to Kuwait, closer to the Gulf of Aden/Somali coast.”⁴¹ Herein lies the challenge with employing the WPBs in anti-piracy operations. The distance from the PATFORSWA base in Bahrain to the Gulf of Aden is approximately 1,500 nautical miles. Continuing on to Djibouti, where the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa is based, extends the trip from Bahrain to approximately 1,800 nautical miles. These distances preclude using the WPBs for anti-piracy missions near the HOA while remaining based out of Bahrain.

An additional concern is the weather the WPBs would face while transiting between Bahrain and the HOA. The Coast Guard has already sent one WPB to the HOA as a feasibility test. During the trip, the WPB was exposed to the increased weather conditions driven by the Indian Ocean and encountered significant weather challenges. This, combined with the extended distance of the trip, supported the belief that for the WPBs to operate near the HOA, they would need to be based near the HOA.⁴²

Although the WPBs would be a fantastic force multiplier in the anti-piracy mission, the logistical support needed to support them near the HOA is currently not established. A

⁴⁰ Charlotte Mundy, Lieutenant, USCG, former CO of *Maui*, e-mail message to author, January 14, 2011.

⁴¹ LT Mundy.

⁴² LCDR Turdo.

significant decision would have to be made to essentially remove the WPBs from the NAG and base them in Djibouti for long-term basis if they were to be used for anti-piracy operations.

MISSION ANALYSIS – THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Theater Security Cooperation, as defined by the Department of Defense, consists of “interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”⁴³ Especially in the CENTCOM AOR, where U.S. forces are exiting Iraq and preparing to do the same in Afghanistan, TSC and nation-building efforts will be key in moving beyond combat operations and building partnerships throughout the area. As such, CTF-152, a multinational task force under NAVCENT command, was established in March 2004 with the mission of “working...to enhance the ability of regional maritime forces to limit illegal activities and defeat destabilizing activities in the Arabian Gulf.”⁴⁴

In the survey responses, an overwhelming majority of the past and current COs recommended TSC as the next mission for the WPBs as the GOPLAT workload decreases, and cited a variety of reasons why and examples where they believed the WPBs could be successful at TSC missions. Additionally, the current Commodore of PATFORSWA, Captain D.S. Bauby, highlights TSC as one of his priorities, requiring his forces to strengthen relationships and interoperability alongside regional naval and coast guard forces.⁴⁵

⁴³ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010), 420.

⁴⁴ Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force 152, <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/152/index.html> (accessed January 5, 2010).

⁴⁵ D.S. Bauby, Captain, USCG, Commodore, PATFORSWA, “Mission and Command Objectives FY2011, September 1, 2010.

First, the Iraqi Navy, while making progress towards assuming full responsibility for the GOPLAT mission, could still benefit from the experience that the WPBs and their crews offer. In order to improve their littoral capabilities and have appropriate assets for the GOPLAT mission, the Iraqi Navy purchased 15 new Swift Class patrol boats in May 2010. The 35-meter patrol boats are being built by Swiftships in Morgan City, Louisiana, and the first one was delivered in May 2010 with the remainder to follow over an 18 month period.⁴⁶ Lieutenant Grant Thomas, former CO of the *Monomoy*, stated, “The Iraqi Navy is going to need mentoring and training for many more years!” and “The Coast Guard is really the best service to conduct this training...because we know how to operate patrol boats and conduct coastal/security defense missions.”⁴⁷ The original reasoning for deploying the WPBs to CENTCOM in 2003, to utilize their expertise in the littorals and MSO mission, should translate into justification why the WPBs are now the best-suited asset to train the Iraqi Navy in the same missions.

A second reason why the WPBs would excel at the TSC mission is inherent in the size and perception of the Coast Guard as a whole. In contrast to the Navy, the Coast Guard is significantly smaller in size and has historically engaged in more humanitarian missions vice combat missions. This is a key statistic as most small foreign navies, such as those in the CENTCOM AOR, are actually similar in size to the U.S. Coast Guard. Both Lieutenant Commander Blake Novak, former CO of the *Wrangell*, and Lieutenant Andrew Pate, former CO of the *Baranof*, cite that the navies of several CENTCOM countries, including Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, are similar in size and organization to the U.S. Coast

⁴⁶ United States Forces – Iraq, “Press Release: First of 15 Patrol Boats delivered for Iraqi Navy training,” May 28, 2010, <http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-releases/first-of-15-patrol-boats-delivered-for-iraqi-navy-training> (accessed December 8, 2010).

⁴⁷ Joseph “Grant” Thomas, Jr., Lieutenant, USCG, former CO of *Monomoy*, e-mail message to author, January 14, 2011.

Guard.⁴⁸ Besides the smaller and more appropriate size the Coast Guard offers, they also offer a perception as a soft power. The U.S. Coast Guard, and in general, coast guards throughout the globe, are not viewed as warfighting forces and are often more welcome across international borders. To quote Lieutenant Commander Jonathan Carter, former CO of the *Aquidneck*, “War or no war, a white hull still projects less hostility than a grey hull.”⁴⁹

In addition, foreign navies and coast guards in the CENTCOM theater would be more willing to accept partnerships with the WPBs because of their expertise in the capabilities that these nations are trying to build. The navies and coast guards of smaller countries, such as those in CENTCOM, are more concerned with keeping their own borders secure and protecting their own coastlines rather than projecting power on a worldwide scale. Lieutenant Thomas stated, “Often times, the countries within the region are more interested in working/training with the U.S. Coast Guard than the U.S. Navy because our missions (coastal security) is the capability they are trying to build.”⁵⁰ Using the countries of Oman and Yemen as examples, Oman is challenged with Iranian migration from the north and smuggling from Africa to the south, while Yemen is also a major smuggling route from Africa. If these two neighboring nations could work to strengthen their coastal borders together as a result of TSC influx from the WPBs, the result would be a direct and positive impact on U.S. and global security as a whole.⁵¹

Additionally, the WPBs would provide expertise in Search and Rescue, MLE, MSO and MIO, all mission areas that are key for a rising nation to secure its borders.

⁴⁸ Blake Novak, Lieutenant Commander, USCG, former CO of *Wrangell*, e-mail message to author, January 18, 2011, and Andrew Pate, Lieutenant, USCG, former CO of *Baranof*, e-mail message to author, January 17, 2011.

⁴⁹ Jonathan Carter, Lieutenant Commander, USCG, former CO of *Aquidneck*, e-mail message to author, January 12, 2011.

⁵⁰ LT Thomas.

⁵¹ LCDR Novak.

The major challenge the WPBs would face with executing the TSC mission throughout the CENTCOM AOR is the size of the AOR itself. Promoting TSC anywhere beyond the Arabian Gulf, such as towards the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Aden, would require significant logistical support, similar to what would be required to conduct anti-piracy operations near the HOA.

Additionally, a second challenge to the TSC mission is circuitous in nature. The very reason the WPBs would conduct TSC in a nation, to improve security and partnerships, also makes the mission inherently dangerous due to the receiving nation's need for security improvement. Both Lieutenant Allen and Lieutenant Thomas cited anti-terrorism and force protection requirements as being a significant challenge, even just for minor logistical stops in foreign ports.⁵²

CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS

There are many challenges and concerns that must be considered prior to deciding on the future employment of the WPBs in the CENTCOM AOR. The first, and most significant issue is the age of the WPBs. The WPBs are all beyond their prescribed 15-year service life. To compound this, the operational tempo in CENTCOM has resulted in the WPBs being underway for more than 4,000 hours each year, more than double what is required of WPBs operating back in the U.S.⁵³ This combination of advancing age and increased operational tempo has resulted in an increased need for maintenance. Lieutenant Andrew Pate, former CO of the *Baranof*, stated WPBs frequently got underway with significant casualties in order to meet mission demands.⁵⁴

⁵² LT Allen and LT Thomas.

⁵³ Dion Nicely, Lieutenant, USCG, CO of *Maui*, e-mail message to author, January 13, 2011.

⁵⁴ Andrew Pate, Lieutenant, USCG, former CO of *Baranof*, e-mail message to author, January 17, 2011.

Lieutenant Dion Nicely, current CO of the *Maui*, said, “There hasn’t been a piece of equipment that hasn’t broken in my nine months in command. It is taxing on engineers especially, they never see downtime in port.”⁵⁵ The survey respondents all cited the support command at PATFORSWA as putting forth significant efforts to keep the WPBs operating, but the age and use of the vessels are slowing overwhelming these efforts. As Lieutenant Allen captured it, “The shoreside support and ship’s force do a fantastic job keeping the ships fully mission capable, but it’s an upcurrent struggle.”⁵⁶

Another significant concern, related to the challenge of keeping the aging hulls operational, is the struggle to obtain parts in a timely manner. The majority of the past and present COs cited at least one, if not several, instances where they suffered a casualty and then had to wait while a part was shipped from “half a globe away.”⁵⁷ In one instance, the age of the WPBs also affected the availability of a part. Lieutenant Mundy was forced to wait eight months for a gyro-compass repeater because the manufacturer had since gone out of business and someone else had to manufacture a brand-new one from scratch.⁵⁸

The result of the combination of age and increased use of the WPBs may already be evident in the situation the Navy is currently dealing with. In September 2010, the Navy was forced to remove all five of its 179-foot Patrol Craft from service in the Arabian Gulf due to significant structural damage to the hulls.⁵⁹ These patrol craft were all built in the early 1990s with a 15-year service life by the same shipyard that built the WPBs. Like the WPBs the patrol

⁵⁵ LT Nicely.

⁵⁶ LT Allen.

⁵⁷ Philip Baxa, Lieutenant, USCG, CO of *Aquidneck*, e-mail message to author, January, 18, 2011.

⁵⁸ LT Mundy.

⁵⁹ Philip Ewing, “Navy pulls patrol ships over wear, cracks,” *Navy Times Online*, September 15, 2010, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/09/navy-patrol-coastal-repairs-091510w/> (accessed January 7, 2010).

craft were designed to be high-speed, highly maneuverable vessels, and share a similar hull design as the WPBs. The WPBs in PATFORSWA are showing similar signs of wear, such as cracks in the superstructure and warped bows.⁶⁰ The condition of the Navy patrol craft may offer a glimpse of what is to come for the WPBs.

A final concern to be addressed is to question what the eventual end game will be for PATFORSWA and the WPBs. In 2003, significant logistical efforts were exerted in order to deploy the WPBs to CENTCOM. Because of the extended distance combined with the WPBs limited range, the WPBs were loaded onto a commercial heavy-lift vessel and shipped to Bahrain.⁶¹ Even if the need for the WPBs within CENTCOM were to end, the cost and effort required to return the WPBs to the U.S. would not be feasible considering the age of the vessels beyond their prescribed service life and the extended use they have experienced since 2003. Additionally, the pending replacement of the WPBs by the Sentinel Class cutter would reinforce a decision not to bring them back to the U.S.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the Commandant of the Coast Guard had already decided, prior to this study being conducted, to maintain a WPB presence in the CENTCOM AOR with appropriate OCO funding, this study focused not only on reiterating the need for a WPB presence in CENTCOM, but more importantly on identifying open source needs throughout the theater, analyzing the capability of the WPBs to meet those needs, and then identifying the best course of action for WPB employment within CENTCOM. The study identified four basic mission areas where the WPBs could contribute to and meet the strategic, operational and tactical goals of leadership ranging

⁶⁰ LT Mundy.

⁶¹ Theisen, 8-9.

from the Commander in Chief, to the Department of Defense, to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and to the CENTCOM and NAVCENT Commanders. These four mission areas were:

1. To continue MSO, MIO and MIP, primarily in support of the GOPLATs,
2. To execute MLE missions throughout CENTCOM,
3. To conduct anti-piracy operations near the HOA, and
4. To conduct TSC missions throughout CENTCOM.

All four missions contributed to overarching strategic goals of shaping an international order to more effectively advance America's interests in the 21st century. At the same time, all four missions presented their own unique challenges.

Based on the analysis of the four missions, as well as how they meet the strategic goals of the nation, this study recommends that the best course of action for the WPBs to contribute to the national strategy is:

1. To continue using them to support the GOPLAT mission until the Iraqi Navy is fully equipped and capable of assuming these duties, and then
2. To shift the primary mission of the WPBs to conducting TSC throughout the CENTCOM theater, with the intent of building partnerships and conducting training of these partners' navies and coast guards, and
3. To conduct MLE as a secondary mission in conjunction with TSC.

The remaining mission, anti-piracy operations in the HOA, presents too many logistical challenges and is not worth the effort from a time-space-distance perspective. Additionally, the advanced age and deteriorating material condition of the WPBs is not worth the efforts and funding that would be required to set up a support base and structure in the HOA theater.

In conclusion, the WPBs have served admirably since the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and continue to do so into Operation NEW DAWN. Their service and that of their crews has contributed significantly towards securing the CENTCOM AOR and helping to build partnerships among nations in the theater. Looking forward to an exit strategy, this study recommends that the WPBs not be brought back to the U.S. because of the logistical challenges involved and because of the advanced age of the WPBs. Additionally, the Sentinel Class will soon replace the U.S.-based fleet of WPBs and the return of the six CENTCOM WPBs will not be necessary. Instead, the WPBs should continue to execute the missions recommended by this study as long as they are able to combat their age and operate in an effective, economical and safe manner.

APPENDIX A

COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS


ABOT	Al Basra Oil Terminal
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CTF	Combined Task Force
CTG	Combined Task Group
GOPLAT	Gas and Oil Platform
HOA	Horn of Africa
KAAs	Khawr Abd Allah Waterway
KAAOT	Khor Al Amaya Oil Terminal
LCDR	Lieutenant Commander
LT	Lieutenant
MIO	Maritime Interdiction Operations
MLE	Maritime Law Enforcement
MSO	Maritime Security Operations
NAG	Northern Arabian Gulf
NAVCENT	United States Naval Forces Central Command
NDS	National Defense Strategy, June 2008
NOC	Naval Operations Concept, 2010
NSS	National Security Strategy, May 2010
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom

OND	Operation New Dawn
PATFORMED	United States Coast Guard Patrol Forces Mediterranean
PATFORSWA	United States Coast Guard Patrol Forces Southwest Asia
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
USA	United States Army
UN	United Nations
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USN	United States Navy
WPB	United States Coast Guard Patrol Boat



USCG PATROL FORCES SOUTHWEST ASIA

55.1



Organizational Stakeholders

- CGHQ
- LANT-3RS
- DOG
- DESRON 50
- ESG 5
- NAVCENT
- NSA Bahrain
- CTF-56
- CENTCOM
- DHS Attaché (Basra)
- U.S. Army 595th TRANSCOM (RAID)
- SFLC: PBPL / Port Eng's
- SILC: Contracting
- PCRON
- PCMST
- ESU Portsmouth
- FORCECOM
- NSWGAU3

Billets;
Shoreside: (97 total)
 12 Officers
 85 Enlisted
Cutters: (136 total)
 21 Officers
 115 Enlisted
ALL: (26-29 total)
 2 Officers
 16-18 Enlisted
RAID/ITAM: (33 total)
 4 Officers
 29 Enlisted

Other CG Units in Theater

- PSU Kuwait
- MARLO (CAPT)
- Maritime Advisor Baghdad (CAPT)
- PACE (CDR)
- SAG (Afghanistan) (CAPT)
- CENTCOM Intel/Threat Cell (Bagram)

PATFORSWA FORCE STRUCTURE DIAGRAM

APPENDIX B

Enclosure (3) to PATFORNOTE 1601.1 07 SEP 10

APPENDIX C

SURVEY OF PATFORSWA WPB COMMANDING OFFICERS

PATFORSWA WPB CO SURVEY

Name:

Position:

Time in Position:

Short Summary of CG Career Experience:

1. What was your primary mission set/tasking while assigned? Also, please describe your basic optempo.
2. What do you consider your major successes and contributions to the overall goals of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), i.e. how effective was your unit in the OIF theater? (For current CO's, how has that changed with the shift to Operation New Dawn?)
3. What were the major challenges you faced; please discuss both operational and logistical?
4. The COMDT has decided to leave the WPB's in the CENTCOM theater as long as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding is provided. Based on your knowledge of the current situation and combined with your experiences in the oparea, how would you continue to employ the WPB's now that OIF is completed?

APPENDIX D

SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Name	Position/Time
LT Craig Allen	CGC Baranof, 2010 to present
LT Philip Baxa	CGC Aquidneck, 2010 to present
LT Fred Bertsch	CGC Aquidneck, 2009-2010
LT Kate Bitel	CGC Adak, 2009-2010
LCDR Jonathan Carter	CGC Aquidneck, 2006-2007
LCDR Matthew Chong	Relief Crew, 2006-2007
LT Craig Dente	CGC Wrangell, 2009-2010
LT Brock Eckel	CGC Wrangell, 2008-2009
LCDR Christopher Keene	CGC Monomoy, 2006-2007
CDR Sean MacKenzie	CGC Adak, 2003-2004
LT Charlotte Mundy	CGC Maui, 2008-2009
LT Justin Nadolny	CGC Monomoy, 2010-present
LT Dion Nicely	CGC Maui, 2010-present
LCDR Blake Novak	CGC Wrangell, 2005-2006
LT Andrew Pate	CGC Baranof, 2009-2010
LCDR Arthur Ray	CGC Aquidneck, 2005-2006
LT Matthew Rooney	CGC Maui, 2009-2010
LT Joseph "Grant" Thomas, Jr.	CGC Monomoy, 2009-2010

Bibliography

- Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.* http://www.usf-iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf (accessed December 19, 2010).
- Bauby, D.S., Captain, USCG, Commodore, PATFORSWA. "Mission and Command Objectives FY2011." September 1, 2010.
- Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force 151, <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmef/151/index.html> (accessed January 5, 2010).
- Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force 152, <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmef/152/index.html> (accessed January 5, 2010).
- Crea, Vivian S., Vice Admiral, USCG. "The U.S. Coast Guard: A Flexible Force for National Security." *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Winter 2007. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519490&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2010).
- Department of Defense. *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. JP 1-02. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010.
- Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: June 2008.
- Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1*. Washington, DC: March 2008. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100890.pdf> (accessed December 17, 2010).
- Embassy of the United States of America. "Fact Sheet on the U.S.-Costa Rica Counter-Narcotics Maritime Agreement." San Jose, Costa Rica: December 1999. <http://sanjose.usembassy.gov/maritfact.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).
- Ewing, Philip. "Navy pulls patrol ships over wear, cracks." *Navy Times Online*, September 15, 2010. <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/09/navy-patrol-coastal-repairs-091510w/> (accessed January 7, 2010).
- Heyl, Phillip J., Captain, USCG. "A Perfect Fit for Africa." *Proceedings*, Vol. 134, No. 8, August 2008. <http://www.usni.org/userfiles/file/Aug%20Pro/Heyl%20Aug%2008.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2010).
- International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services. "Hostage-taking at Sea Rises to Record Levels, says IMB." January 17, 2011. <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb> (accessed January 18, 2011).

- Simmons, D. Keith, Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class (AW), USN. "Iraq Assumes Control of Oil Terminal from Coalition Forces," U.S. Navy, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=44882 (accessed January 10, 2011).
- Stobridge, Truman. "The United States Coast Guard and the Civil War: The U.S. Revenue Marine, Its Cutters, and Semper Paratus," U.S. Coast Guard History, http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/Civil_War_Stobridge.asp (accessed December 18, 2010).
- Theisen, William H., PhD. "Guardians of the Gulf: A History of Coast Guard Combat Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2002-2004." Portsmouth, VA: Atlantic Area Historian's Office, June 11, 2009.
- U.S. Central Command, "Our Mission," <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-mission/> (accessed December 4, 2010).
- U.S. Coast Guard. *2010 Posture Statement*. Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, February 2010.
- U.S. Coast Guard. *U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian*. Publication 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, May 2009.
- United States Forces – Iraq. "Press Release: First of 15 Patrol Boats delivered for Iraqi Navy training." May 28, 2010. <http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/press-releases/first-of-15-patrol-boats-delivered-for-iraqi-navy-training> (accessed December 8, 2010).
- "USCGC BAINBRIDGE ISLAND Characteristic Sheet," U.S. Coast Guard, <http://www.uscg.mil/d1/cgcBainbridgeIsland/info.asp> (accessed December 17, 2010).
- Valliant, Michael. "Fast Response Cutters: The Heroes of the Coast Guard Fleet." *Delivering the Goods*, Vol. 34, November 2010. <http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/newsroom/pdf/CG9newsletterNov10.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2011).
- The White House. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: May 2010.