1. REPORT DATE
   JUN 2013
2. REPORT TYPE
3. DATES COVERED
   00-00-2013 to 00-00-2013

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
   Studies in Intelligence. Volume 57, Number 2 (June 2013)

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC, 20505

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
   Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
   a. REPORT unclassified
   b. ABSTRACT unclassified
   c. THIS PAGE unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
   Same as Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
   98

19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Cover: “Piercing the Reich.” Soldiers of the 55th Armored Infantry Battalion and 22nd Tank Battalion move through smoke-filled street in Wernberg, Germany.

The image bespeaks the uncertain situation into which the US Army and its intelligence components would enter with Germany’s surrender on 8 May 1945.

Photo by Pvt. Joseph Scrippens, 22 April 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
The Mission

The mission of Studies in Intelligence is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public literature concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA’s History Staff, CIA’s Lessons Learned Program, the CIA Museum, and the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. The center also houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

Contributions

Studies in Intelligence welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

Editor
Studies in Intelligence
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Awards

The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in Studies. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes.

Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of Studies’ purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards.
EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for Studies in Intelligence may be written on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Peter S. Usowski, Chairman
Pamela Barry
MG Stephen Fogarty
Jason Manosevitz
John McLaughlin
Wayne M. Murphy
James Noone
Matthew J. Ouimet
Valerie P.
Cynthia Ryan
Cathryn Thurston
Ursula M. Wilder
Cindy Webb

Members of the board are drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency and other Intelligence Community components.

EDITOR

Andres Vaart

CONTENTS

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Post-World War II Intelligence 1
America’s Secret Vanguard: US Army Intelligence Operations in Germany, 1944–47 1
Thomas Boghardt

Moves and Countermoves
The Growth of China’s Air Defenses: Responding to Covert Overflights, 1949–1974 19
Bob Bergin

INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW

Rethinking Failure
Managing the “Reliability Cycle”: An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure 29
Scott J. Hatch

FROM THE STUDIES ARCHIVE

50 Years Since Early Engagement in Southeast Asia
Counterintelligence in Counterguerrilla Operations 39
M. H. Schiattareggia

INTELLIGENCE IN PUBLIC MEDIA

The Cuban Missile Crisis Redux: Lessons from Two More Works 65
Reviewed by Thomas Coffey

Historical Dictionary of Signals Intelligence 69
Reviewed by Gary K.

The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I 71
Reviewed by John Ehrman

The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster William Colby 73
Reviewed by Randall B. Woods

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 75
Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Vol. 57, No. 2 (June 2013)
Bob Bergin is a retired Foreign Service Officer. He has published numerous works on aviation and intelligence history in East Asia.

Thomas Boghardt is a US Army historian. He has contributed articles to Studies in Intelligence. He is the author of a recently published history, The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I, reviewed in this issue.

Thomas Coffey has served as an analyst in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He is currently a member of the Lessons Learned Program of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor.

John Ehrman is an analyst in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He is a frequent and award-winning contributor to Studies.

Scott J. Hatch is a manager in the National Counterterrorism Center. He has served in CIA’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis.

Gary K. is a CIA officer.

Hayden Peake is the curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection in the CIA Library. He has served in the Directorates of Science and Technology and Operations.

M. H. Schiattareggia is the penname of an officer who served in the CIA’s Directorate of Plans (now the National Clandestine Service).

Randall B. Woods is a distinguished professor of history at the University of Arkansas. He is the author of the recently published biography of William Colby, Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA.
In the period between [the dissolution of OSS and the establishment of CIA] the US Army was virtually alone in shouldering American intelligence requirements in a time and place that were to prove critical for the readjustment of US global strategy from world war to the Cold War.

Two of the most riveting spy movies of all time, The Third Man (1949) and The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (1965), are set in post-war Central Europe. The time and place of the plots are no coincidence. Germany’s location at the heart of Europe, its industrial potential, and its large, well-educated population gave it an inherent strategic importance that none of its conquerors could ignore.

When the Allied forces invaded the Reich in 1944–45, they were accompanied by a plethora of secret service and security organizations, which sought to exert control over the occupied territory, exploit the spoils of war, learn about the intentions of their wartime partners, and deny others the opportunity of doing any of the above. “Divided Germany during the Occupation was an intelligence jungle,” recalls James H. Critchfield, an American intelligence officer who served in post-war Germany and Austria. During those years, Soviet and Western intelligence “waged the largest, most concentrated and intense intelligence warfare in history on German soil.”

The United States and its intelligence services played key roles in the defeat and ensuing occupation of Germany, yet the historiography of American intelligence during this time period is decidedly uneven. While two particular agencies—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—have drawn ample popular and scholarly attention, historians have largely ignored the intelligence operations of the US Army.

This is surprising as well as unfortunate since the OSS and CIA played only minor roles in the US intelligence gathering effort in early Cold War Germany. The OSS disappeared from the scene when President Harry S. Truman ordered its dissolution in September 1945. And when the US government established the CIA as America’s premier intelligence organization in 1947, Army leaders successfully demanded that the new agency defer to senior military commanders in occupied areas, including Japan and the US zone of Germany.

The period between those events left the US Army virtually alone in shouldering American intelligence requirements in a time and place that were to prove critical for the readjustment of US global strategy from world war to the Cold War. “We were the CIA, FBI and military security all in one,” reminisces a
military intelligence officer who served in post-war Germany, “because those agencies weren’t functioning in Germany at the time...[c]onsidering the resources that were placed at our disposal in those immediate post-war years...and all the multitude of missions we were required to perform—espionage, black market, security, political activities—we were achieving a minor miracle every day in getting as much information as we did.”

This article serves as a first attempt to outline Army intelligence operations from the moment US troops entered Germany in 1944 to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, and to assess their role in the final defeat of National Socialism and in the unfolding contest between the United States and the Soviet Union.

---

The Army’s Military Intelligence Community on the Eve of the Cold War

World War II greatly expanded and thoroughly professionalized Army intelligence. Opening in June 1942, the Military Intelligence Training Center at Ft. Ritchie, Maryland, trained thousands of G.I.s as prisoner-of-war interrogators, military interpreters, photo interpreters, and order-of-battle specialists. Following an eight-week course, the Army grouped the recruits into military intelligence specialist teams and deployed them overseas, principally to Europe.

A good number of “Ritchie Boys” were German emigrés who had left their country for political reasons under the Nazis, and many were Jewish. The émigrés’ generally superior level of education and intimate knowledge of Germany proved valuable assets as they pursued their Army intelligence duties during the war, and some continued to work for the Army during the occupation period.

As an organization, Army intelligence during that period is best described as a fluid community, composed of several agencies of varying size and different, if often overlapping, responsibilities. Unlike many other intelligence agencies, it was not a single entity with a clear structure and hierarchy, its administrative history being neither static nor monolithic. Between 1944 and 1947, the War Department and the Army managed over half a dozen agencies which dealt with the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and safeguarding of militarily and politically relevant information in Germany.

At the apex of Army intelligence stood the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (MID), whose director doubled as assistant chief of staff of the G-2 (second section of the General Staff). The MID held overall responsibility for the development of strategic intelligence, establishing the Army’s intelligence priorities and requirements, collecting the appropriate information from subordinate agencies and other sources, processing the acquired data into finished intelligence, and passing the results to other agencies inside and outside the War Department. For its operating functions—collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence—the MID relied on its executive arm, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS).

The two most important intelligence organizations under the MID were the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). The ASA was responsible for the interception and decryption of foreign communications. The CIC had the task of countering enemy espionage and sabotage. Toward the end of the war, the CIC acquired a number of additional duties, including intelligence collection through espionage.

During World War II, the Army relied mainly on the OSS for intelligence gathering, but when OSS was dissolved in September 1945, its espionage and counterespionage sections were briefly attached to the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The SSU reported directly to the office of the assistant secretary of war, not to the MID, and thus remained on the periphery of the Army’s intelligence community.

The Military Attaché Branch also produced a steady stream of information for the G-2. The War Department appointed military attachés to US diplomatic missions, and one of the tasks of the attachés was the collection of militarily relevant information in their host countries. Typically, they used open sources, such as newspapers or information gleaned from conversations with local officials. The attachés reported their insights directly to the MID in Washington.
Until 1947, when the US Air Force became an independent military service, Army intelligence also included the intelligence branch of the Army Air Forces (AAF), the Air Intelligence Staff (or A-2). Air Force intelligence focused foremost on the procurement of information needed for strategic bombing and air power. Perhaps more than any other Army intelligence agency, the A-2 suffered from the effects of demobilization, as the AAF's manpower overseas fell from about 1 million men at the end of the war to 385,000 at the end of 1945.11

In Europe, Army intelligence personnel served at every command echelon—in G-2s at division, Army, and Theater level, and S-2s (staff) at the regiment and battalion level. The divisional G-2s oversaw intelligence specialists in the field who operated in four types of teams during World War II: interrogation, interpretation, photo interpretation, and order of battle. So-called “enemy equipment intelligence services,” directed by the Army’s individual technical services, collected technical intelligence on and from enemy forces.12

When the Army established the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) in May 1945, this organization, too, set up its own intelligence component. The Office of the Director of Intelligence provided the military governor information pertaining to issues beyond the military sphere in US-occupied Germany, such as economic, political, and social intelligence. Denazification and the monitoring of communist subversion figured among the top priorities of OMGUS intelligence during the early years of the occupation.13

Last but not least, in 1947 the Army set up the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in Potsdam, a city in the Soviet-occupied part of Germany. Originally established to provide liaison with the Soviet occupation forces in East Germany, the mission quickly evolved into an important collector of military intelligence on Soviet forces in East Germany, and later on the East German People’s Army, because USMLM officers were authorized to travel freely across the Soviet zone.14

While the Army intelligence community’s fragmentation and constantly evolving organizational structure complicated collection and analysis efforts, rapidly changing intelligence requirements in post-war Europe posed additional challenges. Until 1945, the various military agencies focused principally on Nazi Germany, but as the war in Europe came to a close, Army intelligence needed to readjust its sights quickly to the Soviet threat. The shift had to be executed with rapidly dwindling resources: units were transferred to the Pacific or were demobilized altogether and sent back to the continental United States, and in October 1945 the Army closed its wartime military intelligence training center at Fort Ritchie as a cost-reduction measure.15

Constant reorganization and downsizing made for a highly fluid military intelligence community whose exact nature appears to defy historical analysis. As an official historian of Army intelligence wrote in apparent frustration shortly after the war, “it would be easy to assume that the [Military Intelligence] Division did nothing but reorganize.”16 But the difficulty of describing the structure of Army intelligence in its near-constant state of flux must not obscure the fact that the various agencies conducted a wide range of operations in Central Europe, which profoundly shaped American perceptions of the emerging Cold War.

### Nazi Subversion

On the afternoon of 11 September 1944, a five-man patrol of the First US Army’s V Corps crossed the Our River from Luxembourg, becoming the first American military unit to set foot on German soil in World War II.17 With the US invasion of the Reich, the engagement of Army intelligence in Germany began in earnest.

The convulsions of the dying Nazi regime and its potential post-war legacy posed the most immediate challenge to invading forces. As Army units marched into and eventually occupied large chunks of the former Reich, military intelligence gathered tactical information on the retreating German forces; ran counterespionage operations against Nazi spies and stay-behind agents; assessed Nazi plans for a last stand in the Alps (dubbed the “Nazi redoubt”); participated in the removal of Nazi officials from public life (denazification); oversaw US propaganda operations toward the enemy population; aided in the control and settlement of hundreds of thousands of Soviet POWs, Polish
Some threats commanded the attention of Army intelligence beyond the end of the Reich. The notion of a Nazi guerrilla movement operating behind the lines in occupied territory had some substance in fact.

forced laborers, and Jewish concentration camp survivors (Displaced Persons, or DPs); and exercised censorship on US and German mail.

Army intelligence considered some of these tasks, such as propaganda and denazification, extraneous to its core intelligence mission and divested itself of them shortly after the war. Other missions, such as the gathering of tactical intelligence on the Wehrmacht and conducting counterintelligence against Nazi spies, became unnecessary with Germany’s surrender in May 1945. The Nazis feared last stand in the Alps proved nonexistent upon investigation. As the G-2 division of XXI Corps noted drily, Hitler’s vaunted alpine fortress “is neither a Redoubt, nor is it National.”

Yet some threats commanded the attention of Army intelligence beyond the end of the Reich. The notion of a Nazi guerrilla movement operating behind the lines in occupied territory had some substance in fact. As the German fortunes on the battlefield turned for the worse, German intelligence officers in 1943 began discussing the need for a stay-behind organization that would support the Wehrmacht by using guerrilla tactics in Allied-occupied territory.

Since the Führer and many in his entourage regarded talk of an Allied invasion as defeatist, Nazi leaders did not execute plans for such an organization until late 1944, when US troops had already pierced the Reich. On 19 September 1944, SS leader Heinrich Himmler appointed SS General Hans-Adolf Prützmann to head a guerrilla organization, which was to harass enemy lines of communication, assassinate Germans collaborating with Allied authorities, and spread Nazi propaganda to stiffen civilian resistance to the occupation. The Nazis dubbed this organization Werewolf (Werwolf in German), after a lowbrow, patriotic adventure story by an early twentieth century German writer named Hermann Löns.

From the start, an inefficient organizational setup, overbureaucratization, and ineffective leadership plagued the Werewolf. Serving under the SS rather than the Wehrmacht, the would-be guerrillas had no direct access to the resources and expertise of Germany’s professional military. Moreover, Prützmann turned out to be a bad choice to lead the Nazi stay-behind organization. Though intelligent and ideologically committed, he was also an arrogant, unfocused braggart.

Prützmann never managed to turn the Werewolf into anything like the powerful organization portrayed by German radio propaganda, and he committed suicide shortly after falling into British hands in May 1945. An optimistic estimate puts the total membership of the Werewolf at 5,000 to 6,000 mostly underage boys recruited from the Hitler Youth. Many were as politically fanaticized as they were militarily inexperienced.

How well did Army intelligence understand that this organization posed at most a limited threat? Military intelligence personnel obtained reliable information on SS plans for a Nazi subversive organization from German prisoners of war as early as August 1944. In the spring of 1945, an informant provided Sixth Army Group General Staff, G-2, with a stolen German memorandum on the administration of the Werewolf organization, including Prützmann’s name and central role in this endeavor.

By April 1945, Army intelligence had identified the Werewolf as the fulcrum of Nazi subversion and was in a position to describe the brief history and administrative makeup of the organization fairly accurately: “The most serious threat to our security in the immediate future would appear to be the Werewolf organization,” concluded the Combined Intelligence Committee of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF).

“Information about the Werewolves is at present scanty, but this much is clear. It was founded toward the end of last year, as an organization to resist the occupying powers by guerrilla methods. It is a single organization, designed to operate on all fronts and is commanded by SS Obergruppenführer Prützmann.”

Some of the Army’s early intelligence reports on Werewolf activities were alarmist and cast the organization as a serious security threat. A report from the French First Army to the US Fifth Army estimated the strength of the Werewolf “to be better than 22,000,” and predicted “that after Germany’s total occupation the organization may count close to 50,000 members dedicated to National Socialism and ready to carry out any mission.”
In a similar vein, the G-2 of the US Seventh Army reported that the Werewolf was “not a myth,” that it had cells in every major German city, and that it was set to continue its activities after the military defeat of the Third Reich. But as information on the Werewolf moved up through successive echelons of command and was put into context, Army intelligence assessments of the organization became decidedly less alarmist. In April 1945, SHAEF’s Combined Intelligence Committee reported that apart from one or two incidents of isolated resistance, the population of Allied-occupied Germany appeared to be “apathetic and supine,” and that “no serious opposition” had been encountered to date. In mid-May 1945, SHAEF acknowledged various cases of murders and sniping of Allied soldiers, as well as the appearance of Werewolf notices against collaboration in Allied-occupied portions of Germany, but noted that so far the Werewolf had failed to materialize as a serious threat.

In the few instances where Allied forces encountered actual Werewolf partisans, the latter usually surrendered quickly. The G-2 of the Third US Army reported that the Counter Intelligence Corps captured an entire Werewolf headquarters after its members were ordered to surrender by a German soldier who had submitted to the Americans earlier. In the southwestern German city of Speyer, the French arrested two young Werewolves who had been observed loafing near a bridge and were found to possess two notched pistols. “They were not particularly brave during interrogation,” the report noted, “and denounced a dozen German civilians possessing firearms.”

The most dramatic incident commonly associated with the Werewolf occurred shortly before the end of the war. On 21 October 1944, US troops captured the German city of Aachen near the Belgian-Dutch border. Most of the Nazi administrators, as well as much of the civilian population, had fled the city, and the Americans appointed a local politician with anti-Nazi credentials, Franz Oppenhoff, as mayor.

Bent on making an example of Oppenhoff so as to discourage other Germans from collaborating with the advancing Allied forces, Himmler decided to have the US-appointed mayor assassinated. In January 1945, he instructed Prützmann to use the Werewolf for this task, but Prützmann ended up assembling a small hit squad made up mostly of regular SS soldiers, apparently for lack of suitably trained Werewolves.

Using a captured US B-17 “Flying Fortress,” the Luftwaffe dropped the SS commando over Belgium, where they crossed back into Germany and headed for Aachen. On 24 March, two of the assassins, SS Major Herbert Wenzel and SS sergeant Josef Leitgeb, reached Oppenhoff’s home where they identified themselves to the mayor as downed German pilots. Oppenhoff offered them sandwiches and advised them to surrender to the Americans.

When the team leader, Wenzel, hesitated to execute the hospitable mayor, Leitgeb grabbed the pistol from him, pointed it to Oppenhoff’s left temple, and pulled the trigger. The mayor died instantly. On their flight from Aachen, the two SS men survived a shootout with American soldiers, but Leitgeb subsequently stepped on a mine and died. Wenzel disappeared in the chaos of post-war Germany and was never heard from again.

Nazi propaganda touted Oppenhoff’s murder as a spontaneous vendetta carried out by local Werewolves. In reality, “Operation Carnival,” as the Nazis named the hit job, was a carefully hatched assassination plot executed by hardened SS men with critical logistical support from the Luftwaffe. Though the US Army’s intelligence services had been unable to prevent Oppenhoff’s murder, they quickly recognized it as an isolated incident, not as a harbinger of things to come in occupied Germany.

Moreover, Army intelligence realized that the main danger of violent acts ascribed to the Werewolf, such as Oppenhoff’s assassination, lay not in the acts themselves but in their exploitation by Nazi propaganda.

Army intelligence realized that the main danger of violent acts ascribed to the Werewolf, such as Oppenhoff’s assassination, lay not in the acts themselves but in their exploitation by Nazi propaganda.
for attempted sabotage and espionage, though it remains unclear whether this individual had committed any physical acts.\textsuperscript{34}

After Germany’s unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945, Army intelligence remained alert to the possibility of Nazi subversive activities. As the G-2 of Seventh Army pointed out, there was an abundance of fanaticized Hitler Youth, including many strong personalities and prospective leaders, with plenty of time on their hands to stir up trouble.\textsuperscript{35}

Indeed, as the occupation forces settled in, anti-American posters popped up in several German cities in the US zone of occupation,\textsuperscript{36} women and girls associating with G.I.s received (mostly anonymous) threats,\textsuperscript{37} and intelligence officers registered “a notable increase in the arrogance of civilians” toward G.I.’s.\textsuperscript{38} From summer 1945 to spring 1946, the CIC, in conjunction with British intelligence, apprehended a number of former Hitler Youth personalities who apparently were in the early stages of building a subversive Nazi organization.\textsuperscript{39} The Army’s G-2 division in Washington judged this measure, called Operation NURSERY, a complete success.\textsuperscript{40}

Army intelligence eventually came to the conclusion that the post-war Werewolf posed a hollow threat. Extensive telephone wire-cutting constituted virtually the only physical acts perpetrated against the occupation forces of the US Army, and the evidence collected by military intelligence officers suggested that civilians stealing cables for their personal use committed most of this “sabotage.” In one of the rare instances in which the Army apprehended a wire-cutter, the perpetrator turned out to be a 12-year-old boy who “claimed that he was acting on orders from the station master who had told him the wire was no longer in use.”\textsuperscript{41}

In its last political intelligence report before its dissolution, SHAEF concluded:

\textit{No acts of overt resistance traceable to an organized resistance movement have been reported. The rapid collapse of Germany and the thoroughness of counter-intelligence methods have broken up all efforts...to form resistance groups and encourage Werewolf activity; subversive activity now only amounts to scattered and unconnected incidents of sabotage. If in fact active resistance develops in the future it will arise more from disaffection during the prolonged occupation than from the original Werewolf planning.}\textsuperscript{42}

In the immediate post-war period, Army intelligence agencies received numerous reports on such scattered resistance activities. In Goppingen, girls associating with US soldiers received threatening notes, signed with a rubber stamp impression of “The Black Hand.”\textsuperscript{43} In Berlin, the local G-2 reported on two underground organizations, “Deutschland für Deutsche” (Germany for Germans) and “Kreuz und Kette” (Cross and Chain), which bullied anti-Nazis cooperating with the occupation forces.\textsuperscript{44} In Hofgeismar, a small town in northern Hesse, the 78th CIC Detachment investigated a local football team suspected of doubling as a front organization for neo-Nazi activities.\textsuperscript{45}

Very rarely did such groups commit acts of violence, however, and Army intelligence deemed it “improbable” that the various sub-
versive neo-Nazi groups were “part of a widely spread organization.” Rather, they appeared to represent “a natural reaction to the occupation” by returned German soldiers, who were as frustrated by military defeat as they were by German women who preferred the company of comparatively affluent G.I.s to that of penniless Wehrmacht veterans.

As the first post-war winter approached, Nazi subversion seemed to gather strength. In late 1945, Army intelligence received the first reports on a far-flung neo-Nazi movement calling itself Edelweiss Piraten. Allegedly organized throughout occupied Germany, gangs of young men, boys, and some women were reported to be harassing German girls dating American soldiers, beating up Polish DPs, and engaging in extensive black market activities. Members of the Edelweiss Piraten often congregated at railway stations, sported edelweiss flower pins (long the symbol of German youth resistance) for mutual recognition, and spouted Nazi rhetoric. The ostensible aim of the organization was, as a CIC special agent put it, “the reestablishment of a nationalistic State.”

Goaded into action by a growing volume of reports on the nefarious activities of the group, the CIC in early 1946 launched a US-zone-wide operation (Operation VALENTINE) to infiltrate and incapacitate the Edelweiss Piraten. Based on intelligence collected by local informers, and in cooperation with US military police and German police, the CIC arranged the arrest of hundreds of Piraten across the zone.

German police and CIC special agents carefully interrogated the arrested to learn more about their mysterious organization. What emerged from these interviews, though, was not a map of an all-powerful, well-organized Nazi subversive movement, but rather a snapshot of the bleak realities of post-war Germany.

The war had uprooted countless young Germans: orphans, discharged soldiers, escaped prisoners of war, youth fleeing from the Soviet zone, and ideologically corrupted ex-Hitler Youth who lacked parental supervision. With no place to go, many drifted across Germany and lived as vagrants. Given that many had served in the military or one of the various Nazi organizations, they were inclined to embrace a primitive nationalistic creed to create a sort of ersatz community.

The case of one Edelweiss Pirat, Karl Hans Strassmuth, is illustrative. Born in Hanover in 1927, Strassmuth moved to East Prussia with his family in 1933. In 1941, he joined the Hitler Youth and in January 1945 was drafted into the Volksturm, a paramilitary organization set up at the end of the war and consisting mostly of older men and underage boys. While Strassmuth fought the advancing Soviets as a machine gunner, both his parents were killed in an air raid. When the Red Army invaded East Prussia, he took refuge with a neighbor. In September 1945, he managed to flee west. Eventually, he reached Bremen and joined one of the many roving Edelweiss youth gangs that spent their days on the margins of society.

Young Edelweiss Piraten arrested during Operation VALENTINE in 1946. Photo: Courtesy of NARA.
Like many other *Edelweiss Piraten*, Strassmuth had not joined his group in order to build a fourth Reich, but rather out of despair and for lack of an alternative. Strassmuth’s gang, observed a CIC agent who had infiltrated the group, “was nothing more than a band of roving transients, who could never stay in one city for any lengthy period for fear that they would become too well known.”

The information gleaned from the interrogation of hundreds of *Edelweiss Piraten* like Strassmuth led Army intelligence officers to conclude that “[t]he Edelweiss Piraten presents no security threat. It is a name adopted by…loose living youths…who have been forced into small gangs in order to obtain food and lodging. The gangs are formed usually in the vicinity of railroad yards or stations. The goods they steal are usually sold to black market operators. The Edelweiss insignia is seen frequently in Germany, and it has become fashionable to wear the badge.”

By early 1947, Army intelligence had succeeded, through a combination of skillful information gathering, perceptive analysis, and stern countermeasures to all but eliminate subversive activities of the *Edelweiss Piraten*, whose remaining members migrated to the more laissez-faire British zone. A CIC special agent suggested that in the future the problem of violent vagrant youths might be solved not through repression, but rather by “force[ful]ly settling down of a large number of homeless youths,” which “would prevent such incipient subversive organizations as the Edelweiss Pirates from progressing and developing further.”

**The Soviet Threat**

By the time the specter of Nazi subversion faded, US military intelligence had already turned its attention eastward. Army leaders had never entirely trusted their Soviet ally, and during the war, Army intelligence kept a steady eye on communist and Soviet organizations suspected of engaging in espionage, propaganda, or subversion. Likewise, the Army carefully investigated rumors that Stalin was exploring a way out of the war. “Under certain conditions,” the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded in August 1943, “the USSR has the capability of concluding a separate peace with Germany.”

A few weeks later, suspicions about Soviet disloyalty led the MID’s executive organization, the Military Intelligence Service, to recommend the secret registration of communists serving in the Army and their removal from sensitive positions in case Moscow were to drop out of the war.

Such suspicions led to the establishment in the Signals Intelligence Service (the precursor of ASA) on 1 February 1943 of a small, highly secretive unit to decrypt intercepted Soviet diplomatic messages. Among its missions would have been an effort to determine if there was any foundation to recurring rumors that Stalin was considering a separate peace. When knowledge of

---

Col. Carter W. Clarke advocated decryption of intercepted Soviet communications during WW II. Photo: Courtesy of NARA.
through 1952, the paper clearly foresaw the end of US-Soviet alliance once the war had ended.

\textit{In carrying out its national security policies the Soviet Union will rely heavily upon the development of its own influence upon other nations. In peripheral areas, such as Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R. will insist upon control or predominant influence; in other areas, such as Central Europe, it will insist upon an influence equal to that of the Western Powers; in more remote areas, such as Western Europe, it will probably be content to wield a merely negative power such as would prevent an anti-Soviet orientation of the countries involved. In carrying out these policies, the U.S.S.R. will use the Communist parties and other means at its disposal. The methods it may employ are likely to seem repugnant and aggressive to governments not under Soviet influence.}^{63}

With regard to Germany, the committee’s ominous forecast turned out to be mostly accurate. Not even a month after Germany’s surrender, the G-2 of XXI Corps reported that the German Communist Party (KPD) had reemerged, that it sought to use denazification as a tool to nationalize certain industries, and that its leaders looked with optimism to the future.^{64}

In early June 1945, the CIC reported “signs of communist activity, which [had] taken a fairly clear definite form.” In the industrial West German city of Wuppertal, the CIC took the drastic step of squashing an illegal communist party organization.^{65} Based on reports coming from Germany, the MID in Washington concluded that the Nazis had suppressed the communist party only temporarily. With the Nazi oppressive apparatus gone, KPD members were busily rebuilding their party with the ultimate goal of controlling the new German regime.^{66}

By early 1947, Army intelligence concluded that the KPD would not achieve its ambitious goal of decisive political control in the Western zones, and that the overall political balance in the American zone of occupation had tilted in favor of the noncommunist parties.^{67} But in the East, the Soviet military administration authorized a forced merger of the KPD with the noncommunist Social Democratic Party (SPD) in early 1946.

Though the SPD was much larger than the KPD, communists loyal to Moscow assumed all key positions in the new “Socialist Unity Party of Germany” (SED). Army intelligence judged the merger a victory for Soviet zone communists.^{68} Indeed, the SED would eventually become the dominant political party in the Soviet-controlled German Democratic Republic.

The resurgence of the communist party in Germany went hand in hand with Soviet propaganda, subversion, and espionage activities across Central Europe. One country of concern for Army intelligence was Czechoslovakia, which bordered on the US-occupied zone of Germany in the southeast. Though nominally independent, the country remained in Moscow’s crosshairs after the Red Army entered Prague in May 1945. The local communist party gradually expanded its influence and eventually assumed power in a violent coup in 1948.

As the counterintelligence section of the US Forces in the European Theater (USFET) noted in early 1946, the Soviet intelligence service (NKVD) dominated the Czechoslovak security service. The same report observed that “Czech agents have no difficulty in crossing and recrossing the border into Germany, due to the complete lack of border control.” Specifically, the report pointed out that three Soviet citizens employed by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had crossed from Czechoslovakia into Germany on an UNRRA mission. While the UNRRA mission had been bona fide, the three Soviets were known informants for Soviet intelligence, and Army intelligence suspected that they had used their official mission as cover for illegal covert activities. USFET had received this information “from a reliable source in Prague,” proof that Army intelligence engaged in espionage operations in Soviet-controlled territory in Central Europe as early as spring 1946.^{69}

Berlin was another focal point for Army intelligence. The Red Army had conquered the city in May 1945, but the Allies had agreed to administer the German capital jointly. On
4 July 1945, soldiers of the 2d Armored Division of the US Army entered Berlin, and the city was subsequently divided into four occupation sectors, one for each of the three principal World War II Allies, and France.

The city’s location deep inside the Soviet zone, its dense population, the eager willingness of residents to procure and sell information, and the ease with which one could cross from one zone to another quickly turned Berlin into a hub for all sorts of covert and subversive activities. In March 1946, US military authorities in Berlin arrested 12 German communists on charges of intimidation, attempted espionage, and making critical remarks about US occupation policies. These were the first arrests reported to have been made in connection with the political activity of any party members in Germany.

Army intelligence also registered a growing resolve of Soviet authorities to kidnap people of intelligence value or considered hostile to Moscow. In the summer of 1946, a source inside the Berlin criminal police informed Army intelligence of a report from the missing persons bureau to the effect that 337 persons had disappeared in the city during the month of June. Of those, 245 had vanished in the Soviet sector. The source pointed out that “not all of the disappearances in the Russian Sector are assumed the result of the direct action of the Russian authorities”—in other words, many or most had to be considered kidnappings.

A little over a year later, the 970th CIC detachment in Berlin reported that Soviet intelligence had abducted six German employees of the Civil Administration Branch of the Office of Military Government for Berlin Sector (OMGBS). “It is therefore reasonable to conclude,” the CIC noted, “that an almost complete penetration of subject office has been successfully effected by Soviet Intelligence.”

The uncertain future of Soviet-US relations and the menacing presence of Soviet forces in central Europe prompted the MID to take a closer look at Red Army strength and deployments. In September 1945, the division launched a coordinated effort to collect Soviet order of battle information from the various Army intelligence agencies.

MID officers collated the material and used it to produce Soviet Military Roundup, a weekly publication on Soviet forces worldwide. Roundup drew on a large and diverse set of sources, ranging from top secret reports to publicly available information. Initially, the MID distributed Roundup only to the G-2, USFET, and to certain military attachés stationed in countries adjacent to the USSR, but other agencies soon requested copies, and circulation was...
expanded to include the Office of Naval Intelligence; the War Office; Air Force Intelligence (A-2); the G-2, US Army Forces in the Pacific; and the SSU. The popularity of Roundup highlights the importance Soviet issues had attained within the US military intelligence community just a few months after the end of World War II.

The MID cautioned that the constant reorganization of Soviet forces and large-scale transfers of troops into and out of Soviet-occupied Germany rendered precise order of battle estimates difficult. Still, Soviet Military Roundup provided a steady stream of assessments of the location, strength, and composition of Soviet forces worldwide, with a heavy focus on Central Europe. From April through late May 1946, Roundup estimated there were 700,000 Soviet troops (six armies, or 40 divisions) in East Germany. In late May, Roundup registered a slight drop, estimating the number of Soviet troops in East Germany at 628,000, organized into four armies, or 34 divisions. Roundup from 24 May 1946 noted that, while the Soviets intended to decrease troop strength significantly across southeastern Europe, Moscow planned to concentrate the remaining forces in East Germany: “The troop transfers [to East Germany], when completed, will not necessarily constitute a net increase in the already large Soviet-North European occupation forces, for it is probable that the additional troops are to be used to absorb the effects of the third stage of Soviet demobilization on occupation forces in Germany and Poland.”

MID Deputy Director Clarke supported this projection in a memorandum to the chief of staff in February 1947, when he estimated Soviet troop strength in East Germany at 500,000. Though this number constituted a decline vis-à-vis the 1946 estimates, it was a small one compared to the demobilization of much larger Soviet forces elsewhere—in Poland, for example, Soviet troop strength was estimated to have declined by nearly two thirds, from 350,000 in November 1946 to 120,000 in February 1947. And even taking the slight post-war drop into account, Red Army forces outnumbered their US counterparts in Germany by more than three to one in early 1947—if Army intelligence estimates were correct.

How accurate, then, were the MID’s Soviet order of battle estimates? The available data indicates that, while Army intelligence assessments of Soviet force levels were not always precise, they accurately grasped the continued, massive presence of Soviet troops in East Germany. As Army intelligence had noted, there was indeed a heavy turnover of Soviet troops in the immediate post-war years, but constant rotation notwithstanding, the bulk of Soviet forces in Europe remained in East Germany.

At the end of the war, the Soviets had about 1.5 million soldiers in Germany. In the immediate post-war era, demobilization led to a significant reduction, and Soviet troop levels bottomed out at the end of 1947, when 350,000 Red Army soldiers were stationed in the Soviet zone of occupation. By 1949, however, the number had risen to 550,000. These numbers show that Army intelligence had captured the main trend of Soviet troop deployment in the Soviet Zone: decreasing in the months immediately following the war, but increasing thereafter and stabilizing at a high level in the late 1940s. Understandably, Soviet military power in East Germany inspired awe among Army leaders and Washington decisionmakers who were painfully aware of the concurrent rapid decline of US Army troop levels in the US zone of occupation: from 3,077,000 on V-E Day to 399,740 on 1 January 1946; to 161,789 on 1 January 1947; to 109,528 on 1 January 1948; and to 81,071 on 1 January 1949.

The Red Army’s continued presence in East Germany, combined with a steady stream of disturbing information on Soviet covert activities across Central Europe, had a profound impact on the US military’s strategic outlook on the USSR. Shortly after the end of the war, military intelligence strategists in Washington moved from estimates of Soviet intentions to possible responses by the United States. In October 1945, the Joint War Plans Committee requested from the Joint Intelligence Staff, “as a matter of priority, a list of 20 of the most important targets, suitable for strategic bombing, in Russia and Russian-dominated territory.” The Joint Intelligence Staff duly produced a list of targets, with detailed information on how bombing of each would affect the Soviet economy and war-waging capability.

Over the following months, US estimates of Soviet intentions and
capabilities evolved into a gloomy war plan scenario in the European theater. “It seems probable,” a study of the Joint Chief Planners estimated, “that further Soviet expansion in the various parts of Europe and Asia within the next five to ten years will be accomplished by step-by-step advances, with each step taken in a manner and at a time calculated to avoid risk of a major conflict. Such a course endangers the security of the United States.” If war broke out in Europe, the study predicted, the “Red Army should have little difficulty in completely overrunning Denmark, Germany and Austria and most of Belgium, Holland and France.”

From Moscow, the newly appointed US military attaché, Brig. Gen. F. N. Roberts, sent a detailed assessment that emphasized aggressive Soviet designs as well as the country’s military power. According to Roberts, Soviet foreign policy aimed “toward the ultimate attainment of dominant world-wide influence,” and he concluded that “[t]oday, there is no power or combination of powers on the Eurasian continent which is capable of equaling the military strength of the Red Army.”

Roberts sent his report just four days before the deputy head of the US embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan, dispatched his famous “long telegram,” a passionate indictment of Soviet policy as intrinsically aggressive and hostile to the West. In order to keep Soviet belligerence in check, Kennan advocated “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Given the similar thrust of Kennan’s and Roberts’s missives, and their proximity in time, it is likely that the military attaché and the diplomat had coordinated their messages or had at least exchanged views on the subject of Soviet foreign policy and military strategy beforehand.

In Washington, the Joint Intelligence Committee reached a more differentiated—but still worrisome—conclusion. The committee did not believe that Moscow would deliberately start a war, however, it warned that the USSR would pursue an opportunistic foreign policy aimed at extending Soviet power as occasions arose. “It is possible,” the committee stated, “that these courses of action by miscalculation would lead to open warfare.” In view of Joseph Stalin’s attempt to drive the Western Allies out of Berlin during 1948–49 and his successor Nikita Khrushchev’s brinkmanship during the Cuban missile crisis (1962)—both of which pushed the superpowers to the edge of war—the committee’s estimate appears to be a realistic assessment of Soviet foreign policy.

Army intelligence collection and analysis on the Soviet Union reached the highest level of US policymaking. Via his special counsel, Clark
A review of Army intelligence operations in Germany from 1944 to 1947 reveals an organization that was not perfect but performed well overall.

M. Clifford, President Harry S. Truman on 18 July 1945 requested from Secretary of War Robert Patterson a report that would discuss Soviet activities affecting US security, estimate present and future Soviet army and air force policy, and recommend US actions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In his response, Patterson touched upon all the major issues Army intelligence had previously raised with regard to Soviet foreign policy and military strategy. He argued that “Soviet policy and practice in maintaining overwhelming military strength facing US forces in Europe and in Korea is a direct threat to the US.” Furthermore, he contended “that the Soviets are making every effort to raise the standard of efficiency of their forces in all places.” With regard to Moscow’s relationship with communist parties outside the USSR, Patterson noted the “Soviet habit of using local Communist Parties to weaken nations friendly to the US, and to prejudice US interests in those countries,” which represented “an important long-range threat to our security.” When it came to making recommendations on US foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Patterson urged firmness:

To summarize, I see only one real possibility of dealing with the policies at present pursued by the U.S.S.R. That is to be firm against any compromise of our fundamental ideals, the support of which is our responsibility to the world. This requires that the United States be strong internally and assist in strengthening those other nations which share our ideals. The hope is that in time there will evolve in the Soviet sphere a responsiveness to the desires of the peoples of the world, including the Soviet peoples, for a just and real peace.

Patterson’s advice foreshadowed the proclamation of the Truman doctrine of containment less than a year later: before a joint session of Congress, President Truman on 12 March 1947 requested $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey in order to assist their governments in resisting communist aggression. In his speech, Truman also demanded that “[i]t must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”

The roots of Truman’s containment policy are manifold—Stalin’s reluctance to withdraw the Red Army from northern Iran, Moscow’s vigorous support of communist organizations across Central Europe, and the continued presence of a massive Red Army contingent in the Soviet occupation zone also were key concerns. Army intelligence had carefully investigated and continuously reported on these issues since the end of the war, thus feeding directly into the decisionmaking process that resulted in Truman’s promulgation of containment in the spring of 1947.

Army Intelligence and National Security

A review of Army intelligence operations in Germany from 1944 to 1947 reveals an organization that was not perfect but performed well overall. Though cumbersome, constantly in flux, and working with dwindling resources, the Army’s military intelligence community correctly identified and successfully addressed two key threats to the American occupation and US national security: Nazi subversion and Soviet power.

In due course, the rethinking of American security priorities opened the door to wide-scale US-German collaboration. In 1946, Army intelligence sponsored the establishment of a German proto-intelligence organization under former Wehrmacht general Reinhard Gehlen, which was to provide the Americans with military information on the Red Army (Operation RUSTY). In the same year, Army intelligence began par-
In the absence of any other fully operational US intelligence agency in post-war Germany, Army intelligence acted as the US government’s principal intelligence collector in Central Europe well into the 1950s.

Both initiatives had long-term consequences. While Gehlen’s intelligence organization eventually became West Germany’s (and, after 1990, Germany’s) official foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, German rocket scientists recruited in the course of Operation PAPERCLIP contributed directly to the US space program and the successful Apollo 11 moon landing in 1969. In some cases, Army intelligence and other US agencies ended up working with individuals who were deeply compromised by their association with the Nazis.  

From a national security perspective, Army intelligence accomplished its mission. According to the Army’s latest intelligence field manual, an intelligence organization should produce “timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence about the enemy and other aspects.” Its most important task “is to drive operations by supporting the commander’s decisionmaking.”

Measured by its own yardstick, Army intelligence in post-war Germany acquitted itself well. Two key potential threats were investigated thoroughly and assessed in a timely manner. Predictions on future Nazi subversive and Soviet behavior were well-argued and reasonable. And the intelligence collected by the Army in Germany drove strategic planning at the War Department, if not foreign policy crafted at the White House.

In the absence of any other fully operational US intelligence agency in post-war Germany, Army intelligence acted as the US government’s principal intelligence collector in Central Europe well into the 1950s. Especially against the backdrop of radical demobilization, the military intelligence community’s unwieldy structure and the rapidly changing security environment of Central Europe, Army leaders and Washington decisionmakers could hardly have asked for more.
Endnotes


6. John P. Finnegan and Romana Danysh, Military Intelligence (US Army Center of Military History), 4–5.

7. Finnegan, Military Intelligence, 102.


12. Finnegan, Military Intelligence, 91–92.


15. Powe and Wilson, Evolution, 85.


21. Report on further information obtained from PW M/528 Gen Kienburg at Pontassieve (Italy), 14 Aug 1944, SIR 1178, Reports Relating to POW Interrogations 1943–1945, RG 165, NA.

22. Memo, LtCol. T. R. Bruskin, HQ, Sixth Army Group General Staff, G-2, 9 Apr 1945, folder “452/2/1 Werewolf Organization in Germany,” Headquarters Sixth Army Group General Staff, G-2 Section, Numeric-Subject File 1944–1945, RG 331, NA.

23. Memorandum for Information no. 60, Combined Intelligence Committee, 19 Apr 1945, folder “ABC 387 Germany (18 Dec 43) Sec. 7-B,” American-British Conversations Correspondence Relating to Planning and Combat Operations, 1940–1948 (hereafter cited as ABC File), RG 165, NA.
26. Memorandum for Information no. 62, Combined Intelligence Committee, 24 Apr 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 2-B,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.
28. Political Intelligence Report, 15 May 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 1-B,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.
30. Memorandum for Information no. 62, Combined Intelligence Committee, 24 Apr 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 2-B,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.
31. “CI Operations in Germany,” folder “ZC 50 08 71 Counter Intelligent [sic] Corp. Historical Information,” Records of the Investigative Records Repository, Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers-Impersonal Files (hereafter cited as IRR), RG 319, NA.
32. Memorandum for Information no. 62, Combined Intelligence Committee, 24 Apr 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 2-B,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.
33. Memorandum for Information no. 68, Combined Intelligence Committee, 7 May 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 1-B.” ABC File, RG 165, NA.
34. Proclamation of the American High Command, HQ, Seventh Army, G-2, Translation Section, 25 Apr 1945, folder “Black and White Lists, Suspects, Enemy Agents, 16 December 44 – 24 June 45,” Seventh Army, G-2, Subject Files 1942–1946, RG 338, NA. The text of the proclamation suggests that the Army’s main rationale for executing this alleged Werewolf—identified as “Erich Berndt alias Richard Jarczyk”—was to make an example of him in order to deter other would-be guerrillas.
35. HQ, Seventh Army, G-2, to USFET, G-2, 5 Sep 1945, folder “Correspondence, USFET, 22 May 45–15 Oct. 45,” Seventh Army, G-2, Subject Files 1942–1946, RG 338, NA.
38. Rpt, Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, 29 Oct 1945, folder “G-2 Notes for General Council Meeting,” Correspondence, Reports, Directives, and Other Records Relating to the Activities and Functions of the Intelligence Group, 1943–47, RG 165, NA.
39. HQ, CIC, USFET, to Chief of each CIC Region, 16 Mar 1946, folder “3rd Army G-2 Operation Nursery 380.4,” Third United States Army, G-2 Section, Decimal Files 1944–1947, RG 338, NA.
40. Rpt, G-2 Division, 15 Apr 1946, folder “G-2 Notes for General Council Meeting.” Correspondence, Reports, Directives, and Other Records Relating to the Activities and Functions of the Intelligence Group, 1943–47 (hereafter cited as Intelligence Group), RG 165, NA.
41. Folder “VI Corps History June 1945,” Historical Division, Program Files, VI Corps, History, 1945–1946, RG 498, NA.
42. SHAEF, Political Intelligence Report, 21 Jul 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 1-B.” ABC File, RG 165, NA.
46. T/3 Walter Ullmann, Intelligence Section, 6870th District Information Services Command US Army, to Intelligence Officer, Wuerzburg, 15 Oct 1945, folder “3rd Army G-2 Sabotage 000.5,” Third United States Army, G-2 Section, Decimal Files 1944–1947, RG 338, NA.
48. Special Agent Alfred S. Torbert, HQ, Sub-Region Mannheim/Heidelberg, 970th CIC Detachment Region I, memorandum for officer in charge, 22 Mar 1947, folder “E.P. Valentine Region IV XE-111873,” IRR, RG 319, NA.

50. Special Agent Marvin L. Edwards to Chief, CIC, Region IV (Munich), HQ, USFET, 18 Mar 1946, folder “E.P. Valentine Region IV XE-111873,” IRR, RG 319, NA.


56. Memo, Special Agent William C. Wallace, 303d CIC Detachment, for Officer in Charge, sub: Edelweiss Pirates, 15 Apr 1946, folder “3rd Army Subversive Activities 0.91.41,” Third United States Army, G-2 Section, Decimal Files 1944–1947, RG 338, NA.

57. CI/EB/JLB, sub: Information of Interest to the Counterintelligence Group, MIS, 15 Sep 1943, folder “Information Desired Folder ***** Current Questions for Interrogating Officers,” Interrogation Reports and Correspondence, 1942–1946, Enemy POW Interrogation File (MIS-Y), 1943–45, RG 165, NA.

58. Joint Intelligence Committee, sub: USSR-Situation, Capabilities and Intentions, 1st Revision, 20 Aug 1943, folder “ABC 336 RUSSIA Sec 1-A,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.

59. Memo, LtCol. John Lansdale, Jr, MIS, to Colonel Forney, sub: Recommendation as to disposition of Communists in the United States Army in the event of a separate Russo-German peace, 9 Sep 1943, folder “ZF 010029 Communist Infiltration of US Armed Forces,” IRR, RG 319, NA.


63. Joint Intelligence Committee, sub: Estimate of Soviet Post-War Capabilities and Intentions, 18 Jan 1945, folder “ABC 336 RUSSIA Sec 1-A,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.


65. Political Intelligence Report, 8 Jun 1945, folder “ABC 381 Germany (29 Jan 43) Sec 1-B,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.

66. MID, weekly analysis of events in Europe and the Middle East no. 2, from 13 Aug to 20 Aug 1945, folder “ABC 381 German (29 Jan 43) Sec 1-B,” ABC File, RG 165, NA.


68. Rpt, G-2 Division, 22 Apr 1946, folder “G-2 Notes for General Council Meeting,” Correspondence, Reports, Directives, and Other Records Relating to the Activities and Functions of the Intelligence Group, 1943–47, RG 165, NA.


70. Ziemke, U.S. Army, 303.

71. Rpt, G-2 Division, 11 Mar 1946, folder “G-Notes for General Council Meeting,” Intelligence Group, RG 165, NA.

73. HQ, CIC Region VIII, 970th CIC Detachment, memorandum for officer in charge, subject: Soviet Penetration of the Political Affairs Section, Civil Administration Branch, OMGBS, 16 Oct 1947, folder “Soviet Apprehension of German Nationals in US Zone XE 182 800,” IRR, RG 319, NA.


75. Intelligence Division, WDGS, notes on Soviet Armed Forces, no. 22, 8 Nov 1946, folder “ABC 336. (22 Aug 43) Sec 2 ‘Soviet Military Roundup,’” ABC File, RG 165, NA.

76. Soviet Military Roundup, no. 33, 26 Apr 1946; Soviet Military Roundup, no. 34, 3 May 1946; Soviet Military Roundup, no. 35, 24 May 1946, folder “ABC Russia (22 Aug 43) Sec 2 ‘Soviet Military Roundup,’” ABC File, RG 165, NA.


83. Joint Intelligence Staff, Memorandum of Request, sub: Bombing Targets in Russia, 22 Oct 1945, folder “ABC 336 RUSSIA Sec 1-A,” ABC File, RG 165, NA. (Emphasis in the original.)


88. Clark M. Clifford to Secretary of War, 18 Jul 1946, folder “091 Russia,” Office of the Chief of Staff, Top-Secret General Correspondence, 1941–1947, RG 165, NA.

89. Secretary of War Robert Patterson to President Harry S. Truman, 27 Jul 1946, folder “091 Russia,” Office of the Chief of Staff, Top-Secret General Correspondence, 1941–1947, RG 165, NA.


93. For a number of case studies of post-war US intelligence collaboration with Nazi war criminals, see Richard Breitman et al., eds., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 265–442.

94. Department of the Army, Field Manual 2-0: Intelligence (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), subs 1–8 and 1–16.
The Growth of China’s Air Defenses: Responding to Covert Overflights, 1949–1974

Bob Bergin

Protection of the Chinese state, deterrence of possible aggression against it, and, failing that, the ability to successfully defend against an attacking force have been Peking’s highest priorities since the regime came to power.¹

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was an extremely modest force when it was established in 1949, the year the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was officially proclaimed. It had few pilots; its aircraft were US and Japanese leftovers from World War II; and most of its early instructors were Japanese pilots who had been prisoners of war and Chinese Nationalists left behind when Chiang Kai-shek fled mainland China and relocated his Republic of China (ROC) government and his Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [KMT]) to Taiwan.

In the years that followed, new PLAAF pilots were selected from young PLA recruits. They were often poorly educated, but they were tough, bright, and determined. During the Korean War (1950–53), they were trained to fly jets by Russian instructors and were given MiG fighters that could match the US aircraft of the day. With the onset of the Sino-Soviet split in 1958, Soviet support was lost and China was driven to design and manufacture its own aircraft, a vast undertaking beset by technical and political problems.

Political and economic turmoil attending the Great Leap Forward (1958–60), the Cultural Revolution (1966–71), and challenges to Mao Zedong’s leadership all affected the development of the PLAAF and modernization of the Chinese military in general. However, one constant kept air force leadership focused: intrusions into PRC airspace by US and ROC reconnaissance aircraft gathering information on China’s growing military and nuclear and missile programs. The flights, which did not end until 1974, were recurring reminders of China’s vulnerability and spurred PLAAF efforts to counter the threat. The air defenses that emerged contributed to the end of the incursions and became the foundation of the sophisticated air defense system that protects the PRC today.


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
The Early Years—Through the Eyes of Chinese Veterans

The PLAAF’s earliest days are well described in the recollections of two first-generation PLAAF pilots who rose to senior positions, Han Decai and Yang Guoxiang. Han was an ace and a national hero during the Korean War. He rose to become a lieutenant general and vice commander of the Nanjing Air Command, which faced Taiwan and was one of the PLAAF’s most important posts. His background reflects the backgrounds of many other members of the PRC’s first generation of military pilots. Han was born in 1933 in coastal Anhui Province in a poverty-stricken village, Fengyang. Han described his childhood:

“We have an old folk song that says ‘We came from Fengyang and that’s a very good place. But ever since we had the Emperor Chu, we starve nine years in every ten.’... I lived there for 15 years, and in those 15 years I had one year of education. I worked on a farm as a laborer. I was also a beggar. In my 16th year, in February 1949, the Communists came and liberated the town, and I joined the People’s Liberation Army. Then, in June 1950, Chairman Mao said that we need a strong air force to protect our country, and many PLA soldiers volunteered to become pilots. I was one of them.

Han was initially sent to an air force preparatory school to catch up on his education, but his academic training was cut short when, in December 1950, he was assigned to the air academy to begin pilot training.

When Chairman Mao declared that China would join the Korean War, the Chinese air force did not have one operational unit that could put into the air.... We had a single month to learn the theory of flight.... We had three months to learn to fly.... When I joined a combat unit in July I had a total of 60 hours flying time.

Yang Guoxiang had also been a PLA soldier, the political instructor of a horse and mule transportation team when he was accepted into air force training. He recalled:

“I was serving in the military command in Yunnan and was one of a thousand who signed up to join the air force. Candidates had to be military officers with combat experience and at least a primary school education, but good physical condition was the most important thing. I was one of only six candidates chosen, and after we were sent to Kunming for health checks, I was the only one remaining.”

About his days at the PLAAF aviation school at Mudanjiang in China’s far northeast corner, Yang said,

“At first the PLAAF had only aircraft that it had captured from the KMT [Kuomintang-Chinese Nationalist Party] or the Japanese.... Most of our instructors were former Japanese prisoners of war.... We also had former KMT members who had been captured by the PLA and had joined us. Our aircraft were Japanese and American types that remained from the war, like the [Fairchild] PT-17 and the Japanese Type 99.

Yang, who trained as a ground attack pilot, would later become the chief pilot of the supersonic Qiang-5 (Q-5) project, China’s first indigenously produced military aircraft, and would eventually fly it to drop the country’s first H-bomb. During the 1978–79 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, he commanded a Q-5 division.

---

2 Unless otherwise noted, the recollections quoted in this article are all from the author’s interviews with Han Decai in Dalian, Shandong Province, November 2001, and in Shanghai, 2011 and with Yang Guoxiang in Kunming, Yunnan Province, in 2009 and 2010. Extended versions of these interviews have appeared in the Smithsonian’s Air and Space magazine: A&S Interview with Han Decai, “I Was There: Bring Down the Spyplane” in May 2012 and “A&S Interview with Yang Guoxiang,” January 2010.

3 Xiaoming Zhang wrote, “According to the CMC’s [CCP’s Central Military Commission] requirements, all candidates must be party and youth league members known to be politically reliable, be platoon or company officers with combat experience, be elementary school graduates, be physically fit, and be between eighteen and twenty-four. From a Communist perspective, peasant and worker origins and infantry experience were essential for instilling the qualities of bravery, adaptability, and toughness required of an airman.” See Red Wings over the Yalu: China, The Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 13.
The Korean War and its Aftermath

Once in combat units, students transitioned to the MiG-15 with the help of Soviet instructors, who gave them a few hours in the Yak-17—a first generation straight-wing turbo jet—before putting them into the MiGs. After 30 hours in the MiG, they were sent to an advanced airfield at the front. According to Han, 

There we got to understand more about the Americans. We learned that they were among the top pilots in the world, and that the North American F-86 Sabre was probably the best fighter in the world. We started to understand what we were up against. [I took comfort in Chairman Mao’s words] The American is a paper tiger. If you face him with courage, he can be conquered.

Han explained that once in combat, Chinese pilots were independent of Russian control. In the early days, Russian pilots were always in the air when the Chinese were, but in their own formations, serving as cover flights behind the Chinese. Later in the war, Russian and Chinese flights were assigned to separate operational areas.

Reflecting on his experiences in the war, Han said he believed that a Chinese fighter pilot’s success in combat depended on how quickly he recognized his disadvantages and dealt with them. Chinese pilots had a low level of flight experience, and the aircraft they flew were outperformed by the enemy.

We knew that if we used ordinary tactics, we would fail. We had to take advantage of the situation, and take advantage of any mistakes the Americans made. I shot down a total of five aircraft, and in each case but one, I took advantage of a mistake the pilot made and used it against him.

After the armistice in 1953, the PLAAF faced a whole new set of problems. It had a large inventory of aircraft, but, according to Yang, “many of the aircraft the Soviets had given [to the Chinese] were abandoned because of the short life [remaining on] their engines.” The PLAAF had to find ways to meet future requirements. Given the deteriorating relationship with the Soviets, the Chinese started to think about developing their own aircraft.

The PLAAF’s concerns were realized in 1958 with the break in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet air force stopped providing support and withdrew its experts from China. According to Yang,

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev said that without Soviet help, the Chinese air force would become a Chinese ground force in three months. We had great problems. We were short of aircraft and fuel. Most of our airplanes stayed on the tarmac for lack of fuel and spare parts. The lack of fuel meant that Chinese pilots could fly only about 40 hours a year. The recruitment of new pilots was suspended for several years. There were pilot trainees who graduated from flight school without ever touching an airplane.

Han, promoted to deputy squadron commander after the armistice, was dealing with another set of problems, including the incursions of aircraft flying from Taiwan. In 1954, he had been sent to Dalian, in northeast China, where Russian instructors taught him how to fly at night and in challenging weather. These skills would be needed when he transferred to Wuxi airbase in Jiangsu Province, east China, in 1956. Han said,

The weather there was more complicated...but by 1956, we were competent in night flying and all-weather flying. The night incursions of aircraft from Taiwan were going on at this time.

The incursions, also described in memoirs of pilots who committed them, were CIA covert air operations carried out with the ROC government based in Taiwan. The earliest missions were flown by US pilots working for Civil Air Transport (CAT), an airline that served Nationalist China, and that in time would become Air America. Political considerations dictated that the United States train Nationalist Chinese pilots to fly these covert missions in World War II-era aircraft, including B-17s and B-25s.

By 1954, the CIA was readying an airplane built for the purpose, the P2V-7U. The plane was a version of the P2V Neptune maritime patrol aircraft that was heavily modified by Lockheed’s famous Skunk Works. Another, more serious problem for

---

4 For documents related to the origins of Air America and its relationship to CAT, see www.foia.cia.gov/Air America, especially http://www.foia.cia.gov/AirAmerica/C05261065.pdf.
From the Other Side of Collection

In March 1959, pilots from Taiwan were sent to the United States for flight training in the U-2.

the PLAAF was the high-flying Lockheed U-2, also a Skunk Works product, which American pilots had begun to fly across mainland China in August 1957.

Defeating the U-2

As a deputy squadron commander in the Nanjing Military Region, Han was involved in readying the PLAAF’s countermeasures: “We got the MiG-17s without radar. We also received a radar-equipped MiG-17, the PF model, from the Soviet Union, which was used to attack the low-altitude intruders from Taiwan.” China was developing its own aircraft at his time, the Model 56, which was based on the MiG-17. Han’s squadron was equipped with the MiG-17s; the unit’s “main target” would be the U-2.

American-piloted U-2s flew across mainland China until Gary Powers was shot down over the USSR in May 1960. Dino A. Brugioni, a senior officer of the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) wrote:

As part of Operation Soft Touch, U-2 missions were authorized to fly over the PRC to reach Russian targets. Communist China became a prime target when it became known that the Russians were aiding the Chinese in the development of both missile and nuclear capabilities.6

At the time, it was clear that the aerial and satellite photography would have to provide the bulk of intelligence on Chinese nuclear and missile targets because so little information was available from other sources. In some respects China represented a more challenging intelligence problem than the Soviet Union because we had so little collateral information on what was happening there.7

In March 1959, pilots from Taiwan were sent to the United States for flight training in the U-2, and on 6 May 1960, President Eisenhower approved the sale of U-2s to the ROC.8

The Soviet downing of the Powers U-2 appeared to be a devastating blow to the program, and the CIA did close secret overseas bases, but Lockheed continued to sell the aircraft to the US Air Force and other customers. Ben Rich, who participated in the U-2 design and became head of the Skunk Works, wrote:

According to Rich, with CIA assistance, a US-ROC joint squadron of U-2s was established in Taiwan, and Chinese Nationalist pilots started flying over the mainland in 1962 and continued to do so until 1974.10 But there would also be CIA flights over China, in particular to distant nuclear test sites that Nationalist-flown U-2s could not reach. These, Rich wrote, would be approached by CIA U-2s flown from “dirt landing strips” in India and Pakistan.11

Countering the Flights

Han described what it was like to fly the MiG-17 against the U-2:

The U-2s conducted their reconnaissance missions in the daytime. We did our best to attack them, but the problem was the extreme altitude at which the U-2 flew: we could not reach them. The MiG-17 that I was flying at the time had a maximum altitude of 16,000 meters, but the U-2s were flying above

---

5 U-2 flights over the Urals and Siberia were approved by President Eisenhower in May 1957. See Dino A. Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA and Cold War Aerial Espionage (Naval Institute Press, 2010), 227.
6 Ibid., 305.
7 Ibid., 306.
10 H. Mike Hua, Lost Black Cats: Story of Two Captured Chinese U-2 Pilots (AuthorHouse, 2005), viii. Hua is a retired ROC Air Force general and former U-2 pilot.
11 Rich, Skunk Works, 182.
20,000 meters. They usually entered the mainland from the northeast of Shanghai.

There was not much we could do against the U-2. Chasing a U-2 made for a pretty dull flight. Every time a U-2 reconnaissance flight was detected in our sector, we sent up two aircraft to track it. We could go up to our maximum altitude of 15,600 meters, but still not see the U-2, which were flying above 20,000 meters. All we could do was to try to reach the U-2 with a zoom climb. In the end, there was nothing we could do with our aircraft against the U-2. We had to leave the job to our surface-to-air missiles. 12

**Encountering the SA-2**

On 9 September 1962, a U-2 flown by ROC Lt. Col. Cheng Huai was brought down by an SA-2 over Nanchang in Jiangxi Province, some 400 kilometers from the coast. Cheng was killed. On 3 November 1963, a U-2 piloted by Major Yeh “Robin” Changti was brought down near the end of his nine-hour mission, with China’s southern coastline in sight. Major Yeh was severely wounded, but he survived. He recalled that a high-pitched signal from his System 12 radar had warned him that missile guidance radar had locked on to his aircraft. He evaded one SA-2 missile, but a second tore the right wing from his U-2. 13

In Washington, DC, at NPIC, where film from the U-2 cameras was interpreted, Brugioni was concerned by what the U-2 film showed:

We began to spot SA-2 missile sites near Chinese strategic targets and cities. We were asked to search proposed [Nationalist] flight tracks for possible SA-2 deployments. We had no trouble identifying them, but the Chinese began playing a shell game, moving the SA-2 sites about, and even camouflaging them...the branch chief responsible for the searches came to me and demanded to be removed from the operation because the danger of a SA-2 site being moved between missions was great and he did not want to be blamed if a Chinese U-2 was downed. 14

Brugioni added that NPIC’s director, Arthur C. Lundahl, reported to CIA officers that NPIC could “no longer be 100-percent sure” of the locations of PRC SA-2 sites on any given date. 15

The SA-2 was an early generation missile, with very limited range. To hit the U-2 at its operational altitude, the missile had to be launched from almost directly underneath the U-2’s flight path. 16 The PRC did not have many of the missiles, only four operational battalions, according to estimates at the time, and there was no prospect of resupply from the USSR. 17 Han Decai explained PLAAF missile tactics under the circumstances.

The way we did this was just like guerrilla warfare. Our missile launchers were fixed on military trucks and could be moved around. We had some sense of where the priority targets of interest to the U-2s were, and that’s where we located our launchers. We generally fired at the U-2 when it was within a range of 15 kilometers, and we used certain tactics to bring the U-2 into that range. For example, when a U-2 was detected in an area where a missile launcher was located, we cut off all the radars in that area so the U-2 would not be alerted to their presence. The

---

12 According to Mike Hua, “The MiGs always followed the U-2 over the mainland, and hopefully some malfunction happened that would force the U-2 to descend to the MiG’s combat zone. The pilot of the U-2 could easily spot an enemy fighter the size of a tiny pinpoint at the tip of a long white contrail over the background of the earth’s surface.” Lost Black Cats, 5.

13 Ibid., 2.

14 Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky, 312.

15 Ibid.

16 The SA-2 Guideline was the first effective Soviet surface-to-air missile. It had an effective range of about 20 miles and a maximum slant range of 27 miles. This was the missile used to shoot down the U-2 flown by Gary Powers. See US Air Force Fact Sheet: SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile, available online from the National Museum of the US Air Force at http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=334.

17 Hua, Lost Black Cats, 6.
U-2 was not very maneuverable. When it started getting within range, we would suddenly turn on the radars, and it was too late for the U-2 to react.

Ben Rich recorded the Skunk Works reaction to the shoot-downs. Back in Burbank, we did what we could to help cut down the U-2 losses. We developed improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) calculated to confuse Chinese radar operators working their SA-2 ground-to-air missile systems. On radar screens the U-2 would present a false display so that the missile would be launched in the wrong piece of sky.18

Cutting-edge technology it may have been, but it was not effective against the Chinese tactic of keeping radars turned off until it was too late for U-2s to get out of the way of oncoming missiles.

Brugioni later observed that by 1966, the Black Cat Squadron was experiencing losses from SA-2s throughout China and that it had become very dangerous to fly the U-2 over the mainland. But the emergence of a new factor in the overhead reconnaissance equation—satellite systems that could scan vast areas as they passed over—had become operational in the early 1960s. These systems had developed rapidly, and by 1966, according to Brugioni, “Imagery obtained from KH-4 and KH-7 satellites eliminated the need for the dangerous missions flown by the Black Cat Squadron.”19

The last U-2 overflight of mainland China took place in 1968, but Taiwan’s U-2s continued to fly missions along the PRC’s periphery until 1974. In that time, according to Mike Hua, “The U-2s of the Black Cat Squadron penetrated the Bamboo Curtain one hundred and two times, with five aircraft shot down, three pilots killed, and two captured by the enemy.”20

The Black Cat U-2s had done their job well. The photography they brought back enabled US intelligence to monitor the development of China’s nuclear capability, from the construction of the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanzhou in northwest China to the discovery of the nuclear test site at Lop Nor in far western China. This knowledge was deemed critical at the time and could not have been acquired in any other way.

The termination of the U-2 flights was at least partially a result of the PLAAF’s tenacity. The Soviet experience had shown how difficult it was to reach the U-2, even with the state-of-the-art SA-2. The Chinese had devised ways to use their few missiles and launchers most effectively. Guerrilla warfare tactics had defeated sophisticated electronic countermeasures. But success against the U-2 underscored the need to strengthen China’s air defense system across a wide spectrum, from the stratospheric heights of the U-2 down to the space just above the trees.

Dealing With the Low-Level Intruders

Other, less capable aircraft had been intruding into China’s airspace. After 1949 the United States provided a variety of planes to the ROC, including P-38s, F-51s (modernized WW II era Mustangs), T-33s, RF-84s, RE-86s, and a reconnaissance version of the British-designed B-57 bomber, the RB-57D. These, Brugioni noted, flew missions along the coast and inland, targeting airfields, naval bases, and ports in search of buildups that could threaten Taiwan. The missions also produced order of battle information on Communist Chinese forces.21

Improvements in PLAAF intercept capability eventually had a negative effect, however. On 18 February 1958 a high-altitude RB-57A flown by a ROC pilot was brought down over Shandong. The PRC announcement of the shoot-down did not identify the means. In November 1958, the ROC received two improved, “high-altitude design” RB-57Ds. Missions were flown successfully until 7 October 1959, when an RB-57D was shot down near Beijing, apparently by an

18 Rich, Skunk Works, 181.
19 Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky, 312.
20 Hua, Lost Black Cats, ix.
21 Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky, 77.
The fighter-based photo reconnaissance aircraft were short-ranged but fast, ideal for quick dashes across the Chinese countryside.

Swept-wing RF-84Fs started flying regular missions in late 1956. For a year and a half they operated almost with impunity. In good weather, they flew two missions a day. On 14 May 1957, an RF-84F got an in-flight photo of a pursuing PLAAF fighter. One observer claimed that the “picture probably recorded the first MiG-17 flying in the air for the free world.” It was a glimpse of things to come. On 17 June 1958, MiG-15s caught two RF-84Fs and shot one down.

The fighter-based photo reconnaissance aircraft were short-ranged but fast, ideal for quick dashes across the Chinese countryside. They were difficult to intercept and elements of luck were involved in any PLAAF success. Han Decai described one shoot-down, in 1962, of an RF-101 Voodoo on a low-level mission near Guangzhou in southeast China.

It was an air-to-air kill, and it was a miracle that a MiG-17 could bring down an F-101. The F-101 was supersonic; the MiG-17 was subsonic. The aircraft that shot down the Voodoo was actually a Model 56, the Chinese version of the MiG-17. The MiG-17 was coming in from the side as the Voodoo approached. The MiG pilot aimed well to the front of the F-101 and let the enemy fly into the cannon shells. Later, when we had the MiG-19, shooting down an F-101 would not have been such a big deal.

The PLAAF found one aircraft type in particular difficult to deal with, the P2V-7U, a specialized version of the Navy’s P2V Neptune patrol plane. The aircraft grew out of early CIA requirements for a platform that could handle a range of covert operations. The standard P2V, in service since 1947, had two powerful piston engines. The latest model P2V-7 also carried two small jet engines that could be used briefly in a pinch. The P2V had excellent low-level performance, long range, and could carry a large payload.

Like the U-2, the aircraft was a product of Lockheed’s Skunk Works. Included in the modifications was an enlarged hatch, a “Joe hole,” under the fuselage to drop agents; a modified weapons bay to facilitate supply drops to agents or rebels and to house a programmable device that dispensed propaganda leaflets. Camera systems were installed, as were SIGINT and ELINT collection equipment and the best of ECM devices, including a radar warning receiver and a jammer to foil intercepting fighters. According to a memoir, the aircraft carried no defensive armament and depended for defense entirely on jamming, chaff dispensing, low altitude flying, and evasive action. The upgraded P2Vs replaced three B-17s and three B-26s, which ROC pilots used for overflights that often lasted 10 hours or more. The first P2V mission was flown in January 1958.

US intelligence was most interested in the signals and electronic intelligence the P2V could collect. The ROC had other priorities: collecting photo and electronic intelligence, showering propaganda leaflets over selected areas of China, and dropping and supplying agent teams. While the U-2 flights were essentially unknown to the Chinese people, the P2Vs were conspicuous and more of a political problem for the PLAAF. The pressure to stop them presumably was high.

In 1961, Han Decai was transferred to Nanjing to fly the radar-equipped MiG-17PF against the low-level P2V intruders. Squadrons in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Xuzhou were kept on alert and ordered into action when a P2V entered their sector. Because the P2Vs flew low and could elude the radars, their known movements were coordinated from sector to sector.

The PLAAF used ground-controlled intercept (GCI) techniques learned from the Soviets, Han explained.

Our MiGs were directed into position by the GCI controller using ground radars. To avoid detection by the P2V,
the MiG pilot would not turn on his radar until he was in position right behind the intruder. But that tactic was not effective. It really did not work very well. In fact, the P2Vs we did bring down did not come about because of radar, but because we saw them. I can also remember an instance where a PLAAF pilot brought down a B-17 because he just happened to see the exhaust flame.

The MiG-17’s airborne radar was not reliable, and had other faults, Han explained. The range was short: the radar could only be used at about 1,000 meters. And because the intruders flew so low—sometimes as low as 50 meters—there was a lot of ground clutter and it was very difficult to track them. The radar in our MiGs was effective only if we were below the altitude of the enemy aircraft, looking up at him. If we were above him, even just slightly, and put our aircraft’s nose down, the radar would pick up ground clutter, and we could not make out the target. To make the radar effective, we had to modify it, to eliminate the lower part of the scan, and use only the upper part.

The intruder could also elude the ground controller. When we turned on our airborne radar, the P2V would detect it, and immediately dive away. Then he would drop metal foil, and that would disrupt the ground control radar and cause the controller to lose him.

The PLAAF experimented with tactics and equipment. The World War II era Tupolev Tu-2 light bomber was used as a night fighter but not very successfully. Then, remarkably, the Tupolev Tu-4 was pressed into service to pursue and attack the P2V. The Tu-4 was a large, four-engine aircraft, the Russian copy of the American WW II B-29 bomber. Its virtue was that it could stay in the air a long time and bring many guns to bear on any target it caught. But, as Han remembered, “The Tu-4 was just too big and too slow, and it was accident prone. At least one of them flew into the ground.”

Then Russian Ilyushin IL-28 jet bombers were used as illuminators, an effort Han described as pretty hopeless:

A searchlight was mounted on the IL-28. The idea was that the IL-28 would try to fly above and ahead of the P2V, and then turn on the searchlight to light up the P2V’s fuselage so the chasing MiG pilot could see it. Again, this was not very successful.

In practice, this was very difficult to do. It was all a matter of coordination. There were three people involved: the pilot of the IL-28, the pilot of the MiG interceptor, and the GCI controller. The controller and both pilots first had to find the target. Then the IL-28 pilot had to get above and ahead of the target and light it up as the MiG was trying to get into position to fire.

The controller on the ground had to follow the P2V and simultaneously move the IL-28 and the MiG into position on an airplane they couldn’t see. When the IL-28’s searchlight was turned on and illuminated the P2V’s fuselage, the MiG already had to be in position to fire. This required exceptionally close coordination and was very difficult to do.

The Beginnings of China’s Air Defense System

Over the years, the difficulty of dealing with the intruders and the evolution of the tactics the PLAAF used against them, led to a systematic way of dealing with the problem. As Han Decai explained:

We wracked our brains to come up with ideas to defeat the P2V missions. For example, we tried to set up ambushes in remote areas. We knew that the P2V would always fly at low altitude. Over time, we became very familiar with the kind of routes they needed to fly. We would concentrate our anti-aircraft artillery in the areas we believed they were likely to fly over, and position the guns in such a way that when
the P2V entered the area, our artillery could fire at it from different directions.

There were searchlights on the ground as well as radar, but the radars were the most important. They were set up in a chain that allowed us to track the intruders over their entire route.

We had intelligence collection that gave us advance warning of an intruder flight. We could intercept signals intelligence that provided indications of an intruder flight, long before that flight took off. From the preparations that we knew were being made on the ground in Taiwan, we could do some calculations and determine when the aircraft would take off and also get some idea of its planned route.

Our radars could pick up an incoming intruder only at very short range, about 100 kilometers out at sea. Even with a radar station on top of mountain, we still had difficulty tracking incoming aircraft. The P2Vs stayed down very low as they came in, and were hard to pick up. And with the P2Vs being that low, our radar would pick up strong reflections from the waves. In that clutter the P2V was difficult to track.

There were many difficulties that we had to overcome. Over time, in overcoming these difficulties, we established an integrated air defense system. We could track the enemy at low altitude and at high altitude. We incorporated our surface-to-air missiles into our air defense system. Then it became really dangerous for Taiwan intruder aircraft to fly over mainland China. Eventually, it was no longer feasible for the Taiwan Air Force to fly intruder missions into mainland China.

We had intelligence collection that gave us advance warning of an intruder flight. We could intercept signals intelligence that provided indications of an intruder flight, long before that flight took off. From the preparations that we knew were being made on the ground in Taiwan, we could do some calculations and determine when the aircraft would take off and also get some idea of its planned route.

Our radars could pick up an incoming intruder only at very short range, about 100 kilometers out at sea. Even with a radar station on top of mountain, we still had difficulty tracking incoming aircraft. The P2Vs stayed down very low as they came in, and were hard to pick up. And with the P2Vs being that low, our radar would pick up strong reflections from the waves. In that clutter the P2V was difficult to track.

There were many difficulties that we had to overcome. Over time, in overcoming these difficulties, we established an integrated air defense system. We could track the enemy at low altitude and at high altitude. We incorporated our surface-to-air missiles into our air defense system. Then it became really dangerous for Taiwan intruder aircraft to fly over mainland China. Eventually, it was no longer feasible for the Taiwan Air Force to fly intruder missions into mainland China.

The mission against the Taiwanese intruders lasted a long time—until we came to a kind of tacit agreement with Taiwan that turned into a truce. The Taiwan government did not send recon airplanes over the mainland, and we did not bomb the islands near Taiwan. I flew these missions from 1961 to 1968. In 1968, I started to fly the MiG-19, which was also used to go after the intruders.25

What The Low-Level Intruders Accomplished

The P2V-7Us proved very effective at the black work they were chosen to do: dropping and supplying agents, dropping propaganda leaflets, and collecting electronic intelligence while eluding the PLAAF’s pursuing MiG-17s. With years of experience dealing with this problem, Han Decai gave his evaluation of what these missions might have accomplished:

What Taiwan achieved was probably negligible. Their intrusion flights affected relatively small areas of China. In the end, all the propaganda leaflets they dropped gained them nothing. Virtually all the agents they dropped were quickly captured by our local forces. Taiwan may have gained intelligence from these reconnaissance efforts, but as time went on, the value of that was probably offset by US concern about the growing strength of the PLAAF and the increased effectiveness of China’s air defenses—all of which were fostered by Taiwan’s intruder flights.

The ROC’s aircrews displayed incredible courage in carrying out their low-level penetration missions, but the value of the program in retrospect is questionable. Ten of the aircraft engaged in low-level penetration missions from Taiwan—including all five of the CIA-provided P2V-7Us—were lost over the Chinese mainland, three in air-to-air engagements.

Taiwan suspended its penetration flights over the mainland in 1964, although flights along China’s coast were made through 1966, when this joint program with the United States was terminated. Of the hundreds of agents and special operations troops

25 In his interview, Han pointed out that the Nationalists would continue to launch balloons carrying propaganda leaflets over the mainland. Shooting down the balloons, he said, was easy, however.
What the penetration flights did accomplish was to motivate the PRC leadership to more quickly build an air force and to create an effective air defense system.

that were dropped, apparently none survived; the propaganda drops were largely ignored by mainland residents. Electronic and other technical intelligence collection gave the United States a good picture of the PRC’s growing military strength and its rapidly developing nuclear program, although much of the intelligence on the latter came from the high-flying U-2s.

An Unintended Effect

What the penetration flights did accomplish was to motivate the PRC leadership to more quickly build an air force and to create an effective air defense system. The difficulty of defending against incoming flights that ranged from ground level to the stratosphere and which employed state-of-the-art technical countermeasures was a challenge that could only be met by development of a versatile, sophisticated air defense system in which coordination among many parts had to be close and effective and increasingly difficult to defeat.

There is no question that in their time, the mainland U-2 flights were necessary and productive for the United States. However, the PLAAF had to defeat them, and in the process, gained early experience in the use of surface-to-air missiles against specialized high-flying targets. The P2V flights were another matter: they were more difficult to defeat. They required the PLAAF to employ a greater variety of assets and to use them inventively. And it may have been even more imperative to stop the P2V; the P2V’s capability to drop agents and commando teams, and dispense propaganda material added a political component to the

P2V flights that the other intruders did not have.

In seeking the intelligence it needed to assure its own security and that of an ally, the United States spurred a potential opponent to create an integrated, multilayered defense capability, with an air force that today ranks as one of the toughest to defeat. In the words of a RAND corporation study:

Even today, the emerging capabilities of the PLAAF are such that, combined with the geographic and other advantages China would enjoy in the most likely conflict scenario—a war over Taiwan—the USAF could find itself challenged in its ability to achieve air dominance over its adversary, a prospect that the USAF has not had to seriously consider for nearly two decades.²⁶

Rethinking Failure

Managing the “Reliability Cycle”: An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure

Scott J. Hatch

Soon after becoming the director of the Intelligence Success and Failure Course of CIA University’s Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, I realized that much of the literature on intelligence success and failure made no mention of insights from professions outside of our intelligence domain. Many of these professions also face severe consequences for failure. Increasingly, as I taught the class, I came to draw from business and organizational literature on so-called high reliability organizations (HRO) and normal accident theory. In this article I have adapted the material contained in the literature to the domain of intelligence analysis. I believe a shift in our thinking about this subject would allow the Intelligence Community to think more proactively and holistically about the ways to increase the reliability of our intelligence analysis.

During the past few decades, business researchers have produced a substantial body of literature on organizations that achieve high reliability under conditions of dynamic uncertainty, inherent complexity, high risk, and potentially catastrophic costs should they fail. The researchers have focused on are in fields like aviation safety, nuclear power plant operations, chemical or oil processing, medicine, and wildfire control.

Given that Intelligence Community (IC) organizations face challenges of ensuring reliability under conditions in some ways similar to those faced by HROs, I believe the IC should apply the lessons HROs have learned in thinking about failures of intelligence analysis. Doing so may yield not only additional lessons for the community but could help managers of intelligence analysis think more effectively about their own environments in order to avert or mitigate risk of failure and improve prospects for success.

In this essay, I will translate HRO and accident-management insights to the domain of intelligence analysis and sketch out an HRO framework for intelligence analysis.¹ More work, of course, would need

¹ Among the leading researchers in studying HROs are Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Karlene Roberts and David van Stralen. Weick and Sutcliffe together authored, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty (Jossey-Bass, 2007), probably the most frequently referenced book in the field.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
to be done to apply this framework to daily work practices in the IC’s analytic components.

What We Are Aiming For

Any effort to improve organizational performance must begin with a clear sense of aims so that benchmarks can be set up to gauge progress.

In my experience, analysts in CIA’s intelligence successes and failures program have found it challenging to define failure. Much of the literature on intelligence failure has focused on “making the right call” and identifying the cognitive elements that might have gone into “failed” analysis.

But intelligence analysts know they must aim for more than just the “right call.” They rightly observe that factors having to do with organizational and policy environments are always involved as well. Moreover, because most studies of intelligence success and failure tend to be case-specific, it is natural to fixate on specific events, rather than on success and failure as part of a process that transcends particular moments or events.

In reality, I believe we should not be interested in a “win-loss” balance sheet but in how our successes and failures factor into our ongoing efforts to be consistently reliable in supporting our consumers in the many ways they demand of us. With this in mind, I believe we should think of our analytical mission—and hence the ways in which we measure success and failure—in the following way. Our goal in analysis should be to

- have a positive impact in informing our consumer’s decisionmaking…
- by delivering to the consumer the right insights …
- in a timely and useful manner…
- consistently over time.

Impact—informing decisionmaking—is what we aim for as intelligence analysts. Even granting that impact may be difficult to measure, considering impact forces us to look at real measures of effectiveness rather than just at the numbers of products produced, briefings delivered, and other similar quantitative measures (number of graphics, for example). These latter attributes only have indirect effects on impact. Our goal as analysts is not to simply write papers, throw them over some official’s transom, and hope they get read. Stressing impact enables us to start thinking about how to measure effectiveness, not just performance.

Second, the “right insights” can be defined as those insights that accurately describe a situation, add value for a consumer, are rigorously arrived at, and are soundly reasoned. Accuracy and value-added are essential to having the right insights, and without them one is left with either something that is wrong or merely obvious. Failure would come from the absence of the right insights or the delivery of insights (even if the right ones) in ways that were neither timely nor useful to policymakers. This is clear-cut: if we do not do these things, then we have failed. At the same time, meeting these two conditions is necessary—but not sufficient—for success. Success goes beyond “getting it right”: It concerns impact and achieving consistency over time.

The goal of analysts and managers is to have policymakers and policy implementers keep coming back to analysts over time. While luck may be—and often is—a component of any given success or failure, we cannot rely on it. Thus, by always being rigorous in tradecraft, persuasively presenting assessments, and managing relations with our consumers, we demonstrate the marks of reliability. To use a manufacturing analogy, it is not enough to minimize production-line defects. To achieve success we must actively manage our corporate brand, and that means striving for reliability.

Lastly with the above four-part definition of our mission we have a way to identify partial success or partial failure so that we can think about how to do things better and avoid the overgeneralization inherent in today’s use of the terms “success” and “failure.” Moreover, it provides more clarity for accurate benchmarking.

Developing Attitudes to Facilitate Reliability

Having a sharp definition of goals is only a first step toward greater reliability. A second is adoption of the appropriate attitude toward failure. Organizations typically either acknowledge failure or they deny it. A denial mentality is often characterized by the phrase (attributed to Gene Kranz, the NASA flight director dur-
ing the Apollo 13 mission), “Failure is not an option.” In contrast, an “acknowledgement mentality” is captured in the sentence, “We are always one step away from failure.” Both attitudes set up formal and informal incentives throughout an organization. The latter attitude facilitates learning; the former does not.

The saying “failure is not an option” may be well intended. At the same time, however, some managers and employees may draw from the expression the sense that failure should not even be considered. When failure does occur, such attitudes could create incentives for individuals to look for ways of denying it has occurred or to try to deflect responsibility. Such behavior is unproductive and costs organizations energy, time, and focus that could be better spent recovering from failure.

The opposite mentality, the one that adopts the attitude of “we are always one step away from failure” is the mark of the high reliability organization. It is an attitude that, proponents of the HRO concept argue, produces different organizational incentives.

**HROs and the Reliability Cycle**

According to Weick and Sutcliffe, HROs constantly try to anticipate failure, and they recover quickly and effectively when failures occur. In the field of intelligence analysis, I suggest these qualities can be further refined into the five elements shown in the graphic below. I believe management of this cycle holds the key to increasing our analytic reliability. Its application would move us from dealing purely retrospectively with failure to a continuous and forward-looking process for dealing with the possibility of failure. The former looks for lessons after a failure. The latter identifies the risks and potential causes of failure and works to avoid them.

The following is my view of the roles and responsibilities of analysts and managers in this cycle.

**Phase 1: Anticipation**

The “preoccupation [of HROs] with failure,” as Weick and Sutcliffe put it, might seem paralyzing, but that focus leads to constant self-awareness. HROs consistently ask how things are supposed to work, how they are working, what could go wrong, what the consequences would be if things did go wrong, and what indicators, if any, suggest things are going wrong.

In intelligence work, this means analysts and managers need to diagnose the situations they are in, identify potential vulnerabilities, and monitor signals for evidence of weakness. Their goal is not to anticipate every possible failure—that would be impossible—but to address the most evident and biggest potential problems. At the same time, they gain familiarity with their systems so they will be able to anticipate and react to unexpected developments more quickly or establish means for prevention, mitigation, and recovery. The less done at this stage, the more that will need to be done if failure does occur.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

**THE RELIABILITY CYCLE**

**ANTICIPATION PHASE**

Thinking about how things work, how they can go wrong, and what the consequences are of failure

**BUILDING RELIABILITY**

Cultivating mindfulness as a matter of routine, improving organizational capabilities and learning

**MITIGATION PHASE**

Identifying actions to take now to prevent, mitigate, or prepare for the possibility of failure

**RECOVERY PHASE**

Dealing with the consequences of failure by balancing the need for reassessment with near-term demands

**REEVALUATION**

Mitigation efforts may avert failures but they need to be examined to assess what success lessons are repeatable

(UNCLASSIFIED)
Anticipation requires understanding the factors that contribute to failure in intelligence analysis, a topic that has been explored in the writings of Richard Betts, Richards Heuer, Robert Jervis, and others. Analysts typically offer as reasons for failure incompetence, insufficient data, or the fact that the problems they tackle are intrinsically hard.

But it is not enough, in my view, to list specific issues in specific cases after the fact. Just as Heuer has given names to mindsets, biases, and logical fallacies, so too a structured taxonomy of reasons for failure would allow us more readily to diagnose situations more precisely and act more quickly to prevent or mitigate the effects of failure.

For the business world, Max Bazerman, professor of business administration at the Harvard Business School, and Michael Watkins, a consultant in leadership strategy, have done work along these lines that offers a model for a taxonomy. They have named three categories of failure: cognitive, organizational (process or systems), and political, which, with the exception of the third, easily parallel failures in intelligence analysis. The last category refers to failures of businesses to address the political system within which they must operate (e.g., lobbying for legislation or regulatory changes). A more appropriate category for the intelligence world would be failures caused by factors in the “[security] policy environment” or the failure of analysis to engage with those in that environment.²

Introducing COPE

My shorthand for a taxonomy of failure that adopts these three categories is COPE, which I illustrate using three examples below. The elements of each category are detailed in the table on the facing page.

Cognitive Failure: Iraq WMD

The Iraq WMD case was first and foremost a cognitive failure: the IC judged that Iraq had ongoing WMD programs and stockpiles of WMD, even though Saddam Hussein’s regime had destroyed what it had and was only trying to preserve a capability to reconstitute aspects of the program when sanctions ended. While organizational and policy-environmental factors contributed to the failure, it was nevertheless a cognitive failure driven by mind-set issues. Had the cognitive factors been recognized early on—probably years earlier—the IC, using structured analytic techniques or other methods, might have reexamined its assumptions and considered alternative judgments about Saddam and his programs.

Organizational Failure: 9/11

Organizational (or systems) failure may be the most difficult kind of problem we can face. Counterterrorism analysts knew before the 9/11 attacks that al-Qa’ida was planning a major attack in the United States, but they did not know where, when, how, or what kind of targets.

The 9/11 Commission Report and the declassified CIA Inspector General’s Report on Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks detailed organizational issues that contributed to the US government’s failure to act before the attacks.³ These included problems with watchlisting, poor communication within and between agencies, unclear lines of authority, murky legal authorities, and so forth.

Unlike cognitive or policy-environmental failures, organizational failures seldom offer single causes to be remedied: rather, they usually involve multiple breakdowns that, in the aggregate, cause the failure. In intelligence work, tackling this kind of failure requires examination of analytical and work processes and their individual vulnerabilities. Often this requires analysis of processes across bureaucratic boundaries.

Policy-Environmental Failure: CIA and Vietnam Analysis

CIA’s pessimistic assessments of the situation in Vietnam for much of the 1960s were largely accurate, and cognitive challenges (though they existed) had little or no bearing on analysis. The challenges lay in the problems senior CIA officers faced


in engaging presidential administrations that declined to accept CIA analysis. Let alone act on it, which represents failure to have an impact. Indeed, intelligence histories tout as successful CIA’s analytic performance during the period, but that analysis cost CIA one director, John McCone, who resigned in frustration, and kept CIA out of Oval Office deliberations on the issue for nearly two years after he left. In this case, the real challenge (and ultimate failure) was on the policy-environmental side of the equation.

**COPE’s Utility**

The COPE framework can clarify causes of failure in three ways. First, the mere act of determining which of the three types of failure a situation falls into will help triage it to make further diagnosis easier.

The second way in which the framework can help is in providing approaches to diagnosing a very complex process. Intelligence analysis has been evaluated from a number of angles, each more advanced than the simple five-part loop that is known as the traditional intelligence cycle. Rob Johnston’s taxonomy of intelligence analysis variables in his *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community*, for example, illustrates the complexity in the four types of variables he lists in a taxonomy of factors that influence analysis: *systemic* (those factors that affect the intelligence organization and the analytical environment); *idiosyncratic* (factors, especially external influences, that affect the analytical environment); *contextual* (those that affect individuals and their analytic performance); and *communicative* (those that affect communication between groups involved in the analytic process). 4

For the purposes of this discussion I prefer to think in terms of five critical areas of vulnerability, each of which has elements that can be monitored during an analytic process or examined in the event of a failure. These points are:

- Assessment—the cognitive elements of the analytical problem.
- Collection—the continuous effort to expand knowledge about a situation.
- Support—provision to consumers of products, warning memos, efforts to brief them, etc.
- Response from consumers—feedback, further tasking, etc.

---

4 Dr. Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 33–44.
Identification of responsibilities and degrees of influence over given situations will set components up to address prevention and mitigation.

- Organizational—resourcing and process issues, group mind-sets, or poor risk management calculations.

The third way in which the COPE framework can help is in identifying what individual or component would be best able to remedy problems that caused a failure (after the fact) or appear to be contributing to an increasing risk of failure (before one occurs). Identification of responsibilities and degrees of influence over given situations will set components up to address prevention and mitigation.

In the case of cognitive issues or cognitive failures, analysts are likely to bear the most responsibility. They will also have the greatest ability to address problems. In the policy-environmental arena, analysts should be aware of dynamics, but managers will most likely have to take the lead in addressing issues. Neither analyst nor manager is likely to have much influence over the consumer environment, as each is most likely to be in a reactive mode as they see it unfold, especially in a relatively new situation.

Analysts and managers most likely will have to share responsibility for resolving organizational issues. Managers will have decisionmaking responsibility and depend on analysts to contribute substantive and working-levels insights on processes to inform decisionmaking. This is likely to be more difficult than it might seem on the surface. Even first line managers don’t always have complete knowledge of the interactions of their people within the system. When multiple systems are involved and are involved at higher levels, the challenge grows substantially.

**Phase 2: Prevention, Risk Reduction, and Mitigation**

Accepting that we cannot always prevent failure, we should always think about the things that could be done to reduce the risk of failure. At the same time, we should position ourselves to deal with failures and mitigate their consequences.

As with anticipation, mitigation involves shared responsibilities. While managers will make the decisions on resources and processes, the analysts closest to the substance of a problem can speak most authoritatively on the consequences in a region or subject area, should the unforeseen or unlikely actually take place. Their understanding of how things could unfold, including dynamics previously unforeseen that could affect the actors in the region and US interests will provide the basis for decisions about resources and processes to follow.

Analysts may be weaker in their understanding of the consequences of a failure for their component and the larger organization than managers. Experience, training, and management engagement can help sensitize them to these dimensions and help them contribute more effectively to the decisions management will have to make.

By using the COPE framework, analysts can also improve their ability to identify areas in which they can (and should) take the lead in addressing shortcomings. It can also help them recognize areas in which higher management is needed or cases in which a component—or organization as a whole—must react. The more analysts can anticipate management concerns, the more they and management can be proactive in risk-reduction and post-failure activities.

**Phase 3: Recovery and/or Reevaluation**

This is the phase of the process usually given the least thought in organizations that work from the assumption that “failure is not an option.” When failure does happen, two simultaneous, interrelated tasks must follow:

- A retrospective of what went wrong must be completed.
- The organization must rebuild credibility with both higher management and consumers.

These tasks will have to be completed in an environment of increased workloads as consumers will demand intelligence support to manage the new situation.

In this stressful time, the natural temptation is to postpone a reassessment until things quiet down—which often leads to never doing one at all. But a rapid assessment is vital. The more quickly mental models are adjusted, the sooner a component can begin to reestablish its credibility. Being proactive and taking responsibility for failure will buy goodwill, improve the confidence of
higher ups, and possibly earn more latitude to tackle the situation.

Management must play a bigger role than analysts in the recovery phase. First-line managers in particular need to lead the reassessment, but they must do so without alienating individuals—analysts, other managers, or policymakers. The first-line managers also need to preserve team cohesion and deal with resource challenges created by new circumstances. In such an environment, the potential goes up for missteps and counterproductive reactions. It is vital, therefore, to understand what kind of reactions are the most and least helpful. On this score, some useful insights can be gleaned from normal accident theory.

**Normal Accident Theory**

Normal accident theory was introduced by Charles Perrow in his 1984 book in which he observed that complex technological systems are more likely to fail when “tight coupling” and “interactive complexity” occur. “Tight coupling” describes a situation in which incidents in one part of a system will have prompt and major effects on other parts of the same system. In a sense, “tight coupling” defines rigidities in systems. “Interactive complexity” describes a situation in which two or more individual events or failures in a system interact and create unexpected effects on the system as a whole. In short, the more complex the system, the more likely “normal accidents” are to occur.

For Perrow, an ineffective response to failure would be one in which an organization either “tightens the coupling”—for example, by adding redundant backup systems—or adds complexity to its processes, such as by adding new procedures. While Perrow is focused on technological systems, these insights can be applied to organizational behavior more generally.

These insights also dovetail with conclusions Richard Betts and others have made about the inevitability of intelligence failure. In particular, reflexive organizational responses to intelligence failure have increased redundancy, multiplied organizational components, and added more procedures while making work processes more complex, burdening analysts and managers alike with more tasks. These changes, it could be argued, have made the IC system more vulnerable to failure by increasing the incentives people have to ignore even good practices to “get the job done.”

A better response, per Perrow, would have been to find ways to “loosen the coupling” and/or “reduce complexity.” In the environment of intelligence analysis, this could involve substituting greater ownership, accountability, and learning in place of adding redundancy. It could also mean streamlining procedures and components rather than multiplying them.

While recovery assumes that failure has happened, what about those situations in which anticipation and mitigation efforts have led to an intelligence success or averted an outright failure? It is important to assess these situations as well, even when a failure has not occurred.

In this case, one would want to engage in a reevaluation of the success or avoided failure. The natural organizational tendency is simply to accept a success and to allow it to become a new “template,” without an examination of what might have made the seemingly successful procedures work and what actual limitations remain. Determining why success was achieved and what characteristics were unique or repeatable helps to make a clear headed determination of what should be emulated in the future. In short, components should look at both success and failure to sharpen lessons learned.

**Phase 4: Building Reliability**

Unlike the other three phases of the Reliability Cycle, this phase is less tied to a specific situation, although it can flow out of one. In this phase, the focus is on how organizations can improve their ability to learn and more consistently cultivate the practices necessary for high reliability.

Harvard business professor David Garvin and others have described at least four characteristics of learning organizations: (1) a supportive learning environment; (2) concrete learning processes; (3) a leadership that reinforces learning; and (4) the transfer of knowledge throughout...
Inculcating practices of mindfulness and reliability will be done mostly at work, and that is mainly the responsibility of managers—especially first-line managers.

the organization. It should be added that building reliability requires looking at the organizational processes that may be inhibiting effectiveness and thinking through how to realign them to be more conducive to intelligence success. The key here is not simply compiling lessons learned but finding ways of integrating and habituating them into daily work processes.

Climate and Culture. To be effective, efforts to build reliability need to operate on two organizational levels, climate and culture. Climate is the perception within an organization that senior leaders are committed to achieving greater reliability and are actively facilitating the effort. Culture alludes to how the values have been adopted in the rank-and-file and have become part of daily processes.

A true HRO will operate on both levels simultaneously. If senior management is trying to promote a reliability climate but is not thinking about how these values and practices are inculcated at the working level, then efforts to become more reliable are likely to falter. Conversely, a good culture of reliability and tradecraft can be eroded and undermined if working-level personnel perceive that senior managers are only mouthing slogans. Harmonizing these two levels is a significant challenge.

Training. Training is necessary, but it is only part of the process. Training can facilitate skills development and spread values within organizations, but inculcating practices of mindfulness and reliability will be done mostly at work, and that is mainly the responsibility of managers—especially first-line managers.

Management Focus. Managers set the tone in their units and should foster environments in which analysts are free to present minority viewpoints and alternative views and to question key assumptions. Managers have levers for doing this:

- They have the power of example. Experience shows that the tone set by first-line managers and senior analysts, whether positive or negative, will be embraced by more junior analysts.
- Managers have the power to reward behavior that contributes to constructive questioning environments or curb behavior that undercuts them.
- They can mandate papers that question existing points of view or institute regular “stand downs” to review analytic lines or explore vulnerabilities that could lead to failure.
- They can establish performance benchmarks for individuals and their components.
- They can encourage and provide the means their analysts can use to pursue outreach to bring new or different ideas to their teams.

Achieving all this, however, places a premium on deliberate planning on the part of the manager.

Knowledge Capture. Also needed are improvements in the capture and transfer of knowledge within components. This is not about better information sharing, which usually is about getting access to more data from outside of components. Knowledge capture and transfer is about preserving insights gained within a component, enabling their recovery and regular reexamination, and passing them along to new and future members of the component. Despite improvements in our IT systems over the years, we are arguably doing worse in knowledge capture than we have in the past. In my experience components shared common sets of “read” files for all team members. Today analysts tend to maintain their own personal files which few others can see or use.

Willingness to Countenance Failure. On a day-to-day basis, managers must demonstrate willingness to discuss near failures and see them as such. Organizationally, there can be a strong disincentive to do this, as higher management and outsiders could perceive such discussion as an indication of poor perfor-

mance. In reality, however, discussion of smaller or near failures actually can help components get better reads on situations they face and better position themselves to help prevent or mitigate big failures.

**Consumer Relationships.** Focus must be kept on developing relationships with consumers. This can improve reliability by helping to better focus support for them, but it can also help mitigate one effect of failure. While consumers are never happy about failure, a component with a strong track record as a reliable partner that does due diligence will be more likely to be given leeway after a failure, especially if the component demonstrates positively that it is taking responsibility for its mistakes and is learning from and correcting them.

**Conclusion: The Value of This Paradigm**

The value of the conceptual framework sketched out here is in its comprehensiveness and forward-leaning orientation. At a minimum, it can give us a more consistent vocabulary as we continue to explore intelligence success and failure. No doubt elements of this framework touch on existing practices, although they are probably carried out in ad hoc and inconsistent ways. No doubt as well that much more could be said about specific parts of the COPE framework and practices that would flesh it out in even more practical terms.

Nevertheless, by seeing the analytical process in a more integrated and holistic way, we can develop a better sense of where discrete actions fit into the process and how they may affect other parts of the process and its outcomes.

By seeing the analytical process in a more integrated and holistic way, we can develop a better sense of where discrete actions fit into the process and how they may affect other parts of the process and its outcomes.
**Counterintelligence in Counterguerrilla Operations**

*M. H. Schiattareggia*

Originally published in *Studies in Intelligence* Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1962)

*Introduction.*** By the end of 1962, the administration of President John F. Kennedy had committed more than 11,000 US military advisors to train and assist the military and police forces of the Republic of South Vietnam in combating a growing communist insurgency. The Central Intelligence Agency, involved in Vietnam since 1954, had also committed several score field operators to raise and lead village militia units in anti-guerilla warfare in the countryside, most successfully in the Central Highlands.

A different type of conflict from anything seen earlier in the 20th century by US military forces accustomed to large-scale conventional conflicts such as World War I, World War II, and Korea, counterguerrilla warfare as developing in Southeast Asia was something relatively new. It was not until late 1961 and early 1962 that the US Army began developing a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine, encapsulated in FM 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, to inform their operations.

The CIA had more experience at waging such conflicts, which were seen as part of its core covert action mission—these actions were always covert and on much smaller scales than their armed forces colleagues had ever attempted. Americans in general, however, had a steep learning curve to overcome in becoming proficient at waging counterinsurgency warfare—then known as counterguerrilla warfare—and in understanding the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects involved.

This article by M. H. Schiattareggia, the penname of a CIA operations officer with military, counterguerrilla, and intelligence experience, first appeared as a classified article in *Studies in Intelligence* in the summer of 1962. (It was declassified in 1995.) The work delves into the history of past insurgencies as a means of educating intelligence officers of the day who could expect in the years ahead to find themselves serving in Southeast Asian war zones.

As one of the first articles on the topic to appear in *Studies in Intelligence*, it hints at operational concepts that would become a major part of the CIA’s efforts later in the decade when eradication of the Viet Cong infrastructure, the winning of peasant “hearts and minds,” and rural security became foremost US goals. Of special note, Schiattareggia surveyed the classics of guerrilla warfare literature produced by its most famous theorists to that time, those who would become household names to Americans during the later Vietnam War. Knowing how one’s adversaries think and operate, the author maintains, is the first step towards defeating them.

—Clayton Laurie, CIA Historian

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Guerrilla intelligence, ways to combat it, and organizational roles in counter-guerrilla warfare.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
M. H. Schiattareggia

If one is to become proficient in counter-guerrilla operations, one must prepare by learning everything there is to know about guerrilla operations. It follows that if one is to become knowledgeable in the specialty of counterintelligence in counter-guerrilla operations, one must know the objectives, organizational patterns, and modus operandi of typical guerrilla intelligence. It will be comforting to the counter-guerrilla intelligence officer to know something also of the counterintelligence methods employed by guerrillas, to the extent that they have a methodical counterintelligence.

The Guerrillas' Intelligence

How do guerrilla intelligence needs—their Essential Elements of Information—differ from those of conventional forces? For conventional forces it has long been U.S. Army doctrine that the division commander needs to know how many battalions of infantry, artillery, or armor are on his immediate front, how many are within reinforcing distance, and how long it would take for reinforcements to arrive in supporting positions. He wants also additional order-of-battle information such as the identities of units and commanders. He seeks answers to such questions as whether the enemy is going to attack, where, when, with how many battalions, and with what objectives, whether he will defend a position and in what strength, whether he will withdraw and when and

Note that this article is confined strictly to the counter-guerrilla aspect of the broader concept “counter insurgency” currently prominent in official communications.
whither. Such EEI stem from the objective of conventional warfare—to impose one's will on the enemy by whatever force is necessary.

This manifestly is not and cannot be the objective of guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas' objectives are to harass, weaken, demoralize, disrupt; they cannot hope to win wars against massive conventional forces. Their EEI stem from these objectives. They need to know about movements of small convoys and troop detachments, their timing and their routes. They must know intimately the terrain along such routes to select good points for ambush or attack. They must know the terrain offering approaches to these points and possible routes of withdrawal from them. They have to know how the convoys and detachments are armed and protected.

Moreover, the guerrillas must know in detail the complete layout of installations like fortified villages, supply dumps, and command posts which they are going to attack, their defensive structures and the strength, tactical practices, and weapons of the guards, what booty the installations offer, and approaches and withdrawal routes from them. They need intimate knowledge of rail lines and roads and of bridges and other critical points on them suitable for sabotage or attack from ambush. Their main concern with the kind of intelligence needed by conventional forces is for defensive purposes: they seek information on movements of major enemy forces to be forewarned of encirclements or sweeps of their base or bivouac areas.

What are the sources for these kinds of information and what sort of intelligence organization is formed to procure it? In their early formative periods, at least, most guerrilla bands of the past have had no formal intelligence organization; many of their leaders have not had the sophistication even to harbor a conscious concept of intelligence. The Pathan tribesmen on the Northwest Frontier of old India, whose main sport and livelihood has for centuries been the ambushing of caravans in mountain passes and who make guerrilla-type attacks on their neighbors in the conduct of blood feuds, might be called natural experts at guerrilla warfare. They certainly don't sit down in council to organize intelligence collection forces or process collected information; but you can
imagine a tribesman skulking high up on a mountainside, camouflaged by natural coloration and his clothes, watching caravan routes below for great distances and then, by runner or signals, passing the word to his fellows that it is time to get into position for attack. Despite Jomo Kenyatta's education in London and Moscow and the sophistication of several other Kikuyu leaders in the Mau Mau guerrilla actions of the early 1950's, one finds little in the writings of British analysts concerning any Mau Mau organization for acquiring intelligence; but you do find reference to the advantage the "gangster" enjoyed in knowing the area better and his "added advantage of good observation points both on the forest fringe and on the moorland areas." 2

Regardless of its lack of formal organization, every guerrilla force of any size which enjoys any success has a ready-made intelligence collection agency—the people on the ground. If the guerrilla movement in fact springs from these people, if it represents a popular wave of feeling against the government or occupying power, the people on the ground—the peasant or coolie farmer, the laborer, much of whatever middle classes there are—will feed information to the guerrillas spontaneously. As the guerrilla leader becomes experienced, he will improve on this spontaneous flow by teaching the people accuracy in their reporting and by instructing the most intelligent, trustworthy, and courageous of them in what he particularly needs to know and in how to make observations and report them. He will also augment it with trained patrols and with clandestine agents, the latter particularly for penetrations. He will work to improve the speed, accuracy, and security of the communications by which this information gets to him, whether by runners, signals or electronic means.

In Communist practices, particularly, if not all the people in the area fully support the guerrilla effort, those who do not will be harassed by pressures and if necessary by terrorist methods, and at the same time indoctrination teams will exercise persuasion on the populace. Ultimately, as the movement grows, the Communist guerrillas will develop rather

---

sophisticated intelligence requirements, organization, and production. Intelligence documents captured by the French from the Ho Chi Minh forces before the 1954 Geneva agreement to divide Vietnam included remarkably accurate order-of-battle studies on the French units and other situation reports, summaries, and estimates of a high caliber.  

The guerrillas' primary source of intelligence is then the people of the area, the sea, as Mao Tse-tung characterized it, in which the guerrilla fish swims. The guerrilla intelligence effort may be anything from a primitive, instinctive activity in the casual hand of the leader to fully organized work under a true intelligence staff section at the main base or redoubt. Collection facilities can run the gamut from the spontaneous reporting of haphazard information to a system of patrols, observation posts, surveillance teams, sentries, clandestine networks, penetration agents, prisoner interrogations, and technical intelligence. Communist-directed guerrillas will tend toward the sophisticated, the more so the longer they operate successfully.  

This, then, is the intelligence target, the problem confronting the counterintelligence organization of any counter-guerrilla force. How does that organization go about its task of stopping, disrupting, manipulating, or negating the intelligence operations of the guerrillas?  

Keeping the Fish from their Sea  

Certainly it appears from this analysis that the greatest single problem is that of stopping the flow of information from the people on the ground to the guerrillas. There is a choice of two approaches to this problem. The first is to move the people from the guerrilla area—particularly the peasant or coolie farmers, but also all the population of small villages—to relocation centers where they have neither access to infor-

---


* A survey of source materials on guerrilla intelligence is included as an appendix to this paper.

* Some current areas of confusion in delimiting the task of counter-intelligence with respect to that of positive intelligence and that of counter-insurgent action are discussed in a note appended to this paper.
information nor contact with the guerrillas. The second is a massive application of normal police/counterintelligence procedures—detecting and identifying the people that supply information to guerrillas, their guerrilla contacts, and their couriers, courier routes, letter drops, or other means of communication, and then taking either the defensive steps of apprehending, interrogating, and imprisoning these people or the offensive one of turning them around for double agent operations. Outlining these two choices is easy enough, but it must be obvious that carrying either one out is an absolutely staggering job.

The relocation method is not an innovation; it has been demonstrated that it can be effective. The Russians, for example, have proved the harsh effectiveness of mass deportations of population in the Baltic states and elsewhere. In Malaya the British-Malayan Security Forces carried out more humane and limited relocation operations, combining these with other forms of action to cut off the Communist Terrorists from contacts with the people, not only for counterintelligence purposes but to prevent their getting from them food, supplies, and other kinds of support. The French undertook rather massive relocation efforts in Algeria, where whole new towns, with schools, medical facilities, shops, water supplies, and all requirements for living were created, administered, and guarded by the French Army. At present relocation operations are being carried out in South Viet Nam along the Laotian border.

6The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, official manual of the British (later Malayan) forces (3rd edition, 1958, classification “confidential”), chapter III, sections 3 (Main Tasks of the Security Forces) and 4 (The Briggs Plan). This is beyond question the best counter-guerrilla operations manual extant. It is argued by some students of CGW that the peculiar conditions existing in Malaya—the Chinese “minority” (almost as numerous as the Malayans) being the element supporting the CT’s rather than the whole population, and the organization of civil government, police forces, and military forces being so uniquely British—make it not valid for application elsewhere; but it distills from many years of experience a great amount of practical guidance on modus operandi which is clearly applicable any place in the world where guerrilla movements might develop.
There will undoubtedly continue to be situations when relocation is an essential step in counter-guerrilla action. Some of its aspects are completely outside the competence of counterintelligence forces—the construction of housing for the people, the provision of food and water, sanitation and medical care, and schools, the mounting of indoctrination programs to change the loyalties of the people, the stationing of guard or combat troops, the training of village self-defense forces. Other aspects, however, are wholly counterintelligence responsibilities.

First is the painstaking process of checking the bona fides of the people moved to the relocation site, determining that they are not guerrilla espionage agents, active members of the Communist Party, or working for any other subversive organization. This entails a requirement basic to all counterintelligence operations—effective records. The vetting and name tracing task is a very large one. To approach it practically, one must begin with personnel who have been given any official position or responsibility, with especial emphasis on the center’s security forces—the police and self-defense forces, then the civil officials. When these have been vetted, the job of checking the population at large can be attacked.

Counterintelligence personnel must draft or be consulted in the drafting of plans for control of the population—identity cards, travel permits and controls, curfew, neighborhood or block registration and control systems, the selection and training of personnel for these, etc. The development of an informant net is an essential step in counterintelligence control; it forms part of what Eric Lambert, British MI-6 police assistance staff officer, speaking from the British experience in Malaya and Kenya Colony, calls the “police intelligence net at the village level.” Together, the block registration system and the informant network form one of the most effective means of defensive counterintelligence, detecting the presence of subversive or espionage agents and identifying them and their contacts.

In the alternative method used to shut off contact between the guerrillas and the people in the area, the counterintelligence task is probably even more difficult than in relocation. This was the method used by the Filipinos in the Communist-
controlled area known as “Huklandia,” and it worked. Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, the officer of the Philippine Army who was primarily responsible for developing the “Battalion Combat Team” and “Hunter-Killer Team” techniques employed so successfully in destroying the Hukbalahaps on Luzon, describes elements of the counterintelligence aspect of the operation in this way:

Four teams (combined MIS & C Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were varied, but essentially the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was once every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.

Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely. On the theory that the populace are subjected to deep-covered “terrorism,” it was recommended that several individuals be “snatched” and brought to 7th BCT HQ for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, will be made to tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 60 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions grew more about hidden power of the Huk's in Pandi, as in no single case did the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances to the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees (the Secretary of National Defense participating) [ed. note: This was Sr. Magsaysay, later President of the Philippines] to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainee-affiliates were relayed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. These informations were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with
past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of this painstaking effort, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

(1) Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground apparatus of the Communist Party of the country.

(2) Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not catch the attention of the AFP or PC; so as not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.

(3) It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, is supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging will be done through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants is punishable by death.

(4) Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn will make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.

(5) Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on current situations of their destinations, are given pass words, and exercised on new counter-signs.

(6) Pandi inhabitants that had been judged "reactionary" or recalcitrants are not disciplined within the municipal area, but are by long practice secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the kidnap-murder of individuals that were ordered punished by the Huk high command.

(7) During the past years, several PC garrisons were off and on maintained in Pandi that because of their small size and poor security could easily have been wiped out by local Huk guerrillas. These garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals on the area.

(8) Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor's name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating with others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control
lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIP's to and from Manila became more difficult.

This kind of counterintelligence effort resembles in many respects the criminal investigation methods employed by the police against powerful criminal gangs who have the support of large numbers of people, and for this reason and others the police are likely in most countries to be the most effective agency for carrying it out. The method calls for informants in every village, surveillance personnel, patrols disguised as guerrillas, combat squads with great mobility and advanced communications capable of reacting at once to flash reports, skillful interrogators, extensive records carefully built up and cross indexed, and counterintelligence analysts to study the guerrilla intelligence organization, define its modus operandi, and identify its personalities.

Other Counterintelligence Tasks

Aside from its major special problem deriving from support of the guerrillas by people on the ground, counterintelligence has tasks in counter-guerrilla action relating directly to the guerrilla forces and their organic intelligence capabilities which manifest the usual twin aspects, defensive and offensive.

Among the defensive aspects is first the normal job of maintaining the security of the police or military forces engaged in the counter-guerrilla operations. Counterintelligence personnel must conduct training, or must prepare training plans and material and train instructors, to indoctrinate the forces in problems of security. The importance of this responsibility is highlighted in the Malaya manual referred to above. Its chapter XIV, section 5, “Military Security and Counter Intelligence,” makes the following observations:

As the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) does not possess the normal organization of a first class enemy, it must exploit every resource of intelligence to redress the balance of inferior force. Thus, in addition to the direct screen of the Min Yuen, the MCP has established a network of agents and informants throughout
the Federation whose task is to gather information and pass it quickly to the CT [Communist Terrorists].

The G(Int) (b) staffs [counterintelligence staff sections in military headquarters] are responsible for the application of:

(a) Preventive measures to deny the CT all opportunity of gaining knowledge of our intentions.

(b) Detective measures concerned with the investigation of breaches of security or covert activities detrimental to the security of the Armed Forces.

Military Security.—There is clear evidence that:

(a) Many successful ambushes against SF [Security Forces] have been the direct result of lack of security.

(b) CT movement out of an area due to be the scene of impending operations has taken place because of bad security, particularly careless talk.

In operational areas contractors and their employees, who are all vulnerable to CT pressure, quickly become aware of ration strengths, the units engaged, the names and personalities of senior officers and, unless great care is exercised in ordering rations, can forecast with some accuracy future unit changes of locations.

Security is many sided and the CT do not rely on one source only for information. All ranks are prone to careless talk, usually through vanity, thoughtlessness or ignorance. To counter innumerable instances of insecurity of material, loose methods of safeguarding secret papers, inefficient guards, unauthorized entry to WD premises and other breaches of security there is only one remedy: proper security training. The supervision of this training is the task of the Unit Security Officer, assisted by the G(Int) (b) staff, and the security agencies, to ensure that all ranks become security minded.

Counterintelligence.—It is unfortunately only too true of the G(Int) (b) staff and security, as it is with the police and crime, that most of its time is taken up in the investigation of breaches of security that have already occurred.

The G(Int) (b) staff sets up certain standing controls, organizes a system of passes and permits, and arranges with the help of Special Branch for thorough vetting and verification of all employees, but these merely limit the problem. They may make it difficult for an informer or agent to gain access to military establishments or, having got in, to be able to do much harm, but
they cannot exclude the agent or nullify the work of those already inside.

The object of standing controls is, by a process of elimination, to throw into relief incidents or persons that seem to be suspicious and to make them the subject of investigation.

Properly trained, security minded personnel will not only prevent information from getting to the CT but, in adhering to standing security controls, will be quicker to observe any suspicious departures from them and assist the counterintelligence effort.

Since the foregoing is the only section in this manual devoted to the subject of counterintelligence, its writers evidently considered counterintelligence a purely defensive matter. This would in all probability not have been the case if either the Special Branch of the Malayan CID or MI-6 counterespionage people had written it. The offensive counterintelligence operations which can be employed against guerrillas include penetrations, provocations, double agents, and defections in place—all of the classic devices of counterespionage. Of these, the most effective is undoubtedly penetrations. Even Communist guerrilla forces, who are probably more security-minded than most others, are always under pressure to build up their strength; they always are looking for additional men. It is extremely difficult for guerrillas, with their requirement for the highest degree of mobility, to build up counterintelligence records and maintain them, and they are therefore hampered in making the normal security check on new recruits who show up or are brought in by old members.

Penetrations were used by both the Abwehr and the Gestapo of the Nazi forces in Europe during World War II with varying degrees of success, depending in part on the country where they were employed. Their success was especially great in France against the “Free French” or Gaullist resistance forces, which were colossally lacking in security consciousness, but also against the compartmented sabotage groups organ-
ized and led by the much better trained and security-conscious officers of the British SOE.7

The classical double agent operation would presumably retain in counterintelligence activity against guerrillas all the hazards and problems so well described in a recent article in the Studies.8 Yet a distinct form of double agent operation seems to have worked very well in counter-guerrilla action in a primitive area like Kenya Colony. What other term than double agent really applies to the astonishing operations carried on by a corps of penetration agents introduced into the SOE and other groups was led by a Frenchman, thought to have been an Alsatian, known by the code name of “Grand Clément.” Recruited into an early SOE group in France, he was recognized to have qualities of leadership and so was flown to England for training and brought back as an officer in the group. Not long afterward Nazi counterintelligence forces arrested nearly all members of the group. Grand Clément “escaped” and got into contact with another group. This in turn was soon rolled up, and Grand Clément “escaped” again. After this suspicious recurrence it was impossible for him to operate personally again as a penetrator, but he set up a training school for the Germans in which he developed a whole corps of penetration agents, a fairly large number of whom were successful in getting into Maquis, SOE sabotage, or other resistance groups, with the inevitable results.

After the liberation of Paris, the present writer, then a counterintelligence officer in the joint U.S.-British-French Special Forces, joined with officers of the SOE Security Section in trying to track down and apprehend Grand Clément, but he was never found. It was never even determined whether he had been a German agent at the time of his first recruitment into SOE—a true agent provocateur—or was recruited by the Germans later. Two other Alsatians who had followed a pattern much like that of Grand Clément, however, were arrested in Paris after the liberation, given a short, fair trial, and shot. They had been recruited into an SOE sabotage group operating near the Swiss border and had shown such ability that they were flown to England for training and returned to the group as lieutenant and radio operator respectively. During the several months thereafter before the area was liberated, the Abwehr rolled up a number of neighboring groups which, in violation of good compartmentation practice, had had contact with this one, but left it strictly alone. This immunity led to an investigation and the post-liberation arrests. The confessions of the two men established that they had been agents provocateurs, but it could not be determined whether they were trainees of Grand Clément’s.

ried out by Inspector Ian Henderson when he turned the captured Mau Mau around and sent them out to track down their fellows? The preconditions for these operations seem to have been the primitive minds of the targets, subject to intense superstitions, loyalties which appear strange indeed to the occidental white man, and an operations officer who knew these characteristics and the people so well that he could grasp what went on in their minds. Such preconditions are not generally to be found, to be sure but there is a large part of one whole black continent, ripe today for Communist exploitation, where they may obtain, and such operations may be desirable among other tribes than the Kikuyu. How many Hendersons do we have?

Military or Civilian Counterintelligence?

What agency should undertake the counterintelligence effort for the counter-guerrilla forces? Every country has some kind of police force, as well as its military forces, in some state of being; and it cannot be doubted that in most countries the police, whatever their type or organization, will be closer to the people, will know local conditions, will more easily be able to organize, normally in fact will already have organized, informant nets, and will therefore prove more efficacious in the collection of counterintelligence information for this type of warfare than agencies of the armed forces would.

The opinion that police will always be superior to armed forces in counter-insurgency operations was recently expressed by Slavko N. Bjelajac, chief of staff to General Mihailovic in Yugoslavia during World War II.10 They can produce intelligence better than the armed forces, he said, because they get it from the people everywhere; the armed forces cannot get intelligence from the front because there is no front. He referred to the experience in Malaya, where the police were always kept on top in the operations, and the

---


2In a speech before the joint Military Reserve units of CIA. Colonel Bjelajac is now a civilian official in the office of the U.S. Army’s Special Warfare Directorate.
army supported them with strikes against concentrations of the rebels when a concentration could be located. He pointed out the greater flexibility and mobility the police have for instant blows or counterblows against guerrillas and their usually better communications for such actions.

There is much of interest along this line in the Malaya manual previously cited. The opening paragraph on “Own Forces” (Chapter III, Section 1), reads:

The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government. The Police Force is the Government’s normal instrument for the maintenance of Civil Authority but, in the current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been called in to support the Civil Power in its task of seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a Home Guard has been formed.

The main elements of the operational plan for Malaya, which had been developed by a General Briggs, are discussed as follows:

1. The Briggs Plan, which came into effect on 1st June, 1950, aimed at bringing proper administrative control to a population which had never been controlled before. The main aspects of the Plan were:

   (a) The rapid resettlement of squatters under the surveillance of Police and auxiliary police

   (b) ...

   (c) The recruitment and training of CID and Special Branch Police personnel.

   (d) The Army to provide a minimum framework of troops throughout the country to support the Police, and at the same time to provide a concentration of forces for the clearing of priority areas.

   (e) The Police and Army to operate in complete accord. To assist in this, joint Police/Army operational control is established at all levels and there is a close integration of Police and Military intelligence.

The chain of command established by the Briggs Plan ensured that “there was always complete integration of Emergency effort,” and that the Security Forces “have always been acting in support of the Civil Power.”
The final paragraph on this plan is worth repeating here, for it states objectives which appear likely to be valid in every counter-insurgency situation in which the United States may participate:

The Plan was essentially a thorough but long term proposition and it would be unrealistic to look for speedy and decisive results. It envisaged a logical clearing of the country from South to North, leaving behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or State had been cleared. It also aimed to isolate the MRLA [the Malayan Races Liberation Army, or Communist guerrilla force] from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the latter to feel safe to come forward with information, whilst at the same time depriving the MRLA of their means of support and so forcing them into the open where they could better be dealt with by the SF.

The roles of police and military forces as described elsewhere in Chapter III are worth study as a model of the ideal organization wherever counter-insurgency or counter-guerrilla operations have to be carried out. The philosophy on which these roles were based is summed up in the second paragraph of the chapter (XIV) on “Intelligence”:

Since there is no state of war in Malaya, the basic responsibility for maintaining law and order is still that of the Police. In the same way the responsibility for producing intelligence still rests with the Special Branch of the Police. In view of the size and importance of the problem, however, a special intelligence organization has been built up.

What the size of the problem required was joint intelligence operations centers manned by Special Branch and military intelligence personnel. One aspect of their division of labor is particularly interesting: “All members of the public who have information to give should be passed on to the Police, who alone will handle agents and informers. On no account will military units run their own agents or informers.”

The situation in Malaya, of course, with its almost ideally developed security forces organization, is one which United States forces will rarely if ever find in a country they are invited to assist in a counter-guerrilla effort. It might be well, however, to hold up this kind of organization as the goal toward which to work, not only because the police can normally be expected to do a far better intelligence and counterintelli-
gence job than the local military forces, but also because when the emergency situation is over the Americans will have left behind the foundations of a better governmental and internal security structure.

It is unlikely that U.S. forces will themselves ever be doing the counter-guerrilla job in any country; their role will be to assist local forces to do it competently. And presumably there will have been no declaration of war. Probably an emergency situation will have been declared, perhaps martial law, but no true belligerent situation as recognized in international law. Under these circumstances it would be desirable, in pursuit of the long-range goal of establishing a sound civil government responsive to the wishes of the governed, to keep the civil authority in control at all times.

There should certainly, in any case, be no contending between different elements of the U.S. contingent sent to support the indigenous forces as to whether the police and civil forces or the military should have primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation. This question should be settled as a matter of national policy before any U.S. elements are engaged, and it should be settled in the way which will lead most surely toward a sound, strong, democratic government when the operation is finished.

APPENDIX: Survey of Sources on Guerrilla Intelligence

It is a puzzling anomaly that one of the poorest sources of information concerning the intelligence methods developed and used by guerrillas is the writings of the great and alleged great guerrilla leaders. Mao Tse-tung's Yu Chi Chuan,¹ a comprehensive manual on the organization, training, equipment, and tactics of guerrilla forces, makes only one explicit reference even to a need for information about the enemy; at page 80 it assigns the “anti-Japanese self-defense units,” among other responsibilities, that of “securing information of the enemy.” Intelligence, not to mention counterintelligence, is otherwise completely ignored.

Ernesto "Che" Guevara, newly touted as a guerrilla authority, does include in his recent book a section on intelligence, as follows:

"Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to win a hundred battles." Nothing helps the combat forces more than accurate intelligence. But be sure to sort fact from fiction. As soon as post offices and mail deliveries can be set up within the guerrilla zone, try to get intelligence about the enemy. Use women to infiltrate the enemy camp. Use trained men and women to spread rumors and sow confusion and fear among the enemy.

This paragraph, with its remarkable instruction on the subject of intelligence communications, is the amazing totality of what Guevara has to say on the subject of positive intelligence. In the field of counterintelligence, however, he apparently had some afterthoughts. In Appendix 4, pages 66 to 68, he writes:

Almost all recent popular movements have suffered from inadequate preparation. Frequently, the secret service of the governing rulers learns about planned conspiracies. Absolute secrecy is crucial. The human material must be chosen with care. At times, this selection is easy; at others, extremely difficult. One has to make do with those who are available—exiles and volunteers eager to join in the fight for liberation. There is no adequate investigative apparatus. Yet there is no excuse for intelligence reaching the enemy, even if the guerrilla organization has been infiltrated by spies, for no more than one or two persons should be familiar with preparatory plans. Keep new volunteers away from key places.

Absolutely nobody must learn anything beyond his immediate concern. Never discuss plans with anyone. Check incoming and outgoing mail. Know what contacts each member has. Work and live in teams, never individually. Trust no one beyond the nucleus, especially not women. The enemy will undoubtedly try to use women for espionage. The revolutionary secretly preparing for war must be an ascetic and perfectly disciplined. Anyone who repeatedly defies the orders of his superiors and makes contact with women and other outsiders, however innocuous, must be expelled immediately for violation of revolutionary discipline.

... Of course, there is no reason why you cannot have a nucleus of 500 men, but these 500 must be split up, because (a) so large a group is bound to attract attention, and (b) in case of betrayal, the entire force could be liquidated.

\[^1\text{Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. Translation by Major Harris-Clichy Peterson, USMC (Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).}\]
The location of headquarters may be revealed to most of the group and serve as the meeting place for the volunteers, but the leaders of the conspiracy should appear there only rarely and no compromising documents are to be kept there. The leaders should stay in dispersed, secret hiding places. Locations of arsenals should not be known to more than one or two persons. Arms are not to be distributed until the operation is ready to start, so as not to endanger those involved and to avoid possible loss of costly equipment.

The military leader of the Viet Minh forces, General Vo Nguyen Giap, has written extensively about guerrilla warfare. His essays, collected in a book published in 1961, combine a monotonous reiteration of the theme of close relationship between the people and the Communist armed forces with historical treatises on the liberation of North Viet Nam. There is much repetitive material on the manner in which guerrillas developed and were organized and some discussion of guerrilla tactics, but nothing whatever on the part played by intelligence.

General Vo’s forces, however, as they have developed into a conventional army, have not so neglected their intelligence needs. The following passage from one of their training documents begins to reflect the military intelligence interests of conventional forces but applies also to guerrilla operations:

**Military Intelligence**

1. Individuals selected for service as intelligence agents must be active, courageous, perspicacious, realistic and calm in the face of danger.

2. Intelligence targets: Before mounting any attack, you must learn exactly the number of enemy troops and their armament, as our own forces must be at least equal. Learn all you can about the commander of the enemy troops. You should also study the morale of the enemy soldiers, the location of their strong points, such as blockhouses and heavy weapons emplacements, and how many men there are in a squad, a section or a company; identify enemy units by number or name. Find out the equipment of each unit, the firepower of which it is capable and the political and military training received by the enemy troops.

3. The direct and indirect methods of obtaining intelligence: The direct method is to use your own personnel and to send them out as agents. When you send agents into villages or cities, they...
must adopt a cover such as that of a peasant, a fisherman or a coolie. When you send your agents into the countryside, a special cover is not needed, but your men must be able to hide in the forest and must take care to stay away from well-known places, such as water holes or springs, where the enemy will be alert for them. Agents in the countryside must be careful to leave no trails or other traces of their presence.

The indirect method is to recruit your agents from among the populace. You should study the class structure of the people, the youth particularly, and the organization of the enemy's informer nets. You should choose your agents from the groups thus studied, train them, and put them to work. Tell each one that he must submit reports at fixed intervals, and arrange for them to contact your own men using a system of signals.

4. Intelligence reporting: In obtaining a report from your agents on an enemy base, be sure that the following points are covered:

a. The location of the base and the name of the commander.
b. The positions of machine guns, blockhouses, trenches and all other strong or weak places in the base.
c. The relationship between the enemy soldiers and the civilian population at that base.
d. Communication facilities. Do they have radios or telephones?
e. The best routes of approach to or retreat from the base.

Other sections of the Viet Minh document also contain instruction in intelligence aspects of operations:

Ambushes

Before mounting an ambush operation, you must thoroughly study your agents' reports on the situation among the people in the area. Especially study the routes by which and the hours at which enemy troops move through the area. How large are these enemy forces; how fast do they move; what weapons do they carry? Do they have machine guns? In obtaining this information, it is essential that the enemy be unaware of our interest. Only the commander and his agents should know that these things are being studied.

The discussion of ambushes which follows includes many items of intelligence import and puts emphasis on the effect of intelligence on plans and tactics. The same is true of the sections entitled “Raids on Enemy Bases,” “General Operating Principles,” and “Establishing Your Base.” In the last named, an indication is given of a somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the problem of communication with intelligence sources than that displayed by Sr. Guevara: “... or-
ganize your intelligence nets in the area, especially arranging for communications between your agents and yourself." The
document concludes on a realistically grim note: "Intelligence
agents and senior officers must study judo and all methods of
hand-to-hand combat to assist them in avoiding capture.
They must plan to take the most extreme measures to avoid
capture. If capture seems inevitable, they should plan to die
first."

Turning to non-Communist sources, we find a large number
of good books written by officers who had experience in guer­
rilla operations during World War II. From these some
kernels of wisdom can be extracted with effort, but they suffer
as analytical or training texts because they were not inten­
ted for such purposes, being presented simply as exciting
yarns for public consumption.

One of the few books making a deliberate attempt to bring
together historical examples of guerrilla activities and to ex­
tract from them sound principles is a fairly recent one from
a British source, Guerilla Warfare, by C. N. M. Blair, an MI-6
officer. Chapter 7 of this book, "Summary of Guerilla War­
fare" consolidates the principles distilled from a century and a
half of history. Its section on Intelligence begins on page 187:

Not only to give timely information of enemy activity against
them, but also for the success of their own operations against
the enemy, one of the first essentials for any guerrilla force is to
establish an efficient intelligence system. Until the movement
has developed into a large and widespread guerrilla organization
their main need will be tactical intelligence on such matters as
enemy movements, concentrations and intentions, with—from the
counterintelligence aspect—warning of enemy attempts to pene­
trate the guerrillas' own organization. To satisfy these require­
ments, guerrillas must have their own tactical intelligence service
but—like the occupying power—they will also have to rely largely
on the local populace, who in turn will have to penetrate the
enemy's security services to obtain the necessary information.

Conversely, if the enemy are unable to obtain intelligence about
the guerrillas through the local population, they are themselves
very greatly handicapped in their counter-resistance activities. It
is, therefore, extremely important that the local population are

*Published by British Ministry of Defence (London, 1957), classified
British Restricted (U.S. Confidential).
in active sympathy with the guerrillas, and it is interesting to note
that in every successful campaign reviewed in this book this local
support has been forthcoming.
Later, as the guerilla force expands, it will require strategic in-
telligence not only for its operations and own security but also as
as basis for internal propaganda. This type of information may be
provided through national guerilla or clandestine sources (as
happened in the case of the Jugoslavs receiving details of the
plans for the German Fourth Offensive) but is more likely to
have to come through Allied channels.

Communications and control
One of the difficulties in the past has been to disseminate this
intelligence, when received, for communications within guerilla
forces have always been elementary and slow, and as late as the
end of World War II still relied to a very great extent on couriers
and runners . . .

It seems noteworthy that even this more sophisticated ef-
fort to identify principles does not reach to concrete particu-
lars on subjects like means of collecting information (except
to stress reliance on the population), means of communicat-
ing collected information to guerrilla headquarters or intel-
ligence sections, and the system for intelligence processing
within the headquarters.

Brig. General Samuel B. Griffith, Jr. in his introduction to the
translation of Mao Tse-tung, covers the subject somewhat
more completely, both for positive intelligence and for coun-
terintelligence:

Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations.
Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does he propose
to do? What is the state of his equipment, his supply, his morale?
Are his leaders intelligent, bold, and imaginative, or stupid and
impetuous? Are his troops tough, efficient, and well disciplined, or
poorly trained and soft? Guerrillas expect the members of their
intelligence service to provide the answers to these and dozens
more detailed questions.

Guerrilla intelligence nets are tightly organized and pervasive.
In a guerrilla area, every person without exception must be con-
sidered an agent—old men and women, boys driving ox carts, girls
tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, school teachers, priests,
boatmen, scavengers. The local cadres “put the heat” on every-
one, without regard to age or sex, to produce all conceivable in-
formation. And produce it they do.

As a corollary, guerrillas deny all information of themselves to
their enemy, who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog. Total in-
ability to get information was a constant complaint of the Nationalists during the first four Suppression Campaigns, as it was later of the Japanese in China and of the French in both Indochina and Algeria. This is a characteristic feature of all guerrilla wars. The enemy stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around him thousands of unseen eyes intently study his every move, his every gesture. When he strikes out, he hits the air; his antagonists are insubstantial as intangible as fleeting shadows in the moonlight.

Because of superior information, guerrillas always engage under conditions of their own choosing; because of superior knowledge of terrain, they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy's discomfort...

Within U.S. Government agencies there have been recent attempts to build up a body of doctrine on guerrilla forces, including their intelligence. In an early 1962 draft entitled "An Approach to Counterguerrilla Warfare" (Confidential) prepared at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Maryland, is this brief treatment:

A second requirement for successful guerrilla operations is intelligence. Knowledge of the enemy is the key to guerrilla success. The guerrilla leader cannot take the enemy by surprise unless he knows where the enemy is to be at a given time and in what strength. In addition to a civilian clandestine net, a guerrilla organization must have a small group of men trained in clandestine reconnaissance who can move in enemy territory, collect the required information, and return safely to report.

The Department of the Army Field Manual 31-21, "Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations" (September 1961) is authoritative with respect to the intelligence needs of the U.S. Army Special Forces, the units designed to create guerrillas. It covers the EEI for a Special Force team before it is launched into an area to organize guerrillas and also has a good list of EEI within the guerrilla area after arrival of the team. The reader is referred to Chapter 5, "Theater Support," Section II, "Intelligence," and Chapter 7, "Organization and Development of the Area Command," Section IV, "Intelligence in Guerrilla Warfare Operational Areas." The manual falls far short, however, with respect to instruction in the organization of collection means and in the modus operandi, organization, and operation of intelligence production facilities at guerrilla bases or headquarters. It also dis-
tnguishes poorly between positive and counterintelligence matters.

The most complete and probably the soundest analysis of guerrilla warfare in general and its intelligence and counterintelligence aspects in particular which the writer has been able to find is the *Guide to Guerrilla Warfare* published by the Operations School of CIA's Office of Training under date of September 1961 (Confidential). Following up a short paragraph at page 3 on the "Role of Intelligence," a comprehensive and detailed discussion of intelligence matters is contained in a section beginning on page 28 covering "General Reconnaissance," "Operational Reconnaissance" (especially valuable), "Sources of Information Which Supplement Physical Reconnaissance"—enemy personnel, friendly and neutral persons in the area, enemy documents, enemy materiel, maps, weather forecasts, enemy radio broadcasts, and aerial photographs—and finally "Espionage." A whole chapter beginning on page 49 is devoted to the subject of "Security," the first two and a half pages of which are really concerned with the defensive aspects of counterintelligence.

**NOTE: The Counterintelligence Function and Its Limitations**

One area of semantic confusion with possible practical consequences derives from the definition of counterintelligence which, approved officially by the National Security Council and incorporated into NSCID 5, makes it include countersubversion as well as counterespionage and countersabotage. Many people in recent times, including journalists and even high government officials, have referred to guerrilla warfare as the equivalent of subversion. It would be unfortunate if it should therefore be concluded that counterintelligence personnel have the sole or even the major role in counter-guerrilla action; an instant's reflection should make clear how much this is beyond their capabilities.

On the other hand, it is particularly hard in counter-guerrilla operations to distinguish between what is properly positive intelligence and what is counterintelligence. Thus a U.S. Army officer writing about counter-guerrilla operations...
in South Korea, having emphasized as items of positive intelligence the need for complete order-of-battle information on each unit, to include each member of each unit, continued:

Personality files should include all local connections; frequently a mother can persuade her son to surrender, or a guerrilla leader can be captured while visiting his wife or girl friend. Special efforts must be made to kill or capture guerrilla leaders and seize their communications equipment. Aerial reconnaissance by trained units should also be employed.

This statement typifies the loose thinking in regard to intelligence and counterintelligence which pervades most writings about counter-guerrilla warfare. From a semantics standpoint the order-of-battle information, which in conventional warfare would be positive intelligence, must with respect to guerrilla activity, if that is the same as subversion, be counterintelligence. But this sophistry aside, the task of getting a mother to persuade a son to surrender, or of seizing communications equipment, or of getting at a guerrilla leader through his girl friend, is not positive intelligence but something that requires professional counterintelligence know-how.

The point to be emphasized is that, while it is manifestly impossible for counterintelligence forces to carry by themselves the whole responsibility for counter-guerrilla operations, their role in these operations is a critical one on which the success of the enterprise can very well hang. If anyone has any doubt about this statement, let him read Ian Henderson's fascinating book, cited above, about the final tracking down of the most dangerous of all the Mau Mau guerrilla-terrorists, Kimathi, and try to imagine military positive intelligence personnel or even skilled clandestine espionage people not trained in counterintelligence or police-type work accomplishing what this Special Branch Inspector did.

Peacefully disarming your enemy is not what it’s cracked up to be, judging by the two latest histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite averting a worldwide apocalypse in the course of getting the Soviet Union to dismantle medium range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the cool-headed and indispensable John F. Kennedy still faced the need for a lot of damage control. Authors David Barrett and Max Holland recount in *Blind Over Cuba* how the Kennedy administration juggled explaining to Republican opponents in Congress why a U-2 overflight discovered the missile sites just in the nick of time, and preventing its prophetic Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone from telling the true story behind this “near intelligence failure of the first magnitude.”

Author David Coleman, in *The Fourteenth Day*, reminds the reader that these recriminations distracted the administration from the main tasks of negotiating a disarmament deal with a chastened but still dangerous Nikita Khrushchev and figuring out how to monitor any agreement given the resistance of the temperamental Fidel Castro.

It is all interesting material and the stories are well told. The sourcing in both books includes a healthy dose of primary documents. And there are lessons to be gleaned from the narratives. Yet there’s something picked over about the topic, and these attempts at finding something new to say approach overkill, coming across more like journal articles stretched into book length to mark the 50th anniversary of the event.  

For example, who by now does not know McCone held lots of cards when it came to deflecting blame for the “photo gap,” the six-week hiatus in intrusive aerial reconnaissance of the Cuban mainland that prevented US photo-interpreters from discovering the missile sites until 15 October, days before some of them would become operational. As *Blind over Cuba* explains, after the discovery of SA-2 antiaircraft missile batteries in late August, McCone became convinced Khrushchev planned to install nuclear missiles on the island. “Those batteries aren’t there to protect the cane workers,” he was quoted as saying. He wanted the pace of U-2 over-flights drastically accelerated. And then he went on his honeymoon.

However, at a meeting on 10 September, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk ordered, over the outranked Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter, the U-2’s flight plans and frequency of missions severely restricted to avoid the downing of these aircraft. Both officials were jumpy after the Soviets had complained about one stray over-flight and the Chinese had just shot down a U-2 over their territory. They also were not convinced the sophisticated antiaircraft missiles were anything more than the typical military hardware the Soviet Union provided to its satellite countries.

---

1 Max Holland’s early exploration of the gap, “The ‘Photo Gap’ that Delayed Discovery of Missiles,” appeared in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, No. 4 (December 2005), which is available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/Photo_Gap_2.htm.
Upon returning from his honeymoon, McCone protested mightily and demanded restoration of sweeping overflights. What he got was a curtailed flight over western Cuba, where the SA-2s were first spotted, but it was enough: the pictures taken clearly showed nuclear missile sites under construction near San Cristóbal. Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s coined phrase “Thirteen Days” of superpower confrontation and policy deliberations was about to begin.

After JFK got Khrushchev to back down, mostly Republican lawmakers wanted the Kennedy administration to explain its perceived slowness in discovering the missiles. And the player who would deflect enough attention from the near disastrous overflight policy order was none other than McCone.

Through countless testimonials on Capitol Hill, McCone unsuccessfully did his best to be seen as a team player for the administration while at the same time making known his grand foresight in predicting Soviet intentions. He obscured the story just enough so that lawmakers failed to get to the bottom of the photo gap, caused, not by bureaucratic infighting or bad weather, but by Bundy and Rusk’s move to restrict the over-flights. However, the DCI could not help himself, coming across as an I-told-you-so maverick, something the president had problems tolerating.

Unfortunately, Barrett and Holland treat the failure to discover the photo gap as something of a cold case. They focus on McCone’s internal assessment of missile crisis coverage, a CIA Inspector General investigation, a review board report, and congressional hearings. This overreliance on reports and prepared testimony, including quoting a whole paragraph from a Senate report just to make the case that a group of legislators must have signed off on its findings, makes the narrative sound like such a report. And how interesting can reports and congressional hearings that never really got to the bottom of a matter be? Accounts of partisan behavior by the chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and democratic political operative, Clark Gifford, along with the attempts of Roger Hilsman, chief of State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to blame the CIA for the photo gap can only hold attention for so long.

The authors also felt the need to scan existing books and research on the missile crisis for references to the photo gap. This commendable review of scholarship yields the supposedly startling finding that many books did not mention the photo gap in any depth. But why would experts expend any more time than they have to on an intelligence failure that did not happen, no matter how much of a near thing it was?

The Fourteenth Day does a nice job of cataloging the weaponry Kennedy wanted to open up to scrutiny and the means available to monitor their withdrawal. Besides the medium-range missiles, the Kennedy administration wanted other weapons out of Cuba, especially long range IL-28 bombers, as well as MiGs, cruise missiles, and Luna artillery launchers, which could be used for battlefield nuclear weapons. The presence of 41,000 crack Soviet soldiers was also a concern.

Coleman provides a thorough overview of the atmosphere in which Kennedy operated—including an aggressive press that he illegally spied on, a State Department without direction, and a condescending and trigger-happy military. But instead of amplifying, the excessive coverage of these elements actually distracts from the main story of disarmament. The book also would have benefited from more coverage of Khrushchev and Castro—the latter is practically absent from the story.

Lessons

Taken together, these books provide some lessons on coordinating intelligence collection and policy, warning, and policymaker support.

Develop an intelligence collection plan. The Kennedy administration sought a more rigorous policy for collection in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. As the president said to fellow Executive Committee officials, “we can't have this thing every morning whether we are planning to fly planes or not.” Securing greater certainty on collection depended on the administration’s coming to agreement on what weapons Cuba hosted, which ones had to go, which ones would be nice to have out of Cuba, and which ones were not worth the risk of blowing a disarmament deal. Under this framework, high- and low-altitude flights would initially swarm over the island, and then be undertaken more selectively. For example, once aerial surveillance of Soviet ships revealed the Kremlin was acting in good faith in dismantling the nuclear missile installations, Kennedy stopped monitoring compliance on these weapons and went on to get a better
intelligence handle on other objectionable weapon systems in Cuba.

**Recognize collection gray areas.** Having policy officials narrow the list of weapons to be dismantled and, by doing so, lower the risk of a shoot-down is simpler than it sounds, for in making this list, officials sometimes need intelligence on the status of the weapons systems. There’s a continuous feedback loop. The IL-28 bomber, for example, was a particular concern, and officials hoped Khrushchev would take their hints about sending them out of Cuba, piece by piece. But overflights of these bases showed the planes were still being assembled, forcing Kennedy to decide whether to press for their removal, and thus necessitate monitoring Soviet compliance, or let the matter drop. The last thing Kennedy wanted was to upset Khrushchev and induce him to hand over the SA-2 missile sites to the trigger-happy Cubans.

**Special care is needed when analysis hinges on US policy.** Analysts who overestimate the influence of the United States on the behavior of other leaders or countries risk misleading their readers by making their analysis appear more actionable than it is and by giving US policy officials a false sense of comfort. These books make clear that analysts were convinced the Cuban military buildup was defensive and would stay that way as long as Moscow understood Washington’s vehement opposition to an offensive buildup. All US officials had to do was warn Moscow away. But a multitude of factors influenced Khrushchev. These included his desire to redress the strategic balance while protecting Cuba, his expectation that he could pull a fast one by installing the missiles quickly, and his belief that once the missiles were operational, Kennedy would live with the fact just as Khrushchev himself had lived with missiles in Turkey.

Another pitfall of ascribing too much influence to US policy is that analysts sometimes wrongly assume they know what US policy is or can anticipate what it will be even when crucial decisions have not yet been made. Board of Estimates Chairman Sherman Kent and his analysts later bragged about correctly calling the no-compromise position the Kennedy administration adopted on the missile deployments, but they brushed off their failure to see Khrushchev’s Cuban gamble. And despite his bragging, Kent may have blown even the call on the administration’s position, not knowing of Kennedy’s decision to pull US Jupiter missiles out of Turkey as part of a more concessionary bargain.

**Beware of the risk of confirming policymaker views.** The policymaking and intelligence communities, with the exception of the DCI, agreed the Soviets would not do anything so stupid as to put nuclear missiles in Cuba. Right for the wrong reason is how many experts described McCone’s foresight. Kent asked the drafters of a key estimate on the subject whether they agreed with McCone; none did and no notation of this alternative view went down on paper. Policy officials applied no pressure on CIA to give the matter another look since they agreed with the majority view. Only through McCone’s steadfastness and access to the president did that crucial U-2 flight over western Cuba take place. Most crucial intelligence calls lack such high-level contrarians, making it imperative that policy officials see a minority view either in the body of an analytical piece or separately in an alternative analysis-like publication.
Nigel West is the well-known author of many books on intelligence. He has authored or coauthored nine of the 16 historical dictionaries published by the Scarecrow Press on intelligence topics and so is well-placed to attempt perhaps the most difficult of all historical intelligence dictionary subjects: the highly classified field of signals intelligence (SIGINT). West does not shrink from the challenge; he takes on not just British SIGINT, and not even just British and US SIGINT. In fact, West has attempted to corral the SIGINT activities of most of the world’s nations over the past century. No volume could manage such a difficult task well, particularly given how closely guarded the subject is—very little of what the world’s SIGINT agencies have done since WW II has been declassified.

It is obvious, but needs to be stated, that what is available in primary sources determines, and limits, what West—or anyone writing about SIGINT—is able to use. West recognizes this and says so. His bibliographic essay acknowledges the challenge: “Because of its sensitive nature, relatively little has been published about SIGINT” and “detailed SIGINT studies are rare indeed.”(275) West’s bibliography for the entire Cold War tells more of the story. It lists only about 20 sources, while he lists more than 50 for the much narrower VENONA program.

A significant and surprising gap in West’s otherwise fair-minded selection of sources is the lack of references to histories of SIGINT written by NSA historians. Given that the American SIGINT system, as closed as it may be, is probably the most open of all of those services worldwide, one would have expected a nod to them—they actually know what has happened in US SIGINT since WW II. His bibliography notes only two of NSA’s historical publications. The first is Thomas R. Johnson’s *American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945–1989*. Oddly, West notes in one place that the work was “declassified,” (285) when, in fact, it was redacted, i.e., still classified materials were deleted; in an earlier reference to that volume, (163) he had it right. Much of Johnson’s history indeed remains classified. West also notes Frederick D. Parker’s monograph, *A Priceless Advantage: US Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians*, (288) and acknowledges William Friedman, (286) Robert Benson and Michael Warner, (290–91) Hayden Peake, (291) and many veterans of the WW II SIGINT effort. WW II, however, is not where the information gap is.

Still, in providing an introductory essay, a chronology, more than 300 entries, appendices, and, importantly, a bibliography, West has made the best of a difficult subject. His dictionary samples a wide field and will be worthwhile for most scholarly and public educational uses. Also, importantly, West has maintained a sober, balanced, dispassionate—and therefore credible—tone throughout and avoided the breathless, alarmist language of many works on intelligence, especially SIGINT.

The following small sampling of West’s 300 entries illustrates his welcome tone and supplies a good sense

---

1 The Center for Cryptologic History’s unclassified collection can be found at www.nsa.gov.
of the work’s strengths and weaknesses. On the plus side are:

• a nice paragraph on Abner, an early, important, computer. (9) Helpful details like this on obscure, seemingly inconsequential topics are sprinkled throughout the dictionary. They are only unimportant until one needs to know about them.

• a perhaps too succinct but still helpful entry on the Cold War (61–62). A goodly number of other entries—e.g., on the Cuban Missile Crisis, US military SIGINT organizations, and various specific episodes—flesh out the picture, though even with those, many gaps will remain in the Cold War story for years.

• an excellent entry on Vietnam (228–33) gives an idea of the kind of detail that could be known about SIGINT if more declassified primary records became available. Of course, volumes could be written about SIGINT (American, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet) during the Vietnam War, but the level of detail West has provided in this entry indicates that in some areas primary sources are sufficient to provide firm ground for public knowledge.

Examples that illustrate the challenges caused by dearth of available source material include:

• too brief an entry on Russia’s GRU (the military’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, which conducts human and signals intelligence operations abroad) (115), which, one imagines, would warrant volumes if the information were available.

• too brief a mention of the largest and probably most effective Soviet SIGINT site outside of the Soviet Union, in Lourdes, Cuba, which probably targeted the eastern seaboard of the United States and possibly Latin America, as well. Only noted in an entry on FAPSI (the Russian Federation’s signals collection organization), the site operated continuously for many years. Undoubtedly, West could find relatively little primary information about Lourdes, and not surprisingly, the Russians have not deigned to release any of it. In any case, Lourdes deserved its own entry, even if only a cross-reference to FAPSI.

A number of topics could have been treated more fully and some were not treated at all even though supporting information is available. For example:

• the Black Chamber, the first US Cryptologic organization, about which much is known, receives only a seven-line entry. (36–37)

• the United Kingdom’s SIGINT agency, the GCHQ, is covered in an overview, (109–12) which, while solid, is briefer than it could be. In addition, the bibliography fails to include Richard J. Aldrich’s significant, 665-page study, GCHQ, published in 2010, although West does list a 30-page article that Aldrich published in 2010 on the same subject.

• Korea has no entry.

It is not hard to see how this dictionary could be expanded upon for many years to come as more information about SIGINT is released and as time allows consideration of things that might have been included in this edition but were left out. Among them might be many other known instances of SIGINT activity from WW I through WW II, including those of non-allied combatants whose efforts, beyond a few big stories, still remain relatively unknown in English. Also of value would be entries on Cold War communist SIGINT efforts against NATO and ASEAN nations. In the end, though, for all its shortcomings, this volume is nevertheless a sound first step.
Intelligence in Public Literature

The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I

Thomas Boghardt (Naval Institute Press, 2012), 319 pp., illustrations, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Since 1 March 1917, the day its decrypted text was published in US newspapers, the Zimmermann telegram has been a subject of popular fascination. The reason the story is so captivating is not hard to understand: it is a morality play, a story of deception, code-breaking, and high diplomacy. Not surprisingly, though, these elements also have obscured the truth about the telegram, whether because historians have had a difficult time sorting the facts or because of deliberate distortion and mythmaking. In his new history, The Zimmermann Telegram, military and intelligence historian Thomas Boghardt presents a meticulously researched and well-written account that clarifies the story of the telegram and likely will be the standard for many years to come.

The basic story is well known. As Germany prepared in January 1917 to begin unrestricted submarine warfare—a move likely to bring the United States into World War I—Berlin’s foreign minister, Arthur Zimmermann, approved a proposal to the Mexican government that offered it the opportunity to recover territories lost to the United States if it joined the war on Berlin’s side. British intelligence, however, intercepted and decrypted the cable and then gave the text to Walter Hines Page, the US ambassador in London. Page forwarded the text to the State Department, and it was shown to President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing. Lansing, in turn, gave the text to an Associated Press correspondent. The uproar that followed publication, generations of schoolchildren have been taught, helped propel the United States into the war.

The strength of The Zimmermann Telegram is the multiple perspectives that Boghardt uses to tell the story. For general readers, there is plenty of fun. Fascinating, even eccentric characters populate the tale. Foremost among these is the chief of the British navy’s codebreaking branch, Captain William Reginald “Blinker” Hall. Hall, in Boghardt’s description, was a charismatic man and brilliant intelligence operator and politician. He earned his nickname because “when excited...his piercing eyes took to frequent blinking.” Hall also had false teeth that clicked as he spoke, and he used these tics to overcome opponents in Whitehall debates: “When making a point, he clicked his false teeth horridly, and his icy stare and wiggling eyebrows were said to work wonders in negotiations.” (83)

Hall is the key player in the book. Boghardt gives a good account of how he established his operation, known as Room 40, and then expanded it into the best intercept and codebreaking operation in the world. It is a glimpse, too, of the birth of an intelligence service and how—under Hall’s firm hand—it operated with virtually no supervision from above, something that would be almost inconceivable today, when intelligence services are bureaucratized and seek to integrate their operations. Ironically, though, Hall’s success contributed to the creation of the modern intelligence bureaucracy. After the war, the British realized how valuable Room 40 had been and took steps to place it on a firm institutional footing, creating what is now GCHQ, the Government Communications Headquarters, which—along with NSA—is one of the world’s leading SIGINT agencies.

On the German side, too, the characters tend to be interesting, although not because of their abilities. Zimmermann himself was a hardworking plodder who “did not respond well to stress” and who had a poor understanding of European politics—hardly the qualities one would look for in a foreign minister. (24) As for Hans Arthur von Kemnitz, who suggested the proposal to Mexico and drafted the telegram, Boghardt simply notes that his “performance as a diplomat was subpar” even before he came up with his scheme. (53)
After the war, Kemnitz was unable to find employment as a diplomat, but after 1933 suddenly discovered that he long had been a loyal Nazi and tried to find a job in the new regime’s foreign affairs apparatus. Even the Nazis did not want him, however, and he died in well-deserved obscurity.

The story of how Room 40 intercepted the telegram also is fascinating. The British had cut the German undersea cables at the start of the war, leading Berlin to send diplomatic traffic to North America by handing encrypted messages to the US embassy for transmission to Washington on US cables. The cables passed through London, and Hall intercepted and decrypted the State Department’s messages; thus he found and decrypted the Zimmermann telegram, which was embedded within the US traffic. To cap this achievement, Hall staged an elaborate deception so he could pass the telegram to Page without revealing that he was reading US cables. Indeed, it would not be until the 1930s that the United States realized that the British had been reading its traffic (and not until World War II that the UK stopped the practice altogether).

Another of Boghardt’s accomplishments is to set all of this in a broader context. As interesting and important as the intelligence aspect of the story is, he carefully details the diplomatic background in which the events took place. Here, the British come off quite well, as Boghardt walks through their years of efforts to cultivate strong relations with sympathetic US officials. When the telegram was decrypted and handed over, London was able to exploit these relationships quickly and effectively to build support for US entry into the war. The Germans, in contrast, were woefully inept in their diplomacy. The telegram was but one example of Kemnitz’s unrealistic schemes for drawing Mexico or other Latin American states into the war on Germany’s side; Kemnitz somehow convinced himself that such marginal players could tip the scales in Berlin’s favor.

For American readers, the book addresses another important question: how much did the telegram really matter in the decision to go to war? Not much, according to Boghardt. The telegram certainly created an uproar in the US press, but, as Boghardt carefully documents, the furor did not last long and changed few minds on the question of whether or not to intervene. Indeed, he notes, the overwhelming issue in March 1917 was how to respond to the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, and this was the reason Wilson asked for the declaration of war.

In sum, The Zimmermann Telegram is a fine example of how various historical disciplines—intelligence, diplomatic, and political—can be combined to tell a compelling story. It should be on the reading list of anyone interested in how intelligence shapes our world.
William Egan Colby was one of the most intriguing figures of the Cold War. The son of a career military officer, he spent his youth on Army posts in the United States and China. He graduated from Princeton and then enrolled in Columbia University Law School in 1941. Following Pearl Harbor, Colby enlisted and eventually found his way from the regular Army to the Office of Strategic Services. In 1944 and 1945 he earned a hero’s acclaim for his activities behind enemy lines in France and Norway. Colby joined the CIA in 1950 and served with the agency until his dismissal as director by President Ford in 1976.

Rather than being a spymaster—as the subtitle of this movie by one of his sons, Carl Colby, suggests—Colby was from first to last a covert operative, a specialist in psychological and political operations, counterinsurgency, pacification, nation-building, and unconventional warfare. During the 1960s he continually proffered counterinsurgency and pacification as far better alternatives to conventional warfare in the struggle with the forces of international communism, especially in the developing world. After successfully overseeing the CIA’s political warfare shop in Italy in the 1950s, Colby went to Saigon in 1959, rising to the position of station chief and in the process establishing the prototype for what would be the Strategic Hamlet Program.

As Far East Division chief in CIA’s Directorate of Plans (the current-day National Clandestine Service) from 1962 through 1968, Colby continued to supervise counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and struggled mightily, but unsuccessfully, against Gen. William Westmoreland’s search-and-destroy approach. At the same time, he oversaw a massive unconventional war in Laos.

In 1968 Colby returned to Vietnam as head of CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), the most promising counterinsurgency/pacification operation ever undertaken by the United States. Mingling military with civilian personnel in a vast countrywide operation that included everything from education and health to the Phoenix Program, CORDS had pacified significant portions of the countryside by 1972. Unfortunately, Colby’s operation could do nothing about the corrupt military regime in Saigon or waning support in the United States for the war effort.

In 1971, Colby returned home to be closer to his ailing elder daughter, Catherine. He served in various subordinate capacities in the CIA until 1973, when President Nixon appointed him director of central intelligence. As head of the agency, it became his lot to preside over revelations of past CIA misdeeds—the “family jewels”—and in 1976, Ford fired him. In 1982 Bill Colby left his wife of 37 years for another woman. In 1996 he died alone while canoeing near his home, under what some consider mysterious circumstances.

Carl Colby has produced a documentary on his father’s life that is at times penetrating, vivid, and insightful, and at other times disconnected and confusing. The film attempts all at once to be a biography of Bill Colby, a history of America in the world from 1945 to 1976, and an indictment of an absentee father. The family history is delivered by Barbara, Bill’s first wife, on-camera, and by Carl, the neglected son, off-camera.

Bill Colby is portrayed as a cold-hearted patriot who put the welfare of his country above the welfare of his family. Carl forgives excesses he perceives his father may have committed in the line of duty—allowing the
Phoenix Program to become an exercise in “assassina-
tion” and spilling the guts of the CIA before congres-
sional committees, for example. But Carl is less
forgiving when it comes to what he believes his father
did to his family. “I’m not sure he ever loved any-
one,” Carl observes toward the end of the film, “and I
never heard him say anything heartfelt.” Other mem-
bers of the Colby family have disagreed with that
assessment, and there is much evidence available to
back them up.

This film is not a mixture of apples and oranges but
a whole fruit basket turned upside down. Carl has
done wonderful and prodigious work in various film
archives and many of the images are very powerful,
particularly having to do with the Provincial Recon-
naissance Units (PRUs) and the Phoenix program. But
the film suffers from the lack of a single historical nar-
rator. The story of US foreign policy, the CIA, Viet-
nam, and the family jewels is told through a dizzying
array of voices. The only constants are the lengthy
commentaries of Barbara and Carl.

The material on the CIA’s campaign to prevent Italy
from going communist by influencing the electoral pro-
cess during the 1950s is good as is the depiction of coun-
terinsurgency and pacification in Vietnam, although the
film fails to make the key point: overall, CORDS was a
success, although South Vietnam never became a coher-
ent state able to command the respect and support of a
majority of its population. CORDS and its South Viet-
namese allies could never find a way to connect the rice-
roots revolution in the countryside to the corrupt mili-
tary regime in Saigon. In a sense, Bill Colby’s posture
toward Tran Ngoc Chau—the populist leader the Thieu
regime convicted of espionage and imprisoned—was as
important as his attitude toward the Ngo brothers.

The political dimension, such an important part of Bill
Colby’s life and of the life of the CIA, is totally miss-
ing from the film. Like American society as a whole,
the agency featured both New Deal liberals—who
believed it was America’s duty not only to protect its
interests but to spread the blessings of liberty and
democracy to the less fortunate peoples of the world—
and conservatives, who limited their vision to bases,
alliances, and traditional espionage. Significantly, liber-
als like Colby wanted to make openings to the Left as
part of an effort to separate socialists and revolutionary
nationalists from communists, while conservatives
wanted to rely on ties with royalists and even neofas-
cists to wage unrelenting war against the Left.

Also missing from the film is the ongoing rivalry
between William Colby and James Jesus Angleton,
and between the two CIA cultures they represented:
the covert operatives and nation builders, and the spies
and counterspies. That rivalry, along with the Glomar
Explorer drama, had as much to do with Colby’s deci-
sion to release the family jewels as anything.

All too frequently, the focus of the film, Bill Colby
himself, becomes lost. Or perhaps he is not really the
subject of the film. He wrote two memoirs, some of
which must be taken with grains of salt, but they are
for the most part reliable and could have provided the
er elder Colby a voice throughout the film. Barbara,
rather, is the documentary’s heroine—a long-suffering
and neglected wife, and Bill’s putative constant moral
compass.

Another problem for the film is that it contains too
many historical inaccuracies. Henry Cabot Lodge did
not engineer the 1963 coup against the Ngo brothers.
He allowed it to happen, as Washington had instructed
him to do. Hugh Tovar’s observation that, after the coup
against Diem, the war became America’s war—no turn-
ning back—is misleading. The decisions to escalate were
made in late 1964 and early 1965. The trigger was
North Vietnam’s decision to begin infiltrating troops
into South Vietnam. And it was never entirely Amer-
ica’s war. If it had been, as John Paul Vann and others
lamented, pacification might have turned the tide.

The most controversial part of the film is Carl’s insin-
uation, supported by James Schlesinger and Brent
Scowcroft, that Bill was wracked with guilt over his
daughter Catherine’s illness and death, and the excesses
of the Phoenix Program. So true was this, by the film’s
depiction, that it prompted the elder Colby to decide
that life was no longer worth living. Scowcroft, an
instrument of Henry Kissinger who had worked franti-
cally to keep Colby from sharing the family jewels with
Congress (his duty under the law) is a particularly unre-
liable witness. Bill Colby was terribly distraught over
Catherine’s demise, but he felt no more than ordinary
guilt. The notion that he experienced remorse over
Phoenix is absurd. As Carl repeats over and over in the
film, his father was a warrior, and war requires killing.
Bill Colby was as comfortable with the responsibilities
of deadly force as any sane man could be.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics


Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker, by Timothy L. Thomas.

Counterintelligence Theory and Practice, by Hank Prunckun.

Intelligence Analyst Guide: A Digest for Junior Intelligence Analysts, edited by Ionel Nițu.

Intelligence Collection: How To Plan and Execute Intelligence Collection in Complex Environments by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum.

Intelligence Tradecraft: Secrets of Spy Warfare, by Maloy Krishna Dhar.

Introduction to Intelligence Studies, by Carl J. Jensen, III, David H. McElreath, and Melissa Graves.


Historical


Ian Fleming and SOE’s Operation Postmaster: The Untold Top Secret Story Behind 007, by Brian Lett.

An Intriguing Life: A Memoir of War, Washington, and Marriage to an American Spymaster, by Cynthia Helms with Chris Black.

Man of War: The Secret Life of Captain Alan Hillgarth Officer, Adventurer, Agent, by Duff Hart-Davis.


The Secret Listeners: How the Wartime Y Service Intercepted the Secret German Codes for Bletchley Park, by Sinclair McKay.


Memoir

The Formative Years of an African-American Spy: A Memoir, by Odell Bennett Lee.

Intelligence Services Abroad

Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain, by Christopher Moran.


Other People’s Wars: New Zealand in Afghanistan, Iraq and the War on Terror, by Nicky Hager.

Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, from Lenin to Putin, by Julie Fedor.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
**Current Topics**


Readers of *Black Hawk Down* and *Guests of the Ayatollah* have learned that author Mark Bowden is a skillful storyteller. *The Finish* follows that precedent and establishes it as essential reading on the subject of Osama bin Laden’s killing. In this book, Bowden adds to the well-known basics of the story background and texture about the principal characters and operational circumstances that have not been provided in other accounts. To do this, he consulted the materials captured at Bin Laden’s compound and now held at West Point; interviewed President Obama, reporting his views on key aspects of the operation; and conducted interviews with many of the principals, although not all are named.

*The Finish* sets the stage by reviewing the pre-9/11 mindsets of key players and reveals some interesting preconceptions. President Obama, for instance, had, until 9/11, imagined terrorists shaped by “ignorance and poverty,” (23) a view he would soon revise. Bowden also lays the groundwork for a gradual convergence of views with Obama’s predecessor on certain areas of the war on terror. A short summary of Bin Laden’s evolution into Islamic terrorism shows how, ironically, he used modern Western communication techniques to attract dedicated fanatics to join a “backward looking movement with forward looking tactics.” (52)

The balance of the book tracks the search for Bin Laden from the early frustrated attempts by CIA’s Alec Station, through the revitalization of efforts after 9/11, and persistent analysis of information that began to lead to the clues to his whereabouts. On this point, Bowden counters the claim “that torture played no role in tracking down Bin Laden,” when he notes that “in the first two important steps down the trail, that claim crumbles.” (113)

Bowden interrupts the story of the search from time to time and turns to what Bin Laden is doing and thinking as the end nears. He quotes letters to his subordinates that lay out his concepts for more terror, while showing concern for the families whose men were killed by drones, and for the excessive killing of Muslims.

By late 2010, Bin Laden’s compound had been discovered. From that point on, Bowden concentrates on the players who worked to convince the president that the al-Qaeda leader was very likely to be there, the evidence they developed, and several options advanced for killing him. Bowden does a fine job of conveying a sense of the pressure that dominated the planning and the controversies that resulted before the final decision was made. Some accounts held that the president, after the last planning session, said he wanted to think about the decision overnight. Bowden reports that the president told him “he had all but made up his mind when he left the Thursday meeting.” (206)

Bowden treats in detail SEAL Team 6 planning, the importance of the president’s insistence that they be prepared to fight their way out, insistence on adding appropriate backup support and, of course, the successful mission itself. He admits that some of the details he provides conflict with other accounts published since his book went to press and comments that future editions of the book will reflect the differences.

*The Finish* holds your attention from page 1. It is an impressive, finely honed story of a gutsy call and an operation professionally executed.


Using Chinese open sources, author Timothy Thomas, a senior analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office at Ft. Leavenworth, concludes that China is “implicated in the theft of digital information from countries across the globe via a combination of traditional and creative oriental methods.” (xi) These thefts, he suggests, are conducted by civilian and military agencies, and are part of a three component threat—cyber soft power, cyber reconnaissance, and cyber attack: *The Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon*.
The three chapters on soft power variations echo Sun Tzu—“win without fighting; win the victory before the first battle.” (xiv) One technique uses the internet to influence public opinion with high tech media—a Chinese CNN in New York—and discusses methods to deter attacks and control information. Cyber deterrence is another soft power technique. Thomas indicates that China considers it in terms comparable to nuclear deterrence and is working to find the best organization to do this, and thus make the cyber option as powerful as the nuclear. While the focus is on Chinese concepts and initiatives, Thomas compares them with US methods and ideas and notes the concerns US cyber officers have with China’s rapid progress.

The next three chapters discuss China’s cyber activist operations against the United States and other Western nations. There is a section on the PLA’s SIGINT and cyber reconnaissance infrastructure and a discussion of two recent cases: Night Dragon and Shady Rat. The former targeted oil, gas, and petrochemical companies. The latter examines stolen national secrets, source codes, e-mail archives, document stores, among other targets. There is also a section on the role of China’s cyber militia and a case study on how Google dealt with a cyber attack.

Part three of the book deals with a series of Chinese books and articles concerning offensive vs. defensive “informatization theory.” (143ff) One part deals with resources needed to create forces that think and act in terms of the operation of digital weapons against an enemy. The book ends with a chapter comparing Chinese and Russian cyber concepts.

Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon concludes with some alarming thoughts on what this means to the West. Thomas’s emphasis is on China’s attempts to “persuade other nations of [its] peaceful intent” (258) while it continues to refine its capabilities aimed at gaining and maintaining strategic superiority through ‘system sabotage’ and application of means and methods to deceive, bewilder, and control a network control center….” (265) This is an important introductory treatment of a vital subject that provides a comprehensive idea of just how serious the Chinese are when it comes to the future of cyberspace.

**General**


Dr. Hank Prunckun is an associate professor of intelligence analysis at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Stuart University in Sydney. During a 28-year career in Australia’s criminal justice system, he has served in strategic and tactical intelligence positions and has authored several books on intelligence.¹ He explains in the preface to *Counterintelligence Theory and Practice* that he wrote the book to suggest “new remedies” to meet the “new evils” facing “security of classified information and secret operations.” (xi)

Prunckun acknowledges that counterintelligence (CI) practice has been the subject of many other books, among them William R. Johnson’s, *Thwarting Enemies At Home and Abroad*.² But none, he suggests, provide “advanced understanding of the underlying theory” of CI, and that is the focus of the present work.

After reviewing why CI is needed, Prunckun describes its “taxonomic categories” in terms of “defense and offense” (24) and the various functions in each category. Then he looks at “counterintelligence topology” using the United States Intelligence Community (IC) as an example. This amounts to listing the intelligence agencies involved and noting that each deals with counterintelligence in different ways while also working collaboratively. (25)

---


² William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies At Home and Abroad: How To Be A Counterintelligence Officer* (Georgetown University Press, 2009)
Turning to CI theory, Prunckun develops a theoretical model for both the defensive and offensive functions. With a theory of how a system should work, he argues, a practitioner should be able to develop a hypothesis, and test whether the system functions as theory suggests.

The balance of the book is devoted to defensive and offensive CI considerations. With respect to the former, he discusses risk, physical barriers, security, background investigation, personnel security, classification, code names, communication issues, to name a few. Concerning offensive topics, he addresses data collection, deception, counterespionage, double agents and dangles.

At this point the reader might expect specific examples of the application of CI theory in practice, but none are provided. Thus, while the book is intellectually provocative, it is operationally empty. One is left wondering whether a theory is even necessary, as present practices are well established and tested, if not always applied properly, as Prunckun himself acknowledges. (40) If a CI theory is needed, Counterintelligence Theory and Practice fails to make the case.


Romanian intelligence analyst, Ionel Nițu (pronounced neat tzu), has assembled a collection of brief articles on aspects of intelligence analysis written by 20 experienced analysts from the National Intelligence Academy in Bucharest and other elements of the Romanian intelligence community.

Written for junior-level analysts, the contributions are presented in five chapters. The first discusses the role of analysis at the national level. The second chapter looks at three kinds of analysis—strategic, tactical, and operational—factors affecting analysis, and the psychological profiles of analysts he believes are most suited to each type of analysis. Chapter 3 describes methodologies and theories of analysis. These range from the scientific to the more common, experiential approaches. None of the contributions give examples of techniques applied in practice. Nor do the authors recommend one over another, leaving that to analysts to decide based on the circumstances of their situations. The fourth chapter considers the role of dissemination and its importance in a successful intelligence cycle. Chapter 5 examines the need for integrated—all source—analysis in light of modern technological developments and the vastly increased volumes of data available in today’s information society. (93)

Nițu recognizes the need for reform in certain cases, and discusses, in some detail, three areas—process, product, personnel—that should be given close consideration, while recognizing each agency will have unique needs. The five appendices present a summary of the characteristics of analysts, requirements and related capabilities in table form for easy reference. In general, each of the concepts discussed is augmented by well-designed graphics.

The Intelligence Analyst Guide is interesting for several reasons. It indicates how much Romanian thinking about intelligence has changed since the fall of its communist government. The book also reflects the considerable influence of the West in the methods it treats and in the sources it cites in the footnotes and the bibliography.

In his afterword, editor Nițu implies this was the result of either operational common sense or the universality of the concepts of good analysis. Nițu does not say why an English edition of this work was published, although Romanian intelligence agencies have been sponsoring English-language works for several years now. Whatever their reasons, publication in English facilitates cooperation and understanding. Finally, a more fundamental message is conveyed: the National Intelligence Academy has freed itself from Cold War shackles. It is a welcome contribution to the literature of intelligence.
Intelligence Collection: How To Plan and Execute Intelligence Collection in Complex Environments by Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum. (Praeger) 505 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

In an earlier book, BGen. Wayne Hall (US Army-Ret.) and Gary Citrenbaum made a case for advanced intelligence analysis. ³ The current work, intended for experienced officers, is “about metacognition (thinking about thinking) that forms the basis for how we think about intelligence collection operations.” (1) It makes a case for an advanced collection system that requires changes to existing practices “so as to perform the deep thinking about collection and the execution of collection plans.” (7)

The authors define advanced intelligence collection as: “the creative design and use of technical, cyber, human, and open-source collectors in all domains—air, ground, sea, space, information, and cyber—in pursuit of discrete, subtle, nuanced, and often fleeting observables, indicators and signatures…” to support “military and nonmilitary actions, particularly in dense urban OEs” (operational environments). (6) Put another way, one might say that it is a comprehensive look at all-source intelligence.

The first eight chapters discuss aspects of what they consider to be advanced intelligence. Chapter 9 deals with the basics of “advanced intelligence collection,” followed by chapters on performance requirements, “point persistent surveillance” (P2S), critical thinking, and necessary tools.

In their discussion of advanced intelligence collection, the authors suggest some novel concepts. For example, they suggest something they describe as “IW ISR [irregular warfare and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] must be treated as a weapons system. The data, information, and knowledge that intelligence collection produces and the subsequent thinking and machine work that go into producing knowledge for making decisions and understanding the complex OE are, in effect weapons the commander uses to create outcomes…. Now they must bring together the great capabilities of advanced collection and advanced analysis and mass them where and when appropriate and disband or demassify their created assemblages where and when appropriate. This notion suggests a change in commanders’ thinking, as this powerful idea can provide them with the intellectual power, machine power, organizational processes and organizational knowledge to perform these important C2 functions.” (69) Just how thinking of intelligence as a weapons system enhances a commander’s decisionmaking ability is never made clear. Nor do they provide examples of this concept in practice.

A second concept the authors find critical is “point persistent surveillance” which they define as “the ability of a sensing system (or combination of systems) to provide high confidence that event occurrences of interest do not go undetected.” Implementation of this concept involves the use of drones, technical monitors, or human surveillance with communication links, 24/7.

The final chapter presents some closing thoughts that are the most articulate in the book. Readers might well start with Chapter 15 to get an idea of what is coming. Unfortunately, the absence of practical examples of their ideas, and a turgid narrative that borders on the aggressively boring, does not work to their advantage. Readers are left wondering just what “advanced intelligence collection” really is and how it differs from current practice. A strong case can be made, however, that Intelligence Collection is an arcane restatement of the basics: get it right and on time.


After a nearly 30-year career in the Intelligence Bureau—the Indian internal security service—where he specialized in counterintelligence, Maloy Dhar turned to writing about the lessons he learned in his professional life. In his book, Open Secrets, ⁴ Dhar compared India’s intelligence services with those of other democratic nations, suggesting there was some catching up to do. In the present work, he draws on his experience as assistant director for training to fill a gap he found in

³ Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments (ABC Clio, 2009)
⁴ Maloy Dhar, Open Secrets: India’s Intelligence Unveiled (MANAS, 2012)
training literature that did not discuss the basics of intelligence tradecraft.

The 14 chapters of *Intelligence Tradecraft* begin with a discussion of intelligence as presented by Kautilya in Chapters 11–16 of the *Arthashastra*, the ancient Indian treatise that assesses the institution of spies. He emphasizes the difficulty of establishing a single definition of intelligence and reviews some of the western attempts to do so, including what has become a standard point of departure in the literature, Michael Warner’s article, “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence.”

The balance of the book treats the tradecraft of each of the basic functions of intelligence as practiced by the various Indian services and their officers. He is careful to note differences in terminology where they occur. For example, the Indian services use the term “handling officer” where “case officer” is used by the CIA and other Western services; the duties discussed are essentially the same. (23ff) Two other terms not found elsewhere are the “sub-conscious” and “unconscious” agents. The former are potential agents that are indiscrete in discussion and become vulnerable to recruitment. The latter are sources asked to collect seemingly innocuous information valuable to the handling officer. (79–80)

Other topics covered include the prerequisites for a good intelligence officer, the training required, the type of operations, communication and the technical aspects, collection and analysis, CI, legal aspects, open source intelligence, interrogation techniques, and agent handling. There is a chapter on deception, disinformation, and propaganda as part of psychological warfare, which Dhar notes, regretfully, is not yet part of any standard organization or officer training, and the duties are left to the desk officer. (236)

Despite his title, Dhar has included some historical background and candid comments on what he perceives are the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian intelligence services. But in the main, *Intelligence Tradecraft* sticks to tradecraft and is thus one of the few books to treat it in such depth. It is interesting and informative, well worth attention.


While preparing an undergraduate introductory course at the University of Mississippi on intelligence in America, the authors of this book could not find a text that met their needs. Drawing on their extensive backgrounds—military, FBI, law enforcement, consulting, and legal—they wrote this *Introduction to Intelligence Studies*.

The 15 chapters summarize the basic topics: what intelligence is, its history, the intelligence community’s organization, the intelligence cycle, the principal functions, oversight, writing, current threats, and some comments on the future. There is also a chapter that looks specifically at law-enforcement intelligence and another that considers what the authors term a “barrier to analysis,” for example, security issues and policymaker interactions.

Now, most of these topics are covered by Mark Lowenthal in his book *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*. But the similarity stops there. *Introduction to Intelligence Studies* assumes its readers will have less knowledge of the topic than readers of Lowenthal’s book. Each chapter, therefore, includes discussion topics, a list of key terms, and references for further reading. They do not include source notes, however, so students have every right to ask how the authors know what they assert.

In their preface, the authors encourage readers—and hopefully reviewers—to comment on flaws, an opportunity that should not be overlooked. Three are worth mentioning here. First, the intelligence provided by civil war spies Belle Boyd and Rose Greenhow was not crucial to any Confederate victories; it was marginal at best. Second, Pinkerton did not “go on to guard Lincoln throughout the Civil War”; (19) his service ended in 1862 (see Edwin Fishel’s *The Secret War for the Union* for details). Third, Operation Ajax was a joint US-UK endeavor, as Kermit Roosevelt—the CIA man on the scene—pointed out in his memoir.

---

6 Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy* (CQ Press, 2009)
Overall, however, the *Introduction to Intelligence Studies* is a very good primer indeed.


In 1977, Tyrus G. Fain compiled and edited *The Intelligence Community*, a book of 1,036 pages. It contained a collection of contemporary documents having to do with foreign intelligence and associated organizations, with an introduction by Senator Frank Church. While it was a useful resource at the time, it was soon out of date.

It was not until 1985, with the publication of the first edition of Jeffery Richelson’s *The US Intelligence Community*—with 358 pages—that more up-to-date material was available. The current edition reflects many recent changes in the community and is the best single book on the subject. The content of each edition includes descriptions and organization charts of the member agencies introduced by essays describing their historical background and functions they now perform. Unlike the Fain book, however, there are no transcripts of congressional testimony or reports. In fact, the subject of oversight is not included. There are three chapters on managing the community.

As might be expected, some changes are not included, even in this edition. For example, the definition of counterintelligence given in Executive Order 12333 (1981) does not reflect the three amended versions, but the current version is available on the web. One other area not included is the US Cyber Command, though the topics of cyber threat and warfare are mentioned. Since this edition is not available in the Kindle format, perhaps these updates will appear there before the 7th edition is published.

But for anyone wishing to get a sound overall grasp of the Intelligence Community today, this is by far the best place to start. It is thoroughly documented, well written, and generally comprehensive.

**Historical**


After 9/11, the first American boots on the ground in Afghanistan arrived on 19 September 2001. They were worn by members of a CIA team. Their story was told by Gary Schroen in his book *First In*. A month later, two Special Forces teams arrived to coordinate the military support for the Northern Alliance forces about to attack the Taliban. *Boots on the Ground* tells their story.

While the author, retired Marine Colonel Dick Camp, mentions the CIA and its bureaucratic battles with the Department of Defense to get the mission going, his book is more an account of the subsequent cooperative efforts of CIA and the military. First, he begins with an account of the events that led to 9/11. He covers the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the actions that led to their withdrawal, the eventual takeover by the Taliban, and the occupation of Afghanistan by al-Qaeda. With those as background, he deals with the post 9/11 operations of the CIA and Special Forces elements that resulted in the expulsion of the Taliban and the attempts to find Bin Laden.

Camp follows with detailed descriptions of extensive joint military operations in Afghanistan, including the battle for Tora Bora, where CIA officer Gary Berntsen thought Bin Laden was hiding. *Boots on the Ground* concludes with a description of Operation Anaconda. He describes the actions of the Special Forces, SEAL teams, Army Rangers, the 10th Mountain Division, and various Pashtun elements in the final effort to crush al-Qaeda and the Taliban before American forces began to be reassigned to prepare for the war in Iraq. When the

---


redeployment became evident, Camp explains, “The Taliban regrouped in Pakistan and prepared to start round two in the fight for Afghanistan.” (292)

Camp tells an important story well and adds essential perspective to the current situation in Afghanistan.


Before becoming a member of Parliament in 1976, Jeremy John Durham Ashdown, now Lord Paddy Ashdown, served in the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and was a swimmer canoeist in the Special Boat Service (SBS) of the Royal Marines. In 1965, while returning by train from a canoe race, he occupied a compartment with one other passenger, who guessed by Ashdown’s uniform that he was in the SBS and inquired about his duties. Ashdown was tired and gave a “gratuitously rude” (xxiv) reply to the effect that his duties were confidential and he could not discuss them, ending the exchange.

On disembarking, Ashdown learned, to his everlasting embarrassment, from colleagues who saw the two sitting together that the inquisitive passenger was Blondie Hasler, the much decorated former SBS canoeist who had led a team of commandoes paddling two-man canoes—Cockle models—on Operation Frankton, the subject of this book. After their mission, that team was commonly referred to as the Cockleshell Heroes. Hasler was one of two survivors.

The story of the raid has been told before, both in a book and a movie titled *The Cockleshell Heroes*. Based in part on Hasler’s recollections, the two works were made without access to official British or French accounts. After his retirement from political life, Lord Ashdown decided to write the full story. *A Brilliant Little Operation* is the result of his extensive research among the descendants of the participants and new documents released by national archives in England and France.

Operation Frankton’s objective was the destruction of two enemy blockade runners that were supplying Germany with much-needed materiel from its Japanese ally through the French inland port of Bordeaux. The target was some 60 miles up the treacherous and well-guarded Gironde River from the French west coast and more than 100 miles from the point at which their canoes were launched from a submarine on 7 December 1942. The mission’s aim was to place magnetic limpet mines on the sides of the ships. The plan included an overland escape to Spain with help from the French resistance.

Ashdown deals at length with the bureaucratic battles waged by Admiral Mountbatten, the overall commander, to gain approval for the mission—many of his peers thought the mission too risky. He also discusses crew selection, training, planning, and execution.

In the end Ashdown candidly addresses the factors that caused the Frankton mission to fail and the compromise of an effort by Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) to accomplish the same objective. The main reason for Frankton’s failure was that, although two ships were successfully mined, the team did not know they were empty and, with the tide out during the attack, they were later easily refloated, repaired, and returned to duty. Ironically, the SOE team, codenamed Scientist, was already on the docks, protected by the French resistance and waiting for the arrival of loaded ships. The SOE had independently planned its operation, and neither team was aware of the other’s presence. The Frankton attack forced Scientist to withdraw.

Nevertheless Mountbatten chose to call Operation Frankton a “brilliant little operation.” (xxv) It did provide experience and lessons that were applied later in the war, among them the importance of coordination.

Ashdown tells an exciting story, and very well indeed. Together with its extensive documentation, this book is an impressive contribution to WW II history. Bondie Hasler would have been well satisfied.

---


In early 1942, Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE), created to support resistance and sabotage in occupied Axis countries, launched Operation Postmaster. An SOE team aboard a converted trawler named Maid Honor was to capture two Italian ships—one a freighter, the other a small support ship—that had taken refuge in the port of Santa Isabel—now Malabo—on an island off the coast of what is now Equatorial Guinea. Serving as the command post, the Maid Honor was to sail into the harbor accompanied by two tug boats. An SOE agent ashore had arranged an on-shore party for the crews of the targeted ships, thus leaving them unmanned. Teams from the Maid Honor would then board the ships, free them from their moorings and have the tugs tow them into international waters, where Royal Navy warships would seize them. The captured ships had no operational value—their capture was merely intended to embarrass the Axis powers—and in this they succeeded, though no official complaints resulted.

Ian Fleming and SOE’s Operation Postmaster describes the origin of the operation, the personnel involved, the planning phase, the numerous obstacles encountered, and how they were overcome.

In a secondary but important theme, author Brian Lett attempts to link events in the operation to Fleming’s fictional spy hero James Bond. For example, throughout the narrative Lett inserts comments like “James Bond would have agreed with every word,” (13) or when a character visits a casino, Lett notes “it may be pure coincidence that Ian Fleming set much of the plot of his first book in a casino.” (147) Double agent Dusko Popov also made this claim, with greater though never proved validity. Other examples occur when Lett identified the SOE officer controlling the operation—Colin Gubbins—as “M,” the head of a “secret service.” Fleming, Lett contends, borrowed the “codename” for “M” in the Bond books. (18) But there is no evidence for any of this. In the Gubbins case, he didn’t head a secret service; he was deputy for operations during Postmaster. The more likely candidate for the “M” title was Stuart Menzies, the head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, of which Bond was fictionally a part.

Lett goes on to make the sweeping claim that for Fleming, Operation Postmaster “was clearly inspirational. He stored it away in his mind and eventually used these men to create James Bond, the perfect Secret Agent.” (190) Returning to the subject toward the end of the book, he concludes that “the true inspiration for the James Bond character, however, can only have come from the real ‘M’s’ secret service, and from the Maid Honor force and their exploits.” All just speculation.

The successful Operation Postmaster is a small but significant part of SOE history, and Lett tells that story well. The frequent allusions to James Bond are only distractions.


In his book, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, Thomas Powers concentrated on Richard Helms as the professionals’ intelligence officer—the secrets keeper. Helms’s wife, Cynthia, was mentioned briefly only three times and listed in the index under “Helms, Mrs. Richard.” Readers learned more from her 1981 book, An Ambassador’s Wife in Iran. (10) And now, in An Intriguing Life, she tells how she became a DCI’s wife and the adventures they shared. It is an extraordinary story.

Cynthia Ratcliffe was born in Britain, the youngest of six children in a family that was “land rich and cash poor.” (18) During WW II, her brother Len was a pilot who flew more than 70 missions for the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The war interrupted her education, and, “to do her part,” she joined the Wrens (Women’s Royal Naval Service—WRNS) and learned to pilot boats that carried crews from ship to shore. Her most important passenger was Queen Elizabeth (later the Queen Mother). It was during the war that she married her first husband, a Royal Navy doctor. After the war they moved to the United States, where he continued his studies. Twenty four years and four children later, she divorced her husband to marry Richard Helms.

10 Cynthia Helms, An Ambassador’s Wife in Iran (Dodd, Mead, 1981).
Most of An Intriguing Life is devoted to her life with Helms. At the time of their marriage, finances were tight and Cynthia satisfied a long-time ambition and went to work for the first time—Helms was CIA’s deputy director for plans, but he lacked independent wealth and they had to rent a house. She writes easily about her relationship with Dick and their social life. Though she says she doesn’t like to be thought of as part of the “Georgetown set”—they didn’t live in Georgetown—they certainly were in terms of their party going and friends. She tells anecdotes about many, including Sandra Day O’Connor, the Alsop brothers, Katharine Graham, Frank and Polly Wisner, Robert McNamara, and Pamela Harriman, to name a few. Her comments about Dick are sometimes surprising: “He had 11 toes and his shoe size was eight; he was utterly useless around the house…and an absolutely terrible automobile driver. We would sometimes read spy stories to one another…he found le Carré too dark and cynical.” (96–97) When he finally decided to write his memoir, he “worked on the book everyday,” dictating at first then writing in longhand. (183) It was published just after he died in October 2002. Helms had read the final draft.

On the professional side, she covers Helms’s conflicts as director of central intelligence with the Nixon White House, and how he became ambassador to Iran—Nixon had suggested the Soviet Union. It was while in Iran that he was investigated for the Senate testimony that led to his “badge of honor” conviction, a story she tells at length, pointing out the untenable position into which Senator Stuart Symington, who they considered a friend, had placed Helms.

The Helms’s post-Iran years were spent in Washington at their Garfield Avenue home, where they entertained interesting people ranging from the Reagans to a KGB defector (unidentified) who, in answer to Dick’s question, acknowledged that Alger Hiss was a Soviet agent. (172)

An Intriguing Life concludes with some comments on Cynthia’s active, current life in Washington. She attends the annual briefing at CIA headquarters for “former directors and their spouses,” where she visits the Director’s Gallery to view the portrait of “Dick Helms, my one true love.” (186) Cynthia Helms has given us and her grandchildren a fascinating look into the life of a very private man and the wife he adored.


Shortly after British author Duff Hart-Davis and his wife moved to Ireland in 1978, they began hearing stories about a Captain Alan Hillgarth, who had lived nearby but died before they could meet him. Hillgarth, the talk went, had been a confidant of Churchill, a spy, an explorer for gold, and a Royal Navy officer. Intrigued, Huff-Davis made contact with Hillgarth’s children and gained access to his papers. The biography, Man of War, is the result.

Huff-Davis learned that “Hillgarth” was an assumed name. His subject was born George Hugh Jocelyn Evans in London on 7 June 1899. While Evans was attending the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, WW I erupted, and he was activated. He saw action at Gallipoli and was later wounded during a patrol off Turkey. Evans left the navy in 1922, and without explanation—he changed his name to Alan Hugh Hillgarth. After trying his luck at writing novels, he fell for a scam and went searching for gold in Bolivia. By 1932, married and with children, he was living in Majorca, writing novels and serving as acting UK vice consul at Palma. In 1938, Winston Churchill visited, and Hillgarth made a positive impression. During the Spanish Civil War, Hillgarth helped British subjects and others threatened by Franco’s German and Italian allies to escape Spain. Later he met Captain John Godfrey, who would become “C,” the head of MI6.

By the outbreak of World War II, Hillgarth was recalled to active duty as a captain and appointed naval attaché in Madrid. Although opposed in general to attachés, becoming involved in clandestine operations, the MI6 station was weak at the beginning of the war, and Hillgarth developed a network of contacts among the Spaniards that proved valuable in monitoring German spies. He also corresponded directly with Godfrey and Churchill, sending them summaries of what both the Spaniards and Germans were doing. Kim Philby, then head of the Iberian counterintelligence section in MI6, was irritated when Hillgarth bypassed him. He would comment in his memoirs that Hillgarth had “illusions of grandeur.” (219)
Hillgarth also played a prominent role in Operation Mincemeat, “the man who never was,” convincing Spanish authorities not to ask too many questions about the corpse. Later, he was the officer who rescued Lt. Col. Dudley Clarke, the Army officer in charge of Middle East deception operations, from a Spanish jail. The Spanish police had arrested Clarke, dressed as a woman—heels, bra, silk stockings and all in a circumstance never adequately explained. (220) In December 1943, with the MI6 station up and running, Hillgarth was posted to India, where he served as chief of intelligence on Lord Mountbatten’s staff.

After the war, Hillgarth retired to Ireland to continue his writing and travels. But he also kept in touch with Churchill and visited him at his Chartwell home. In one letter, he noted, to the annoyance of MI5, that the Soviet staff in London outnumbered the British staff in London and that the MI5 was not staffed to perform the necessary surveillance.

Duff Hart-Davis’s fine biography has recorded for history the unusual career of an inadvertent but effective intelligence officer. A life adventure worth reading.


“Why another book about Pearl Harbor?” asks author John Koster in his introduction to Operation SNOW. His answer, “because none of the other books got it right.” (xvii) Koster goes on to assert that it was the Soviet agent Harry Deter White, guided by NKVD officer Vitalii Pavlov, who influenced President Roosevelt’s decision not to cooperate with sincere Japanese efforts to avoid war, thus making the attack on Pearl Harbor inevitable. From the Soviet point of view, the operation accomplished its objective: the elimination of the two-front war threat.

Operation SNOW quotes conversations between Pavlov, White, and many of other agents and key figures to explain how the plan was conceived and implemented. Just how he gained this intimate insight, Koster does not explain. The only evidence he cites of Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor is the questionnaire produced by British double agent, Dusko Popov (TRICYCLE) “that clearly indicated that Pearl Harbor was the key target” of the Japanese. (121)

At first glance, Koster makes a plausible case. But on closer examination his arguments leave room for considerable doubt. For example, his interpretation of the Popov questionnaire is wrong. 11 Moreover, Koster relies heavily on Pavlov’s book, Operation SNOW, which has never been validated. Furthermore, though some of the anecdotes and myriad conversations he includes are mentioned in his note on sources, (219ff) his interpretation of their significance is little more than speculation. In sum, before Operation SNOW can be accepted as serious history it requires serious documentation. Case not made.


The ULTRA Secret was the first of many books to describe the breaking of German codes during WW II. 12 Each of them mentions that the messages decrypted came from a system of world-wide radio intercept stations. They do not, however, explain much about how the stations were established, the functions each performed, what the personnel were like, or the bureaucratic and organizational problems they overcame. The Secret Listeners fills the gap.

British author Sinclair McKay tells the WW II intercept side of story of what came to be called the Y Service—the term comes from pronouncing the abbreviation WI for wireless-intercept. Intercepting German radio traffic originated during WW I as a

12 Frederick Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret (Dell, 1975).
source for the British Room 40 and the Government Code and Cypher School responsible for breaking German codes. At the start of WW II, MI5 created the Radio Security Service (RSS), which was intended to detect German agents operating from England. When it turned out there weren’t any such agents, the intercept operators began tracking any German encrypted messages they could hear and sent them to Bletchley Park in case that might be of interest. When their efforts were dismissed as unnecessary, since that was not the RSS mission, Hugh Trevor-Roper and a colleague decided to try decrypting them themselves. They were successful and discovered that the traffic was from the Abwehr, the German military security service. When this was pointed out to Bletchley, Trevor-Roper was rebuked again for butting in, but his point had been made. The RSS was quickly subsumed under MI6, joining the Y Service, which took over the mission.

The Secret Listeners doesn’t dwell on the operational side of the Y Service activities. Instead, McKay describes the personnel involved and their selection criteria, their often unrelentingly tedious working conditions, and some of the clever techniques they employed. In the latter category he tells about the “Ghost Voices.” When operators became proficient in monitoring instructions to German pilots, they began interrupting instructions from German aviation control and giving pilots spurious orders to misdirect them and, in some cases, causing them to run out of fuel en route to a bogus target.

Although some of the names McKay mentions will be familiar to readers of WW II codebreaking history, most will not, and he uses their letters and reminiscences to give them long overdue recognition. The Secret Listeners is a story too long untold, and it is a valuable contribution to the intelligence literature.


The reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the daughter of Henry VIII and the last of the Tudor monarchs, began in 1558 and ended with her death of natural causes in 1603. Hers was a time of renaissance in the arts—Shakespeare, Marlow, Milton. It was also a time of constant religious conspiracies aimed at ending the Church of England, restoring Catholicism, and of constant threats of military invasion. Throughout her reign, Elizabeth was the target of conspiracies to seize her crown, and she assembled a group of men—the “watchers”—to protect her and the state: William Cecil (later Lord Burghley), his son Robert Cecil, Robert Devereux (Earl of Essex), and the most well known today, Sir Francis Walsingham. And then there was Thomas Phelippes, Walsingham’s principal agent and cryptographer.

Together, these watchers used spies, codes and secret writing, deception, double agents, and torture to uncover conspiracies and to bring supposed plotters to Elizabethan justice. The most famous conspiracy, a plan to assassinate the Queen—disrupted by Walsingham and his agents—was the Babington plot in which Mary Queen of Scots and her cohorts lost their heads for their troubles. The best known military attempt against Elizabeth and England was by the Spanish Armada. This too failed, in part, thanks to Walsingham.

This is a story that has been told many times before, in 11 books since 2001. As the latest, it does a good job, although it is different from the others in three respects. Author Stephen Alford covers a somewhat wider period of time than the others—he also includes some details on Henry VIII’s reign—and he adds some characters not mentioned and data on those only slightly mentioned elsewhere. The third, and somewhat annoying new feature, is his occasional digression into counterfactual history, for example speculation on what might have followed had Mary Queen of Scots been successful.

The Watchers appears to be well documented, but the system of endnotes is awkward and difficult to use. If one is trying to get as complete a story as possible of Elizabethan intelligence activities, the book shouldn’t be overlooked. But it has not displaced Conyers Read’s three volume history of Walsingham as the place to start.

13 Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth (London: Clock and Rose Press, 2003).
Memoir

The Formative Years of an African-American Spy: A Memoir, by Odell Bennett Lee. (Author published, 2012)
241pp., appendix, no index.

The story of Odell Lee reads like the fiction of Horatio Alger. Born out of wedlock and raised in a dysfunctional family, Lee dropped out of high school in California at 16 and joined the US Navy. In the early 1960s, he left the Navy and lived with his birth father for a time. He held a number of odd jobs, including one at a state psychiatric hospital and another with the post office, before going back to high school to get his diploma.

This time, education agreed with Lee, and he steadily worked his way up and through graduate school at Johns Hopkins University, after which he went to work in Singapore. After several years there, he joined an international petroleum company, where he was working when CIA contacted him and offered him a job that would take advantage of the French and Spanish Lee had learned along the way. He accepted and the family moved to Washington, where the usual processing was completed. Lee’s wife Nora found a position with CBS in Washington, on Dan Rather’s staff.

Lee devotes only a single chapter to his CIA career in the Clandestine Service. As with the rest of the book he doesn’t supply any dates, a somewhat annoying feature that might well have been avoided. But he does discuss his duties in general terms, including some experiences on the job with a double agent, another servicing dead drops, and the difficulties of living under cover. He ends with a short and informative essay on race and spying, concluding that relations have gradually improved.

Throughout The Formative Years of an African-American Spy, Lee reflects on the many friends who helped him at important stages in his life. The result is a complete picture of a man who worked hard and made it on his own. His story should serve as a role model for those with similar drive and ambition to find a rewarding career.

Intelligence Abroad

Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain, by Christopher Moran. (Cambridge University Press, 2013)
464 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

In 1911, the British Official Secrets Act (OSA) was amended. Section 2 made unauthorized communication or receipt of official information by civil servants, politicians, authors, and journalists a felony. Moreover, the burden of proof rested with the defense. Recognizing that difficulties controlling official information would be greatest with authors and journalists, the government in 1912 established the Admiralty’s War Office and Press Committee—called the D Notice Committee. Its function was to supplement the OSA and implement an unofficial gentleman’s agreement with the press that would operate on the honor system. When classified or other official information came to, or might have come to, the attention of the press—newspapers, book publishers, and the like—which the government did not want made public, the D-Notice Committee could be consulted for a recommendation on whether or not the item should be published. Alternatively, when the committee wished to keep information secret, it could issue a “D-Notice” suggesting restraint. But the final decision rested with the press. This informal system was put to its first test during WW I, and precedents were set that would apply after WW II. University of Warwick post-doctoral fellow Christopher Moran’s Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain is a study of how the system worked until the early 21st century, when Section 2 of the OSA was repealed and a Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 2005.

The early, post WW I, tests of the 1911 OSA in effect created a double standard. Moran tells how Prime Minister Lloyd George ignored the rules and decided for himself what official documents could be used for his memoir. Winston Churchill did the same for his six vol-
ume study, *The World Crisis, 1911–1918*. Likewise, Field Marshall Sir John French and Admiral John Jellicoe produced memoirs based in part on official documents, the latter mentioning the Government Code and Cypher School. None had official approval; all escaped legal action.

Author Compton Mackenzie, on the other hand, was prosecuted for his book *Greek Memories*, which mentioned the still not officially acknowledged Secret Intelligence Service, identified its chief by name, and noted he was called “C.” The government persuaded him to plead guilty—thus preventing further revelations in court—and copies of the book were recalled—although not all were confiscated. Mackenzie escaped jail time but was fined £100.

Moran describes the bureaucratic skirmishes created by these and other episodes through the end of the Cold War before going on to even more complex attempts to control secrecy and the press. He uses the experiences of Chapman Pincher, “Fleet Street’s greatest scoop-merchant,” (99) and other authors to explore the intricacies of the D-Notice system. One case, although based on open sources, involved the failed attempt to suppress mention of NSA and then little known GCHQ. The journalists involved were deported, but the political fallout was severe. Another concerned former CIA officer Philip Agee, who was deported after publishing his memoir *Inside The Company* in Britain. (190)

The chapters concerning the battles to publish intelligence histories and memoirs perhaps will be the most interesting to intelligence professionals. They include descriptions of the clashes preceding exposure of the “double-cross secret” and Operation Mincemeat—“the man who never was.” Later, encounters followed over official histories, for example, M.R.D. Foot’s *SOE in France*, the six-volume history of British intelligence in WW II and Peter Wright’s unofficial exposé, *Spycatcher*.

*Classified* concludes with a discussion of what Moran terms “a retreat from secrecy” (329) on a surprising scale in Britain today despite the threat of WikiLeaks and the implications of cyber communications. It is a superbly documented study and a fine contribution to the literature.

---


The Mossad is Israel’s foreign intelligence service. A Mossad team captured Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires. Another recruited an Iraqi pilot and convinced him to fly a MiG-21 to Israel. And its officers assassinated Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah terrorist who planned the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1982. It is also credited with attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists and cyber operations intended to slow Iran’s nuclear program. Authors Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal discuss these and many other incidents in their new book *MOSSAD*.

The authors don’t just write about successful operations. There is a chapter on the botched attempt in Amman, Jordan, to assassinate Hezbollah leader Khaled Mash’al by injecting a poison into his ear. The King of Jordan was so incensed that he threatened to break diplomatic relations with Israel and to keep the captured assassins unless Prime Minister Netanyahu sent an antidote: he did.

Other cases included in this anthology of espionage have elements of both success and failure. The best known success concerns Mordechai Vanunu, who stole atomic secrets and was later captured in a text-book honey trap. More recently, a failure, after the assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud Adbel Rauf Al-Mabhouh in Dubai, the assassination team was exposed because it had not avoided closed circuit television and, the authors suggest, their fake passports didn’t stand up to scrutiny.

One case at least remains in the uncertain category. A Mossad double agent codenamed ANGEL, in reality Nasser’s son-in-law, died a mysterious death in London. The Egyptians claimed him as their double agent and gave him an official funeral, leaving both sides to wonder if he was really a triple agent and if so, for whom. Some cases border on the bizarre. The supposed Israeli recruitment of the larger-than-life Nazi SS officer, Otto Skorzeny, is the prime example.

As with all unofficial case books of this nature, readers are left wondering how much is true. The authors do provide source notes, but they are all secondary journalistic accounts. On the other hand, some cases, as with
Eichmann and Vanunu, have been officially acknowledged. The Jonathan Pollard case probably falls into the latter category, but the authors dismiss it, only conceding that the Mossad was embarrassed and claiming that all the documents Pollard took were returned.

Bar-Zohar and Mishal have provided an interesting survey of Mossad espionage operations. It is good reading.


The 10-year war in Afghanistan has been the longest in the histories of both New Zealand and the United States. For New Zealand investigative journalist Nicky Hager, it should never have been fought. The US government “could have taken responsibility and apologized to its citizens for not stopping the hijackings. They could have left the punishment to law enforcement and diplomacy.” (23) When this didn’t happen and despite the CIA led “massacre” to topple the Taliban, (30) New Zealand agreed to participate in the war on terror. At the time, Hager followed events in the press and gradually concluded that his government was intentionally not reporting the full story of Kiwi involvement to its public: “Both the military and intelligence agencies are far more deeply entangled in the controversial aspects of the war on terror than New Zealanders were told.” (9) After 10 years of investigating, he presents his version of the truth in *Other People’s Wars.*

Hager claims his book is based mainly on leaks of thousands of pages of “classified military and intelligence documents.” Some were “obtained via Facebook,” (307) and some, as explained in his endnotes, came from “confidential source[s].” Invoking the journalist’s right to decide what should remain declassified, he “ensures that it contains nothing that might genuinely prejudice the defense and security of New Zealand.” (9)

In describing New Zealand’s contribution to the war, Hager emphasizes NZ Special Air Service (SAS) units and the NZ Security Intelligence Service, but he also addresses New Zealand’s SIGINT elements and military components. He highlights their interactions with US and British counterparts and complains about the controls placed on the media, especially the limits on mentioning the operations of coalition partners. He argues that while NZ forces were nominally under the command of NZ officers, the reality was that Americans were in charge.

Particularly irritating to Hager is the fact that Americans in civilian clothes were stationed in New Zealand outposts and would not discuss their activities: “All evidence points to them being CIA officers.” Even more vexing was the fact that NZ soldiers provided base security and other support services. (250–51) “In the end, it is a choice between being independent and being a loyal ally.” (341) The difficulty of independence in a coalition eludes him. Hager goes on to question the existence of a terrorist threat, the use of drones, “targeted killings,” “CIA-military capture/kill operations,” (237) and the war itself.

Despite the author’s less than objective opinions, *Other People’s Wars* depicts the not insignificant contribution of New Zealand’s intelligence units in joint operations. More generally, it provides an in-depth view of New Zealand’s role in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent Iraq, subjects not dealt with elsewhere. Still, read with caution.


The KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti [the Committee for State Security]) was the main security agency for the Soviet Union when it collapsed in 1991. It had evolved from the first Soviet security and intelligence agency, the VCheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle with Counter-Revolution and Sabotage) created by Felix Dzerzhinsky on 20 December 1917. Its officers were called Chekists, a term that has endured despite multiple changes in the official name of the organization. So, too, argues Dr. Julie Fedor in *Russia and the Cult of State Security* has the legacy of Dzerzhinsky endured. While the operational histories of Soviet and Russian security and intelligence services have been the subject of many books, Fedor, a
research associate at Cambridge University, takes a different approach. She examines the “Chekist officer” and moral behavior in light of Dzerzhinsky’s legacy and the “mythology woven around” the Russian intelligence service that “continues to shape its popular historical consciousness.” (2)

In the first of this two-part work, Fedor documents the Dzerzhinsky cult from its revolutionary origins to the present day. She asserts that Dzerzhinsky was seen as a humanist, whose moral purity and love of nature and little children explain his sensitivity to human needs and formed the basis for “cardinal Chekist virtues.” These were institutionalized in aphorisms learned by every Chekist: “A Chekist must have a cool head, a warm heart and clean hands…. A Chekist must be more pure and honest than anyone else…. He is not a Chekist whose heart does not engorge with blood and contract with pity at the sight of a man imprisoned in a prison cell.” By applying these and many others like them, says Fedor, the Soviets justified “Chekist violence… as an active moral good, a virtue to be celebrated in its own right.” (17) This moral code formed the basis of the Cheka security mission that somehow reconciled terror and humanism. (18)

Fedor goes on in the first part to show how the Dzerzhinsky cult changed over time. His public image was transformed beginning in the Khrushchev era in movies—a Soviet James Bond treatment, though without the sex, appeared—and various public relations techniques. For example, the cruel interrogations of the past came to be described as profilaktika, a Russian euphemism for “friendly” questioning that could still result in the destruction of one’s career.

Part two of the book deals with the post-Soviet era, which for the security services began with the removal of Dzerzhinsky’s statue from in front of the Lubyanka, the KGB’s titular headquarters. After a period of uncertainty and organizational instability, the intelligence services gradually adopted what Fedor calls “high chekism.” Here the “cult of Andropov”—a milder version of Dzerzhinsky morality that stressed order and discipline—provided a new catechism, but it did not prohibit many of the practices for which the KGB had been so well known.

With the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of Russia, further changes were introduced, changes that Fedor sees as amounting to a “new Chekist mythology,” which draws heavily on the traditions of the cult of Dzerzhinsky.

Russia and the Cult of State Security is a unique and absorbing look into the history of Russia’s intelligence profession, with some disturbing conclusions about its future. A very valuable contribution.