**Selecting the Right Marines for Recruiting Duty: The Important Role of the Commander**

The persistent stress and isolation unique to recruiting duty demands that we select only well-screened, stable, professional Marines for this arduous, independent assignment. There are numerous steps and participants in the process of screening and selecting Marines for assignment to recruiting duty; however, the most critical participant is the commanding officer. The commander’s personal involvement, leveraged with a thorough knowledge of and engagement with his or her Marines, is crucial to a successful screening process. Inefficiencies abound, and they exist at every step in the screening and selection process. However, no single participant or stakeholder has access to more information or is more directly involved in the process than the commander.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Selecting the Right Marines for Recruiting Duty:  
The Important Role of the Commander

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

**Title:** Selecting the Right Marines for Recruiting Duty: The Important Role of the Commander

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**Thesis:** Although there are numerous steps and participants in the screening and selection process, the most critical participant is the commanding officer. The commander’s personal involvement, leveraged with a thorough knowledge of and engagement with his or her Marines, is crucial to a successful screening process.

**Discussion:** Inefficiencies abound in the process of screening and selecting Marines for recruiting duty. However, no single participant or stakeholder has access to more information or is more directly involved in the process than the Marine’s commanding officer (CO). In reviewing the chain of events that result in a Marine’s assignment to recruiting duty, the CO’s first responsibility is to ensure changes in a Marine’s availability and duty status are promptly reported in order to facilitate the entry of the appropriate draw case code. Once Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA) has applied its filters and identified the Marine for screening, the CO then bears the responsibility of the command’s screening process which demands the CO’s personal interview with the Marine. The third time the CO impacts the process is when he or she certifies the Marine’s qualified status 30 days prior to orders execution. When conditions arise that will prevent a Marine from executing orders, the CO is responsible to ensure that information is reported to MMEA-85 via naval message. Finally, it is incumbent upon the CO to ensure the Marine executes orders as directed. A commander’s avoidance of direct involvement in this process will often result in screening failure and a poorly selecting Marine being assigned to recruiting duty. The tools, processes, and regulating directives are in place; however, personal ownership on the part of the commander is necessary to achieve the desired end state.

**Conclusion:** The mantle of responsibility born by a commander is rarely understood unless one has held command. Responsible for all that the unit does or fails to do, the commander’s influence extends across the breadth and depth of his or her organization. While much of the routine planning and execution is delegated to the staff and subordinate commanders, there remain those critical tasks that require the commander’s personal involvement. The screening of Marines for special duty assignment in general and for recruiting duty specifically is one of those tasks. Through personal involvement, it is incumbent upon commanders to deliberately engage in this process. The best interests of the Marine, the Marine’s family, the recruiting effort, and the Marine Corps depend upon it.
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Preface

The Marine Corps’ ability to select the right caliber of Marine for assignment to recruiting duty is critical to the daunting task of making Marines. I remain convinced that recruiting duty is the most challenging non-combat duty to which a Marine can be assigned. I approached the screening and selection process with an open mind. While I had some theories as to where the potential problem areas might be, I sought to gain a substantial understanding of each step of the process, and then to examine each step individually for its problems and inefficiencies. In so doing, my goal was to be able to ultimately determine the greatest point(s) of failure.

My initial interest in the subject of recruiter screening and selection developed during my first recruiting assignment where I served as an officer selection officer (OSO) for Recruiting Station (RS) Twin Cities in the Ninth Marine Corps District (MCD) from 2001 to 2004. My interest was rekindled during my second recruiting assignment as the commanding officer (CO) of Recruiting Station Seattle in the Twelfth MCD from 2008 to 2011. It was in this capacity that my concerns matured as my command group and I dealt with the myriad problems and challenges that poorly selected recruiters presented.

The scope of this paper is limited to the screening and selection of enlisted Marines to recruiting duty as canvassing recruiters. It does not give consideration to command group members, career recruiters, or OSOs.

I extend my appreciation to the many professionals who made important contributions to the development of this paper. First, I would like to acknowledge the assistance I received from the leadership of the Twelfth MCD. I extend my thanks to Colonel Mike Biszak, CO of the Twelfth MCD, for his sage advice, perspective and leadership during the two years I have known him. Additionally, his executive officer (XO) Lieutenant Colonel Marc Begin and his Sergeant Major (SgtMaj), SgtMaj Lawrence Archambault, contributed significantly to my research in support of this thesis.

The compelling supporting evidence for this work would not have been possible without the important support from the RS COs of the Twelfth MCD — from RS Los Angeles, Major Warren Cook; from RS Orange, Major Matt Zummo; from RS Portland, Major Heather Cotoia; from RS Sacramento, Major Jay Lappe; from RS Salt Lake City, Major Jeff Buffa; from RS San Diego, Major Brendan Sullivan; from RS San Francisco, Major Todd Mahar; and from RS Seattle, Major Tom Cunningham and his XO, Captain Carl Ronhaar. Additionally, I extend my thanks to Major David Hyman from RS Baltimore in the Fourth MCD.

I would like to further acknowledge the assistance provided by several professionals from the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC). Lieutenant Colonel Rex Sappenfield (G-1), Ms. Elizabeth Montalvo (Deputy G-1), and Captain Patrick Heiny (MCRC Adjutant) were all instrumental in shaping my understanding of the problem. Additionally, Major Shawn Studley
(Director, Recruiters School) aided significantly in developing my understanding from his unique vantage point.

Important input and support was provided to me from Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA). Specifically, I extend my appreciation to Major Mike Broyan (MMEA-8), Captain Alexandria DesJardins (MMEA-85), and Gunnery Sergeant Dustin Barnes (Recruiter Monitor) for their contributions to this project.

Additional acknowledgement is necessary for the time and assistance provided to me from retired Marine Major, Mr. Joe Riley. As the Chief of Police for Marine Corps Base Quantico, his perspective and recommendations as a law enforcement professional were of great value.

In pursuit of this thesis, I must acknowledge the guidance provided to me by my faculty mentor and Associate Dean of Academics, Dr. Craig Swanson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Retired). Additionally, I extend my appreciation to my military faculty advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Yee, U. S. Army, for his review and recommendations.

Most importantly, I must thank my wife, Jennifer, for her enduring support and tolerance. She has not only supported me for nearly twenty-four years in the Marine Corps, but she languished together with me for six years of recruiting duty. Furthermore, she had to listen to me conjure it all back up as I navigated my way through the development of this paper.

Finally, I extend my sincere appreciation to the Marines who have served or who currently serve on recruiting duty. Your willingness to take on our toughest job is a testament to your professionalism and dedication to the Marine Corps.

Semper Fidelis
Introduction

The vision statement of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) concludes with the acknowledgement that “[w]e will sustain our success through leadership and our most effective weapon – THE MARINE RECRUITER.”¹ It is the Marine, carefully selected and trained for this challenging assignment, who bears the burden of finding those who will also serve in the Marine uniform. This is no easy task and has been referred to by many as the most difficult peace time assignment for a Marine. The 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, referring to the Marine Corps Recruiting Command remarked that “I know of no other Command that is more operational.”²

Recruiting duty is demanding and the mission unrelenting. As such, it is incumbent upon all leaders to thoroughly vet each prospective recruiter, thereby ensuring only the right Marines are assigned as recruiters. The persistent stress and isolation unique to recruiting duty demands that only well-screened, stable, professional Marines are selected for this arduous, independent assignment.

The purpose of this paper is to reveal that, although there are numerous steps and participants in the screening and selection process, the most critical participant is the commanding officer. The commander’s personal involvement, leveraged with a thorough knowledge of and engagement with his or her Marines, is crucial to a successful screening process.

This is no simple task and far transcends the “checklist mentality” approach too often adopted. The only way this screening is accomplished successfully is when engaged leaders embrace the Marine Corps’ third enduring leadership principle – “know your Marines and look out for their welfare.”³
**Recruiting Environment**

The Marine Corps Recruiting Command, commanded by a major general, is organized into two Recruiting Regions divided by the Mississippi River and each commanded by a brigadier general. Each region is further divided into three districts commanded by colonels, each of which contains eight recruiting stations, each commanded by a major.\(^4\) Refer to Appendix A for a map of the MCRC area of operations and locations of its subordinate commands.

The symmetry ends there with each recruiting station overseeing the operations of numerous recruiting substations (RSS) organized and geographically located based upon the market population of the RS’s area of operations (AO). The RSS is where the tactical fight of the challenging recruiting effort is waged. Led by a staff noncommissioned officer-in-charge (SNCOIC), these small teams are often no larger than a four-Marine fire team. This is distributed operations; each RSS, some positioned hundreds of miles from the RS headquarters, is embedded in the local community from which the recruiters prospect. In some cases, a recruiter may be assigned to a one-man fighting position within a permanent contact station (PCS). Given the distributed nature of recruiting operations, it is crucial that the Marines assigned to this duty are thoroughly vetted.

In addition to the isolated nature of the assignment, the frustrations and stressors the recruiter will experience are persistent. Much of this is a function of the significant amount of rejection the recruiter will encounter coupled with the necessity for volume and consistency. Recruiters will need to make approximately 10,000 contacts to get 100 applicants to show up at a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) to process for enlistment.\(^5\) This effort will net approximately 80 applicants accepted into the Delayed Enlistment Program (DEP). Of those 80 enlistees, roughly 20 percent will constitute the DEP attrition experienced resulting in only 64 of those 80 actually shipping to recruit training.\(^6\) The Marine Corps will then typically experience
about 10 percent attrition during the recruit training process yielding 57 new Marines from those 64 shippers.7

The necessity to achieve 10,000 contacts in order to produce 57 new Marines illustrates the volume of work required to accomplish the recruiting mission. The recruiter will experience rejection far more often than acceptance in prospecting for applicants. This routine rejection produces discouragement and demands that only the most mature, professional, and resilient Marines be assigned to recruiting duty.

The stressful and relentless nature of the duty combined with both preexisting and developed personal and family hardships produces recruiter attrition. Between the fiscal years of 2006 and 2009, MCRC relieved 836 recruiters – an average of 209 recruiters per year.8 Against a structure of 3,116 production recruiters,9 this costs the recruiting effort approximately 6.7 percent in unplanned annual personnel attrition. Appendix B provides a categorized depiction of recruiter attrition through relief.

The ability to forecast the probability of relief in five of the seven categories is quite unlikely. Refusal to recruit, inability to recruit, low productivity, malpractice, and misconduct will typically only manifest themselves once the Marine has been introduced to the recruiting environment. In the other two categories of family hardship and medical conditions, there will often be an outright manifestation of a problem before the Marine arrives, or indications and warnings of the potential for such. On average for the subject period, these two categories combined accounted for 26 percent of all recruiter reliefs. The efforts of all participants in the screening and selection process should be directed toward uncovering such indications and warnings.
Recruiter Screening & Selection Process

The current process of screening and selecting Marines for assignment to recruiting duty contains a number of participants and stakeholders. Appendix C is provided as a reference to understand the process flow and those involved. An analysis of the screening process reveals ten steps that occur, starting with the ongoing data management necessary to generate an initial roster of potential recruiters and ending when the new recruiter reports for duty to his or her assigned RS.

The first step in the screening process is the ongoing requirement for timely and accurate data management. This is the front end of the process that will eventually yield a recruiter on the back end. More than just a step, data management is the perpetual maintenance of a manpower database that will generate a filtered roster of Marines to be screened for the duty. Like any database, it is only as valuable as the accuracy and timeliness of its inputs. In order to understand the importance of data management, the concept of the draw case code (DCC) must be introduced; a list of common DCCs is provided in Appendix D.\(^\text{10}\) There are many conditions that would preclude a Marine from serving as a recruiter and would be captured and reported as a DCC; however, if not reported and entered into the database, unqualified Marines will not be identified by the manpower filters and will be selected to enter the screening process.

The second step in the screening process is the initial record selection. Relying on the accuracy of the aforementioned database, the Special Duty Assignments Unit, otherwise identified as Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA)-85 generates a roster of prospects for the duty. This roster is initially sent to the enlisted military occupation specialty (MOS) monitors for review. The monitors will identify which Marines from their managed populations have not already been slated for orders, or should be removed from the screening process for some other reason known to the monitor. The monitor will annotate either “screen”
or “don’t screen” next to each Marine’s name and return the list to MMEA-85. The final roster is then promulgated to the operating forces and supporting establishments by naval message triggering the most vital step in the process – the commanding officer’s screening and interview.

This third step, the Commanding Officer’s Screening and Interview, will encompass the deep vetting of the Marine at the unit level. If there were to be a center of gravity for the entire process of screening and selecting recruiters, this would be it. The Marine Corps order governing this process—Selecting, Screening, and Preparing Enlisted Marines For Special Duty Assignments and Independent Duties (Short Title: SDAMAN)—is very clear about its importance:

The commanding officer (CO) plays the most important role in the screening process. The CO is responsible for the initial screening (personal interview) of his/her Marines. The CO has access to the Marine’s records, financial information, and other current information not available to HQMC. The CO must be at least a Battalion or Squadron level commander with Courts Martial Authority, or an Officer in Charge with message releasing authority . . . this cannot be delegated.11

Appendix E contains the content (excerpted in a narrative format for the reader’s convenience) of the Commanding Officer’s Screening & Interview Guide as delineated in the SDAMAN.12 Appendix F13 contains a graphical depiction of all the factors (both objective and subjective) that must be considered when the commanding officer screens a Marine for recruiting duty. The criteria are exhaustive, and effective screening requires both detailed staff action and the commanding officer’s personal involvement and certification.

Once the Marine has been screened by his or her CO, the fourth step in the process can take place. This is the screening by the Headquarters Special Duty Assignment Screening Team (HSST).14 Semi-annually, the HSST will travel to major Marine Corps installations (East Coast, West Coast, and Overseas) in order to conduct special duty assignment (SDA) briefs and
screenings of prospective recruiters.\textsuperscript{15} The HSST conducts a cursory screening with the prospective recruiter, which is centered on a review of the Commanding Officer’s Screening & Interview Guide (the Marine has this in his or her possession). Additionally, the Marine is questioned about disqualifying criteria and solicited for his or her SDA preference.\textsuperscript{16} In the cases where the commanding officer has determined the Marine to be unqualified or not recommended for recruiting duty, the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the HSST is imbued with the authority to waive disqualifying criteria in order to meet the needs of the Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{17} This ensures enough Marines are identified to fill scheduled classes at the Basic Recruiters Course (BRC).\textsuperscript{18}

Having been vetted now by the monitor, the commanding officer, and the HSST, the fifth step ensues. Qualified (or waived) selectees are slated with orders to report to the appropriate BRC. The finalized list is promulgated to the operating forces and supporting establishment via standard naval message.\textsuperscript{19}

Once the Marine is in receipt of orders, the CO again engages in the screening process by executing the sixth step, the Commanding Officer’s 30-Day Recertification. Given the natural delays that are inherent in the process, a number of months will inevitably elapse between the CO’s initial interview and the Marine’s detachment from his or her parent command. Herein is the necessity for a recertification. Thirty days prior to detaching, the commanding officer is required to recertify that the Marine is still qualified for the duty. If the Marine is no longer qualified for the duty, the CO must report this change to MMEA-85 via naval message.\textsuperscript{20}

In the seventh screening step, the Marine reports for the formal training process. The BRC is the required formal school that produces the basically trained recruiter in a 7-week program of instruction (POI).\textsuperscript{21} The BRC staff will spend the preponderance of the first week screening the newly arrived students. All the independent duty qualifying factors are reviewed with additional
emphasis on medical history, and family and financial stability. Additionally, tattoos are reviewed and waivers are pursued as appropriate. Furthermore, students are required to correct any delinquency with respect to periodic health assessments (PHA) and post-deployment health reassessments (PHRA). At the end of the week, the students are weighed (to include a body fat measurement if required) and administered a physical fitness test (PFT). When feasible, the BRC staff works with the students to rectify disqualifying conditions. Marines with problems that cannot be rectified are disenrolled from the POI and returned to their parent commands.22

The eighth screening step begins during the BRC POI and is referred to as the assignment process. During the third week of the POI, the students, stakeholders, and leadership from MCRC, the MCDs, and RSs convene to solidify a final determination for where each recruiter will be assigned. In addition to the students, participants include the BRC staff; liaisons from MCRC, the two Regions, the six Districts, and the 48 RSs. District and RS Sergeants Major as well as RS Recruiter Instructors (RIs) are key participants in the process. Consideration is given to a variety of factors including Manning shortfalls, by-name requests, active duty spouses, and special-need family members.23

The ninth screening step encompasses the remaining balance of the BRC POI where any additional or emerging non-compliance issues should be identified. Those Marines that arrive at graduation day will have completed an approximately 7 week-long POI and will have been screened and trained to “perform the duties inherent to the procurement of enlisted Marines and Officers.”24 The BRC curriculum includes emphasis on public speaking, product knowledge, RSS operations, Marine Corps Communication & Consulting (MC3),25 and quality enlistment procedures.26
The final screening step occurs when the new recruiter reports for duty to his or her assigned RS. Upon reporting, the recruiter receives an administrative join audit, and is interviewed by the available RS leadership. When possible, the RS commanding officer (RS CO) and the RS Sergeant Major interview the newly joined Marine early in the reporting process. Again, the recruiter is screened by the RS leadership to discern indications and warnings of existing or potential conditions that will be an impediment to the recruiter’s success. The RS leadership is aware that conditions will emerge that went undiscovered during the screening process, or that were waived in the interest of maximizing BRC throughput.

Within 30 days of reporting to the RS for duty, the newly assigned recruiter is required to attend Proficiency and Review (PAR) training at the RS headquarters. This week-long evolution is engineered to “review and reinforce” the training provided at recruiters school. Additionally, PAR training serves as a forum to initially evaluate the recruiter’s abilities and identify any specific additional training that may be required to set the Marine up for success.

Discovering the Screening Failures

By the time the recruiter has reported to the RS for duty, he or she has been screened no fewer than five times and has graduated from the POI at the BRC. Having discussed the screening process and the quality controls built into its design, it is important to consider where the failure can and does occur, how that failure manifests itself, and what the implications are to the Marine, the Marine’s family, the command, and the Marine Corps. This is effectively done by reviewing a number of RS case studies. The examples provided are cases drawn from RS COs currently serving within the 12th MCD. All personally identifiable information has been omitted in order to preserve the identities of the subject Marines.
The synopses of these case studies are captured in appendices G through M and are by no means exhaustive. The 23 examples provided by seven incumbent RS COs are representative of the kinds of problems that develop on recruiting duty when the screening process has failed. In cases where there was no conclusive evidence that the problem could and should have been identified during the screening process, the example was omitted.

The examples will illuminate challenges such as marital instability, financial instability, language barriers and speech impediments, poor past performance, lack of citizenship, medical conditions, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), introversion and lack of confidence. Additionally, examples are captured of insufficient obligated service, poor judgment, unique difficulties that arise when a Marine transfers from outside the continental United States (OCONUS) to recruiting duty and the cases where the recruiter is plagued by multiple issues simultaneously.

**Problems and Inefficiencies**

When the process is observed critically, obvious problems and inefficiencies in the screening and selection process emerge. Among them are the utilization of an unreliable database, the fencing of Marines by their monitors, the failure of Marines to report to the BRC in accordance with their orders, and the financial burden of the costs incurred from transferring poorly screened Marines.

The unreliable database of personnel management information is the first problem impacting the screening process. As mentioned previously, in discussing the first step of the screening process, the timely and accurate reporting of draw case codes is crucial to the success and effectiveness of the balance of the screening and selection process. Much time and effort is wasted in the process when the codes that will flag a Marine’s record as being unavailable for
assignment to SDA are never reported. Absent these necessary flags, MMEA-85 solicits the generation of a roster that will invariably identify numerous Marines for SDA screening that will never actually be available to report to BRC. This is further discussed later when addressing the issue of a Marine’s failure to report for school.

The second problem is the monitors’ endeavor to prevent Marines from being screened for and assigned to recruiting duty. As introduced in the discussion of step two in the screening process, the initial roster of Marines identified to be SDA screening eligible is first vetted through the monitors prior to further promulgation. While the intent is for the monitor to simply flag each record with “screen” or “don’t screen,” monitors historically “fence” their best Marines for other assignments.30

Enlisted monitors are managing their own populations – the Marines from within their own occupational field. Requests are received, qualifications and reputations are considered, promises are made, and other external influences are brought to bear on the assignment process. Marines that are otherwise well within the eligibility criteria for SDA screening may be flagged as “don’t screen” by the monitor in order to keep that Marine “fenced” for an alternate assignment. Consequently, the monitors and the SDA section are, by process design, naturally working in opposition to one another in the battle for personnel.31 As the SDA section pursues the process of acquiring the best Marines available for recruiting duty, the monitors are naturally predisposed toward “fencing” their best Marines for alternatives, and relinquishing the only Marines that they can afford to make available.32

This conundrum is a manpower management reality. Notwithstanding, under the current MMEA-85 leadership, an agenda is in motion to influence a paradigm shift in the way business is conducted with respect to the working relationship between the SDA section and the enlisted
monitors. Promising results are already being observed, as the goal of a teamwork approach to assignments is achieved.\textsuperscript{33}

The third problem is the failure of Marines to report to the BRC when ordered to do so. The BRC in progress at the time of this paper’s development is typical with respect to the volume of Marines that just do not report as directed by their orders. For the recent BRC Class 2-12, 371 Marines were issued orders to report to the school; only 274 showed up.\textsuperscript{34} Empirically, MMEA knows that it needs to issue 150\% of the orders necessary to arrive at the end state – 250 graduates from the BRC. In the case of Class 2-12, only 197 made it to graduation; BRC Class 2-12 dropped 77 Marines over the course of its seven weeks—a deficit of 53 graduates that will have to be made up in subsequent classes. The combined effect of Marines not reporting for school with a significant number of noncompliance issues resulting in attrition is significant.\textsuperscript{35}

Initially, the cause of non-reporting is a mystery—it takes time to determine. Some of it comes back to the failure to run draw case codes necessary to flag the Marine as unavailable for assignment. This includes, but is not limited to deployment, or stabilization for deployment. Any other issue that would have precluded a Marine from executing orders to recruiting duty would have required communication from the parent command to MMEA-85 via naval message.\textsuperscript{36} Regardless of the cause, the subject case of BRC 2-12 has 97 Marines (26 percent of the Marines who were ordered to report for school) absent and requiring a disposition determination. According to the Head of MMEA-8 (Enlisted Monitors), “it only gets more painful for all involved from this point forward.”\textsuperscript{37}

Since the non-reporting Marine has been slated for BRC, the Marine’s record in the database now is flagged with a draw case code so reflecting; the Marine is automatically reassigned to the following BRC class. Shortly thereafter, a non-compliance message is published identifying the
Marines who failed to report. If the Marine also fails to report to the following BRC class, MMEA then initiates administrative measures to prevent the Marine from being eligible for reenlistment.38

In addition to the time and effort MMEA-8 expends searching for non-reporting Marines, the parent commands now can do nothing with the Marine by virtue of the assigned draw case code that stabilizes him or her for SDA. Lastly, the Marine’s prospects for retention have now been jeopardized as a result of his or her failure to report to school. The most common causes of the unfortunate aforementioned chain of events typically relate to medical issues, legal problems, and the failure of the command to stabilize their Marines for deployment.39

By simply reporting issues and ensuring appropriate draw case codes are entered into the database, much of this can be averted entirely. It is the commanding officer’s responsibility to ensure this reporting process occurs.

The fourth problem is the unnecessary cost incurred in transferring Marines that have not been thoroughly vetted by the screening process. On average, it costs the Marine Corps approximately $15,000 to transfer a Marine to a new duty station.40 In the present era of shrinking budgets and personnel structure reductions, the Marine Corps can ill afford to vector poorly vetted Marines and their families into the SDA process; the money is not there.41 Turning deliberate attention toward fixing this problem may initially result in unfilled BRC class seats. With imminent structure reductions and budgetary constraints, now is the time to seek greater efficiency with the screening and selection process. Every RS CO canvassed agreed that they would rather manage a vacancy than deal with the assortment of issues stemming from a poorly screened recruiter arriving for duty. The solution will be found in fostering stakeholder and
participant ownership in the screening process. And again, the commanding officer emerges as the most critical participant.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations herein captured are reflective of a holistic examination of the screening and selection process. The following seven recommendations include addressing noncompliance, reconfiguring the composition of the HSST, incorporating the assistance available through the installation provost marshal, certifying the Marine’s own screening checklist, revising the disposition requirements of the CO’s Screening and Interview Guide, incorporating a review of the Marine’s fitness report in the screening process, and training commanders on how to screen their Marines for SDAs.

The first recommendation identifies the irrelevance of the noncompliance message that is released when the Marine reports to school without having been properly screened. If the Marine fails to report to the BRC, or the disqualified Marine reports to the BRC, appropriate commands across the operating forces and supporting establishments are notified through the release of a noncompliance message. What happens at that point remains a mystery. There is no evidence of accountability, and therefore, little incentive for the Marine’s CO to invest much personal interest in the screening process. Capture well by a former District XO, “commanders are disinterested, uninformed parties loosely engaged in a screening process – they just don’t take it seriously.”

Most commanders with court-martial authority who are tasked with the screening and interview process have never actually been on recruiting duty. Not only are they lacking a fundamental understanding and appreciation of the duty for which they are screening their Marines, but they are not sitting down and conducting the personal interview as directed.
At the HSST screening event held at the base theater aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico during January 2012, the author personally interviewed approximately 50 percent of the Marines present for screening. This was a random canvassing to assess commanders’ involvement in the screening and interview process. Of those Marines canvassed, *none* had personally sat down with their commanding officer. Furthermore, most of them had never met their CO, and many of them could not even recall their CO’s name.\(^{45}\) When questioned about this observation at the end of the event, the OIC of the HSST commented that “this is typically what we find.”\(^ {46}\)

The time available to spend with each Marine at an HSST screening event is limited. If the Marine’s parent command, with the personal involvement of the commander, has not screened the Marine (and his or her family) thoroughly beforehand, new disqualifying information is not likely to be discovered by the HSST.

The second recommendation captures the necessity to modify the composition of the HSST. Presently, the HSST is led by an officer-in-charge (OIC) and is comprised of a number of enlisted screeners. In addition to the recruiter monitor, the other screeners are conventionally pulled from recruiter school and are career recruiters (MOS 8412) from the staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) ranks.\(^ {47}\) What is lacking in this construct is the involvement of a disinterested third party. Having instructors from the school house involved in filling school seats has been metaphorically likened to the fox guarding the hen house.\(^ {48}\) While the instructors are themselves career recruiters, and by definition, skilled in the art and science of professional selling and systematic recruiting, it is the RS leadership that bears the administrative and disciplinary burden of leading the poorly selected Marine assigned to recruiting duty.

The RS command group is best equipped to aid in the front end screening and selection process. These are the leaders who will ultimately be responsible for leading and influencing the
performance of that recruiter once he or she emerges from the process. The members of the RS command groups, on a rotational basis, should be sent on temporary additional duty (TAD) to augment the HSST during the installation briefings and screening process. Given that there are 48 RSs each comprised of five command group members (Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Operations Officer, Sergeant Major, and Recruiter Instructor), 240 professionals constitute this community from which to draw for such a collateral duty.

More specifically, it would be well advised to task only command group members in their second year of recruiting duty for this responsibility. The reason for this is twofold. First, the second-year command group member has experienced a full annual recruiting cycle and has acquired the experience necessary to discern the indications and warnings of a Marine that may not be well suited for the duty. Secondly, he or she has yet another year ahead of them on the assignment, thereby ensuring there remains a vested interested in delivering a diligent screening effort. This will shift the incentive from one of filling class seats to one of ensuring only the best qualified are selected for recruiting duty.

With the exception of the Recruiter Instructor (a career recruiter who will remain permanently on recruiting duty), the other four members of the RS command group are on a three-year assignment. Drawing from the entire pool of Recruiter Instructors (48) along with one third of the remaining 192 command group members (64), 112 recruiting professionals are available to augment the HSST in the screening process.

With respect to the waiver authority granted to MMEA-8, and subsequently MMEA-85, the present composition and screening tempo, of the HSST particularly, does not facilitate circumspect waiver decisions that are in the best interest of the recruiting effort. A more effective approach would result with the formation of a panel of recruiting leaders (District and
RS Command Group members) convened to review the screened subjects that would require waivers for assignment. The panel would consider the disqualifying factors, be resourced to make further inquiry if deemed necessary, and would produce a recommendation to an appropriately appointed SDA waiver authority. The waiver authority should be free of mandate or obligation to fill BRC class seats, but would be in a position of sufficient objectivity as to decision waivers appropriate to the best interest of the Marine Corps.

The third recommendation utilizes the untapped resources available through the installation provost marshal’s office (PMO) in the screening process. With respect to the commander’s requirement to ensure that recruiters possess a valid driver’s license (see Appendix E), the current check is not performed until the Marine reports to the BRC.51

In the case of the Marine whose driving privileges have been suspended or revoked, there is no way for the Marine’s CO to know this unless voluntarily disclosed (if the Marine is even aware of it himself). If the Marine does not possess a valid driver’s license, it will not matter how successful he or she is at BRC – the recruiter cannot drive, and therefore cannot perform the duties of a recruiter. This needs to be identified early and certainly before the Marine executes orders to the BRC. With access to the National Crime Information Center’s (NCIC) database, PMO can determine if the Marine possess a valid license free of suspension or revocation, and can identify previous criminal convictions as well as any outstanding arrest warrants that may exist.52

The Provost Marshal will also have access to public record databases such as The Last One (TLO)53 which, among other functions, provide a rapid risk assessment with respect to debt, collections, and associations.54 This capability would be particularly useful to the commander in determining if the Marine was excessively indebted, or at risk for legal action as a result of
unresolved outstanding debt. The current process offers the commander a financial worksheet with which to assess financial risk; however, this is arguably of negligible value as the completion of the worksheet is voluntary and will ultimately capture only what the Marine is willing to disclose. 55

The fourth recommendation reinforces the necessity for the Marine to certify his or her own screening checklist. The Commanding Officer’s Screening and Interview Guide should not only be certified by the CO, but also by the Marine. The document should include an affidavit signed by the Marine verifying the completeness and accuracy of the information. The cost to the Marine Corps, the command, the Marine, and his family is too great to trivialize this process. The institution requires commanding officers to certify that the Marine is qualified for SDA, yet it does not require the Marine to certify that full disclosure has been made. Were the document to be redesigned so as to constitute an official statement, the Marine who intentionally misled his chain of command would be in violation of Article 107 of the UCMJ—making a false official statement. The objective is to obligate the Marine to full disclosure, which will better inform the commander’s decision.

The fifth recommendation is designed to ensure that the CO’s screening and interview guide (with financial worksheet) makes it into the hands of the RS CO and RS SgtMaj. By current design, the RS CO is not afforded the opportunity to review the new recruiter’s screening and interview guide that accompanied the Marine to Recruiters School. Curiously, the current requirement mandates that the document be destroyed once the recruiter graduates from the BRC. 56 Graduation from the BRC is just the beginning. Thirty-six months of recruiting production in an independent environment await that recruiter.
The general nature of the recruiting environment coupled with the unrelenting stress of the duty will inevitably expose any issues the recruiter may have. Rather than blindside the RS leadership by requiring them to discover problems over time, they need to know and understand what challenges the Marine is experiencing at the outset of his assignment.

The sixth recommendation is that the Marine’s fitness reports should be reviewed in accordance with their intended purpose. In the first chapter of the Performance Evaluation System (PES) Manual and at the top of the first page of every fitness report one will find the following guidance: “The completed fitness report is the most important information component in manpower management. It is the primary means of evaluating a Marine’s performance. The fitness report is the Commandant’s primary tool available for the selection of personnel for . . . duty assignments.” Presently, no such application of this guidance is implemented in any of the screening and selection steps outlined in Appendix C.

The case example provided from RS Orange of the Marine whose past performance would have been an indicator of the Marine’s likelihood of struggling on recruiting duty is applicable here (Appendix H). Even a cursory review of the Marine’s master brief sheet (MBS) would have revealed a steady trend of low relative values on his fitness reports. A Marine who cannot successfully perform the routine duties of his primary occupation will likely struggle on recruiting duty.

Additionally, section “A” of the fitness report solicits the Marine’s duty station preferences, and in the case of Gunnery Sergeants, a preference for promotion to either Master Sergeant or First Sergeant. In like manner, this would be a valuable opportunity to solicit the Marine’s preference of SDAs. The Marine would be required to either choose the preferred SDA, or rank his priority for the five SDAs available: Recruiter, Drill Instructor, Marine Security Guard,
Marine Combat Instructor, or Security Forces. This would not only provide a manpower management tool for matching preferences with vacancies, but would also require the Reporting Senior to make a recommendation with respect to the Marine’s preference(s).

Finally, the last recommendation revisits the critical role of the commander in the screening process. In order to equip commanders to perform their important SDA screening role, training on this responsibility should be provided to them. The training should include fostering an awareness of the consequences of poor screening and presenting best practices for effectively screening their Marines for SDA.

An appropriate forum for conducting this training is the semi-annual Commanders Program facilitated by Marine Corps University. All colonels and lieutenant colonels slated for command are mandated to attend this course either before, or just after assuming command. The purpose of the program is to “educate commanders . . . on the fundamental authorities, responsibilities, programs, and practices that contribute to a successful command tour.”58 The screening of Marines for recruiting duty is one of those responsibilities, and it is one that cannot be delegated.59

**Further Recommended Analysis**

In an effort to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the screening and selection process of Marines for assignment to recruiting duty, further analysis is recommended in three key areas. First, the concept of personality testing should be revisited. Second, the institution should develop a system of tracking recruiter reliefs and administrative separations in an attempt to capture lessons learned with respect to failures in the screening and selection process. Third, some examination should be devoted to countering the perceived negative stigma associated with
recruiting duty in an effort to attract qualified Marines who will be inclined to voluntarily pursue the duty.

The first recommendation for further analysis revisits a credible recommendation already made—personality testing. A thesis on this topic was submitted by Major Lance Jackola during the Marine Corps Command and Staff College’s 2008-2009 academic year. In his paper, he made a cogent argument for the development and implementation of personality testing in the selection of Marines for recruiting duty.

Although this recommendation never gained traction within the Marine Corps, the concept has merit. In his paper, Jackola acknowledges the effective research that has already been conducted and its implementation in civilian applications. He further asserts that by administering a personality test already developed on the front end of the recruiter screening and selection process, the costs of implementing such a test would not be prohibitive.

While there may be similarities between a civilian sales organization and the Marine Corps’ recruiting force, there are a number of factors that are different. Unlike a civilian sales organization that hires its sales force, the Marine Corps draws its sales force from within its ranks. Additionally, the Marine Corps recruiting effort prides itself on its focus of selling the intangible characteristics of being a Marine rather than a tangible asset or financial benefit. Furthermore, the Marine Corps cannot tie a commission or compensation package to production – Marines will earn the established pay commensurate with grade and longevity in accordance with federal law. No amount of production or lack thereof will affect this fixed compensation structure.

Within these constraints, the Marine Recruiter is necessarily a special caliber of sales person. Building upon Jackola’s defendable postulation, by testing successful post-tour
recruiters, the institution will be better informed to select the Marine with the right personality
traits on the front end. In general, this concept would involve administering a personality test
battery to recruiters who have completed a successful tour and met a predetermined set of
performance standards and attributes.

Once a volume of subjects has been tested, the results should be analyzed to determine
personality types and traits that should characterize the Marine who should be selected for
recruiting duty in the future. The current focus of screening to ensure simply that the Marine is
not disqualified could then be shifted to an offensive, deliberate method designed to actively
seek those best suited for this SDA.

The second recommendation for further analysis emphasizes the need to track those that are
prematurely removed from the duty through relief (the most current available data with respect to
reliefs are reflected in Appendix B). According to the MCRC Adjutant, the need did not exist to
track this kind of data; therefore, this same information was not captured from fiscal year 2010 to
the present. The absence of relief tracking procedures along with the requirement to destroy
the Commanding Officer’s Screening and Interview Guide upon BRC graduation is
problematic.

On the occasion of a recruiter’s relief, there should be the resident capability to marry up the
approved relief package with the Marine’s original screening checklist. The purpose herein
should be to identify whether or not conditions existed on the front end that would have served
as indications and warnings of a potential future relief. The lessons learned could be used to
inform the screening process and support a perpetual effort to continuously improve the
organization’s ongoing objective of selecting the best Marine for recruiting duty. If destruction
of the screening product is ultimately necessary, such disposition should not occur until after the recruiter has completed the assignment.

The third recommendation for further analysis should evaluate the necessity to counter the perception that recruiting duty is something to fear. Presently, the only SDA that is entirely sourced from volunteers is Marine Security Guard (MSG) duty. This is highly beneficial and necessary for that assignment given the potential international implications of assigning the wrong Marine to support the State Department’s diplomatic mission. There is a similar argument to be made for recruiting duty given the domestic strategic environment that exists within the communities, high schools, and junior colleges in which recruiters perform their duties. While it would be advantageous to be able to rely upon volunteers alone, this is not presently possible for recruiting duty.

Since returning to an all volunteer force (AVF) in 1973, the nature of the recruiting environment has produced a self-perpetuating stigma within the ranks of the personnel from whence the recruiting force is drawn. The majority of the recruiting force is comprised of conscripts to the assignment. A former District Commander, in his Commanding Officer’s Handbook, attributed much of this stigma to “[the] briefings [the Marine] receives both officially from the recruiting chain of command and unofficially from ‘the scuttlebutt mill’ of old (and usually unsuccessful) recruiters wandering around in the fleet.” When recruiters are relieved and ultimately return to the operating forces and supporting establishment, they carry their negative testimonies with them.

Additionally, recruiters who successfully complete their recruiting assignment often do so carrying an unsavory flavor of the recruiting experience with them. The duty is difficult and many recruiters are unable to find enjoyment while on the assignment. In his address to the
students of a 1979 Recruiting Management Course (RMC), then Brigadier General McMillan made the following comment:

We’ve got about 20 percent salesmen out there. We’ve got about 20 percent of the recruiting force who truly love getting in there and hooking and jabbing and meeting people. You’ve got another 60 percent that are going to try to do it, but they don’t really enjoy it; and we’ve got 20 percent that want out of it no matter what. Those are the guys that get relieved.66

In the grand effort of finding the right Marine for the job, consideration should be given to a method utilized by U. S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) in their recruiting process. Presently, MARSOC employs a career recruiter in its effort to find and recruit Marines from the operating forces to join their ranks.67 Curiously, the one organization in the Marine Corps that corners the market on recruiting does very little to prospect to fill its own ranks. The SDA brief that the HSST delivers in conjunction with their semi-annual installation tour only reaches the Marines that were directed to attend the brief. If MCRC is going to experience a substantial improvement in the caliber of its recruiters, it will have to counter the recruiting stigma and actively prospect to find and recruit the best available.

Conclusion

The persistent stress and isolation unique to recruiting duty demands that we select only well-screened, stable, professional Marines for this arduous, independent assignment. There are numerous stakeholders and participants in the screening and selection process; however, the most important participant is the commanding officer. Through personal involvement, only the commander, who possesses a thorough knowledge of and engagement with his or her Marines, will consistently send the right Marines to recruiting duty.
Inefficiencies abound, and they exist at every step in the screening and selection process. However, no single participant or stakeholder has access to more information or is more directly involved in the process than the CO. In reviewing the chain of events, the CO’s first responsibility is to ensure changes in a Marine’s availability and duty status are promptly reported in order to facilitate the entry of the appropriate draw case code. Once MMEA has applied its filters and identified the Marine for screening, the CO then bears the responsibility of the command’s screening process which includes the personal interview with the Marine. The third time the CO impacts the process is when he or she certifies the Marine’s qualified status 30 days prior to orders execution. When conditions arise that will prevent Marine from executing orders, the CO is responsible to ensure that information is reported to MMEA-85 via naval message. Finally, it is incumbent upon the CO to ensure the Marine executes orders as directed.

There will likely be no argument against the fact that commanders are very busy people. The mantle of responsibility is rarely understood unless one has held command. Responsible for all that the unit does or fails to do, the commander’s influence extends across the breadth and depth of his or her organization. While much of the routine planning and execution is delegated to the staff and subordinate commanders, there remain those critical tasks that require the commander’s personal involvement.

The screening of Marines for special duty assignment in general and for recruiting duty specifically is one of those tasks. Through personal ownership, it is incumbent upon commander’s to deliberately engage in this process. The best interests of the Marine, the Marine’s family, the recruiting effort, and the Marine Corps depend upon it.
Appendix B
Recruiter Reliefs (FY 2006 to FY 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family Hardship</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to Recruit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Productivity</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malpractice</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Condition</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>44.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misconduct</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>96.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to Recruit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refusal to Recruit: 25 (3%)
Family Hardship: 46 (5%)
Inability to Recruit: 57 (7%)
Low Productivity: 81 (10%)
Malpractice: 63 (8%)
Medical Condition: 177 (21%)
Appendix C
Recruiter Screening & Selection Process

DATA MANAGEMENT
Maintaining accurate & timely reporting & data entry

INITIAL RECORD SELECTION
MMEA-85\(^1\) publishes a list of potential students

COMMANDING OFFICER'S SCREENING & INTERVIEW
Commanders conduct first interview & screening IAW the SDA\(^2\) screening checklist

HSST\(^3\) SCREENING
HSST conducts briefs & screens individual Marines (CO's checklist is with the Marine)\(^4\)

ORDERS ISSUANCE
MMEA assigns Marine to appropriate Basic Recruiters Course (BRC) class

COMMANDING OFFICER'S 30-DAY RECERTIFICATION
Commanders re-certify that the Marine remains qualified to execute orders to BRC

BRC SCREENING
BRC staff screens Marines reporting to the BRC

ASSIGNMENT
BRC students are assigned to their duty stations during week 3 of the POI\(^5\)

BRC GRADUATION
The qualified new 8411\(^6\) completes the POI and detaches

REPORTING TO THE RECRUITING STATION
8411 reports to assigned Recruiting Station for duty

NOTES
\(^1\) Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments – 85 (Special Duty Assignments Unit).
\(^2\) Special Duty Assignment.
\(^3\) Headquarters Special Duty Assignment Screening Team.
\(^4\) HSST has override authority on CO’s recommendation.
\(^5\) Program of Instruction.
\(^6\) Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) code for Recruiter (also Production Recruiter or Canvassing Recruiter).
Appendix D
Draw Case Codes (DCCs)

AA  Stabilized for unit deployment.
AB  Serving on Recruiter/DI duty-station-option
AC  Stabilized assignment; used for situations not covered by other DCCs.
AD  Marine dropped from MSG school.
AE  Denied further service due to service limits or failure to meet high standards.
RE-1B Marine eligible for promotion consideration.
RE-1C Marine eligible for promotion consideration.
AF  Marine not authorized to extend or reenlist without approval of MMEA.
AG  Volunteer for accompanied overseas tour.
AH  Humanitarian reasons.
AI  Marines approved for VSI/SSB.
AJ  Review personnel file before assignment.
AK  SRB recipient: SNM must be assigned per current SRBP instructions (MCO 7220.24).
AL  Stabilized for new aircraft or aircraft transition.
AM  Relieved from DI, Recruiter, MSG, I-I Staff, or MCSF duty.
AN  Not qualified for Drill Instructor Duty.
AP  Not qualified for Recruiting Duty.
AQ  Reserved for 01XX population.
AR  Restrictive assignment for 02XX and 26XX only.
AS  Marine due for formal school in primary MOS.
AT  Marine twice passed for promotion.
AU  Marine was subject of a poor performance letter.
AV  Volunteer for DAUS(DR) Tour.
AW  Marine once passed for promotion.
AX  Denied further service due to failure to meet reenlistment prerequisites (weight, performance, not recommended by CO, etc.) – RE-3_ or RE-$.
AY  Assigned RE-3O. Marine refused to extend/reenlist to deploy or execute PCSO. Marine is not eligible for promotion consideration and not authorized to extend or reenlist without MMEA approval.
AZ  Approved for transfer to FMCR.
BA  Marine granted a deferred reenlistment option.
BB  Not currently used.
BC  Marine on EFM Program.
BD  Marine not qualified for MCSF duty.
BE  Marine found not qualified by Headquarters Recruiter Screening Team.
BF  Not currently used.
BG  Serving on reenlistment duty station option.
BH  Career Planning Force.
BI  Temporarily physically unqualified for world-wide assignment and/or pending result of a medical board.
Appendix E
Commanding Officer’s Screening & Interview Guide

THE PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT FOR INFORMATION ON THIS FORM IS CONTAINED ON NAVMC FORM 11000, PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT FOR MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL AND PAY RECORDS.

THIS FORMAT IS TO BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION OF RECRUITERS SCHOOL OR AS LISTED IN DESTRUCTION INSTRUCTIONS. A COPY OF THIS FORM WILL BE SENT TO THE CMC (MMEA-85) PRIOR TO THE MARINE DETACHING STIPULATING SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL SCREENING BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER.

1. Background. There is no single assignment which can prepare a Marine for Recruiting Duty. Recruiters School will provide the Marine with the required entry-level knowledge for recruiting duty. The school will teach the Marine effective communication skills, techniques of salesmanship, and the fundamental tools and methods of recruiting. The potential recruiter, like any effective salesperson, must project a positive attitude and believe in the product before he/she is able to make a sale. The Marine recruiter is a highly visible individual in the civilian community. His/her responsibilities are demanding, very time-consuming, and considerably different from those encountered in the operating forces. The recruiter must be able to cope with a certain degree of rejection and frustration and resist the temptations encountered in the independent duty environment. The nature of a Marine recruiter’s responsibilities, which are performed in the civilian community and without direct supervision, require the potential recruiter to be mature, self-confident, trustworthy, and cooperative. Marines should present an exceptional appearance, be self-starters, and possess good judgment.

2. Action. One copy of the completed Commanding Officer’s Screening/Interview Guide and Financial worksheet will be placed on the left side of the Marine’s Service Record Book prior to the Marine’s transfer to Recruiters School. Thirty days prior to transfer, the commanding officer will re-certify that the Marine is still qualified for recruiter duty. One copy of the Commanding Officer’s Screening/Interview Guide and Financial Worksheet along with certified copies of the Marine’s page 11, 12, and 13 will be forwarded to the CMC (MMEA-85). The command will contact the CMC (MMEA-85) via naval message when there is a change in the Marine’s status. Upon request, certain criteria may be waived by the CMC (MMEA).

CPL – MSGT: First Sergeants are not considered for recruiting duty. Voluntary applications for corporals and master sergeants will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Corporals must meet the following criteria: 22 years old; single or married with no more than one child; 2 years TIG; 4 years TIS; completed NCO nonresident course; and have 4.6/4.6 average proficiency and conduct marks in service. Waivers for PRO/CON marks, TIG, TIS will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

INTEGRITY/ JUDGMENT: Marine demonstrates integrity and sound judgment. Corporals may be acting in an unsupervised capacity for the first time.
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE/GED: The recruiter will spend most of the working day talking to high school students and graduates, community college students, educators, school officials, and civic leaders about Marine Corps programs, benefits, and educational opportunities in an attempt to attract qualified young men and women for enlistment or commissioning into the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve. The recruiter must be able to effectively communicate with, and favorably relate to, these individuals using an equivalent educational background.

GT SCORE – 90 OR ABOVE: Marines must be able to understand and effectively use the books and methods of systematic recruiting. Marines with a reading level below the 10th grade may experience difficulty with Recruiters School course material. (GT score can be waived)

NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS: MAXIMUM FAMILY MEMBERS SGT & BELOW (2); SNCO (4): This should be viewed as a precaution to avoid potential financial hardships. Most recruiting stations and substations are far removed from military installations. The recruiter may not have immediate access to commissaries, exchanges, base quarters, and free medical care. (Can be waived by MMEA. Number of family members should only become a disqualifier if financial instability occurs as a result).

VALID STATE MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR’S LICENSE: The potential recruiter must have a valid civilian driver’s license since he/she will be required to drive a Government leased vehicle to carry out daily recruiting functions. The potential recruiter who is under the age of 26 must complete a driver improvement course prior to reporting to Recruiters School. (NOT waiverable).

DISCIPLINARY RECORD AND DRUG OR ALCOHOL RELATED INCIDENT(S): A court-martial conviction may be waived, if 5 or more years have elapsed since the offense. Not more than two NJPs in the last 5 years preceding the class reporting date. Not more than one NJP in the last 12 months preceding the class reporting date. No drug related incidents within the last 5 years preceding the class reporting date. No alcohol related incidents within the last 2 years preceding the class reporting date. A waiver granted for reenlistment is not valid for assignment to recruiting duty. A separate waiver must be requested.

MEDICALLY AND PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR DUTY: The Marine must be medically fit. A physical exam must be conducted within 12 months of the class reporting date. Standard forms 88 and 93 must be completed. A medical officer will certify in block 77 of Standard Form 88 that the Marine is physically qualified for recruiter duty. Commanding Officers will personally screen the Marine’s medical record. Recruiting duty is a high stress environment. Any medically documented problems related to hypertension or migraine headaches are disqualifying if the Marine is currently on medication. Additionally, any medical documentation indicating problems with stress or psychological dysfunction may be disqualifying and must be identified. Marines found unqualified for these reasons may be directed by HQMC to appear before a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) to determine worldwide assignability.
DENTAL QUALIFICATION (CLASS I OR II): The Marine must be dentally qualified (Class I or II). Marines considered permanently Dental Class II IAW NAVMEDCOMNOTE 6600 dtd 8 Sep 1987 are qualified for the purpose of this Order. Dental examinations must be conducted within 6 months of class reporting date. Because of the time constraints on Recruiters School, a Marine requiring excessive dental treatment would miss valuable training. More importantly, since this Marine may be far removed from a Government supported medical facility, dental problems may translate into an increased financial burden. **Do not detach a Marine who is less than Dental Class II.**

MARINE’S FAMILY SHOULD NOT REQUIRE UNUSUAL OR RECURRENT MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE: Commanders should consider this requirement equally important to the individual Marine’s fitness for duty. Consideration must be given to serious physical conditions or abnormalities which require specialized medical treatment, dental treatment or specialized training not likely to be available without considerable cost to the Marine. Ultimate assignment will consider any special requirements of the Marine’s family. Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) status does not necessarily disqualify a Marine for recruiting duty. Each EFMP Marine screened will be approved by CMC (MMEA-86) prior to assignment.

STABLE FAMILY: The Marine is not currently enrolled in a command-directed stress/anger management course or undergoing marital counseling. Special attention must be given to Marines who are separated or undergoing divorce proceedings. Marines legally separated or pending divorce may be disqualified. Verify any legal proceedings and comment on completion.

SINGLE PARENTS: A single parent may request or be assigned to recruiting duty. Requests and qualification must include a certified copy of their plan for child care while attending school and during the subsequent 36 month assignment on recruiting duty. Final approval and assignment of eligible single parents resides with Marine Corps Recruiting Command. Single parents must be able to execute orders to assignments that support the needs of the command. Disenrollment from Recruiters School or disqualification for recruiting duty as a result of an uncertifiable child care plan will result in the assignment of a draw case code and may affect future retention and assignments.

JOINT HOUSEHOLD: Both members must meet min TOS requirements in accordance with reference (e) [MCO 1300.8R] to be qualified for assignment to recruiting duty.

FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE: The Marine has demonstrated an ability to manage personal financial affairs with maturity and judgment. Does not exhibit a pattern of indebtedness or frequently write checks without sufficient funds. Marines on recruiting duty face additional expenses due to the non-availability of military support facilities. Marines should have approximately $800 - $900 net available funds (including the SDA pay of $375.00) after completing the Commanding Officer’s Financial Worksheet.

MEETS MINIMUM OBLIGATED SERVICE: Marines must have a minimum of 2 years of active service remaining upon completion of Recruiters School. **Minimum obligated service must be obtained prior to detaching.** (Marines being screened are career Marines who are assumed to be reenlisting).
MEETS PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND HEIGHT AND WEIGHT STANDARDS: The Marine must be within the Marine Corps height and weight standards IAW MCO 6100.10. No unresolved history of assignment to weight control or personal appearance programs is authorized. Marines will be weighted in PT gear, no shoes.

TATTOOS: The Marine does not have excessive or offensive tattoos (visible in uniform or PT gear), body piercings, or any other markings that could be construed as inconsistent with Marine Corps Uniform Regulations.

COMMUNICATIONS: A Marine who stutters or has other speech impediments should not be assigned to recruiting duty. Recruiters School cannot teach a Marine to become an articulate, logical speaker. Marines should be able to converse in a clear manner. A recruiter should be persuasive and personable, and should feel comfortable among strangers.

I have personally screened [Grade/Name/SSN/MOS].

This Marine does/does not meet the requirements listed in MCO P1326.7. If the Marine doesn’t meet the requirements, explain below:

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________
Battalion/Squadron SgtMaj’s Printed Name

________________________________________        Date
Battalion/Squadron SgtMaj’s Signature

________________________________________
Commanding Officer’s Printed Name Rank  Billet(*)

________________________________________
Commanding Officer’s Signature        Date

Commanding Officer’s Re-certification: (To be completed 30 days prior to the Marine’s detachment date). This Marine’s qualifications for assignment to recruiting duty has/has not changed since my initial interview and screening of his/her records. The Marine does/does not meet the requirements listed in MCO P1326.7. (If the Marine no longer meets the requirements, contact CMC MMEA-85 via naval message).

________________________________________
Commanding Officer’s Signature        Date

NOTE: * Denotes must be at least Battalion/Squadron level with Courts Martial Authority.
Appendix G
Case Studies from RS Los Angeles

Financial Instability

A staff sergeant reports to the recruiting station with pre-existing, unresolved financial instability. A phone call from his former SgtMaj provided the first indicator there would be problems. The staff sergeant had charged two Marines from his former unit for repairs he had agreed to make on their personal vehicles. The repairs were never made, but the staff sergeant kept their payments. Additionally, the staff sergeant had failed to surrender unit keys prior to detaching and departing the area.70

Soon after making this first set of discoveries, the District SgtMaj called the RS to inform them that the staff sergeant had amassed nearly $23,000 in eleven bad checks that had been returned for insufficient funds—payments to his government travel charge card (GTCC) account. Furthermore, the staff sergeant was currently delinquent on an additional balance of nearly $3,200 on his same GTCC.71

Following the second discovery, the RS commander was notified by the Marine’s former command that he was also delinquent to Omni Financial for an amount just over $5,700. In total, the staff sergeant was being pursued for nearly $32,000 in bad debt. Further investigation revealed that the staff sergeant’s former command was aware of the GTCC delinquencies, but failed to take action in rectifying the issue.72

Speech Impediment

A sergeant reported to the RS with an obvious speech impediment that was characterized by a persistent stuttering problem. It was clear to the RS commander that nobody had taken the time to thoroughly screen this Marine. A simple conversation with the sergeant would have revealed this impediment and flagged him as being unsuited for recruiting duty.73
Appendix H
Case Studies from RS Orange

Poor Performance

The commander of RS Orange describes a sergeant that reported for duty as an “administrative disaster.” In the stressful, isolated assignment of recruiting duty, Marines that are described as “bad at Marine things like following simple instructions” are never going to make it. On the surface, he met the basic eligibility requirements for the duty; however, a story would have been told if the Marine’s master brief sheet (MBS) would have been reviewed. His CO captured it well in stating that “when you have all 80s for relative value and it took seven years to make sergeant . . . these are not the drones you’re looking for.” The recruiter quickly demonstrated his inability to recruit through his failure to write a single contract over the span of five months. He has been recommended for relief for recruiting duty.

The cost to the Marine Corps will be measured in the expenditure necessary to pay for permanent change of station orders to move the Marine and three dependents to another duty station having only served one year in his current assignment. The cost to the recruiting effort will be measured in the customary delay that will be experienced in the time necessary to get another trained recruiter assigned to the newly vacated PCS.

Citizenship

A sergeant reports for duty and, by all initial appearances, is well equipped to succeed on the duty. There is, however, one small problem. He is not a U.S. citizen. This is not an impediment to enlistment into active service; however, it is a major problem for assignment to recruiting duty. Without citizenship, the Marine is ineligible for a security clearance. Without a security clearance, he cannot be given an email account and issued a government laptop computer. Without these tools, not only can the Marine not process an automated enlistment package (AEP) on a prospective applicant, but he cannot communicate electronically with applicants, educators, parents, community influencers, or his chain of command—all crucial communication requirements for a recruiter.

The problem is compounded for this Marine for two additional reasons. First, he is assigned to PCS Saipan (RS Orange bears responsibility for recruiting in the Pacific in addition to their assigned area of operations in Southern California). Given his inability to use a government computer, he does his work by fax (requiring another Marine offsite to generate his applicants’ AEPs) and communicates using a Gmail account accessed from his personal computer. Secondly, his wife is also without U.S. citizenship. Consequently, she was not permitted to move to Saipan with him. The recruiter is not only unequipped to do his job, but he is also now a geographic bachelor.

In order to address the issue, the commander was faced with a decision to either enter the citizenship business, or pursue the painstaking process of getting the Marine relieved from recruiting duty for the good of the service. Neither option is expeditious. The commander chose to look after the Marine’s welfare and provided the Marine the necessary assistance to acquire
U.S. citizenship for the Marine and his wife, and subsequently security clearance eligibility for the recruiter. At the time of this writing, it remains a work in progress.
Appendix I
Case Studies from RS Portland

Speech Impediment

The CO of RS Portland provides an account of a sergeant that lacked the ability to communicate clearly; the Marine had a speech impediment, which was exacerbated by dysfluency. This impediment was immediately recognized by the RS leadership when the Marine reported for duty at the RS. Furthermore, and more importantly, it was identified by the Marine’s former SgtMaj and annotated on the SDA screening and interview guide prior to the Marine’s SDA assignment.80

Though identified, it was overridden by the HSST, and the Marine was sent to the BRC. Additionally surprising to the RS leadership was the fact that the Marine emerged successfully from the BRC POI. Ultimately, the RS CO was obligated to pursue the Marine’s relief for the good of the service (GOS) – it is imperative that a Marine possesses the ability to communicate if assigned to recruiting duty.81

The Marine’s former SgtMaj provided comments in the Marine’s relief package, and included the following remarks:

I recommended that [the sergeant] not attend Recruiter's School due to his speech impediment and his inability to grasp and retain information. At that time, I did not believe this was in the best interest of the Marine or the Marine Corps. When contacted concerning [the Marine’s] pending Relief for Good of the Service, I [was] not surprised.82

Medical Condition (Spouse)

The CO of RS Portland, who is responsible for recruiting in the state of Alaska, provided insight on a Marine who reported for duty to an RSS in Alaska accompanied by his wife who had been previously diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis (MS). The question of how it might be possible for the Marine in this case to be assigned to a remote independent duty remains unanswered.83

Once in place, the spouse’s condition continued to worsen, and she was subsequently diagnosed with the additional chronic medical conditions of Antiphospholipid Antibody Syndrome (APS) – also referred to as Hughes Syndrome, and Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE) – also known as Lupus. This confluence of autoimmune disorders produces inner organ inflammation which causes severe pain and can be life-threatening absent medical treatment. The spouse’s required monitoring and treatment necessitated 36 separate treatments for Lupus flares, multiple hospital admissions, and five trips to the emergency room.84 Such a condition demands that the family be stationed in immediate proximity to a major military treatment facility.
The obvious observation is that recruiting duty, in general, was not the appropriate assignment for a Marine bearing a medical challenge of this magnitude. This challenge is exacerbated when the Marine is dislocated from an appropriately equipped treatment facility and, who in this case, is also over 2,500 miles from the RS headquarters. Summarized succinctly by the RS CO, “recruiting duty does not have the support programs and medical personnel that are better provided at the major bases and station.”

Multiple Factors

The third case from RS Portland describes the Marine who reported to recruiting duty possessing a confluence of problematic factors. While it is stipulated in the Commanding Officer’s Screening and Interview Guide that assignment to the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) does not necessarily preclude a Marine from SDA, it was not the sole factor in this case. In addition to being an exceptional family member (EFM), the Marine’s spouse had also been diagnosed with a brain cyst which was classified as inoperable at the time the Marine was screened for SDA.

Additionally, following episodes of the Marine “lashing out,” he was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD and referred to a treatment program. Furthermore, the Marine went on to be additionally diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD). In this family’s case, there were additional medical and personal issues that only served to exacerbate the aforementioned problems.

The confluence of such an array of issues should quickly deselect such a Marine for SDA. In cases such as these where a host of challenges prevail, dealing with them becomes the Marine’s full time occupation. Thorough screening, which requires the investment of time and leader engagement, will most often reveal these cases. The ones that remain obscure and result in a poor assignment decision should and can be the very rare exception. This Marine should have remained stationed aboard a major installation.
Appendix J
Case Studies from RS Salt Lake City

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

The CO of RS Salt Lake City shared the case of the corporal who, by all appearances, was an effective recruiter. He was consistently exceeding his assigned contracting mission. Though reduced to corporal early in his assignment as a result of a DUI conviction, he recovered from the violation and successfully participated in the required substance abuse counseling program. Due in part to his recruiting production, he was retained on the assignment and was eventually promoted again to sergeant.89

One Sunday morning, the CO was notified that the Marine had been apprehended by the local police when he was observed “running down [the street], drunk, buck naked, and screaming his head off that he had been raped and robbed.” The Marine was quickly admitted to the psychiatric unit and subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. Following a series of evaluations and consultations, his diagnosis was elevated to “extreme PTSD.”90

Further investigation revealed that the Marine had previously been diagnosed with PTSD prior to his assignment to recruiting duty. The Marine’s physician was “incredulous” that the Marine’s current command had no knowledge of his previous PTSD diagnosis. When the CO informed the Marine’s spouse of her husband’s diagnosis, she stated that “I didn’t know he had PTSD, and maybe that’s why he used to back me into a corner and threaten to kill me!”91

Following an 18-month process, the CO and his staff were able to get the combat-wounded Marine medically retired.92 A diligent initial screening of this Marine would have revealed recruiting duty to be a bad idea; this entire experience could have been averted.

Transferring From Outside The Continental United States (OCONUS)

The CO of RS Salt Lake City offers three compelling accounts of Marines that dealt with the challenges of transitioning from duty stations in Japan to a recruiting assignment. His general assessment of the concept is captured well in his quote – “Coming from overseas to recruiting duty is crazy.”93

In the first case, a sergeant, following the completion of BRC and having returned to his parent command to execute his permanent change of station (PCS) orders, had to wait a month to acquire his clearance to return. Upon finally reporting in to his assigned RS for duty, the leadership discovered that his Filipino wife remained back home in Manila waiting for her husband to initiate the process for immigration. No one within the Marine’s former parent command had provided this Marine any guidance or assistance in the matter.94

The RS has now inherited the challenge of assisting the Marine in his navigation of the process with the State Department while simultaneously serving as a production recruiter in the middle of Montana. As is often the common resulting affect, the Marine’s production suffered. It became clear to the RS leadership that the Marine’s predicament was now being exacerbated
once they learned that he was exhausting all of his income on lawyers and fees to get his wife to the United States. Recruiters have neither the time, nor access to the necessary resources to pursue such a frustrating and time consuming task.  

In the second case, a sergeant, following his graduation from BRC, returns to Okinawa to get his family and ship his household goods. Following the customary month-long delay, the Marine, with his family in tow, reports to his assigned RSS in the great state of Montana. The Marine gets out of the taxi, finds the SNCOIC in the RSS, and states, “I need a place to stay.”

This begs the question – how does a Marine coming from overseas find a home in Montana? Marines’ orders are written so as to stipulate that they must return to their parent commands following the completion of the BRC. In this case, “the Marine loses and the gaining unit has to scramble to help this Marine from [the RS headquarters] eight hours away.” As the examples of the challenges of transitioning from OCONUS to recruiting duty are considered, it becomes clear that this concept requires more scrutiny.

In the third case, another immigration challenge, the sergeant is challenged with the transition from Mainland Japan, through BRC, and on to his recruiting assignment. Destined for duty in the Montana heartland, he finally arrives, but does so having to abandon his wife and children in Japan. Again, the Marine is relegated to navigate the distractions and cost-prohibitive process of his family’s immigration. Marines so embattled are not equipped to diligently engage in the accomplishment of the recruiting mission.
Appendix K
Case Studies from RS San Diego

Introversion & Lack of Confidence

The commander of RS San Diego relates the account of a sergeant who immediately demonstrated signs for concern. He was “highly introverted”99 and demonstrated “erratic and awkward”100 behavior whenever he was required to communicate. This not only manifested itself when the Marine had the occasion to speak in front of groups, but also when merely required to communicate with his seniors. His significant lack of confidence was exacerbated by his physical fitness struggles; he was barely capable of passing the PFT.101

Though a sergeant, the recruiter demonstrated difficulty with accomplishing basic tasks common to all recruiters in conjunction with the daily routine. Absent the direct supervision from his SNCOIC, the sergeant was unable to deliver normal daily expectations. This failure to contribute to the mission placed an unfair burden on his fellow recruiters who were obligated to shoulder the additional load created from the sergeant’s ineptitude.102

The RS commander notes that these issues could and should have been easily identified by the Marine’s former chain of command, which should have raised concerns with respect to his fitness for recruiting duty. Additionally, the RS commander pointed out that it would have been impossible for the sergeant to have escaped the attention of the BRC staff and faculty.103 This is only explained by a failure of leadership to directly engage with this Marine in the screening process.

Insufficient Obligated Service

“Intelligent, articulate and quick on his feet,”104 the subject of this next case reported for duty with less than two years remaining on his current enlistment. By the order, Marines must have at least two years of obligated service remaining upon completion of the BRC.105 This could have been caught and remedied by his former command. Furthermore, the redundancy built into the screening process would also have identified this as well (for instance, the HSST and BRC should have immediately recognized this).106

In this unfortunate case, the Marine, a sergeant, quickly discovered the challenges of recruiting duty. Distraught by his newfound lot in life, he rapidly adopted an unwillingness to do his job. He preferred now to leave the Marine Corps rather than serve the required three years on recruiting duty. The sergeant now became a burden on his team and a leadership challenge to his SNCOIC.107

Language Barrier

The RS commander describes two Marines presently assigned to RS San Diego who “can barely make themselves understood in English.”108 Significant concentration is required to understand either one of them in a personal conversation. This barrier is exacerbated when any addition friction is introduced to the communication environment. If the communication is via
telephone, or involves presenting to a group in a room with poor acoustics, these two Marines are “unintelligible.”

Both recruiters were raised speaking Spanish, and neither began to learn English until later in life. One recruiter has managed to obtain a certain measure of success despite this limitation. This success is attributed to diligence and hard work—which also likely explains why he is a gunnery sergeant in the top 5 percent of his peer group. The other recruiter, an average performer is “highly sensitive of his language limitations whenever dealing with that part of his market that is not Spanish speaking.” In both cases, these Marines should have been screened more thoroughly and precluded from having to suffer from the additional challenge and embarrassment they would face as recruiters.

Multiple Issues

The sergeant described in this next case came to the duty with a confluence of challenges, any of which should have raised concerns long before arriving. In addition to having insufficient remaining service obligation, she was “barely able to pass the PFT” and “consistently walks the line with body composition.” The RS commander asserts that these physical fitness challenges did not just suddenly arise on recruiting duty.

Further investigation revealed that the sergeant had attempted to quit recruiters school on a number of occasions. According to her instructors, her performance in the course was substandard. Nevertheless, she was “pushed through the course despite her unwillingness and poor performance.”

Since reporting for duty at the RS, she has emerged as a significant challenge to both the leadership of both the RS and her assigned RSS. After numerous unauthorized absences from her appointed place of duty, the RS commander made the decision to conduct non-judicial punishment (NJP). The sergeant refused the NJP, which began “a long and wasteful legal process.” Her attorney was ultimately able to convince her that accepting NJP was the best course of action.

Upon completion of the disciplinary process, she was reassigned to a different RSS in order to provide her with an environment for a “fresh start.” Since the NJP, she has enjoyed the leadership of two different SNCOICs where she “presented a significant and continual leadership challenge to both.” Throughout her assignment to RS San Diego, her production has been described as being at “the absolute bare minimum.”

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

A sergeant arrives at the RS and begins to demonstrate symptoms of post traumatic stress during his first months on the duty. After failed efforts to get the Marine the assistance he required (to include unsuccessful counseling for his substance abuse), he was reassigned to the Wounded Warrior Battalion. The sergeant did not return to the RS, and it took nearly nine months to get him dropped from the administrative roles of the RS and get a new recruiter to fill the vacancy created.
In this case, the RS commander was unable to establish whether or not his former command knew that the Marine had PTSD. It is clear, however, that the Marine did not develop PTSD from recruiting duty.\textsuperscript{120}

**Multiple Issues**

The RS CO conveys the account of a sergeant who reported for duty with insufficient obligated service on her current enlistment. Again, this is in violation of the order governing the assignment of Marines to special duty.\textsuperscript{121} Additionally, she was in violation of the Marine Corps’ height and weight requirements and was unable to consistently pass the PFT.\textsuperscript{122}

The sergeant’s troubles were further compounded by some emotional instability. She would habitually resort to crying when exposed to moderately stressful conditions. Well below average with respect to recruiting production, her substandard performance placed a “significant amount of strain on the rest of her team.”\textsuperscript{123} Given the challenging area of operations to which she was assigned, it was crucial that every recruiter contribute each and every month.\textsuperscript{124}

Ultimately, the sergeant was unable to conquer her battle with body composition. Upon the occasion of her third assignment to the body composition program (BCP), the RS commander began the process for her administrative separation from the Marine Corps. The Marine’s enlistment contract expired before that process reached maturity.\textsuperscript{125}

**A Correlation Between Physical Fitness And Performance**

RS San Diego’s commanding officer captures well what most RS commanders come to appreciate in the course of their tours. That is that recruiting production and PFT scores “have a lot in common.”\textsuperscript{126} He observes that the Marines with the highest PFT scores often are the same Marines with the highest accessions per recruiter (APR). While he admits there will always be exceptions, they are usually few.

Though the standard for assignment to recruiting duty is simply a passing PFT score, it might be worth considering raising the bar on this. “Not a surprising trend, people who tend to push themselves, manage time well and are willing to experience some pain in order to achieve gain will do so in all areas of life.”\textsuperscript{127}
Appendix L
Case Studies from RS San Francisco

Judgment

The CO of RS San Francisco describes one of his staff sergeants who reported for recruiting duty and technically met the requirements for assignment to recruiting duty. However, once this Marine found himself in the throes of the recruiting environment, his true colors emerged.  

When the incumbent CO took command, the staff sergeant was awaiting court martial proceedings as a result of allegations that he had engaged in an “inappropriate relationship with a female minor.” While awaiting his court martial, the staff sergeant sent a letter to the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps (SMMC) detailing his personal story and his many fine attributes. In fact, what the letter revealed was that the staff sergeant had been the recipient of no fewer than three separate adverse fitness reports. His letter is further described as being “replete with disagreements with previous commands about not following regulations.”

As a follow on measure to his letter to the SMMC, the staff sergeant also filed a complaint with the Inspector General (IG) raising “allegations against most of the previous command group members.” The complaint was investigated, which failed to produce any findings of fact.

The RS CO identifies the requirement in the Special Duty Assignment Manual (SDAMAN) to screen prospective recruiters for “good judgment.” His staff sergeant was clearly not in possession of this desired attribute. Although there is no requirement to screen a Marine’s fitness reports for assignment to recruiting duty, having done so would have revealed his pattern of adverse reports and would have illuminated the Marine’s poor judgment. “The Marine had shown a pattern and his performance on recruiting duty simply reinforced his prior shortcomings.”

Medical Condition (Recruiter)

The RS San Francisco CO relates the sad and troubling account of one of his recruiters who committed suicide after only four months on the assignment. The sergeant, though initially successful on recruiting duty, began to struggle. Following the tragic event, a preliminary inquiry revealed that the Marine had a medical history that would be disqualifying for assignment to recruiting duty. Furthermore, the Marine had been previously screened for assignment to Marine Security Guard (MSG) duty. The Marine’s chronological record, however, reflected the MSG school as being incomplete for reasons yet unknown.

In the wake of this tragic event, the RS commander learned from an Air Force psychiatrist that any history of mental health care is an automatic trigger for “a psych consult in the Air Force recruiter screening process.” The CO also noted that there are “many parallels that can be drawn between recruiter screening and applicant screening, but there are lapses in the accountability mechanism on the recruiter screening side.” The most obviously disparate condition can be seen when a new recruit discloses a disqualifying condition at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) that was not caught in the screening process within the RS. In such a
case, “we are held accountable whether on our stats or Malpractice/Misconduct classifications and investigations. Either way, as an RS CO, we own that.”

He goes on to point out that presently, nothing happens to the commander or medical officer who fails to properly screen a Marine for recruiting duty. How critical is this screening process? Clearly, this case is particularly troubling. “If the life of a Marine isn't a catalyst for change then what does it take? Or, we can do nothing, but then as an organization we will say that another life is an acceptable risk, and we can continue to maintain the status quo.”

It should not be inferred that the assignment to recruiting duty was a direct causal factor in the suicide. Rather, this case is offered as yet another example of how poor screening can result in the wrong Marines being assigned to recruiting duty.
Appendix M
Case Studies from RS Seattle

Medical Condition (Recruiter)

A sergeant reports to the RS for duty and is assigned to recruit out of a 4-Marine RSS located 225 miles away from the RS headquarters. During his first few months, he experiences a fainting spell in the RSS. The SNCOIC reports the incident to the RS CO, who directs the Marine to be evaluated by his physician. The Marine is diagnosed with “generalized seizures.” The recruiter is subsequently placed on medication, prohibited from operating a motor vehicle, and introduced to the physical evaluation board (PEB) process.140

No longer able to recruit, the Marine is removed from production. Given the location to which he is assigned, he must be transported 270 miles to the nearest military treatment facility for the series of appointments necessary to facilitate the PEB process. Since he cannot drive, another recruiter must be dedicated to the task. The Marine is retained and counted against the RS’s end strength until he can be treated and medically retired. A thorough medical review revealed that the Marine had experienced documented seizures previously while in the operating forces. This was never identified in the screening process.141 The answer seems apparent, but the question remains – did the CO “personally screen the Marine’s medical record”142 as directed by the SDAMAN?

Medical Condition (Spouse)

A Marine reports to his RS for duty with his wife and four-year-old daughter and is assigned to an RSS 90 miles north of the RS. Unbeknownst to the RS leadership, the Marine’s spouse is the subject of ongoing treatment for mental health issues including bipolar disorder and depression. Additionally, she continues treatment and pain management for a chronic back condition stemming from multiple herniated discs from several years before.143

This confluence of conditions became known when the Marine’s spouse became pregnant just months in his assignment. As a result of the pregnancy, the spouse’s primary care manager removed the patient from her prescription pain medication, and altered the medication for the treatment of the bipolar disorder and depression to pregnancy-safe alternatives. The combination of these changes produced a mental and emotional instability that created an untenable situation for that family. Due to the necessity for that family to be returned to an assignment back aboard a major military installation, the recruiter was relieved for the good of the service (GOS) from recruiting duty.144

In conjunction with the processing of the GOS relief, it was discovered that the recruiter’s former command was aware of the spouse’s condition and necessary medical maintenance. Consequently, the Marine’s former parent command assigned him to administrative duties characterized by fixed and manageable working hours in order to accommodate the requirements of his spouse’s medical care.145 Recruiting duty was no place for this Marine or his family. Diligent attention to the screening process and its necessary purpose would have prevented this unnecessary turbulence.
Marital Instability

A sergeant reports for recruiting duty having already filed for divorce while assigned to his previous command. In this case, his squadron commander performed a thorough screening and interview and recommended that this Marine not be assigned to SDA. In his comments, he stated that the Marine “needs more time to mature as an NCO . . . and stabilize his family situation.” This recommendation was overridden by the HSST and the Marine was ordered to recruiting duty anyway.¹⁴⁶

The Marine’s recruiting duty experience became unnecessarily painful given his circumstances. Given the marital separation, the Marine now had to travel from Washington to California to visit his daughter. The costs of travel and maintaining two residences became untenable. With his wages now garnished, the Marine ultimately vacated his apartment and alternated boarding with his single recruiter counterparts. Forced to sell his car, he found himself homeless and without transportation. This balancing act ultimately crumbled under the demands and stressors incident to recruiting duty. The Marine was relieved (GOS) and returned to an assignment aboard a major Marine Corps Installation.¹⁴⁷

In this case, although the indications and warnings were known and expressed on the front end, the Marine was ordered to report to BRC anyway. In the interest of filling class seats at the BRC, MMEA can override the CO’s recommendations.¹⁴⁸ In this case, it would have been far better to have vacated a school seat than to have placed both the Marine and the gaining command in the predicament described. Better to have gapped a recruiting sector for a time than to send a Marine only to have his personal resources exhausted and the sector still absent a functioning recruiter anyway.
End Notes


2 This quote and attribution are inscribed above the doorway at the entrance to the Marine Corps Recruiting Command Headquarters at the Marsh Building aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico.

3 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Leading Marines, MCWP 6-11, November 27, 2002, 105.


5 Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Guidebook For Recruiters, Volume I, 2005 Edition, 1130/MCRC, September 1, 2005, A-3. Definition of a contact: A telephone conversation or face to face meeting with an individual – who appears to be eligible to make application for enlistment – that results in the recruiter getting a name and sufficient other information to allow follow-up. Talking to a person but not getting a name plus locator information is not a contact.

6 DEP attrition can be caused by, but is not limited to medical disqualification, drug use, failure to graduate from high school, a lack of commitment (apathy), or the pursuit of higher education.


8 Captain Patrick J. Heiny, Adjutant, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, email message to the author, January 12, 2012. MCRC discontinued tracking this same aggregated data after FY09.


12 Ibid, B-1.

13 This concept map of the CO’s screening and interview process was generated by the author in order to graphically depict the exhaustive nature of the process as well as its interrelated linkages.

14 The HSST is the new name for the HRST (Headquarters Recruiter Screening Team), and reflects its broadened role of screening for all the special duty assignments. The sources referenced will still refer to the HRST until rewritten. Given the focus of this paper, the other special duty assignment options will not be discussed.


16 SDA Brief and HSST Screening, MCB Quantico, Base Theatre, attended by the author on January 31, 2012.


18 Captain Alexandria J. DesJardins, Head, Special Duty Assignments Unit (MMEA-85), Manpower & Reserve Affairs, interview with the author, January 3, 2012.

19 Ibid.


21 Ibid, 3-4.

22 Major Shawn C. Studley, Director, Marine Corps Recruiter School, email message to the author, January 12, 2012.
23 Sergeant Major Lawrence E. Archambault, District Sergeant Major, 12th Marine Corps District, email message to author, January 19, 2012.


25 The sales methodology program known as MC3 replaces the previous program known as Professional Selling Skills (PSS).


27 The distributed nature of RS operations requires the RS command group to be "on the road." As with other assignments, Marines reporting for recruiting duty may not have the luxury of meeting their senior leadership on the day they report.


29 Refer to Appendix A. By the time the recruiter reports to his designated RS for duty, he/she will have been screened by MMEA, the CO (interview), the HSST, the CO again (30-day recertification), and the BRC.

30 Gunnery Sergeant Dustin R. Barnes, Recruiter Monitor, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, interview with the author, February 1, 2012.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Captain Alexandria J. DesJardins, Head, Special Duty Assignments Unit (MMEA-85), Manpower & Reserve Affairs, interview with the author, February 1, 2012.

34 Ibid.


37 Major Michael D. Broyan, Head, Enlisted Monitors (MMEA-8), Manpower & Reserve Affairs, interview with the author, February 1, 2012.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Lieutenant Colonel Marc A. Begin, Executive Officer, 12th Marine Corps District, interview with the author, January 23, 2012.

42 Major Michael D. Broyan, Head, Enlisted Monitors (MMEA-8), Manpower & Reserve Affairs, interview with the author, February 1, 2012.

43 Lieutenant Colonel Marc A. Begin, Executive Officer, 12th Marine Corps District, interview with the author, January 23, 2012.

44 Ibid.

45 SDA Brief and HSST Screening, MCB Quantico, Base Theatre, attended by the author on January 31, 2012.


47 Ibid.

48 Lieutenant Colonel Rex W. Sappenfield, Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, interview with the author, January 3, 2012.

49 Lieutenant Colonel Marc A. Begin, Executive Officer, 12th Marine Corps District, interview with the author, January 23, 2012.

50 SDA Brief and HSST Screening, MCB Quantico, Base Theatre, attended by the author on January 31, 2012.
Major Shawn C. Studley, Director, Marine Corps Recruiter School, email message to the author, January 12, 2012.


The Last One (TLO) Company Website. http://www.tlo.com/about_tloxp.html (accessed February 11, 2012). “TLO is used by the largest global corporations, major financial institutions, insurance carriers and tens of thousands of law enforcement agencies and their investigators to investigate and research people, locations, companies, and their interrelationships for due diligence, risk assessment, fraud detection and protection, identity authentication and more.”


Ibid, B-1.


Ibid, 19.


Ibid, 4-3.


Major Jeffrey H. Buffa, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Salt Lake City, interview with the author, January 24, 2012.

Captain Patrick J. Heiny, Adjutant, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, email message to the author, January 12, 2012. The table and chart depicted in Appendix F are products generated by the author to capture and represent four years of reliefs tracked by the MCRC G-1.

This is a representation of commonly used draw case codes; however, it is not exhaustive. Moreover, draw case codes change to reflect the categorization requirements of manpower management.

Major Warren C. Cook, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Los Angeles, email message to the author, January 26, 2012.

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Major Warren C. Cook, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Los Angeles, email message to the author, January 26, 2012.


Major Matthew P. Zummo, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Orange, email message to the author, January 16, 2012.

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Major Heather J. Cotoia, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Portland, email message to the author, February 9, 2012.

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Major Heather J. Cotoia, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Portland, email message to the author, February 9, 2012.

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Major Jeffrey H. Buffa, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Salt Lake City, telephone interview with the author, January 24, 2012.

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Major Todd E. Mahar, Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station San Francisco, email message to the author, January 19, 2012.

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Major Carl J. Ronhaar, Executive Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Seattle, email message to author and telephone interview with the author, January 25, 2012.

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147 Captain Carl J. Ronhaar, Executive Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Seattle, email message to author and telephone interview with the author, January 25, 2012.


