Joint Security Cooperation and the AirSea Battle Operations provide a cost efficient, balanced, and effective strategy to increase global security, ensure US military advantage, and protect US national interests abroad, all while reducing overall defense spending. To defend against both traditional and emergent threats, the smaller Joint Force will increase their support to security cooperation initiatives with partner nations. The Defense Department will attempt to leverage security cooperation agreements to deter regional instability and diminish the potential for phase III combat operations by executing comprehensive phase 0 shaping operations in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations.

The primary objective is securing regional stability through effective phase 0 shaping operations and if a crisis erupts use AirSea Battle as an additional operational capability to mitigate the threat. No matter how independently robust security cooperation efforts and the development of the AirSea Battle Concept become, the Joint Force must link these two facets as critical components of a greater national defense strategy through the next decade and beyond.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Defense Strategy for the Next Decade: Joint Security Cooperation and AirSea Battle Operations

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Executive Summary

Title: Defense Strategy for the Next Decade: Security Cooperation and AirSea Battle

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Thesis: Joint Security Cooperation and the Air-Sea Battle Operations Concept provide a cost efficient, balanced, and effective strategy to increase global security, ensure US military advantage, and protect US national interests abroad, all while reducing overall defense spending.

Discussion: The national debt, at $15 trillion, exceeds one year of US Gross Domestic Product. Reductions to federal spending, specifically cuts to the defense budget are on the horizon. In response to the looming fiscal constraints, the Department of Defense responded with its own drastic change in military strategy, transitioning from major combat operations to fighting global terrorism with a smaller deployed force and refocusing on other emerging threats. This transition will allow the Defense Department the opportunity to redeploy, restructure, and reduce costs. The transformation will result in a smaller expeditionary Joint Force with each service focused on training to regain traditional core competencies, retaining competency in counterinsurgency operations, and developing competency to fight emerging threats.

To defend against both traditional and emergent threats, the smaller Joint Force will increase their support to security cooperation initiatives through military-to-military bilateral and multilateral relations with partner nations around the world. The Defense Department will attempt to leverage security cooperation agreements to deter regional instability and diminish the potential for phase III combat operations by executing comprehensive phase 0 national and regional based shaping operations in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations. The primary objective of the Defense Department securing regional stability through effective phase 0 shaping operations is to support US government efforts towards reducing baseline spending and minimizing overseas contingency operations spending as a result of phase III military operations caused by crisis response.

The Defense Department views anti-access and area denial as a threat that challenges US national security and its ability to maintain freedom of the global commons. Therefore, the Joint Force will continue funding the development of an operational execution concept and future technologies for the capital intensive weapons systems needed to combat the anti-access/area denial threat. If the phase 0 security cooperation strategy fails and military operations must ensue then the new strategy calls on the capital intensive operating systems defeat A2AD threats and insure protection of US national interests. If a crisis arises then the US will look to leverage partner nations within the crisis region to participate in military operations while the US supports the effort employing its technological advanced systems, depending on whether a partner nation’s capabilities and willingness to support US interests will determine the extent of US military involvement.

Conclusion: Security Cooperation and the AirSea Battle Concept provide the Defense Department’s most efficient and effective way to support the President’s National Security Strategy. No matter how independently robust security cooperation efforts and the development of the AirSea Battle Concept become, the Joint Force must link these two facets as critical components of a greater national defense strategy through the next decade and beyond.
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Preface

For the past decade the United States has fought two major wars against rogue nations and terrorist organizations that threaten US national security. The cost of these wars combined with the real fiscal crisis our national government faces forces a change in strategy. I wrote this paper to analyze how increasing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation initiatives combined with effective employment of the AirSea Battle Concept in part meet the Department of Defense responsibilities outlined in the National Security Strategy. While the Defense Department must continue to maintain proficiency, capability, and capacity to operate effectively throughout all spectrums of warfare, focusing resources on improving and increasing security cooperation initiatives and fully developing the AirSea Battle Concept are two areas which the Defense Department accurately identified as critical for maintaining strategic advantage throughout the next decade. Many thanks to Dr Jonathan Phillips, Professor of Culture and Interagency Operations at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, for his patience, guidance, and mentorship.
INTRODUCTION

On 10 June 2011, weeks before the end of his tenure, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates addressed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in Brussels, Belgium. In his address Secretary Gates warned of some alarming trends within NATO. He spoke of two levels of membership, those members that pay and contribute forces for the common good and those that do not. He continued that in order for NATO to remain effective, all nations must contribute and resist the temptation to rely on wealthier nations to carry the burden. His point foreshadowed a new national defense strategy for the United States and in January 2012, President Obama introduced “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense.”

This new defense strategy will change the Defense Department’s approach for the next decade. In line with the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy, the new Defense Department Strategic Guidance outlined the need for “building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world [as it] remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.” The strategic guidance now echoed the comments delivered by Secretary Gates. Two weeks later, the Defense Department released the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). The JOAC outlined the need for “future joint forces [to] leverage cross domain synergy—the complementary [instead of] merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others—to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission.” In order to be effective, the Defense Department needs to balance security cooperation with its ability to operate against an adversary capable of employing advanced conventional capabilities, including anti-access and area denial systems (A2/AD), combined with other indirect, irregular, and hybrid capabilities.
Joint Security Cooperation and the Air-Sea Battle Operations Concept provide a cost efficient, balanced, and effective strategy to increase global security, ensure US military advantage, and protect US national interests abroad, all while reducing overall defense spending. This paper briefly outlines the fundamental reason for linking security cooperation with AirSea Battle Concept in the new defense strategy. Next this paper identifies the current and emerging threats that the United States may face in the next decade. Then this paper assesses the increased emphasis on security cooperation as one component of a long term strategy for worldwide regional stability. Next it explains how the AirSea Battle Concept provides the force needed to achieve an advantage against emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities. Finally, it examines the major restructuring of the joint force and suggests how each service will contribute to Joint Security Cooperation and AirSea Battle Operations.

JOINT SECURITY COOPERATION AND AIRSEA BATTLE-OPERATIONS

The Joint Staff initiated the development of the AirSea Battle Concept as the latest transformation of the joint force for ensuring regional stability. When combined with coordinated security cooperation initiatives both effectively contribute to safeguarding US national security interests abroad. The AirSea Battle Concept begins to address how the joint force will fight if called to operate in a constrained and non-permissible maritime or littoral environment against both low and high-tech threats. The end result of joint operations will either be a rapid strike with no boots on the ground and therefore a limited mission objective or a costly operation to gain and maintain a foothold for joint and coalition forces to occupy later. Alone the AirSea Battle Concept may not achieve long term regional stability; however, combining AirSea Battle with security cooperation operations may. By focusing resources and manpower to enhance and improve security cooperation initiatives around the world, the Defense
Department will shape the theater and improve regional stability by coordinating the joint force with the Interagency and partner nation forces. With increased diplomatic, economic, and military ties developing mutually shared interests with regional partners, the US government will help guarantee and safeguard national security and improve regional stability worldwide. By increasing Defense Department support to security cooperation efforts, the risk of instability decreases and the potential for unmitigated escalation also diminishes. If a crisis develops and escalates to the point of US military intervention, then the Defense Department can chose to employ a multitude of forces and, if appropriate, execute the AirSea Battle Concept to gain access, strike an objective, and safely land ground forces (coalition, Army, and Marines) as required.
Security cooperation and the AirSea Battle Concept reinforce one another. The Defense Department’s main effort begins by increasing security cooperation initiatives with strategic partners. As security cooperation efforts combined with diplomatic and economic development initiatives increase, the potential for improved access also increases. Increased access advances military-to-military relationships. By developing the AirSea Battle Concept and demonstrating joint force effectiveness defending against regional threats, US partner nations gain increased confidence in their relationship with the US government. This increased confidence furthers closer ties with the US. Understanding the potential threats the US faces over the next decade and their dramatic increase in complexity, array, capability, technology, distribution, and density is the first step to understanding the importance of increasing security cooperation and developing AirSea Battle as two separate yet linked integral components of the Defense Department’s long term strategy.

**THREATS FOR THE NEXT DECADE**

With combat forces redeployed from Iraq at the end of 2011, Afghanistan remains the focus. By 2009, Vice President Biden advocated a drawdown of ground forces in Afghanistan while continuing the presence of US Special Forces to combat insurgent groups and terrorist organizations. On 20 November 2010, NATO leaders established a deadline ending NATO involvement in combat operations in Afghanistan. This established a firm commitment by NATO to continue International Security and Assistance Force operations and Afghan National Security Forces training until the end of 2014. The transition changes US efforts in Afghanistan from a war on insurgency to a regional partnership with a robust security cooperation agreement. The redeployment of forces will leave a small contingent to provide foreign internal defense training focused on supporting the Afghan government’s counter-insurgency mission, in addition
to a contingent of US Special Forces continuing the fight against global terrorism. This shift allows the Defense Department time to restructure its forces to meet the fiscal challenges of today and the threats of the next decade.

Violent extremism and terrorism remain threats to the US. With the redeployment of forces, US Special Forces will continue to combat the most violent worldwide extremist and terrorist organizations. United States Special Operations Command offered its strategy on the future of combating violent extremism. Admiral Olsen, then Commander, United States Special Operations Command, identified both a direct and an indirect approach based on each terrorist organization and the assessed motives for their violent acts. The direct approach involves military action to “kill, capture, and interdict terrorists and terrorist networks to prevent them from harming us in the near term.” The indirect approach involves a whole of government effort to engage states and enable them, through security cooperation and other efforts, to combat extremism. The indirect approach also identifies other emerging threats and attempts to mitigate the factors that tend to lead to violent extremism.

By August 2009, the White House issued a policy defining a new approach to fighting extremism. The White House directed a two part initiative for defending against the threat of extremism. The first part focused on defeating the immediate threat by ensuring US Special Forces maintained the appropriate resources for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as increasing the number of special forces and the associated “capabilities and technologies needed to support the [counter-extremism] fight.” The second part focused on, “tackling the political, economic, and social factors that help drive individuals to extremist organizations” specifically through, “social, political, and economic campaigns” and not simply with direct military action, in otherwords, Security Cooperation.
terrorism, criminal activities combine with state actors to form an even more complex hybrid threat to US national security.

In 2007, a Department of the Navy report stated, “conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.”11 Frank Hoffman defined hybrid warfare as, “a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder [that] can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors.”12 While the Department of Defense has yet to publish its definition of hybrid warfare, Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary for Defense Policy, stated “US military dominance in conventional warfare makes the combination of regular and irregular warfare an asymmetric strategy used to exploit US military weaknesses.”13 The invasion of Iraq began as a conventional fight. However, both Iraq and Afghanistan evolved into irregular warfare with multifaceted complex hybrid threats, terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations. The extended duration of these conflicts permitted other states and non-state actors to observe how the US dealt with insurgencies, irregular warfare, and hybrid threats. In addition, numerous near peer nation-states continue to develop weapons systems capable of challenging the most technologically advanced US systems. These state and non-state actors pose the potential to incorporate advancing conventional capabilities with unconventional elements in an integrated stratagem to challenge US interests worldwide.

The 2010 National Security Strategy stated, “we must safeguard the sea, air, and space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital shipping lanes open, improving the early detection of emerging
maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air domain, and ensuring the responsible use of space.”14 Secretary Panetta defined projecting power in Anti-Access/Area Denial regions as a primary mission of the US Armed Forces.15 With a combination of advanced conventional air, land, and naval forces and irregular hybrid adversary forces targeting US and partner nation subsurface, surface, air, land, space, and cyberspace forces, a near peer nation presents a credible threat to the US military’s freedom to maneuver and ability to project power. Many of these new systems US adversaries can use as anti-access and area denial weapons. Whether denying access to airspace, sea lanes, land routes, space, or cyberspace, the Defense Department must restructure to ensure when fighting insurgents, hybrid threats, or high tech near peer adversaries that US forces possess the capabilities and capacity to prevail.

On 5 January 2012, Secretary Panetta noted that, “the United States faces a complex and growing array of security challenges across the globe, challenges that call for a reshaping of America’s defense priorities.”16 While violent extremism remains a threat to the US, other threats emerged over the past ten years including technologically advanced weapons systems that threaten the most advanced US systems. These weapons change the strategic balance in several global regions and potentially threaten aspects of US national security, regional diplomacy, and international trade. As the preeminent superpower, the Defense Department must resource initiatives for increased and improved security cooperation as well as the development of AirSea Battle to counter these new emerging threats. Combining Joint Security Cooperation and AirSea Battle Operations allows the Defense Department to restructure its forces to meet the fiscal challenges of today and defend against the national security challenges of the next decade. Security cooperation builds the foundation for stability and lessens the chances of conflict escalating to military intervention.
SECURITY COOPERATION

The decade long costs of fighting two wars added significant stress to the exploding US national debt. The prohibitive cost of these protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the US to reassess how to execute future military operations. Rather than employing the military to fight major wars, the US will look to avoid combat through increasing security cooperation engagement with nations of strategic importance. The new defense strategy calls for enhancing security cooperation to increase engagement, improve access, and develop interoperability with partner nations, “develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”

By establishing peaceful diplomatic, economic, and military relationships, the US intends to leverage long term active engagement to deter regional crises—preventing the prohibitive cost of major military conflict. The Defense Department and the State Department form the nexus of this new strategy.

In the inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Secretary Clinton stated, “we will build up our civilian power: the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises. Many different agencies contribute to these efforts today. But their work can be more unified, more focused, and more efficient.” The QDDR describes the Chief of Mission as the position to integrate all instruments of power to support national security interests in a nation and region. The QDDR then outlines areas for the State Department to energize including: diplomacy to meet the threats and opportunities of the 21st century, results driven development plans, and preventing crises. Similar to the QDDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review, (QDR) also provides strategic vision.
In the QDR, the Defense Department focuses on three main areas: rebalancing the force, strengthening relationships, and reforming business practices. The Defense Department emphasis falls in line with the State Department’s vision of building capacity with partner nations worldwide; however, the Defense Department narrows its focus to military engagements. These more robust military-to-military relationships are achieved by working with the Interagency formulating a unified holistic approach to engagement, whether the engagement centers on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, a military-led multi-national defense exercise, or the signing of a foreign military sales agreement. While strategic vision comes from the QDDR and QDR, the operational plans driving the execution of the strategic vision combined with the coordinated efforts of combatant commands and embassy teams develop the roadmap for US engagement.

Combatant commanders provide the Theater Campaign Plan and Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) to the Defense Department while embassy country teams provide the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan to the State Department, all of which outline the engagement plan for a nation. These documents provide the foundation for establishing relationships with a nation. From these documents the Defense Department coordinates efforts with various subordinate organizations including the service branches to support the requirements for a specific country. If security cooperation becomes the Defense Department’s main effort for defending US interests abroad, then even greater coordination between the Defense Department, State Department, embassies, combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and armed services must develop. At the center of the Defense Department’s efforts lies the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA.

Working together, embassy teams and combatant commands develop TSCPs for
military-to-military engagement and DSCA aids in coordinating these efforts. From foreign military sales, foreign military financing and direct commercial exports, to international military education and training, DSCA “provide[s] policy oversight, guidance, planning, coordination, and direction for the execution of security cooperation programs.” To achieve greater success each country program must develop security cooperation initiatives focused on both internal national and external regional stability. DSCA must continue to aid combatant commands with linking security cooperation efforts to contingency plans whereby partner nations are resourced to support US military coalitions when diplomacy fails and conflict ensues. For Security Cooperation to function effectively as a strategic deterrent to regional escalation, the Defense Department must fully resource DSCA. With DSCA fully resourced, the Defense Department ensures a more coordinated effort between the various contributing agencies developing security cooperation initiatives supporting US strategic interests. The result provides the appropriate combination of foreign military sales, military education and training, and military exercises that improves interoperability with our allies and regional partners. If a belligerent state attempts to incite either direct or indirect violence against US regional interests then the US and its partners are manned, trained, and equipped to defeat the threat. With the regional threats and partner nation strategic concerns identified and a plan developed, the Defense Department can begin to build host nation capacity. With the combination of economic and diplomatic engagement, the Defense Department can positively affect US national security through building the capacity of partner nations.

As partner nation relationships build, the Defense Department can deploy more small units to execute security cooperation missions to reduce the potential for major combat operations. While the Army and Marine Corps will downsize by upwards of twenty percent over
the next five years, both will focus on regaining their respective core competencies, major land combat against a near peer enemy and maritime littoral operations respectively. And in addition, both services must plan to deploy in support of security cooperation agreements in order to build partner nation capacity. The Air Force and Navy can expect similar requirements in the next decade. As a result, the Defense Department will gain greater access with partner nations and further collaborative agreements. These agreements will further contribute to regional stability, a forward presence for US forces, and increased economic opportunities. By increasing diplomatic and economic engagement while increasing military-to-military relations with partner nations, the US intends to increase regional stability, isolate adversaries attempting to subvert regional stability and US regional interests, and ensure mutual economic prosperity. These efforts must be complemented and coordinated with the rest of the Interagency to ensure a comprehensive whole of government approach towards building partnership capacity and security cooperation.

Attempting a strategy in which security cooperation is the main effort must be a whole of government strategy to be most effective. For example, the Department of Justice may support efforts to improve a nation’s police force and judicial system diminishing the effects of corruption, an attempted insurgency, or violent extremists. This also holds true with the Department of Commerce and USAID as closer economic ties develop into trade agreements that benefit the US and our partner nations. A comprehensive approach ensures the greatest defense against state and non-state threats to US national security interests.

State and non-state actors that threaten these bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships will face compounding opposition. The strategy deters aggression as a method of defiance. If one nation becomes threatened then all partner nations in the region have increased capacity to counter using diplomatic, economic, and if required, military action. Effectively, each partner
nation’s internal capacity to handle a terrorist organization, insurgency, or overt military action increases by US persistent engagement. This increased capacity allows the United States to share the mutual burden rather than acting unilaterally. While security cooperation attempts to deter aggression, the defense strategy also recognizes the requirement to defend against emerging weapons systems that threaten regional stability and national security. Just as regional adversaries can use irregular warfare to threaten regional stability, so can using conventional forces.

**JOINT AIR-SEA BATTLE OPERATING CONCEPT**

The most significant development by near peer nations over the past decade consists of anti-access and area denial weapons. The 2010 National Security Strategy acknowledged the threat A2/AD weapons poses to US national security and acknowledged the need to address the concern. The 2010 QDR defined the A2/AD threat as, “Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant U.S. capabilities to project power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” With the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD began developing the AirSea Battle concept as the strategy to defeating A2/AD weapons. These weapons combine high and low tech capabilities designed to exploit superior range, maneuverability, diminished detect ability, and saturation to defeat the advanced US military systems. To counter these weapons systems and ensure US and partner nation militaries have access for follow-on operations, the Joint Staff directed the development of the AirSea Battle Concept.
With ninety percent of the world’s commerce traveling via ship from continent to
continent, US economic security ties directly to freedom of the seas and access to worldwide
ports. With the development of anti-access and area denial weapons, the US views its future
access to ports and therefore its economic security as threatened. These new weapons systems
create a shift in the balance of security particularly in the regions of the world where blue waters
are constrained by land masses—Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Taiwan Strait,
Panama Canal, and the Strait of Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{28} These chokepoints remain critical for the free
navigation and shipping of commerce.

AirSea Battle coordinates joint targeting of adversary capabilities designed to deny
access by predominately Air Force and Navy systems without landing forces and occupying
foreign territory. By denying an adversary the ability to close maritime chokepoints and disrupt
international commerce with A2/AD systems, AirSea Battle provides the military response
necessary to ensure uninterrupted freedom of the seas. The concept involves funding weapons
systems to counter A2/AD systems and developing joint operational and tactical doctrine to
achieve the “enhanced synergy” defined by the JOAC.\textsuperscript{29} The result requires the ability for forces
to gain and maintain access to land by defeating A2/AD threats and therefore allow follow-on
operations by coalition forces, Marines, Army, and Special Forces. If the strategic objective
requires military action including boots on the ground then because of effective security
cooperation, partner nations are more capable of contributing resources to the fight. In order for
the strategic vision to be effective, the services must define an operational framework from
which to operate.
“Recognizing that the Navy and Air Force are the two Services with global perspective to cooperate routinely in the global commons. Access to the global commons is vital to the country for both strategic and national security reasons, but also economic reasons, so we concluded we needed to collaborate at a different level. AirSea Battle really came about in three dimensions. One is the institutional dimension to normalize this collaboration between Marines, Sailors, and Airmen at the headquarters level on down. The second dimension was at the operational level. Clearly, the anti-access/area-denial environment is intensifying, and this is an issue again for the Services on which the country depends a great deal for power projection. This is not so much about new systems as it is really about how we better employ what we have at our collective disposal for maximum effect.”

General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff United States Air Force.

Joint doctrine directs the maritime component as the supported component when at sea. The Navy controls the air, surface, and subsurface at sea; while the Air Force controls the air when operating over land. The operational concern with AirSea Battle stems from defining authorities when the land encroaches on the sea and both components have constricted operating space. How are the air, land, and sea divided? Who provides command and control? How are fires deconflicted? Is the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander responsible for the entire airspace or does that responsibility fall on the Joint Force Air Component Commander when threats exists on land, surface, air, and subsurface simultaneously? These questions become infinitely more complicated as technology permits the operation of unmanned systems, over-the-horizon communications, and operation centers thousands of miles removed.

Rear Admiral Philip Davidson, current US Fleet Command Director of Global Force Command and former Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group Commander, suggests the maritime component as the supported commander and, at the operational level, the air operations center (AOC) only support command-and-control of air assets through planning and apportionment. When controlling combat operations, Admiral Davidson suggests the Maritime Air Support
Operations Center (MASOC) becomes the single command-and-control authority, minimizing the capabilities that the Air Operations Center (AOC) provides. Another option maximizes the use of both the MASOC and the AOC by dividing the airspace around a chokepoint ensuring the capabilities of both systems are employed. Both command and control platforms share the workload balancing threats and optimizing coordination of effects. The greatest advantage to sharing command and control is that it allows the Navy more time and resources to focus on surface and subsurface threats, while allowing the AOC to provide vital support during combat operations with airborne threats. As the Navy and Air Force develop the operational directives for AirSea Battle, the tactics, techniques, and procedures must also be vetted.

Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Navy supported land based combat operations, proving proficiency in close air support all while continuing to maintain proficiency in fleet air defense operations. However, the Air Force while proficient in close air support, must gain an understanding of threats to naval forces, from anti-ship missiles, fast-attack boats, mines, torpedoes, and air breathing threats and how fleet defense deconflicts fires to effectively target and eliminate those threats. While the operational and tactical employment considerations are developed there are other considerations.

AirSea Battle success requires operational simplicity and tactical proficiency. Ensuring complete interoperability between Navy and Air Force weapons systems becomes the highest joint urgent operational need. Through the effective development of operational and tactical doctrine, systems interoperability, and proficiency training, AirSea Battle Operations can mitigate the A2/AD threat. The threat to US national security warrants funding development and implementation of the AirSea Battle Concept. Current force restructuring presents a perfect opportunity to achieve the necessary equipment and personnel requirements to accomplish
effective worldwide Security Cooperation initiatives and a Joint Force equipped and trained to execute AirSea Battle in defense of partners, allies, and US national security interests.

**FORCE RESTRUCTURE FOR THE NEXT DECADE**

With looming budget cuts to reduce the national debt and the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Defense Department must restructure. The cost of fighting these two wars added to the national debt by increasing both base line defense spending and overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding. Since 2001, the base line budget nearly doubled from $297B to $549B in 2011, while OCO funding increased tenfold from $13B to $159B in 2011. When added together the spending on the defense budget from 2001 to 2011 totaled $5.9 trillion. Based on 2001 spending, these two wars cost an additional $2.4 trillion. This burgeoning expense led to the requirement to reduce spending while continuing to protect US national interests. Over the next decade, the Defense Department must transition its force structure to support global security cooperation agreements, develop technologies to remain ahead of adversary technology and defeat A2AD capabilities, continue to fight violent extremism, deter weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and remain capable of fighting an enemy using the full spectrum of regular and irregular warfare.

Terrorism, irregular warfare, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction encompass a few of the numerous threats to US national security that Special Operations Command forces must defend against. In his 6 March 2012 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral McRaven, Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), described a transition in how state and non-state actors fight. He noted that “strategic trends and challenges are producing a distinct change in the character of conflict. Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of yesterday. Increasingly these threats are
networked, adaptable, and empowered by cyberspace to find new ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate. In short, the strategic environment is changing – quickly and constantly.”34 USSOCOM will grow in manpower and weapons systems to meet operational needs for fighting violent extremism in addition to the increasing requirements for supporting security cooperation initiatives. The next decade will see an increase in the number of special operators and their missions. In contrast, the Army will see an overall reduction in force structure. 35

By 2014, the Army looks to redeploy from Afghanistan and reduce its total force from 570,000 to 490,000. As a means to accomplish this reduction while continuing to provide a robust Army, General Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, considers reducing the number of brigade combat teams from 45 to 32.36 This force reduction includes a realignment that increases the size of the remaining 32 brigade combat teams.37 According to the Army, this reduction increases the risk to the Army to effectively fight two major land wars simultaneously and therefore forces a paradigm shift of security cooperation missions rather than combat deployments.38 Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) provides the following mission statement, “for the Army of 2020, FORSCOM provides enhanced land power gaining operational depth and versatility through a mix of fully integrated Active and Reserve Component forces operating in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment. Organizations will be expeditionary, campaign focused, and tailorable to provide Combatant Commanders the required capabilities to be decisive across the range of military operations.”39 The benefits of a reduced force structure guarantee an overall reduction in defense spending and a greater capacity to manage deployment types and cycles.40

In addition to the downsizing, the Army begins to reevaluate future weapons systems. A 2011 Congressional Budget Office report shows, the Army attempting to fund acquisitions in five areas: ground combat vehicles and heavy trucks; command, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; rotor wing and unmanned aerial vehicles; missile defense systems; and munitions. Whether a company deploys to a partner nation providing foreign internal defense support or a division mobilizes and deploys to support major combat operations, the end result establishes an Army prepared for major conventional regular or irregular warfare as well as deployed supporting security cooperation agreements. While the Army looks to return forces from Afghanistan, down size, and reduce procurement costs, the Marine Corps will also make significant changes to its force structure.

In an interview with Joint Force Quarterly, General Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, spoke of the impending force restructuring, “When we start thinking about where the world’s going over the next two decades, America may want to try to influence things so that we do more war prevention instead of war intervention. I think America buys a Marine Corps to be out there on ships, forward deployed and forward engaged, to be its insurance policy.” With the looming fiscal constraints, the Marine Corps will reduce its force structure as forces return from Afghanistan from 202,000 to 187,000. The future acquisitions will focus on supporting the Commandant’s vision of returning the Corps to its amphibious roots.

Over the next decade, the Marine Corps will focus on purchasing new ground combat vehicles, F-35 low observable vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, tilt rotor and rotary wing aircraft, and new amphibious ships to support the expeditionary amphibious mission. This will establish a Marine Corps manned, trained, and equipped to operate from the littorals as well as deployed for a multi-national exercise in support of security cooperation agreements. Since the Marine Corps acquisition budget is part of the Department of the Navy, the Navy’s forecast provides the overall analysis of costs from 2012 to 2031.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Greenert wrote, “A navy is most effective when it is forward, especially at the strategic “maritime crossroads” where shipping lanes, energy flows, information networks, and national security interests intersect. Being forward is critical to deterring aggression without escalation, defusing threats without fanfare, and containing conflict without regional disruption.” In line with the recent direction from Defense Secretary Panetta, the Navy looks to maintain its current force structure while increasing its presence throughout the world. The Navy plans to accomplish this increase in mission through the combination of retiring older platforms and acquiring new systems.

With an increased emphasis on an expeditionary Navy for the next decade and beyond, the service submitted requests for a 320 ship force. From 2012-2035, the Navy looks to replace many of its existing carriers, destroyers, ballistic missile submarines, amphibious assault ships, and dock landing ships, and purchase new littoral combat ships. In addition to the ship purchases, the Navy also looks to invest in fixed, tilt, and rotary wing, manned and unmanned aircraft including the F-35, EA-18G, MV-22, E-2, P-8A, MQ-8A, and MH-60R/S. Missiles and munitions round out the major acquisition plans for the Navy including air-to-air, surface-to-air, ship-launched weapons, torpedos, cruise missile and other stand-off munitions. This request appears to match Admiral Greenert’s intent “[that] ships and aircraft of 2025 will predominantly be the proven platforms of today, but with greater reach and persistence thanks to new payloads of unmanned vehicles and weapons. The future fleet will maintain America’s current advantages in the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace, but will fully operationalize them as warfighting domains. The US will remain dominant under the sea, but the capability of submarines will be expanded as they become part of a network of platforms, unmanned systems and sensors.” The Navy of the next decade will provide the maritime capabilities to an
integrated joint and coalition force capable of defeating A2AD threats, major combat operations, and conducting security cooperation initiatives all while ensuring access to the global commons through freedom of the seas. As the Navy prepares to face the threats of the next decade, so does the Air Force.

Recently, the Air Force announced a small reduction in force structure from 332,000 to 324,000 airmen making it the smallest Air Force since before World War II. General Shwartz (sic), Air Force Chief of Staff, noted that “command and control, ISR, lift, domain control, and global strike are the features of an Air Force like ours, and which are required now in the kinds of irregular warfare fights that we've been in during the last 10 years or so, and will be required in other fights that we might see in the future.” This four plus one concept drives the acquisition requests of the Air Force.

The Air Force elected to reduce its A-10 inventory by 121 airframes while it looks to modernize its force replacing legacy systems with newer more capable ones including stand-off munitions, the F-35, KC-46A, CSAR-X, more MQ-9s and RQ-4s, a long-range bomber, and advanced theater transport plane. Fund requests for several extremely-high frequency satellites, wideband global SATCOM, Space based infrared systems, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle complete the Air Force acquisitions requests from 2016 to 2030. The Air Force looks to provide decisive air, space, and cyber support to the full spectrum of combat operations bridging its forces through access created by robust security cooperation agreements.

The Defense Department looks to the Air Force and Navy to protect the international commons and project power abroad for the next decade. The Marine Corps returns to the Marine Expeditionary Unit at sea and the Army downsizes and reconstitutes from ten years of combat
operations. Financial savings and emerging threats drive the shift in strategy and force structure. The combination of Security Cooperation and the AirSea Battle Concept are essential components of the overall Defense Strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

As Secretary Gates alluded to NATO in 2011, the United States can no longer supply and fund the overwhelming majority of forces in any theater of operation. Therefore, through building partnership capacity and security cooperation in bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, the United States can rely on partner nations to provide regional stability and oppose military or otherwise threatening actions from state and non-state actors. This greater emphasis on mutual prosperity and shared security reduces the threat of a greater regional crisis. Partner nations gain empowerment through the diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with the US. Those partner nations form a deterrent against regional escalation of instability and violence. If a rogue actor ignites a crisis then partner nations are prepared to respond. In addition, the United States still remains capable of providing the world’s greatest Armed Forces to deter or defeat any nation’s or organization’s attempt to threaten mutual security interests, particularly in an access denied environment. The Marine Corps and Army stand ready to support any requirements for littoral or land-based operations not already met by regional partners. Security Cooperation and Air-Sea Battle provide the nation the perfect balance of carrot and stick diplomacy to weather the current fiscal constraints while still protecting America’s national security interests around the world.

The combination of security cooperation and the AirSea Battle concept make an effective defense strategy capable of supporting national security strategy requirements. With the increase in A2/AD weapons systems, security cooperation alone cannot mitigate the threat these
capabilities pose to national security. Security cooperation begins with increased diplomatic efforts and ends with greater diplomatic, economic, and military stability. Increased diplomacy on bilateral engagement breeds the potential for increased multilateral engagement. Increased state and regional diplomacy expands economic opportunities. Combined with military-to-military relationships, exercises, foreign military sales, and other security cooperation initiatives, the military gains increased access. If a crisis develops, partner nations are better prepared to use instruments of national power to deescalate them. If a crisis expands and US military involvement is required then access to basing, airspace, and territorial waters already exist and partner nations are trained, equipped, and able to integrate into a coalition operation.

The purpose of combining security cooperation efforts with structuring US forces to employ within an A2AD environment builds confidence and allows greater access with partner nations while protecting our national interests. As competitor and adversary nations close the technological gap in military capabilities, the US must continue to fund research and development future technologies to maintain the advantage. For the US to maintain its military as an instrument of national power, these costs are necessary. If other nations surpass our military technological advantage then other national security interests are at stake. A Defense Department fully funding both Joint Security Cooperation and the AirSea Battle Operating Concept ensures a robust defense capable of defeating threats to US strategic interests.


6 Ibid


8 Ibid

9 Ibid


15 Ibid


17 Ibid


19 Ibid


24 Ibid, Panetta
25 Ibid, QDR
29 Ibid, JOAC
37 Ibid
38 Ibid
40 Ibid
43 Ibid
46 Ibid, Panetta

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