OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS

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Operation Restore Hope: Strengthening Multilateral Operations

The United States (U.S.) 1994 National Security Strategy emphasized the strengthening of the United Nations (UN) capability to conduct multilateral operations. This thesis analyzes U.S. policy decisions made during the 1992-1994 Somali crisis and Operation Restore Hope to determine if the U.S. strengthened the UN ability to conduct multilateral peace operations. Using criteria outlined in Joint Doctrine Publication 3-07, Peace Operations, and by examining critical U.S. policy decisions made throughout the crisis the research determined U.S. policy decisions did not strengthen UN capabilities to conduct multilateral peace operations. U.S. policy decisions hindered the perceived legitimacy, credibility and the UN ability to foster political reconciliation.

The implications of the U.S. and UN experience in Somalia had a long lasting impact on the perceptions of U.S. resolve in the face of casualties and the UN capabilities to organize and lead a multilateral peace operation.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS, by Major Jason M. Alexander, 101 pages.

The United States (U.S.) 1994 National Security Strategy emphasized the strengthening of the United Nations (UN) capability to conduct multilateral operations. This thesis analyzes U.S. policy decisions made during the 1992-1994 Somali crisis and Operation Restore Hope to determine if the U.S. strengthened the UN ability to conduct multilateral peace operations. Using criteria outlined in Joint Doctrine Publication 3-07, *Peace Operations*, and by examining critical U.S. policy decisions made throughout the crisis the research determined U.S. policy decisions did not strengthen UN capabilities to conduct multilateral peace operations. U.S. policy decisions hindered the perceived legitimacy, credibility and the UN ability to foster political reconciliation.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly — The White House, 1994 National Security

The 1992 humanitarian crisis in Somalia provided the United States (U.S.) an opportunity to strengthen the use of multilateralism as a method for dealing with conflict and crisis in a post-Cold War world. As the remaining superpower following the fall of the Soviet Union, the world looked to the U.S. for leadership in times of crisis. A Charles Kegley stated, “the status of being a superpower, the single “pole” or center of power, without a challenger has fated the U.S. with heavy and grave responsibilities.”¹ A major policy goal of the U.S. was to strengthen the United Nations (UN). The 1993 National Security Strategy emphasized this point very clearly, “In concert with others, the United States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of the United Nations . . . . The United States should do its part to strengthen U.N. conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking.”² The crisis in Somalia provided an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to work with and through the UN to develop a collective and coordinated response. A successful UN operation in Somalia would strengthen the UN

capacity to execute multilateral peace enforcement and reduce the pressure on the U.S. to respond unilaterally to crisis around the world.

The U.S. experience in Somalia was an experiment in melting political and military goals during a peace enforcement operation under the direction of the UN. Since the end of the Cold War the world has experienced multiple conflicts similar to Somalia where unilateral action was not sufficient enough to produce an acceptable solution. As a case study, Somalia provides an excellent opportunity to analyze and understand the effort required by the U.S. when conducting multilateral operations and the impact of U.S. strategic level decisions on the outcome of such operations.

United States Policy and Practice of Multilateralism

During the Cold War, the UN conducted only a few limited missions mostly focused on observing the peace between two agreeing parties. Very often, UN interventions often aimed to stabilize areas of Cold War competition, but as the Cold War ended, the frequency and complexities of missions increased. The scope of UN operations transitioned from observing cease fires between two willing belligerents to facilitating political transitions, providing humanitarian relief or facilitating the cessation of hostilities.³ UN forces increasingly found themselves under-trained and under-resourced to successfully accomplish their mission as policymakers failed to understand the limitations of the UN capabilities.⁴

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⁴Ibid., 5.
In 1992, President George Bush desired to strengthen the UN peacekeeping capability. President Bush and his administration looked to the UN as a tool to assist the U.S., “shape a world consistent with American values and interests.” In January 1992, President Bush addressed the UN Security Council and urged the UN Secretary General, to examine ways to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities while pledging full American support.

President Bush’s 1993 National Security Strategy clearly lays out the U.S. policy on multilateralism and the role the U.S. feels it will play in the future:

With the paralyzing divisions of the Cold War now over, the United Nations has been given a new lease on life, emerging as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace. . . . In concert with others, the United States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of the United Nations . . . we now have the opportunity to make the United Nations a key instrument of collective security. The United States should do its part to strengthen U.N. conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities.

President Bush also emphasized the need for the U.S. to, “participating and supporting and contributing to long overdue reform of the U.N. system to increase the organization's capability” and “taking an active role in the full spectrum of U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and support.”

5Ibid.


8Ibid.
In November 1992, as the Somali crisis loomed in the foreground, President Bush published National Security Directive 74 advocating active U.S. support for UN peacekeeping operations and recommended a variety of U.S. and UN initiatives.\(^9\) In a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1992, the President pledged the U.S. would, “work with the UN to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities” in support of UN missions.\(^10\) He called on nations to develop and train military units for possible peacekeeping duty and advocated multinational planning, training and field exercises to better prepare UN peacekeeping force and even directed the Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. President Bush also addressed the need for UN planning, crisis management and a need for refinement for financing UN peacekeeping operations.\(^11\)

By the end of November 1992, then candidate Clinton defeated President Bush leaving President Bush unable to follow up on the proposals in National Security Directive 74. During the campaign, President Clinton openly supported UN efforts for peacekeeping operations, but stressed he did not believe in turning over the responsibility of protecting the nation to the UN or any other international institution.\(^12\) Clinton also advocated the deployment of the UN rapid deployment force for use in operations other than peacekeeping. His rhetoric was one of full support to the UN and multilateralism.


\(^10\)George Bush Presidential Library and Museum.

\(^11\)Ibid.

\(^12\)Sewall, 8.
In February 1993, less than a month after taking office, President Clinton directed a review of the U.S. policy on peacekeeping. Presidential Review Document 13 was intended to examine the issues surrounding the creation of a U.S. policy on peacekeeping and outline the important information required by the President prior to committing the U.S. to any peacekeeping or humanitarian operation.\textsuperscript{13} The Presidential Review Document looked very similar to President Bush’s policy but with one major difference; President Clinton signaled a willingness to deploy regular combat forces in support of peacekeeping operation whereas President Bush’s National Security Directive 74 emphasized providing “unique” capabilities such as logistics, intelligence or transportation.\textsuperscript{14} Although the Clinton administration’s initial rhetoric seemed to imply the U.S. was deepening the nation’s commitment to the UN, Presidential Review Document 13 seemed to suggest otherwise.

In February 1993, shortly after taking office, President Clinton ordered Presidential Review Directive 13. The mandate directed a, “all-encompassing mandate to review the entire spectrum of peace operations, from traditional peacekeeping to large scale peace enforcement operations just falling short of war.”\textsuperscript{15} The objective of


\textsuperscript{14}Sewall, 9.

\textsuperscript{15}William Dusch, \textit{UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 42.
Presidential Review Document 13 was to devise a plan for the U.S. to strengthen the UN and the U.S. capacity to participate in peace operations.\textsuperscript{16}

In May 1994, after a year in development, the White House published Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 entitled, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The tone of PDD 25 was not as optimistic as the administration had been during its campaign. Instead, PDD 25 warned,

Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. The U.S. will urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations, with special attention paid to the aforementioned principles.\textsuperscript{17}

The PDD provided policy guidance for deciding when U.S. participation in peace operations are appropriate, the role of regional organizations, recommendations for strengthening the UN, strengthening U.S. support for multilateral peace operations, and finance and budget management.

In July 1994, President Clinton released his National Security Strategy. U.S. policy for peacekeeping operations was directly in line with PDD 25. The nations or at least the Clinton’s administration’s enthusiasm for peacekeeping operations was clearly affected by our experiences in Somalia. The shine of multilateralism was tarnished. Within the National Security Strategy, the rhetoric comes off cautious and skeptical of UN or multilateralism,

\begin{itemize}
\item Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy but . . . the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 43.

and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened. Second, while the international community can create conditions for peace, the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people of the country in question.\textsuperscript{18}

The U.S. experience during the Somalia crisis from December 1992 until its exit in March 1994 had a tremendous amount of influence on future U.S. policy decisions involving future multilateral peace operations and inspired the development of PPD 25. In order to fully understand the impetus of the U.S. policy swing it is important to gain an appreciation of critical decisions and events which unfolded during the Somali crisis.

The Road to Intervention

Following the end of the Cold War, Somalia’s hollow shell of a nation state crumbled. In January 1991, Somali opposition forces successfully deposed General Mohammed Said Barre following a three year guerrilla war. Somali institutions and infrastructure were destroyed during the heavy fighting dissolving any ability for the nation to function as a cohesive society. The void in leadership created violent internal clan and sub-clan conflict further destabilizing the fragile country.\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, a severe drought overtook Somalia causing a dangerous food shortage. In the face of a famine, food became a source of power as warring clans quickly seized control of all food aid supplies. By January 1992, the International Red Cross warned starvation was overtaking hundreds of thousands of refugees in southern Somalia.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
In response to the crisis in Somalia, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions aimed at relieving the humanitarian crisis and brokering a cease fire between the armed militias. The result of these resolutions was the creation of the UN Operation in Somali. The purpose of the UN Operation in Somalia was to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centers. At its peak, the UN Operation in Somalia consisted of 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel, up to 719 logistic support personnel, and some 200 international civilian staff.\textsuperscript{21} The UN mission in mid-1992 was hampered by a lack of central-government in Somalia preventing them from obtaining consent for intervention.\textsuperscript{22} Although the UN successfully attempted to sidestep adverse consequences from this it hampered their efforts because the warlords refused to cooperate with UN efforts by refusing to allow any movement outside the immediate vicinity of the Mogadishu Airport. As a result, the UN only deployed a fraction of the planned 3,500 man force which limited their ability to achieve success.\textsuperscript{23}

During the summer of 1992, dramatic media coverage of clan violence and images of the UN unable to assist the starving people in Somalia were broadcasted to the world. Due to the massive media coverage, the Bush administration felt pressure by


\textsuperscript{22}Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and U.S. Interests (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 130.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 131.
international relief organizations, the U.S. public and Congress to take action in Somalia. President Bush also received pressure from then Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton to “take the lead in galvanizing the UN to find ways to end the tragic civil war.”

On August 14 1992, the Bush administration approved Operation Provide Relief; an emergency airlift of food to the hardest hit area of Bardhere located south of Mogadishu.

During the fall of 1992 conditions worsened in Somalia. The five hundred Pakistani UN troops remained “virtual hostages of the warlords” inside the Mogadishu Airport and the militias were preventing ships loaded with aid from docking. The U.S. recognized the need for an increased UN presence to provide security at key points of entry and for the many aid agencies attempting to operate inside the interiors of Somalia. President Bush and policy makers in the U.S. were also concerned about maintaining the UN’s credibility and capacity to execute peace enforcement in Somalia. Recognizing the UN Operation in Somalia efforts and the U.S. airlift efforts were failing to provide relief, policy makers provided President Bush three courses of action to considered. These were:

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25 Ibid., 3.

26 Walter Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 16.

27 Menkhaus, 6.
1. Continue the current course, although with more U.S. air and sealift.

2. Push the UN to increase troop numbers from 3500 to at least 10000. In this option the U.S. would provide logistical support units and deploy a Marine Amphibious Group as a deterrent.

3. A U.S. led, UN sponsored coalition, equal to a division and containing U.S. ground forces.

President Bush decided to execute option 3, but wanted U.S. troops replaced by UN Soldiers as quickly as possible. President Bush emphasized this point in a letter to Secretary Boutros-Ghali in which he argued for a specific mission for the coalition, “creating conditions that would allow starving Somalis to be fed and make possible the later transfer of this security function to UN peacekeeping force.” The U.S. would limit their efforts in Somalia to securing emergency food convoys and protecting UN agencies and NGOs.

On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 794 (1992). The UN “welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia” and authorized, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the use of “all necessary means” to do so.

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28 Poole, 21.

29 Ibid., 23.

30 Ibid., 10.

31 Department of Public Information, 5.
Bush immediately initiated *Operation Restore Hope*. The U.S. officially assumed the lead in what would be termed the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).\(^{32}\)

The first U.S. forces landed on the beaches of Somalia unopposed on 9 December 1992. In Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo, the arrival of UNITAF forces quickly quelled any disorder and food distribution was able to resume.\(^{33}\)

A point of friction between the U.S. and UN began to emerge over the disarming of the militias. Secretary Boutros-Ghali told President Bush on 8 December, that the militia’s heavy weapons needed to be neutralized, and gaining control over the militias arsenals was a requirement for stability and even suggested in a report to the Security Council that UNITAF either disarm all factions or at least confiscate heavy weapons.\(^{34}\) The U.S. policy was to establish weapons-free security zones, voluntary surrender of heavy weapons and only forcibly disarm when weapons might directly impede a humanitarian mission.\(^{35}\)

From a U.S. standpoint, the policy made sense. It reduced the possibility of U.S. casualties, limited the U.S. role to strictly humanitarian efforts and left the door open for a quick U.S. handover to the UN once humanitarian efforts were complete. From a multilateral perspective, the refusal to participate in disarmament of the militias complicated the UN’s ability to deal with the harder task of national reconciliation and nation building.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., 6.

\(^{33}\)Poole, 26.

\(^{34}\)Ibid., 27-28.

\(^{35}\)Ibid., 28.
While UNITAF disarmed and challenged some groups who were deemed to be a security threat the U.S. led effort mostly steered away from any provocative actions. Overall, UNITAF was successful in bring relief to the starving masses of Somalia because it was a well-armed and organized force with a limited mandate which did not upset the political balance, or the warlords.36

**UNOSOM II Assumes Responsibility**

By spring 1993, only a minority of the Somali population was suffering from starvation and violence has ceased in the capital.37 On 26 March, The UN Security Council approved Resolution 814 beginning the transfer of responsibility from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The mandate approved by the UN Security Council would increase the level of complexity of the mission in Somalia. UNOSOM II’s mission included restoring order to Somalia, disarming the militias and rebuilding the country’s economic and political systems.38

The U.S. involvement in UNOSOM II was reduced to 4000 personnel mainly tasked with providing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and logistical support. The Clinton administration took measures to try and bolster the capacity of UNOSOM II efforts. With PDD/NSC-6, President Clinton directed wide range support for the UN effort including, a program to collect heavy weapons, helping create a police force and committing Special Operations Forces (SOF) if required. Clinton also pressed other donor nations to make

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36Fleitz, 131.
37Ibid., 39.
38Ibid., 131.
good on their aid pledges and encouraged the UN to stay committed to nation building, and the restoration of essential public services.\(^{39}\)

The U.S. also contributed heavily to the leadership and staff of UNOSOM II. First, Admiral Howe assumed the duties of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Somalia. Additionally, several military and Foreign Service personnel joined the UN staff and Major General Thomas Montgomery assumed command of U.S. Forces Somalia and served as Deputy Force Commander of UNOSOM II.\(^{40}\)

By June 1993, a month after assuming control of the mission, UNOSOM II contained about eighteen thousand personnel from nineteen countries.\(^{41}\) Strains between member nations and peacekeeping forces and Somalis quickly emerged.\(^{42}\) The UN and many donor nations remained reliant on U.S. logistical support and Forces Command was manned at only twenty-two percent, and thereby the UN was already treading water a month into UNOSOM II.\(^{43}\)

In June, UN troops came under a complex attack from General Aideed’s militia in Mogadishu while attempting to conduct an announced inspection of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) weapons containment sites. Mohammed Farah Aideed mistakenly believed UNOSOM was attempting to shut down his radio transmitter and ordered the ambush. Twenty-three Pakistani Soldiers were killed and another fifty-nine were injured.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., 39.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., 37.

\(^{41}\)Poole, 41.

\(^{42}\)Ibid.

\(^{43}\)Ibid., 39.
The U.S. and UN leaders held a very strong conviction that Aideed needed to be forcefully dealt with.\textsuperscript{44} The UN Security Council quickly approved a hastily written Resolution 837 authorizing, “all necessary measures” against those responsible for the attacks.\textsuperscript{45} The resolution did not specify Aideed by name. Although the vote in the UN Security Council was unanimous, many would criticize the actions of a peacekeeping force declaring a local leader the enemy. According to former UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Brian Urquhart, The UN Security Council’s decision to target Aideed was:

Both the rhetoric and the action on this occasion were a radical departure from the cautious and carefully calibrated approach to peacekeeping crises in the past, when it had been considered both improper and unwise to risk intense popular hostility by attacking local leaders, however obnoxious. Traditional peacekeeping forces were not supposed to have enemies. There was no caution on this occasion, and Aideed was officially proclaimed the enemy.\textsuperscript{46}

On 8 June Special Representative Howe pushed the U.S. for a robust force package including an amphibious ready group, six attack helicopters, AC-130 gunships, a tank company and SOF. Howe received the amphibious ready group, AC-130s, eight attack and two observation helicopters, and riot control equipment. At the same time, UNOSOM was developing plans for offensive operations against Aideed’s weapon


\textsuperscript{45}Poole, 42.

\textsuperscript{46}Fleitz, 131.
storage sites and strongholds. Additionally, the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher suggested Aideed no longer be allowed to participate in the peace process.

“Mission Creep” Sets In

On June 11, U.S. led airstrikes targeted Aideed’s military installations, radio station and munitions dumps. On 12 July, a SNA command and control site was destroyed by U.S. QRF elements. The attack, which many UN partners viewed as too aggressive, killed elder clansmen belonging to Aideed’s Habr Gidr Clan. The operation inspired the SNA and by mid-July Aideed’s militia and UNOSOM forces were fighting almost daily. Aideed’s stock in Somalia had risen, and the UNOSOM II was losing credibility. In an effort to discredit Aideed, Special Representative Howe, after legal evaluation and consulting with UN leadership issued a warrant for Aideed arrest and a $25,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. The warrant and reward pushed Aideed into hiding. Howe advocated Aideed’s capture was the key to retuning normalcy to Mogadishu, and with support from Ambassador Robert Gosende, requested SOF to help capture Aideed. Opposed to the idea, General Hoar believed the likelihood of capturing Aideed would now be low since he went into hiding and along with General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed sending SOF to Somalia.

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47 Ibid., 40.
48 Ibid., 44.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 45.
As conditions worsened in Mogadishu, the debate on what to do with Aideed continued. On 16 August, with input from an interagency assessment team led by Ambassador David Shinn, the Deputies Committee agreed on a four point plan: continue to attempt to capture Aideed, pursue clan elders to arrange a forced exile for Aideed, capture Aideed’s key leadership, and urge the UN to plans for Aideed’s detention and trial. The committee did not recommend the deployment of any U.S. SOF to assist in the capture of Aideed.

In August, four U.S. soldiers were killed and ten injured by mines in Mogadishu. Three days after the third attack which wounded six U.S. soldiers U.S. SOF arrived in Somalia. Task Force Ranger consisted of 460 personnel; a company of Army Rangers, 16 SOF helicopters; 130 SOF personnel. Additionally, Secretary Aspin announced the U.S. QRF contingent would remain in Somalia until violence in Mogadishu subsided, militias turned in their heavy weapons and a national police force began operating.

By mid-September, President Clinton’s cabinet wanted renewed efforts on a political reconciliation and called for a fixed date for U.S. forces to be replaced by UN troops. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense recommended pressing the UN to seek a political solution in Somalia by isolating Aideed. The recommendation included a negotiated cease fire, the formation of a transitional council, and limiting the QRF’s role and by 1 January 1994 replacing the QRF.

\[51\text{Ibid.}, 47.\]
\[52\text{Ibid.}, 49.\]
\[53\text{Ibid.}, 19.\]
\[54\text{Ibid.}, 53.\]
both advocated negotiating a cease fire and attempt to achieve some sort of reconciliation by exiling Aideed. On 30 September, General Powell, in his last day as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Clinton that the situation in Somalia was unraveling and the U.S. and UN troops should be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{55} UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed concern with the sudden unilateral shift in U.S. policy citing a “U.S. reversal would undermine UN credibility in peace enforcement.”\textsuperscript{56} It looked like the U.S. was attempting to find its way out of Somalia or at least determine the direction it needed to go.

Unfortunately, U.S. Commanders in Somalia never received any change in guidance. In fact, in response to the dangerous mines and mortar attacks, Major General Montgomery requested additional assets in the form of a mechanized infantry company with a platoon of tanks and artillery.\textsuperscript{57} General Hoar opposed the deployment of these forces for fear of elevating Aideed’s status and increasing the U.S. footprint. When the request reached Secretary Aspin with General Powell’s approval the request was denied citing the administration’s change in perspective. Major General Montgomery’s request for mechanized forces was raised to the Chairman three times in eight days.\textsuperscript{58}

On 3 October a U.S. special operations force consisting of mainly Army Rangers fought a major engagement with Aideed’s militia inside Mogadishu. During the fight, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, 75 were wounded and a pilot of a Blackhawk helicopter shot

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 56.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 19.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 56.

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.
down during the engagement was captured by Aideed’s militia. Intense media coverage of the event, including video of the bodies of two U.S. Soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu inflamed international and domestic criticism for the operation in Somalia.

On the same day, the J5 submitted a paper commissioned by Rear Admiral Bowman recommending the majority of U.S. forces withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1994. The paper also recommended a cease fire with Aideed, establishment of a national police and justice system, an increase the UN troop strength in Somalia, replacement of all U.S. logistics troops with contractors, and further restrictions on the role of the U.S. QRF.59

After the battle, the domestic pressures on the administration to change course in Somalia was intense. It was clear the administration could not afford additional U.S. casualties and the public would need a clear end date for U.S. forces in Somalia. At the same time, President Clinton had to avoid the perception that the U.S. would back out of its commitments when faced with mounting casualties. On 7 October President Clinton announced to the world the U.S. would, “finish the work we set out to do” by increasing U.S. troop presence in Somalia by 5,300 and establishing a new diplomatic initiative focused on political settlement. The President also announced a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia by March 1994, only six months later.60

59Ibid., 57.

60Ibid., 22.
Following the U.S. example, every industrialized nation involved in Operation Restore Hope announced its withdrawal from Somalia leaving only underdeveloped nations and their ill equipped troops to support the UN.61

Future Impacts on Operations

Operation Restore Hope was thought to be a change in the way the world would respond to crisis. The Somali intervention was a test for multilateralism in a post-Cold War setting and an opportunity for the U.S. to empower the UN for future operations.

During the Somali crisis, President Clinton ordered a review of the U.S. policy concerning intervening in peacekeeping operations. The end result was PDD 25 which outlines specific guidelines for U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.

Research Question

The U.S. intent of assertive multilateralism was premised on the need to strengthen UN capabilities. The end result was a PDD aimed at clearly defining U.S. decision making on the support and participation of multilateral peace operations and, as stated by President Clinton, strengthen the support of the UN politically, militarily and financially.62 Did U.S. policy decisions during the Somali crisis strengthen UN capabilities to accomplish their mission in Somalia?

Significance of the Study

The likelihood of the U.S. to “go at it alone” in the future is low. The U.S. must continue to improve our ability to achieve our strategic and military objectives when

61Ibid., 24.

working with or through an international organization such as the UN. The degree of coordination required by the U.S. government and the military entities with other nations or coalitions in order to develop achievable objectives in line with both our national policies and long term strategies and those of our allies or partners is significant. As the world power the U.S. should be viewed as a leader within this regard.

Limitations

This thesis will remain focused on strategic policy decisions and military decisions made at the operational level of war. I will not examine the operational plan or tactical practices of the U.S. or UN forces during Operation Restore Hope unless they influenced a future policy decision. I will also not defend the policy decisions of the U.S. or UN.

Chapter 1 outlined the important significance of the U.S. working with international organizations like the UN in order to respond to future challenges as the world’s superpower. Chapter 2 will provide the reader the necessary literature review and a detailed background of the U.S. and UN response to the crisis in Somalia.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The development of this thesis requires detailed understanding of the circumstances leading up to and during the U.S. and UN intervention in Somalia, U.S. foreign policy prior to the crisis and the development of future U.S. policy. There is a large amount of information relevant to this thesis in the form of books, articles, historic policy papers and orders, academic works and interviews and firsthand accounts. In order to draw conclusions and analyze U.S. policy decisions during the Somalia crisis it becomes critical to provide the reader a brief, recent history of Somalia, a detailed account of the U.S. and UN mission in Somalia and the impact the Somali experience had on future U.S. policy concerning multilateral peace operations.

Somalia Background

In order to analyze the Somali crisis a study of Somalia and the complexities involved within the Somali society is required. *Somalia: A Country Study* published by The Federal Research Division provides both a historical and social account of Somalia. The handbook also provides insight into the Somali society, influence of colonialism, terrain, and economic and political systems of Somalia. Key to the research for this thesis is the understanding of the tribal structure and the importance it plays within Somali society. Additionally, the study provided contextual background on previous attempts by colonial powers to exert their influence on the complex Somali social and political structures. The study also provided an understanding of the geography and traditional sociological makeup of Somalia.
In order to understand the U.S. position on multilateral peace operations prior to and during the Somali crisis it was critical to review key national security documents, speeches, and interviews with senior government officials.

The 1993 National Security Strategy was developed by the Bush administration in 1992 and provides context in which to analyze the Bush administration’s decision to intervene in Somalia. The 1993 National Security Strategy stresses the importance of identifying and dealing with instability early in order to prevent conflict. It also stresses the importance the UN and outlines a series of actions the U.S. will take in order to strengthen the UN and increase their capabilities. Of note, the 1993 National Security Strategy also highlighted the importance of regional solutions for regional problems.

The 1994 National Security Strategy, entitled *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* provides context to the U.S. policy of multilateral operations under consideration for the Bush administration during the decision to intervene with U.S. ground forces in December 1992 in order to strengthen the UN position to address the humanitarian crisis which the UN was failing to have an impact on.

**U.S. Intervention in Somalia**

Two of the most thorough accounts of the U.S. experience in Somalia were produced by Walter Poole and Kenneth Allard. Colonel Kenneth Allard’s work, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* was produced for The Institute for National Strategic Studies and examined the operational lessons learned from a military strategic
perspective. Colonel Allard provided an exceptional analysis on the military’s difficult task in conducting strategic and operational level planning in order to meet policy aims. Walter Poole’s work, *The Effort to Save Somalia*, relied mostly on primary source interviews and Joint Staff documents to analysis the involvement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff in planning and directing operations in Somalia. Additionally, Poole’s work provides insight to both the Bush and Clinton’s administration’s decision making. Poole provides accounts of National Security Council meetings, opinions of key leaders and advisors within both administrations and context under which decisions were made.

Another work which provided a detailed account of the Somali crisis from a political, informational, military and economic perspective was John Hirsch and Robert Oakley’s *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. During the Somali crisis, Robert Oakley played a significant diplomatic role during key timeframes in the operation. Initially, Ambassador Oakley was appointed by President Bush as his special envoy to Somalia charged to coordinate all civilian activities in Somalia and provide diplomatic advice to UNITAF and liaison with the UN and NGOs working in Somalia. The book provides detailed information regarding key decisions made during the crisis and provides insight to the U.S. and UN relationship. Specifically, Hirsch and Oakley provide a detailed account and analysis of the friction involved in the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the impacts this had on the mission going forward.

Robert Baumann and Lawrence Yates provide a detailed account of the operations unfolding in Somalia throughout the crisis in their CSI publication, *My Clan Against the*
World: U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994. Baumann and Yates provide a contextual account of the events of operations being conducted by U.S. and coalition partners and the impacts of those operations on policy decisions. The book provided a detailed account of the issues involved in the decision to raid the Abdi House and the impact collateral damage had on the population and UNOSOM II’s efforts in Somalia at the time.

United Nations Interventionism 1991-2004, edited by Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides also provided a detailed account of crisis and concludes with a summary of the social and political conditions which made the UN mission almost impossible. The book provides a detailed analysis of the U.S. decision to withdraw from Somalia following the October 3 battle in Mogadishu.

The MMAS thesis “Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia,” by Major Vance J. Nannini, provides strategic context by applying the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability test to various policy decisions. “Centers of Gravity of United Nations Operation Somalia II,” by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Daze, in its chapter 2 identifies some key decisive points in the operation and discusses the implication of some mandates and strategy followed in the UN operations, providing information to analyze future policy decisions.

William Durch’s UN: Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s provides context to the development of President William Clinton’s multilateralism foreign policy. Specifically, the book provides an undetailed assessment of the crisis in Somalia and traces the administrations development process from the Presidential Review Directive 13, in which President Clinton ordered a comprehensive
review of peace-keeping operations and sought to chart a path for a long term capacity building effort of the UN peacekeeping capabilities. The book also provides insight into the development of the administrations changing relationship with the UN throughout the crisis.

*The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace* by Mark Bradbury is a detailed study commissioned by Oxfam with the intent of identifying practical recommendations for the peace-making process in Somalia. The study provided additional background information on the crisis, a summary of the major efforts made by UNOSOM and UNITAF to forge a peace and the author provides analysis and recommendations from a non-military and non-government prospective.

**Peacekeeping**

A key U.S. doctrine manual referenced during this study was the U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, published in 2012. The joint publication provides the current discussions of peace operations. Specifically, the publication captures the lessons learned by the U.S. military after the numerous operations other than war conducted during the 1990s. For this study, the publication provided the defining success factors or “essential elements” required for success during a peace operation; legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership of a peacekeeping force.63 These elements were used in order to provide the defined criteria used to answer the primary research question.

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Published in 1994, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* provides information pertaining to the legitimacy of a peace keeping force. Although the manual was released after the Somali crisis, the field manual captures many of the lessons from the U.S. perspective during Operation Restore Hope. Specifically, the field manual provides the military guidance for the conduct of peace operations. It specifically addresses the operational environment, related principles and fundamentals of planning peace operations. For this study I will use the manuals discussion on legitimacy and the four variables used to determine the legitimacy of a peace operations force: U.S. public, the indigenous population, leaders and forces and the international community. Also of importance to this study is the impartiality of a peacekeeping force. The manual addresses this issue in depth and provides guidance for peacekeeping forces on maintaining a balance of legitimacy and not showing favoritism to any particular leader, clan, or segment of the population.

Fredrick Fleitz’s, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests*, provided an informed historical critique of peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s. The book examines U.S. policy decisions regarding peacekeeping, the creation of PPD-25 and the long term impact failed peacekeeping operations will have on future U.S. policy decisions regarding peacekeeping. The work also provided additional information concerning the U.S. and UN operation in Somalia and the relationship between the U.S. and the UN during UNITAF.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict report entitled, *When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Intervention* prepared by Andrew Goodpaster examines the problems of using multinational forces to deal with
conflict and provides recommendations to improve future peacekeeping operations. Of particular use in this study is the recommendation for managing multinational forces and addressing three key areas: Command and Control, Intelligence and Logistics and recommendations on the use of force.

The National Defense University work *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, edited by Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic and Eliot Goldberg not only provided an additional historic overview of the crisis, but focused on the reestablishment of a Somali police force in order to establish and maintain security and the issues arising during the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

**Scholarly Articles and Newspapers**

*Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention* by Ken Menkhaus and Louis Ortmayer is a case study which outlines some of the key decisions made by the U.S. during the Somali crisis. The case study covers the U.S. response to the Somali famine, the decision to intervene, the parameters of the U.S. intervention, the reaction to the 5 June 1993 attack on UN peacekeepers and the U.S. response to the 3 October 1993 battle in Mogadishu where eighteen American soldiers were killed. The case study provides detailed accounts of discussions of key decisions makers in the Bush and Clinton administrations and outlines the options considered in response to the above mentioned decision points during the crisis. The work also provides a detailed historic account of the U.S. involvement in Somalia.

An additional primary source document is a UN Secretary-General Progress report submitted in January 1993 to the UN Security Council. The report provides a detailed account of the January Addis Ababa conference; to include a copy of the general
agreement signed by the Somali leadership, the cease fire agreement and modalities of
disarmament, and the agreement establishing of an ad hoc committee to continue efforts
to resolve questions concerning criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation
Conference. Additionally, the report provides an overview of the ongoing efforts of both
UNITAF and UNOSOM including the ongoing planning efforts for the transition from
UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

General Joseph Hoar’s “A CINC’s Perspective” published in *Joint Force
Quarterly*, provided supporting information regarding the U.S. strategy during Operation
Restore Hope and the relief efforts prior to the commitment of U.S. ground forces. The
article highlights many of the major issues UNITAF confronted during their operation
including operations, logistics and coalition management. Key to this thesis was General
Hoar’s discussion on the formation of the right force to accomplish the set objectives of
humanitarian relief. General Hoar also details the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM
II and the ways U.S. Central Command attempted to bridge the early capability gaps
present in the UNOSOM II staff.

Walter Clarke’s “Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia” argues that although
UNITAF military forces were successful in alleviating the humanitarian struggle in
Somalia, a failure at the political level to develop a strategy capable of building on the
military gains is what caused the UN failure in Somalia. Clarke argues the decision to
avoid disarmament and develop a clear political agenda for Somalia weighted the
heaviest burdens on success in Somalia. Clarke also provides a compact historical
narrative of the Somali crisis highlighting the major actions and political decisions made
during the operation and the impact they had on the operational environment. Clarke’s
conclusion states UNOSOM was unable to fill the political vacuum left by a mostly military focused UNITAF resulting in the unsatisfying results of Somalia.

John Bolton’s “Wrong Turn in Somalia” published in *Foreign Affairs* explores the notion that the without the support of the U.S., the UN will struggle to execute nation building. Bolton contrasts the Bush administration’s decision to limit the Somali intervention to a humanitarian mission despite encouragement from the UN to expand the mission to the Clinton administration’s assertive multilateralism approach and their support in the expansion of the UN mission resulting in the failed attempt to rebuild Somali. Key to this thesis was Bolton’s emphasis on the reliance of the UN on strong U.S. support in order to build an effective strategy to achieve its objectives.

Sara Sewall’s, *U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations* published by the Harvard Kennedy School, provides a detailed account of the Clinton administration’s experience with the Somali crisis and the details regarding the policy shifts which took place during the operation. Sewall provides detailed accounts of NSC meetings and discussions which took place within the Clinton Administration during the crisis providing insight to the mindset of the policy makers throughout the operation. Specifically, Sewall’s article explores development of PDD 25 and the role the U.S. experience played in shaping the change in the U.S. approach to future peace operations.

A key source in determining the overall legitimacy of the Somali operation was Carolyn Logan’s “U.S. Public Opinion and Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Interventions” published in the *Fletcher Forum* in 1996. Logan’s study provides a summary of the various public opinion polls taken throughout the Somali operation. The polling information detailed in her article provided a measure
for the overall legitimacy of the operation by measuring the support of the U.S. population. Key in Logan’s study were the touch points where her data intersected with the methodology within this thesis. Logan provided the public opinion information for the four major timeframes analyzed within this thesis allowing for a true measure of the legitimacy criteria for the U.S. public at the right timeframes within the operation.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s article “Empowering the United Nations” published in *Foreign Affairs* in the winter of 1992 argues the end of the Cold War has brought about an important time for the future of the UN. Boutros-Ghali argues for an expanded role for the UN in peacekeeping endeavors and calls on all participating members to commit to the strengthening of the UN. The article was key in the development of this thesis in that it established the U.S. and UN were in agreement on the need to strengthen the UN. Many of the proposals set forth by Boutros-Ghali were echoed in the U.S. National Security Strategy published around the same timeframe.

**Interviews and Presentations**

Major General Thomas Montgomery, the UNOSOM II Deputy Commander and Commandeer for all U.S. forces in Somalia provided primary source information during an interview with Frontline and a presentation he gave at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. Major General Montgomery’s major contribution to this thesis was his descriptions and analysis of the transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II and the relationship between UNOSOM II and the U.S. Special Operations Task Force, Task Force Ranger. Major General Montgomery provided insight into the difficulties the shortage of manpower, the lack of UN doctrine and the UNITAF rush to transition had on an effective transfer on authority. Additionally, Major General
Montgomery provided clarification on the command relationship verse the actual relationship UNOSOM II had with Task Force Ranger.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to answer the proposed research question: “did U.S. policy decisions during the Somali crisis strengthen UN capabilities to accomplish their mission in Somalia?” this chapter will outline the approach taken to analyze U.S. policy decisions during the Somali crisis in order to determine if the U.S. did, as stated the National Security Strategy, strengthen the UN during a multilateral peace operation.

Through an extensive review of primary sources, books, articles and firsthand accounts the author will conduct a study to align U.S. policy decisions in order to determine if the U.S. meet its strategic policy of strengthening the UN during the Somali crisis. U.S. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, sets forth the doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the U.S. forces during peace operations and provides the framework I will use in order to answer the research question.

Joint Publication 3-07.3 states peace operations are determined by a number of success factors as essential elements required for success during a peace operation; legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership of a peacekeeping force. Combined, these three elements aim to create a secure and stable environment to facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance while displaying a commitment to all involved in the success of the operation.

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Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Peace Operations* states legitimacy “is perceived by interested audiences as the legality, morality, or fairness of a set of actions. Such audiences may include the U.S. public, foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces.”\(^65\) JP 3-07.3 further goes on to state that if a peacekeeping force is perceived as legitimate the chances of long term success is more likely.\(^66\) Restricting the use of force, ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved and in the absence of a centralized government like in Somalia, ensuring a force does not legitimize non-recognized factions are all important factors in building and maintaining legitimacy during an operation and each presented a unique challenge to U.S. forces during the Somali crisis. For this study, the specific audiences determined critical to the peacekeeping force establishing its legitimacy is defined as the U.S. population, the international community and nations with commitments to the UN mission in Somalia.

The second “success factor” described in JP 3-07.3 is the credibility of a peacekeeping force. JP 3-07.3 describes credibility as “essential to ensure mission accomplishment. Credibility reflects the belligerents’ assessment of the capability of the force to accomplish its mission.”\(^67\) The JP further goes on to address the importance in the ways a peacekeeping force should perform their duties; “it must discharge its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its capabilities and commitment.”\(^68\) A critical element for a force to maintain credibility among the indigenous population and political

\(^65\)Ibid., I-6.

\(^66\)Ibid.

\(^67\)Ibid., I-4.

\(^68\)Ibid.
factions is its ability to act with impartiality throughout the operation. During the Somali crisis the U.S. and UN diplomats and military commanders struggled to navigate a complex network of clan politics in the absence of a central government in an effort to remain impartial. The Somali view of the U.S. as the dominant world power, and therefore, the strongest participant in the operation often placed the U.S. appointed special ambassador Robert Oakley at odds with his stated mission to coordinate civilian efforts in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Many of the clan leaders, to include Muhammad Aideed, sought out Oakley as their “principle interlocutor” when it came to large issues concerning Somali reconstruction possibly hurting the credibility of the UN. Credibility will be measured against the Somali population and clan and political leaders. Specifically, how U.S. decisions impacted their opinion on the capabilities and commitment of the UN to accomplish their mission in Somalia.

The third factor essential in the success of a peace operation is the promotion of national and local ownership. According to JP 3-07.3, “the establishment of governance and a workable administration leading to a civil society is the responsibility of the HN.” Since the ouster of Said Barre a working national government was absent in Somalia. An objective for the UN in Somalia was the reestablishment of a legitimate central government, but the ongoing clan violence was preventing both the process and potential leaders from establishing an interim government. According to JP 3-07.3, during a peace operation:

69Ibid., 18.


71Ibid., IV-8.
operation one of the early responsibilities of a peacekeeping force is to establish a security environment which would allow the creation of a stable government. For this study, the promotion of national and local ownership will be measured by how U.S. decisions impacted UN efforts to foster the formation of a central Somali government.

In order to determine if U.S. decisions increased the legitimacy and credibility of the UN operation and fostered the national reconciliation process I will examine four key strategic and operational decisions implemented by the U.S. during the operation in Somalia and weigh the second and third order effects of these decisions on key audiences in order to determine if in fact, the U.S. was effective in increasing the legitimacy of the UN. The four key strategic and operational decisions I will examine are:

1. President Bush’s November 1992 decision to commit U.S. land forces to Somalia,
2. The May 1993 transition from U.S. led UNITAF to UN led UNOSOM II,
3. Escalation of the mission from SCR 814 to SCR 837 following the attack on Pakistani UN soldiers,
4. The U.S. reaction following the 3 October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.

By focusing the analysis on the impact each decision had on reinforcing or obstructing the legitimacy, credibility of the UN and the creation of a centralized Somali government I can determine if in fact, U.S. decisions during the Somali crisis strengthened the UN.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In November 1992, President Bush took a major step by committing to lead an international force to include U.S. ground forces to support UN efforts in Somalia aimed at stop the widespread famine. UN efforts up to this point had failed to quell the violence inside Somalia and humanitarian conditions on the ground continued to worsen as the international media streamed video of violence and starvation to a sympathetic international audience.

Over the previous years, internal conditions in Somalia pushed the situation into an overwhelming humanitarian crisis that the UN and NGOs were unable to confront. Following the ouster of Said Barre, a new civil war erupted between rival militia leaders each seeing an opportunity to gain power and influence. Constant clan against clan violence raged across Somalia further intensifying the humanitarian suffering.

In late 1991, two clan leaders, once united against Said Barre, turned on one another and further complicated the situation in Somalia. Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aideed were both respected leaders inside of Somalia, and without a national government, clan politics was the only basis for power. Both men laid claim to their right to lead Somalia and both men commanded capable and well-armed militias willing to fight for their leader. In November 1991 the two forces clashed in a violent battle for Mogadishu. Throughout November and December the damage inflicted on the

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72 Hirsch and Oakley, 42.

73 Ibid., 16.
capital city was massive and destroyed the already fragile infrastructure.\textsuperscript{74} By the end of 1991 it was estimated the civil war caused over 20,000 casualties, 600,000 refugees and several hundred thousand displaced persons.\textsuperscript{75}

In January 1992, in response to requests from the Organization of Islamic Countries, the incoming UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, already deeply concerned about the situation in Somalia dispatched a UN representative to Somalia on a fact finding mission. The goal of the mission was to determine if the faction leaders would accept UN mediation efforts.\textsuperscript{76} The fact finding mission quickly revealed Aideed, unlike Al Mahdi (who welcomed UN intervention), was opposed to UN intervention. Aideed feared a UN cease fire would negate the military advantage he held over his rivals, further complicating his efforts to gain power. Aideed also held a strong personal contempt for Egyptian Boutros-Ghali whom, “he considered responsible for Egypt’s strong support of Said Barre” during Boutros-Ghali’s term as Egypt’s minister of state for foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite Aideed’s misgivings, both faction leaders agreed to a UN brokered cease fire in February 1992. Although UN efforts reduced violence in the capital it led to some unintentional consequences. By focusing on Al Mahdi and Aideed, the UN increased their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and at the same time, by all but ignoring the other faction leaders, further complicated future efforts to reach a

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., 19.
national consensus. An additional unwanted result of the UN effort was an escalation in the feud between Al Mahdi and Aideed as they competed for control of Mogadishu. The cease fire also failed to improve the humanitarian situation. Food aid was still being looted by faction leaders and NGOs continued to struggle to provide relief to the starving Somalis across the country. The UN responded by passing resolution 733.

United Nations Resolution 733, passed in January 1992, was intended to increase the levels of humanitarian aid. By April 1992, despite UN efforts to coordinate with the NGOs and faction leaders throughout Somalia the efforts were seen as a failure. By the summer of 1992 massive media coverage of the crisis exposed the U.S. population to images of starving Somali women and children and militias stealing and preventing international aid from reaching those in need. In the U.S., pressure from the American people, aid agencies and Congress pushed for the Bush Administration to do something in Somalia. In August 1992, President Bush met with his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and decided on a “flooding strategy.” By committing U.S. military aircraft to transport relief supplies directly to the hardest hit areas of Somalia President Bush hoped to bypass the overland routes denied to the current relief agencies and quickly provide relief to starving Somali people. In addition, the U.S. would provide the strategic transportation for five hundred Pakistani troops who would serve as UN troops inside Mogadishu.

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78 Ibid., 20.
79 Ibid.
80 Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2.
81 Ibid., 4.
Unfortunately, the airlift fell short in providing famine relief and only heightened clan violence in the areas targeted for relief. The airlift was planned to only be a temporary solution until the UN could establish security and facilitate ground delivery of aid supplies. Without security, food aid was quickly intercepted by militias. In one area, two militias battled over a town targeted by the airlift ceasing all flow of aid to the area. With continued mounting pressure from both the American public and the international community, President Bush and his administration were forced to consider an escalation in effort in order to further prevent a humanitarian disaster in Somalia.

Throughout the fall of 1992 the situation continued to deteriorate in Somalia. A UN reference paper published in April 1993 described the situation in the fall of 1992, Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of the United Nations troops to secure the delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put in danger.

The success of any UN mission in Somalia was clearly in jeopardy and the Somali population continued to suffer. The decision to consider U.S. ground forces was motivated by the realization that the meager UN force would never be capable of providing the necessary security in and

\[82\text{Ibid., 6.}\]

around the port and airport.\textsuperscript{84} A second concern was the difficulty the UN would have in expanding or recruiting any additional donor nations for the mission. In November, President Bush requested his staff to provide three policy options for Somalia.\textsuperscript{85} After heavy debate the following three options were presented to the President by the National Security Council:

1. Continue the current course, although with more U.S. air and sealift.

2. Push the UN to increase troop numbers from 3500 to at least 10000. In this option the U.S. would provide logistical support units and deploy a Marine Amphibious Group as a deterrent.

3. A U.S. led, UN sponsored coalition, equal to a division and containing U.S. ground forces.

On 25 November, despite interagency support for an option which limited U.S. intervention to a mere five thousand personnel aimed at filling the security gap before UN forces could be increased, President Bush decided on a full scale intervention consisting of 28,000 U.S. troops. This option not only provided the U.S. with a “decisive advantage,” but it fell within the parameters of the U.S. policy to strengthen the UN. The option would also be carried out under a UN mandate and the strong contribution of U.S. military resources would significantly increase the ease in which other contributing nations could be recruited.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally, the U.S. wanted the operation to be conducted

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 8.
under a UN mandate in order to increase the legitimacy of the mission and pave the way for a quick transition to a UN led effort.

Security Council Resolution 794 passed the UN Security Council on 3 December 1992 authorizing the transfer of control of the Somali mission to UNITAF. On 4 December, President Bush defined UNITAF’s mission to the people of the United States:

First we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once we have created the secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. . . . We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.

President Bush clearly outlined a limited humanitarian focused mission; one that would bring domestic and international support but also caused the UN immediate concern for the longer term mission in Somalia.

The U.S. decision to commit ground forces into Somalia was viewed by the U.S. population in a positive manner increasing the level of legitimacy of the UN operation. A New York Times—CBS poll taken immediately following President Bush’s decision to commit U.S. troops to Somalia found 81 percent of those interviewed agreed “the U.S. is doing the right thing in sending troops to Somalia to make sure food gets to the people there,” while 70 percent agreed that the task was even worth possible American lives. Although the majority of the U.S. population was in support of the operation it was also

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87 Hirsch and Oakley, 177.
88 Durch, 320.
89 Ibid.
wary of a long term commitment to Somalia. In the above poll, only 44 percent of Americans believed the U.S. should stay long enough to ensure Somalia remained peaceful.90

The U.S. also received broad support from the international community. Ken Menkhaus and Louis Ortmayer state, “Most, though not all, international NGOs operating in Somalia came out in support of intervention.”91 Within the UN, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Perkins met with several members of the Security Council, the secretary general and select others from Africa and NATO. The overall consensus was widespread support within the international community for intervention. President Bush also made personal phone calls to multiple heads of states in order to obtain pledges for troop support. All but the United Kingdom agreed to donate forces to the efforts in Somalia.92 After the U.S. commitment to send troops to Somalia nearly three dozen other states pledged to join UNITAF.93 Clearly, the international community believed U.S. efforts go be legitimate.

Although the domestic and international support provided an increased level of legitimacy to the UN, the U.S. decision to limit its objectives to a humanitarian effort damaged the credibility of the longer term UN mission. By adopting a U.S. policy limited to humanitarian relief UNITAF would choose to place forces in only a portion of Somalia and limit their role to providing only enough security to facilitate humanitarian relief in

90Ibid.
91Menkhaus, 2.
92Hirsch and Oakley, 44-45.
93Durch, 320.
those areas. Furthermore, the U.S. refused to initiate or participate in any effort to disarm the militias for fear of retaliation by the warlords and risking U.S. casualties and their ability to execute their primary mission of humanitarian relief. Although U.S. strategy would produce a successful relief of the humanitarian crisis, the policy would not support longer term objectives of rebuilding the destroyed Somali political system. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed concern over UNITAF’s limited mandate. The UN mandate clearly gave UNITAF the authority to use any means necessary to bring about the favorable conditions desired in Somalia, but in the eyes of the UN, the U.S. limited objectives sent a message to the Somali factions that UNITAF was not interested in dealing with the underlying issues in Somalia.94

A crucial issue of disagreement between the U.S. and UN was disarmament of the militias. Somalia was saturated with weapons; most controlled by the various warlords, who were unlikely to agree to a voluntary disarmament effort and many argued the U.S. was the only force who possessed the strength to disarm the militias.95 In order to reduce future UN risk, Boutros-Ghali wanted UNITAF to disarm the militias. The UN believed disarmament was an essential step in the long term effort to unify Somalia and reestablish a legitimate political process through reconciliation and an open political process. In a New York Times article, Boutros Boutros-Ghali is quoted, “Disarmament is very important to provide the security which will allow us to replace the unified command with a peacekeeping operation. The point of view of the UN, the point of view of the

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94Durch, 321.

95Menkhaus, 11.
Security Council, is disarmament is a prerequisite.”96 The UN also argued UNITAF was strong enough to conduct a widespread disarmament campaign and doing so would enhance the long term credibility of the mission.

The U.S. believed any effort to forcibly disarm the militias would result in U.S. casualties and risk the overall intent of the mission to provide humanitarian relief. Statements from inside Somalia from Warlords like Aideed furthered the belief any attempt to disarm or marginalize any group would likely result in a greater risk to UNITAF forces on the ground. A representative of Aideed said during a national reconciliation meeting, “the moment he (Aideed) believes they are favoring other clans over his (Aideed); it will be open season on Americans here in Mogadishu. This is a very dangerous game to be playing, because it’s very difficult to be evenhanded in Somalia.”97 Aideed’s financial backer, Osman Atto, further explained the dangers of disarmament by UNITAF explaining Somali police should handle any disarmament, not the UNITAF force.98 Again, Although the UN mandate establishing UNITAF provided the U.S. with the authority to conduct any necessary measure to secure Somalia, the stated U.S. policy to limited their objectives to humanitarian relief would only produce a limited form of disarmament in specific areas of Somalia; none of which having any long term impact on the ability of militia leaders like Aideed to maintain their heavy arms.

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97 Menkhaus, 11.

98 Ibid.

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President Bush’s condition that the U.S. forces be replaced as quickly as possible by a UN force was also a very contentious point between the U.S. and the UN. The UN opposed the idea of quickly replacing the U.S. led mission with a larger UN force. A major concern for the UN was taking over the mission with the militias still having their large cache of weapons leaving the UN “holding the Bag” and responsible for disarming the militias in addition to assuming a larger mission scope with less personnel than UNITAF. Of particular concern was Aideed who was “vehemently opposed to any UN-led operation.” Aideed welcomed the U.S. led force and the UN believed Aideed was simply waiting out the U.S. who did not present a threat to his power and preparing to violently disrupt the longer term UN mission. Boutros-Ghali realized the UN lacked the command and control structure, the forces or the doctrine to confront an opposed opposition while attempting to rebuild Somalia.

In summary, President Bush’s decision to intervene in Somalia had both positive and negative impacts on the longer term UN mission. The initial support of the American and international community brought an increase in legitimacy to the mission. Additionally, the large U.S. military force combined with a robust support from donor nations provided a high amount of credibility to the mission. Unfortunately, U.S. policy decisions limiting the role of UNITAF to a humanitarian mission and refusal to


100 Menkhaus, 12.

101 Durch, 321.
participate in any disarmament campaign weakened credibility of the force and created an
environment which facilitated a wait it out mentality by the militia leaders.

A Push for Transition

UNITAF’s Operational plan was divided into four phases. Phase one focused on
establishing basing, securing Baidoa and securing routes for the push of humanitarian aid
into and out of the Mogadishu port and airport. Phase two focused on expanding the use
of ports and airfields, establishing security in the Somali interior to set conditions for
additional aid distribution sites; and adding additional bases in Gialalassi, Bardera, Belet
Weyn and Oddur. Phase three focused on securing the southern town of Kismayo. Phase
four was the handoff to the UN. In all, the UNITAF planners estimated a total of 240
days were required until the mission could be handed over to the UN. 102

The first UNITAF units arrived on the beaches of Mogadishu on 9 December and
were greeted by a large contingent of reporters. The initial units quickly secured the
Mogadishu airport and port and then an airstrip in Baledogle. UNITAF had secured their
initial objectives without any interference from the militia which is credited by some to
Robert Oakley who, as the U.S. special Ambassador to Somalia, arrived a few days
before the military landings and met with Aideed and Al Mahdi to petition their
cooperation. Both leaders utilized their influence to ensure U.S. forces would land
unopposed. Aideed even made public statements welcoming UNITAF. 103 Others would

102 Durch, 322.

103 Hirsch and Oakley, 54.
criticize Oakley’s decision to meet with Aideed and Al Mahdi believing the meeting legitimized the two warlords in the eyes of the international community.  

On 11 December Oakley and LTG Johnston invited Aideed and Al Mahdi to meet with them and the UN representative, Ismat Kittani. The meeting was the first time the two faction leaders would meet following the outbreak of the civil war.  

The meeting underscored the importance the U.S. placed on a secure and cooperative environment to the success of the mission. The meeting was a surprising success. The two leaders developed and signed a seven-point agreement establishing a cease-fire between the two groups and an agreement to move all heavy weapons outside the city into cantonment areas. The meeting signaled the U.S. was willing to work with the militia leaders to help establish a secure environment by bargaining a partial disarmament, but it also represented a possible missed opportunity. Aideed and Al Mahdi were clearly willing to work with UNITAF and their agreement to store their heavy weapons could have been a stepping stone in a larger disarmament campaign.

The agreement between the two combatants marked an early success for UNITAF. Not only did the agreement assist in the establishment of a secure environment in and around Mogadishu, but it set the stage for the longer term issue of political reconciliation.  

Another major step in reconciliation was the establishment of a joint security committee. The security committee was used by the factions to discuss and

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105 Baumann and Yates, 40.

106 Hirsch and Oakley, 55.
resolve issues. Meetings would occur on almost a daily basis and many times only attended by Somalis encouraging open dialogue and problem resolution; Somalis solving Somalis problems. The formation of the joint security committee did enhance the UN ability to promote local and national ownership by the Somali leadership. Security was a paramount first step in the furthering of national political reconciliation and the joint security committee established a forum that could transition to a larger forum for discussions on larger subjects outside of the security realm.

The UNITAF, after discussions with key NGOs, divided Somalia into eight humanitarian relief sectors which reflected the hardest hit areas by the famine and in the most urgent need of relief. The area only encompassed about a third of the country, but the northeast of the country and the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland were not suffering as much as the people in the south.107 Although UNITAF planners estimated it would take almost sixty days to occupy all eight humanitarian relief sectors they completed deployment to all eight sectors by late December. Prior to the movement of UNITAF troops into a humanitarian relief sector, Oakley or a representative would arrive and meet with leaders and representatives to explain UNITAF’s objectives and hear any concerns of the population.108 The practice was successful and once military commanders arrived they assumed responsibility to work with local leaders to address the security and humanitarian needs.

The UNITAF also established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) inside the UNOSOM headquarters. The CMOC had two very important impacts on the

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107 Ibid., 65.
108 Ibid., 71.
legitimacy of the UN mission. First, the CMOC established an immediate working relationship with the NGOs inside Somalia. The CMOC held almost daily meetings attended by, “nearly 100 participants from UN agencies, the International Red Cross, and other NGOs, as well as representatives from UNITAF headquarters and representatives for each of the eight humanitarian relief sectors.” The purpose of the meetings was to share information on security and operations and coordinate for future operations to include coordination for protection of aid convoys moving from the airports or ports.

The second function of the CMOC was to provide an early working relationship with the members of UNOSOM. UNITAF recognized the UN as the coordinator for relief operations and by standing up the CMOC inside the UN headquarters it provided the perception to both the NGOs and the Somalis that the UN was largely involved in the coordination for relief operations.

The CMOC established by UNITAF provided instant legitimacy to the UN by influencing the perceptions of the NGOs so critical to the long term success of the operation and the Somali people. Additionally, the coordination for security and protection for the movement of aid and the increased security for aid workers provided credibility to the mission in the eyes of the Somali population and the warlords. The CMOC was instrumental in relieving the humanitarian crisis and providing information from trusted agents on the ground to not only the needs of the population, but also a gauge to security situation throughout the country. The CMOC was a key component to the success of UNITAF in coordinating and synchronizing efforts across all of Somalia.

Additionally, the interaction between UNITAF, UNOSOM, NGOs and other major organizations was critical to the success of the mission.

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109Ibid., 67.
contributors to the efforts in Somalia provided a venue that could facilitate a seamless transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM leadership.

In January and March 1993 the UN attempted to build on the momentum created by UNITAF by hosting two conferences in Addis Ababa. The January conference resulted in many useful proposals in terms of disarmament and reconstruction and resulted in an agreement for another conference in March. The ceasefire and disarmament agreement signed during the January conference was supported by UNITAF, but the UN’s willingness to recognize its own responsibility in the task was slow to emerge. Although Lieutenant General Johnston made it clear that UNITAF forces were prepared to start implementing the disarmament plan, UN official Mr. Shaheen and Mr. Kittani in mid-February, “flatly rejected any UN responsibility for cease-fire or disarmament” citing the role of UNOSOM in Somalia was suspended as long as UNITAF operated.\textsuperscript{110} The disagreement was eventually worked out in March, but U.S. forces were preparing for transitioning responsibility back over to the UN and were reluctant to take on additional responsibility.

Before it began, the March Addis Ababa conference drew criticism because the fifteen signatories at the conference were warlords which would further legitimize them in the eyes of the international community. In an effort to quell this concern a large number of Somali intellectuals, clan leaders, religious leaders and women were invited to participate in the conference.\textsuperscript{111} The conference reaffirmed January 1993 agreements on a general cease fire and disarmament, and the formation of a Transitional National Council

\textsuperscript{110}Hirsch and Oakley, 95.

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
The agreement called for the creation of the TNC by July 1993 and once formed, the structure would be in place for two years.\textsuperscript{112}

A major criticism of the Addis Ababa agreement was it lacked an appropriate timeline and structured mechanisms to implement the agreements. These reasons alone handicapped the UN’s ability to build off the peace conference. Additionally, the disagreements between the UN and the UNITAF over enforcement mechanisms for disarmament hindered the long term prospects of bringing to fruition the signed agreements. In the past it was evident the reputation of UNITAF and the coercion of force was required to ensure the faction leaders remained true to their word, but with the U.S. pressing for a quick handover to the UN the chance of successfully implementing the signed agreements looked slim.

As the transition progressed, UNOSOM was clearly not manned and equipped as well as the UNITAF forces reducing the credibility of the force. Additionally, the under manned political staff of Admiral Howe struggled to work through the initial disagreements over the final agreements of the Addis Ababa conference. The UN only recognized the agreement that materialized out of the formal sponsored conference and not the amended agreements made in the days following the conference by the faction leaders. This disagreement placed the UN and the faction leaders immediately at odds over the Addis Ababa agreement putting the UN at a disadvantage when it came to assisting the political reconciliation process.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 24.
The UNITAF was sold to the American public as a short term humanitarian operation and the new Clinton administration was pushing for a transition to the UN. The mission in terms of easing humanitarian suffering and establishing a secure environment was a success. The U.S. successfully coordinated reconciliation efforts between the primary belligerents in Mogadishu, established an effective means of communication between Somalis in the form of a joint security council, and built an efficient civil-military coordination center in the form of a CMOC to coordinate future operations. Unfortunately, the limited mandate, short term focus and failure to recognize the limited capabilities of the UN impeded the continued success during and after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

The reality was multiple factors were influencing the efficient handover of the mission to the UN. First, UNITAFs sheer military capability could not be matched by the small number of UNOSOM II contributing nations. UNITAF was manned at the equivalent of three U.S. divisions. The UN force was a little more than five brigades when it assumed control of Somalia and was still awaiting the arrival of an Indian brigade. Second, UNITAFs unwillingness to expand their mission in scope and breadth severely hampered the credibility of the mission in the eyes of Somali faction leaders who knew the UN would lack the teeth to respond militarily once the U.S. forces left. The UN repeatedly pushed the U.S. to expand the geographic span of their operations and conduct an ambitious disarmament campaign. The UN, understanding the scope of a new mandate, was concerned that once the U.S. military left, the security situation would
quickly deteriorate leaving an incapable UN force to try and bring order. An expanded effort by UNITAF would have required additional forces and more time to accomplish the mission.

In January 1993, LTG Johnston provided a briefing to the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and recommended a broad outline for the planning process for the eventual transition. Johnston recommended the approval of a force commander and the deployment of a UN planning team to begin the planning process. Unfortunately, the UN did not dispatch a planning team and the naming of Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir as the force commander did not take place until late February. General Bir would travel to Somalia to meet with UNITAF staff in the months leading up to the transition, but he would not arrive in a full time capacity until March. Additionally, the UN Secretariat was not given authorization to start the planning process until March.

The number of UN forces replacing UNITAF was also a major roadblock in the planning process which threatened to immediately undermine the credibility of UNOSOM II. UNITAF could not develop a detailed plan for force deployments until the number of UN forces and equipment was determined. Despite UN and U.S. leadership approaching donor nations, commitments for UNOSOM II were hard to come by. Many of the successful contributors during UNITAF like the Australians and Canadians choose not to stay past June 1993. Other nations like France and Belgium, who maintained brigade sized forces in Somalia shifted their political focus to Bosnia and Rwanda. Of the countries that did contribute forces an argument can be made as to the legitimacy of those

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113 Ibid., 103.

114 Ibid., 108.
forces based on both their past relationship with Somalia and their performance during
UNITAF. Italy once colonized Somalia, Nigeria provided refuge to Said Barre and the
Pakistani performance during UNOSOM I was anything but credible.\textsuperscript{115} Additionally, the
high security threat inside Somalia hampered efforts to recruit civilian UN workers to
assist in some of the key reconstruction efforts.\textsuperscript{116}

The U.S. intended to provide support to UNOSOM II in the form of 4,000 support
troops and a small Quick Reaction Force. Of significance, the U.S. provided Major
General Montgomery as the UN deputy commander, a 1400 man quick reaction force in
the form of a Marine Expeditionary Unit and an American, Admiral Jonathan Howe
would replace Kittani as the UN representative to Somalia.\textsuperscript{117} Despite Howe’s impressive
defense resume, he was not a diplomat and would maintain strong ties back to
Washington and eventually causing confusion within the U.S., UN and Somali factions
on who Howe represented.\textsuperscript{118} Throughout his tenure, Howe would repeatedly look back
to the U.S., not the UN to provide key personalities for his staff and to source military
requirements.

On 26 March 1993 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 814 under a
Chapter VII charter. The resolution officially expanded the UN mission from the
previous UNITAF mandate opening the door for as Madeleine Albright stated, “an

\textsuperscript{115}Durch, 335.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., 109-110.

\textsuperscript{118}Hirsch and Oakley, 113.
unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.119

The actual handover of responsibility experienced flaws at the military and diplomatic levels. Many of contributing nations’ troops had yet to arrive by 4 May and many that were present lacked sufficient equipment like body armor or armored personnel carriers to protect troops from small arms fire. Upon assumption of the mission, UNOSOM forces consolidate the nine humanitarian relief sectors into five areas of responsibilities covering just over forty percent of Somalia.120 Unfortunately, the UNOSOM II’s staff was short on both personnel and experience. In fact, in an interview, MG Montgomery revealed the UNOSOM II staff was only filled at 30 percent authorized strength at the time of the 4 May transition.121 Time was needed to develop the working knowledge of the complexities involved in executing such a broad mission under such adverse conditions. The timing of UNITAF forces leaving Somalia and UNOSOM II forces arriving did not always allow for a proper handover of information. This “gap” created voids forcing UNOSOM II forces, both staff members and ground forces, to learn some of the same hard lessons learned by UNITAF over its time in Somalia. There was also a strong amount of animosity between the departing UNITAF staff and UNOSOM over what the UNITAF staff perceived as a time constraint due to the lack of staff

119 Ibid., 111.

120 Durch, 338.

members arriving in support of UNOSOM II. Combined with the extreme pressure applied by the U.S. for UNOSOM to take the mission the situation became unpleasant.

From a diplomatic perspective the transfer of authority to UNOSOM II was awash with complications. Admiral Howe’s UNOSOM II staff was even smaller than the military contingent and manned at only 15 percent on 4 May.\textsuperscript{122} Howe even reached back to the U.S. for assistance in manning his staff. Militarily the forces under UNOSOM control lacked the ability to enforce the disarmament agreements.

The UNOSOM II was also presented with a difficult situation when it came to assisting the Somalis reestablish a functioning government. The Security Council Resolution 814 enforcement power lay primarily with military matters and lacked any enforcement power for UNOSOM II officials to assist in the reconciliation process.\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, divergent views on UNOSOM II’s political mandate and the scope the UN had in assisting the Somalis in their efforts for national reconciliation were formed. Further complicating the diplomatic avenue was at the same time the UN Security Council was passing Resolution 814, the Somali faction leaders were meeting in Addis Ababa for the March reconciliation conference. At the end of the formal conference an agreement was signed on 27 March calling for a two-year transitional period where a Transitional National Council would run the country. The agreement provided for a specific process for choosing the members of the council ensuring the factions would not have the only

\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid.}

Following the end of the formal conference, faction leaders remained in Addis Ababa and continued their discussions. On 30 March, the faction leaders signed an additional document overriding many of the principles agreed upon in the 27 March document. Specifically, the document specified all representatives of the Transitional National Council would be determined by the faction leaders. The document also removed the requirement for women as members of the Transitional National Council. UNOSOM II would never recognize the 30 March document as a formal agreement and choose to only recognize the 27 March document, which according to a UN investigation resulted in conditions being “set for clashes between UNOSOM II and some of the Somali political groups.”

General Montgomery, when describing the UNOSOM II mission, commented the UN nation building mission “was not in the best interest of the warlords, who wanted, each of them, to control, and of course Aideed was the strongest of the warlords.”

In summary, the flawed handover from UNITAF to UNISOM did not strengthen the ability of the UN to conduct multilateral operations. The fault lies with both U.S. and UN policies which created a situation that where the credibility of the UN force was in question. The UN mandate creating UNOSOM II was bold. The mandate called for the UN to conduct nation building inside Somalia, but the means applied to the strategy were clearly not enough to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the staff and ground forces

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124 Ibid., 16.
125 Ibid., 17.
126 Ibid.
127 Baumann and Yates, 105.
the UN secured prior to the start of their assumption of responsibility were inadequate. In May, when UNOSOM II assumed the lead from UNITAF, their military and civilian staffs were manned at 23 percent and 21 percent. Additionally, the UN ground forces were under trained, under manned and under equipped to take on the violent militias. Clearly, the UN immediately lacked the credibility of a force capable of accomplishing its mission.

A Road to Confrontation

UNOSOM II officially assumed the mission on 4 May 1993. Conditions were ripe for a confrontation between UNOSOM II forces and Aideed. In addition to the mistrust Aideed held for the UN leadership, he also began to believe UNOSOM II was biased against his efforts. First, a meeting chaired by U.S. Foreign Service officers assigned to UNOSOM II held a meeting in Mogadishu with prominent lawyers with the aim of reestablishing the country’s judiciary system. Aideed, with support from UNITAF had already nominated and appointed judges which were presiding over the rudimentary courts system. Aideed felt the UNOSOM meeting was an attempt to take away the authority of the Transitional National Council to appoint judges; a point agreed upon during Addis Ababa. Additionally, Aideed perceived the event as a deliberate attempt by UNOSOM to reduce his power.

In May, Aideed organized a peace conference in Mogadishu to discuss the situation in central Somalia. Aideed envisioned UNOSOM supporting the event with

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128 Hirsch and Oakley, 116.

logistical and security resources and invited Admiral Howe to open the meeting. As UNOSOM learned of the meeting there was concern, specifically from Ambassador April Glaspie, that Aideed was using the conference to further his own agenda. In response, UNOSOM II attempted to replace Aideed with former Somali President Alman Abdalla Osman, an open critic of Aideed, as the lead presider of the Conference. Second, UNOSOM attempted to expand the agenda of the conference to discuss the security concerns ongoing in Kismayo. Aideed argued and believed UNOSOM II was overstepping its bounds by interfering with the political process.

The conference was held and UNOSOM successfully prevented Aideed from influencing the other faction leaders, but the situation only increased the tensions between Aideed and UNOSOM II. In response, Aideed targeted UNOSOM II in a hostile information campaign through Aideed’s Radio Mogadishu. The messages broadcasted to the Somali population painted both UNOSOM II and the U.S. as aggressors attempting to recolonize Somalia. UNOSOM grew increasingly concerned with the negative perceptions generated from the broadcasts leading to Admiral Howe attempting to convince Aideed to stop the broadcasts. Additionally, by controlling the Radio Mogadishu, UNOSOM II believed Aideed held an unfair advantage over his political rivals and many among UNOSOM leadership advocated taking Radio Mogadishu off the air.

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130 Ibid., 19.
131 Ibid., 20.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
At the same time, the Pakistani force now charged with patrolling Mogadishu was seen as a much less credible force compared to the U.S. Marines they replaced. The Pakistani contingent lacked both personnel and equipment and their lack of effectiveness provided an opportunity for Aideed to begin movement of his heavy weapons back into the city.\(^{134}\)

In accordance with the January Addis Ababa agreements, Radio Mogadishu was declared a SNA authorized weapons storage site. On 3 June 1993 intelligence indicated Aideed’s militia was moving weapons out of their containment sites. Admiral Howe directed an inspection of both Aideed’s and Al Mahdi’s sites and instructed two U.S. Army officers serving with UNOSOM II to provide Aideed’s SNA with a twelve hour notice of inspection for six of their authorized weapons storage sites.\(^{135}\) Included on the list of sites to be inspected was Radio Mogadishu all but confirming Aideed’s suspicions that UNOSOM was going to silence Radio Mogadishu. The response from the SNA representative after reading the notification was if UNOSOM II insisted on conducting the inspections it would “lead to a war.”\(^{136}\)

On 5 June at 0830 a Pakistani led inspections team arrived at Radio Mogadishu to begin their inspection. In response, the SNA conducted two ambushes against UNOSOM forces. The first attacked occurred on 21 October Road on a company sized Pakistani element. The second attack was against Pakistani soldiers guarding a feeding site. By the end of day, 24 Pakistani troops were dead, 57 injured and six were captured. One

\(^{134}\)Hirsch and Oakley, 116.

\(^{135}\)Durch, 342.

captured soldier would die while in captivity.\textsuperscript{137} Italian and U.S. forces also experienced injuries.\textsuperscript{138} Many of the bodies of the dead soldiers were mutilated by angry Somali mobs.\textsuperscript{139}

The attack on 5 June showed the inability of UNOSOM II forces to confront the dangerous conditions present in Somalia, reducing the overall credibility of UNOSOM. According to the UN Commission of Inquiry report the attack demonstrated, “the inadequacy of the military equipment and lack of preparedness of UNOSOM II forces.”\textsuperscript{140} Clearly, the armed Somali factions were not intimidated by UNOSOM II’s military capability. Aideed’s willingness to openly confront and attack the UNOSOM II force was evidence he believed the credibility of the UN force, without the heavy U.S. military presence, was in question. In a 9 July UNOSOM enemy assessment the reality of the situation was clearly stated, “The general population in Mogadishu is slowly losing confidence in the ability of UNOSOM II forces to protect them.”\textsuperscript{141}

In response to the 5 June attacks on UNOSOM II forces the UN Security Council approved Resolution 837 directing UNOSOM II to, “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks.” Additionally, Resolution 837 recognized UNOSOM’s shortcomings and called for the rapid deployment of all remaining UNOSOM II forces.

\textsuperscript{137}Baumann and Yates, 108.

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid., 24.

\textsuperscript{139}Hirsch and Oakley, 118.


\textsuperscript{141}Baumann and Yates, 116.
The resolution also placed the blame for the attacks squarely on the shoulders of Aideed. The resolution indicated the attacks on 5 June were “launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (U.S.C/SNA),” and although the report never named Aideed specifically it was abundantly clear who the UN believed to be the number one enemy in Somalia.\textsuperscript{143}

In response to their new found Resolution, UNOSOM II took up the offensive against Aideed and his militia. On 17 June, after Aideed refused the idea of an independent inquiry into the 5 June attacks, Admiral Howe offered a $25,000 reward for Aideed’s capture.\textsuperscript{144} Additionally, UNOSOM II took up a more aggressive approach to patrolling the streets of southern Mogadishu and targeting Aideed’s known strongholds. UNOSOM forces bombed Aideed’s weapons sites, targeted militia leaders, and conducted well-coordinated sweeps inside Aideed strongholds.\textsuperscript{145} Major General Montgomery even requested a U.S. armored cavalry squadron complete with Bradley fighting vehicles to support the ever fractioning situation inside the capital, but his request was denied by U.S. policy makers.\textsuperscript{146}

On 12 July UNOSOM II forces, led by Major General Montgomery conducted a large raid on Aideed’s known command and control center known as the Abdi House.


\textsuperscript{144}Hirsch and Oakley, 120.


\textsuperscript{146}Baumann and Yates, 116.
The raid was designed to capture or kill key leaders suspected on planning and facilitating recent attacks against U.S. and UN personnel and gather additional intelligence and reduce Aideed’s command and control capabilities in order to reduce the amount of attacks on UNOSOM II forces.\textsuperscript{147} The raid force was composed mostly of U.S. ground and air elements from the Quick Reaction Force.

The raid began with a broadcast warning and then a barrage conducted by attack helicopters, TOW missiles and 20mm grenades. Of note, one TOW missile missed its target and slammed into the nearby French Embassy.\textsuperscript{148} When ground forces entered the building they discovered seventeen dead and ten wounded. All were prominent members of the U.S.C/SNA to include Sheik Aden Mohamed, the group’s religious advisor. During the raid, U.S. helicopters engaged gathering Somali crowds with tear gas further instigating the already bad situation. Following the raid, after UNOSOM forces left the target area four international journalists were attacked and killed at the Abdi House by a hostile Somali crowd. The bodies of the journalists were put on display for television cameras.\textsuperscript{149}

In response to the seemingly new found strategy, some of the contributing nations further fractured UN legitimacy by openly challenging the UNOSOM II command relationships. After losing two soldiers, Italian military leaders began looking back to Rome for guidance and paid little attention to General Bir’s directives.\textsuperscript{150} There were also

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Frontline, interview with MG Montgomery.
\item Ibid., 118.
\item Hirsch and Oakley, 121.
\item Ibid., 119.
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\end{footnotesize}
many reports and indicators the Italians were working to cut a unilateral deal with Aideed further undermining the legitimacy of UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{151} Like the Italians, the French military also favored the wishes of their political masters in Paris over the orders of General Bir. In one incident, after an operation in Mogadishu, General Bir ordered the French to remain in the capital. Instead of remaining in Mogadishu, French soldiers, at the urging of their government returned to Biadoa.\textsuperscript{152}

Reaction in the U.S. to the 5 June attack and the escalation of the mission in Somalia produced a significant reduction in the percentage of U.S. peoples supporting the President’s handling of Somalia. Between December 1992 and April 1993 approval ratings of the President’s handling of the situation in Somalia averaged between 73 percent and 77 percent. Following the 5 June attacks and UNOSOMs shift to focus on Aideed popular support for the President declined almost 25 percentage points to a staggering 51 percent.\textsuperscript{153} It must be added that in another poll, most Americans supported efforts to capture Aideed, but 42 percent believed the mission would become “bogged down.”\textsuperscript{154}

As the conditions continued to deteriorate in Somalia U.S. congressional and senate leaders expressed concern over the role of U.S. forces under UNOSOM II. Senator

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151] Baumann and Yates, 117.
\item[152] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
John McCain stated, “We went to Somalia to keep people from starving to death. We are now killing women and children because they are combatants. It’s got to stop. It’s got to stop and it’s got to stop soon.” Senator Robert Byrd expressed concern that the “mandate to disarm the warlords and rebuild society . . . was never addressed, never debated or never approved by this [Senate] body.”

The concerns of the American political leaders and population were not unfounded. Following UNOSOM’s stepped up efforts to target Aideed and his militia and the unsuccessful Abdi House raid attacks on UNOSOM forces increased. Any chance of the UN and Aideed coming to a successful negotiation seemed to be gone. Attacks against UNOSOM personnel increased in efficiency and complexity. By August, the militias were using improvised explosive devices to target troops. In one attack, four U.S. troops were killed when a remote controlled device detonated under their HMMWV. Fourteen days later six more U.S. troops were injured by a landmine.

By August the U.S. was contemplating its policy in Somalia. Admiral Howe and Ambassador Gosende agreed with the UN Secretary General that in order to make progress Aideed needed to be removed from the picture. By late August it was apparent the two diplomats had pushed away from their predecessor, Robert Oakley efforts to reach a diplomatic solution and requested an elite military team capable of bringing Aideed to justice. In Washington, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was advocating a full-scale review of Somalia policy to the Secretary of Defense Les

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155 Ibid., 44.
156 Ibid.
157 Hirsch and Oakley, 122.
Aspin. On 27 August, Les Aspin suggested a narrower approach to the problem in Somalia and encouraged the UN to strengthen its overall strategy in Somalia and focus on a political approach.\textsuperscript{158}

As U.S. casualties mounted and despite the misgivings of senior policy advisors to include the CENTCOM Commander, General Hoar, and President Clinton approved the deployment of Task Force Ranger with the mission of breaking the SNA Leadership and, if possible, capture Aideed.\textsuperscript{159}

In summary, the reaction by the UN and the U.S. to the 5 June attacks did not strengthen the UN position. The 5 June attacks and subsequent reaction marked the first time since the start of the operation that U.S. support for the operation started to wane. Both the U.S. population and congressional leaders started questioning the strategy in Somalia. Additionally, the increase in the number of civilian casualties created an outpouring in the press criticizing the use of force and further reducing the support of the international community. The perception of the UN solely focused on capturing Aideed also created animosity between the aid agencies and UNOSOM. The UN was criticized for losing focus on the humanitarian issues and turning to a largely military effort in Somalia. The UN’s credibility was also damaged when it failed to capture Aideed. The U.S. commitment of Task Force Ranger to assist the UN in dismantling Aideed’s network was seen by many as a missed opportunity. After several failed attempts to capture Aideed, the chances of capturing him were diminished. By late summer, Aideed

\textsuperscript{158}Ibid., 127.

\textsuperscript{159}Baumann and Yates, 139.
was able to slip away into the shadows of Mogadishu protected by a network of loyal clansmen.

The Battle of Mogadishu

With the arrival of Task Force Ranger came an increased level of complexity within the UNOSOM command and control mechanism. Task Force Ranger appeared in Somalia as an American led and directed force. Major General Garrison was appointed to lead Task Force Ranger and he would not report to General Bir, but would report directly to U.S. Central Command. The command relationship painted the picture that the search for Aideed was a U.S. focused effort and created unity of effort problems within the UNOSOM command structure. The separate chains of command and the ability of Major General Garrison to launch operations without the approval or even knowledge of the UNOSOM commander were difficult. Although Major General Montgomery and Major General Garrison agreed to coordinate efforts the high tempo and short notice operations of Task Force Ranger did not always allow close coordination prior to operations resulting in at least one embarrassment for the special operators.

Within days of landing in Somalia Task Force Ranger conducted its first operation and quickly exposed the shortcomings created by the command structure. The target of the first raid was the Legatto House; a suspected command and control facility for Aideed.160 Major General Garrison launched the operation without coordinating with UNOSOM and in turn caught UNOSOM personnel within the target area. The incident

160Baumann and Yates, 140.
was an embarrassment for the elite task force and underscored the complexities they faced operating seemingly independently inside Somalia.

Subsequent raids by Task Force Ranger were successful in capturing some of Aideed’s lieutenants including Aideed’s financial backer Osman Atto. The deployment of Task Force Ranger surely increased the credibility of the UN in the eyes of Aideed and the Somali population, but events internal to UNOSOM actions would question UNOSOM’s abilities. On 5 September, a Nigerian company was ambushed while moving into an Italian controlled area inside Mogadishu. Seven Nigerian soldiers were killed and eight were wounded in the ambush, but more damaging was the Nigerian claims that the Italians refused to come their aid. Four days later, Pakistani troops were caught in a large engagement that lasted for hours where it was reported Somali woman and children hurled grenades at the UNOSOM forces.

From an outside perspective the situation was troubling. The U.S. entered Somalia in order to stop a humanitarian crisis, but less than a year later U.S. and UN troops are losing their lives, Somali civilian casualties were mounting and the U.S. deployed an elite military unit to hunt down a specific warlord. Following the downing of a U.S. helicopter which resulted in the death of three U.S. soldiers congress adopted a nonbinding resolution requesting President Clinton seek congressional approval for the continued deployment of U.S. forces in support of the Somalia mission by 15 November. In response, on 27 September, President Clinton, in a speech to the UN General Assembly,

\[161\] Durch, 346.

\[162\] Ibid., 347.

\[163\] Hirsch and Oakley, 127.
expressed concern in the direction of events inside Somalia. Clearly, the legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of U.S. political leaders was diminishing.

On 3 October Task Force Ranger launched a hastily planned daytime raid into central Mogadishu. Intelligence placed top SNA leadership at the Olympic Hotel in an area usually determined to be off limits to UN personnel. The quick turn from obtaining the intelligence and planning and launching the raid left very little time for coordination with UNOSOM and more importantly with the U.S. quick reaction force. Task Force Ranger conducted its assault and quickly captured 24 personnel. As the Task Force attempted to evacuate the detainees a two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters were downed by militia fire. Facing what Colonel Mike Dallas considered the worse-case scenario- a downed aircraft on Aideed’s turf-Task Force Ranger found themselves swarmed by angry armed Somali militia.\textsuperscript{164} Over the next 18 hours Task Force Ranger, the U.S. quick reaction force and other UNOSOM elements battled the militia. In all, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and seventy-eight wounded and one missing in action. The estimated Somali casualties are between 500 and 1000. Angry crowds of Somalis dragged American bodies of U.S. service members through the streets for television cameras to capture.

An immediate backlash occurred in the U.S. from both political leaders and the population. On 5 October, President Clinton sent top administration officials, including the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to meet with congressional leaders and discuss the situation in Somalia. Press reports from the meeting cite the meeting as a “disaster” for the administration who was unable to convey a clear policy on Somalia to the population.

\textsuperscript{164}Ibid., 127.
congressional leaders.\textsuperscript{165} Democratic and Republican leaders alike questioned the administration’s handling of Somalia and some even called for the immediate withdraw of all U.S. troops.\textsuperscript{166}

On 6 October President Clinton held a special meeting with his national security advisors to include Robert Oakley. The result of the meeting was a new policy for Somalia. The U.S. would leave Somalia in six months. The six month period was meant to show a level of resilience from the U.S. to save a level of credibility in the eyes of the international community, but the message was clear. President Clinton also ordered an increase in U.S. forces to deploy to Somalia in order to counter any further aggressive action by Aideed. Most importantly, the administration would push the UN to reverse course on the aggressive pursuit of Aideed and seek a more diplomatic approach.\textsuperscript{167} In a speech announcing his decisions to the nation President Clinton would again emphasize the solution in Somalia was a political one, not military.

The UNOSOM leaders, including General Bir disagreed with the U.S. decision to shift away from a military focus. Bir, as well as Major General Montgomery felt the military situation was ideal for ridding Somalia of Aideed. The actions on 3 October weakened Aideed’s militia and the potential backlash left Aideed with little favor among the Habr Gidr clan.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{165}Ibid., 128.
\textsuperscript{166}Baumann and Yates, 166.
\textsuperscript{167}Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{168}Ibid., 169.
Diplomatically, the legitimacy of the UNOSOM force was compromised when President Clinton again appointed Robert Oakley as his special envoy to Somalia and charged him and Major General Anthony Zinni with getting the political efforts back on track. The appearance of two senior U.S. diplomats who were outwardly critical of the UNOSOM efforts and both men expressed shock as to how bad the situation was only after a few months after UNITAF left.169

In Oakley’s first meeting with a top Aideed aid, Oakley assured him President Clinton intends to “depersonalize” the mission in Somalia and also provided a stern warning regarding the coming military capability of the U.S. The message was clear—the U.S. is the only body with the legitimacy and credibility to handle the situation in Somalia.

Aideed and the SNA took advantage of President Clinton’s policy shift. Aideed struck out against all UNOSOM created local government councils calling for their dissolution. At the same time, Aideed was embracing dialogue with the U.S.170 Clearly, Aideed’s perception and the perception he wanted the Somali people to embrace was UNOSOM’s efforts to facilitate government in Somalia was not legitimate. In fact, the SNA took measures to create rival councils in many areas and were openly challenging UNOSOM supported leadership.171

Following President Clinton’s announcement to withdraw from Somalia he echoed the opinion of the majority of the U.S. population. Following the 3 October battle,  

\[169\] Ibid., 171.

\[170\] Hirsch and Oakley, 135.

\[171\] Ibid., 136.
only 33 percent of the U.S. population supported the mission in Somalia. The legitimacy of the operation in Somalia, at least in the eyes of the American public, was lost.

Following the U.S. lead, the majority of the larger donor nations would also leave Somalia. At the time of the U.S. withdraw in March 1994; UNOSOM only consisted of smaller ill equipped forces like the Pakistanis. With the loss of the U.S. and many of the stronger donor nations UNOSOM II lost both military power and political support of the international community. Although the UNOSOM mission would continue to try and shape the political and security environment in Somalia, and the increase in U.S. military forces deployed to Somalia provided a short term perception of credibility to the mission, it no longer carried legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

In summary, U.S. policy decisions made following the 3 October battle did not strengthen the UN’s ability to conduct multilateral operations. President Clinton’s announcement to the world of a withdraw date for American forces was followed by similar announcements by many of the stronger donor nations to the mission in Somalia. Additionally, the actions of the U.S. and UN forces following the October 3 battle, despite an increase in the number of U.S. forces on the ground, was perceived as a posture set on protecting itself as it conducted a phased withdraw. The credibility of the UNOSOM force to accomplish its mission was clearly lost.

Public and international support for the mission plummeted following the 3 October battle. U.S. popular support for the mission reached its lowest point and congressional support for the mission was all but lost. Aid agencies still working inside

172Logan, 168.
of Somalia were subjected to an increase in violence as UNOSOM forces were unable to provide adequate security in many areas of the country.

U.S. decisions to “depersonalize” the fight in Somalia and bring Aideed back into the political arena hindered the UN effort for political reconciliation. Any effort to diminish the legitimacy of the warlords was lost when Aideed was allowed by the U.S. and the UN to reenter the political discussions harming efforts to bring educators, religious leaders and other non-violent groups into the political process.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Somalia was an opportunity for both the U.S. and the world to exercise the idea of multilateralism and promote the UN as the world’s legitimate and credible peace force. The U.S. National Security Strategy clearly supported the strengthening of the UN peacekeeping capabilities and laid out the means to do so. In order to answer the research question, did U.S. policy decisions during the Somali crisis strengthen UN capabilities to accomplish their mission in Somalia U.S. policy decisions were analyzed against U.S. joint doctrine. U.S. joint doctrine, JP 3-07.3 proposes the success of any peace operation is determined by a number of essential elements; legitimacy of the peace force, credibility of the peace force and a promotion of national and local ownership by a peacekeeping force. After analysis, U.S. policy decisions when combined with UN shortcomings did not strengthen UN capabilities to conduct multilateral peace operations.

JP 3-07.3 defines legitimacy as the perceived by interested audiences of the legality, morality, or fairness of a set of actions. Such audiences may include the U.S. public, foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces. For this study, the specific audiences determined critical to the peacekeeping force establishing its legitimacy is defined as the U.S. population, the international community and nations with commitments to the UN mission in Somalia.

Credibility is essential to ensure mission accomplishment. Credibility reflects the indigenous population’s and belligerents’ assessment of the capability of the force to accomplish its mission. The JP further goes on to address the importance in the ways a peacekeeping force should perform their duties stating it must discharge its duties swiftly
and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its capabilities and commitment. A critical element for a force to maintain credibility among the indigenous population and political factions is its ability to act with impartiality throughout the operation.

The third factor essential in the success of a peace operation is the promotion of national and local ownership. According to JP 3-07.3, the establishment of governance and a workable administration leading to a civil society is the responsibility of the HN. For this study, the promotion of national and local ownership will be measured by how U.S. decisions impacted UN efforts to foster the formation of a central Somali government.

**U.S. Decision to Intervene in Somalia**

President Bush’s decision to lead an international effort to prevent a further humanitarian disaster was met with overwhelming U.S. and international support increasing the legitimacy of the operation. The U.S. public polled as high as 84 percent from January to April 1993 or for the duration of the U.S. led UNITAF mission. Also, after the 4 December 1992 announcement by President Bush that U.S. forces would lead an international effort to prevent a humanitarian disaster a dozen countries offer 13,650 troops for the coalition and over a dozen other nations were weighing contributions to the mission.173 The U.S. decision also garnered major support from the relief agencies operating inside Somalia.

Although President Bush’s decision to intervene in Somalia increased the legitimacy of the UN mission in Somalia, the decision carried both a positive and

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173 Poole, 23.
negative effect on the credibility of the mission. The 28,000 U.S. troops were perceived by the Somali population and the warlords as a very credible force committed to relieving the humanitarian crisis certainly increased the credibility of the mission. Attacks against UNITAF forces throughout the mission were low signaling a respect for the capabilities of U.S. forces and reinforcing the perception of UNITAF’s credibility.

Damaging the credibility of the mission and hampering UN efforts was the U.S. policy decision to limit the objectives of the UNITAF mission to a strictly humanitarian effort and forgo any attempt at a disarmament campaign. The UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and the UN Security Council were adamant about the need to conduct a country wide disarmament campaign. The UN believed disarming the militias would greatly help bring about the political reconciliation process. By disarming the militias, the UN believed it would encourage other political parties, academics and religious leaders to participate in the political process without fear of retribution from the militias. By failing to do this the U.S. decreased the ability of the UN to promote local and national ownership into the political process. The UN also believed the UNITAF force was capable of executing the disarmament unlike the UNOSOM force. The U.S. instead conducted a limited deployment of forces and focused only on creating a security environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian relief. Additionally, the U.S. believed any effort to disarm the militias would be counterproductive to the humanitarian efforts due to the scope and risk involved in conducting such a campaign. Although different disarmament measures were taken by UNITAF the efforts failed to create any significant long term impact on any faction leader’s ability to maintain their arms.
U.S. efforts during UNITAF did assist in the promotion of a national government. Ambassador Oakley’s effort to communicate with the leadership throughout Somalia, to include the warlords created a stable environment which facilitated the Addis Ababa conferences in January and March 1993 which led to the creation of the Transitional National Council; a step in the right direction for a unified Somalia. Oakley’s open dialogue with many of the militia leaders, specifically Aideed, led to political progress in the short term, but his efforts did hamper future efforts by the UN to promote national reconciliation. Oakley’s focus on Aideed at the outset of the mission was, although critical to the short term success of the mission, provided legitimacy to the very warlords responsible for the humanitarian crisis damaging the longer term efforts for political reconciliation and bringing other potential leaders to the forefront.
Table 1. Results of President Bush’s Decision to Intervene in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Strengthened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
<th>Weakened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision garnered U.S. and international popular support</td>
<td>U.S. decision to limit mission objectives to humanitarian relief</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. decision to intervene assisted in the recruitment of strong donor nations</td>
<td>U.S. refusal to participate in any disarmament campaign against the militia leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
<td>U.S. decision to limit mission objectives to humanitarian relief</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong U.S. ground forces were viewed by the Somali population and the faction leaders as a capable force</td>
<td>U.S. refusal to participate in any disarmament campaign against the militia leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
<td>Weakened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF efforts at the local level to work with local leadership in order to facilitate humanitarian relief</td>
<td>Ambassador Oakley’s focused efforts to mediate with Aideed and Al Mahdi legitimized the warlords as potential political leaders</td>
<td></td>
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*Source:* Created by author.

**Transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II**

The transition from UNITAF to UN led UNOSOM II was less successful in strengthening the UN, but the majority of the issues hindering the UN were caused by a lack of UN procedures to ensure an adequate handover was completed.

In April 1994, during the last month of the UNITAF operation, U.S. polls still reflected a very supportive American public. The UNITAF operation did accomplish its objectives in bringing a stop to the humanitarian crisis in the hardest hit parts of Somalia.
and was seen as a success in the eyes of the American and international community maintaining the overall legitimacy of the mission.

The untimely transition to UNOSOM II quickly revealed shortcomings of an undermanned and over tasked UN force. The U.S. decision to push a quick transition with the UN created a credibility issue for the UN. The new mandate passed by the UN Security Council provided UNOSOM II with a daunting task; take any and all measures to rebuild Somalia. At its peak UNITAF was manned at roughly 35,000 troops. When UNOSOM II inherited the mission from UNITAF its staff was manned at 22 percent and troop offers for the operation was around 18,000. Compounding the problem was the majority of the troops from the donor nations came to Somalia lacking proper equipment like body armor or armored vehicles severely hampering the credibility of the UNOSOM II force.

The UNITAF and UNOSOM II transition was flawed from the outset. A rush by U.S. forces to transition responsibility over to UNOSOM II resulted in an improper handover. In an interview with Major General Montgomery, the deputy UNOSOM II commander, he explained a lack of personnel and doctrine on the part of the UN degraded the ability of UNITAF’s staff and units to conduct a proper handover. Additionally, a flawed assumption about the “worst case” scenario the UN force would face also blinded the UNOSOM II forces when conducting the handover which decreased the legitimacy and credibility of the mission.

The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II also damaged the UN efforts to advance the Somali political process. Although not charged with doing so, UNITAF

174 Poole, 32.
made considerable efforts to reestablish many of the political institutions at the local and
district levels simply out of necessity to accomplish their mission of humanitarian relief.
UNOSOM II lacked both the relationships at the local and national levels to continue the
effort. Additionally, the mistrust of the UN by militia leaders like Aideed caused an
immediate rift in the political reconciliation process damaging the ability of the UN to
promote local and national ownership of the political reconciliation process.

From its assumption of responsibility UNOSOM II struggled to maintain its
legitimacy, credibility and to continue the political reconciliation process. The majority
of the issues preventing UNOSOM II from achieving success were directly linked to the
UN failing to provide the appropriate means to accomplish the ends. A lack of military
and civilian personnel, an inadequate process for conducting the transition with UNITAF
and a failure to incorporate successful UNITAF practices all resulted in UNOSOM II
losing legitimacy, credibility and hampered their efforts to assist in the Somali political
process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Strengthened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
<th>Weakened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II Control</td>
<td>Continued U.S. and international support for the mission due to the perceived success of UNITAF in alleviating the humanitarian suffering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
<td>Weakened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II forces were undermanned and unprepared to assume the mission from UNITAF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN failed to secure the appropriate “means” in order to achieve the objectives outlined in the UN mandate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Withdraw of the majority of U.S. combat forces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
<td>Weakened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagreement between Somali faction leaders and the UN over the agreements reached during the January 1993 Addis Ababa conference</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II forces were unable to capitalize on UNITAF gains made at the local political level</td>
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Source: Created by author.

Reaction to the 5 June Attacks

A month following their assumption of responsibility, UNOSOM II forces were attacked while executing a scheduled inspection of declared weapons containment areas. The UN Security Council’s response to the attacks, outlined in Resolution 837, which was written mainly by the U.S. Joint Staff, called for the arrest and detention of those
Resolution 837 marked a major turning point in UNOSOM II’s mission. For the next few months the perception was UNOSOM II’s leadership was focused on killing or capturing Aideed. Violence also increased inside Mogadishu as well as attacks against UNOSOM II forces. Although UNOSOM II’s aggressive actions to capture Aideed may have temporarily increased the credibility of the force, the failure to conduct a proper ends means analysis to successfully capture Aideed eroded their credibility in the eyes of the other faction leaders and the Somali population.

The response to the 5 June attacks had negative consequences on the legitimacy, credibility and overall ability of UNOSOM to participate in the Somali political reconstruction. U.S. public opinion began to drop following the 5 June attacks, but 66 percent of the American public still supported the U.S. effort in Somalia. Many military and political leaders also began questioning what they perceived was a very military focused approach in Somalia. By August, Les Aspin, the U.S. Secretary of Defense was advocating a less ambitious approach to Somalia calling for an increase in efforts to build a police force and increased efforts to bring about political reconciliation. In late September, the U.S. presented the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali with a policy shift emphasizing a more political approach to Somalia and then following the downing of a U.S. helicopter killing three U.S. soldiers, Congress called on President Clinton to seek approval for U.S. troops remaining in Somalia. Many donor nations, including the French and Italians reacted negatively to the increase in violence applied by UNOSOM II. Media also began to scrutinize the uptick in violence and the increase of civilian casualties and

\[175\] Poole, 42.

\[176\] Hirsch and Oakley, 125.
criticized the UN for losing focus on the larger task of nation building. Clearly, the legitimacy of the UNOSOM mission was under question in the months following the 5 June attacks.

Stepped up military efforts by UNOSOM II forces were clearly centered on capturing Aideed and reducing the effectiveness of his militia. Although the strong response may have initially increased the credibility of the UN mission, the inability of the force to capture or kill Aideed negatively affected the credibility of UNOSOM II in the eyes of the Somali people and the other Warlords. Additionally, the targeted raids seemed to only draw an increase in violence against UNOSOM II forces. By August the SNA was firing mortars at UN targets almost daily and began to use more sophisticated means of attack against the coalition to include improvised explosive devices. The deployment of Task Force Ranger proved to be too little too late. Although the extremely capable force was conducting missions aimed at Aideed’s leadership and infrastructure within hours of its arrival, UNOSOM II’s hand had already been played. Aideed was well entrenched in the Somali underground surrounded by supporters placing the odds in his favor. If deployed sooner, around the June timeframe when Admiral Howe first requested a special operations force, Task Force Ranger may have been successful in capturing Aideed.

With UN efforts focused on Aideed and the resulting increase in violence the UN efforts to continue political reconciliation was stalled. Although outside of Mogadishu progress was being made when UNOSOM II shifted focus to a “bottom up” approach and assisted in the establishment of many district and regional councils that were agreed upon
during the Addis Ababa Accords, any progress at the national level was stalled due to the violence in Mogadishu.\(^{177}\)

### Table 3. Results of the U.S. and UNOSOM II Reaction to the 5 June 1993 Attacks on UN Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Strengthened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
<th>Weakened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. and international support began to erode due to the increase in violence and media coverage of civilian casualties</td>
<td>A rise in U.S. casualties resulted in a reduction of U.S. popular and congressional support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction to 5 June 1993 attacks on UNOSOM II forces</td>
<td>Strengthened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
<td>Weakened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II forces were unable to capture or kill Aideed</td>
<td>UNOSOM II forces were unable to stop the increase in violence inside Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. commitment of Task Force Ranger failed to have success in capturing or killing Aideed</td>
<td>The increase in violence decreased UNOSOM II ability to further political reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
<td>Weakened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

\(^{177}\)Ibid., 124.
U.S. Response to the 3 October Battle

The 3 October Battle of Mogadishu and the U.S. policy shift was a blow to the legitimacy, credibility and long term efforts of the UN to support the political reconciliation. Within days following the battle President Clinton would announce a complete change in policy including a withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia within six months. Many of the donor nations would follow suit and withdraw their forces in line with the U.S. For the final six months in Somalia the U.S. focus was the protection of its forces as it withdrew.178

U.S. and congressional support for the operation plummeted following the 3 October battle. According to U.S. polls, American support for Clinton’s handling of Somalia following the 3 October battle and announced change in policy dropped to 33 percent. Domestic pressures would force Clinton in adopting a policy shift in Somalia. The shock at the sheer number of U.S. casualties as a result of one battle clearly impacted the legitimacy of the mission in the U.S. and forced Clinton to change course in Somalia and ultimately led to a revamp of U.S. policy concerning peacekeeping operations.

The credibility of the UN force was severely weakened by the U.S. announcement to withdraw its forces. As U.S. forces stood down other UN military contingents followed suit creating an atmosphere that UNOSOM was “digging in.”179 Additionally, the military units left to try and fill the void struggled to maintain security. An Indian unit replaced a Belgian unit in Kismayo was attacked within 24 hours of taking over the mission. Attacks on aid workers increased over the winter of 1993 and 1994.

178Durch, 348.

179Ibid.
Additionally, UN relief agencies were evacuated from offices inside Mogadishu and the World Food Program office in Baidoa were attacked by gunmen.\textsuperscript{180} Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces looters in Mogadishu targeted the airport and port disregarding the Egyptian military presence. UNOSOM II leadership was careful in response to such attacks for fear of reconstituting violence with militias. As the UNOSOM mission came to an end it took the deployment of a U.S. Marine unit support by U.S. special operations forces to cover the UN withdraw from Somalia.

Despite the inability of UNOSOM II to control the security situation, the UN continued to try and move forward with the political reconciliation. UNOSOM II sponsored a humanitarian aid conference coupled with a political reconciliation conference. Although the conference was successful in creating agreements, the UN was in no position to push forward with any initiatives. Additionally, the direct engagement with Aideed by Ambassador Oakley on behalf of the U.S. following the U.S. change in policy created a difficult environment for the UN to work in. Ambassador Oakley’s efforts, although fruitful in easing tensions between UNOSOM and Aideed and securing the release of a captured U.S. soldier, was counterproductive to a longer term effort for political reconciliation thus failing to promote local and national ownership of the political reconciliation process.

When examined, U.S. policy decisions did not strengthen the UN capability to conduct multilateral peace operations. Policy decisions made during the operation hindered the UN legitimacy, credibility and the UN effort to support the establishment of Somali government. Although U.S. Policy decisions to intervene in Somalia initially

\textsuperscript{180}Ibid., 349.
increased the legitimacy and credibility of the UN mission, subsequent policies eroded the UN legitimacy and credibility. At its core, Somalia is an example of a U.S. failure to accurately link strategy to a policy and for the UN to link means to an end.

U.S. policy in Somalia changed on a continuous basis making it difficult to formulate a coherent strategy that could achieve the desired objectives. Changes in the operational environment will always cause decision makers to reconsider their strategy, but in the case of the U.S. and Somalia, ripples caused by the change in the operational environment caused changes in U.S. policy. Clearly, the shifting policy decisions damaged the ability of both UNITAF and UNOSOM to formulate a strategy to meet their desired objectives of the U.S.

In the case of UN, the policy of nation building in Somalia was always clear and their strategy was sound. Unfortunately, the UN failed to acquire the appropriate means to accomplish their objectives and because the UN is reliant on the strength and commitment of donor nations it will always struggle to do so.

Somalia represented an opportunity for the U.S. to take a step in the right direction in accomplishing its stated policy of strengthening the UN to conduct multilateral operations. The U.S. was in a position to accomplish its objective, but a shifting U.S. policy throughout the Somali crisis failed to strengthen the UN for multilateral operations.
Table 4. Results of the U.S. Reaction to the 3 October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Strengthened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
<th>Weakened the Legitimacy of the United Nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. popular and congressional support dropped severely following the October 3 battle</td>
<td>International support and support of other donor nations dropped following President Clinton’s announcement to withdraw from Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
<td>Weakened the Credibility of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. increased the number of armored forces to support withdraw of forces from Somalia</td>
<td>President Clinton’s reaction to withdraw created a perception that the U.S. was adverse to casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
<td>Weakened the promotion of local and national ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. decisions to open dialogue with Aideed created a position of strength for Aideed and weakened the UN ability to facilitate political reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Create by author.

Recommendation for Further Study

The conclusions of this thesis clearly indicate it was a combination of U.S. and UN misgivings which combined to create the conditions which caused the UN to fail in Somalia. Future research could focus on both the UN and the U.S. policies in response to their experiences in Somalia and their application during future peacekeeping operations like Rwanda and Bosnia.

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