

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

**Newport, RI**

**OPERATIONALIZING CAPACITY BUILDING**

**IN THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS**

**A NEW OPERATIONAL FUNCTION**

*Capacity Building-Lost in Translation?*

**By**

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
**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College for the 2009 Essay Competition**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**X**

Theodore L. Grabarz  
Commander

**12 May 2009**

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# Report Documentation Page

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## INTRODUCTION

*Capacity building* is the way in which productivity, a function of knowledge and skill, leads to increased national output and potentially the enhanced quality of life of a society. This enhanced quality of life thus cognitively influences behavior, historically known as “winning the hearts and minds.” That enhanced quality of life, manifested economically as increased national output or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also known in this context as the end-state objective. The means by which productivity leads to this end-state objective is through the consecutive process of assessment, planning and implementation. *Capacity building* is one of the most widely used terms in Iraq and Afghanistan today, the ultimate inter-agency term. It potentially offers significant positive impact as a way to exercise soft power, non-kinetic effects that have lasting quality of life impact. Yet in trying to define *capacity building*, you will find as many definitions as you will people that use the term. It’s meaning and therefore its value, has become lost in translation.

A strategic framework for influencing behavior is Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP), (the seminal planning document in all Combatant Commands) that are intended to influence the behavior of countries in which the U.S. has a strategic interest. In finding ways to influence that behavior, a key area within the *operational factor of space* is the “human-factor”<sup>1</sup> component. The human factor component represents all the individual behavioral and group sociological aspects that in a larger context are manifested by the political, economic, and societal dimensions that are mostly left outside the operational military realm. Individually, these human factors are partly represented

by the values and attitudes<sup>2</sup> of the people of a culture<sup>3</sup> that forms the basis of a collective societal ethos. This ethos is what the National Security Strategy (NSS) envisions helping impact; a world of well governed states that meet the needs of their citizens while conducting themselves responsibly in the international system.<sup>4</sup>

Understanding the basis of that societal ethos, including values and attitudes is one aspect of the human factor component that has received a lot of recent study, which is the Human Terrain System (HTS).<sup>5</sup> HTS was created to meet the military's need for socio-cultural knowledge of the local civilian population similar to that which exists in the Intelligence Function<sup>6</sup> for Friendly and Enemy Forces. HTS analyzes social structures in an anthropological and sociological sense to assist in the understanding of societies, which can be invaluable when conducting stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.

*Capacity building* can be considered the synthesis of that analysis of social-cultural knowledge of the local civilian population, in the assessment, planning and implementation of whatever program is to be delivered. It can be one of the most important paradigms in military operations today,<sup>7</sup> geared toward enhancing the quality of life of a people, thus influencing their behavior, ideally consistent with the goals of the NSS. Therefore, it can deal with not only shaping future battlespace but in sustaining or enhancing a peaceful environment as well. Through the use of adroit, disciplined and measured efforts that serve to enhance trust,<sup>8</sup> *capacity building* can obviate the need for increasing kinetic operations. However, the term *capacity building* used throughout the SSTR<sup>9</sup> realm has little substance. The reasons for lack of substance involve several

areas, from a lack of DOD orthodoxy to the challenge of synchronization with other U.S. Government (USG) organizations.

The two primary departments in the realm of *capacity building*, DOS and DOD approach the planning for *capacity building* from two completely different perspectives. DOD's perspective is based primarily on the planning of physical, tangible end-states such as building a school to enhance educational access.<sup>10</sup> DOS views *capacity building* more as an on-going dialog with the host nation participants, in a word, maintaining relationships<sup>11</sup> with no definitive end-state, and at least in Iraq, lacks the ability to conceptualize quantitative or qualitative interim planning steps. There are other effective means that are based on "shared interest"<sup>12</sup> rather than the imposition of will that can provide a more collaborative means to influence behavior that draws upon the strengths of both departments.

*Capacity building* should be a core operational function, as promulgated by DOD in the preparation of all TSCP's to enhance the success of all shaping operations. Due to its unique planning and forecasting capabilities, coupled with its large intact regional presence and mission accomplishment culture, DOD is the natural lead agent for *capacity building* activities. Within that lead role, DOD would utilize coordinating input from other organizations in the U.S. Government (USG). The other agencies would include DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other Inter Governmental Agencies (IGA) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)'s that should have core competencies in the subject matter expertise required, that DOD doesn't have.

Unfortunately that is not what is being done in Iraq. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) operates on the physical “reconstruction” premise of various infrastructure systems. Anecdotally, in at least one instance, the result of this physical infrastructure intensive effort has been that after the U.S. spends its money on building schools for instance, that the facility are not used for their intended purpose. An example of this misuse has been a school project being used to shelter livestock after it was completed.<sup>13</sup> The reason for this is that the Iraqis didn’t have the initial “buy-in”, i.e. making it the Iraqi’s plan, instead of ours. In that regard there were also numerous systemic instances of being overly concerned with delivering completed capital projects rather than the maintenance to sustain them, including water purification plants with no connection to the existing infrastructure of the area, or abrogating training of the Iraqi’s in the use of the systems or effective transfer of the systems into their hands.<sup>14</sup> Ultimately in the largest context *capacity* turns on the ability of a civil service to deliver public goods through sustainable governmental institutions and to maintain a monopoly on the use of physical force.<sup>15</sup> The U.S. is effective in the security arena, but much less so in *capacity building*. At the lowest level it is working *through* others, not just *with* others to effect positive change. We have been focused on programs, not people. Programs provide an easy to determine metric, dollars expended. The metric of human capacity seems more difficult to measure. Projects are being built that meet the needs of the USG to show a visual extrinsic effect, without building in the *capacity* within the local population to memorialize that capability for the future. As Simon Chesterman aptly put it, “[But] *doing* something is not the same as *teaching* someone.”<sup>16</sup> This forms the essence of the definitional difference between *Capacity* building and *Nation* building.

This paper will examine the current doctrinal basis of *capacity building* as well as define the term, review the positive attributes of its use as well as implementation challenges. Additionally, this paper will advocate the addition of *capacity building* as an operational function for unity of effort. Finally, there will be recommendations to institutionalize *capacity building* within an organizational framework.

## **BACKGROUND**

Doctrinally, the non-kinetic effects of *capacity building* fit clearly into our national security framework. The National Security Strategy (NSS) envisions helping to create a world of well governed states that meet the needs of their citizens while conducting themselves responsibly in the international system, thereby providing the most security for U.S. citizens.<sup>17</sup> The implementation document of the NSS, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) speaks to the overarching need to defeat violent extremism in our strategic environment.<sup>18</sup> Our National Military Strategy (NMS) reiterates the NSS, in that homeland security is the first priority, protecting the United States at home, but that the first line of defense of the U.S. is abroad and includes mutually supporting efforts with allies, to counter threats close to their source.<sup>19</sup>

Growing out of these strategic policy documents within joint doctrine, *capacity building* is mentioned in the Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) 2008-2010. *Capacity building* is described in the GEF as a core requirement for Global Core Partnerships to include in Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Global Core Partnership objectives include:<sup>20</sup>

1. Capacity Building.
2. Operational Capability.
3. Interoperability.
4. Information and Intelligence Sharing.
5. Defense Exports.
6. International Collaboration.

Through the GEF at Phase 0, Combatant Commands (COCOM) are mandated to engage in “steady state” activities (security cooperation and other shaping activities) with the intent to operationalize theater strategies proceeding from contingency-centric to strategy-centric, thus making *capacity building* a core requirement for DOD.

Within TSCP’s, the method by which DOD “encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives”<sup>21</sup> of Phase 0 Shaping Operations have six security cooperation categories that define the range of activities:<sup>22</sup>

1. Port Visits and Senior Level Interchanges.
2. Nation Assistance, including Foreign Internal Defense.
3. Security Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities.
4. Multinational Training.
5. Multinational Exercises and Multinational Education.
6. Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring.

The TSCP is a document that coordinates between numerous nation-states within an AOR relative to maintaining US influence for strategic interest and thus bridging the

cultural, ethnic, political, economic and religious differences trans-nationally, TSCP's clearly influence the *space-human factor* element aspect of *capacity building*.

Many agencies have jurisdiction over certain areas that can be termed *capacity building*. For instance DOS has been given the lead on SSTR<sup>23 24</sup> which includes coordination of all USG Departments and Agencies through the National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-44.<sup>25</sup> However DOD is the only organization that has the capability, span of control, resources and understanding of the planning process to effectively lead the Five Phases of Operational Plans from Shaping through the Enabling of Civil Authority.<sup>26</sup>

Phase 0 Shaping Operations are defined in JP 3-0 to include:<sup>27</sup>

[They are] executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. *They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies*, [emphasis added] "Shape" phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.

In terms of efficiency and effectiveness, looking at DOD planning efforts around the Operational Phases II-V<sup>28</sup> paradigm, it is also clear that the amount of military effort required is much less in shaping operations than in any of the other phases.

Further referencing the definition above is "[They are designed to] assure success by *shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior* of both adversaries and allies."<sup>29</sup> This can be most effectively addressed in *capacity building* in terms of changed behavior. This changed behavior is brought about by education, behavior that becomes so ingrained that it becomes part of the individual and subsequently part of society. The outcomes are

based upon societal input, <sup>30</sup> what that society actually wants, compared to what the US wants to provide.

In Iraq, the term *capacity building* usually went hand in hand with a follow-on statement that we have to make sure that the Iraqi's "do it [managed projects] themselves."<sup>31</sup> Yet in Iraq, there was little understanding of how to achieve the intended effect of developing self sufficiency within the population. There are many projects that deal with physical improvements. Very few programs though dealt with matching those physical improvements to sustainability and human resource impact, the design of budgeting systems or any of the other myriad tasks necessary to re-invigorate a nation again. Such an effort can be understood in a macroeconomic sense as the productivity function<sup>32</sup> where:

$$\text{GDP} = \text{Output} = \text{Productivity} \times \text{Input}$$

$$\text{Input} = \text{Labor} + \text{Capital} + \text{Raw Material Natural Resources}$$

$$\text{Productivity} = \text{Knowledge} + \text{Skill} = \text{Technology}$$

Growth in Productivity depends upon Improved Technology = *Capacity Building*

In reality we have simply funded and undertaken the programs ourselves with little literal or figurative buy-in from the Iraqis. More importantly because of that lack of buy-in we have missed the opportunity to develop the kind of institutional knowledge that leads to long lasting national progress.<sup>33</sup> This long lasting national progress is represented by an increase in productivity, by the increase in knowledge and skill that is crucial to economic growth, and thereby self sufficiency and stability.<sup>34</sup>

## ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

### **Capacity Building Proposed Definition:**

For the purposes of this paper, as a defined term, Capacity Building is determined to be:

Assisting other cultures, (often defined by nation-states) in human, organizational and institutional development to improve their quality of life as determined by various economic and intrinsic societal metrics, thus developing a commonality of interest rather than an imposition of will in an international relations context.

### **Capacity Building Proposed Algorithm:**

Algorithmically this can be expressed as above by:

Capacity Building = Knowledge + Skill = Increased Productivity = Improved Technology

To measure “quality of life” in a positive rather than a normative sense, (i.e. objectively rather than subjectively) attempts are often made to find variables that have some causal relationship with individual’s sense of well-being in various countries.<sup>35</sup> While Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often discounted as a sole explanatory variable of quality of life, it provides a surprisingly valid determinant.<sup>36</sup> Further, in addition to GDP, one can broadly define the most important economic goals or objectives of nations to be: low unemployment, external balance (or positive balance of trade), a reasonable level of growth or GDP, and finally an equitable distribution of income.<sup>37</sup>

In a national security context engaging in *capacity building* efforts also offers a positive avenue for countering violent extremism.<sup>38</sup> Extremism flourishes on the factors that most contribute to a nation-states ill health, including mismanagement of the state’s

assets, market dysfunction, insecurity, weak human capital, weak public financing, weak rule of law and human rights, and poor investment in human capital.<sup>39</sup> *Building capacity* is an essential part of the formula to defeat international terrorism<sup>40</sup> using the enduring template of *containment*, advocated by George Kennan during the Cold War against the Soviet Union,<sup>41</sup> and in this case used to win the hearts and minds in enhancing quality of life.

### **Capacity Building as an Operational Function:**

According to Vego, an operational function is an attribute that maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of one's combat forces and should be used both at peace and at war.<sup>42</sup> One value of making *capacity building* an operational function is that it would automatically place it in the taxonomy of the other six (C2, Intelligence, Maneuver, Fires, Protection and Logistics) in terms of synchronization, and thus provide an automatic inclusion in all coordination efforts with developed plans and synchronization matrices as well as coordination with other agencies. While *capacity building* would involve combat and non-combat force, the TSCP's recognize that influencing behavior goes beyond combat forces into the realm of the inter-agency environment.

One example of a methodology to tie the means to an end and the non-kinetic effects and their results at the operational level is a program developed by Dr Jim Derleth, a Sociologist from USAID. He has developed a Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework<sup>43</sup> that begins to formalize a process for aligning effects with results from that synchronization. Through a process of *conflict transformation* his program focuses on creating "results on the ground that empower societies through peaceful means to make their own political and economic choices."<sup>44</sup> The programs aim is to facilitate a unified

US national strategy rather than a collection of agency responses, and through work with international partners, provides a framework for international cooperation.<sup>45</sup> Derleth lists discrete activities developed from Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs<sup>46</sup> to influence populations to further support our efforts for their benefit. These are typically activities that focus either on either physical or qualitative improvements to positively effect the quality of life in the populations of Iraq and Afghanistan.

### **Critical Values of Capacity Building (Why is it Important?):**

Key values of implementing a capacity building program within DOD include the following:

1. Capacity building develops trust - Deconstructing *capacity building* to understand its essence of value can be understood within the context of trust, opening up the barriers to communication, particularly within the context of language, ethnicity, religion and culture.<sup>47</sup> It is those very barriers that can be broken down through the use of *capacity building* that seeks to enhance predictability, credibility and benevolence<sup>48</sup> in our national efforts.

In my own efforts in that regard while working as a consultant to DOS I engaged with an Iraqi Minister of Municipalities in Ninewah Province. The Minister had been meeting with others in DOD and DOS for over a year and hadn't gotten anything tangible from those meetings despite significant risk to his own life being seen associating with the U.S. forces. By creating an initial rapport we agreed to meet on a regular basis. Over the next several months our meetings established the required

*predictability* of trust. From a professional standpoint we each had similar educational (I was an architect and he was an engineer) and professional experiential backgrounds (he was the head of city municipal government in Mosul as I was in Bridgeport, CT) which led to surprisingly similar professional political understanding as we could both commiserate as to the idiosyncrasies of provincial and city council politicians, etc. This experiential consonance established that mutual *credibility*. Finally, by assisting and advising him in a professional consultation role on program and project management as well as giving him a political forum for his program, the *benevolence* was understood.

2. Capacity building fosters Educational versus Financial Development – Building intellectual (educational) capacity provides a far more enduring legacy than financial aid can. In a recent study by Easterly, he discusses the conclusion that financial aid to least developed countries yields a 100% inverse correlation to their economic growth.<sup>49</sup> The governments of the poor countries, through which the financial aid is directed, often have little incentive to raise the productive potential of the poor, especially when doing so might engender political activism that threatens the current political elite.<sup>50</sup> On the donor aid side it is much easier to focus on the dollars expended rather than the effectiveness of aid dollars spent.<sup>51</sup> Therefore directly impacting the poor through specific educational programs that focus on increasing knowledge and skill, offers the most hope over the long term in improving the quality of life for other societies that the US seeks to influence.

3. Capacity building is responsive to Host Nation Needs rather than US Perception of those Needs - Sitting in weekly Governance and Reconstruction Meetings at FOB Marez in Northern Iraq with the 3rd Air Cavalry Regiment (ACR); I was amazed by the assembled talent of all the military and non-military agency personnel. Much time, talent and effort in planning, organizing, funding and executing a large number of projects was expended. Unfortunately all these projects were U.S. centric. Very few of these projects or programs were Iraqi ideas, or would be sustainable beyond our U.S. participation.

The converse of this result was another area worked on, a Master Plan for Ninewah Province in Northern Iraq<sup>52</sup> which included assessing the economic, historical, sociological, ecological and physical land use characteristics of the Province. Prior to my work there, an entire study of all of the provinces was completed at the national ministry level, that resulted in a Ninewah Provincial Development Strategy<sup>53</sup> of specific areas of purpose, assumptions, strategic goals, vision and message. In a word, it was *their* (the Iraqi's) plan and so had a great deal of impact in satisfying *their* needs.

4. Capacity building provides demonstrable behavioral influence- There are also positive externalities that grow out of US actions by simply being within the Area of Operations (AO) interacting with the civilian population in While in Accra, Ghana in 2007, I visited a number of locations that the US was rebuilding including in one instance, schools in an Islamic area of Accra. The Security Assistance Officer (SAO) with the Embassy began to play soccer with a group of children from a local madrassa. You could see by the imperious body language of the imam standing in front of the madrassa and see the anger he was feeling at this soldier playing with these kids. It was sending the message of trust

to these kids, the next generation and obviously putting a disarming face to US actions that the imam was very upset with.

5. Capacity building amplifies the Space Factor – As part of the “human-space”<sup>54</sup> factor, where the preponderance of behavioral influencing occurs, *capacity building* provides robustness to this factor by accounting for the areas described, namely the political, trade, ethnicity, religion, governmental, population size and density. All of these aspects increasingly influence the planning, preparation and execution of a campaign and a theater security cooperation plan.<sup>55</sup>

6. Capacity building shapes regional outcomes- As a TSCP covers a theater wide AOR, it will automatically translate capacity building effort into a theater wide strategy thus meeting the JP 3.0 requirement to gain multinational cooperation.<sup>56</sup>

### **Implementation Challenges of Capacity Building:**

Despite these positive values, there a number implementation challenges for capacity buildings regular use in DOD:

1. Lack of DOD Orthodoxy – Military personnel prefer force type solutions as this is where their training primarily exists. However the amount of non-kinetic effects that taking more control of the *capacity building* effort provides, could yield a significant advantage to the COCOM Commander (CDR) particularly in the area of Phase 0 shaping operations.

2. Lack of Doctrine –To date there is no doctrine or process that specifically describes *capacity building* use. The definition and algorithm on page 10-12 provide a substantive start to this effort.
  
3. Lack of Planning Process – Specifically missing in the goal setting of *capacity building* is the rigorous planning process characteristic of military planning as in the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP ).<sup>57 58</sup> By thinking of *capacity building* as another operational function similar to maneuver, fires, intelligence or sustainment, it can be more thoroughly integrated into the Operational Phases 0-V.<sup>59</sup>

For instance, if we evaluated *capacity building* within the context of critical factors towards an overall attempt to understand the operational and strategic objectives with a host nation, even with a TSCP, it would be extremely valuable in gaining further fidelity of an overall plan. In this case it would not be to defeat an adversary by attacking their Center of Gravity (COG), *but rather by enhancing that COG, to benefit the U.S. in shaping operations and to develop that nation's social and economic capacity, their quality of life as well.*

As an example, since 9/11 we have spent \$11B<sup>60</sup> on security cooperation assistance and foreign aid in Pakistan, largely for Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) activities. However, while working in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in 2004 the Pakistani's had a somewhat different view of the efficacy of the GWOT, and preferred to

use the money for other areas of security concern that they found more important, in particular, against potential incursions by India.

A better course of action would have been to focus effort at *capacity building* within the country tied to the reduction of Islamic extremism. For instance as Appendix I shows, through an evaluation using JOPP, a more appropriate use of those funds might have been to reduce the 20,000 madrassas<sup>61</sup> dedicated to teaching hate of all things western. The potential strategic and operational objectives would be tied to reducing Islamic Extremism and in this case operationally, the birthplace where much of that inculcation occurs, namely the schools. Offering tied aid and professional consultation in curriculum, physical infrastructure, and instruction would have been far more effective, both in shaping potential future operations, as well as actually satisfying a vital interest, than in simply providing open military aid.

4. Lack of Organizational Framework – From an organizational framework the Provincial Reconstruction Team offers a good model for future efforts in *capacity building*. Arranged along the lines of sections involving: Reconstruction, Governance, Rule of Law, Health and Education and Economics this would provide a good template throughout the world for Shaping Operations. However what is needed is a Team Leader who had a good working relationship with the military. The scalability of this construct is key. The flat nature of this framework would allow for ease of communication and transferability of information in rapid rotations. As an example, JTF KATRINA<sup>62</sup> there was nightly meetings of small groups to exchange results of day's activities. This

essentially one on one format pushed accountability down, and left little room for letting key activities slide.

5. Lack of Time Phased Incremental Planning- Key to any of these activities is an understanding in space and time when these activities will occur. Even seemingly qualitative aspects can be broken down into meaningful subsets of logical activities with durations and milestone dates. It is natural in DOD to prepare these types of critical path documents but not so for other agencies. While in Iraq the Commanding Officer of the 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR wanted to know the Provincial Reconstruction Teams timelines for all of their programs synchronized with their various sections, to align with the 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR's efforts. The attitude of DOS was that DOD was trying to obtain privileged information.<sup>63</sup> This kind of inter-agency paranoia is rampant and can be eliminated by DOD having greater control over that area of planning.

6. Lack of Subject Matter Expertise (SME) – Subject Matter Experts are crucial and are most likely filled by civilians. SME's that know the subject matter as well or better than their host nation counterparts is vital. SME's need to work inside of an organizational template similar to the PRT's in Iraq. It is an organization that is small enough to be collegial in size thus rapidly responsive, without the stovepipe emphasis on hierarchy that usually pervades the military, which can thus stifle creativity.

7. Lack of Synchronization – From a synchronization perspective, DOD has the span of control necessary to enact the means to achieve such goals that are required. In efforts

historically involving the coordination of DOD and DOS, there is often a breakdown. Stationed in Pakistan, I met with GEN Barry McCaffrey US Army (USA) (ret) and a number of DOS representatives<sup>64</sup> discussing the growing of alternative crops in Afghanistan to include tomatoes instead of opium. DOS had proposed major agricultural shifts (and were in the process of funding) in areas where DOD was in the process of conducting major eradication efforts. This lack of synchronization was habitual between many of the agencies working there. By putting DOD in charge of *capacity building*, it will aid also in the synchronization of shaping operations within the A.O.

For instance, the State Department through its Mission Strategic Plan for each country develops specific goals for the advancement of relations with those countries each year. Utilizing these same types of activities for the Theater Security Cooperation Plan as promulgated from the COCOM as well as the Mission Strategic Plan<sup>65</sup> from DOS all to develop theater wide goals for *capacity building* at the theater level would effectively set the stage for synchronization that wouldn't otherwise occur. In terms of specific aspects or components of *capacity building*, many of the same efforts we have undertaken in the Strategic Mission Plans issued by the Department of State could fulfill the *capacity building* efforts being described but at a more useful regional level.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

*Capacity building* is the way in which productivity, a function of knowledge and skill, leads to increased national output and potentially the enhanced quality of life of a society. This enhanced quality of life thus cognitively influences behavior, historically known as “winning the hearts and minds.” That enhanced quality of life, manifested economically as increased national output or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also known in this context as the end-state objective. The means by which productivity leads to this end-state objective is through the consecutive process of assessment, planning and implementation. It potentially offers significant positive impact as a way to exercise soft power, non-kinetic effects that have lasting quality of life impact.

*Capacity building* should be recognized, adopted and developed as another aspect of operational functions. Within the context of a *Capacity Building Team* or CBT model, this team would assist in assessing, planning and implementing the programs deemed necessary for local populations that the US seeks to influence. This capacity building effort would be to influence human behavior in Phase 0 shaping operations to meet the needs of Theater Security Cooperation Plans in providing persistent, pre-emptive non-kinetic means to build common interest, and thus positively impact US strategic objectives within the various theater commands.

Further implementation strategies are as described below:

1. Theater Capacity Building Team Commissioning - Establish TCBT's, Theater Capacity Building Teams at each Combatant Command to interface with other Agencies and Departments and participate in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan development.

In addition this will be the OPCON and ADCON node that manages the efforts of CBT's in-country.

2. Capacity Building Teams- Establish *Capacity Building Teams* in each country within the US Embassy, that report to a military member as part of the Security Assistance Office.

3. Capacity Building Team composition- Each Team would consist at a minimum, of Sections including: Rule of Law, Governance, Economics, Reconstruction, and Health and Education (symmetrical with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams today). Each team would be headed by a DOD military member with each deputy team leader being a DOS member.

## APPENDIX I

**Strategic Objective** – Enhance Pakistan’s long term peaceful potential to join the international community in constructive efforts by eliminating the threat of Islamic extremism within its own borders.

**Operational Objective** - Counter Islamic extremism ideology at the generational source through the rehabilitation of the educational system and infrastructure in Pakistan.

**Operational COG** – Create a generation of willing participants in peaceful self-determination within the young people of Pakistan by reforming their educational system through the revision of curriculum, physical infrastructure, and instructor role models.

### **Critical Factors:**

**Critical Strengths** – Continue to develop a new generation of recruits to carry forward the extremist jihad message within all walks of life.

**Critical Weaknesses** – Inability to full inculcate all participants due to external influence.

**Critical Capabilities** – An isolated, decrepit physical location (FATA), coupled with a poorly educated parental base along with poor health care and economic standing that contribute to a willing constituency, devoid of hope.

**Critical Requirements** – Physical location, students, curriculum, and instruction.

**Critical Vulnerabilities** – Physical Location / Curriculum / Instructors.

## NOTES

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